G.R. No. 80391. February 28, 1989.* development and social progress.
development and social progress.” At the same time, it relieves the central
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI,
SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS
ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAKIL DAGALANGIT, and
BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Due Process in Administrative Proceedings; Access to Judicial
Remedies; No one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts, unless the
recourse amounts to malicious prosecution.—In the second place, the resolution
appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblyman against the
petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be obduracy on the part of the
latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of “a case [having been filed] [by the
petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assembly—an act which some members
claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as
representative of the people,” an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access
to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, and, unless the recourse
amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in
the courts.
Same; Autonomous Regions; Administrative Law; The autonomous governments of
Mindanao are subject to the jurisdiction of our national courts.—An examination of
the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation.
Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that “[t]he President shall
have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.” In
the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to
discharge chiefly administrative services. x x x Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if
we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more
reason can we review the petitioner’s removal as Speaker.
Same; Same; Same; Decentralization; Autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power.—Now, autonomy is either
decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivision in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments “more responsive
and accountable,” and “ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate
on national concerns. The President exercises “general supervision” over them, but
only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his
own.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Decentralization of power involves an abdication
of political power in favor of local government units declared to be autonomous.—
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case,
the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future
with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional
author, decentralization of power amounts to “self-immolation,” since in that event,
the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities
but to its constituency.
PETITION to review the decision of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII,
Cotabato City.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The
antecedent facts are as follows:
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a
member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region
XII, representing Lanao del Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members,
respondents Acmad Tomawis and Rakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with
the Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May
11, 1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later
withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions
as members of the Assembly.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier
Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his 3. Dagalangit, Rakil
capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads:
4. Dela Fuente, Antonio
The Committee on Muslim Affairs will undertake consultations and dialogues with
local government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on 5. Mangelen, Conte
the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX 6. Ortiz, Jesus
and XII.
7. Palomares, Diego
The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart the
autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the 8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as
mandated by the Commission. 9. Tomawis, Acmad

You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your 10. Tomawis, Jerry
respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of the
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized
Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic)
to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all
indispensable.
Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary seat of the Speaker vacant.
Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no
8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following
session in November as “our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress
Assemblymen present:
take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook x x x.”
1. Mangelen Conte—Presiding Officer
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary
Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram: 2. Ali Salic

3. Ali Salindatu

TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED 4. Aratuc, Malik
FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID 5. Cajelo, Rene
COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV.
6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
1ST TO 15. HENCE WIRE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN
NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS 7. Dagalangit, Rakil
TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF
MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS. 8. Dela Fuente, Antonio

7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner’s 9. Ortiz, Jesus
advice, with the following assemblymen present:
10. Palamares, Diego
1. Sali, Salic
11. Quijano, Jesus
2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
12. Sinsuat, Bimbo
13. Tomawis, Acmad
14. Tomawis, Jerry
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the
presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to
call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the
previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so,
I move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding
Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelista as Acting Secretary in the session last November
2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today’s session.
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motion
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented?
The chair hears none and the said motions are approved. x x x.
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the
Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against.1
Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that—
(a) This Petition be given due course;
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued
enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November
5, 1987, and on any day thereafter;
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by
respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or
Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting; and
(e) Making the injunction permanent.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable.2
Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution
filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, “EXPELLING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM
MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK, AUTONOMOUS REGION XII,”3 on
the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner “had caused to be prepared
and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who
was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen
for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections . . . and nothing in
the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula
was ever made . . .”4 and that “such action of Mr. Limbona in paying Abdula his
salaries and emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a
usurpation of the power of the Assembly,”5 that the petitioner “had recently
caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the
non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic],”6 and that he
had “filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly
on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the
Assembly,”7 for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become
“moot and academic”.8
The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner
(pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason
simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner’s expulsion was
done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt the
Court, it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the
expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing
that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the
petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation,
or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in
the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that “since
November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the
Sangguniang Pampook.”9 To be sure, the private respondents aver that “[t]he
Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City,”10
but that was “so that their differences could be threshed out and settled.”11
Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how
conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing
contemplated by law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law,
does not absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the
opportunity to be heard,12 it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to
begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and
corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded
any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now
levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
In the second place, the resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by
the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former
perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks
of “a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on
question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly—an
act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity
and character as representative of the people,”13 an act that cannot possibly justify
expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution,14 and,
unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for
seeking redress in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the
petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so
minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most
elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the
members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are
nonetheless subject to the moderating hand of this Court in the event that such
discretion is exercised with grave abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are
“autonomous,” the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less
strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called
autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-
government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by
Presidential Decree No. 161815 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things,
the Decree established “internal autonomy”16 in the two regions “[w]ithin the
framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of
the Philippines and its Constitution,”17 “with legislative and executive machinery to
exercise the powers and responsibilites”18 specified therein. It requires the
autonomous regional governments to “undertake all internal administrative matters
for the respective regions,”19 except to “act on matters which are within the
jurisdiction and competence of the National Government,”20 “which include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and
external borrowing;
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural
resources;
(6) Air and sea transport;
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing.”21
In relation to the central government, it provides that “[t]he President shall have
the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions xxx.”22
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments “more
responsive and accountable,”23 and “ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress.”24 At the same time, it relieves the
central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises “general supervision”25
over them, but only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law.”26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own.27
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to “self-immolation,”
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
central authorities but to its constituency.28
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao
under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather
than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is
involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the
present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this
case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in
the proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two
senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.30
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.
(1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it
and accepted principles on the effects and limits of “autonomy.” On the other hand,
an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government).32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII),
then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably, beyond the domain
of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of
the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former
category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction.
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise
autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an
act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates
that “[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions.”33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their
legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook.—The Sangguniang Pampook shall
exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of
national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the
Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social
services, programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture
indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law, including the enactment of
such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that
enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap
ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and
programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa.34
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the
expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner’s removal as
Speaker.
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds
that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole
purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the
Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2)
assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of
quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were
invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules,
“[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the
Sangguniang Pampook,”35 but it provides likewise that “the Speaker may, on [sic]
his discretion, declare a recess of “short intervals.”36 Of course, there is
disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by
the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the “recess of short
intervals” referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that,
to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that “recess” as used by
their Rules only refers to “a recess when arguments get heated up so that
protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic]
and disunity.”37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly,
the Rules speak of “short intervals.” Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the
Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to
convene on November 1, the date session opens under the same Rules.38 Hence,
there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But
while this opinion is in accord with the respondents own, we still invalidate the twin
sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the “recess,” it was not
a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation
tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives
provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a
valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his
attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions
themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances,
we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the “recess” called on the
ground of good faith.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the
aforesaid “recess” in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster.
This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that the
invitation was what precipitated it.
In holding that the “recess” in question is valid, we are not to be taken as
establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared
without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we
are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the
Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing
itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time.
In the event that he petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is
certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them.39
In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang
Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member,
Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152774. May 27, 2004.*
THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, represented by its Governor, HERMILANDO I.
MANDANAS, petitioner, vs. HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary and
Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Devolution; HON. EMILIA BONCODIN,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR.,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, respondents.
Actions; Parties; Locus Standi; The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.”—The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has “alleged
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Accordingly, it
has been held that the interest of a party assailing the constitutionality of a statute
must be direct and personal. Such party must be able to show, not only that the law
or any government act is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in imminent
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or
penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
Same; Same; Same; Local Autonomy; Local Government Code; A local government
unit (LGU), seeking relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and
of the other LGUs, pertaining to their interest in their share in the national taxes or
the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), has the requisite standing to bring suit.—The
Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the
present suit. The petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect
or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. This interest pertains to
the LGUs’ share in the national taxes or the IRA. The petitioner’s constitutional
claim is, in substance, that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
2001, and the OCD resolutions contravene Section 6, Article X of the Constitution,
mandating the “automatic release” to the LGUs of their share in the national taxes.
Further, the injury that the petitioner claims to suffer is the diminution of its share
in the IRA, as provided under Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
occasioned by the implementation of the assailed measures. These allegations are
sufficient to grant the petitioner standing to question the validity of the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions as the
petitioner clearly has “a plain, direct and adequate interest” in the manner and
distribution of the IRA among the LGUs.
Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The rule on hierarchy of courts may be relaxed when the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for
the exercise of the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction.—Considering that these
facts, which are necessary to resolve the legal question now before this Court, are
no longer in issue, the same need not be determined by a trial court. In any case,
the rule on hierarchy of courts will not prevent this Court from assuming
jurisdiction over the petition. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of this Court’s primary jurisdiction. The crucial legal issue submitted for
resolution of this Court entails the proper legal interpretation of constitutional and
statutory provisions. Moreover, the “transcendental importance” of the case, as it
necessarily involves the application of the constitutional principle on local
autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The nature of the present controversy, therefore,
warrants the relaxation by this Court of procedural rules in order to resolve the case
forthwith.
Same; Moot and Academic Questions; Supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; Another reason justifying the resolution by the Court
of the substantive issue now before it is the rule that courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”—
Granting arguendo that, as contended by the respondents, the resolution of the
case had already been overtaken by supervening events as the IRA, including the
LGSEF, for 1999, 2000 and 2001, had already been released and the government is
now operating under a new appropriations law, still, there is compelling reason for
this Court to resolve the substantive issue raised by the instant petition.
Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court
from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in
cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and public. Another reason justifying the
resolution by this Court of the substantive issue now before it is the rule that courts
will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is “capable of repetition,
yet evading review.” For the GAAs in the coming years may contain provisos similar
to those now being sought to be invalidated, and yet, the question may not be
decided before another GAA is enacted. It, thus, behooves this Court to make a
categorical ruling on the substantive issue now.
Municipal Corporations; Local Autonomy; Local Government Code; Consistent with
the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President’s power
over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which provision has been interpreted
to exclude the power of control.—Consistent with the principle of local autonomy,
the Constitution confines the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general
supervision. This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control.
The distinction between the two powers was enunciated in Drilon v. Lim: An officer
in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he
may, in his discretion, order the act undone or redone by his subordinate or he may
even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The
supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done
but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner
for doing the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed.
Same; Same; Same; When parsed, it would be readily seen that Section 6, Article X
of the Constitution readily mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share” in
the national taxes, (2) the “just share” shall be determined by law, and (3) the “just
share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs.—Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution reads: Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them. When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision mandates that (1)
the LGUs shall have a “just share” in the national taxes; (2) the “just share” shall be
determined by law; and (3) the “just share” shall be automatically released to the
LGUs.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The LGUs are not required to perform any
act to receive the “just share” accruing to them from the national coffers—the “just
share” of the LGUs shall be released to them “without need of further action”;
“Automatic” means “involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any
activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition;
mechanical; like or suggestive of an automation.”—Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary defines “automatic” as “involuntary either wholly or to a
major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature;
without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton.” Further, the word
“automatically” is defined as “in an automatic manner: without thought or
conscious intention.” Being “automatic,” thus, connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory. As such, the LGUs are not required to perform any
act to receive the “just share” accruing to them from the national coffers. As
emphasized by the Local Government Code of 1991, the “just share” of the LGUs
shall be released to them “without need of further action.”
Same; Same; Same; Internal Revenue Allotments; Local Government Service
Equalization Fund (LGSEF); Statutory Construction; The entire process involving the
distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible—to subject
its distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and
regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the
Oversight Committee from time to time, makes the release not automatic; Where
the law, the Constitution in this case, is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to
mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the
mandate is obeyed.—To the Court’s mind, the entire process involving the
distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is
part of the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its
distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations,
including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight
Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a
flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the “just share”
of the LGUs “shall be automatically released to them.” The LGUs are, thus, placed at
the mercy of the Oversight Committee. Where the law, the Constitution in this case,
is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts
have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. Moreover, as correctly
posited by the petitioner, the use of the word “shall” connotes a mandatory order.
Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the
idea of discretion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Oversight Committee exercising discretion,
even control, over the distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is
an anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in
the Constitution; The Oversight Committee’s authority is undoubtedly limited to the
implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991, not to supplant or subvert
the same, and neither can it exercise control over the IRA, or even a portion
thereof, of the LGUs.—Indeed, the Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even
control, over the distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is an
anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the
Constitution. Moreover, it finds no statutory basis at all as the Oversight Committee
was created merely to formulate the rules and regulations for the efficient and
effective implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991 to ensure
“compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the
Constitution.” In fact, its creation was placed under the title of “Transitory
Provisions,” signifying its ad hoc character. According to Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, the principal author and sponsor of the bill that eventually became Rep.
Act No. 7160, the Committee’s work was supposed to be done a year from the
approval of the Code, or on October 10, 1992. The Oversight Committee’s authority
is undoubtedly limited to the implementation of the Local Government Code of
1991, not to supplant or subvert the same. Neither can it exercise control over the
IRA, or even a portion thereof, of the LGUs.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The assailed provisos in the Gen-eral
Appropriations Acts (GAAs) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the Oversight Committee
on Devolution (OCD) resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA
—they effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs and must
be struck down.—In like manner, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001, and the OCD resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the
IRA. They put on hold the distribution and release of the five billion pesos LGSEF
and subject the same to the implementing rules and regulations, including the
guidelines and mechanisms prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to
time. Like Section 4 of A.O. 372, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001 and the OCD resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy
enjoyed by the LGUs and must be struck down. They cannot, therefore, be upheld.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The only possible exception to the mandatory
automatic release of the LGUs’ IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for
the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding
third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be a
proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year.—Thus, from the
above provision, the only possible exception to the mandatory automatic release of
the LGUs’ IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal
year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in
which case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount
of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on
a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue
taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year. In the instant case, however, there is
no allegation that the national internal revenue tax collections for the fiscal years
1999, 2000 and 2001 have fallen compared to the preceding three fiscal years.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; Appropriations Bills; Amendments and
Repeals of Laws; While it is conceded that Congress may amend any of the
provisions of the Local Government Code, a substantive law, it may not do so
through appropriations laws or GAAs—any amendment to the Local Government
Code should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, because
Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in a separate legislation.—The respondents argue that this
modification is allowed since the Constitution does not specify that the “just share”
of the LGUs shall only be determined by the Local Government Code of 1991. That
it is within the power of Congress to enact other laws, including the GAAs, to
increase or decrease the “just share” of the LGUs. This contention is untenable. The
Local Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law. And while it is conceded that
Congress may amend any of the provisions therein, it may not do so through
appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the Local Government Code of
1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, because
Congress cannot include in a general appropriation bill matters that should be more
properly enacted in a separate legislation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Inappropriate
Provisions; Words and Phrases; A general appropriations bill is a special type of
legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a
specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit—any provision therein which is intended
to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate provision.”—A general
appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to
specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit.
Any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered an
“inappropriate provision.” The category of “inappropriate provisions” includes
unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws,
because clearly these kinds of laws have no place in an appropriations bill.
Increasing or decreasing the IRA of the LGUs or modifying their percentage sharing
therein, which are fixed in the Local Government Code of 1991, are matters of
general and substantive law. To permit Congress to undertake these amendments
through the GAAs, as the respondents contend, would be to give Congress the
unbridled authority to unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs, and thus
put the same in jeopardy every year. This, the Court cannot sanction.
Same; Same; It is well to note that the principle of local autonomy, while
concededly expounded in greater detail in the present Constitution, dates back to
the turn of the century when President William McKinley, in his Instructions to the
Second Philippine Commission dated 7 April 1900, ordered the new Government
“to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal
governments in which the natives of the Islands, both in the cities and in the rural
communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own affairs to the
fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of
supervision and control in which a careful study of their capacities and observation
of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of
law, order and loyalty.”—In closing, it is well to note that the principle of local
autonomy, while concededly expounded in greater detail in the present
Constitution, dates back to the turn of the century when President William
McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission dated April 7,
1900, ordered the new Government “to devote their attention in the first instance
to the establishment of municipal governments in which the natives of the Islands,
both in the cities and in the rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to
manage their own affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and
subject to the least degree of supervision and control in which a careful study of
their capacities and observation of the workings of native control show to be
consistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.” While the 1935
Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy, nonetheless, it limited the
executive power over local governments to “general supervision . . . as may be
provided by law.” Subsequently, the 1973 Constitution explicitly stated that “[t]he
State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units,
especially the barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.” An entire article on Local Government was incorporated therein. The
present Constitution, as earlier opined, has broadened the principle of local
autonomy. The 14 sections in Article X thereof markedly increased the powers of
the local governments in order to accomplish the goal of a more meaningful local
autonomy.
Same; Same; The value of local governments as institutions of democracy is
measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy—our national officials should
not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should
also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.—
Indeed, the value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by
the degree of autonomy that they enjoy. As eloquently put by M. De Tocqueville, a
distinguished French political writer, “[l]ocal assemblies of citizens constitute the
strength of free nations. Township meetings are to liberty what primary schools are
to science; they bring it within the people’s reach; they teach men how to use and
enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free governments but without the spirit
of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty.” Our national officials
should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but
should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor, Hermilando I. Mandanas,
filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, to declare as unconstitutional and void certain
provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and
2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount
of five billion pesos (P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for
the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions
for the release thereof.
Named as respondents are Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, in his capacity as
Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Devolution, Secretary Emilia Boncodin of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and Secretary Jose Lina of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).
Background
On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 48 entitled “ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION
ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION.” The program was established to “facilitate the
process of enhancing the capacities of local government units (LGUs) in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them by the National
Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the Local Government Code.”1 The
Oversight Committee (referred to as the Devolution Committee in E.O. No. 48)
constituted under Section 533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government
Code of 1991) has been tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate rules and
regulations necessary for its effective implementation.2 Further, to address the
funding shortfalls of functions and services devolved to the LGUs and other funding
requirements of the program, the “Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund”
was created.3 For 1998, the DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be
determined by the Oversight Committee based on the devolution status appraisal
surveys undertaken by the DILG.4 The initial fund was to be sourced from the
available savings of the national government for CY 1998.5 For 1999 and the
succeeding years, the corresponding amount required to sustain the program was
to be incorporated in the annual GAA.6 The Oversight Committee has been
authorized to issue the implementing rules and regulations governing the equitable
allocation and distribution of said fund to the LGUs.7
The LGSEF in the GAA of 1999
In Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the GAA of 1999, the program was
renamed as the LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF).
Under said appropriations law, the amount of P96,780,000,000 was allotted as the
share of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes. Item No. 1, Special Provisions, Title
XXXVI—A. Internal Revenue Allotment of Rep. Act No. 8745 contained the following
proviso:
. . . PROVIDED, That the amount of FIVE BILLION PESOS (P5,000,000,000) shall be
earmarked for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund for the funding
requirements of projects and activities arising from the full and efficient
implementation of devolved functions and services of local government units
pursuant to R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That such amount shall be released to the local
government units subject to the implementing rules and regulations, including such
mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations and distribution of said
fund among local government units subject to the guidelines that may be
prescribed by the Oversight Committee on Devolution as constituted pursuant to
Book IV, Title III, Section 533(b) of R.A. No. 7160. The Internal Revenue Allotment
shall be released directly by the Department of Budget and Management to the
Local Government Units concerned.
On July 28, 1999, the Oversight Committee (with then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
B. Zamora as Chairman) passed Resolution Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005 and OCD-
99-006 entitled as follows:
OCD-99-005
RESOLUTION ADOPTIG THE ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR THE PhP5 BILLION CY 1999
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF) AND REQUESTING HIS
EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA TO APPROVE SAID ALLOCATION
SCHEME.
OCD-99-006
RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR THE PhP4.0 BILLION OF
THE 1999 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND AND ITS
CONCOMITANT GENERAL FRAMEWORK, IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND
MECHANICS FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEASE, AS PROMULGATED BY THE
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON DEVOLUTION.
OCD-99-003
RESOLUTION REQUESTING HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
TO APPROVE THE REQUEST OF THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON DEVOLUTION TO
SET ASIDE TWENTY PERCENT (20%) OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE
EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF) FOR LOCAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROJECTS AND
OTHER PRIORITY INITIATIVES FOR LGUs INSTITUTIONAL AND CAPABILITY BUILDING
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND MECHANICS AS
PROMULGATED BY THE COMMITTEE.
These OCD resolutions were approved by then President Estrada on October 6,
1999.
Under the allocation scheme adopted pursuant to Resolution No. OCD-99-005, the
five billion pesos LGSEF was to be allocated as follows:
1. The PhP4 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in accordance with the allocation
scheme and implementing guidelines and mechanics promulgated and adopted by
the OCD. To wit:
a. The first PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in accordance with the codal
formula sharing scheme as prescribed under the 1991 Local Government Code;
b. The second PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated, in accordance with a
modified 1992 cost of devolution fund (CODEF) sharing scheme, as recommended
by the respective leagues of provinces, cities and municipalities to the OCD. The
modified CODEF sharing formula is as follows:
This is applied to the P2 Billion after the approved amounts granted to individual
provinces, cities and municipalities as assistance to cover decrease in 1999 IRA
share due to reduction in land area have been taken out.
2. The remaining PhP1 Billion of the LGSEF shall be earmarked to support local
affirmative action projects and other priority initiatives submitted by LGUs to the
Oversight Committee on Devolution for approval in accordance with its prescribed
guidelines as promulgated and adopted by the OCD.
In Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the Oversight Committee set aside the one billion
pesos or 20% of the LGSEF to support Local Affirmative Action Projects (LAAPs) of
LGUs. This remaining amount was intended to “respond to the urgent need for
additional funds assistance, otherwise not available within the parameters of other
existing fund sources.” For LGUs to be eligible for funding under the one-billion-
peso portion of the LGSEF, the OCD promulgated the following:
III. CRITERIA FOR ELIGIBILITY:
1. LGUs (province, city, municipality, or barangay), individually or by group or multi-
LGUs or leagues of LGUs, especially those belonging to the 5th and 6th class, may
access the fund to support any projects or activities that satisfy any of the
aforecited purposes. A barangay may also access this fund directly or through their
respective municipality or city.
2. The proposed project/activity should be need-based, a local priority, with high
development impact and are congruent with the sociocultural, economic and
development agenda of the Estrada Administration, such as food security, poverty
alleviation, electrification, and peace and order, among others.
3. Eligible for funding under this fund are projects arising from, but not limited to,
the following areas of concern:
a. delivery of local health and sanitation services, hospital services and other
tertiary services;
b. delivery of social welfare services;
c. provision of socio-cultural services and facilities for youth and community
development;
d. provision of agricultural and on-site related research;
e. improvement of community-based forestry projects and other local projects on
environment and natural resources protection and conservation;
f. improvement of tourism facilities and promotion of tourism;
g. peace and order and public safety;
h. construction, repair and maintenance of public works and infrastructure,
including public buildings and facilities for public use, especially those destroyed or
damaged by man-made or natural calamities and disaster as well as facilities for
water supply, flood control and river dikes;
i. provision of local electrification facilities;
j. livelihood and food production services, facilities and equipment;
k. other projects that may be authorized by the OCD consistent with the
aforementioned objectives and guidelines;
4. Except on extremely meritorious cases, as may be determined by the Oversight
Committee on Devolution, this portion of the LGSEF shall not be used in
expenditures for personal costs or benefits under existing laws applicable to
governments. Generally, this fund shall cover the following objects of expenditures
for programs, projects and activities arising from the implementation of devolved
and regular functions and services:
a. acquisition/procurement of supplies and materials critical to the full and effective
implementation of devolved programs, projects and activities;
b. repair and/or improvement of facilities;
c. repair and/or upgrading of equipment;
d. acquisition of basic equipment;
e. construction of additional or new facilities;
f. counterpart contribution to joint arrangements or collective projects among
groups of municipalities, cities and/or provinces related to devolution and delivery
of basic services.
5. To be eligible for funding, an LGU or group of LGU shall submit to the Oversight
Committee on Devolution through the Department of Interior and Local
Governments, within the prescribed schedule and timeframe, a Letter Request for
Funding Support from the Affirmative Action Program under the LGSEF, duly signed
by the concerned LGU(s) and endorsed by cooperators and/or beneficiaries, as well
as the duly signed Resolution of Endorsement by the respective Sanggunian(s) of
the LGUs concerned. The LGU-proponent shall also be required to submit the
Project Request (PR), using OCD Project Request Form No. 99-02, that details the
following:
(a) general description or brief of the project;
(b) objectives and justifications for undertaking the project, which should highlight
the benefits to the locality and the expected impact to the local program/project
arising from the full and efficient implementation of social services and facilities, at
the local levels;
(c) target outputs or key result areas;
(d) schedule of activities and details of requirements;
(e) total cost requirement of the project;
(f) proponent’s counterpart funding share, if any, and identified source(s) of
counterpart funds for the full implementation of the project;
(g) requested amount of project cost to be covered by the LGSEF.
Further, under the guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee as contained
in Attachment-Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the LGUs were required to identify the
projects eligible for funding under the one-billion-peso portion of the LGSEF and
submit the project proposals thereof and other documentary requirements to the
DILG for appraisal. The project proposals that passed the DILG’s appraisal would
then be submitted to the Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval.
Upon its approval, the Oversight Committee would then serve notice to the DBM
for the preparation of the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) and Notice of
Cash Allocation (NCA) to effect the release of funds to the said LGUs.
The LGSEF in the GAA of 2000
Under Rep. Act No. 8760, otherwise known as the GAA of 2000, the amount of
P111,778,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue
taxes. As in the GAA of 1999, the GAA of 2000 contained a proviso earmarking five
billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF. This proviso, found in Item No. 1, Special
Provisions, Title XXXVII—A. Internal Revenue Allotment, was similarly worded as
that contained in the GAA of 1999.
The Oversight Committee, in its Resolution No. OCD-2000-023 dated June 22, 2000,
adopted the following allocation scheme governing the five billion pesos LGSEF for
2000:
1. The PhP3.5 Billion of the CY 2000 LGSEF shall be allocated to and shared by the
four levels of LGUs, i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, using the
following percentage-sharing formula agreed upon and jointly endorsed by the
various Leagues of LGUs:
Provided that the respective Leagues representing the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays shall draw up and adopt the horizontal
distribution/sharing schemes among the member LGUs whereby the Leagues
concerned may opt to adopt direct financial assistance or projectbased
arrangement, such that the LGSEF allocation for individual LGU shall be released
directly to the LGU concerned;
Provided further that the individual LGSEF shares to LGUs are used in accordance
with the general purposes and guidelines promulgated by the OCD for the
implementation of the LGSEF at the local levels pursuant to Res. No. OCD-99-006
dated October 7, 1999 and pursuant to the Leagues’ guidelines and mechanism as
approved by the OCD;
Provided further that each of the Leagues shall submit to the OCD for its approval
their respective allocation scheme, the list of LGUs with the corresponding LGSEF
shares and the corresponding project categories if project-based;
Provided further that upon approval by the OCD, the lists of LGUs shall be endorsed
to the DBM as the basis for the preparation of the corresponding NCAs, SAROs, and
related budget/release documents.
2. The remaining P1,500,000,000 of the CY 2000 LGSEF shall be earmarked to
support the following initiatives and local affirmative action projects, to be
endorsed to and approved by the Oversight Committee on Devolution in
accordance with the OCD agreements, guidelines, procedures and documentary
requirements:
On July 5, 2000, then President Estrada issued a Memorandum authorizing then
Executive Secretary Zamora and the DBM to implement and release the 2.5 billion
pesos LGSEF for 2000 in accordance with Resolution No. OCD-2000-023.
Thereafter, the Oversight Committee, now under the administration of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, promulgated Resolution No. OCD-2001-29 entitled
“ADOPTING RESOLUTION NO. OCD-2000-023 IN THE ALLOCATION,
IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEASE OF THE REMAINING P2.5 BILLION LGSEF FOR CY
2000.” Under this resolution, the amount of one billion pesos of the LGSEF was to
be released in accordance with paragraph 1 of Resolution No. OCD-2000-23, to
complete the 3.5 billion pesos allocated to the LGUs, while the amount of 1.5 billion
pesos was allocated for the LAAP. However, out of the latter amount, P400,000,000
was to be allocated and released as follows: P50,000,000 as financial assistance to
the LAAPs of LGUs; P275,360,227 as financial assistance to cover the decrease in
the IRA of LGUs concerned due to reduction in land area; and P74,639,773 for the
LGSEF Capability-Building Fund.
The LGSEF in the GAA of 2001
In view of the failure of Congress to enact the general appropriations law for 2001,
the GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted, together with the IRA of the LGUs therein
and the proviso earmarking five billion pesos thereof for the LGSEF.
On January 9, 2002, the Oversight Committee adopted Resolution No. OCD-2002-
001 allocating the five billion pesos LGSEF for 2001 as follows:
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P3.0 B of the CY 2001 LGSEF which is to be allocated
according to the modified codal formula shall be released to the four levels of LGUs,
i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, as follows:
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P1.9 B earmarked for priority projects shall be
distributed according to the following criteria:
1.0 For projects of the 4th, 5th and 6th class LGUs; or
2.0 Projects in consonance with the President’s State of the Nation Address
(SONA)/summit commitments.
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the remaining P100 million LGSEF capability building fund
shall be distributed in accordance with the recommendation of the Leagues of
Provinces, Cities, Municipalities and Barangays, and approved by the OCD.
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas wrote to the
individual members of the Oversight Committee seeking the reconsideration of
Resolution No. OCD-2002-001. He also wrote to Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging her
to disapprove said resolution as it violates the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991.
On January 25, 2002, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo approved Resolution No. OCD-2002-
001.
The Petitioner’s Case
The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as unconstitutional and void the
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, relating to the LGSEF. Similarly
assailed are the Oversight Committee’s Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005,
OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001 issued pursuant
thereto. The petitioner submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs and the OCD
resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of
the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the
release thereof, violate the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it mandates that the “just
share” of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. Sections 18 and 286 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, which enjoin that the “just share” of the LGUs
shall be “automatically and directly” released to them “without need of further
action” are, likewise, cited.
The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release of the five-billion-
peso portion of the IRA, classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the
implementing rules and regulations, including the mechanisms and guidelines
prescribed by the Oversight Committee, contravenes the explicit directive of the
Constitution that the LGUs’ share in the national taxes “shall be automatically
released to them.” The petitioner maintains that the use of the word “shall” must
be given a compulsory meaning.
To further buttress this argument, the petitioner contends that to vest the
Oversight Committee with the authority to determine the distribution and release
of the LGSEF, which is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema to the principle
of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution and the Local Government Code
of 1991. The petitioner cites as an example the experience in 2001 when the
release of the LGSEF was long delayed because the Oversight Committee was not
able to convene that year and no guidelines were issued therefor. Further, the
possible disapproval by the Oversight Committee of the project proposals of the
LGUs would result in the diminution of the latter’s share in the IRA.
Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by the assailed OCD resolutions is
the improper amendment to Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991 on
the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs. Said provision allocates the IRA
as follows: Provinces—23%; Cities—23%; Municipalities—34%; and Barangays—
20%.8 This formula has been improperly amended or modified, with respect to the
five-billion-peso portion of the IRA allotted for the LGSEF, by the assailed OCD
resolutions as they invariably provided for a different sharing scheme.
The modifications allegedly constitute an illegal amendment by the executive
branch of a substantive law. Moreover, the petitioner mentions that in the Letter
dated December 5, 2001 of respondent Executive Secretary Romulo addressed to
respondent Secretary Boncodin, the former endorsed to the latter the release of
funds to certain LGUs from the LGSEF in accordance with the handwritten
instructions of President Arroyo. Thus, the LGUs are at a loss as to how a portion of
the LGSEF is actually allocated. Further, there are still portions of the LGSEF that, to
date, have not been received by the petitioner; hence, resulting in damage and
injury to the petitioner.
The petitioner prays that the Court declare as unconstitutional and void the
assailed provisos relating to the LGSEF in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the
assailed OCD resolutions (Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006,
OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001) issued by the Oversight
Committee pursuant thereto. The petitioner, likewise, prays that the Court direct
the respondents to rectify the unlawful and illegal distribution and releases of the
LGSEF for the aforementioned years and release the same in accordance with the
sharing formula under Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Finally,
the petitioner urges the Court to declare that the entire IRA should be released
automatically without further action by the LGUs as required by the Constitution
and the Local Government Code of 1991.
The Respondents’ Arguments
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the Court to
dismiss the petition on procedural and substantive grounds. On the latter, the
respondents contend that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001
and the assailed resolutions issued by the Oversight Committee are not
constitutionally infirm. The respondents advance the view that Section 6, Article X
of the Constitution does not specify that the “just share” of the LGUs shall be
determined solely by the Local Government Code of 1991. Moreover, the phrase
“as determined by law” in the same constitutional provision means that there exists
no limitation on the power of Congress to determine what is the “just share” of the
LGUs in the national taxes. In other words,
Congress is the arbiter of what should be the “just share” of the LGUs in the
national taxes.
The respondents further theorize that Section 285 of the Local Government Code of
1991, which provides for the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs, was
not intended to be a fixed determination of their “just share” in the national taxes.
Congress may enact other laws, including appropriations laws such as the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001, providing for a different sharing formula. Section 285 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 was merely intended to be the “default share” of
the LGUs to do away with the need to determine annually by law their “just share.”
However, the LGUs have no vested right in a permanent or fixed percentage as
Congress may increase or decrease the “just share” of the LGUs in accordance with
what it believes is appropriate for their operation. There is nothing in the
Constitution which prohibits Congress from making such determination through the
appropriations laws. If the provisions of a particular statute, the GAA in this case,
are within the constitutional power of the legislature to enact, they should be
sustained whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of their enactment.
On procedural grounds, the respondents urge the Court to dismiss the petition
outright as the same is defective. The petition allegedly raises factual issues which
should be properly threshed out in the lower courts, not this Court, not being a
trier of facts. Specifically, the petitioner’s allegation that there are portions of the
LGSEF that it has not, to date, received, thereby causing it (the petitioner) injury
and damage, is subject to proof and must be substantiated in the proper venue, i.e.,
the lower courts.
Further, according to the respondents, the petition has already been rendered
moot and academic as it no longer presents a justiciable controversy. The IRAs for
the years 1999, 2000 and 2001, have already been released and the government is
now operating under the 2003 budget. In support of this, the respondents
submitted certifications issued by officers of the DBM attesting to the release of the
allocation or shares of the petitioner in the LGSEF for 1999, 2000 and 2001. There
is, therefore, nothing more to prohibit.
Finally, the petitioner allegedly has no legal standing to bring the suit because it has
not suffered any injury. In fact, the petitioner’s “just share” has even increased.
Pursuant to Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the share of the
provinces is 23%. OCD Nos. 99-005, 99-006 and 99-003 gave the provinces 40% of
P2 billion of the LGSEF. OCD Nos. 2000-023 and 2001-029 apportioned 26% of P3.5
billion to the provinces. On the other hand, OCD No. 2001-001 allocated 25% of P3
billion to the provinces. Thus, the petitioner has not suffered any injury in the
implementation of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and
the OCD resolutions.
The Ruling of the Court Procedural Issues
Before resolving the petition on its merits, the Court shall first rule on the following
procedural issues raised by the respondents: (1) whether the petitioner has legal
standing or locus standi to file the present suit; (2) whether the petition involves
factual questions that are properly cognizable by the lower courts; and (3) whether
the issue had been rendered moot and academic.
The petitioner has locus standi
to maintain the present suit
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has “alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”9 Accordingly, it has been held
that the interest of a party assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct
and personal. Such party must be able to show, not only that the law or any
government act is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining
has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason
of the statute or act complained of.10
The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the
present suit. The petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect
or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. This interest pertains to
the LGUs’ share in the national taxes or the IRA. The petitioner’s constitutional
claim is, in substance, that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
2001, and the OCD resolutions contravene Section 6, Article X of the Constitution,
mandating the “automatic release” to the LGUs of their share in the national taxes.
Further, the injury that the petitioner claims to suffer is the diminution of its share
in the IRA, as provided under Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
occasioned by the implementation of the assailed measures. These allegations are
sufficient to grant the petitioner standing to question the validity of the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions as the
petitioner clearly has “a plain, direct and adequate interest” in the manner and
distribution of the IRA among the LGUs.
The petition involves a significant legal issue
The crux of the instant controversy is whether the assailed provisos contained in
the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. This is undoubtedly a legal
question. On the other hand, the following facts are not disputed:
1. The earmarking of five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF in the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and re-enacted budget for 2001;
2. The promulgation of the assailed OCD resolutions providing for the allocation
schemes covering the said five billion pesos and the implementing rules and
regulations therefor; and
3. The release of the LGSEF to the LGUs only upon their compliance with the
implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms,
prescribed by the Oversight Committee.
Considering that these facts, which are necessary to resolve the legal question now
before this Court, are no longer in issue, the same need not be determined by a
trial court.11 In any case, the rule on hierarchy of courts will not prevent this Court
from assuming jurisdiction over the petition. The said rule may be relaxed when the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for
the exercise of this Court’s primary jurisdiction.12
The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the proper legal
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions. Moreover, the
“transcendental importance” of the case, as it necessarily involves the application
of the constitutional principle on local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid. The nature of
the present controversy, therefore, warrants the relaxation by this Court of
procedural rules in order to resolve the case forthwith.
The substantive issue needs to be resolved
notwithstanding the supervening events
Granting arguendo that, as contended by the respondents, the resolution of the
case had already been overtaken by supervening events as the IRA, including the
LGSEF, for 1999, 2000 and 2001, had already been released and the government is
now operating under a new appropriations law, still, there is compelling reason for
this Court to resolve the substantive issue raised by the instant petition.
Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court
from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.13 Even in
cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not
hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and public.14
Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the substantive issue now
before it is the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic
if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”15 For the GAAs in the coming
years may contain provisos similar to those now being sought to be invalidated, and
yet, the question may not be decided before another GAA is enacted. It, thus,
behooves this Court to make a categorical ruling on the substantive issue now.
Substantive Issue
As earlier intimated, the resolution of the substantive legal issue in this case calls
for the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of
local autonomy.16 In Article II of the Constitution, the State has expressly adopted
as a policy that:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing
and promoting the autonomy of LGUs. Section 2 thereof reiterates the State policy
in this wise:
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the
President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision.17 This provision has
been interpreted to exclude the power of control. The distinction between the two
powers was enunciated in Drilon v. Lim:18
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or redone by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover
such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no judgment on this matter
except to see to it that the rules are followed.19
The Local Government Code of 199120 was enacted to flesh out the mandate of
the Constitution.21 The State policy on local autonomy is amplified in Section 2
thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy.—(a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment
of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the local government units.
Guided by these precepts, the Court shall now determine whether the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, earmarking for each corresponding
year the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF and the OCD
resolutions promulgated pursuant thereto, transgress the Constitution and the
Local Government Code of 1991.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001 and the OCD resolutions violate the
constitutional precept on local autonomy
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the
national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision mandates that (1) the
LGUs shall have a “just share” in the national taxes; (2) the “just share” shall be
determined by law; and (3) the “just share” shall be automatically released to the
LGUs.
The Local Government Code of 1991, among its salient provisions, underscores the
automatic release of the LGUs’ “just share” in this wise:
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources.—Local government units shall
have the power and authority to establish an organization that shall be responsible
for the efficient and effective implementation of their development plans, program
objectives and priorities; to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes,
fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively for their use and disposition and
which shall be retained by them; to have a just share in national taxes which shall
be automatically and directly released to them without need of further action;
...
Sec. 286. Automatic Release of Shares—(a) The share of each local government unit
shall be released, without need of any further action, directly to the provincial, city,
municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within five
(5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share of local
government units under existing laws.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “automatic” as “involuntary
either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely negligible;
of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of an
automaton.” Further, the word “automatically” is defined as “in an automatic
manner: without thought or conscious intention.” Being “automatic,” thus,
connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such, the LGUs
are not required to perform any act to receive the “just share” accruing to them
from the national coffers. As emphasized by the Local Government Code of 1991,
the “just share” of the LGUs shall be released to them “without need of further
action.” Construing Section 286 of the LGC, we held in Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,22
viz.:
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal
autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the National internal
revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government
Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned
within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and “shall not be subject to any
lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose.” As a rule, the term “SHALL” is a word of command that must be given a
compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, IMPERATIVE.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of
10 percent of the LGUs’ IRA “pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation” in
the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means “something held
back or withheld, often temporarily.” Hence, the “temporary” nature of the
retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of
national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision
effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly,
the President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs’ IRA,
but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within
the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be
carried out by legal methods.23
The “just share” of the LGUs is incorporated as the IRA in the appropriations law or
GAA enacted by Congress annually. Under the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001, a portion of the IRA in the amount of five billion pesos was
earmarked for the LGSEF, and these provisos imposed the condition that “such
amount shall be released to the local government units subject to the
implementing rules and regulations, including such mechanisms and guidelines for
the equitable allocations and distribution of said fund among local government
units subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed by the Oversight Committee
on Devolution.” Pursuant thereto, the Oversight Committee, through the assailed
OCD resolutions, apportioned the five billion pesos LGSEF such that:
For 1999
P2 billion—allocated according to Sec. 285 LGC
P2 billion—Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces—40%;
Cities—20%; Municipalities—40%)
P1 billion—projects (LAAP) approved by OCD.24
For 2000
P3.5 billion—Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces—26%;
Cities—23%; Municipalities—35%; Barangays—16%);
P1.5 billion—projects (LAAP) approved by the OCD.25
For 2001
P3 billion—Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces—25%;
Cities—25%; Municipalities—35%; Barangays—15%)
P1.9 billion—priority projects
P100 million—capability building fund.26
Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without the Oversight
Committee’s prior approval. Further, with respect to the portion of the LGSEF
allocated for various projects of the LGUs (P1 billion for 1999; P1.5 billion for 2000
and P2 billion for 2001), the Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD
resolutions, laid down guidelines and mechanisms that the LGUs had to comply
with before they could avail of funds from this portion of the LGSEF. The guidelines
required (a) the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding based on the
criteria laid down by the Oversight Committee; (b) the LGUs to submit their project
proposal’s to the DILG for appraisal; (c) the project proposals that passed the
appraisal of the DILG to be submitted to the Oversight Committee for review,
evaluation and approval. It was only upon approval thereof that the Oversight
Committee would direct the DBM to release the funds for the projects.
To the Court’s mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of the
LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or “just share”
of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the
vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and
mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time,
as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the
OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the
constitutional and statutory mandate that the “just share” of the LGUs “shall be
automatically released to them.” The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the
Oversight Committee.
Where the law, the Constitution in this case, is clear and unambiguous, it must be
taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that
the mandate is obeyed.27 Moreover, as correctly posited by the petitioner, the use
of the word “shall” connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.28
Indeed, the Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over the
distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is an anathema to and
subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution.
Moreover, it finds no statutory basis at all as the Oversight Committee was created
merely to formulate the rules and regulations for the efficient and effective
implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991 to ensure “compliance with
the principles of local autonomy as defined under the Constitution.”29 In fact, its
creation was placed
under the title of “Transitory Provisions,” signifying its ad hoc character. According
to Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the principal author and sponsor of the bill that
eventually became Rep. Act No. 7160, the Committee’s work was supposed to be
done a year from the approval of the Code, or on October 10, 1992.30 The
Oversight Committee’s authority is undoubtedly limited to the implementation of
the Local Government Code of 1991, not to supplant or subvert the same. Neither
can it exercise control over the IRA, or even a portion thereof, of the LGUs.
That the automatic release of the IRA was precisely intended to guarantee and
promote local autonomy can be gleaned from the discussion below between
Messrs. Jose N. Nolledo and Regalado M. Maambong, then members of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, to wit:
MR. MAAMBONG. Unfortunately, under Section 198 of the Local Government
Code, the existence of subprovinces is still acknowledged by the law, but the
statement of the Gentleman on this point will have to be taken up probably by the
Committee on Legislation. A second point, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that under Article
2, Section 10 of the 1973 Constitution, we have a provision which states:
The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units,
especially the barrio, to insure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.
This provision no longer appears in the present configuration; does this mean that
the concept of giving local autonomy to local governments is no longer adopted as
far as this Article is concerned?
MR. NOLLEDO. No. In the report of the Committee on Preamble, National Territory,
and Declaration of Principles, that concept is included and widened upon the
initiative of Commissioner Bennagen.
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you for that.
With regard to Section 6, sources of revenue, the creation of sources as provided by
previous law was, “subject to limitations as may be provided by law,” but now, we
are using the term “subject to such guidelines as may be fixed by law.” In Section 7,
mention is made about the “unique, distinct and exclusive charges and
contributions,” and in Section 8, we talk about “exclusivity of local taxes and the
share in the national wealth.” Incidentally, I was one of the authors of this
provision, and I am very thankful. Does this indicate local autonomy, or was the
wording of the law changed to give more autonomy to the local government units?
31
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes. In effect, those words indicate also “decentralization” because
local political units can collect taxes, fees and charges subject merely to guidelines,
as recommended by the league of governors and city mayors, with whom I had a
dialogue for almost two hours. They told me that limitations may be questionable
in the sense that Congress may limit and in effect deny the right later on.
MR. MAAMBONG. Also, this provision on “automatic release of national tax share”
points to more local autonomy. Is this the intention?
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, the Commissioner is perfectly right.32
The concept of local autonomy was explained in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals33 in
this wise:
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy ‘means a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization.’ The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to
break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local
governments and as put by political adherents, to “liberate the local governments
from the imperialism of Manila.” Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration
and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The
Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the
Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose
than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
As we observed in one case, decentralization means devolution of national
administration—but not power—to the local levels. Thus:
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the process to make local governments ‘more
responsive and accountable’ and ‘ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress.’ At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate
on national concerns. The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over them, but
only to ‘ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.’ He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his
own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
power in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous.
In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape
its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to ‘self-immolation,’ since
in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.34
Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. The fairly recent
case of Pimentel v. Aguirre35 is particularly instructive. The Court declared therein
that local fiscal autonomy includes the power of the LGUs to, inter alia, allocate
their resources in accordance with their own priorities:
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative
autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal
autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own
sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes
released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of
their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof.
They are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local governments,
whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not . . .36
Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the constitutionally mandated
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.37
Following this ratiocination, the Court in Pimentel struck down as unconstitutional
Section 4 of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 372 which ordered the withholding,
effective January 1, 1998, of ten percent of the LGUs’ IRA “pending the assessment
and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation.”
In like manner, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the
OCD resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA. They put on
hold the distribution and release of the five billion pesos LGSEF and subject the
same to the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and
mechanisms prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time. Like Section
4 of A.O. 372, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the
OCD resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs
and must be struck down. They cannot, therefore, be upheld.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and 2001 and the OCD resolutions cannot amend
Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991
Section 28438 of the Local Government Code provides that, beginning the third
year of its effectivity, the LGUs’ share in the
national internal revenue taxes shall be 40%. This percentage is fixed and may not
be reduced except “in the event the national government incurs an unmanageable
public sector deficit” and only upon compliance with stringent requirements set
forth in the same section:
Sec. 284.
Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable
public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon
recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local
Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation
with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the
liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local
government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent
(30%) of the collection of the national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current fiscal year; Provided, further That in the first year of the
effectivity of this Code, the local government units shall, in addition to the thirty
percent (30%) internal revenue allotment which shall include the cost of devolved
functions for essential public services, be entitled to receive the amount equivalent
to the cost of devolved personnel services.
Thus, from the above provision, the only possible exception to the mandatory
automatic release of the LGUs’ IRA is if the national internal revenue collections for
the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding
third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be a
proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment
may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of
national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year. In the
instant case, however, there is no allegation that the national internal revenue tax
collections for the fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001 have fallen compared to the
preceding three fiscal years.
Section 285 then specifies how the IRA shall be allocated among the LGUs:
Sec. 285. Allocation to Local Government Units.—The share of local government
units in the internal revenue allotment shall be allocated in the following manner:
(a) Provinces—Twenty-three (23 %)
(b) Cities—Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities—Thirty-four (34%); and
(d) Barangays—Twenty percent (20%).
However, this percentage sharing is not followed with respect to the five billion
pesos LGSEF as the assailed OCD resolutions, implementing the assailed provisos in
the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, provided for a different sharing scheme. For
example, for 1999, P2 billion of the LGSEF was allocated as follows: Provinces—
40%; Cities—20%; Municipalities—40%.39 For 2000, P3.5 billion of the LGSEF was
allocated in this manner: Prov-inces—26%; Cities—23%; Municipalities—35%;
Barangays—26%.40 For 2001, P3 billion of the LGSEF was allocated, thus: Prov-inces
—25%; Cities—25%; Municipalities—35%; Barangays—15%.41
The respondents argue that this modification is allowed since the Constitution does
not specify that the “just share” of the LGUs shall only be determined by the Local
Government Code of 1991. That it is within the power of Congress to enact other
laws, including the GAAs, to increase or decrease the “just share” of the LGUs. This
contention is untenable. The Local Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law.
And while it is conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions therein, it
may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the Local
Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the
appropriations law, because Congress cannot include in a general appropriation bill
matters that should be more properly enacted in a separate legislation.42
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited
to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal
unit.43 Any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is considered
an “inappropriate provision.” The category of “inappropriate provisions” includes
unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws,
because clearly these kinds of laws have no place in an appropriations bill.44
Increasing or decreasing the IRA of the LGUs or modifying their percentage sharing
therein, which are fixed in the Local Government Code of 1991, are matters of
general and substantive law. To permit Congress to undertake these amendments
through the GAAs, as the respondents contend, would be to give Congress the
unbridled authority to unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs, and thus
put the same in jeopardy every year. This, the Court cannot sanction.
It is relevant to point out at this juncture that, unlike those of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
the GAAs of 2002 and 2003 do not contain provisos similar to the herein assailed
provisos. In other words, the GAAs of 2002 and 2003 have not earmarked any
amount of the IRA for the LGSEF. Congress had perhaps seen fit to discontinue the
practice as it recognizes its infirmity. Nonetheless, as earlier mentioned, this Court
has deemed it necessary to make a definitive ruling on the matter in order to
prevent its recurrence in future appropriations laws and that the principles
enunciated herein would serve to guide the bench, bar and public.
Conclusion
In closing, it is well to note that the principle of local autonomy, while concededly
expounded in greater detail in the present Constitution, dates back to the turn of
the century when President William McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second
Philippine
Commission dated April 7, 1900, ordered the new Government “to devote their
attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments in
which the natives of the Islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities,
shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own affairs to the fullest extent
of which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of supervision and
control in which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the workings
of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order and
loyalty.”45 While the 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy,
nonetheless, it limited the executive power over local governments to “general
supervision . . . as may be provided by law.”46 Subsequently, the 1973 Constitution
explicitly stated that “[t]he State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of
local government units, especially the barangay to ensure their fullest development
as self-reliant communities.”47 An entire article on Local Government was
incorporated therein. The present Constitution, as earlier opined, has broadened
the principle of local autonomy. The 14 sections in Article X thereof markedly
increased the powers of the local governments in order to accomplish the goal of a
more meaningful local autonomy.
Indeed, the value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by
the degree of autonomy that they enjoy.48 As eloquently put by M. De Tocqueville,
a distinguished French political writer, “[l]ocal assemblies of citizens constitute the
strength of free nations. Township meetings are to liberty what primary schools are
to science; they bring it within the people’s reach; they teach men how to use and
enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free governments but without the spirit
of municipal institutions, it cannot have the spirit of liberty.”49
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on
local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these
provisions are based.50

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed provisos in the General

Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed OCD Resolutions, are
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 91649. May 14, 1991.*

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND

LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING
CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.

Constitutional Law; Taxation; Municipal Corporations; Municipal corporations have

no inherent power to tax; their power to tax must always yield to a legislative act.—
The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105
Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, “the Charter or
statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot
assume it” (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its “power to tax” therefore must
always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the
state itself which has the “inherent power to tax” (Bernas, the Revised [1973]
Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress has the power of control over local
governments; if Congress can grant a municipal corporation the power to tax
certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.—
The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be
stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress” (Unson v.
Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to “create and
abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers” (Asuncion v.
Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has
the power of control over local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July
2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
Same; Same; Same; License Fees; The power of local governments to regulate
gambling thru the grant of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD
771, it is now vested exclusively on the National Government.—The City of Manila’s
power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975,
the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of “franchise,
licenses or permits” was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on
the National Government. xxx xxx Therefore, only the National Government has the
power to issue “licenses or permits” for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the
power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of
“licenses or permits” is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Local governments have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the National Government; PAGCOR, being an instrumentality of
the Government, is therefore exempt from local taxes.—Local governments have no
power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a
government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All
of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. xxx xxx PAGCOR has
a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the
Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and
actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened,
impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government. “The states have no
power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control
the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the
powers vested in the federal government.” (MC Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316,
4 L Ed. 579) This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National
Government over local governments. “Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme
Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to
touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States
(Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political
subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it
from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the
accomplishment of them.” (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140,
italics supplied). Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies
thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable
activities or enterprise using the power to tax as “a tool for regulation” (U.S. v.
Sanchez, 340 US 42). The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the
“power to destroy” (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an
instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield
it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The power of local government to impose taxes and fees
is always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law.—The power of
local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to “limitations”
which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an “operative” law until
“amended, repealed or revoked” (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its
“exemption clause” remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local
governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is
consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Same; Same; Same; Local Autonomy; The principle of local autonomy does not
make local governments sovereign within the state, it simply means
decentralization.—Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means “decentralization” (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments
sovereign within the state or an “imperium in imperio.” Local Government has been
described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law
and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such
as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only
be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium
in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of
decentralization of the function of government. (italics supplied)
Same; Equal Protection Clause; The “equal protection” clause does not preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law
as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary.—Petitioners next
contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
because “it legalized PAGCOR—conducted gambling, while most gambling are
outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices” (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners’
posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the
laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not
have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21,
1989). The “equal protection clause” does not prohibit the Legislature from
establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall
operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the
same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827). Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling
conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in
the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449)
horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA
1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others
are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one,
unconstitutional. “If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not
to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been
applied.” (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827) “The equal protection clause of the 14
th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must
be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed
as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less
than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made
mathematically exact.” (Dominican Hotel v. Arizana, 249 U.S. 2651).
Same; Statutes; Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, for a
law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution.—Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality
(Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to
be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds
for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra)
Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional
must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition
must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable.
But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of
“morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state
principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values” being raised, is up
for Congress to determine.
PADILLA, J., Concurring
Constitutional Law; Legislative Department; The legislative department must
outlaw all forms of gambling, as a fundamental policy.—Gambling is reprehensible
whether maintained by government or privatized. The revenues realized by the
government out of “legalized” gambling will, in the long run, be more than offset
and negated by the irreparable damage to the people’s moral values. Also, the
moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals against “illegal gambling”
is fatally flawed and becomes untenable when it itself engages in the very activity it
seeks to eradicate. One can go through the Court’s decision today and mentally
replace the activity referred to therein as gambling, which is legal only because it is
authorized by law and run by the government, with the activity known as
prostitution. Would prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be authorized
by law, franchised, and “regulated” by the government, in return for the substantial
revenues it would yield the government to carry out its laudable projects, such as
infrastructure and social amelioration? The question, I believe, answers itself. I
submit that the sooner the legislative department outlaws all forms of gambling, as
a fundamental state policy, and the sooner the executive implements such policy,
the better it will be for the nation.
PARAS, J.:
A TV ad proudly announces:
“The new PAGCOR—responding through responsible gaming.”
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition
seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)
Charter—PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and
order, and because—
“A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and
license fees, which is recognized by law;
“B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law
has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license
fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local
autonomy;
“C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes
PAGCOR—conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed,
together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
“C. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic
and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization.” (p. 2, Amended
Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to
the declared national policy of the “new restored democracy” and the people’s will
as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a “gambling
objective” and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of
Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second
Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo).
The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers
(petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City
Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged
grounds mentioned above.
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by
virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D
1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 “to establish, operate and maintain gambling
casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.” Its
operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino “Philippine
Tourist.” The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential
source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socioeconomic projects, thus, P.D.
1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the
Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing
franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy—
“Section 1 . Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by
existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:
“(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct
games of chance into one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and
supervised by the Government.
“(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation,
including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other
forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be
allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will:
(1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic
projects, such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage
projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and
such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities
which will expand and improve the country’s existing tourist attractions; and (3)
minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are
normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos
without direct government involvement.” (Section 1, P.D. 1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the
Philippines. Under its Charter’s repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders,
rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or
modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone,
PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a
total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government’s income share, the
President’s Social Fund and Host Cities’ share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other
sociocultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various
governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3
1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the
government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was
employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting
the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D No. 1869. They allege that
the same is “null and void” for being “contrary to morals, public policy and public
order,” monopolistic and tends toward “crony economy”, and is violative of the
equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the
state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12
(Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII
and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the
most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what
has been described as “the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the
judicial department of the government.” (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v.
Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and
coordinate branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-
honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed
to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This
is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear
that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of
its authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let
it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr.
Justice Zaldivar underscored the—
“x x x thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where
questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All
presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt;
that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any
reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld
and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned
with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal
interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation
should be adopted.” (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton,
106 N.W. 2 nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734,
739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of
Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for
Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the
legal personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping
with the Court’s duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not
the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng
Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)
“With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases
before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors
because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate
injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly
speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion
of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its
addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
“In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed
to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President
Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in
common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not
proper parties and ruled that ‘the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must technicalities of procedure.’ We have since then applied the exception in
many other cases.” (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec.
of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues
raised.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the
prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in
the exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been
defined as the “state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare.” (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA
481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,
163 SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest
benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its
origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn
in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance.
Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the
plenary power of the state “to govern its citizens”. (Tribe, American Constitutional
Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self-
protection and is most aptly termed the “law of overwhelming necessity.” (Rubi v.
Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is “the most essential, insistent,
and illimitable of powers.” (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic
force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of the winds of change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to “regulate and
centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing
franchise or permitted by law” (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently
proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity—
the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It
is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It
provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to “close scrutiny,
regulation, supervision and control of the Government” (4th Whereas Clause, PD
1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government,
the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not
totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD
1896.
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of
Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is
violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13
par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying
any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies
of whatever nature, whether National or Local.”
“(2)Income and other taxes.—(a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form,
income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether
National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the
Corporation; nor shall any form of tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of
the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or
earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such
tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in
lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or
description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national
government authority” (Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to
impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105
Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, “the Charter or
statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot
assume it” (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its “power to tax” therefore must
always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the
state itself which has the “inherent power to tax” (Bernas, the Revised [1973]
Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be
stressed that “municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress” (Unson v.
Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to “create and
abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers” (Asuncion v.
Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has
the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July
2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain
matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been
revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling
thru the grant of “franchise, licenses or permits” was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771
and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:
“Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of
chartered cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or other form
of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai
and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.
“Section 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish,
horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by
the national government upon proper application and verification of the
qualification of the applicant x x x.”
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue “licenses or
permits” for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect
license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of “licenses or permits” is no
longer vested in the City of Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an
original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National
Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II,PD 1869) it also
exercises regulatory powers, thus:
“Sec. 9. Regulatory Power.—The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the
affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the
responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such
affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not
limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in
corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the
operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original
incorporation.”
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role
is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of
the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be
and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.
“The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in
any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to
carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government.” (MC Culloch v.
Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the “supremacy” of the National Government over
local governments.
“Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire
absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least,
the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it
can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal
instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal
responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accmplishment of them.”
(Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, italics supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or
enterprise using the power to tax as “a tool for regulation” (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US
42). The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the “power to
destroy” (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an
instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield
it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be
violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987
Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:
“Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of
revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and
limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local
government.” (italics supplied)
The power of local government to “impose taxes and fees” is always subject to
“limitations” which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an
“operative” law until “amended, repealed or revoked” (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987
Constitution), its “exemption clause” remains as an exception to the exercise of the
power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be
violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
“decentralization” (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436,
as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First
Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or
an “imperium in imperio.”
“Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state
which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary
system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution,
local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign
nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio . Local government in such a system
can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (italics
supplied)
As to what state powers should be “decentralized” and what may be delegated to
local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is
therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy
Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with
gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to
retain it or delegate it to local governments.
“As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express
charter power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with
the subject. x x x In the absence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance
provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void.”
(Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757
following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as
cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 ibid, p. 548, italics supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, because “it legalized PAGCOR—conducted gambling, while most
gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices”
(p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners’
posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the
laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not
have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21,
1989).
The “equal protection clause” does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v.
Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same
(Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by
PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition.
The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing
(R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as
amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are
prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
“If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown
because there are other instances to which it might have been applied.” (Gomez v.
Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
“The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all
occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may
do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in
which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would
insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact.” (Dominican Hotel v.
Arizana, 249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners’ claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the “avowed trend of the Cory
Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise
and privatization” suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify
P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government’s policies then it is
for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.
“The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law
is and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues
are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people
themselves as the repository of all state power.” (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170
SCRA 256).
On the issue of “monopoly,” however, the Constitution provides that:
“Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so
requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed.” (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily
prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest
demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of
policy for the Legislature to decide.
On petitioners’ allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12
(Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII
and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it
to state also that these are merely statements of principles and policies. As such,
they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is
to clearly define and effectuate such principles. precisely so when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness
necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his
“In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the
principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental control,
addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are
failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but
political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been
executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot.” (Bernas, Vol. II, p. preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.
2)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA SO ORDERED.
30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must
be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must
be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly
establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based
on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869,
the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The
dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869
remains a wise legislation considering the issues of “morality, monopoly, trend to
free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of
youth and educational values” being raised, i s up for Congress to determine.

As this Court held in Citizens’ Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory
Board, 162 SCRA 521—

“Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any
case, in its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners
Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to
identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated
by that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine
how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution.
The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in
question the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF,
issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court may not
constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political
departments of government: the President and the Congress.”
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPO-RATION, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Gambling; The morality of gambling is

not a justiciable issue.—The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the
interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing
or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to
Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion,
the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it
may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may
consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its
own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well
has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories.
That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions
regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the
judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to
which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is
exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their
own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not
to the courts of justice.

Local Governments; Tests of a valid ordinance.—The tests of a valid ordinance are

well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance
must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene
the constitution or any statute; 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) It must not
be partial or discriminatory; 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) It
must be general and consistent with public policy; 6) It must not be unreasonable.

Same; Gambling; Statutory Construction; Local Government Code; Under the rule
of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given
the same meaning of, words with which it is associated, and, since the word
“gambling” is associated with “and other prohibited games of chance,” under Sec.
458 of the Local Government Code, the word should be read as referring only to
illegal gambling.—We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local
Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, “gambling and other prohibited games of chance.” Obviously, this
provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact
permitted by law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code
could have excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language
of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word
or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words
with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word
“gambling” is associated with “and other prohibited games of chance,” the word
should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited
games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The ordinances in question contravene P.D.
1869 which has not been repealed by the Local Government Code.—The apparent
flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public
policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power
conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an
ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have
changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute.
Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local Government Code
itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In their view,
the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely “modified pro
tanto” in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of
the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 of the Local
Government Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal another
law. It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that
the decree has only been “modifiedpro tanto,” they are actually arguing that it is
already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code
has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking,
its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact,
the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if
the word “shall” as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local
government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which
in the petitioners’ view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this
construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize
as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the
mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot
continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no
longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue
through the operation of casinos.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Implied Repeals; It is a familiar rule that implied
repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
showing of such intention.—It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only
Par. (f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision
which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are
repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. x x x
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that
instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive
confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that
both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of
the government.—There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869.
On the contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the
source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a
Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust
punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for
measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by
these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been
repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to
make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government. It is a
canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in
an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile
them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork
of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between
P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other
but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the
case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under
the Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must)
prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those
allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be
read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and
mutually complementary.
Same; Same; Same; There are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and
those authorized by law.—This approach would also affirm that there are indeed
two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized
gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not
indeed more so. The petitioners’ suggestion that the Code authorizes them to
prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms
of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature.
Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance,
prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as
authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome
as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.
Same; Same; The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not
contravene a statute is obvious as municipal governments are only agents of the
national government and that the delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter.—In light of all the above
considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the
petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find that
the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as
well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain
games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. The rationale of the
requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the
local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate
of the statute.
Same; Same; Congress retains control of the local government units although in
significantly reduced degree now than under the previous Constitutions.—This
basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units
has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the
policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here
confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in
significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power
to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the
power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power
to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the
national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot
defy its will or modify or violate it.
PADILLA, J., Concurring:
Gambling; It is worth remembering that 1) what is legal is not always moral and 2)
the ends do not always justify the means.—However, despite the legality of the
opening and operation of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent PAGCOR, I
wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any form runs counter to the
government’s own efforts to reestablish and resurrect the Filipino moral character
which is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion. It is in the light of
this alarming perspective that I call upon government to carefully weigh the
advantages and disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the country.
That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of the government is not
enough reason for setting up more gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will
not help improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino moral
character. It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is legal is not always
moral and 2) the ends do not always justify the means.
Same; The national government (through PAGCOR) should reexamine and re-
evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan
de Oro City.—In the present case, it is my considered view that the national
government (through PAGCOR) should re-examine and re-evaluate its decision of
imposing the gambling casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City; for it is
abundantly clear that public opinion in the city is very much against it, and again
the question must be seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be
realized from the casino outweigh the further destruction of the Filipino sense of
values?
DAVIDE, JR., J., Concurring:
Pleadings and Practice; Prohibition; Court of Appeals; Hierarchy of Courts; The
petition for prohibition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court,
instead of the Court of Appeals.—It must at once be noted that private respondent
Pryce Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the Court of Appeals its so-
called petition for prohibition, thereby invoking the said court’s original jurisdiction
to issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it, however,
the principal cause of action therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and
unconstitutional x x x the challenged ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro. x x x Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
does not have jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even assuming arguendo
that the case is one for prohibition, then, under this Court’s established policy
relative to the hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no special or compelling reason
why it was not filed with the said court. I do not wish to entertain the thought that
PRYCE doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which case the filing of the
petition with the Court of Appeals may have been impelled by tactical
considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals would have been
in order pursuant to our decisions in People vs. Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415 [1989])
and Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]).
Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; A contravention of a law is not
necessarily a contravention of the constitution.—The nullification by the Court of
Appeals of the challenged ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in
contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention of a law is not
necessarily a contravention of the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still
stand even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be reconciled,
which is not impossible to do. So reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as
not applying to PAGCOR.
Gambling; Gambling, even if legalized, would be inimical to the general welfare of
the inhabitants of the City, or of any place for that matter, accordingly, PAGCOR
must consider the valid concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and
should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.—
From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and the people of Cagayan de
Oro City are, for obvious reasons, strongly against the opening of the gambling
casino in their city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be inimical to the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the city, or of any place for that matter. The PAGCOR,
as a government-owned corporation, must consider the valid concerns of the
people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and should not impose its will upon them in
an arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.
CRUZ, J.:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The
religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women’s groups and the
youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media
trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.
The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities,
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it
leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one
of the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared
to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and
hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3353
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND
CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING
AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE
OPERATION OF CASINO.
BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro, in
session assembled that:
SECTION1.—That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino
within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any person,
partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the city limits.
SECTION2.—That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons,
partnership or corporation to use its business establishment or portion thereof, or
allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and other gambling activities.
SECTION3.—PENALTIES.—Any violation of such existing business permit as defined
in the preceding section shall suffer the following penalties, to wit:
a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first offense and a
fine of P1,000.00/day
b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the second offense, and
a fine of P3,000.00/day
c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of One (1) year,
for the third and subsequent offenses.
SECTION4.—This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof.
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93
reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING
PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.
WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO
under its Resolution No. 2295;
WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No.
2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment of CASINO;
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353,
prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel existing Business Permit
to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion
thereof for the operation of CASINO;
WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI
of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the City Council as the
Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any activity inimical to public
morals and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity
pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moral
welfare of the community.
NOW THEREFORE,
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:
SECTION1.—The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is
hereby prohibited.
SECTION2.—Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following
penalties:
a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor,
partnership or corporation undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance of
gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof;
b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or a
fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court against the
manager, supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the establishment, conduct
and maintenance of gambling CASINO.
SECTION3.—This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a
local newspaper of general circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by
PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On
March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued
the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement.1 Reconsideration of this decision
was denied on July 13, 1993.2
Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.3 They aver that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred in holding that:
1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro
does not have the power and authority to prohibit the establishment and operation
of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City’s territorial limits.
2. The phrase “gambling and other prohibited games of chance” found in Sec. 458,
par. (a), sub-par. (1)-(v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean “illegal gambling.”
3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on
that point.
4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to
cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point.
5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the general
powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with the
laws or policy of the State.
6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR,
G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the issues presented in
this present case.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and
regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation,4 this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even
cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest
revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purpose indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly
vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause
now embodied in Section 16 as follows:
SEC.16.—General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:
Sec.458.—Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.—(a) The Sangguniang
Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and
shall:
(1)Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective
city government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate
penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,
prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and
other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or
property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delin-
quency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic
materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and
morals of the inhabitants of the city;
This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and
businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare.5
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of
chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general
law and even by
the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units
may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over “illegal gambling” as
the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been
permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the
authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted
to it by the Local Government Code.
It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local
autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as
well as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the
nation. In giving the local government units the power to prevent or suppress
gambling and other social problems, the Local Govern-ment Code has recognized
the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best
expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the
policies of the State.
The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local
government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant all forms of gambling
without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos.6
Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their power casinos
and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could have easily done.
The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local government units are
permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories, including the
operation of casinos.
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of
modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than
P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them.
More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly
discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and
provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local
Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the
petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal
interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code
specifically provides:
Sec.5. Rules of Interpretation.—In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code,
the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved
in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair
and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor
of the local government unit concerned;
xxx
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give
more powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and
upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various
provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the
general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the
family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call
attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the
immorality of gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they
describe as “a martial law instrument”) in creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to
operate casinos “on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.”
This is the opportune time to stress an important point.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se.
While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is
nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for
that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity
as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of
gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it
has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-
racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this
Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that
courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories.8 That is the
prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the
wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but
may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive.
Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own
conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the
courts of justice.
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of
Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid
down by law and not by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions9 has held
that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local
government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, “gambling
and other prohibited games of chance.” Obviously, this provision excludes games of
chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners
are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of
chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule ofnoscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is
associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word “gambling” is associated
with “and other prohibited games of chance,” the word should be read as referring
to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be
prevented or suppressed.
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite
conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the
inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve
more than short shrift from this Court.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869
and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from
exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The
petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the
ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail
against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local
Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking
authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but
merely “modified pro tanto” in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a
casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification
of P.D. 1869 of the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can
change or repeal another law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the
decree has only been “modified pro tanto,” they are actually arguing that it is
already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code
has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking,
its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact,
the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if
the word “shall” as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local
government units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which
in the petitioners’ view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this
construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize
as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the
mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot
continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no
longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue
through the operation of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause,
conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the
specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code.
Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause,
which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission:
SEC.534. Repealing Clause.—a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
“Local Government Code,” Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No.
319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders,
instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are
hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital
fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special
Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree
Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree
No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos.
381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of
no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-
funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential
Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections
52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as
amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v.
Apostol,10 this Court explained:
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the
assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of
the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect;
but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become
an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former
law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or
provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear to each other the
relation of general to special.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary,
as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of
funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of
Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust
punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for
measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by
these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been
repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to
make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against
another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to
reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the
handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a
conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one
and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This
is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to
hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units may (and
indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories
except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such
laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally
effective and mutually complementary.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to
wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern
concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The
petitioners’ suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of
gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without
a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this
theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42
or stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A.
983.
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion
urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the
contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and
force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the
playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a
statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national
government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on
them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior
to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to
suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which
they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the
mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which
they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge
and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the
legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly
and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the
state, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the
right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase
it, the mere tenants at will of the legis-lature.11
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government
units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that
policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units
although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous
Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to
grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable
innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government
units of the power to tax,12 which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By
and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare
of their constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro
City will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that “the
hope of large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the
workman”13 and that “habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin.”14 In
People v. Gorostiza,15 we declared: “The social scourge of gambling must be
stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit.” George
Washington called gambling “the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the
father of mischief.” Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the legislature to
decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done in P.D.
1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can be
revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all
official acts. We do not find such contravention here.
We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance,
including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local
Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or
suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute
that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not
competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino
and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinance are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public
policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 89651. November 10, 1989.*
DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU MACALIMPOWAC
DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTAHA BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID
SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing the other taxpayers of
Mindanao, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE
GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 89965. November 10, 1989.*
ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O, petitioner, vs. HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Budget, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; It is neither necessary nor determinate to rule on the nature of
the Tripoli Agreement; Case at bar.—We find it neither necessary nor determinative
of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on
the Philippine Government whether under public international or internal
Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for
the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any
inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in
the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and
the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the
implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the
Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would then
constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to
R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be
in the same class as the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th
ed., 1974), citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2
Pet. 253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli
Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A.
No. 6734 contravenes the Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs
sought.
Same; Creation of autonomous region under the Constitution and R.A. 6734; How
to take effect; Single plebiscite contemplated, determinative of (1) whether there
shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and
cities, shall compromise it.—Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the
creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be
included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a
majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be
that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces
and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be
included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A.
No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among
those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall comprise it.
Same; The creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total
majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the
constituent units; Case at bar.—If the framers of the Constitution intended to
require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have
so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that “[t]his Constitution
shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held for the purpose x x x.” Comparing this with the provision on the
creation of the autonomous region, which reads: The creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be
included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec. 18, para. 2.] it will readily be seen
that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total
majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the
constituent units and the proviso underscores this. For if the intention of the
framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast,
they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the
ratification of the Constitution, i.e. “the creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose.”
Same; What is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving
the organic act in individual constituent units.—It is thus clear that what is required
by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in
individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent
units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
Same; Separation of powers; The ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share
common attributes is within the exclusive realm of legislature’s discretion.—
Petitioner’s argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by
which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous
region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of
the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the
legislature’s discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the
wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the
separation of governmental powers.
Same; Equal Protection; Permits of reasonable classification; The guarantee of
equal protection is not infringed in the case at bar; Reason.—Moreover, equal
protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1936);
Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land Tenure
Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. In Dumlao v.
Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392], the
Court ruled that one class may be treated differently from another where the
groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of equal
protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been made by
Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution
itself.
Same; Courts; Judicial power, defined; Case at bar; No actual contoversy between
real litigants; No conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting
in an alleged violation of religious freedom.—As enshrined in the Constitution,
judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. As a condition precedent
for the power to be exercised, an actual controversy between litigants must first
exist [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra; Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161,
February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677]. In the present case, no actual controversy
between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the
application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom.
This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is
merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code
and national law.
Same; Local Governments; The power to merge administrative regions is a power
which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of
the power of general supervision over local governments; No conflict between the
power of the President to merge administrative regions with the Constitutional
provision requiring plebiscite in the merger of local government units; Reason.—It
must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of
administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which
are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres.
Dec. No. 1; Presidential Decree No. 742]. Administrative regions are not territorial
and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see
Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions
is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has
traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power
of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the
Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge
administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the
merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a
merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not
to administrative regions.
Same; The creation of the autonomous region when to take effect; The provisions
in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight committee do not provide for a different
date of effectivitiy; Reason; Case at bar.—Under the Constitution, the creation of
the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. If the Organic
Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled
plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect. The
questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an Oversight Committee to
supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less
would the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the
operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth
transition period for the regional government. The constitutional objection on this
point thus cannot be sustained as there is no basis therefor.
Same; Statutes; Presumption of constitutionality; Court finds that petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption.—Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R.
No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v. Mutuc, supra; Peralta v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those who petition this
Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the
basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the
grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734,
the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The
dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.
CORTÉS, J.:
The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine
(9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan,1 scheduled for November 19, 1989, in
implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled “An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.”
These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget
and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2)
declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional.
After a consolidated comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the
respondents, which the Court considered as the answer, the case was deemed
submitted for decision, the issues having been joined. Subsequently, petitioner
Mama-o filed a “Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File Reply on Respondents’
Comment and to Open Oral Arguments,” which the Court noted.
The arguments against R.A. No. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be
categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front with the
Participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic
Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference”
took effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for “[t]he establishment of
Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines” and enumerated the thirteen
(13) provinces comprising the “areas of autonomy.”2
In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which for the first time provided for
regional autonomy. Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that “[t]here shall
be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.”
To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution
or by law to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with
the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed
of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from
multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government
for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both
of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The
organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and
property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen
months from the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide
for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the
responsibility of the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and
security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into
law on August 1, 1989.
1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised by
petitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the provisions
of the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement
is part of the law of the land, being a binding international agreement. The Solicitor
General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not having
been entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign state and
ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding
international agreement.
We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of
the Tripoli Agreement and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether
under public international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is now the
Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region in
Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734
would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict
between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli
Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic
Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding
treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the
land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of
the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter
[SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing Head Money
Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all,
R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent
law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravenes the
Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought.3
2. The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which have
been raised by petitioners.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous
region in Mindanao, contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on
the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent upon
the outcome of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734
which declares that “[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite
called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.”
Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an
autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of
autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two
provinces where the favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to
be clarified.
First, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X
of the Constitution which sets forth the conditions necessary for the creation of the
autonomous region.
The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly
indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place only in accord
with the constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the
Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates
substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the
details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take
effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units
provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120)
days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions: Provided, however, That the President may, by administrative
determination, merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the creation of the autonomous
region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a
majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous
region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be
included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is
created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in
Article II, section 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single
plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No.
6734, shall comprise it. [See III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION
487-492 (1986)].
As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao is made effective upon the approval “by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose” [Art. X, sec. 18]. The
question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority
of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in
each of the constituent units, or both?
We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.
If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all
the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII,
section 27, it is provided that “[t]his Constitution shall take effect immediately upon
its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose x x
x.” Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the autonomous region,
which reads:
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably
in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec. 18, para.
2].
it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to
depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the
majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. For if the
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of
the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used
for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. “the creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose.”
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes
approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority
of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in
which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18
must have been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.
Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other
hand, maintains that only those areas which, to his view, share common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of
the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because
only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and
Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen
(13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such
concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By
including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristics as the others,
petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region
which the Constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner’s argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by
which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous
region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of
the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the
legislature’s discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the
wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the
separation of governmental powers. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139
(1936); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].
After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis,
petitioner Mama-o would then adopt the extreme view that other non-Muslim
areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered. He argues that since the Organic Act
covers several non-Muslim areas, its scope should be further broadened to include
the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the others to similarly
enjoy the benefits of autonomy. Petitioner maintains that the failure of R.A. No.
6734 to include the other non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of
the law, and therefore is violative of the Constitution.
Petitioner’s contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision he
had earlier invoked. Any determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao
should comprise the autonomous region, taking into account shared historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics,
would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. As earlier stated, such
determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act for
the autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose
wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court.
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera, 65
Phil. 56 (1936); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land
Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. In
Dumlao v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA
392], the Court ruled that one class may be treated differently from another where
the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of
equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been
made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the
Constitution itself.
Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it
violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The
objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should
there be any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code
(still to be enacted) on the one hand, and the national law on the other hand, the
Shari‘ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners
maintain that the Islamic Law (Shari‘ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it
part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any “man-made” national law.
Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of
conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an
application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim’s religious convictions.
As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable [Art.
VIII, Sec. 1]. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual
controversy between litigants must first exist [Angara v. Electoral Commission,
supra; Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677]. In the
present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no
conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged
violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be
called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the
provisions of the Muslim Code and national law.
Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No.
6734 which, among others, states:
... Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces
and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous
Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, that
the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge
regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.
That the President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the Organic
Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution
which provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of
administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which
are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres.
Dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not territorial and
political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X,
sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is not
expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been
lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is
no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions
with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local
government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly
applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative
regions.
Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which
create an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region
of the powers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional government
by the Organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said provisions mandate that the
transfer of certain national government offices and their properties to the regional
government shall be made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight
Committee, and that such transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years from
the organization of the regional government.
It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because while
the Constitution states that the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect
upon approval in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an Oversight
Committee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and properties to the
regional government would in effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the
result of the plebiscite. If the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast
by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous
region immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734
requiring an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a
different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight
Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is
evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the regional
government. The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as
there is no basis therefor.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979,
46 SCRA 734; Morfe v. Mutuc, supra; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March
11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts
thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration.
Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to
challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners
have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is,
therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 102782. December 11, 1991.*
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RODOLFO A. MALAPIRA, STEPHEN A. MONSANTO, DAN R.
CALDERON, and GRANDY N. TRIESTE, petitioners, vs. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA
AUTHORITY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MANDALUYONG, respondents.
Court rules; Power of Supreme Court to suspend procedural rules.—The
Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of
a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is
indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed
by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present
controversy. x x x. Regrettably, not one of the complainants has filed a formal
challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and
could have been more assertive of their rights. Given these considerations, the
Court feels it must address the problem squarely presented to it and decide it as
categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on the basis of the technical
objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow them to fester. The step we
now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent. Unquestionably, the
Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent
power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning
“pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.” In proper cases, procedural rules
may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise
may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules,
Administrative Law; Local Government; Delegation of legislative power.—The Court
holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such
measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These
requisites are: 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the
presence of a sufficient standard. Under the first requirement, the statute must
leave the legislature complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the
delegate will have to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only
can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the
discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done in the
second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with a
sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and thus “prevent the delegation from running riot.” This
requirement has also been met. It is settled that the “convenience and welfare” of
the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an
acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate’s authority.
Same; Same; Requisites for validity of a municipal ordinance; Measures under
consideration do not conform to existing law.—According to Elliot, a municipal
ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be
general and consistent with public policy. A careful study of the Gonong decision
will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion
because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD1605
does not allow either the removal of the license plates or the confiscation of
driver’s licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila.
Same; Same; Same.—The requirement that the municipal enactment must not
violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate
only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature
(except only that the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with
what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress,
the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of
their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely
local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a
statute.
CRUZ, J.:
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong,
G.R. No. 91023, promulgated on July 13, 1990,1 the Court held that the confiscation
of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the
sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605
and was permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of
stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even
the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed
by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission.
No motion for reconsideration of that decision was submitted. The judgment
became final and executory on August 6,1990, and it was duly entered in the Book
of Entries of Judgments on July 13, 1990.
Subsequently, the following developments transpired:
In a letter dated October 17, 1990, Rodolfo A. Malapira complained to the Court
that when he was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver’s license was
confiscated by Traffic Enforcer Angel de los Reyes in Quezon City.
On December 18,1990, the Caloocan-Manila Drivers and Operators Association sent
a letter to the Court asking who should enforce the decision in the above-
mentioned case, whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their driver’s
licenses, and where they should file their complaints.
Another letter was received by the Court on February 14, 1991, from Stephen L.
Monsanto, complaining against the confiscation of his driver’s license by Traffic
Enforcer A.D. Martinez for an alleged traffic violation in Mandaluyong.
This was followed by a letter-complaint filed on March 7, 1991, from Dan R.
Calderon, a lawyer, also for confiscation of his driver’s license by Pat. R.J. Tano-an of
the Makati Police Force.
Still another complaint was received by the Court dated April 29, 1991, this time
from Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front
license plate by E. Ramos of the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations
Center and the confiscation of his driver’s license by Pat. A.V. Emmanuel of the
Metropolitan Police Command-Western Police District.
Required to submit a Comment on the complaint against him, Allan D. Martinez
invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the
confiscation of driver’s licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles
for traffic violations.
For his part, A.V. Emmanuel said he confiscated Trieste’s driver’s license pursuant to
a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District Commander of the
Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police, authorizing such sanction
under certain conditions.
Director General Cesar P. Nazareno of the Philippine National Police assured the
Court in his own Comment that his office had never authorized the removal of the
license plates of illegally parked vehicles and that he had in fact directed full
compliance with the above-mentioned decision in a memorandum, copy of which
he attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle License Plates and dated February
28,1991.
Pat. R.J. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued that the Gonong decision prohibited
only the removal of license plates and not the confiscation of driver’s licenses.
On May 24,1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11,
Series of 1991, authorizing itself “to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the
flow of traffic in Metro Manila.”
On July 2,1991, the Court issued the following resolution:
The attention of the Court has been called to the enactment by the Metropolitan
Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, providing inter alia that:
Section 2. Authority to Detach Plate/Tow and Impound. The Metropolitan Manila
Authority, thru the Traffic Operations Center, is authorized to detach the license
plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally
parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila.
The provision appears to be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at
bar (as reported in 187 SCRA 432), where it was held that the license plates of
motor vehicles may not be detached except only under the conditions prescribed in
LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has received several complaints against the
confiscation by police authorities of driver’s licenses for alleged traffic violations,
which sanction is, according to the said decision, not among those that may be
imposed under PD 1605.
To clarify these matters for the proper guidance of law-enforcement officers and
motorists, the Court Resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the
Solicitor General to submit, within ten {10) days from notice hereof, separate
COMMENTS on such sanctions in light of the said decision.
In its Comment, the Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on
the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO
392, It particularly cited Section 2 thereof vesting in the Council (its governing
body) the responsibility among others of:
1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or
consolidation for the Authority; and
2. Promulgation of resolutions and other issuances of metropolitan wide
application, approval of a code of basic services requiring coordination, and
exercise of its rule-making powers. (Emphasis supplied)
The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the
ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter.
It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was
invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11
was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be
attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.
For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null
and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power.
The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which
does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He
made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said
ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.
On October 24,1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the
early resolution of the questioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the
uncertainty of their validity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents inquestion should be
dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy before the Court.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the
validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally.
That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be
relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present
controversy.
The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a great
deal of confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the questioned
sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are illegal, being
violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be stopped. We also
note the disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a driver’s license
dismissed the Gonong decision as “wrong” and said the police would not stop their
“habit” unless they received orders “from the top.” Regrettably, not one of the
complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including Monsanto
and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their rights.
Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem squarely
presented to it and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the complaints on
the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its inaction, allow
them to fester.
The step we now take is not without legal authority or judicial precedent.
Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the
exercise of its inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to
promulgate rules concerning “pleading, practice and procedure in all courts."2 In
proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of
substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and
formalistic adherence to such rules.
The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs.
Dinglasan,3 where Justice Tuason justified the deviation on the ground that “the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.”
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May 9,1988,161 SCRA
276.) Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a
particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper
procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly
to the merits of the case. (Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).
Three of the cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were argued
separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same fundamental
question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of jointly. For the
same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or sufficiency of
interest of the petitioners in case G.R. No. L-3054 and case G.R. No. L-3056 and the
question whether prohibition lies in cases G.R. Nos. L-2044 and L2756. No practical
benefit can be gained from a discussion of these procedural matters, since the
decision in the cases wherein the petitioners’ cause of action or the propriety of the
procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling authority on the others.
Above all, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No. L-2821 cited in Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84
Phil. 368.)
Accordingly, the Court will consider the motion to resolve filed by the Solicitor
General a petition for prohibition against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11-
Series of 1991, of the Metropolitan Manila Authority, and Ordinance No. 7, Series
of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong. Stephen A. Monsanto, Rodolfo A.
Malapira, Dan R. Calderon, and Grandy N. Trieste are considered co-petitioners and
the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the Municipality of Mandaluyong are
hereby impleaded as respondents. This petition is docketed as G.R. No. 102782. The
comments already submitted are duly noted and shall be taken into account by the
Court in the resolution of the substantive issues raised.
It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules, which
the Court has recognized often enough as necessary to the orderly administration
of justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is because of the failure
of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding against the acts complained
of, and the necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important
substantive issues raised. Now to the merits.
The Metro Manila Authority sustains Ordinance No. 11Series of 1991, under the
specific authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of
1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the Local
Government Code.4 It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote
the comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening traffic
problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of traffic rules.
The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate
such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present.
These requisites are: 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and
2) the presence of a sufficient standard.5
Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature complete in all
its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have to do when the statute
reaches it is to implement it. What only can be delegated is not the discretion to
determine what the law shall be but the discretion to determine how the law shall
be enforced. This has been done in the case at bar.
As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in accordance with
a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out the boundaries of the
delegate’s authority and thus “prevent the delegation from running riot.” This
requirement has also been met. It is settled that the “convenience and welfare” of
the public, particularly the motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an
acceptable sufficient standard to delimit the delegate’s authority.6
But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power.
The question we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated
power.
The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as
agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect
and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the
specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance
as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not
be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.7
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under
consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing
law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of
license plates or the confiscation of driver’s licenses for traffic violations committed
in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree
authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan
Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions:
Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose
fines and otherwise discipliñe drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations
of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such
amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the
powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation
under existing laws over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby
transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the proper penalty to
be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver’s license or certificate of public
convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall
suspend or revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or revoked driver’s
license or the report of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public
convenience shall be sent to the Land Transportation Commission or the Board of
Transportation, as the case may be, for their records update.
xxx
Section 3. Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed
within a twelve-month period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall
subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense,
P20.00 for the second offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension
of driver’s license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver’s license for
the fifth offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose
higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting
or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets and thoroughfares in
Metropolitan Manila.
xxx
Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver’s license shall not be confiscated
but the erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed
by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed,
the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make
payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to
the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their branches within
seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket.
If the offender fails to pay the fine imposed within the period herein prescribed, the
Metropolitan Manila Commission or the lawenforcement agency concerned shall
endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate proceedings preparatory to
the filing of the case with the competent traffic court, city or municipal court.
If at the time a driver renews his driver’s license and records show that he has an
unpaid fine, his driver’s license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and
corresponding surcharges.
xxx
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees,
orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in
Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to “impose fines and otherwise
discipline” traffic violators only “in such amounts and under such penalties as are
herein prescribed,” that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license
plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the
Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that “in case of traffic
violations, the driver’s license shall not be confiscated.” These restrictions are
applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political
subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of
Mandaluyong.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law
explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a
valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that
the power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by
the Constitution itself).8 They are mere agents vested with what is called the power
of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit
cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case
before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot
prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting.
Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the
questioned sanction.
In Villacorta vs. Bernardo,9 the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the
Municipal Board of Dagupan City for being violative of the Land Registration Act.
The decision held in part;
In declaring the said ordinance null and void, the court a quo declared:
“From the above-recited requirements, there is no showing that would justify the
enactment of the questioned ordinance, Section 1 of said ordinance clearly
conflicts with Section 44 of
Act 496, because the latter law does not require subdivision plans to be submitted
to the City Engineer before the same is submitted for approval to and verification
by the General Land Registration Office or by the Director of Lands as provided for
in Section 68 of said Act. Section 2 of the same ordinance also contravenes the
provisions of Section 44 of Act 496, the latter being silent on a service fee of P0.03
per square meter of every lot subject of such subdivision application; Section 3 of
the ordinance in question also conflicts with Section 44 of Act 496, because the
latter law does not mention of a certification to be made by the City Engineer
before the Register of Deeds allows registration of the subdivision plan; and the last
section of said ordinance imposes a penalty for its violation, which Section 44 of Act
496 does not impose. In other words, Ordinance 22 of the City of Dagupan imposes
upon a subdivision owner additional conditions.
xxx
“The Court takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt
the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government. But as already
intimated above, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance
cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general
law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance.”
We affirm.
To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances
amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus,
ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of
marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize
carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of
passports, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce
disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid,
would be ultra vires.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but,
worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In
so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law.
We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong Case that PD 1605 applies only to the
Metropolitan Manila area. It is anexception to the general authority conferred by
R.A. No. 4136 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of
traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanctions therein prescribed,
including those here questioned.
The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of
motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction
of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement
of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also
reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of
such sanctions, including the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong
decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for—and indeed
there is a statutory prohibition against—the imposition of such penalties in the
Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be
imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative
powers.
It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not
to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating
authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without
such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues to prohibit the confiscation of
license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43)
and of driver’s licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong,
NULL and VOID; and
(2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from removing
the license plates of motor vehicles (except when authorized under LOI 43) and
confiscating driver’s licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 91023. July 13, 1990.*
METROPOLITAN TRAFFIC COMMAND WEST TRAFFIC DISTRICT, petitioner, vs. HON.
ARSENIO M. GONONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 8 at Manila, and DANTE S. DAVID, respondents.
Transportation; Presidential Decree No. 1605; LOI 43; Under PD 1605, removal and
confiscation of the license plate of any illegally parked vehicle is not among the
specified penalties.—A careful reading of the above decree will show that removal
and confiscation of the license plate of any illegally parked vehicle is not among the
specified penalties. Moreover, although the Metropolitan Manila Commission is
authorized by the decree to “otherwise discipline” and “impose higher penalties”
on traffic violators, whatever sanctions it may impose must be “in such amounts
and under such penalties as are herein prescribed.” The petitioner has not pointed
to any such additional sanctions, relying instead on its argument that the applicable
authority for the questioned act in LOI 43.
Same; Same; Same; What the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic
obstruction which is an altogether different offense.—It would appear that what
the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic obstruction, which is an
altogether different offense. A violation imports an intentional breach or disregard
of a rule, as where a driver leaves his vehicle in a no-parking area against a known
and usually visible prohibition. Contrary to the common impression, LOI 43 does
not punish illegal parking per se but parking of stalled vehicles, i.e., those that
involuntarily stop on the road due to some unexpected trouble such as engine
defect, lack of gasoline, punctured tires, or other similar cause. The vehicle is
deemed illegally parked because it obstructs the flow of traffic, but only because it
has stalled. The obstruction is not deliberate. In fact, even the petitioner recognizes
that “there is a world of difference between a stalled vehicle and an illegally parked
and unattended one” and suggests a different treatment for either. “The first means
one which stopped unnecessarily or broke down while the second means one
which stopped to accomplish something, including temporary rest.”
Same; Same; Same; LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles that stall on the streets and
highways and not those that are intentionally parked in a public place in violation of
a traffic law or regulation.—LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles “that stall on the
streets and highways” and not those that are intentionally parked in a public place
in violation of a traffic law or regulation. The purpose of the LOI evidently is to
discipline the motorist into keeping his vehicle in good condition before going out
into the streets so as not to cause inconvenience to the public when the car breaks
down and blocks other vehicles. That is why, for the first offense, the stalled vehicle
is immediately towed at the owner’s expense to clear the street of the traffic
obstruction. Where it appears that the owner has not learned from his first
experience because the vehicle has stalled again, presumably due to his failure to
repair it, the penalty shall be confiscation of the license plate and cancellation of
the certificate of registration.
Same; Same; Same; It is not alleged or shown that private respondent’s vehicle
stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic; Case at bar.—In
the case of the private respondent, it is not alleged or shown that his vehicle stalled
on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic. The charge against him
is that he purposely parked his vehicle in a no-parking area (although this is
disputed by him). The act, if true, is a traffic violation that may not be punished
under LOI 43. The applicable law is PD 1605, which does not include removal and
confiscation of the license plate of the vehicle among the imposable penalties.
Same; Same; Same; Even if LOI 43 were applicable, the penalty of confiscation
would still not be justified as it has not been alleged much less shown, that the
illegal parking was a second or subsequent offense.—Indeed, even if LOI 43 were
applicable, the penalty of confiscation would still not be justified as it has not been
alleged, much less shown, that the illegal parking was a second or subsequent
offense. That circumstance must be established at a trial before a court of justice
where the vehicle owner shall have a right to be heard in his defense. The second
or subsequent offense cannot be simply pronounced by the traffic authorities
without hearing and without proof. Confiscation of the registry plate without a
judicial finding that the offense charged is a second or subsequent one would,
unless the owner concedes this point, be invalid.
Same; Same; Same; Court finds that there is no inconsistency between LOI 43 and
PD 1605 whichever is considered the special law either because of its subject or its
territorial application.—We find that there is no inconsistency between LOI 43 and
PD 1605, whichever is considered the special law either because of its subject or its
territorial application. The former deals with motor vehicles that have stalled on a
public road while the latter deals with motor vehicles that have been deliberately
parked in a no-parking area; and while both cover illegal parking of motor vehicles,
the offense is accidental under the first measure and intentional under the second.
This explains why the sanctions are different. The purpose of the LOI is to
discourage the use of the public streets by motor vehicles that are likely to break
down while that of the decree is to penalize the driver for his defiance of the traffic
laws.
Same; Same; Same; If at all, the private respondent may be held liable for illegal
parking only and subjected to any of the specific penalties mentioned in Section 3
of the decree.—As it has not been shown that the private respondent’s motor
vehicle had stalled because of an engine defect or some other accidental cause and,
no less importantly, that it had stalled on the road for a second or subsequent time,
confiscation of the license plate cannot be justified under LOI 43. And neither can
that sanction be sustained under PD 1605, which clearly provides that “in case of
traffic violations, (even) the driver’s license shall not be confiscated,” let alone the
license plate of the motor vehicle. If at all, the private respondent may be held
liable for illegal parking only and subjected to any of the specific penalties
mentioned in Section 3 of the decree.
Same; Property; A license plate is strictly speaking not a property right but it does
not follow that it may be removed or confiscated without lawful cause.—While it is
true that the license plate is strictly speaking not a property right, it does not follow
that it may be removed or confiscated without lawful cause. Due process is a
guaranty against all forms of official arbitrariness. Under the principle that ours is a
government of laws and not of men, every official must act by and within the
authority of a valid law and cannot justify the
CRUZ, J.:
We deal here with a practice known to many motorists in Metro Manila: the
removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles. This was challenged by the
private respondent in the regional trial court of Manila, which held the practice
unlawful. The petitioner is now before us, urging reversal of the decision for grave
abuse of discretion.
The original complaint was filed with the said court on August 10, 1989, by Dante S.
David, a lawyer, who claimed that the rear license plate of his car was removed by
the Metropolitan Traffic Command while the vehicle was parked on Escolta. He
questioned the petitioner’s act on the ground not only that the car was not illegally
parked but, more importantly, that there was no ordinance or law authorizing such
removal. He asked that the practice be permanently enjoined and that in the
meantime a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued.
Judge Arsenio M. Gonong issued a temporary restraining order on August 14, 1989,
and hearings on the writ of preliminary injunction were held on August 18, 23, and
25, 1989. The writ was granted on this last date. The parties also agreed to submit
the case for resolution on the sole issue of whether there was a law or ordinance
authorizing the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles. The parties
then submitted simultaneous memoranda in support of their respective positions,
following which the respondent judge rendered the assailed decision.
In ruling for the complainant, Judge Gonong held that LOI 4 3, which the defendant
had invoked, did not empower it “to d e tach, remove and confiscate vehicle plates
of motor vehicles illegally parked and unattended as in the case at bar. It merely
authorizes the removal of said vehicles when they are obstacles to free passage or
continued flow of traffic on streets and highways.” At any rate, he said, the LOI had
been repealed by PD 1605. Moreover, the defendant had not been able to point to
any MMC rule or regulation or to any city ordinance to justify the questioned act.
On the allegation that the practice was “the root cause of graft and corruption or at
the very least the equivalent of street racket among defendant’s deployed agents,”
His Honor made the following pointed observations:
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to say, that if the arbitrary and capricious
detachment and confiscation of vehicles plates illegally parked and unattended as in
the act complained of in the instant case, the image of the man clothed in a traffic
or police uniform will be greatly impaired if not cursed with disrespect on the part
of those who have suffered at his hands. Worse, he will cease (if he had not already
ceased) to be the law-abiding, courageous and valiant protector of a citizen of the
Republic that he is meant to be, and instead his real oppressor and enemy, thereby
fortifying the contemporaneous public perception that he is a dyed-in-the-wool
extortionist if not an unmitigated chiseler.1
It bears noting that this petition should have been filed first with the Court of
Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court on decisions of the
regional trial courts involving questions of law. However, in view of the importance
of the issue raised, we have decided to take cognizance thereof under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court so we can address and resolve the question directly.
Upon the filing of this petition, we issued a temporary restraining order dated
February 6, 1990, to prevent enforcement of the said decision until further orders
from this Court. Thereafter, we required a comment from the private respondent,
to which the petitioner filed a reply as also directed.
The petitioner reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court below and insists
that LOI 43 remains in force despite the issuance of PD 1605. It contends that there
is no inconsistency between the two measures because the former deals with
illegally parked vehicles anywhere in the Philippines whereas the latter deals with
the regulation of the flow of traffic in the Metro Manila area only. The two
measures may be enforced together because implied repeals are not favored and,
furthermore, to look at them another way, LOI 43 is the special law dealing only
with illegal parking while PD 1605 is the general law dealing with all other kinds of
traffic violations. The special law must of course prevail over the general law. The
petitioner also deplores the above-quoted remarks of the trial judge, pointing out
that the parties had agreed to limit the issue to whether there was a statutory basis
for the act complained of. And even assuming that abuses have been committed in
the enforcement of LOI 43, the remedy is not to disregard it or consider it revoked
but to prosecute the guilty parties.
In his comment, the private respondent argues that LOI 43 has been repealed by PD
1605, which specifies all the sanctions available against the various traffic
violations, including illegal parking. He stresses that removal and confiscation of the
license plates of illegally parked vehicles is not one of them, the penalties being
limited in the decree to imposition of fine and suspension or revocation of driver’s
licenses or certificates of public convenience, etc. Expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. He agrees that the special law prevails over the general law but maintains
it is PD 1605 that is the special law because it is applicable only on Metro Manila
and LOI 43 that is the general law because it was intended to operate throughout
the country. As for his allegation that the challenged practice is a source of graft, he
maintains that it was not improper to discuss it in his memorandum because it was
pertinent to the central issue under consideration. Finally, he claims that removal
and confiscation of the license plate without notice and hearing violates due
process because such license plate is a form of property protected by the Bill of
Rights against unlawful deprivation.
In its reply, the petitioner faults the private respondent for belatedly raising the
constitutionality of LOI 43, suggesting faintly that this should not be permitted. In
any case, it maintains, the license plate is not property in the constitutional sense,
being merely the identification of the vehicle, and its “temporary confiscation” does
not deprive the owner of the use of the vehicle itself. Hence, there is no unlawful
taking under the due process clause. The petitioner also takes issue with the
contention that it is PD 1605 that should be considered the special law because of
its limited territorial application. Repeal of LOI 43 on that ground would run counter
to the legislative intention as it is in fact in Metro Manila that the problem of illegal
parking is most acute. LOI 43, entitled Measures to Effect a Continuing Flow of
Transportation on Streets and Highways, was issued on November 28, 1972, with
the following pertinent provisions:
Motor vehicles that stall on the streets and highways, streets and sidewalks, shall
immediately be removed by their owners/users; otherwise said vehicles shall be
dealt with and disposed in the manner stated hereunder;
1. For the first offense the stalled or illegally parked vehicle shall be removed,
towed and impounded at the expense of the owner, user or claimant;
2. For the second and subsequent offenses, the registry plates of the vehicles shall
be confiscated and the owner’s certificate of registration cancelled. (Emphasis
supplied).
PD 1605 (Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Central Powers Related to
Traffic Management, Providing Penalties, and for Other Purposes) was issued, also
by President Marcos, on November 21, 1978, and pertinently provides:
Section 1. The Metropolitan Manila Commission shall have the power to impose
fines and otherwise discipline drivers and operators of motor vehicles for violations
of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations in Metropolitan Manila in such
amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed. For this purpose, the
powers of the Land Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation
under existing laws over such violations and punishment thereof are hereby
transferred to the Metropolitan Manila Commission. When the proper penalty to
be imposed is suspension or revocation of driver’s license or certificate of public
convenience, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or its representatives shall
suspend or revoke such license or certificate. The suspended or revoked driver’s
license or thereport of suspension or revocation of the certificate of public
convenience shall be sent to the Land Tranportation Commission or the Board of
Transportation, as the case may be, for their records update.
x x x whatever sanctions it may impose must be “in such amounts and under such
Section 3. Violations of traffic laws, ordinances, rules and regulations, committed
within a twelve-month period, reckoned from the date of birth of the licensee, shall
subject the violator to graduated fines as follows: P10.00 for the first offense,
P20.00 for the second offense, P50.00 for the third offense, a one-year suspension
of driver’s license for the fourth offense, and a revocation of the driver’s license for
the fifth offense: Provided, That the Metropolitan Manila Commission may impose
higher penalties as it may deem proper for violations of its ordinances prohibiting
or regulating the use of certain public roads, streets or thoroughfares in
Metropolitan Manila.
x x x It would appear that what the LOI punishes is not a traffic violation but a traffic
Section 5. In case of traffic violations, the driver’s license shall not be confiscated
but the erring driver shall be immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed
by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation committed,
the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make
payment to the city or municipal treasurer where the violation was committed or to
the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their branches within
seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket. If the offender fails to
pay the fine imposed within the period
herein prescribed, the Metropolitan Manila Commission or the law-enforcement
agency concerned shall endorse the case to the proper fiscal for appropriate
proceedings preparatory to the filing of the case with the competent traffic court,
city or municipal court.
If at the time a driver renews his driver’s license and records show that he has an
unpaid fine, his driver’s license shall not be renewed until he has paid the fine and
corresponding surcharges.
x x x
Section 8. Insofar as the Metropolitan Manila area is concerned, all laws, decrees,
orders, ordinances, rules and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent herewith are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied).
A careful reading of the above decree will show that removal and confiscation of
the license plate of any illegally parked vehicle is not among the specified penalties.
Moreover, although the Metropolitan Manila Commission is authorized by the
decree to “otherwise discipline” and “impose higher penalties” on traffic violators,
penalties as are herein prescribed.” The petitioner has not pointed to any such
additional sanctions, relying instead on its argument that the applicable authority
for the questioned act is LOI 43.
The petitioner stresses that under the decree, “the powers of the Land
Transportation Commission and the Board of Transportation over such violations
and punishment thereof are (hereby) transferred to the Metropolitan Manila
Commission,” and one of such laws is LOI 43. The penalties prescribed by the LOI
are therefore deemed incorporated in PD 1605 as additional to the other penalties
therein specified.
obstruction, which is an altogether different offense. A violation imports an
intentional breach or disregard of a rule, as where a driver leaves his vehicle in a
no-parking area against a known and usually visible prohibition. Contrary to the
common impression, LOI 43 does not punish illegal parking per se but parking of
stalled vehicles, i.e., those that involuntarily stop on the road due to some
unexpected trouble such as engine defect, lack of gasoline, punctured tires, or
other similar cause. The vehicle is deemed illegally parked because it obstructs the
flow of traffic, but only because it has stalled. The obstruction is not deliberate. In
fact, even the petitioner recognizes that “there is a world of difference between a
stalled vehicle and an illegally parked and unattended one” and suggests a different
treatment for either. “The first means one which stopped unnecessarily or broke
down while the second means one which stopped to accomplish something,
including temporary rest.”2
LOI 43 deals with motor vehicles “that stall on the streets and highways” and not
those that are intentionally parked in a public place in violation of a traffic law or
regulation. The purpose of the LOI evidently is to discipline the motorist into
keeping his vehicle in good condition before going out into the streets so as not to
cause inconvenience to the public when the car breaks down and blocks other
vehicles. That is why, for the first offense, the stalled vehicle is immediately towed
at the owner’s expense to clear the street of the traffic obstruction. Where it
appears that the owner has not learned from his first experience because the
vehicle has stalled again, presumably due to his failure to repair it, the penalty shall
be confiscation of the license plate and cancellation of the certificate of
registration.
It is worth noting that it is not the driver’s license that is confiscated and canceled
when the vehicle stalls on a public street. The LOI goes against the vehicle itself. The
object of the measure is to ensure that only motor vehicles in good condition may
use the public streets, and this is effected by confiscating the license plates and
canceling the certificates of registration of those vehicles that are not roadworthy.
In the case of the private respondent, it is not alleged or shown that his vehicle
stalled on a public thoroughfare and obstructed the flow of traffic. The charge
against him is that he purposely parked his vehicle in a no-parking area (although
this is disputed by him). The act, if true, is a traffic violation that may not be
punished under LOI 43. The applicable law is PD 1605, which does not include
removal and confiscation of the license plate of the vehicle among the imposable
penalties.
Indeed, even if LOI 43 were applicable, the penalty of confiscation would still not be
justified as it has not been alleged, much less shown, that the illegal parking was a
second or subsequent offense. That circumstance must be established at a trial
before a court of justice where the vehicle owner shall have a right to be heard in
his defense. The second or subsequent offense cannot be simply pronounced by
the traffic authorities without hearing and without proof. Confiscation of the
registry plate without a judicial finding that the offense charged is a second or
subsequent one would, unless the owner concedes this point, be invalid.
While it is true that the license plate is strictly speaking not a property right, it does
not follow that it may be removed or confiscated without lawful cause. Due process
is a guaranty against all forms of official arbitrariness. Under the principle that ours
is a government of laws and not of men, every official must act by and within the
authority of a valid law and cannot justify the lack of it on the pretext alone of good
intentions. It is recalled that more than seventy years ago, the mayor of Manila
deported one hundred seventy prostitutes to Davao for the protection of the
morals and health of the city. This Court acknowledged his praiseworthy purpose
but just the same annulled his unauthorized act, holding that no one could take the
law into his own hands.3 We can rule no less in the case before us.
We find that there is no inconsistency between LOI 43 and PD 1605, whichever is
considered the special law either because of its subject or its territorial application.
The former deals with motor vehicles that have stalled on a public road while the
latter deals with motor vehicles that have been deliberately parked in a no-parking
area; and while both cover illegal parking of motor vehicles, the offense is
accidental under the first measure and intentional under the second. This explains
why the sanctions are different. The purpose of the LOI is to discourage the use of
the public streets by motor vehicles that are likely to break down while that of the
decree is to penalize the driver for his defiance of the traffic laws.
As it has not been shown that the private respondent’s motor vehicle had stalled
because of an engine defect or some other accidental cause and, no less
importantly, that it had stalled on the road for a second or subsequent time,
confiscation of the license plate cannot be justified under LOI 43. And neither can
that sanction be sustained under PD 1605, which clearly provides that “in case of
traffic violations, (even) the driver’s license shall not be confiscated,” let alone the
license plate of the motor vehicle. If at all, the private respondent may be held
liable for illegal parking only and subjected to any of the specific penalties
mentioned in Section 3 of the decree.
We recognize the problem of the traffic policeman who comes upon an illegally
parked and unattended vehicle and is unable to serve a citation on the offending
driver who is nowhere insight. But that problem is not addressed to the courts; it is
for the legislative and administrative authorities to solve. What is clear to the Court
is that the difficulty cannot be avoided by the removal of the license plate of the
offending vehicle because the petitioner has not shown that this penalty is
authorized by a valid law or ordinance.
The petitioner complains that the respondent judge did not confine himself to the
issue agreed upon by the parties and made gratuitous accusations that were not
only irrelevant but virtually condemned the whole traffic force as corrupt. Assuming
that this issue was indeed not properly raised at the trial, the Court is nevertheless
not inhibited from considering it in this proceeding, on the basis of its own
impressions on the matter.
We realize the seriousness of our traffic problems, particularly in Metro Manila, and
commend the earnest efforts of the police to effect a smoother flow of vehicles in
the public thoroughfares for the comfort and convenience of the people. But we
must add, as a reminder that must be made, that such efforts must be authorized
by a valid law, which must clearly define the offenses proscribed and as clearly
specify the penalties prescribed.

This Court is not isolated from the mainstream of society and secluded in a world of
its own, unconcerned with the daily lives of the rest of the nation. On the contrary,
the members of this Court mix with the people and know their problems and
complaints. And among these are the alleged abuses of the police in connection
with the issue now before us.
It is claimed that the removal of the license plates of illegally parked motor vehicles
in Metro Manila has become a veritable gold mine for some police officers. To be
sure, we do not have hard, provable facts at hand but only vague and
unsubstantiated rumors that could be no more than malicious and invented
charges. Nevertheless, these accusations have become too prevalent and
apparently too persuasive that they cannot be simply swept under the rug.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court holds that LOI 43 is valid but
may be applied only against motor vehicles that have stalled in the public streets
due to some involuntary cause and not those that have been intentionally parked in
violation of the traffic laws. The challenged decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED
in so far as it enjoins confiscation of the private respondent’s license plate for
alleged deliberate illegal parking, which is subject to a different penalty. The
temporary restraining order dated February 6, 1990, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

The widespread report is that civilian “agents,” mostly street urchins under the
control and direction of certain policemen, remove these license plates from
illegally parked vehicles and later discreetly suggest to the owners that these may
be retrieved for an unofficial fee. This ranges from P50.00 to P200.00, depending on
the type of vehicle. If the owner agrees, payment is usually made and the license
plate returned at a private rendezvous. No official receipt is issued. Everything is
done quietly. The owners, it is said, prefer this kind of fast settlement to the
inconvenience of an official proceeding that may entail not only the payment of a
higher fine but also other administrative impositions, like attendance at a traffic
seminar.

The Court is not saying that these reports are true nor is it stigmatizing the entire
police force on the basis of these unsubstantiated charges. But it does believe and
stress that the proper authorities should take official notice of these reports instead
of blandly dismissing them as mere canards that do not deserve their attention and
concern. An inquiry is in our view indicated. The old adage that where there’s
smoke there’s fire is not necessarily true and can hardly be the rationale of a
judicial conclusion; but the Court feels just the same that serious steps should be
taken, especially because of the persistence of these charges, to determine the
source of the smoke.

G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000.*
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. BEL-AIR
VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
Constitutional Law; Political Subdivision; Police Power; Definition of Police Power.—
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the
power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying
measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
Same; Same; Same; Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature
which may delegate the power to the President and administrative boards as well
as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.—It
bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It
cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative
power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President
and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise
only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking
body.
Same; Same; Same; Definition of Local Government.—A local government is a
“political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs.” The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a
local government unit as a “body politic and corporate”—one endowed with
powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate
entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. Local government units are the
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. They are also the territorial and
political subdivisions of the state.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Police power delegated to the local government units in
the Local Government Code of 1991.—Our Congress delegated police power to the
local government units in the Local Government Code of 1991. This delegation is
found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare clause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Local government units exercise police power through
their respective legislative bodies.—Local government units exercise police power
through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial
government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the
sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang
bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local
Government Code of 1991 empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as
the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality]
provided under the Code x x x.” The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the
power to “enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the
inhabitants thereon.”
Same; Same; Same; There is no syllable in Republic Act No. 7924 that grants the
Metro Manila Development Authority police power, let alone legislative power.—It
will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is
no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there
is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to “enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare” of
the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
“development authority.”
Same; Same; Same; Metro Manila Development Authority is not a political unit of
government.—Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate
administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA’s
functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis.
Same; Same; Same; Metro Manila Development Authority is not a local government
unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power.—It is thus beyond
doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power. It is not even a “special metropolitan political
subdivision” as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The
creation of a “special metropolitan political subdivision” requires the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R.A.
No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The
Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by
the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his
function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the
President, whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises
supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
Same; Same; Same; Unlike the Metro Manila Commission, the Metro Manila
Development Authority has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community.—Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as
the MMDA under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to
enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units,
acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power
and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did
not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street,
hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent
Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.
PUNO, J.:
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve urgent
problems of the people. But even when government is armed with the best of
intention, we cannot allow it to run roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let
the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the MMDA to open for public
use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold that the general welfare
should be promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of the
rule of law.
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services
in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock,
non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a
private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of
Neptune Street, a road inside BelAir Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman,
a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street
to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. The notice reads:
“SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic
“Dear President Lindo,
“Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or Republic
Act No. 7924 which requires the Authority to rationalize the use of roads and/or
thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons, Neptune Street
shall be opened to vehicular traffic effective January 2, 1996.
“In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the points of
entry and exit on said street.
“Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may be extended by
your association to the MMDA personnel who will be directing traffic in the area.
“Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction of the
President on the matter.
“Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA
Chairman”1
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the
subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction.
Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining
order the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a
preliminary injunction.2 Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The appellate court conducted an ocular
inspection of Neptune Street3 and on February 13, 1996, it issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDA’s proposed
action.4
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the
case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune
Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It
held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. The
decision disposed of as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order dated January 23,
1995, in Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
issued on February 13, 1996 is hereby made permanent.
“For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite Roberto L. del Rosario in
contempt is denied.5
“No pronouncement as to costs.
“SO ORDERED.”6
The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28, 1998.
Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
“I HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE
MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS
REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
II IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENT BEFORE THE
MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING OF SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?
III IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPED FROM DENYING
OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF THE MMDA TO OPEN THE SUBJECT STREET?
IV WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE SEVERAL MEETINGS
HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE AFFECTED BEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND BAVA
OFFICERS?
V HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS?”7
Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air
Village, a private residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial
district of Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to
the general public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall
approximately fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects
Nicanor Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular
traffic, while its eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of
Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates.
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public
traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery
of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management
which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety,
convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of
MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v.
Intermediate Appellate Court.8 From the premise that it has police power, it is now
urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening
Neptune street to the public.9
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the
power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be
for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the
same.10 The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and
justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general
welfare.11
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature.12 It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power.13 The National Legislature, however, may delegate
this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking
bodies of municipal corporations or local government units.14 Once delegated, the
agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the
national lawmaking body.15
A local government is a “political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.”16 The Local
Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit as a “body politic and
corporate”17—one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National
Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its
territory.18 Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays.19 They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.20
Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local
Government Code of 1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code,
known as the general welfare clause, viz..
“Sec. 16. General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.”21
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is the sangguniang
panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of
the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is
the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991 empowers the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to
“enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code x x
x.”22 The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to “enact
ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it
by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants
thereon.”23
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government
units—i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of
Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las
Pinas, Marikina, Parañaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon,
Navotas, Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
792424 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a “special development and
administrative region” and the Administration of “metrowide” basic services
affecting the region placed under “a development authority” referred to as the
MMDA.25
“Metro-wide services” are those “services which have metrowide impact and
transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would
not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government
units comprising Metro Manila.”26 There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services
and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2)
transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4)
flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use
planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and
pollution control; and (7) public safety. The basic service of transport and traffic
management includes the following:
“(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination,
and monitoring of policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the
existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of
thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and
goods; provision for the mass transport system and the institution of a system to
regulate road users; administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including
the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;”27
In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the following powers
and functions:
“Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority.—The
MMDA shall:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-
term plans and programs for the delivery of metrowide services, land use and
physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national
development objectives and priorities;
(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term
investment programs for metro-wide services which shall indicate sources and uses
of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging
of projects and presentation to funding institutions;
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the
delivery of specific services under its jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the
Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project management
offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and
projects in Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and adopt solutions to problems of
implementation;
(e)The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall
coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects
concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering
and education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation,
including but not limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other government
agencies and offices concerned;
(f)Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and
penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether moving
or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in
the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and
PD 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall
impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation
center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government
units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations
to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and
requirements as the Authority may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the
MMDA, including the undertaking of delivery of basic services to the local
government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination with and
consent of the local government unit concerned.”
The implementation of the MMDA’s plans, programs and projects is undertaken by
the local government units, nationalgovernment agencies, accredited people’s
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by
the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into
contracts, memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with
these bodies for the delivery of the required services within Metro Manila.28
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is
composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the
president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors’ League and the president of the Metro
Manila Councilors’ League.29 The Council is headed by a Chairman who is
appointed by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the
policy-making body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide
plans, programs and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the
implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and
promulgates the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection
of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. These functions are particularly
enumerated as follows:
“Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council.—
(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;
(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue rules and
regulations deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes of this Act;
(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the members of the
Council to be effective during the term of the succeeding Council. It shall fix the
compensation of the officers and personnel of the MMDA, and approve the annual
budget thereof for submission to the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM);
(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and standards for
metro-wide application governing the delivery of basic services, prescribe and
collect service and regulatory fees, and impose and collect fines and penalties.”
Clearly, the scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7)
basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the
formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the
existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares
and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass
transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the
administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in
Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly
authorized “to set the policies concerning traffic” and “coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all traffic management programs.” In addition, the MMDA may
“install and administer a single ticketing system,” fix, impose and collect fines and
penalties for all traffic violations.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts:
formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is
no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there
is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to “enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare” of
the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a
“development authority.”30 It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the
efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All
its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the
charter itself, viz.:
“Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority.—x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in
the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of
metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of
the local government units concerning purely local matters.”31
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate
Court32 where we upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the MMDA, as an exercise of police power.
The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the petition,33 while the second
decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the case
of Yabut v. Court of Appeals.34
Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent BAVA
and three residents of Bel-Air Village against other residents of the Village and the
Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati Development Corporation, as the developer
of the subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements
in the deeds of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the
prohibition on the setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and
the condition that the lots be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners alleged
that respondents, who were residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision,
converted their residences into commercial establishments in violation of the “deed
restrictions,” and that respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the full
“commercialization” of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that
separated the commercial from the residential section of the village.35
The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council
of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC).
Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone,
with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of Jupiter Street. The
Municipal Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance for the National Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No.
81-01. Bel-Air Village was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and the
block adjacent thereto was classified as a High Intensity Commercial Zone.36
We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary
between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for the
exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also held that the perimeter wall on said
street was constructed not to separate the residential from the commercial blocks
but simply for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation
did not violate the “deed restrictions” in the deeds of sale.
We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimate
exercise of police power.37 The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal
Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the “deed
restrictions.”
In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street
was warranted by the demands ofthe common good in terms of “traffic
decongestion and public convenience.” Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor
to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to the Village.38 The
same reason was given for the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a
road inside the same village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also
made under the police power of the municipal government. The gate, like the
perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it hindered and
impaired the use of property, hence, its summary abatement by the mayor was
proper and legal.39
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at
bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of
Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of
Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner
to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance
or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as
the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA
simply relied on its authority under its charter “to rationalize the use of roads
and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons.”
Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within
the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination,
however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinancemaking
power, much less police power.
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the
MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed
greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824.
It comprised the Greater Manila
Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and
Caloocan, and the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan,
Las Piñas, Malabon, Navotas, Pasig, Pateros, Parañaque, Marikina, Muntinlupa and
Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in the province of Bulacan.40
Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding that the rapid growth
of population and the increase of social and economic requirements in these areas
demand a call for simultaneous and unified development; that the public services
rendered by the respective local governments could be administered more
efficiently and economically if integrated under a system of central planning; and
this coordination, “especially in the maintenance of peace and order and the
eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and
discontent [were] part of reform measures under Martial Law essential to the
safety and security of the State.”41 Metropolitan Manila was established as a
“public corporation” with the following powers:
“Section 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila.—There is hereby created a public
corporation, to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and
attributes of a corporation including the power to make contracts, sue and be sued,
acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of property and such
other powers as are necessary to carry out its purposes. The Corporation shall be
administered by a Commission created under this Decree.”42
The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC) vested with the following powers:
“Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission.—The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
1.To act as a central government to establish and administer programs and provide
services common to the area;
2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and expend money and
issue bonds, revenue certificates, and other obligations of indebtedness. Existing
tax measures should, however, continue to be operative until otherwise modified or
repealed by the Commission;
3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;
4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan government and
review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its jurisdiction with
authority to disapprove the same if found to be not in accordance with the
established policies of the Commission, without prejudice to any contractual
obligation of the local government units involved existing at the time of approval of
this Decree;
5.To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of cities
and municipalities within Metropolitan Ma-nila;
6.To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix penalties for any violation
thereof which shall not exceed a fine of P10,000.00 or imprisonment of six years or
both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense;
7. To perform general administrative, executive and policymaking functions;
8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct the fire services of
the city and municipal governments in the metropolitan area;
9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall direct garbage
collection and disposal in the metropolitan area;
10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which shall direct traffic
activities;
11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities pertaining to
essential services such as transportation, flood control and drainage, water supply
and sewerage, social, health and environmental services, housing, park
development, and others;
12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive social, economic and
physical planning and development of the area;
13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in the affairs of their
respective local governments and to propose to the President of the Philippines
definite programs and policies for implementation;
14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal year an annual
report to the President of the Philippines and to submit a periodic report whenever
deemed necessary; and
15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed by the President of
the Philippines.”
The MMC was the “central government” of Metro Manila for the purpose of
establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area. As
a “central government” it had the power to levy and collect taxes and special
assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate
money for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city
and municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or
approve ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances
and resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all
ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13)
municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
P.D. No. 824 further provided:
“Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four cities and thirteen
municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila shall continue to exist in their present
form except as may be inconsistent with this Decree. The members of the existing
city and municipal councils in Metropolitan Manila shall, upon promulgation of this
Decree, and until December 31, 1975, become members of the Sangguniang Bayan
which is hereby created for every city and municipality of Metropolitan Manila.
In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many barangay
captains as may be determined and chosen by the Commission, and such number
of representatives from other sectors of the society as may be appointed by the
President upon recommendation of the Commission.
x x x.
The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission ordinances,
resolutions or such measures as it may adopt; Provided, that no such ordinance,
resolution or measure shall become effective, until after its approval by the
Commission; and Provided further, that the power to impose taxes and other levies,
the power to appropriate money and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions
with penal sanctions shall be vested exclusively in the Commission.”
The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang
Bayan. This was composed of the members of the component city and municipal
councils, barangay captains chosen by the MMC and sectoral representatives
appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the power to recommend
to the MMC the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC
itself, however, that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and
measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMC’s
approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to
appropriate money, and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal
sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC.
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a “central government,” i.e., the MMC which fully
possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever legislative powers the
component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by
the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore the
autonomy of the local government units in Metro Manila. Hence, Sections 1 and 2
of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provided:
“Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as herein provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.”
The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan
regions not only in the existing National Capital Region but also in potential
equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao.43 Section 11 of the same Article X thus
provided:
“Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political
subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The
component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be
entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of
the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic
services requiring coordination.”
The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create “special
metropolitan political subdivisions” which shall be subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected; the
jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring
coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall
retain their basic autonomy and their own local executive and legislative
assemblies.44 Pending enactment of this law, the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution gave the President of the Philippines the power to constitute the
Metropolitan Authority, viz.:
“Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the
Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all local government units
comprising the Metropolitan Manila area.”45
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 392 and constituted the
Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were
devolved to the MMA.46 It ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers and
functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA.
The MMA’s power was limited to the “delivery of basic urban services requiring
coordination in Metropolitan Manila.”47 The MMA’s governing body, the
Metropolitan Manila Council, although composed of the mayors of the component
cities and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1) formulation of policies
on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2)
promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of basic
services and the exercise of its rule-making power.48
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily
responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA’s
jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services
that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was
merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the
preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had
was confined to a “review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative
assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the
comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila,” and to “advise the local
governments accordingly.”49
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a “special
development and administrative region” and the MMDA a “special development
authority” whose functions were “without prejudice to the autonomy of the
affected local government units.” The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in
the legislative debates enacting its charter.
R.A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/11116 and was introduced by
several legislators led by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and Feliciano Belmonte. It was
presented to the House of Representatives by the Committee on Local
Governments chaired by Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a product of
Committee consultations with the local government units in the National Capital
Region (NCR), with former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA,50 and career officials
of said agencies. When the bill was first taken up by the Committee on Local
Governments, the following debate took place:
“THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. This has been debated
a long time ago, you know. It’s a special... we can create a special metropolitan
political subdivision.
Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in the Constitution:
barangay, municipality, city, province, and we have the Autonomous Region of
Mindanao and we have the Cordillera. So we have 6. Now . . . .
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of the Autonomous
Region, that is also specifically mandated by the Constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: That’s correct. But it is considered to be a political subdivision.
What is the meaning of a political subdivision? Meaning to say, that it has its own
government, it has its own political personality, it has the power to tax, and all
governmental powers: police power and everything. All right. Authority is different;
because it does not have its own government. It is only a council, it is an
organization of political subdivision, powers,‘no, which is not imbued with any
political power.
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the Metro Manila
Development Authority, it is purely coordinative. And it provides here that the
council is policy-making. All right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative power.
Meaning to say, it coordinates all of the different basic services which have to be
delivered to the constituency. All right.
There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective . . . as a
political subdivision. Kalookan has its powers, as provided for and protected and
guaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the exercise. However, in the exercise of
that power, it might be deleterious and disadvantageous to other local government
units. So, we are forming an authority where all of these will be members and then
set up a policy in order that the basic services can be effectively coordinated. All
right.
Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We have to provide
some funds, resources. But it does not possess any political power. We do not elect
the Governor. We do not have the power to tax. As a matter of fact, I was trying to
intimate to the author that it must have the power to sue and be sued because it
coordinates. All right. It coordinates practically all these basic services so that the
flow and the distribution of the basic services will be continuous. Like traffic, we
cannot deny that. It’s before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water system, peace
and order, we cannot deny these. It’s right on our face. We have to look for a
solution. What would be the right solution? All right, we envision that there should
be a coordinating agency and it is called an authority. All right, if you do not want to
call it an authority, it’s alright. We may call it a council or maybe a management
agency.
x x x.”51
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to
the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative
rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA’s functions. There is no
grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of
the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in the last Committee
deliberations prior to the bill’s presentation to Congress. Thus:
“THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I think this
was already approved before, but it was reconsidered in view of the proposals, set-
up, to make the MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no objection to paragraph
“f”. . . And then next is paragraph “b,” under Section 6. “It shall approve metrowide
plans, programs and projects and issue ordinances or resolutions deemed
necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes of this Act.” Do you have the
powers? Does the MMDA . . . because that takes the form of a local government
unit, a political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When we say that it has
the policies, it’s very clear that those policies must be followed. Otherwise, what’s
the use of empowering it to come out with policies. Now, the policies may be in the
form of a resolution or it may be in the form of a ordinance. The term “ordinance”
in this case really gives it more teeth, your honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a
situation where you have the power to adopt the policy but you cannot really make
it stick as in the case now, and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree
that that is the case now. You’ve got the power to set a policy, the body wants to
follow your policy, then we say let’s call it an ordinance and see if they will not
follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN: That’s very nice. I like that. However, there is a constitutional
impediment. You are making this MMDA a political subdivision. The creation of the
MMDA would be subject to a plebiscite. That is what I’m trying to avoid. I’ve been
trying to avoid this kind of predicament. Under the Constitution it states: if it is a
political subdivision, once it is created it has to be subject to a plebiscite. I’m trying
to make this as administrative. That’s why we place the Chairman as a cabinet rank.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are saying there is . . . .
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political exercise. Believe me.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances of rules and
regulations. That would be . . . it shall also be enforced.
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will . . . .
HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you impose a
sanction. But you know, ordinance has a different legal connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right. I defer to that opinion, your Honor.
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and regulations.
ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units,
acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power
and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did
not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street,
hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent
Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues
as they are unnecessary.

HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually considering resolutions
now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.
HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions.”52
The draft of H.B. No. 14170/11116 was presented by the Committee to the House
of Representatives. The explanatory note to the bill stated that the proposed
MMDA is a “development authority” which is a “national agency, not a political
government unit.”53 The explanatory note was adopted as the sponsorship speech
of the Committee on Local Governments. No interpellations or debates were made
on the floor and no amendments introduced. The bill was approved on second
reading on the same day it was presented.54
When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were made. These
amendments, however, did not affect the nature of the MMDA as originally
conceived in the House of Representatives.55
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDA’s noble efforts to
solve the chaotic traffic condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic
bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our once sprawling boulevards and
avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with motorists
and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our people’s
productivity and the efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The
MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system
but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its good intentions
cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision
without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical
to the preservation of the rule of law of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549 are
affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a “special metropolitan
political subdivision” as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution.
The creation of a “special metropolitan political subdivision” requires the approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.56 R.A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila ina
plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but
appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In
fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him
by the President,57 whereas in local government units, the President merely
exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the
MMDA.

Clearly then, the MMC under P.D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA
under R.A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact

G.R. No. 177597. July 16, 2008.*
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN
P. DILANGALEN, respondents.
G.R. No. 178628. July 16, 2008.*
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Constitutional Law; Writs of Prohibition; The writ of prohibition is appropriate to
test the constitutionality of election laws, rules and regulations.—The Writ of
Prohibition is Appropriate to Test the Constitutionality of Election Laws, Rules and
Regulations. The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of
discretion by “any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.” On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act “which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty.” True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902
in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Nor is there a law which
specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast in
Cotabato City for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato
City.” These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R.
No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition
and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of
election laws, rules, and regulations.
Same; Delegation of Powers; There is neither an express prohibition nor an express
grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local
legislative bodies the power to create local government units.—There is neither an
express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can
delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units,
subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision
of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city
and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,
subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However,
under the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of Congress” can create
provinces, cities or municipalities.
Same; Election Laws; Each City with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least have one representative in the
House of Representatives.—There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts
with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create
municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is
followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, “Each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may
hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more
than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member x x x.”
Same; A province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will
violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.—A province cannot be created without a
legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same
reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without
a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a
population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative
district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves
the power to create a legislative district because once the city’s population reaches
250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city
inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
Same; Congress; Delegation of Powers; The power to reapportion legislative
districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing
ones.—Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to
increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these
powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that
regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House
of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can
be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v.
COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995), we held that the “power of redistricting x x x is
traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws,” and thus is
vested exclusively in Congress.
Same; Same; An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,
cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.—This textual
commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative
districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable
membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative
districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It
would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion
legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative
body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the
superior legislative body.
Same; Same; Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes
autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative
districts for Congress.—Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion
legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054
amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, “The Regional Assembly may exercise
legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x
x x.” Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws
relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose
representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law
creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the “next
national elections” from the effectivity of the law.
Same; Same; The power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be
delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself.—Neither the
framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional
autonomy, nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these
disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of
government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion
legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by
Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
Same; Local Autonomy; Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); It is
axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
constitution.—It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot
prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly
provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its
territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national
laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the
ARMM Government is established “within the framework of the Constitution.” This
follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM
“shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”
Same; Same; The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Regional
Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district.—We rule
that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to
Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create
provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily
includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise
under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a
province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every
province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district
representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional
Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the
ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Same; Republic Act No. 9054; Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
declared unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities.
—Wherefore, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities.
Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is VALID.
TINGA,  J., Dissenting and Concurring Opinion:
Courts; Appeals; It is cardinal that the Court’s power of judicial review may be
exercised in constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied
with: 1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; 2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; 3)
the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and 4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.—It is clear that both petitioners
rely on constitutional issues in support of their petitions as they posit that under
the Constitution Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to its own separate legislative district.
It is cardinal that the Court’s power of judicial review may be exercised in
constitutional cases only if all the following requisites are complied with, namely:
(1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal
and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Election Laws; Sema’s prior avowal that she was running for the Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City legislative district, and her campaign for election to that district,
belie the existence of injury on her part caused by the COMELEC resolution that
affirmed that very legislative district.—It would indeed be difficult to assess injury
for purposes of locus standi on the part of Sema by reason of the assailed COMELEC
Resolution, which after all, reaffirms the very legislative district whose seat in
Congress she had sought to be elected to. Her standing to raise the present petition
is materially affected by her express consent and active campaign for election from
the legislative district which she now seeks to invalidate. A party challenging the
constitutionality of a law, act or statute must show “not only that the law is invalid,
but also that he or she has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,” that party has been or
is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he or she is lawfully entitled.
Sema’s prior avowal that she was running for the Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato
City legislative district, and her campaign for election to that district, belie the
existence of injury on her part caused by the COMELEC resolution that affirmed
that very legislative district.
Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); The COMELEC does not have the
requisite power to call elections, as the same is part of the plenary legislative
power.—Marquez does not have a valid cause of action before this Court. His prayer
is to compel the COMELEC to provide for new congressional elections for Cotabato
City.The relief sought does not lie simply because Rep. Dilangalen, by virtue of his
electoral victory, lawfully represents the City in addition to the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan. From another perspective, the COMELEC does not have the requisite
power to call elections, as the same is part of the plenary legislative power. Only
Congress, which was not impleaded as a party to Marquez’s petition, has the power
to set congressional elections only for Cotabato City, if ever. Even assuming that
Congress was impleaded, it would be improper for this Court to compel Congress
by judicial fiat to pass a law or resolution for the holding of such elections.
Constitutional Law; Delegation of Powers; A logical corollary to the doctrine of
separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as expressed in
the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest (what has been delegated
cannot be delegated).—The
Constitution expressly vests legislative power in the Congress of the Philippines,
consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Traditionally, the delegation
of Congress of its legislative powers had been frowned upon. “A logical corollary to
the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers,
as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegare potest (what has
been delegated cannot be delegated). This is based on the ethical principle that
such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by
the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the
intervening mind of another.”
Same; Same; The strict application of the non-delegation doctrine has in recent
times, been relaxed, if not minimized altogether, particularly in the context of
regulatory jurisdiction of administrative agencies.—The strict application of the
non-delegation doctrine has, in recent times, been relaxed, if not minimized
altogether, particularly in the context of regulatory jurisdiction of administrative
agencies. In every industrialized nation, administrative agencies, which are
generally part of the executive branch, have been granted considerable lawmaking
power. “Given the volume and variety of interactions in today’s society, it is
doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and
respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to
administrative bodies—the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their
specialized fields—the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement
a given statute and effectuate its policies.” In the context of delegation of legislative
powers to local governments, a noted authority on the subject has this to say: The
state legislative power—that is, the exercise of the policy-making judgment and
discretion on state matters that state constitutions vest and recognize in the
legislature—cannot be delegated to some other person or body but must rest with
the legislature itself. Thus, the legislature cannot delegate to a commission the
power to determine the form of government, powers and functions of proposed
municipalities since these matters require legislative judgment. But the details of
organization of its own government can be left to a municipality, limited only by
general state law; and such basic state powers as the police power, taxing power,
and power of eminent domain can be, and almost always are, delegated to local
governments for their use for local purposes. The rule against delegation of state
legislative authority is no barrier to the delegation of powers of local self
government to local units. x x x
Same; Same; Nothwithstanding the exceptions that have been carved to the rule of
non-delegation, it bears notice that while our Constitution broadly endows
legislative powers to Congress it also specifically conditions the emergence of
certain rights, duties and obligations upon the enactment of a law oriented towards
such constitutional predicate.—Notwithstanding the exceptions that have been
carved to the rule of non-delegation, it bears notice that while our Constitution
broadly endows legislative powers to Congress it also specifically conditions the
emergence of certain rights, duties and obligations upon the enactment of a law
oriented towards such constitutional predicate. These include the prohibition of
political dynasties as may be defined by law, the reasonable conditions prescribed
by law relating to full public disclosure of all the State’s transactions involving public
interest; the manner by which Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired; the
date of regular elections for members of Congress; the manner of conduct of
special elections to fill in congressional vacancies; the authorization of the
President to exercise emergency powers; the system for initiative and referendum;
the salaries of the President and Vice-President; the creation and allocation of
jurisdiction of lower courts; and on many other matters of grave import.
Same; Same; As to those powers which would normally fall within the plenary
legislative power, the Constitution has decided to doubly emphasize that it is the
Congress which is so empowered to perform such tasks.—May these specified
functions be delegated by Congress to another body? These specific functions are
non-delegable, for they are textually committed by the Constitution to Congress.
Perhaps it is possible to segregate these particular functions to those which would,
even absent constitutional definition, anyway fall within the plenary legislative
power, and those which are not plenary in nature but were especially designated to
Congress by the Constitution. Still, in either case, only Congress, and no other body,
can carry out that function. As to those powers which would normally fall within
the plenary legislative power, the Constitution has decided to doubly emphasize
that it is the Congress which is so empowered to perform such tasks. With respect
to the non-plenary functions assigned to Congress, it is clear that the assignment
implies the delegation by the Constitution to Congress of specific, wholly original
functions.
Same; Same; Local Autonomy; The guarantee of local autonomy is actualized
through a local government code that delineates the structure and powers of local
governments, and through constitutional measures that entitle local government
units to generate their own revenue stream and assure the same to their fair share
in the national internal revenue.—Section 2, Article X guarantees that the territorial
and political subdivisions in the Philippines shall enjoy local autonomy. The
guarantee of local autonomy is actualized through a local government code that
delineates the structure and powers of local governments, and through
constitutional measures that entitle local government units to generate their own
revenue stream and assure the same to their fair share in the national internal
revenue. Local government rule, in constitutional contemplation, is a live being that
exists to counterbalance the rule of the national government, and is not a mere
palliative established in the Constitution to soothe the people with the illusion of
having a more direct say in their governance.
Same; Local Autonomy; The idea behind the constitutional provisions for
autonomous regions is to allow the separate development of peoples with
distinctive cultures and traditions.—In Disomangcop v. Datumanong, 444 SCRA 203
(2004), the Court explained at length the vital constitutional purposes of local
autonomy: x x x According to Commissioner Jose Nolledo, Chairman of the
Committee which drafted the provisions, it “is an indictment against the status quo
of a unitary system that, to my mind, has ineluctably tied the hands of progress in
our country . . . our varying regional characteristics are factors to capitalize on to
attain national strength through decentralization.” The idea behind the
Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate
development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. These cultures, as
a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish.
Same; Same; On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy
to these regions.—On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution,
contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy
to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous
regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department
and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law
jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
Same; Same; It should be emphasized that local autonomy cannot be in denigration
of the Constitution.—Unfortunately, the majority gives short shrift to the
considerations of local autonomy, even as such paradigm partakes of a
constitutional mandate. If anything, these provisions should dissuade against a
reflexive dismissal of the provisions of the Organic Acts. It should be emphasized
that local autonomy cannot be in denigration of the Constitution. It is repeatedly
emphasized within Article X that the grant of local autonomy and the subsequent
exercise of powers by the autonomous government must remain within the
confines of the Constitution. At the same time, if there is no constitutional bar
against the exercise of the powers of government by the autonomous government
in Muslim Mindanao, particularly by the Regional Assembly, then there is no basis
to thwart the constitutional design by denying such powers to that body.
Same; Same; Delegations of Powers; Considering the constitutional mandate of
local autonomy for Muslim Mindanao, it can be said that such delegation is in
furtherance of the constitutional design.—May such power be delegated by
Congress to a local legislative body such as the Regional Assembly? Certainly,
nothing in the Constitution bars Congress from doing so. In fact, considering the
constitutional mandate of local autonomy for Muslim Mindanao, it can be said that
such delegation is in furtherance of the constitutional design.
Same; Same; Same; Republic Act 9054; Attuned with enhanced local government
rule, Congress had, through Rep. Act No. 9054, taken the bold step of delegating to
a local legislative assembly the power to create provinces, albeit prudently
withholding any ability to create legislative districts as well.—It bears
reemphasizing that the Constitution also actualizes a preference for local
government rule, and thusly provides: The Congress shall enact a local government
code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units. Attuned with enhanced local
government rule, Congress had, through Rep. Act No. 9054, taken the bold step of
delegating to a local legislative assembly the power to create provinces, albeit
prudently withholding any ability to create legislative districts as well.
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 9054; The subsequent passage of Rep. Act No. 9054
granted to the Regional Assembly the power, function and responsibility to create
provinces and other local government units which had been exercised by the
National Government.—Section 17, Article X states that “[a]ll powers, functions,
and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous
regions shall be vested in the National Government.” The original Organic Act for
Muslim Mindanao did not grant to the regional government the power to create
provinces, thus at that point, such power was properly exercised by the National
Government. But the subsequent passage of Rep. Act No. 9054 granted to the
Regional Assembly the power, function and responsibility to create provinces and
other local government units which had been exercised by the National
Government.
Same; Republic Act No. 9054; It bears noting that there is no contention presented
thus far that the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan was not in accordance with the
criteria established in the Local Government Code (LGC), thus this aspect of
unconstitutionality of Rep. Act No. 9054 may not be material to the petitions at bar.
—It bears noting that there is no contention presented thus far that the creation of
Shariff Kabunsuan was not in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC,
thus this aspect of unconstitutionality of Rep. Act No. 9054 may not be material to
the petitions at bar.
Same; Congress; Congress does not have any express or plenary legislative power to
create legislative districts, except by reapportionment.—How exactly does a
legislative district come into being? In theory, Congress does not have any express
or plenary legislative power to create legislative districts, except by
reapportionment. Under the Constitution, such reapportionment occurs within
three years following the return of the census, but this Court has likewise
recognized that reapportionment can also be made through a special law, such as in
the charter of a new city. Still, even in exercising this limited power through the
constitutionally mandated reapportionment, Congress cannot substitute its own
discretion for the standards set forth in Section 5, Article VI. And should general
reapportionment made by Congress violate the parameters set forth by the
Constitution, such act may be invalidated by the Court, as it did in Macias v.
COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1 (1961).
Same; Same; The Constitution clearly provided that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than 250 members unless otherwise provided by
law.—The Court has previously recognized that such law increasing the
membership of the House of Representatives need not be one specifically devoted
for that purpose alone, but it may be one that creates a province or charters a city
with a population of more than 250,000. In Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994),
the Court pronounced that the law converting Mandaluyong into a city could
likewise serve the purpose of increasing the composition of the House of
Representatives: As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present
limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of
the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the
present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that
the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
“unless otherwise provided by law.” The inescapable import of the latter clause is
that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; The power to increase the composition of the
House of Representatives is restricted by the Constitution to a law passed by
Congress, which may not delegate such law-making power to the Regional
Assembly.—I have already pointed out that when the Constitution specifically
designates a particular function to Congress, only Congress may exercise such
function, as the same is non-delegable. The power to increase the composition of
the House of Representatives is restricted by the Constitution to a law passed by
Congress, which may not delegate such law-making power to the Regional
Assembly. If we were to rule that Congress may delegate the power to increase the
composition of the House of Representatives, there would be no impediment for us
to similarly rule that those other specific functions tasked by the Constitution to
Congress may be delegated as well. To repeat, these include gravely important
functions as the enactment of a law defining political dynasties; the enactment of
reasonable conditions relating to full public disclosure of all the State’s transactions
involving public interest; the manner by which Philippine citizenship may be lost or
reacquired; the date of regular elections for members of Congress; the provision for
the manner of conduct of special elections to fill in congressional vacancies; the
authorization of the President to exercise emergency powers; the prescription of a
system for initiative and referendum; the salaries of the President and Vice-
President; and the creation and allocation of jurisdiction of lower courts.
Same; Republic Act No. 9054; Even as Section 19 of Rep. Act 9054 constitutionally
authorizes the Regional Assembly to create provinces, there are legal limitations
that constrict the discretion of that body to exercise such power.—Even as Section
19 of Rep. Act No. 9054 constitutionally authorizes the Regional Assembly to create
provinces, there are legal limitations that constrict the discretion of that body to
exercise such power. I had earlier identified as unconstitutional the discretion of the
Regional Assembly to create local government units based on a lower standard than
that prescribed under the LGC. Another clear limitation is that the creation of
provinces cannot be authorized without the ratification through a plebiscite by the
people affected by such act, a requirement imposed by the Organic Act itself and by
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These consolidated petitions1 seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May
2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of
the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.2
The Facts
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative
districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of
Cotabato City and eight municipalities.3 Maguindanao forms part of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act,
Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).4
Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s first
legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against
its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,
exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,5
enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first
district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:
“Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan,
Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated
from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent
province, which is hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan.
xxxx
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the
appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of
the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall
continue to serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or
where they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position in both
provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference
for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time being be
appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors
shall have been elected and qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further,
that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the
approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law.
Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province.
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which
includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.”
Later, three new municipalities6 were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11.
Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second
legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative
district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite held
on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed
Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City
in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular
province” under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato City’s query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on
6 March 2007 “maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.” Resolution No. 07-
0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s Law Department
under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,7 provides in pertinent parts:
“Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to
adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of
the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as
part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.”
(Emphasis supplied)
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated
on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative
district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act
201.8
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District
of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”9
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for
Representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City,” prayed for the
nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of
the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff
Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution10 and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.11 Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in
Maguindanao’s first legislative district despite the COMELEC’s earlier directive in
Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of
Maguindanao’s reapportioned first legislative district.12 Sema further claimed that
in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress’ power to create or
reapportion legislative districts.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema
wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not
quasi-judicial, power and (2) Sema’s prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No.
177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen
(respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from
questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy
filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as
representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City.” Respondent
Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it
did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the
legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanao’s first
legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could
not reapportion Maguindanao’s first legislative district to make Cotabato City its
sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively
with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum
population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the
creation of a legislative district within a city.13
Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents’
Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing
Resolution No. 7902.
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No.
177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM
Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted their
compliance as follows:
(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the
Court in Felwa v. Salas14 stated that “when a province is created by statute, the
corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of
that statute—which cannot provide otherwise—nor by apportionment, but by
operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment”; (b) Section 462 of
Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) “affirms” the apportionment of a legislative
district incident to the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate
the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces.
(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its
earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and
joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution is “self-executing.” Thus, every new province created by the ARMM
Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and
(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following
grounds: (a) the “province” contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the
provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA
9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures
relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative
districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative
district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the
disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as
the Regional Assembly can create provinces without regard to the requirements in
Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than
250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.
On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral
arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is
constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of
Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for
such new province.15
In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No.
177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral
arguments.16 On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions:
 (1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as
a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces
under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous
regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over “other matters as may
be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the
region” and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.17 However, Sema
concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the
ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to “prescribe standards lower than those
mandated” in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution.18 Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 “should be construed
as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not
comply with the minimum criteria” under RA 7160.19
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was
not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of
the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the
ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those
mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and
(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen
(thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance
with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI
of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and Section
6,20 Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was
withheld from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA
9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without
need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema
and respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they
adopted in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The
COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position on this issue considering its
stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional.
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral
arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the
Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in
G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema’s contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in
issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters of Cotabato City of a
representative in the House of Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in
G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by
Congress of the “appropriate law.”
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily—
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test
the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No.
177597.
(B) On the merits—
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional
Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a
national law creating a legislative district for such province.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao
(as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City]”), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate
to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by “any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.”21 On the
other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation,
board, officer, or person to perform an act “which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty.”22 True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.23 Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins
the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for
representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.” These, however,
do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because
Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long
recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws,
rules, and regulations.24
Respondent Dilangalen’s Proclamation
Does Not Moot the Petition
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s proclamation as
winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City” mooted this petition. This case does not concern
respondent Dilangalen’s election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way
or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative
of the district of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” will be included in
the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us
not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Court’s
ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also
all the other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of
the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.
On the Main Issues
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly
Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
“Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units—province, city,
municipality or barangay—must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of
a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises
with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial
boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction,25 subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of
Congress” can create provinces, cities or municipalities.26
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within
the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers
because the power to create local government units is not one of the express
legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.27 In
the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to
regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays,
provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation
of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of
Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides, “Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall
be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.”
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will
violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district.
Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or
more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a
city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative
district because once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically
becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus,
the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a
legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also
validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The
threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives?
The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned
Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past28 Constitutions, the power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to
reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution provides:
“SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in
this section.” (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase,
through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section
5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to
reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative
districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that
Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies
enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be
increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a
national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,29 we held that the
“power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of
Congress) to make laws,” and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or
reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any
increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the
creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress
can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies
to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress.
An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change
the membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional
Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to
create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM
Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:
“SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall
provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions,
expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic
Act, provides, “The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except
on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x.” Since the ARMM
Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national
elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in
national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district,
the first representative is always elected in the “next national elections” from the
effectivity of the law.30
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national
office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national
official.31 It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM
Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend
only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by
national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a
self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional
legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it
can never create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its
legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM’s territorial jurisdiction. This
violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage
of the Regional Assembly’s legislative powers “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x
x.”
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the
exclusive nature of Congress’ power to create or reapportion legislative districts by
abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of
MMA Act 201 provides that:
“Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which
includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain.” (Emphasis supplied)
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because
the Constitution mandates that “each province shall have at least one
representative.” Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a
legislative district is unconstitutional.
Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
“Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.” (Emphasis
supplied) and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which
states:
“Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of
Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and
according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which
such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so
increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the
Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one
hundred and twenty days before the election.” (Emphasis supplied)
serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on
29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of
Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance,
petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that “when a province is created by
statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by
authority of that statute—which cannot provide otherwise—nor by apportionment,
but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.”
The contention has no merit.
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA
4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-
Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new
provinces, was unconstitutional for “creati[ng] congressional districts without the
apportionment provided in the Constitution.” The Court answered in the negative,
thus:
“The Constitution ordains:
“The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred
and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as
nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each
province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an
apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not
otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for
the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the
present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as
practicable, contiguous and compact territory.”
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a)
indirectly, through the creation of a province—for “each province shall have at least
one member” in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several
representative districts within a province. The requirements concerning the
apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the
second method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those
incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible,
not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the
fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an
Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute—
which cannot provide otherwise—nor by apportionment, but by operation of the
Constitution, without a reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other
conditions under which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the
consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts
prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under
consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into
other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representative districts,
without complying with the aforementioned requirements.”32 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly
created legislative districts “indirectly” through a special law enacted by Congress
creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in
breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935
Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new
provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new
province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional
Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not
emanate alone from Congress’ power to reapportion legislative districts, but also
from Congress’ power to create provinces which cannot be created without a
legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created
by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that “each
province shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives.
This does not detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create
legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other
legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative
body to create a province such legislative body must have the power to create
legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a
legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the
power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to
Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone
component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City
cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in
2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the
surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the Constitution which requires that “[E]ach city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative.”
Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and independence of
the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,33 Article VI of RA 9054, the
ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or
without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum
annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square
kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.34 The following scenarios thus
become distinct possibilities:
“(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100
or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body,
the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the
Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise);
(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one
representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because the
ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)
(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at least
250,000; and
(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the
House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assembly’s continuous
creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.”
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No.
177597 highlights the absurdity of Sema’s position that the ARMM Regional
Assembly can create provinces:
Justice Carpio:
  So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and
pack Congress with their own representatives [?]
Atty. Vistan II:35
  Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.
Justice Carpio:
  So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x
provinces x x x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five (35) new representatives in
the House of Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you are
saying? That can be done, under your theory[?]
Atty. Vistan II:
  Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.
Justice Carpio:
  Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new
provinces, there may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000) [population],
x x x, and they will each have one representative x x x to Congress without any
national law, is that what you are saying?
Atty. Vistan II:
  Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying.
xxxx
Justice Carpio:
  So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one
thousand (1000) representatives to the House of Representatives without a
national law[,] that is legally possible, correct?
Atty. Vistan II:
  Yes, Your Honor.36 (Emphasis supplied)

Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X
on regional autonomy,37 nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended
these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tribranch system of
government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion
legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by
Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts,
not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which
states, “[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member,” refers to a province
created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of
a province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an
increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress,
there are 21938 district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House
of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total
membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in
every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves
only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent
district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law
the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new
provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the
legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x
x.” The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM
Government is established “within the framework of the Constitution.” This follows
Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM “shall be
created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty
as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily
involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not
comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities
and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the
resolution of this issue to an appropriate case.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being
contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as
well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can
create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily
includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise
under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a
province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every
province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district
representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional
Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the
ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the
geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section
20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities.
Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No.
7902 is VALID.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 114783. December 8, 1994.*
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and
ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR., petitioners, vs. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS,
CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all
of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Municipal Corporations; Highly Urbanized Cities; Congressional Districts; The
statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city indubitably
complies with the “one city-one representative” proviso in the Constitution.—
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the
statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population
of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with
the “one city-one representative” proviso in the Constitution: “x x x Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative” (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Hence, it is in
compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a
separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article
VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Statutes; Titles of Bills; The creation of a
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and
distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a
natural and logical consequence of such conversion.—Contrary to petitioners’
assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a
subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, “An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Manda-luyong”
necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49
regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A liberal construction of the “one title-one
subject” rule has been invariably adopted by the Supreme Court so as not to cripple
or impede legislation.—Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one title-one
subject” rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or
impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled
that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1)
“should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not required that all laws emanating from the
legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment
of said laws.—Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by
petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census
to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative
districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The
said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the
minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At
any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain
all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Congressional Districts; The present composition of
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative
enactment.—As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on
the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the
applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the
present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that
the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
“unless otherwise provided by law.” The inescapable import of the latter clause is
that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right
which pertains to itself.—As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in
effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said
argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it
was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law,
including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right
which pertains to itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Plebiscite; The inhabitants of San Juan, which
used to be part of the congressional district together with Mandaluyong, were
properly excluded from the plebiscite on the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city since the matter of separate district representation was only
ancillary thereto.—Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have
been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a
change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the
principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into
a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district repre-sentation was only
ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from
the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of
neighboring Mandaluyong.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Gerry-mandering,” Defined.
—Similarly, petitioners’ additional argument that the subject law has resulted in
“gerrymandering,” which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a
particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by
the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of
the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/
Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which
development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Manda-luyong, herein
petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known
as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City
to be Known as the City of Mandaluyong.”
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong
and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the
incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the
bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675
into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10,
1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the
conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7,911 voted “no.” By
virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically
Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three
specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
“As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections
after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its
first representative to be elected at the same election.”
Petitioners’ first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it
contravenes the “one subject-one bill” rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26
(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
“Section 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.”
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law
resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion
of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the
subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law.
Therefore, since Section49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of
the law, the “one subject-one bill” rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners’ second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5 (1) and (4) of
the Constitution, which provide, to wit:
“Section 5 (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.”
“Section 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in this section.”
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an
increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided
in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that
said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally,
petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress
to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the
statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population
of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with
the “one city-one representative” proviso in the Constitution:
“x x x Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative” (Article VI, Section 5(3),
Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the
creation of a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed
under Article VIII, Section
Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district
for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, “An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong” necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under
Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one title-one subject” rule has been
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in
Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) “should be given a
practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance
with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject.”
The liberal construction of the “one title-one subject” rule had been further
elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
“Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons
interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation” (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect
that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that
Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of
250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the
same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act
enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional
processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the
minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At
any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain
all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number
of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable
provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of
250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, “unless
otherwise provided by law.” The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the
present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates
through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to
have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be
allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the
absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which
drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49
thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present
further arguments against the validity thereof.

Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to
participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their
legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject
involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary
thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said
plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.

Similarly, petitioners’ additional argument that the subject law has resulted in
“gerrymandering,” which is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a
particular candidate or party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by
the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of
the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San
Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing
San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished,
which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176970. December 8, 2008.*
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Remedial Law; Actions; Hierarchy of Courts; Direct invocation of the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition; Recourse must first be made
to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.—
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. It was pursuant to this original
jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the present petition. While this jurisdiction is
shared with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs, a direct invocation of the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition. Reasons of practicality,
dictated by an increasingly overcrowded docket and the need to prioritize in favor
of matters within our exclusive jurisdiction, justify the existence of this rule
otherwise known as the “principle of hierarchy of courts.” More generally stated,
the principle requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court
exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.
Municipal Corporations; Congressional Districts; Definition of Legislative
Apportionment and Reapportionment.—Legislative apportionment is defined by
Black’s Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives which
a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the
allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing
of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the
districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Same; Same; Plebiscite; The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly
require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of a local government unit; No plebiscite requirement exists
under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.—A pronounced
distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the
requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code
expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite
requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision. In
Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994), a case that arose from the division of the
congressional district formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a
legislative reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered
and held for Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city, while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this happened, the Court
ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the objective of the
plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new
legislative district only followed as a consequence. In other words, the
apportionment alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was
needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.
Same; Same; Same; The plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a
province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local Government Code should
not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment.—These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a
legislative apportionment or reapportionment and the division of a local
government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment
does not mean, and does not even imply, a division of a local government unit
where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies
to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local
Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a
legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus,1 with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction, filed by Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to prevent the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the ground that
Republic Act No. 93712—the law that Resolution No. 7837 implements—is
unconstitutional.
Background Facts
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula
filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: “An Act Providing for the Apportionment
of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro.”3 This law eventually
became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371.4 It increased Cagayan de Oro’s legislative
district from one to two. For the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro’s voters
would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending
on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang
Panglungsod.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the City’s barangays as follows:
“Legislative Districts—The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan De Oro is
hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity
of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag,
Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia,
Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga,
Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district
while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth,
Macasandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto,
Bugo, and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall
comprise the second district.”5
On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 78376
implementing R.A. No. 9371.
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present petition against the COMELEC on
March 27, 2007.7 On 10 April 2008, the petitioner amended the petition to include
the following as respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita; the Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management; the Chairman of the Commission on
Audit; the Mayor and the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cagayan de
Oro City; and its Board of Canvassers.8
In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on
constitutional grounds, the petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement
R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the
conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a
local government unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the
respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which
provided for a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and Local Elections
proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371 and Resolution No. 7837.
The respondent’s Comment on the petition, filed through the Office of the Solicitor
General, argued that: 1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of courts, as
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with concurrent jurisdiction over cases
assailing the constitutionality of a statute; 2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and
Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; 3) the
criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply
when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local
government unit took place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no
plebiscite is required.
The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Del Mar
v. PAGCOR,9 the Court may take cognizance of this petition if compelling reasons, or
the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of
its jurisdiction; 2) Cagayan de Oro City’s reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls
within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration
of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 3) the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a common denominator—the material change in the
political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected, as well
as of the people therein; 4) a voter’s sovereign power to decide on who should be
elected as the entire city’s Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one half
because the questioned law and resolution only allowed him to vote and be voted
for in the district designated by the COMELEC; 5) a voter was also arbitrarily denied
his right to elect the Congressman and the members of the city council for the
other legislative district, and 6) government funds were illegally disbursed without
prior approval by the sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro City.10
The Issues
The core issues, based on the petition and the parties’ memoranda, can be limited
to the following contentious points:
1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of courts rule; if so, should the instant
petition be dismissed on this ground?
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of
Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local
government unit?
3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of representation doctrine?
Our Ruling
Except for the issue of the hierarchy of courts rule, we find the petition totally
without merit.
The hierarchy of courts principle.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.11 It was pursuant to this original
jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the present petition.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals12 and the RTCs,13 a
direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the
petition. Reasons of practicality, dictated by an increasingly overcrowded docket
and the need to prioritize in favor of matters within our exclusive jurisdiction, justify
the existence of this rule otherwise known as the “principle of hierarchy of courts.”
More generally stated, the principle requires that recourse must first be made to
the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court.14
Among the cases we have considered sufficiently special and important to be
exceptions to the rule, are petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo
warranto against our nation’s lawmakers when the validity of their enactments is
assailed.15 The present petition is of this nature; its subject matter and the nature
of the issues raised—among them, whether legislative reapportionment involves a
division of Cagayan de Oro City as a local government unit—are reasons enough for
considering it an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the
petition assails as well a resolution of the COMELEC en banc issued to implement
the legislative apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an action against a
COMELEC en banc resolution, the case falls under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court that
in turn requires a review by this Court via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.16 For
these reasons, we do not see the principle of hierarchy of courts to be a stumbling
block in our consideration of the present case.
The Plebiscite Requirement.
The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de
Oro as a local government unit, and does not merely provide for the City’s
legislative apportionment. This argument essentially proceeds from a
misunderstanding of the constitutional concepts of apportionment of legislative
districts and division of local government units.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as the determination
of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may
send to a legislative body.17 It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in
proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize
population and voting power among the districts.18 Reapportionment, on the
other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by
changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality
of representation.19
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the
rules on legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:
“Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred fifty members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in
this section.”
Separately from the legislative districts that legal apportionment or
reapportionment speaks of, are the local government units (historically and
generically referred to as “municipal corporations”) that the Constitution itself
classified into provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.20 In its strict and
proper sense, a municipality has been defined as “a body politic and corporate
constituted by the incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the purpose
of local government thereof.”21 The creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays, are covered by the Article on Local Government
(Article X). Section 10 of this Article provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly affected.
Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the
authority to act has been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the
apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts,22 and likewise acts on
local government units by setting the standards for their creation, division, merger,
abolition and alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging,
abolishing local government units and altering their boundaries through legislation.
Other than this, not much commonality exists between the two provisions since
they are inherently different although they interface and relate with one another.
The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political
representation and the means to make a legislative district sufficiently represented
so that the people can be effectively heard. As above stated, the aim of legislative
apportionment is “to equalize population and voting power among districts.”23
Hence, emphasis is given to the number of people represented; the uniform and
progressive ratio to be observed among the representative districts; and
accessibility and commonality of interests in terms of each district being, as far as
practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent territory. In terms of the people
represented, every city with at least 250,000 people and every province
(irrespective of population) is entitled to one representative. In this sense,
legislative districts, on the one hand, and provinces and cities, on the other, relate
and interface with each other. To ensure continued adherence to the required
standards of apportionment, Section 5(4) specifically mandates reapportionment as
soon as the given standards are met.
In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X,
Section 10 expressly speaks of how local government units may be “created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered.” Its concern is the
commencement, the termination, and the modification of local government units’
corporate existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards
that must be observed in implementing this concern, namely, the criteria
established in the local government code and the approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Under the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) passed in 1991, the criteria of income,
population and land area are specified as verifiable indicators of viability and
capacity to provide services.24 The division or merger of existing units must comply
with the same requirements (since a new local government unit will come into
being), provided that a division shall not reduce the income, population, or land
area of the unit affected to less than the minimum requirement prescribed in the
Code.25
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is
on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government
Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger,
abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit.26 In contrast, no
plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment
provision. In Tobias v. Abalos,27 a case that arose from the division of the
congressional district formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a
legislative reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered
and held for Mandaluyong in the course of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city, while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this happened, the Court
ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the objective of the
plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
required by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new
legislative district only followed as a consequence. In other words, the
apportionment alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was
needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.
The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10 and the lack of requirement for
one under Article VI, Section 5 can best be appreciated by a consideration of the
historical roots of these two provisions, the nature of the concepts they embody as
heretofore discussed, and their areas of application.
A Bit of History.
In Macias v. COMELEC,28 we first jurisprudentially acknowledged the American
roots of our apportionment provision, noting its roots from the Fourteenth
Amendment29 of the U.S. Constitution and from the constitutions of some
American states. The Philippine Organic Act of 1902 created the Philippine
Assembly,30 the body that acted as the lower house of the bicameral legislature
under the Americans, with the Philippine Commission acting as the upper house.
While the members of the Philippine Commission were appointed by the U.S.
President with the conformity of the U.S. Senate, the members of the Philippine
Assembly were elected by representative districts previously delineated under the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902 pursuant to the mandate to apportion the seats of
the Philippine Assembly among the provinces as nearly as practicable according to
population. Thus, legislative apportionment first started in our country.
The Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 maintained the
apportionment provision, dividing the country into 12 senate districts and 90
representative districts electing one delegate each to the House of Representatives.
Section 16 of the Act specifically vested the Philippine Legislature with the
authority to redistrict the Philippine Islands.
Under the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 retained the concept of legislative
apportionment together with “district” as the basic unit of apportionment; the
concern was “equality of representation . . . as an essential feature of republican
institutions” as expressed in the leading case of Macias v. COMELEC.31 The case
ruled that inequality of representation is a justiciable, not a political issue, which
ruling was reiterated in Montejo v. COMELEC.32 Notably, no issue regarding the
holding of a plebiscite ever came up in these cases and the others that followed, as
no plebiscite was required.
Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution retained the concept of equal
representation “in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio” with each district being, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. This formulation was
essentially carried over to the 1987 Constitution, distinguished only from the
previous one by the presence of party-list representatives. In neither Constitution
was a plebiscite required.
The need for a plebiscite in the creation, division, merger, or abolition of local
government units was not constitutionally enshrined until the 1973 Constitution.
However, as early as 1959, R.A. No. 226433 required, in the creation of barrios by
Provincial Boards, that the creation and definition of boundaries be “upon petition
of a majority of the voters in the areas affected.” In 1961, the Charter of the City of
Caloocan (R.A. No. 3278) carried this further by requiring that the “Act shall take
effect after a majority of voters of the Municipality of Caloocan vote in favor of the
conversion of their municipality into a city in a plebiscite.” This was followed up to
1972 by other legislative enactments requiring a plebiscite as a condition for the
creation and conversion of local government units as well as the transfer of sitios
from one legislative unit to another.34 In 1973, the plebiscite requirement was
accorded constitutional status.
Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of a plebiscite
was never a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment. After it
became constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was also always identified with the
creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries of local
government units, never with the concept of legislative apportionment.
Nature and Areas of Application.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a
political unit because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of
Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It is not, however, a
political subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. It can
more appropriately be described as a representative unit that may or may not
encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike the latter, it is not a
corporate unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf
of the people comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the
people who will choose a representative in their national affairs.
Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor;
and a barangay, which has a punong barangay, a district does not have its own chief
executive. The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure that the voice of
the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the
legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal
personality that must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence,
there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other similar
action on a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units.
They are the territorial and political subdivisions of the state.35 They possess legal
personality on the authority of the Constitution and by action of the Legislature.
The Constitution defines them as entities that Congress can, by law, create, divide,
abolish, merge; or whose boundaries can be altered based on standards again
established by both the Constitution and the Legislature.36 A local government
unit’s corporate existence begins upon the election and qualification of its chief
executive and a majority of the members of its Sanggunian.37
As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an “instrumentality of the state
in carrying out the functions of government.”38 As a corporate entity with a distinct
and separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises special functions for
the sole benefit of its constituents. It acts as “an agency of the community in the
administration of local affairs”39 and the mediums through which the people act in
their corporate capacity on local concerns.40 In light of these roles, the
Constitution saw it fit to expressly secure the consent of the people affected by the
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government
units through a plebiscite.
These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative
apportionment or reapportionment and the division of a local government unit.
Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean,
and does not even imply, a division of a local government unit where the
apportionment takes place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies to the
division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local Government
Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative
apportionment or reapportionment.
R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Res. No. 7837
R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed
in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4)
of the Constitution. Its core provision—Section 1—provides:
“SECTION 1. Legislative Districts.—The lone legislative district of the City of
Cagayan de Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections
after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas,
Kauswagan, Carmen,
Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia,
Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga,
Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district
while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth,
Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan,
Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40
shall comprise the second district.”
Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and
corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains
a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory
remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another
legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of
representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the
Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly
apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.
Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of
another congressional district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC
Resolution No. 7837, for additional Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for
along the lines of the congressional apportionment made. The effect on the
Sangguniang Panglunsod, however, is not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to
another law—R.A. No. 663641—whose Section 3 provides:
“SECTION 3. Other Cities.—The provision of any law to the contrary
notwithstanding the City of Cebu, City of Davao, and any other city with more than
one representative district shall have eight (8) councilors for each district who shall
be residents thereof to be elected by the qualified voters therein, provided that the
cities of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod, Iloilo and other cities comprising a
representative district shall have twelve (12) councilors each and all other cities
shall have ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large by the qualified voters of
the said cities: Provided, That in no case shall the present number of councilors
according to their charters be reduced.”
However, neither does this law have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de
Oro into two political and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the
city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter
representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and
in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment, Cagayan de Oro had only one
congressman and 12 city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000.42 By having two legislative districts, each of them with one
congressman, Cagayan de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one
representing 250,000 of the city’s population. In terms of services for city residents,
this easily means better access to their congressman since each one now services
only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000 he used to represent. The same
goes true for the Sangguniang Panglungsod with its ranks increased from 12 to 16
since each legislative district now has 8 councilors. In representation terms, the
fewer constituents represented translate to a greater voice for each individual city
resident in Congress and in the Sanggunian; each congressman and each councilor
represents both a smaller area and fewer constituents whose fewer numbers are
now concentrated in each representative. The City, for its part, now has twice the
number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since
the total number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of
doubling its numbers, the presence of two congressman (instead of one) from the
same city cannot Equality of representation.
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal.
District 1 has only 93,719 registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is
composed mostly of rural barangays while District 2 is composed mostly of urban
barangays.43 Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of equality of
representation.
A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for districting
shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of
registered voters therein. We settled this very same question in Herrera v.
COMELEC44 when we interpreted a provision in R.A. No. 7166 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2313 that applied to the Province of Guimaras. We categorically
ruled that the basis for districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province of
Guimaras by municipality based on the official 1995 Census of Population as
certified to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of the National Statistics Office.
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual
population of Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the August
2007 census of the National Statistics Office which shows that barangays comprising
Cagayan de Oro’s first district have a total population of 254,644, while the second
district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the
population sizes of the districts.45 The Constitution, however, does not require
mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation.46 In fact, for cities, all it asks is that “each city with a population of
at least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one representative,” while ensuring
representation for every province regardless of the size of its population. To ensure
quality representation through commonality of interests and ease of access by the
representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that every
legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local government units as they
are found and does not require their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the
numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are satisfied despite some
numerical disparity if the units are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as
practicable.
The petitioner’s contention that there is a resulting inequality in the division of
Cagayan de Oro City into two districts because the barangays in the first district are
mostly rural barangays while the second district is mostly urban, is largely
unsubstantiated. But even if backed up by proper proof, we cannot question the
division on the basis of the difference in the barangays’ levels of development or
developmental focus as these are not part of the constitutional standards for
legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
What the components of the two districts of Cagayan de Oro would be is a matter
for the lawmakers to determine as a matter of policy. In the absence of any grave
abuse of discretion or violation of the established legal parameters, this Court
cannot intrude into the wisdom of these policies.47
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155855. January 26, 2004.*
MA. SALVACION BUAC and ANTONIO BAUTISTA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, respondents, DANTE O. TINGA, SIGFRIDO
R. TINGA, MILAGROS VALENCIA-RODRIGUEZ, MARISSE BALINA-ERON, HENRY
DUENAS, JR., ALLAN PAUL C. CRUZ, ARNEL M. CERAFICA, DELIO SANTOS, GAMALIEL
SAN PEDRO, ROBERTO DIONISIO, ELPIDIO JAVIER, HENDRY DUENAS, SR., NICANOR
GARCIA, PACIFICO SANTOS, RICARDO NATIVIDAD, GABRIEL VICTORIA, ROMEO G.
SANTOS, GEORGE A. ELIAS, DANIEL VALDEZ, MARIANITO MIRANDA, ROLANDO C.
PAAC, WILFREDO C. VILLAR, MENANDRO O. TINGA, JULIAN MARIATEGUI,
BERNARDINO ELIAS, HERMINIA C. PEREZ and RICARDO J. JORDAN, petitioners-in-
Intervention, RICARDO D. PAPA, JR., respondent-in-Intervention, ALAN PETER S.
CAYETANO, respondent-in-Intervention.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; Plebiscites; Courts; Judicial Power;
Jurisdiction; A case assailing the regularity of the conduct of a plebiscite does not fit
the kind of a case calling for the exercise of judicial power—it does not involve the
violation of any legally demandable right and its enforcement.—The key to the case
at bar is its nature. The case at bar involves the determination of whether the
electorate of Taguig voted in favor of, or against the conversion of the municipality
of Taguig into a highly urbanized city in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose.
Respondents submit that the regular courts of justice, more specifically, the
Regional Trial Court, has the jurisdiction to adjudicate any controversy concerning
the conduct of said plebiscite. We hold that the invocation of judicial power to
settle disputes involving the conduct of a plebiscite is misplaced. Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution defines judicial power as including “the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” According to Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, “the first
part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power involving
the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law.” The case at bar assailing
the regularity of the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case
calling for the exercise of judicial power. It does not involve the violation of any
legally demandable right and its enforcement. There is no plaintiff or defendant in
the case at bar for it merely involves the ascertainment of the vote of the electorate
of Taguig whether they approve or disapprove the conversion of their municipality
to a highly urbanized city. There is no invocation of a private right conferred by law
that has been violated and which can be vindicated alone in our courts of justice in
an adversarial proceeding. Rather, the issue in the case at bar is the determination
of the sovereign decision of the electorate of Taguig. The purpose of this
determination is more to protect the sovereignty of the people and less to vindicate
the private interest of any individual. Such a determination does not contemplate
the clash of private rights of individuals and hence cannot come under the
traditional jurisdiction of courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; Words and Phrases; Section 19 (1)
and (6) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act (B.P. Bilang 129, as amended), refer to
civil cases or actions; A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong; The
determination of the public will is a subject that does not fit the jurisdiction of civil
courts, for civil courts are established essentially to resolve controversies between
private persons.—If the determination of the result of a plebiscite is not fit for the
exercise of judicial power, the invocation of Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act, is ineluctably errant, viz.: Sec.
19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction: 1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation; x x x 6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person
or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. There cannot be any bout
with doubt that the aforequoted provisions refer to civil cases or actions. A civil
action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right or the prevention or redress of a wrong. As stressed above, a plebiscite
involves the expression of the public will on a public issue. The determination of the
public will is a subject that does not fit the jurisdiction of civil courts, for civil courts
are established essentially to resolve controversies between private persons.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What grabs the eyeball is the intent of the
Constitution and election laws to subject only contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of elected officials—from the barangay to the President
of the Philippines—to the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or
administrative tribunals; The enforcement and administration of a law relative to a
plebiscite falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section 2(1), Article IX
(C) of the Constitution which gives it the power to enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of a plebiscite.—What grabs the eyeball is
the intent of our Constitution and election laws to subject only contests relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of elected officials—from the barangay to
the President of the Philippines—to the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers
of courts or administrative tribunals. Contests which do not involve the election,
returns and qualifications of elected officials are not subjected to the exercise of
the judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or administrative agencies. Clearly,
controversies concerning the conduct of a plebiscite appertain to this category. In
the case at bar, the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite is the core of the controversy.
This is a matter that involves the enforcement and administration of a law relative
to a plebiscite. It falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section 2(1),
Article IX (C) of the Constitution which gives it the power “to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of a x x x plebiscite x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Another reason why the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to
resolve disputes involving plebiscite results should be upheld is that such a case
involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC; This is the
first time that the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over a petition to annul the results of a
plebiscite has been assailed and surprisingly, this is the first time that the COMELEC
has yielded its historic jurisdiction.—From our earliest Constitution and election
laws, the conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the
business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. If the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over this matter, our laws would have been amended to that effect.
There is another reason why the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to resolve disputes
involving plebiscite results should be upheld. Such a case involves the appreciation
of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body
exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of
election and related laws. Consequently, we should be extra cautious in delimiting
the parameters of the COMELEC’s broad powers. We should give the
COMELEC enough latitude in the exercise of its expertise, for to straightjacket its
discretion in the enforcement and administration of laws relating to the conduct of
election, plebiscite or referendum may render it impotent. This is the first time that
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over a petition to annul the results of a plebiscite has
been assailed and surprisingly, this is the first time that the COMELEC has yielded its
historic jurisdiction. More inexplicable is the inconsistent stance of the COMELEC on
the issue. As stressed by the petitioners, the COMELEC assumed jurisdiction over
the case assailing the result of the Malolos plebiscite. In the case at bar, it refused
to exercise jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure provides that a motion for reconsideration should be filed within five
(5) days from receipt of the COMELEC Order or Resolution.—Finally, it appears that
the Motion for Reconsideration of private respondent Congressman Cayetano was
filed out of time. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides
that a motion for reconsideration should be filed within five (5) days from receipt of
the COMELEC Order or Resolution. Congressman Cayetano himself admitted that he
received a copy of the October 3, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division on
October 9, 2001. The records show that it was only ten (10) days after said receipt,
or on October 19, 2001, that private respondent Cayetano filed his undated and
unverified Motion for Reconsideration. Clearly, the COMELEC 2nd Division had no
jurisdiction to entertain his Motion.
CARPIO-MORALES, J., Dissenting:
Election Law; Commission on Elections; Administrative Law; It is impermissible for a
petitioner to call on the COMELEC to exercise a function quasi-judicial in nature but
invoke a constitutionally-vested administrative power as legal basis thereof.—The
grounds petitioners and petitioner-intervenors are raising, however—fraud,
anomalies and irregularities that attended the balloting and canvassing alleged to
have seriously affected the results of the plebiscite—are similar to the grounds
raised in an election contest. Petitioners and petitioner-intervenors are thus asking
the COMELEC to exercise a function similar to what it exercises in election protests.
The Constitution provides, however, that election protests are governed by Section
2(2) of Article IX-C—a quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC. Ergo, petitioners and
petitioner-intervenors call on the COMELEC to exercise a function quasi-judicial in
nature but invoke a constitutionally-vested administrative power as legal basis
thereof. This is impermissible. It bears emphasis that Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of
the Constitution can neither be applied to the petition for revision and recount of
plebiscite votes, for the Constitution expressly enunciates the quasi-judicial power
of the COMELEC as covering the exercise of exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial and city officials appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal official decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. To extend by
implication the jurisdiction to plebiscite results violates the clear provision of the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Judicial Power; Since neither the Constitution nor any
law confers upon the COMELEC the jurisdiction to order the revision and recount of
ballots in plebiscites or any contests arising from plebiscite results, it is the judicial
branch that can take cognizance thereof.—In Lopez v. Roxas, this Court held that the
Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in the judicial branch “except only
so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency” in which case said
agency would be exercising quasi-judicial power. Consequently, where the power
has not been expressly delegated by either the law or the Constitution to “some
other agency,” the same remains lodged with the judicial branch. Since neither the
Constitution nor any law confers upon the COMELEC the jurisdiction to order the
revision and recount of ballots in plebiscites or any contests arising from plebiscite
results, it is the judicial branch that can take cognizance thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether there was fraud or there were
anomalies or irregularities is a legal question which is determinable by a judicial or
quasi-judicial body calling for the exercise of judicial power or quasi-judicial power
as the case may be.—Not only by analogy with election contests can it be
concluded that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over controversies involving
plebiscites. The case at bar does not simply involve “the determination of whether
the electorate of Taguig voted in favor of, or against the conversion of the
municipality of Taguig into a highly urbanized city” as seen by the majority. For
petitioners are alleging that there have been fraud, anomalies and irregularities in
the balloting and counting. Whether there was fraud or there were anomalies or
irregularities is a legal question which is determinable by a judicial or quasi-judicial
body calling for the exercise of judicial power or quasi-judicial power as the case
may be.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The exercise of the right of the electorate of a
particular locality to vote in a plebiscite to convert their municipality into a city
would be futile if it does not come with the concurrent right to a canvass free from
fraud, anomalies and irregularities, and if said right is alleged to have been
impaired, then there exists a controversy which calls for the exercise of judicial
power.—The majority also view the case as not calling for the exercise of judicial
power as it does not involve violation of any legally demandable and enforceable
right nor the protection of the private interest of any individual and does not
contemplate the clash of contending private parties. I beg to differ. The Taguig
electorate, being directly affected by the proposed conversion into cityhood, has
the constitutionally vested right to vote in said plebiscite. The exercise of such right
would be futile if it does not come with the concurrent right to a canvass free from
fraud, anomalies and irregularities. As said right is alleged to have been impaired,
as in the case at bar, then there exists a controversy which calls for the exercise of
judicial power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Legislation; Statutory Construction;
Recognizing a gap in the law does not empower the judiciary to fill it in without
committing judicial legislation.—As to the apparent fear of “jumbled justice” that
may result in giving the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over petitions to annul
plebiscite results in the event that they involve a nationwide plebiscite, it should be
stressed that the present petition accentuates the present gap in the law as neither
the Constitution nor legislation provides which court or body has jurisdiction over
said controversy. Recognizing such gap in the law, however, does not empower the
judiciary to fill it in without committing judicial legislation.
CARPIO, J., Dissenting:
Election Law; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; The COMELEC can exercise its
quasi-judicial jurisdiction only if there is an election contest involving an elective
official.—The COMELEC can exercise its quasi-judicial jurisdiction only if there is an
election contest involving an elective official. A plebiscite on whether a municipality
should become a city does not involve the election into public office of any official.
Such a plebiscite does not involve any election contest as no one is running for any
public office. Thus, the COMELEC has no quasi-judicial jurisdiction over any dispute
involving the results of such plebiscite.
Same; Same; Same; The COMELEC’s power to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of plebiscite does not include any quasi-judicial power.—The
distinction between the administrative powers and quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the
COMELEC extends to the conduct of plebiscites. The COMELEC’s power to “enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct x x x of x x x plebiscite” does not
include any quasi-judicial power. Any question on the validity of the plebiscite, or
any dispute on the results of the plebiscite, falls within the general jurisdiction of
regular trial courts. Thus, in Salva v. Makalintal, this Court ruled: x x x We agree with
the Solicitor General that “. . . . [t]he issuance of [COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987 is
thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and
parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary
authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear and resolve controversies defining the
rights and duties of party-litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public
officers and the enforcement of the election laws.” (Citation omitted.) Briefly,
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations
governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the
COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution
may not be deemed as a “final order” reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any
question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an
ordinary civil action before the trial courts. (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Actions; An action to annul the results of a plebiscite is
one incapable of pecuniary estimation, just like an action to declare the
unconstitutionality of a law, and, under Section 19(1) and (6) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, expressly falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
Regional Trial Courts.—An action to annul the results of a plebiscite is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation, just like an action to declare the
unconstitutionality of a law. Moreover, an action to annul the results of a plebiscite
does not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. Thus, under Section 19(1) and (6) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, such action expressly falls under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the law that confers jurisdiction, not experience,
practice or tradition.—The argument that Regional Trial Courts have no experience
in the revision of ballots does not hold water. Regional Trial Courts exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal
officials. Regional Trial Courts also exercise appellate jurisdiction over election
contests involving elective barangay officials. Besides, it is the law that confers
jurisdiction, not experience, practice or tradition.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioners Ma. Salvacion
Buac and Antonio Bautista assailing the October 28, 2002 en banc Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which held that it has no jurisdiction over
controversies involving the conduct of plebiscite and the annulment of its result.
The facts show that in April, 1988, a plebiscite was held in Taguig for the ratification
of the Taguig Cityhood Law (Republic Act No. 8487) proposing the conversion of
Taguig from a municipality into a city. Without completing the canvass of sixty-four
(64) other election returns, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared that the
“NO” votes won and that the people rejected the conversion of Taguig to a city.
The Board of Canvassers was, however, ordered by the COMELEC en banc to
reconvene and complete the canvass. The Board did and in due time issued an
Order proclaiming that the negative votes prevailed in the plebiscite conducted.
Forthwith, petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul1 the results of
the plebiscite with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots cast therein. They
alleged that fraud and irregularities attended the casting and counting of votes. The
case was docketed as an election protest and raffled to the COMELEC Second
Division.2
Private respondent Cayetano intervened and moved to dismiss the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC. He claimed that a plebiscite cannot
be the subject of an election protest. He averred that the jurisdiction to hear a
complaint involving the conduct of a plebiscite is lodged with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC).3
The COMELEC Second Division initially gave due course to the petition and ruled
that it has jurisdiction over the case. It treated the petition as akin to an election
protest considering that the
same allegations of fraud and irregularities in the casting and counting of ballots
and preparation of returns are the same grounds for assailing the results of an
election. It then ordered the Taguig ballot boxes to be brought to its Manila office
and created revision committees to revise and recount the plebiscite ballots.4
In an unverified motion, intervenor Cayetano moved for reconsideration of the
COMELEC Order insisting that it has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition
contesting the results of a plebiscite.
In a complete turnaround, the COMELEC 2nd Division issued an Order on
November 29, 2001 granting the Motion for Reconsideration. It dismissed the
petition to annul the results of the Taguig plebiscite and ruled that the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction over said case as it involves an exercise of quasi-judicial powers
not contemplated under Section 2 (2), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution.5
On appeal, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the ruling of its 2nd Division. It held that
the COMELEC cannot use its power to enforce and administer all laws relative to
plebiscites as this power is purely administrative or executive and not quasi-judicial
in nature. It concluded that the jurisdiction over the petition to annul the Taguig
plebiscite results is lodged with the RTC under Section 19 (6) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 which provides that the RTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in
cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions.6
Hence this petition.
Petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista reiterate their submission that
jurisdiction to decide plebiscite protest cases is constitutionally vested with the
COMELEC. They likewise claim that the impugned Order is discriminatory as during
the pendency of the Taguig case, the COMELEC assumed jurisdiction over a similar
case concerning the revision and recount of the plebiscite ballots involving the
conversion of Malolos into a city. The COMELEC resolved said case and already
declared Malolos a city.
Respondents contend that there is no such action as a plebiscite protest under the
Constitution, the laws and the COMELEC rules as they provided only for election
protests; the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the COMELEC over election contests
extends only to cases enumerated in Section 2 (2), Article IX (C) of the Constitution,
which does not include controversies over plebiscite results; and, even if the
petition to annul plebiscite results is akin to an election protest, it is the RTC that
has jurisdiction over election protests involving municipal officials, and the
COMELEC has only appellate jurisdiction in said cases.
The petition is impressed with merit.
First. The key to the case at bar is its nature. The case at bar involves the
determination of whether the electorate of Taguig voted in favor of, or against the
conversion of the municipality of Taguig into a highly urbanized city in the plebiscite
conducted for the purpose. Respondents submit that the regular courts of justice,
more specifically, the Regional Trial Court, has the jurisdiction to adjudicate any
controversy concerning the conduct of said plebiscite. We hold that the invocation
of judicial power to settle disputes involving the conduct of a plebiscite is
misplaced. Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution defines judicial power as
including “the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
According to Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, “the first part of the authority represents the
traditional concept of judicial power involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law.”7 The case at bar assailing the regularity of the conduct of the
Taguig plebiscite does not fit the kind of a case calling for the exercise of judicial
power. It does not involve the violation of any legally demandable right and its
enforcement. There is no plaintiff or defendant in the case at bar for it merely
involves the ascertainment of the vote of the electorate of Taguig whether they
approve or disapprove the conversion of their municipality to a highly urbanized
city. There is no invocation of a private right conferred by law that has been violated
and which can be vindicated alone in our courts of justice in an adversarial
proceeding. Rather, the issue in the case at bar is the determination of the
sovereign decision of the electorate of Taguig. The purpose of this determination is
more to protect the sovereignty of the people and less to vindicate the private
interest of any individual. Such a determination does not contemplate the clash of
private rights of individuals and hence cannot come under the traditional
jurisdiction of courts.
Second. If the determination of the result of a plebiscite is not fit for the exercise of
judicial power, the invocation of Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act, is ineluctably errant, viz.:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
1. In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
xxx
6. In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions.
There cannot be any bout with doubt that the aforequoted provisions refer to civil
cases or actions. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong.8 As
stressed above, a plebiscite involves the expression of the public will on a public
issue. The determination of the public will is a subject that does not fit the
jurisdiction of civil courts, for civil courts are established essentially to resolve
controversies between private persons.9
The case of Salva v. Macalintal10 does not support the overarching thesis that “any
question on the validity of plebiscite, or any dispute on the result of the plebiscite
falls within the general jurisdiction of regular trial courts.” Looking at it with clear
eyes, Salva resolved the validity, not of a plebiscite or its result, but of a provision in
the rules and regulations issued by the COMELEC governing the conduct of a
plebiscite.
Third. To grant the RTC jurisdiction over petitions to annul plebiscite results can
lead to jumbled justice. Consider for instance where the plebiscite is national as it
deals with the ratification of a proposed amendment to our Constitution. Snap
thinking will tell us that it should be the COMELEC that should have jurisdiction over
a petition to annul its results. If jurisdiction is given to the regular courts, the result
will not enhance the orderly administration of justice. Any regional trial court from
every nook and corner of the country will have jurisdiction over a petition
questioning the results of a nationwide plebiscite. Bearing in mind that the
jurisdiction of these courts is limited only within their respective judicial regions,
the difficulties that will attend their exercise of jurisdiction would be many if not
unmanageable.
Fourth. An eye contact with our Constitution and related laws will reveal that only
contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of elected officials are
subject to the exercise of judicial power of our courts or quasi-judicial power of our
administrative agencies, thus: (a) contests involving elective municipal officials are
tried and decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, while those involving
barangay officials are tried and decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction; in both
cases, however, the COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdiction; (b) contests involving
all elective regional, provincial and city officials fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power; (c) contests
involving members of the House of Representatives fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of
quasi-judicial power; (d) contests involving members of the Senate fall within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal in the exercise of
quasi-judicial power; and, (e) contests involving the President and the Vice
President fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, also in the exercise of quasi-judicial power.
What grabs the eyeball is the intent of our Constitution and election laws to subject
only contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of elected officials
—from the barangay to the President of the Philippines—to the exercise of judicial
or quasi-judicial powers of courts or administrative tribunals. Contests which do not
involve the election, returns and qualifications of elected officials are not subjected
to the exercise of the judicial or quasi-judicial powers of courts or administrative
agencies. Clearly, controversies concerning the conduct of a plebiscite appertain to
this category. In the case at bar, the conduct of the Taguig plebiscite is the core of
the controversy. This is a matter that involves the enforcement and administration
of a law relative to a plebiscite. It falls under the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under
Section 2(1), Article IX (C) of the Constitution which gives it the power “to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of a x x x plebiscite x
x x.”
Fifth. The Court agrees with the following submissions of the Solicitor General, viz.:
xxx
There can hardly be any doubt that the test and intent of the constitutional grant of
powers to the COMELEC is to give it all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest and peaceful and credible elections
[Maruhom v. COMELEC, 331 SCRA 473 (2000)]. Hence, the all encompassing power
endowed the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election (or plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall)
includes the power to cancel proclamations [Nolasco v. COMELEC, 275 SCRA 762
(1997)]. The COMELEC also has the power to supervise and control the proceedings
of the board of canvassers, suspend and/or annul illegal and void proclamations,
declare a failure of elections and promulgate rules and regulations concerning the
conduct of elections.
While the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is most commonly invoked over popular
elections—that which involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office
by popular vote, the same may likewise be invoked in connection with the conduct
of plebiscite.
In the present case, petitioners filed a petition for revision of ballots cast in a
plebiscite. The COMELEC dismissed the petition on the ground that it has no
jurisdiction over the petition considering that the issue
COMELEC’s claim that the petition for revision of ballots is cognizable by the
Regional Trial Courts pursuant to Section 19 (6) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980 which provides that “Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction x x x in cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions” lacks merit. To repeat,
the power to ascertain the true results of the plebiscite is necessarily included in
the power to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite.11
Sixth. From our earliest Constitution and election laws, the conduct of plebiscite
and determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC and
not the regular courts. If the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over this matter, our laws
would have been amended to that effect. There is another reason why the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC to resolve disputes involving plebiscite results should
be upheld. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the
COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the
power of enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC
has the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws.
Consequently, we should be extra cautious in delimiting the parameters of the
COMELEC’s broad powers. We should give the COMELEC enough latitude in the
exercise of its expertise, for to straightjacket its discretion in the enforcement and
administration of laws relating to the conduct of election, plebiscite or referendum
may render it impotent. This is the first time that the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over a
petition to annul the results of a plebiscite has been assailed and surprisingly, this is
the first time that the COMELEC has yielded its historic jurisdiction. More
inexplicable is the inconsistent stance of the COMELEC on the issue. As stressed by
the petitioners, the COMELEC assumed jurisdiction over the case assailing the result
of the Malolos plebiscite. In the case at bar, it refused to exercise jurisdiction.

Seventh. Finally, it appears that the Motion for Reconsideration of private

respondent Congressman Cayetano was filed out of time. Section 2, Rule 19 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that a motion for reconsideration should be
filed within five (5) days from receipt of the COMELEC Order or Resolution.
Congressman Cayetano himself admitted12 that he received a copy of the October
3, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division on October 9, 2001. The records
show that it was only ten (10) days after said receipt, or on October 19, 2001, that
private respondent Cayetano filed his undated and unverified Motion for
Reconsideration. Clearly, the COMELEC 2nd Division had no jurisdiction to entertain
his Motion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC is directed to reinstate

the petition to annul the results of the 1998 Taguig plebiscite and to decide it
without delay.

SO ORDERED.