LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS legal wife of Carlos Ui.
of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China,
BONIFACIO, respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for
allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship
with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant,
Leslie Ui.
The relevant facts are:
On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui
married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of
Lourdes Church in Quezon City[1] and as a
result of their marital union, they had four (4)
children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and
Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in
December 1987, however, complainant found
out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying
on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty.
Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter
sometime in 1986, and that they had been
living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street,
Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City.
Respondent who is a graduate of the College of
Law of the University of the Philippines was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982.
Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his
relationship with the respondent. Complainant
then visited respondent at her office in the later
part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the
respondent admitted to her that she has a child
with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that
everything was over between her and Carlos
Ui. Complainant believed the representations of
respondent and thought things would turn out
well from then on and that the illicit
relationship between her husband and
respondent would come to an end.
However, complainant again discovered that
the illicit relationship between her husband and
respondent continued, and that sometime in
December 1988, respondent and her husband,
Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant
then met again with respondent sometime in
March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to
discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos
Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship
persisted and complainant even came to know
later on that respondent had been employed by
her husband in his company.
A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm.
Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11,
1989 by the complainant against respondent
Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the
ground of immorality, more particularly, for
carrying on an illicit relationship with the
complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her
Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met
Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known
him all along to be a bachelor, with the
knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had
from whom he had long been estranged. She
stated that during one of their trips abroad,
Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her
and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in
1985[3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent
did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter
continued to live with his children in their
Greenhills residence because respondent and
Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually
to know and accept the fact of his second
marriage before they would live together.[4]
In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed
in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return
occasionally to the Philippines to update her
law practice and renew legal ties. During one of
her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988,
respondent was surprised when she was
confronted by a woman who insisted that she
was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and
desolate upon her discovery of the true civil
status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for
Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and
returned only in March 1989 with her two (2)
children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after
she reported to work with the law firm[5] she
was connected with, the woman who
represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui
again came to her office, demanding to know if
Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.
It is respondents contention that her
relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because
they were married abroad and that after June
1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis
true civil status, she cut off all her ties with
him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never
lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided
at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in
Alabang in a house which belonged to her
mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the
said house was built exclusively from her
parents funds.[6]By way of counterclaim,
respondent sought moral damages in the
amount of Ten Million Pesos
(Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for
having filed the present allegedly malicious and
groundless disbarment case against respondent.
In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990,
complainant states, among others, that
respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui
was married to complainant and had children
with her even at the start of her relationship
with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent
went abroad was to give birth to her two (2)
children with Carlos Ui.
During the pendency of the proceedings before
the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged
her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with
the crime of Concubinage before the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S.
No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged. The resolution
dismissing the criminal complaint against
respondent reads:
Complainants evidence had prima facie It is worth stating that the evidence submitted
established the existence of the "illicit by respondents in support of their respective
relationship" between the respondents allegedly positions on the matter support and bolster the
discovered by the complainant in December foregoing conclusion/recommendation.
1987. The same evidence however show that
respondent Carlos Ui was still living with WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully
complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or recommended that the instant complaint be
the early part of 1989. dismissed for want of evidence to establish
probable cause for the offense charged.
It would therefore be logical and safe to state
that the "relationship" of respondents started RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8]
and was discovered by complainant sometime
Complainant appealed the said Resolution of
in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were
the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary
still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast
of Justice, but the same was dismissed [9] on the
Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they,
ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove
admittedly, continued to live together at their
her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui
conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or
lived together as husband and wife at 527 San
later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the
Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa,
same.
Metro Manila.
From the above, it would not be amiss to
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission
conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit
on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion
as complainant puts it, had been prima facie
to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the
established by complainants evidence, this
Commission [10] wherein she charged
same evidence had failed to even prima facie
respondent with making false allegations in her
establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation
Answer and for submitting a supporting
in the concept of husband and wife at the 527
document which was altered and intercalated.
San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of
She alleged that in the Answer of respondent
which is necessary and indispensable to at least
filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent
create probable cause for the offense charged.
averred, among others, that she was married to
The statement alone of complainant, worse, a
Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a
statement only of a conclusion respecting the
Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her
fact of cohabitation does not make the
averment. However, the Certificate of
complainants evidence thereto any
Marriage [11] duly certified by the State
better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy,
Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in
20 Phil. 178).
the Hawaii State Department of Health, and
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate
General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed
that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October
22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed
by respondent in her Answer. According to
complainant, the reason for that false allegation
was because respondent wanted to impress
upon the said IBP that the birth of her first
child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock.[12] It is the contention of complainant
that such act constitutes a violation of Articles
183[13] and 184[14] of the Revised Penal Code,
and also contempt of the Commission; and that
the act of respondent in making false
allegations in her Answer and submitting an
altered/intercalated document are indicative of
her moral perversity and lack of integrity which
make her unworthy to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite
Respondent in Contempt),[15] respondent
averred that she did not have the original copy
of the marriage certificate because the same
was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she
annexed such copy because she relied in good
faith on what appeared on the copy of the
marriage certificate in her possession.
Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on
February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of
whether or not she has conducted herself in an
immoral manner for which she deserves to be
barred from the practice of law. Respondent
averred that the complaint should be dismissed
on two (2) grounds, namely:
(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner
consistent with the requirement of good moral
character for the practice of the legal
profession; and
(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation
that respondent conducted herself in an
immoral manner.[17]
In her defense, respondent contends, among
others, that it was she who was the victim in
this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not
know that Carlos Ui was already married, and
that upon learning of this fact, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui.
She stated that there was no reason for her to
doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos
Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so
much time with her, and he was so open in his
courtship.[18]
On the issue of the falsified marriage
certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly
incredible for her to have knowingly attached
such marriage certificate to her Answer had she
known that the same was altered. Respondent
reiterated that there was no compelling reason
for her to make it appear that her marriage to
Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987,
because the fact remains that respondent and
Carlos Ui got married before complainant
confronted respondent and informed the latter
of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June
1988. Further, respondent stated that it was
Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he
was the person responsible for changing the
date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to
1985, and complainant did not present evidence
to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this
matter.
Respondent posits that complainants evidence,
consisting of the pictures of respondent with a
child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a
picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light
colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture
of the same car, and portion of the house and
ground, and another picture of the same car
bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the
house and the garage,[19] does not prove that
she acted in an immoral manner. They have no
evidentiary value according to her. The pictures
were taken by a photographer from a private
security agency and who was not presented
during the hearings. Further, the respondent
presented the Resolution of the Provincial
Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427
dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui
against respondent for lack of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense
charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by
the Department of Justice [21] to bolster her
argument that she was not guilty of any
immoral or illegal act because of her
relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent
claims that she entered the relationship with
Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct
cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or
shameless, nor can it suggest moral
indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui
whom she believed to be single, and, that upon
her discovery of his true civil status, she parted
ways with him.
In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20,
1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for
the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and
reiterated that respondent committed
immorality by having intimate relations with a
married man which resulted in the birth of two
(2) children. Complainant testified that
respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio,
personally knew complainant and her husband
since the late 1970s because they were clients
of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the
Branch Manager.[23] It was thus highly
improbable that respondent, who was living
with her parents as of 1986, would not have
been informed by her own mother that Carlos
Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise
averred that respondent committed disrespect
towards the Commission for submitting a
photocopy of a document containing an
intercalated date.
In her Reply to Complainants
Memorandum [24], respondent stated that
complainant miserably failed to show sufficient
proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent
insists that contrary to the allegations of
complainant, there is no showing that
respondent had knowledge of the fact of
marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The
allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be
a married man does not prove that such
information was made known to respondent.
Hearing on the case ensued, after which the
Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its
Report and Recommendation, finding that:
In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time
respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter
represented himself to be single. The
Commission does not find said claim too
difficult to believe in the light of contemporary
human experience.
Almost always, when a married man courts a
single woman, he represents himself to be
single, separated, or without any firm
commitment to another woman. The reason
therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very
nature, single women prefer single men.
The records will show that when respondent
became aware the (sic) true civil status of
Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July
of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him.
When she returned to the Philippines in March
of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty.
Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and
respondent only talked to each other because of
the children whom he was allowed to visit. At
no time did they live together.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the
Commission fails to find any act on the part of
respondent that can be considered as
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she
was more of a victim that (sic) anything else
and should deserve compassion rather than
condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode
destroyed her chance of having a normal and
happy family life, a dream cherished by every
single girl.
x..........................x..........................x"
Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a
Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997,
the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it
is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality
against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED
for knowingly and willfully attaching to her
Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same
will merit a more severe penalty."
We agree with the findings aforequoted.
The practice of law is a privilege. A bar
candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by
passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege
that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of
due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and
the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for
admission to the practice of law are:
a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;
b. a resident thereof;
c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;
d. a person of good moral character;
e. he must show that no charges against him
involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending
in court;
f. possess the required educational
qualifications; and
g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics
supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that one of the
conditions prior to admission to the bar is that
an applicant must possess good moral
character. More importantly, possession of
good moral character must be continuous as a
requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege
of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a
ground for the revocation of such privilege. It
has been held -
If good moral character is a sine qua non for
admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a
requisite for retaining membership in the legal
profession. Membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good
moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil.
865).
A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the bar should have
moral integrity in addition to professional
probity.
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix
an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly
immoral conduct" or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a
lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of
the bar. The rule implies that what appears to
be unconventional behavior to the straight-
laced may not be the immoral conduct that
warrants disbarment.
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that
conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26]
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent
Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui,
she knew and believed him to be single.
Respondent fell in love with him and they got
married and as a result of such marriage, she
gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her
knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui,
she left him.
Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the
effects of the actuations of respondent are not
only far from simple, they will have a rippling
effect on how the standard norms of our legal
practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry
from what it used to be before. This
permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a
higher degree of social responsibility and thus
must handle their personal affairs with greater
caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe
that perhaps respondent would not have found
herself in such a compromising situation had
she exercised prudence and been more vigilant
in finding out more about Carlos Uis personal
background prior to her intimate involvement
with him.
Surely, circumstances existed which should
have at least aroused respondents suspicion that
something was amiss in her relationship with
Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing
questions. For instance, respondent admitted
that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with
a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared
that she never exerted the slightest effort to find
out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed
unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in
1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent
and their first child, a circumstance that is
simply incomprehensible considering
respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very
open in courting her.
All these taken together leads to the
inescapable conclusion that respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs.
However, the fact remains that her relationship
with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage,
cannot be considered immoral. For immorality
connotes conduct that shows indifference to the
moral norms of society and the opinion of good
and respectable members of the
community.[27] Moreover, for such conduct to
warrant disciplinary action, the same must be
"grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.[28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and
officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but
must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral
standards."[29] Respondents act of immediately
distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that
alleged moral indifference and proves that she
had no intention of flaunting the law and the
high moral standard of the legal profession.
Complainants bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant, and the Court will
exercise its disciplinary powers only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein
complainant miserably failed to do.
On the matter of the falsified Certificate of
Marriage attached by respondent to her
Answer, we find improbable to believe the
averment of respondent that she merely relied
on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate
which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an
event as significant as a marriage ceremony,
any normal bride would verily recall the date
and year of her marriage. It is difficult to
fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in
the case at bar, can forget the year when she got
married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human
experience and highly improbable.
Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify
the information contained in an attachment to
her pleading, especially so when she
has personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances contained therein. In attaching
such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated
date, the defense of good faith of respondent on
that point cannot stand.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere
unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. The legal profession exacts from its
members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon
to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice.
Their exalted positions as officers of the court
demand no less than the highest degree of
morality.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment
against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for
alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby
REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a
photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an
altered or intercalated date thereof, with a
STERN WARNING that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on her for any
repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO
PUNO.
FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.
Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as
respondent.
REGALA, J.:
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before
this Court a verified complaint charging
Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with
gross immorality and misconduct. In his
answer, the respondent denied all the material
allegations of the complaint, and as a special
defense averred that the allegations therein do
not constitute grounds for disbarment or
suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the
former Rules of Court.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General
on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were held by the
then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during
which the complainant, assisted by her counsel,
presented evidence both oral and documentary.
The respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-
examined the complainant's witnesses. The
respondent likewise testified. He denied having
sexual intercourse with complainant at the
Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed
the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno"
appearing in the hotel register, and disowned
Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a
complaint, formally charging respondent with
immorality. The complaint recites:
That on June 1, 1958, at a time when
complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent
Armando Puno were engaged to be married, the
said respondent invited the complainant to
attend a movie but on their way the respondent
told the complainant that they take refreshment
before going to the Lyric Theater; that they
proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R.
Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on
the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel,
respondent proposed to complainant that they
go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her
that 'anyway we are getting married; that with
reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered
by love of respondent and the respondent's
promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced,
and before they entered the hotel room
respondent registered and signed the registry
book as 'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after
registering at the hotel, respondent shoved
complainant inside the room; that as soon as
they were inside the room, someone locked the
door from outside and respondent proceeded to
the bed and undressed himself; that
complainant begged respondent not to molest
her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway
I have promised to marry you'; and respondent,
still noticing the reluctance of complainant to
his overtures of love, again assured
complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I
promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon
respondent pulled complainant to the bed,
removed her panty, and then placed himself on
top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on
the bed; that when respondent was already on
top of complainant the latter had no other
recourse but to submit to respondent's demand
and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from
3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same
evening when they left the hotel and proceeded
to a birthday party together; that after the
sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958,
respondent repeatedly proposed to have some
more but complainant refused telling that they
had better wait until they were married; that
after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958
and feeling that she was already on the family
way, complainant repeatedly implored
respondent to comply with his promise of
marriage but respondent refused to comply;
that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave
birth to a child.
That the acts of the respondent in having carnal
knowledge with the complainant through a
promise of marriage which he did not fulfill
and has refused to fulfill up to the present
constitute a conduct which shows that
respondent is devoid of the highest degree of
morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of and must be possessed by members
of the Philippine Bar.
The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment
of the respondent.
A copy of this complaint was served on
respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he
answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again
denying that he took complainant to the Silver
Moon Hotel and that on the promise of
marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual
intercourse with her. He, however, admitted
that sometime in June, 1955, he and the
complainant became sweethearts until
November, 1955, when they broke off,
following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga
City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without
stating in his answer that he had the intention of
introducing additional evidence, respondent
prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on
July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing
Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for
the complainant submitted the case for decision
without oral argument. There was no
appearance for the respondents.
Since the failure of respondent to make known
in his answer his intention to present additional
evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of
the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs.
Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963),
the evidence produced before the Solicitor
General in his investigation, where respondent
had an opportunity to object to the evidence
and cross-examine the witnesses, may now be
considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced
that the facts are as stated in the complaint.
Complainant is an educated woman, having
been a public school teacher for a number of
years. She testified that respondent took her to
the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing
the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno,"
and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel
register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and
Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno"
arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00
P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.
Complainant also testified that she last saw
respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter
went to Zamboanga City. When she learned
that respondent had left for Zamboanga City,
she sent him a telegram sometime in August of
that year telling him that she was in trouble.
Again she wrote him a letter in September and
another one in October of the same year, telling
him that she was pregnant and she requested
him to come. Receiving no replies from
respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in
November, 1958, where she met the respondent
and asked him to comply with his promise to
marry her.1äwphï1.ñët
Respondent admitted that he left for
Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and
complainant met in Zamboanga City in
November, 1958. The fact that complainant
sent him a telegram and letters was likewise
admitted in respondent's letter to the
complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E),
which was duly identified by the respondent to
be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on
February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and
Children's Hospital. This is supported by a
certified true copy of a birth certificate issued
by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila,
and a certificate of admission of complainant to
the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by
the medical records clerk of the hospital.
To show how intimate the relationship between
the respondent and the complainant was, the
latter testified that she gave money to the
respondent whenever he asked from her. This
was corroborated by the testimony of Maria
Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even
respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958
(Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money
from the complainant.
The lengthy cross-examination to which
complainant was subjected by the respondent
himself failed to discredit complainant's
testimony.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor
General, the respondent averred that he and
complainant were sweethearts up to November,
1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and
were sweethearts in 1958 is established by the
testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the
complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's
letter to the complainant dated November 3,
1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony
(pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for
sexual intercourse because of respondent's
promise of marriage and not because of a desire
for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and
mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17,
1966) .
One of the requirements for all applicants for
admission to the Bar is that the applicant must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character (Section 2,
Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section
2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition
precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon
the practice of law, it is essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of
the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case
No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44
Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by
evidence, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue
and overcome the evidence for the relator
(Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93)
and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity, which
at all times is expected of him. Respondent
denied that he took complainant to the Silver
Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with
her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present
evidence to show where he was on that date. In
the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303,
Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to
himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the
State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet
the obligation which he owes to himself, when
to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is
hardly indeed if he demand and expect that
same full and wide consideration which the
State voluntarily gives to those who by
reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This
is particularly so when he not only declines to
help himself but actively conceals from the
State the very means by which it may assist
him.
With respect to the special defense raised by
the respondent in his answer to the charges of
the complainant that the allegations in the
complaint do not fall under any of the grounds
for disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule
127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a
settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the
grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to
be taken as a limitation on the general power of
courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The
inherent powers of the court over its officers
can not be restricted. Times without number,
our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be
removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for
the office and unworthy of the privileges which
his license and the law confer upon him. (In
re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith
[1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm.
Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583;
Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145,
December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter
of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one
of the grounds for suspension or disbarment.
(Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that
the respondent has committed a grossly
immoral act and has, thus disregarded and
violated the fundamental ethics of his
profession. Indeed, it is important that members
of this ancient and learned profession of law
must conform themselves in accordance with
the highest standards of morality. As stated in
paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar
against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because
deficient in either moral character or education.
He should strive at all times to uphold the
honor and to maintain the dignity of the
profession and to improve not only the law but
the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is
hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his
name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys.
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on
January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina
Royong charged the respondent Ariston J.
Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with
rape allegedly committed on her person in the
manner described therein. Upon requirement of
this Court, the respondent filed his answer
denying all the allegations in the complaint and
praying that he be not disbarred. On February
3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General
submitted his report on the case with the
recommendation that the respondent "be
permanently removed from his office lawyer
and his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys". The pertinent part of the report
reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on
August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster
mother, left her alone in their house and went
down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about
1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was
ironing clothes on the second floor of the house
the respondent entered and read a newspaper at
her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with
one hand and with the other hand dragged her
to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced
her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout
for help because he threatened her and her
family with death. He next undressed as she lay
on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with
her after he removed her panties and gave her
hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue
her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he
warned her not to report him to her foster
parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the
members of her family. She resumed ironing
clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that
afternoon when she joined her foster mother on
the first floor of the house. As a result of the
sexual intercourse she became pregnant and
gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8,
21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she
would have been heard by the neighbors that
she did not report the outrage to anyone
because of the threat made by the respondent;
that she still frequented the respondent's house
after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was
alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee,
and received his mail for him. Once, on
November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick
of influenza, she was left alone with him in his
house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for
Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24,
t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that
he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of
March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on
August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of
Civil Service to follow up his appointment as
technical assistant in the office of the mayor of
Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the
administrative case against Buenaventura Perez
(pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25,
1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had
illicit relations with the complainant from
January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their
clandestine affair was discovered by the
complainant's foster parents, but to avoid
criminal liability for seduction, according to
him, he limited himself to kissing and
embracing her and sucking her tongue before
she completed her eighteenth birthday. They
had their first sexual intercourse on May 11,
1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the
second one week later, on May 18. The last
intercourse took place before Christmas in
December, 1958. In all, they had sexual
intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her
house and sometimes in his house whenever
they had the opportunity. He intended to marry
her when she could legally contract marriage
without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case
occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask
permission to marry, for her foster parents will
object and even my common-law wife, will
object.' After the discovery of their relationship
by the complainant's foster parents, he
confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that
he wanted to have a child, something she
(Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25,
t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
xxx xxx xxx
FINDINGS AND COMMENT
There is no controversy that the respondent had
carnal knowledge of the complainant. The
complainant claims she surrendered to him
under circumstances of violence and
intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced
that the sexual intercourse was performed not
once but repeatedly and with her consent. From
her behaviour before and after the alleged rape,
she appears to have been more a sweetheart
than of the victim of an outrage involving her
honor ....
But the foregoing observations
notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in
conscience recommend respondent's
exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia
Angeles to live maritally with him not long
after she and her husband parted, and it is not
improbable that the spouses never reconciled
because of him. His own evidence shows that,
tiring of her after more than fifteen years of
adulterous relationship with her and on the
convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles,
could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina
Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in
her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June
2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with
grave abuse of confidence and by means of
promises of marriage which he knew he could
not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman
who forsook her husband so that he,
respondent, could have all of her. He also took
advantage of his moral influence over her.
From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him
as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a
sister of her mother. Considering her age (she
was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult
to see why she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22,
1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition
dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a
person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and
praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to
take the bar examinations to be given on the
first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time
as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral
character he represented himself to be. From
1942 to the present, he has continuously lived
an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose
husband is still alive, knowing that his
concubine is a married woman and that her
marriage still subsists. This fact permanently
disqualified him from taking the bar
examinations, and had it been known to the
Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have
been permitted to take the bar examinations
that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of
office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently
disqualified from admission to the Philippine
Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a
married woman, it is submitted that the same
misconduct should be sufficient ground for his
permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a
double standard of morality, one for
membership to the Philippine Bar and another
for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
xxx xxx xxx
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully
recommend that after due hearing, respondent
Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed
from his office as a lawyer and his name be
stricken from the roll of attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his
investigation, that even if respondent did not
commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was
guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor
General formulated another complaint which he
appended to his report, charging the respondent
of falsely and deliberately alleging in his
application for admission to the bar that he is a
person of good moral character; of living
adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same
time maintaining illicit relations with the
complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia,
thus rendering him unworthy of public
confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the
legal business of others, and praying that this
Court render judgment ordering "the permanent
removal of the respondent ... from his office as
a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from
the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint,
respondent alleged the special defense that "the
complaint does not merit action", since the
causes of action in the said complaint are
different and foreign from the original cause of
action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the
necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule
128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed
that after due notice and hearing for additional
evidence, the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated
the Court Investigators to receive the additional
evidence. Accordingly the case was set for
hearing of which the parties were duly notified.
On September 29, 1961, respondent asked
leave to submit a memorandum which was
granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was
filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge
of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of
seduction was committed by the respondent; 3)
That no act of perjury or fraudulent
concealment was committed by the respondent
when he filed his petition for admission to the
bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally
unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence
to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
At the hearing on November 16, 1961,
respondent presented his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband
(t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on
December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n.
23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong
were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross
(t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro
Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines
are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24).
Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them
(t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked
her about her status she told him she was
'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia,
were then told to stay at respondent's house,
respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent
asked her if she was married and she told him
'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She
told respondent she was married (to Arines)
when she and respondent were already living
together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n.
26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when
they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n.
27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months
after their arrival thereat, but she did not go
with her because she and respondent 'had
already a good understanding'(sexual relations)
[t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to
her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because
respondent was already reluctant to live with
her and he told her it was better for her to go
home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she
met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told
her he had already a wife, named Conching
Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to
Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived
with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent
eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n.
35); in fact, she is still presently living with
respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court
Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to
submit an affidavit at a later date, which
request was also granted. The affidavit was
filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent
averring, among others, the following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of
seduction against the complainant, because the
latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his
first sexual intercourse with her took place on
May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18
years of age; that he had been living with his
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost
20 years, but from the time he began courting
her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for
her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of
adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16,
1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by
her; that on February 21, 1942, he found
Briccia alone in his house, who told him that
her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with
the other evacuees; that from said date
(February 21), to the present, he and Briccia
had been living together as common-law
husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter,
he asked Briccia to marry him, but she
confessed she was already married, and maybe
her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga;
that he could not then drive Briccia away,
because she was a stranger in the place, nor
could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as
the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she
told Briccia to separate from him and to return
to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again;
that contrary to his expectations, Briccia
returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that
Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again,
telling him that she cannot separate from him
anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's
father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines)
had agreed not to molest them as in fact he
(Arines) was already living with another
woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with
her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his
petition to take the bar examinations in 1954,
he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide'
from this Court the fact of his 'open
cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia
Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his
petition, because he did not see in the form of
the petition being used in 1954 that the fact
must be stated; and that since his birth, he
thought and believed he was a man of good
moral character, and it was only from the
Solicitor General that he first learned he was
not so; and that he did not commit perjury or
fraudulent concealment when he filed his
petition to take the bar examinations in 1954."
(Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8,
March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a
report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used
his knowledge of the law to take advantage by
having illicit relations with complainant,
knowing as he did, that by committing immoral
acts on her, he was free from any criminal
liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross
immorality by continuously cohabiting with a
married woman even after he became a lawyer
in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent
falsified the truth as to his moral character in
his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations,
being then immorally (adulterously) in
cohabitation with his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The
investigators also recommended that the
respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be
suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of
which was served on respondent, through his
counsel of record, the case was set for hearing
before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent
asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of
oral argument. This was granted and the
corresponding memorandum was duly filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that
the respondent had sexual relations with the
complainant several times, and as a
consequence she bore him a child on June 2,
1959; and that he likewise continuously
cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an
adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the
present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit
relations with the complainant Josefina Royong
the and the open cohabitation with Briccia
Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient
grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not
liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit
relations with the complainant and his open
cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married
woman, because he has not been convicted of
any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true
that the respondent has not been convicted of
rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and
that the grounds upon which the disbarment
proceedings is based are not among those
enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the
Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be
disbarred. But it has already been held that this
enumeration is not exclusive and that the power
of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy
members of the profession is inherent; it is a
necessary incident to the proper administration
of justice; it may be exercised without any
special statutory authority, and in all proper
cases unless positively prohibited by statute;
and the power may be exercised in any manner
that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial
and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco,
Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re
Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well
settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme
Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may
provide that certain acts or conduct shall
require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that
statutes and rules merely regulate the power to
disbar instead of creating it, and that such
statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general
powers of the court over attorneys, who are its
officers, and that they may be removed for
other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In
the United States, where from our system of
legal ethics is derived, "the continued
possession of a fair private and professional
character or a good moral character is a
requisite condition for the rightful continuance
in the practice of law for one who has been
admitted, and its loss requires suspension or
disbarment even though the statutes do not
specify that as a ground of disbarment". The
moral turpitude for which an attorney may be
disbarred may consist of misconduct in either
his professional or non-professional activities
(5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions
of this Court has been toward the conclusion
that a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from office as a lawyer for other
than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so
phrased as to be broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re
Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the
moral depravity of the respondent is most
apparent. His pretension that before
complainant completed her eighteenth birthday,
he refrained from having sexual intercourse
with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as
he himself declared — and that he limited
himself merely to kissing and embracing her
and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming
mind, which together with his knowledge of the
law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable
considering that the complainant was the niece
of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a
moral ascendancy over her who looked up to
him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General
observed: "He also took advantage of his moral
influence over her. From childhood, Josefina
Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and
called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because
he is the paramour of a sister of her mother.
Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years
old then), her inexperience and his moral
ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see
why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the
blunt admission of his illicit relations with the
complainant reveals the respondent to be a
person who would suffer no moral
compunction for his acts if the same could be
done without fear of criminal liability. He has,
by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of
the moral integrity expected of a member of the
bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although
unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient
grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we
have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez,
44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with
approval the following portion of the decision
of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of
Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which
exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory
rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney be a person
of good moral character. If that qualification is
a condition precedent to a license or privilege
to enter upon the practice of the law, it would
seem to be equally essential during the
continuance of the practice and the exercise of
the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will
be removed not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, which shows him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him.
(Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his
office and in no way directly bearing on his
profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit
and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We
cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so
would be — as the Solicitor General puts it —
recognizing "a double standard of morality, one
for membership to the Philippine Bar, and
another for disbarment from the office of the
lawyer." If we concede that respondent's
adulterous relations and his simultaneous
seduction of his paramour's niece did not and
do not disqualify him from continuing with his
office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be
requiring moral integrity as an essential
prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to
later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral
depravity and character degeneration of the
members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in
justifying his stand that even if he admittedly
committed fornication, this is no ground for
disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if
committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as have proven in this case, as to
shock common sense of decency, certainly may
justify positive action by the Court in
protecting the prestige of the noble profession
of the law. The reasons advanced by the
respondent why he continued his adulterous
relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she
helped him in some way finish his law studies,
and that his "sense of propriety and Christian
charity" did not allow him to abandon her after
his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of
cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral
dereliction. The means he employed, as he
stated, in order to extricate himself from the
predicament he found himself in, by courting
the complainant and maintaining sexual
relations with her makes his conduct more
revolting. An immoral act cannot justify
another immoral act. The noblest means he
could have employed was to have married the
complainant as he was then free to do so. But to
continue maintaining adulterous relations with
a married woman and simultaneously
maintaining promiscuous relations with the
latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be
condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore
renders him unfit and unworthy for the
privileges of the legal profession. As good
character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, he may be
removed therefrom whenever he ceases to
possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the
Solicitor General exceeded his authority in
filing the present complaint against him for
seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an
offense or offenses different from those
originally charged in the complaint of January
14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.—
Based upon the evidence adduced at the
hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no
sufficient ground to proceed against the
respondent, he shall submit a report to the
Supreme Court containing his findings of fact
and conclusion, whereupon the respondent
shall be exonerated unless the court orders
differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General.
Answer of the respondent. — If the Solicitor
General finds sufficient ground to proceed
against the respondent, he shall file the
corresponding complaint, accompanied with all
the evidence introduced in his investigation,
with the Supreme Court, and the respondent
shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme
Court with a copy of the complaint with
direction to answer the same within fifteen
days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in
the language of the foregoing rules requires the
Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the
same offense charged in the complaint
originally filed by the complainant for
disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that
should the Solicitor General find sufficient
grounds to proceed against the respondent, he
shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied by the evidence introduced in his
investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is
at liberty to file any case against the respondent
he may be justified by the evidence adduced
during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not
falsify his petition to take the bar examinations
in 1954 since according to his own opinion and
estimation of himself at that time, he was a
person of good moral character. This
contention is clearly erroneous. One's own
approximation of himself is not a gauge to his
moral character. Moral character is not a
subjective term, but one which corresponds to
objective reality. Moral character is what a
person really is, and not what he or other
people think he is. As former Chief Justice
Moran observed: An applicant for license to
practice law is required to show good moral
character, or what he really is, as distinguished
from good reputation, or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in
which he is held by the public in the place
where he is known. As has been said, ante the
standard of personal and professional integrity
which should be applied to persons admitted to
practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as
merely enables them to escape the penalties of
criminal law. Good moral character includes at
least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In
Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v.
Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del
Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley,
82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not
possess a good moral character at the time he
applied for admission to the bar. He lived an
adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the
fact that people who knew him seemed to have
acquiesced to his status, did not render him a
person of good moral character. It is of no
moment that his immoral state was discovered
then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a
member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered
striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston
J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.
A.C. No. 377 April 29, 1966
CONCEPCION BOLIVAR, complainant,
vs.
ABELARDO SIMBOL Y
MANUEL, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General for the
complainant.
Valentino Castro for the respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Disbarment proceedings on moral grounds.
This Court referred the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and
recommendation. Complainant, the sole
witness at said investigation, wound up her
testimony on September 4, 1959. Then
followed several postponements of hearing.
The last was on August 4, 1960.
There is a vacuum in the record as to what
happened thereafter. But on October 28, 1963,
the Solicitor General filed his report
stating, inter alia, that complainant made a
sworn withdrawal and desistance. In view of
the facts found, however, he recommended that
respondent be disciplined and simultaneously
filed the corresponding complaint1 asking for
his suspension "for a period of at least five (5)
years.
On October 31, 1963, the Clerk of this Court
sent by registered mail to respondent, thru Atty.
Valentino G. Castro, his counsel of record, a
letter, with a copy of the foregoing complaint,
requiring answer thereto in 15 days.
On November 27, 1963, Castro wrote this
Court:
In connection with the transmittal letter dated
October 31, 1963, addressed to Mr. Abelardo
Simbol, c/o the undersigned, ... please be
informed that since sometime in September or
October, 1960, after Miss Concepcion Bolivar
and Atty. Abelardo Simbol had executed a
compromise agreement in Civil Case No.
01700 of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court, the undersigned ceased to hear from
Atty. A. Simbol. Notwithstanding this, upon
receiving your said letter of transmittal, I tried
to get in touch with Atty. A. Simbol at 1877-A
Tayuman Street, Tondo, Manila, which is the
address appearing in my files. I was, however,
informed that Atty. A. Simbol reportedly
resides at 232 Maria Cristina Street,
Dumaguete City.
It is, therefore, respectfully requested that copy
of the complaint filed by the Hon. Solicitor
General, against Atty. Abelardo Simbol in
Adm. Case No. 377 be sent directly to said
respondent at 232 Maria Cristina Street,
Dumaguete City. . . . .
On December 6, 1963, a copy of the complaint
was sent by registered mail direct to Simbol at
232 Maria Cristina St., Dumaguete City. It was
returned to this Court with the notation on the
envelope that said respondent was no longer in
that city.
At the hearing set by this Court for February 3,
1964, Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo and Atty.
Tomas Yumul for complainant appeared. They
submitted the case for decision without oral
argument. There was no appearance for
respondent.
1. The problem that at once projects itself is:
Can we proceed further on the face of the facts
that: first, there is no answer to the complaint
of the Solicitor General; and, second, at the
hearing before this Court neither respondent
nor counsel appeared? The controlling statute,
Section 30, Rule 138, Rules of Court, reads:
SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal
or suspension.—No attorney shall be removed
or suspended from the practice of his
profession, until he has had full opportunity
upon reasonable notice to answer the charges
against him, to produce witnesses in his own
behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel.
But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear
and answer the accusation, the court may
proceed to determine the matter ex parte.
The pattern of behaviour pursued by
respondent requires articulation. Complainant's
testimony was completed on September 4,
1959. Then followed a series of postponements:
November 13, 1959; January 15, 1960;
February 24, 1960; April 4, 1960; May 9, 1960;
July 1, 1960; August 4, 1960. In the interim,
negotiations were had. Result — amicable
settlement and complainant's withdrawal and
desistance.
That respondent did not take the trouble to
answer the Solicitor General's complaint is now
unimportant. The directive for him to answer
was first served on his lawyer. Then it was sent
to him personally at his address in Dumaguete
City; but the registered mail was unclaimed.
Neither will he profit by non-appearance on the
date of hearing before this Court (February 3,
1964). Because, notice of hearing was sent to
him at both his Manila and Dumaguete
addresses; and he did not bother to get it from
the post-office. Even his two attorneys of
record, who received said notice, did not appear
before this Court.
Respondent knew that the disbarment
proceedings were pending. His right to practice
his profession was at stake. He could ill afford
to just stand by and wait. It was his duty to
inquire as to his fate. He was hide-bound by his
obligation to inform this Court of his
whereabouts, to the end that notices could
reach him. In all these, he failed. On the face of
the environmental facts, respondent gave this
Court ample reason to believe that he
purposedly stayed away.1äwphï1.ñët
We, accordingly, hold that respondent has had
full opportunity to defend himself, and that he
has waived his right to be heard.
In a previous case2 this Court has had occasion
to pass upon a similar question. There,
respondent and counsel, after a series of non-
appearances and postponements at their behest,
failed to finally appear before the investigating
fiscal in Pangasinan. The fiscal rendered the
report on the merits finding respondent guilty
of malpractice and recommending that
disbarment charges be filed. The Solicitor
General thereafter lodged a formal complaint
before this Court. Notices sent by this Court
directing respondent to answer were all
returned because he could not be located at his
given address, San Vicente, Alcala,
Pangasinan. His attorney of record was also
required to answer; instead, he asked that he be
relieved as counsel for respondent. Counsel,
however, appeared in oral argument. This
Court there held:
The respondent avoided attending the hearings
conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan. Even in this Court, his
whereabouts are totally unknown. His
knowledge that a disbarment proceeding had
been filed or pending against him imposes upon
the duty to make himself or his presence
available to this Court for a fair trial. That he
could not be located at his known address
without asking his whereabouts known implies
that he had chosen to waive every right and
opportunity to put up his defense.
2. The next point that logically crops up is the
weight to be accorded complainant's
withdrawal and desistance, made long after her
testimony in full had been taken down at the
Solicitor General's office. Reasons given: first,
they threshed out their differences; and, second,
the irreconciliability of religious beliefs alleged
caused the marriage plans to miscarry. The first
is correct. The second is at war with the proven
facts. Religious differences never did mar the
relations between the two. As the Solicitor
General pointedly remarked, "It is unbelievable
for a Filipino woman to refuse to marry a man
she had lived with for 3 or 4 years trusting in
the man's promise to marry on the ground of
irreconcilable religious belief", else she "would
not have complained if this were so". Indeed,
settlement of the case and the consequent
withdrawal obviously were part of an overall
plan calculated to purge respondent from
mischief and to insulate him from disciplinary
action. To conform to this arrangement is to
wink at wrongdoing.
This Court had heretofore ruled3 that, "Any
person may bring to this Court's attention the
misconduct of any lawyer, and action will
usually be taken regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant, if the facts proven
so warrant". The power to discipline lawyers —
officers of court — may not be cut short by a
compound of compromise and withdrawal of
charges.4
3. The preliminaries out of the way, we now go
to the core of the case. Here are the facts5:
Concepcion Bolivar was 27 years old at the
time she took the stand. Her schooling ended in
sixth grade. She testified in Tagalog. She
became acquainted with respondent in April,
1952. By December following, respondent
started to court her. Convinced by his promise
to marry, she accepted him in February, 1953.
By April 7, 1953, the two lived as husband and
wife. Respondent had been "telling his
classmates" that she "was his wife". On April
22, 1957, they bore a child baptized Eduardo
Bolivar Simbol.
Came November 12, 1957. The two separated.
For, complainant learned from respondent's
brother-in-law, one Turing Mendoza, and
others, that respondent married another girl,
Lydia Lingat. Complainant investigated. At the
Iglesia ni Kristo and in the Local Civil Register
of Angeles, Pampanga, her worst fears were
confirmed. Respondent and Lydia Lingat were
really married in Angeles on January 5, 1957.
When the two first met, respondent was a
jobless first year law student. He remained
jobless during his student days. Since June,
1953, complainant helped respondent in his
studies, gave him money to buy his books and
to pay his matriculation fees and for "other
things he needed in his studies". At one point in
her testimony complainant stated, "I had been
working nights (ang gabi ay ginagawang araw)
and even on Sundays and then afterwards he
made me suffer all kinds of embarrassments
and shame". Respondent became a member of
the bar, and found work in a law office. Yet,
she continued giving him money. She gave
respondent a total of around P8,000.00.
All along, respondent fed complainant with
assurances that he would marry her. To ward
off celebration of marriage respondent offered
varied excuses. There was a time when they
travelled to Angeles, Pampanga, ostensibly to
get married. The marriage was put off, so
respondent gave complainant to understand,
because there was nobody to solemnize. And
then, dangling a piece of paper, he told her that
the license had already expired. In early 1954,
respondent told complainant "to wait until he
finished his studies", anyway, they were
"practically husband and wife". Then he asked
her to hold the marriage till after delivery,
because "it was shameful to appear in church"
when she was "on the family way". The child
was born. Now, marriage became conditioned
on his securing a job for he was ashamed as
complainant "was spending for him". Came
June of 1957.6 Respondent informed
complainant that he secured a job as an
assistant attorney in the Fernandez Law office
and that he would start earning money. Never
running out of explanations, this time it was:
"cases take long to finish, but as soon as he
earns thousands of pesos he was going to marry
me". Again she agreed. When on cross-
examination, she was quiried why she accepted
all the excuses inspite of the birth of the child,
she answered: "... because he told me that now
[that] we have a child I can no longer deceive
you because the child is more than a mere
marriage".
These avowals notwithstanding, respondent
turned around and married another. Adding
insult to injury, he concealed the fact of his
marriage and continued to live with
complainant for several more months until the
latter discovered the bitter truth. Even then,
respondent had the temerity to deny his
marriage and to appease complainant with the
palaver that "the woman was not his wife but
the wife of his cousin".
In January of 1958, respondent kept asking
complainant to live with him again because he
was going to marry her and "leave his wife";
that he "did not really love the girl he married".
He also asked for money. This met with rebuff.
Respondent got angry and threatened her.
And now, to the appropriate action. We part
with the premise that this Court has inherent
jurisdiction to suspend or disbar an attorney for
sufficient cause.7 On this point, the Solicitor
General aptly observed.8
Undoubtedly, respondent's actuations in
making a dupe of complainant, living on her
bounty and allowing her to spend for his
schooling and other personal necessities while
dangling before her the mirage of a marriage,
marrying another girl as soon as he had
finished his studies, keeping his marriage a
secret while continuing to demand money from
complainant, and trying to sponge on her and
persuade her to resume their broken
relationship after the latter's discovery of his
perfidy, are indicative of a character not worthy
of a member of the bar. The fact that
complainant has withdrawn her complaint
against respondent does not wipe out the
grievous offense he had committed, making
complainant and her child with him virtual
outcasts of society. This, respondent should not
be allowed to do with impunity.
Respondent, we are persuaded to say, "has
failed to maintain the highest degree of
morality expected and required of a member of
the bar".9 He is, indeed, guilty of "grossly
immoral conduct" within the meaning of
Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court. 10
In the light of the entire record, we vote to
suspend respondent Abelardo Simbol y Manuel
from the practice of law for a period of five (5)
years. 11 So ordered.
A.M. No. 997 September 10, 1979
PILAR ABAIGAR, complainant,
vs.
DAVID D.C. PAZ, respondent.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
On April 27, 1971, Pilar Abaigar filed this
administrative case for disbarment against
David D. C. Paz, a member of the Philippine
Bar.
The verified complaint alleged that sometime
in March 1970, the complainant, Pilar Abaigar
sought the aid of a legal counsel regarding her
divorce case filed by her husband in the
Superior Court of California, County of
Alameda, U.S.A.; that she called on the
telephone the office of Congressman Bagatsing
in Manila; that the respondent David D.C. Paz,
answered the telephone call and volunteered his
legal services; that believing that the
respondent had the necessary legal experience,
the complainant confided her legal problems to
him: that after the termination of the divorce
case, the respondent became exceedingly
friendly with the complainant and started to
profess his love for her; that at the start, the
complainant was hesitant in continuing the
cordial relations between her and the
respondent but the respondent made her believe
that although he was living with another
woman, his relations with said woman were no
impediment that the respondent convinced the
complainant that he had been compelled to
contract a civil marriage with the woman and
that since it was not a marriage under the
church laws, it was no bar for him to get
married under the church laws with the
complainant; that the respondent proposed
marriage to the complainant; that believing in
this good faith, the complainant accepted the
proposal of the respondent; that sometime in
the latter part of November 1970, an
application for the issuance of a marriage
license to the complainant and the respondent
was made and executed: that thereafter, the
respondent convinced the complainant that
since they were going to get married anyway,
they should act as husband and wife; that
because of the confidence which the
complainant reposed upon the respondent, she
reluctantly acceded to said demands; that as a
result of their being together, the complainant
became pregnant but due to causes beyond her
control, the pregnancy was lost; that sometime
in the third week of April 1971, one Virginia
Paz was introduced to the complainant by the
respondent; that said Virginia Paz was the
woman previously referred to by the
respondent as his wife with whom he had
contracted a forced civil marriage; that said
Virginia Paz, in the course of the meeting,
informed the complainant that there had been
actually two marriages between Virginia Paz
and the respondent, one under the civil law and
one under the church law; that upon being
confronted by the complainant, the respondent
made no explanation whatsoever and merely
kept silent; that since that time, the respondent
had done nothing to make amends for having
deceived the complainant and for having taken
advantage of her; and that the complainant has
no other recourse but to ask for the disbarment
of the respondent who is a member of the
Philippine Bar and an officer of the courts of
justice. 1
In his answer filed on June 10, 1971, the
respondent denied having had any illicit
relations with the complainant and alleged that
when the complainant called by telephone
Congressman Ramon D. Bagatsing, the
respondent advised complainant to come to the
office; that on the next day when the
complainant came to the office of Congressman
Bagatsing, she was at first referred to Atty.
Geronimo Flores of the Legal Assistance
Service to handle the case; that two or three
days thereafter, the complainant requested the
respondent to personally handle her case; that
on October 30, 1970, the respondent prepared a
letter to complainant's husband, Samuel L.
Navales, which letter was signed by
Congressman Bagatsing; that sometime in the
latter part of October 1970, the complainant
borrowed from the respondent the sum of
P200.00 to complete the payment for the
hospitalization and treatment of her brother,
Eric, at the Makati Medical Center: that as a act
of pity, the respondent gave her the loan; that
after the election for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention in November 1970,
the complainant called at the residence of the
respondent and asked help in filing a case
against the assailant of her brother who was
stabbed in Olongapo City; that the wound
sustained by complainant's brother was only
superficial and he could not Identify his
assailant, hence, no criminal case was filed;
that after the trip to Olongapo, the complainant
requested the help of the respondent to
recommend her admission to a hospital because
of abdominal and chest pains; that the
respondent recommended complainant to be
admitted to the Singian Clinic located at
General Solano Street, San Miguel Manila; that
on December 20, 1970, the complainant caged
up the respondent at his residence by telephone
and requested him to assist her mother, Mrs.
Cecilia Abaigar to file a criminal action against
her minor sister, Vilma Abaigar for
disobedience; that the respondent prepares a
complaint on the same night and a sworn
statement of her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar
that he accompanied the complainant to the
Fiscal's Office at Pasig, Rizal and to the
Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal where
Criminal Case No. 23994 entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Vilma Abaigar was filed by
her mother; that the respondent also helped the
mother of the complainant to prepare and file a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal; that by reason of said
petition for habeas corpus, the mother of the
complainant was able to take Vilma Abaigar
into her custody although the petition was
denied; that the respondent had never informed
the complainant that he was compelled to
contract a civil marriage with his wife; that the
respondent never proposed marriage to the
complainant; that the respondent has no
recollection of the supposed application for the
issuance of a marriage license in the latter part
of November 1970; that respondent and
complainant had never acted as husband and
wife; and that the respondent had not deceived
complainant nor taken advantage of her. 2
In a resolution dated August 20, 1971, this
Court referred this case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. 3
After hearing the parties, the Solicitor General
submitted on June 30, 1973 his report and
recommendation containing the following
findings:
The complaint seeks the disbarment of
respondent Paz on grounds that may properly
fall under the category of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct as found in Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court.
Assuming for the moment that there had been
sexual intercourse between complainant and
respondent, the first inquiry, we respectfully
submit, is whether respondent Paz practiced
demotion on complainant by making her
believe that notwithstanding their subsisting
marriages to their respective spouses, they
could legally get married to each other and
based on his promise of marriage, she
consented to go to bed with him.
Complainant admitted that during her alleged
romantic liason with respondent, she was
married to a certain Samuel Navales, also a
Filipino, who divorced her in the U.S.A.
sometime in the middle of 1970 (par. 2,
Complaint; p. 46, t.s.n., November 18, 1971).
She also admitted that before she submitted
herself to his sexual desires, she was informed
by him that, he had a wife with whom he was
civilly married but that the marriage was void
because it was either fake or 'forced' (sic).
Whether there was deceit hinges on whether
complainant actually believed the
representation of respondent that they could
legally marry. Highly intelligent that she is and
with the educational background that she has, it
is difficult to accept the proposition that she
swallowed hook, line and sinker his supposed
assurances that notwithstanding full awareness
by both of the existence of each other's
previous marriages, no legal impediment stood
in the way of their getting married
ecclesiastically. It is worthwhile repeating that
complainant was a fifth placer in the Board
Examinations for Chemical Engineering. She
was licensed as a chemical engineer in 1964 or
1965, after which she taught at one time or
another in different schools and colleges in
Manila. In 1970 or 1971 when she was
supposedly tricked into surrendering her body
on a promise of marriage, she was already in
her late twenties. It is improbable that at this
age, she was still ignorant of the law regarding
indissolubility of marriage. Before jumping
headlong into accepting respondent's proposal
that they act as husband and wife, she should
have pondered upon the serious legal
implications and complications of a second
marriage for both of them. She could have
easily asked a lawyer for advice on the matter.
Complainant's own neighbor in Mandaluyong,
Rizal is a lawyer by the name of Atty. Paler
whose wife testified on her behalf. According
to Mrs. Paler, her husband and complainant
used to converse (p. 18, t.s.n., November 23,
1971). In these conversations complainant
could have asked, perhaps in a casual manner,
Mrs. Paler's husband as to the legal effects of a
divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen or
the effects of a marriage brought about through
the use of force and intimidation in order to
settle whatever doubts she had in her mind.
The truth however, of the matter is that
complainant did not even have to consult a
lawyer to know that she could not legally marry
respondent. It is of no little significance that
some persons utilized by complainant as
witnesses on her behalf because of their
supposed knowledge of her relations with
respondent, were themselves aware that divorce
is not recognized in this country. Thus Mrs.
Paler categorically stated that she knew for a
fact that divorce obtained abroad is not
recognized in the Philippines (p. 19, t.s.n.,
November 23, 1971). The same admission was
elicited from Fr. Troy de los Santos, another
witness for the complainant. Fr. de los Santos
who used to be her spiritual adviser admitted at
one point of his testimony that divorce obtained
abroad cannot be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as state laws are concerned and
complainant knew about this (pp. 33-34, t.s.n.,
November 23, 1971). Thus, the Jesuit priest
declared under cross-examination:
Q Do you know that complainant's husband is
still alive?
A Yes.
Q Up to the present?
A Yes.
Q Do you know that divorce is not recognized
in the Philippines?
A I know, but the church does not recognize
divorce.
Q How about the State, do you know that the
State recognize divorce?
A As far as my knowledge, I do not think that
our laws permit divorce.
Continuing with his testimony, Fr. de los
Santos stated:
Q Did not the fact that complainant's husband
is still have and that divorce is not recognized
in ' the Philippines be considered an
impediment to complainant's marriage to
anyone?
A Yes.
Q Did you inform her so?
A She knows about that.
(33,34, t.s.n., Id.)
Again, granting that complainant did not
actually comprehend the existence of a legal
bar to her remarriage, 'not being steeped in the
intricacies of the law'. just the mere realization
that both respondent's wife and her own
husband being still have was enough to stir her
mind and to impel her to make her own
investigation. She could have, for instance,
made discreet inquiries as to who was the
woman respondent was married to and verified
his claim whether he was forced into the
marriage. Or, perhaps, she could simply have
asked Congressman Bagatsing about
respondent's personal status. After all she was
competent enough to prepare, without anyone's
help her own affidavit, Exhibit 'A', and
resourceful enough to make research in the
Supreme Court's Library on the subject of
disbarment (pp. 63, 89, t.s.n., November 18,
1971).
What conclusion then can a reasonable mind
draw from the given premises? Either
complainant was so helplessly naive as to be
beguiled by respondent's blandishments or.
comprehending fully the legal impossibility of
the fulfillment of his marriage proposals, she
unconditionally laid herself prostrate to his
charms, too much enamored of him to care
about anything else. For, as philosopher Blaise
Pascal has so pithily stated of the profundity of
human love, 'love has reasons that reason
cannot explain.' Since complainant cannot hide
behind the camouflage of innocence,
considering her intellectual capacity and
educational background, no other conclusion is
possible 'except that she voluntarily submitted
to sexual intimacy with respondent without
entertaining any illusion or hope of sublimating
the illicit relations by legal union.
The question is intriguing whether respondent
ever made vehement protestations of love and
actually made an offer of marriage to
complainant. If there was, the evidence
adduced does not clearly show. Complainant
asserted that she had evidence in the form of
love letters and the marriage application form
showing respondent's sustained courtship and
offer of marriage. However, such purported
documents were not presented, complainant
making the excuse that respondent tricked her
into giving him the envelope containing the
evidence. Such explanation, however, staggers
human credulity considering that the supposed
documents were vital to establish the case. It is
simply preposterous that she would easily Dart
with the documents and give them to no other
than the respondent himself . Be that as it may,
if respondent had made an offer of marriage, it
is not clearly established that complainant's
submission to his sexual desires was not on
account of the offer but for the gratification of
her mundane human longings.
The next question is whether there was sexual
intimacy between complainant and respondent.
Complainant testified that she acceded to his
proposal that they live as husband and wife and
as a matter of fact they had three sexual
intercourses that took place in the Tower Hotel
and Singian Clinic in Manila and in the Sulo
Hotel in Quezon City. While there is no proof
that sexual intimacy took place in Singian
Clinic except her testimony, her allegation that
they had trysts at the Tower Hotel and Sulo
Hotel was supported by the guest cards at said
hotels, Exhibits 'A' and 'B'. Notwithstanding
respondent's denial that the 'Mrs.' stated in the
entry in said guest cards was a 'good-time'
woman, not the complainant, common sense
will tell us that complainant could not have
known that respondent lodged in said hotels on
those particular dates unless she was the
woman whom respondent brought there. On
this score, we are inclined to believe that
evidence has been sufficiently adduced to
establish that intimacy between complainant
and respondent took place once in the Tower
Hotel and once in the Sulo Hotel. As the
Honorable Court has stated, when the lawyer's
integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not
enough that he denies the charges against him;
he must meet the issues and overcome the
evidence for the relator and to show proof that
he still maintains the highest degree of morality
and integrity which at all times he is expected
of him (Quingwa vs. Puno, Adm. Case No.
389, Feb. 28, 1967; 19 SCRA 439). Insofar as
this point is concerned, the evidence of the
complainant as to the trysts they had in the two
hotels has not been met and overthrown by
respondent. 4
Upon considering the report and
recommendation filed by the Solicitor General,
this Court, in a resolution dated July 29, 1972,
resolved to require the Solicitor General to file
the corresponding complaint against the
respondent, David D.C. Paz, pursuant to
Section 5 of Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of
Court. 5
On September 4, 1975, the Solicitor General
filed the corresponding complaint against
David D.C. Paz praying that the respondent be
suspended for a period of at least six months
from the practice of law, with a warning that
similar transgressions in the future win be dealt
with more severely.
Meanwhile the complainant sent a verified
letter-petition dated March 29, 1974 to the then
Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal wherein
the complainant asked this Court to look into
the suspicious activities of a certain Rodolfo
del Prado, who allegedly in connivance with
the respondent, David D.C. Paz, made her sign
an affidavit prejudicial to her interest. Among
other allegations, the complainant stated in her
verified complaint the following.
6. That there never is an illicit relationship
between Atty. Paz and me at present because I
believed all along that he was single and able to
marry me. In fact, our relationship is above-
board just like any engaged couple.
7. That I was made to understand by the
Citizens Legal Assistant Office that the tenor of
the affidavit made by Mr. Rudolfo Del Prado is
such that the consideration for the illicit
relationship was promissory note which to all
intents and purposes is immoral and illegal.
8. That I am only after the collection of the loan
which Atty. Paz got from me and not revenge
for his deception. 6
The foregoing portions of her letter militate
against the credibility of the complainant.
In her complainant for disbarment, she pictured
the respondent as morally perverse. However,
in the aforementioned letter, she states that
there never was an illicit relationship between
her and the respondent, Atty. David D.C. Paz,
and that their relationship was aboveboard just
like any engaged couple. And finally, she avers
that she was only after the collection of the loan
which the respondent got from her and not for
revenge for his deception.
It has been held that the power of this Court to
disbar a lawyer should be exercised with
caution because of its serious
consequences. 7 The burden of proof rests upon
the complainant and the case against a
respondent must be established by convincing
proof. 8
In Arboleda vs. Gatchalian, this Court held:
The Court has held that in disbarment
proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant and the charge against the lawyer
must be established by convincing proof (Go
vs. Candoy, A.C. No. 736, Oct. 23, 1967, 21
SCRA 439; Toquib vs. Tomol, Jr., A.C. No.
554, March 25, 1970, 32 SCRA 156; in re Atty.
Felizardo M. de Guzman, A.C. No. 838, Jan.
21. 1974, 55 SCRA 139). The record must
disclose as free from doubt a case which
compels the exercise by this Court of its
disciplinary powers. The corrupt character of
the act done must be clearly demonstrated.
Moreover' considering the serious
consequences, of the disbarment or suspension
of a member of the Bar, We have consistently
held that clearly preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of either
penalty (De Guzman vs. Tadeo, 68 Phil. 554;
Lim vs. Antonio, A.C. No. 848, Sept. 30, 1971,
41 SCRA 44). This Court likewise held that
where there is no proof that respondent lawyer
was guilty of any unethical conduct,
harassment and malpractice, the disbarment
case against him should be dismissed (Ricafort
vs. Baltazar, A.C. No. 661, June 26, 1967, 20
SCRA 418; Delos Santos vs. Bolanos A.C. No.
483, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 763). 9
The evidence adduced by the complainant has
failed to establish any cause for disciplinary
action against the respondent. As the Solicitor
General said in his report, "From all
indications, there is little room for doubt that
she filed his disbarment case not in redress of a
wrong, for there was no wrong committed. It
was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two
consenting adults who were fully aware of the
consequences of their deed and for which they
were responsible only to their own private
consciences."
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint
for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated
12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a
member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court
to lift the suspension from the practice of law
imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 17 October 1988 in C.A.-G.R.
CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received
from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces
of jewelry, with a total stated value of
P36,000.00, for sale on a commission basis,
with the condition that the respondent would
turn over the sales proceeds and return the
unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14
February 1984. Sometime in February 1984,
respondent, instead of returning the unsold
pieces of jewelry which then amounted to
approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks:
(a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the
amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23
February 1984 also for the amount of
P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February
1984 for the amount of P15,450.00. Upon
presentment for payment within ninety (90)
days after their issuance, all three (3) checks
were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders
Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds.
Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of
dishonor, respondent made no arrangements
with the bank concerning the honoring of
checks which had bounced and made no effort
to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed
against respondent with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 85-38358; and (b) three (3)
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed
respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 85-38359,
85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial,
the trial court rendered a decision dated 25
August 1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa;
and
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced
respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to indemnify the complainant in the
amount of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No.
8538359;
to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of
P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
indemnify the complainant in the amount of
P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-38361,
and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R.
CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court but, in addition, suspended
respondent Tuanda from the practice of law.
The pertinent portion of the decision read as
follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the
evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction,
the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to
this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused
Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the
offense for (sic) which she is found guilty
involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law and shall
not practice her profession until further action
from the Supreme Court, in accordance with
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. A copy of this decision must be
forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by
Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED. 1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a
Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9
January 1989, noted respondent's Notice of
Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice
of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the
proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent
filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the
Supreme Court noted without action
respondent's Notice of Appeal and declared that
the Court of Appeals' decision of 17 October
1988 had become final and executory upon
expiration of the period for filing a petition for
review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In
that Resolution, the Court found that
respondent had lost her right to appeal
by certiorari when she posted with this Court a
Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for
review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court within the
reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension, respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is
indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty
aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine
considering that accused-appellant's action on
the case during the trial on the merits at the
lower court has always been motivated purely
by sincere belief that she is innocent of the
offense charged nor of the intention to cause
damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the
respondent that, she had not violated her oath
as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the
ground that when she issued the checks which
bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to
complainant Ms. Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the
practice of law imposed by the Court of
Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of]
which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which
deleteriously affects public interest and public
order. In Lozano v. Martinez,2 the Court
explained the nature of the offense of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P.
Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. . . . The
thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of
penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the
practice is prescribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against
property but an offense against public order.
xxx xxx xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the
public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare
of society and the public interest. 3(Italics
supplied)
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from
the practice of law because she had been
convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court provide as follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of
Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The
Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance
may suspend an attorney from practice for any
of the causes named in the last preceding
section, and after such suspension such attorney
shall not practice his profession until further
action of the Supreme Court in the premises.
(Italics supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which
respondent was convicted also import deceit
and violation of her attorney's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility under both
of which she was bound to "obey the laws of
the land." Conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude might not (as in the instant
case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate
to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer;
however, it certainly relates to and affects the
good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this
Court stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law
requires that she shall be a person of good
moral character.1âwphi1This qualification is
not only a condition precedent to an admission
to the practice of law; its continued possession
is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law. 5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY
the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the
practice of law until further orders from this
Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be
forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on
the record of respondent.
MARIA ELENA MORENO, complainant,
vs. ATTY. ERNESTO
ARANETA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta for deceit and
nonpayment of debts.
The complaint,[1] dated 25 September 1972,
was filed in this Court by Maria Elena Moreno
on two causes of action. The first cause of
action involved Treasury Warrant No. B-
02997354 issued by the Land Registration
Commission in favor of Lira, Inc., and indorsed
by Araneta, purportedly as president of the said
corporation, to Moreno, in consideration of the
amount of P2,177. The complaint alleged that
almost a year later, the warrant was dishonored.
The second cause of action involved Aranetas
nonpayment of debts in the amount of P11,000.
Moreno alleged that sometime in October 1972,
Araneta borrowed P5,000 from her, purportedly
to show to his associates, with the assurance
that he would return the said amount within the
shortest possible time. Again in May 1972,
Araneta borrowed P6,000 for the same purpose
and with the same assurance. Thereafter, since
he failed to make good on both promises,
Moreno sought repayment in the aggregate
amount of P11,000. Araneta issued two Bank
of America checks in her favor, the first dated
30 June 1972 for P6,000, and the other dated 15
July 1972 for P5,000. However, when Moreno
tried to encash the checks, the same were
dishonored and returned to her marked Account
Closed. She referred the matter to a lawyer,
who sent Araneta a demand letter. Araneta,
however, ignored the same.
In his defense, Araneta claimed it was in fact
Moreno who sought to borrow P2,500 from
him. To accommodate her, he allegedly
endorsed to her the Treasury Warrant in
question, worth P2,177, which he received
from Lira, Inc., as part of his attorneys fees,
and gave her an additional P323 in cash.
Araneta also denied borrowing any amount
from Moreno. He admitted that he issued the
two undated checks in her favor, but maintains
that he had no intention of negotiating them. He
avers that he gave them to Moreno, allegedly
upon her request, only so she could show the
bank where she was working that she had
money coming to her. Araneta further claims
that he warned her that the checks belonged to
the unused portion of a closed account and
could not be encashed. To protect himself, he
asked the complainant to issue a check in the
amount of P11,000 to offset the two borrowed
checks. The respondent offered this check in
evidence.
Moreno, however, contended[2] that this check
for P11,000 belonged to the Philippine Leasing
Corporation, which she managed when her
father passed away. She claimed she signed the
check in blank sometime in 1969 when she fell
seriously ill and gave them to Araneta who was
then helping her in the management of the
corporation. She concluded that Araneta falsely
filled up the check in a desperate bid to turn the
tables on her.[3]
On 01 December 1972, the case was referred to
the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation.[4]
The case was first set for hearing on 22 January
1973 at nine oclock in the morning, when the
complainant and her counsel appeared. Araneta
was absent despite due notice. Upon motion,
however, of Moreno, and to give the
respondent a chance to defend himself, the
hearing was reset to 23 and 24 January 1973,
both at nine oclock in the morning. Service of
the notice for the new dates of hearing were
effected to the respondent through a certain
Mely Magsipoc on 22 January 1973.[5] On 23
January 1973, Araneta once more did not
appear, so the case was called again the
following day, 24 January 1973.
In the absence of respondent Araneta, an ex-
parte hearing was conducted on 24 January
1973 with the complainant, Moreno, taking the
stand.[6] On 27 February 1973, Araneta
appeared for the scheduled hearing, only to ask
for a postponement to prepare his defense.[7] No
further hearings appear to have been conducted
thereafter. A hearing is shown to have been
scheduled on 28 May 1973, however, on said
date, Araneta filed a joint motion for
postponement with the conform of Morenos
lawyer, as he, Araneta, was earnestly pursuing
a possible clarification of complainants basic
grievance.
Thereafter, nothing was heard from respondent
Araneta. On 14 September 1988, records of the
case were forwarded to the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court. Two days later, the
Commission notified[8] both parties of a hearing
to be held on 2 November 1988, on which date
neither of the parties nor the complainants
counsel appeared despite due notice. It appears
that notice could not be served on Araneta, as
he no longer resided in his indicated address,
and his whereabouts were unknown. An
inquiry[9] made at his IBP chapter yielded
negative results. The Commission reset the
hearing to 18 November 1988 at two oclock in
the afternoon.[10] Again on this date, none of the
parties appeared. Thus on the basis of the
evidence so far adduced, the case was
submitted for resolution on such date.[11]
On 28 December 1988, IBP Commissioner
Concepcion Buencamino submitted her
Report,[12] which reads in part:
The evidence of the complainant was not
formally offered in evidence. Be that as it may,
it is worthwhile considering. The stop payment
of Treasury Warrant No. B-02997354 was an
act of Lira, Inc. and not that of the respondent.
There was a subpoena issued for the
appearance of Lilia Echaus, alleged President
of Lira, Inc. and Simplicio Uy Seun, the alleged
Secretary/Treasurer of Lira, Inc. to explain
about why the stop payment of the treasury
warrant was done but neither witness appeared
(as evidenced by the records) before the Office
of the Solicitor General to testify. At the dorsal
portion of Exh. B, the photocopy of the
Treasury Warrant is a signature which
complainant claims to be that of the respondent
beneath which is the word President and above
the signature are the words Lira, Inc. but an
ocular examination of said signature in relation
to the signature on the checks Exhibits G and H
do not show definitely that they were the
signatures of one and the same person, so there
is no basis to form the conclusion that the
respondent did sign the treasury warrant as
president of Lira, Inc. The testimony of the
complainant was merely that [the] same
treasury warrant was given to her by Atty.
Araneta, which she deposited [in] her account.
There is no evidence to prove that she saw him
sign it.
There is no evidence of a letter of the
complainant informing the respondent about
the stop payment or even any written demand
by the complainant to the respondent that the
payment of the treasury warrant having been
stopped he should reimburse her with what he
received as consideration for this check.
Same considered, there is no cause to fault the
respondent for the first cause of action.
On the other hand, the respondent admits
having issued the two checks, one for
P5,000.00 and the other for P6,000.00 to the
complainant for her to show to her creditors
that money was coming her way, when in fact
he is presumed to have been aware when he
issued said checks that his account with the
bank against which [these] checks were drawn
was already closed, as was discovered from the
fact that the checks were dishonored for said
reason.
Even disregarding the complainants evidence
and considering the answer of the respondent,
the act of the respondent in issuing the two
checks, one for P5,000.00 and the other for
P6,000.00 which he gave to the complainant for
her to show to her creditors that money was
coming her way, when there was none and the
respondent knew such fact was an act of
connivance of the respondent with the
complainant to make use of these useless
commercial documents to deceive the public.
However beneficial it may have been to the
complainant, this act of the respondent as a
lawyer is abhorrent and against the exacting
standards of morality and decency required of a
member of the Bar.
The personal actuations of a member of the bar
the like of which was, as in this case,
committed by the respondent, belittles the
confidence of the public in him and reflects
upon his integrity and morality. In the Bar,
moral integrity as a virtue is a necessity which
the respondent lacks.
The above considered, it is respectfully
recommended that as a lesson the respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for three
(3) months arising from his irresponsible
conduct as a member of the bar to take effect
upon notice by him of the decision of
suspension.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted[13] the
above report, but increased its recommended
period of suspension from three months to six
months.
Over ten years later, on 15 October 2002, IBP
Director for Bar Discipline Victor C.
Fernandez, transmitted[14] the records of this
case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B,
Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court.[15] On 8 July
2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a
Report[16] regarding various aspects of the case.
The Report further made mention of a
Resolution[17] from this Court indefinitely
suspending the respondent for having been
convicted by final judgment of estafa through
falsification of a commercial document. The
Resolution, which was attached to the report,
states:
L-46550 (Ernesto S. Araneta vs. Court of
Appeals, et. al.) Considering that the motion of
petitioner Ernesto S. Araneta for
reconsideration of the resolution of September
16, 1977 which denied the petition for review
on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 18553-R which
affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila convicting the said
petitioner of the crime of estafa thru
falsification of commercial document, was
denied in the resolution dated October 17, 1977
of the Second Division of this Court for lack of
merit, which denial is final, the Court
Resolved: (a) to SUSPEND petitioner Ernesto
S. Araneta from the practice of law and (b) to
require the said petitioner to SHOW CAUSE
within ten days from notice why he should not
be disbarred.
Verification conducted by the Office of the Bar
Confidant revealed that the above case had
been archived on 20 November 1992.
It therefore appears that in the intervening time
between herein respondents last filed pleading
dated 28 May 1973, when he sought a
postponement of the scheduled hearing on this
case to settle matters amicably between himself
and Moreno, and the present, Araneta had been
found guilty and convicted by final judgment of
a crime involving moral turpitude, and
indefinitely suspended.
We find no reason to disturb the findings of
Commissioner Buencamino. However, we
disagree with the penalty sought to be imposed.
Whether or not the complainant sufficiently
proved that Araneta failed to pay his debts is
irrelevant, because by his own admission, the
respondent issued two checks in favor of
Moreno knowing fully well that the same were
drawn against a closed account. And though
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 had not yet been
passed at that time, the IBP correctly found this
act abhorrent and against the exacting standards
of morality and decency required of a member
of the Bar, which belittles the confidence of the
public in him and reflects upon his integrity
and morality.
Indeed, in recent cases, we have held that the
issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct,[18] as the effect transcends the
private interests of the parties directly involved
in the transaction and touches the interests of
the community at large. The mischief it creates
is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but
also an injury to the public since the circulation
of valueless commercial papers can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt
the welfare of society and the public interest.
Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer
who issues an unfunded check deliberately
reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow
men or society in a manner contrary to
accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals.[19]
Thus, we have held that the act of a person in
issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its
presentment, is also a manifestation of moral
turpitude.[20]
In Co v. Bernardino[21] and Lao v. Medel,[22] we
held that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer
may be sanctioned with one years suspension
from the practice of law, or a suspension of six
months upon partial payment of the
obligation.[23]
In the instant case, however, herein respondent
has, in the intervening time, apparently been
found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru
falsification of a commercial document, a crime
involving moral turpitude, for which he has
been indefinitely suspended.
Moral turpitude includes everything which is
done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.[24] It involves an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society
in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.[25]
Considering that he had previously committed
a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case
likewise involves moral turpitude, we are
constrained to impose a more severe penalty.
In fact, we have long held[26] that disbarment is
the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude.
As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment
Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,[27] [t]he
review of respondent's conviction no longer
rests upon us. The judgment not only has
become final but has been executed. No
elaborate argument is necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed
on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to say
that, by his conviction, the respondent has
proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice.[28]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S.
Araneta is hereby DISBARRED and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in the respondents record as a member
of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
In the matter of the estate of Crescenciano
Abesamis, deceased.
CONCORDIA CUEVAS
( aliasCONCORDIA ABESAMIS), executrix-
appellant, vs. PEDRO ABESAMIS, 2. oET
AL., oppositors-appellees.
Villasan, Valenton and Santiago for appellant.
Angel Cecilio for appellees.
LAUREL, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dated May 27,
1937, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
Wherefore, the court sustains the opposition to
the approval of the amended project of partition
presented by the executrix and hereby orders
the latter to present another inventory and
another project of partition which shall include
only the property adjudicated to the defendants
in the final decision of this court in case No.
4816, consisting of only one-eight (1/8) of the
three parcels of land described in the will of the
deceased Crescenciano Abesamis.
On February 11, 1928, Crescenciano Cuevas
submitted for probate in the court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija the last will and
testament of her deceased natural father,
Crescenciano Abesamis, which bequeathed
three parcels of land, one share of stock in the
"Gallera de Peñaranda" of a par value of P100,
and two carabaos worth P100 to Concordia
Cuevas ( alias Concordia Abesamis), Francisco
Abesamis, Perpetua Abesamis, Isaias Abesamis
and Pedro Abesamis in the manner and under
the conditions stated
therein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
On March 15, 1928, however, Pedro Abesamis
and twenty-five others entered their opposition
to the distribution of the properties described in
the will, for the reason that "a que dichos
bienes son de propiedad pro indiviso entre los
aqui opositores y la testamentaria," and
simultaneously informed the court that they had
commenced an action for the partition of said
properties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl
es virtual law library
On May 14, 1928, the will was admitted to
probate and Concordia Cuevas was appointed
executrix with a bond of
P1,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
On May 13, 1928, Pedro Abesamis and the
other oppositors did institute civil case No.
4816 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija against the estate of Crescenciano
Abesamis, Concordia Nuevas, Francisco
Abesamis and Isaias Abesamis for the partition,
alleging that said properties belonged, in the
first instance, to Anacleto Mercado, their
common causante, who entrusted them to
Crescenciano Abesamis with the understanding
that they were not to be subdivided as long as
the minor children of her other deceased son,
Teodorico Abesamis, were living with the
Crescenciano. A demurrer interposed by the
defendants on the ground that there was another
pending action involving the same subject
matter was sustained after which the plaintiffs
were required to amend their complaint, the
amendment consisting simply in eliminating
therefrom the estate of Crescenciano Abesamis
and leaving as party defendants Concordia
Cuevas, Francisco Abesamis and Isaias
Abesamis. As these defendants failed to answer
the amended complaint, they were declared in
default and , on July 3, 1930, judgment was
rendered adjudicating seven-eights (7/8) of the
properties in favor of the plaintiffs and the
other one-eight (1/8) for the defendants. On
February 7, 1931, the court ordered the
commissioners of partition to declare as sole
heiress Concordia Cuevas to the exclusion of
Francisco and Isaias
Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
On March 3, 1931, the partition commissioners
submitted their report, upon which the court
declared that "no hay lugar a aprobar por ahora
el informe de los comisionados partidores hasta
que se haya verificado la particion en dicha
testamentaria en la cual pueden las partes de
esta causa hacer valer los derechos que
pudieran tener sobre los terrenos en cuestion."
A motion for reconsideration having been
denied on September 15, 1932, plaintiffs, on
February 14, 1934, moved for the approval of
the project of partition filed by the
commissioners . On February 26, 1934, the
court ordered the suspension of the approval of
the partition of the properties until the
termination of the testamentary
proceedings.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanro
bles virtual law library
On January 9, 1937, Concordia Cuevas
presented to the probate court a partition plan
adjudicating the three lots and the two carabaos
in favor of the legatees mentioned in the will.
This was rejected by the court for the reason
that it was not in conformity with the inventory
of the estate and the decision in civil case No.
4816. On January 26, 1937, the executrix
submitted an amended inventory and later
another project of partition distributing the
properties of the estate in accordance with the
terms of the will, which were objected by the
defendants, because these included their
legitimate shares under the decision in civil
case No. 4816. The opposition was upheld by
the court in kits decision of May 27, 1937, the
dispositive part of which is quoted in the
beginning of this
opinion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The executrix-appellant assigns the following
errors:
1. The court erred in not holding that the
decision in civil case No. 4816 of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, declaring that the
estate of Crescenciano Abesamis is entitled
only to one-eight (1/8) of the property
described in the will, is a nullity and can not
bind the estate of Crescenciano
Abesamis.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanroble
s virtual law library
2. The court erred in not approving the
amended project of partition presented by the
executrix on February 8, 1937, and in not
distributing the estate of the deceased
Crescenciano Abesamis according to the
provision of the
will.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
3. The court erred in not finding that it has no
jurisdiction as a probate court to decide the
question of ownership of the property involved
in these proceedings part of which is claimed
by the oppositors to be their property not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased Crescenciano Abesamis but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
4. The court erred in not holding that the
oppositors have no personality to object to the
project of partition presented by the executrix
on February 8, 1937, which was drafted in
accordance with the provision of the will of the
deceased Crescenciano Abesamis.
Under the first assignment of error, appellant
impugns the validity of the decision of the
lower court in civil case No. 4816 declaring
that the legatees here, defendants in that action,
are entitled only to one-eight of the property on
the ground that the estate of Crescenciano
Abesamis was not a party in said proceeding. It
should be noted that all the coheirs, except
Perpetua Abesamis, were defendants therein,
and that by order of the court, in its instructions
to the partition commissioners dated February
7, 1931, the herein executrix-appellant was
pronounced by the sole heiress of the deceased.
As said defendants were declared in default and
are, to be sure, bound by the decision in that
case, we are of the opinion that the appellant
cannot now be permitted to assail its virtuality
not to regard it as totally ineffectual against the
testate estate. The rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of
death(article 657, Civil Code), and where, as in
this case the heir is of legal age and the estate is
not burdened with any debts, said heir
immediately succeeds, by force of law, to the
dominio n, ownership and possession of the
properties of his predecessor, and consequently
stands legally in the shoes of the latter.
(Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321;
Dais vs. Court of First Instance of Capiz, 51
Phil., 396.) In the absence of a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate,
there is no necessity of a previous declaration
of status and the heir or heirs can sue and be
sued in that capacity (Arsenio de Vera et al. vs.
Cleotilde Galauran, 37 Off. Gaz., 1821). This
disposes likewise of the second assignment of
error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
With reference to the third assignment of error,
it should be observed that the oppositors
instituted a separate action (civil case No.
4816) for the partition of the properties
described in the will of Crescenciano
Abesamis. No question of ownership, therefore,
was in fact determined in the testamentary
proceedings (civil case No. 4797) by the
probate court. It results that when, on February
8, 1937, the court disapproved the project
partition filed by the executrix, it did not decide
adverse claims of proprietorship but only lent
force and effect to the decision rendered in civil
case No.
4816.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Under the fourth and last assignment of errors,
it is vigorously contended that only heirs or
legatees may present an opposition, and that
only inasmuch as the oppositors-appellees are
not heirs or legatees, they have no legal
personality to object to the approval of the
project of partition. By virtue of the judgment
in civil case No. 4816 adjudicating seven-eights
of the property in their favor, the herein
oppositors had the right to oppose any project
of partition which, in effect, would divest them
of their right of ownership. To conclude
otherwise would be to permit the executrix to
enrich herself at the expense of the
oppositors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobl
es virtual law library
The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792
Complainant,
Present:
Panganiban, CJ,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:
Respondent. January 25, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the
disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by
Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar
Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the
conviction of respondent for a crime involving
moral turpitude, together with the
circumstances surrounding the conviction,
violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility;[2]and constitutes
sufficient ground for his disbarment under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit
his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a
Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that
he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing
had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.[4]
After that hearing, complainant manifested that
he was submitting the case on the basis of the
Complaint and its attachments.[5] Accordingly,
the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper,
which he did on July 27, 2004.[6] Afterwards,
the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita
J. Herbosa rendered her Report and
Recommendation, which was later adopted and
approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12,
2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged
that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and that the conviction of the
latter for frustrated homicide,[7] which involved
moral turpitude, should result in his
disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction
were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:
x x x. The accused was driving his brown
Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after
gassing up in preparation for his trip to
Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along
Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car
driven by the accused not knowing that the
driver of the car he had overtaken is not just
someone, but a lawyer and a prominent
member of the Baguio community who was
under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the
accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter
stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and
Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his
car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his
shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver
forced open his door causing the accused to fall
to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the
accused had been drinking because he smelled
of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who
looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car
to help him get up. But the accused, by now
enraged, stood up immediately and was about
to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the
latter boxed him on the chest instead. The
accused fell down a second time, got up again
and was about to box the taxi driver but the
latter caught his fist and turned his arm around.
The taxi driver held on to the accused until he
could be pacified and then released him. The
accused went back to his car and got his
revolver making sure that the handle was
wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was
on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed
the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He
picked them up intending to return them to the
accused. But as he was handing the same to the
accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun
held by the accused who fired and shot him
hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of
the accused so the latter pushed him out and
sped off. The incident was witnessed by
Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated
that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this
case, Roberto Soriano.[8]
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio
Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and
brought the latter to the hospital. Because the
bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the
left side of his neck,[9] complainant would have
surely died of hemorrhage if he had not
received timely medical assistance, according
to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco
Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord
injury, which caused paralysis on the left part
of his body and disabled him for his job as a
taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated
November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002,
respondent filed an application for probation,
which was granted by the court on several
conditions. These included satisfaction of the
civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor
of the offended party, Roberto Soriano.[10]
According to the unrefuted statements of
complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to
comply with this particular undertaking, even
appealed the civil liability to the Court of
Appeals.[11]
In her Report and Recommendation,
Commissioner Herbosa recommended that
respondent be disbarred from the practice of
law for having been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had
not only been convicted of such crime, but that
the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of
good moral character, based on the following
facts:
1. He was under the influence of liquor while
driving his car;
2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault
Complainant only because the latter, driving a
taxi, had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off
his attempted assault, Respondent went back to
his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a
handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was
unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent
simply pushed him out and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and
overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied
that he had shot Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied
when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons;
and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation,
Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his
civil liabilities to Complainant.[12]
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received
for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting
the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)
recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as v. NLRC,[15] a labor case concerning an
approved and adopted by the IBP Board of employee who was dismissed on the basis of
Governors. his conviction for homicide. Considering the
particular circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime, this Court rejected
the employers contention and held that
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
homicide in that case did not involve moral
Court, conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
violative of the IRRIs Employment
suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is
Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for
deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
dismissal.) The Court explained that, having
administration of justice and to be no longer
disregarded the attendant circumstances, the
possessed of good moral character.[13] In the
employer made a pronouncement that was
instant case, respondent has been found guilty;
precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the
and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of
latter to determine conclusively whether a
frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has
crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion
already been established and is no longer open
belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
to question, the only issues that remain to be
determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime
of frustrated homicide involves moral
turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral
disbarment. turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every
criminal act and is not shown by every known
and intentional violation of statute, but whether
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything
any particular conviction involves moral
which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or
turpitude may be a question of fact and
good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or
frequently depends on all the surrounding
depravity in the private and social duties which
circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals.[14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide
involves moral turpitude has been discussed
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of
homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the
Court appreciated the presence of incomplete
self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of
that Decision, the circumstances of the crime
are quoted as follows:
x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa
[the IRRI employee] was then urinating and
had his back turned when the victim drove his
fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then
forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy
urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop
the attack but was ignored and that it was while
Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan
knife from the left pocket of his shirt and
desperately swung it at the victim who released
his hold on Micosa only after the latter had
stabbed him several times. These facts show
that Micosa's intention was not to slay the
victim but only to defend his person. The
appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self-defense and voluntary
surrender, plus the total absence of any
aggravating circumstance demonstrate that
Micosa's character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust.[17]
The present case is totally different. As the IBP
correctly found, the circumstances clearly
evince the moral turpitude of respondent and
his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he
pursued and shot complainant when the latter
least expected it. The act of aggression shown
by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact
that he was hit once and his arm twisted by
complainant. Under the circumstances, those
were reasonable actions clearly intended to
fend off the lawyers assault.
We also consider the trial courts finding of
treachery as a further indication of the skewed
morals of respondent. He shot the victim when
the latter was not in a position to defend
himself. In fact, under the impression that the
assault was already over, the unarmed
complainant was merely returning the
eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter
unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse,
respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with
a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints.
In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to
escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the
earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct,
respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and
feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted
like a god on the road, who deserved to be
venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his
inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident
reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member
of the legal profession. His overreaction also
evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an
undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a
lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued
complainant, we see not the persistence of a
person who has been grievously wronged, but
the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false
sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent
seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his illegal
possession of an unlicensed firearm[18]and his
unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.[19]
He has thus brazenly violated the law and
disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We
remind him that, both in his attorneys
oath[20] and in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the
laws of the land.
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this
incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense
of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the
trial court when it suspended his sentence and
granted him probation. And yet, it has been
four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his
civil liabilities to complainant. To date,
respondent remains adamant in refusing to
fulfill that obligation. By his extreme
impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his
violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation,
he has taken away the earning capacity, good
health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still,
Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly
amount that could never even fully restore what
the latter has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the
profession of lawyers, but certainly to their
good moral character.[22] Where their
misconduct outside of their professional
dealings is so gross as to show them morally
unfit for their office and unworthy of the
privileges conferred upon them by their license
and the law, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing them from that
office.[23]
We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent
displayed an utter lack of good moral character,
which is an essential qualification for the
privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good
moral character includes at least common
honesty.[24]
In the case at bar, respondent consistently
displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior.
As found by the trial court, he had sought, with
the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral
court settlement with complainants
qualification for bar membership is more
family.[25] But when this effort failed,
important than truthfulness.[29] The rigorous
respondent concocted a complete lie by making
ethics of the profession places a premium on
it appear that it was complainants family that
honesty and condemns duplicitous
had sought a conference with him to obtain his
behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead
referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]
the court or allow it to be misled by any
artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected
to act in good faith.
The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He
went on to fabricate an entirely implausible
story of having been mauled by complainant
The actions of respondent erode rather than
and two other persons.[27] The trial court had
enhance public perception of the legal
this to say:
profession. They constitute moral turpitude for
which he should be disbarred. Law is a noble
profession, and the privilege to practice it is
The physical evidence as testified to by no less bestowed only upon individuals who are
than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. competent intellectually,
Dizon] does not support his allegation that academically and, equally important, morally.
three people including the complainant helped Because they are vanguards of the law and the
each other in kicking and boxing him. The legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
injuries he sustained were so minor that it is themselves, especially in their dealings with
improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] their clients and the public at large, with
that three people who he said were bent on honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
beating him to death could do so little damage. reproach.[31]
On the contrary, his injuries sustain the
complainants version of the incident
particularly when he said that he boxed the
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are
accused on the chest. x x x.[28]
not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic
moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the
offense he committed, we find the penalty
recommended by the IBP proper and
commensurate.
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is
to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important
function be competent, honorable and reliable -
- lawyers in whom courts and clients may
repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear
case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs
that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not
hesitate to rid our profession of odious
members.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must
be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any
lesser penalty would accomplish the end
desired. In the instant case, however, the Court
cannot extend that munificence to respondent.
His actions so despicably and wantonly
disregarded his duties to society and his
profession. We are convinced that meting out a
lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our
lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that
every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and
justice.
We stress that membership in the legal
profession is a privilege demanding a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a
condition precedent to admission, but also as a
continuing requirement for the practice of law.
Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the
exacting standards expected of him as a
vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of
frustrated homicide, the attending
circumstances not the mere fact of their
conviction would demonstrate their fitness to
remain in the legal profession. In the present
case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery,
and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly
show his unworthiness to continue as a member
of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL
DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in his record as a member of the Bar;
and let notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.