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Revolutionary Europe 1783-1615 * THE*FONTANA HISTORY oF EUROPE : The Fontana History of Europe is the first to make its original appearance in paper- pack. It will.consist of twelve. volumes covering the period from the close of the Middle Ages to the end of the second world wat. While social, economic and intellectual developments are not neglected, the aim of the séries is to provide both general reader and student with an account, based on the latest research, that combines “narrative and explanation, Hach volume has been spec- jally commissioned from 2 leading English, American ot European scholar and, will be complete in itself, ‘General Editor: J. H. Plumb Already Published mer on REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE Jacques Droz EUROPE BETWEEN REVOLUTIONS Teny-a¢8 1783-1815 Elizabeth Wiskemann EUROPE OF THE DICTATORS TQEQ-1945 In Preparation J. AS. Grenville EUROPE 1848-1878 ¥. H, Hinsley EUROPE 1878-1919 Collins Bi alieeig Saas THE FONTANA HISTORY OF EUROPE First published in Fontana 1964 Eleventh Impression August 1973 © George Rudé 1964 Printed in Great Britain Collins Clear-Type Press London and Glasgow CONDITIONS OF Satz: This Look is sold subje 02 ALE: fect to the condition that it shall not, by nay yack or otherwise, be tent, re-sold, hired out or othernise eirculated without the publisher's prior consent in any in which it ig Mis condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser CONTENTS PART ONE: EUROPE ON THE EVE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 1 The Social Pattern i Governments and the Conflicts within States mt ‘The Conflicts between States PART TWO: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION ty Why was there a Revolution in France ? Vv. 1789 vi The Reconstruction of France vi The Struggle for Power vit Robespierre Ix The Bourgeois Republic PART THREE: REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE x Europe and the French Revolution x1 Revolutionary War PART FOUR: THE NAPOLEONIC ERA xm Napoleon and France xut The Napoleonic Empire xiv The Fall of Napoleon xv Perspectives MAPS FURTHER READING GLOSSARY ~= E.D Galeotia & BOOK rs Connaught I Preface This book attempts to present a picture of France and Europe before, during and immediately after the French Revolution. The literature in this field is immense and is tapidly becoming more so. During the past fifteen months, at least half-a-dozen major studies relating to the Revolution, in both its French and European contexts, have been published in France, the United States and England; and no doubt several more are on the stocks, Which is merely another way of saying that the Revolution remains an ever-open field of enquiry, and a short book like this can hope to do little more than present its many unsolved problems to wider groups of readers and whet their appetites for more discussion. OF these problems, none has perhaps, in recent years, been so warmly debated as the significance of the French Revolution in its European (or world) context. How far was the revolu- tion in Europe a projection of the French, and how far was it the product of its own internal development? It is a knotty question that allows of varying interpretations. It is one, however, that has been sharply posed only in the last ten years, y and here, at least, the literature is still comparatively meagre. 4 ‘All the more credit is, therefore, due to Professor Palmer (late of Princeton) and Professor Godechot of Toulouse for open- ing up the question; and even those of us who cannot accept their view of a “Western” or “Atlantic” Revolution will applaud their pioneering efforts. In writing 2 volume of this kind it is impossible to pay due regard to all who, in one form or another, have contributed to its making. Like many others working in this field, I should like to pick out for special mention the name of the late Georges Lefebvre, who has not only inspired all who have attempted to treat the Revolution “from below” but whose works include the best general comprehensive treatment of if | : y i i Preface é ‘Both the French Revolution and Napoleon. To him, more _ than to any other, all recent studies on the Revolution, the » Consulate and Empire and their repercussions across France's ‘borders owe a debt. In addition, 1 wish to thank Mr.’Richard Ollard of William Collins for his patience, good humour and vigilance ‘in steering my manuscript towards the ptess; and Mr. William A. Cowan, Librarian of the Barr Smith Library, University of Adelaide, for consenting to read the proofs, : ‘nally, my thanks are due to the University of Adelaide and, _ in particular, to my colleague, Professor Hugh Stretton, for making it possible for teaching historians to write books. GEORGE RUDE ella Ea + i f J 24h ee Europe on the Eve of the French Revolution Chapter I THE SOCIAL PATTERN . Europe, on the eve of the French Revolution, presented a pic- ture of deep and varying contrasts—the contrast between the developed West and the undeveloped East; between the expansion of trade, industry and population and the relative stagnation of agriculture; and between the wide dissemination of news and. ideas and the tenacious conservatism of social relations and political institutions, For a great part of Europe the eighteenth century was one of growing commercial prosperity. The great maritime powers, owing to their geographical situation and their possession of colonies, inevitably took the lion’s share of international trade. Nearly nine-tenths of the gold and silver mined in Latin America was passed on by the original owners, Spain and Portugal, to England, France and the United Provinces, whose great trading companies plied their wares in Asia, Africa and the Americas. England’s merchant fleet expanded from 3,300 ships with a tonnage of 260,000 in 1702 to 9,400 ships with a tonnage of 695,000 in 1776; by 1800, her carry- ing capacity had risen to perhaps five or six times what it had been a century before. France, Britain’s greatest trading rival, increased her trade with other European countries nearly four- fold between 1716 and 1788, and the value of her combined exports for the same period rose from 120 million to 500 million livres. Arthur Young, during his travels in France Burope on the Eve of the French Revolution Ba the eve of the Revolution, was struck by the evident signs fee of prosperity of the great Atlantic port of Bordeaux, which _ he considered superior to that of Liverpool, whose slave- traders were reputed to earn profits of £300,000 a year. The pperity of both ports is a reminder of the growing import- of the colonial trade: by 1789, the value of trade with America amounted to one-third of the value of all Britain's mmmercial operations and to only a little less in the case of France. Meanwhile, the United Provinces, though still a sub- itial trading power, was falling behind in the race with two greater and more powerful rivals: already in 1739, it $ rumoured that twice as many ships unloaded their cargoes London as in Amsterdam. The Dutch, however, still held their own over the English and French in banking and inter- national financial operations. In 1777, they owned forty per .* poe? aren Debt. “The bill on Amsterdam,” ites a modern istorian, “‘ was to the eighteenth centu hat ee bill’ on London was to become to the nineteenth cen Compared with these giants, the merchant fleets of other * opean gountries appeared insignificant; yet Sweden had, in ia an expanding fleet of 1,200 merchantmen and Prussia ned | and limited, bogged down b ae se (in countries such as France) by Pies! he ictive tariffs and tolls levied by irene and filson in The New Cambridge Modern History, vit (1957), at Abs The Social Pattern 1 privileged landowners. In most countries, agriculture remained rooted in the traditions of the past and was often quite unable to meet the needs of an expanding population: in Sicily, once the granary of southern Europe, the famine of 1763-64 took 30,000 lives; and, in 1770, 150,000 people were reported to have died of hunger in Saxony and 80,000 in Bohemia. Conditions might vary greatly within the same country: the primitive Jatifundia of Andalusia contrasted sharply with the. relatively prosperous and independent hold- ings of the Basque provinces, Catalonia and parts of Aragon. In France, the lush pastures of Normandy stood out in sharp relief against the barren soils of Brittany and the persistent poverty of the métayers of the Cévennes and Limousin. In eastern Europe generally, the rich potentialities of the soil had been little explored and the cultivation remained primitive and traditional. Only in parts of western Europe had decisive steps been taken to revolutionize techniques and to apply scientific methods to crop-rotation and cultivation, and thus lay the basis for the large-scale farming of the future. This “ revolu- tion” had started in the Netherlands in the mid-seventeenth century and had, soon after, attracted the attention and spurred the energies of visiting French and English agronomists and noblemen. In France, the new methods had been promoted in certain provinces by the combined efforts of enterprising aristocrats, the school of Physiocrats, or “ economists”, and the government itself which, in 1761, set up a Department of Agriculture. In England, they had, by the 1780's, been - adopted in many counties following the experiments of Town- shend, Tull and Bakewell and the propaganda of Arthur Young. Yet nowhere was agriculture as advanced as in the Austrian Netherlands where, in 1802, productivity was still reported to be thirty per cent higher than in England. Industry continued, in almost every country, to play an increasingly important part in national economic life. In France, on the eve of revolution, the Van Robais textile mills at Abbeville employed 12,000 workers and the Anzin mining company 4,000, while there were some fifty “ manu- 12 Europe on the Eve of the French Revolution factories” in Paris employing between 100 and 800 work people within their walls. In Russia, Catherine II promoted and extended the production of iron, which had already made sensational headway under Peter; and, by 1793, the sailcloth industry of Kaluga employed neatly 9,000 workers. In rural Bohemia, 200,000 workers, mainly women, were engaged in the spinning of flax; and even the tiny canton of Glarus j Switzerland counted over 30,000 spinners. But the great bulk of this industrial activity was carried on along old- fashioned and traditional lines, The modern factory and industrial Capitalism had barely made their appearance, The prevailing mode of production was that of the domesti tem, Opetated in rural cottages, under the remote supervision of merchants and merchant-manufacturers, by Gaatiisds peasant families. Tn towns, the predominant unit of production was still the small workshop, deriving from medieyal times and subject to the restrictive tegulations of the guild. The large Manufactory, where it existed, was an extension of the dom- €stic system, whereby workpeople were concentrated in greater gpa 7 under the closer Supetvision of the State - ae . es oe of eastern Europe and : Wee manned by the con- minals, vagrants, foundlings s, and even such Sreat undertakings as the Van * in France ie te 783, any substantial Progress towards the large- ik eer of labour-saving Machinery and an aan Was fll init intangy ate Bete the modern factory system Was still lagely an tBS fapidly expanding cotton indast steam seiae eas ‘ly Prater power; and, by 1780, Watts mining. Even nly begun to be applied to spinning and *, Britain had a clear lead over her ane competitors which was to i ae b stand her in pood tead j c ha a With France, Yet she, a pee ae Country in which nearly half the Popes ) The Social Pattern 13 their livelihood from agrarian pursuits; and, in stressing the point in x770, Arthur Young added the estimate that £66 million of England's national income was derived from the Soil as against a mere £37 million from commerce and industry In the wake of economic development followed the spread of ideas, which were gradually creating an informed “ public opinion” and undermining traditional modes of thought and loyalties over large pasts of Europe. The fir monthly journal had been founded at The Hague in 1686 and the earliest English daily newspaper in 1702. In France, there was no daily paper before the Journal de Paris began to appear in 1777. But, in the last decades before the Revolution, the growth of the periodical press in the West was phenomenal. English p: ntaty proceedings were reported at length in £ 1771; and, by 1782, eighteen newspapers were being published in London. In France, there were thirty- five papers and periodicals of all kinds in 1779 and 169 in 1789. The number of periodicals printed in Germany, though they were often short-lived owing to censorship and tepres- sion, was even greater, Even in Spain, the Gaceta de Madrid and the Espiritu de los majores Diarios served as channels for disseminating the ideas of the new “ Philosophy’’. For, meanwhile, the writings of the Enlightenment—the tracts and treatises of Montesquieu and Rousseau; the Encyclopedia of D’Alembert and Diderot; Raynal’s History and Voltaire’s political satires and letters—had begun, in numerous guises and translations, to circulate outwards from Paris and the Netherlands to find a new and increasingly curious reading public in Rome, Madrid, Brussels, Berlin, Vienna and St. Petersburg. The American Revolution and its aftermath pro- duced a fresh crop of tracts and commentaries that extended still further the boundaries of enlightened and educated “ public opinion ” 2 Economic development and the spread of new ideas would both, in the context of war ahd revolution, profoundly modify *Sce R. R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution, Vol. 1 The Challenge (Princeton, 1959), PP- 242-4. 14 Europe on the Eve of the French Reve n prevailing attitudes and relations between cl European society remained e itially hierarchic and “‘aristo- cratic”. In almost every country an aristocracy of birth, wealt or legal status lorded it over their fellow-me and magistrates, as feudal Seigneurs, as monoy ses; but, as yet, Privilege and of high office in army, Church and State, or merely in their display of material prosp: ostentati = ing, cultural attainments and foreign t “In all s Europe”, wrote the Abbé Raynal in 1770," there are a sort o men who assume from their infancy a pre-eminence ir dent of their moral character.” While this broad generalis tion held true even for the Most advanced monarchies and Republics of the West, there Were, of course, con differences in the wealth, status and power enjoyed and exercised by the landed classes and aristoctacy both b and within the various Countries of Europe. In Spain, like the Dukes of Osuna, Alba and Medina Coeli, owne Yast Sefiorios in Andalusia and Catalonia, or the great tilt de Castilla were Of a very different ¢ cial status fd apart ance from the humblet caballeros and, still More, from the greai cn of impoverished tural gentry, or 4 fx nec tein ay ty at, Sale de could be found in France, ie the osc : ; N€ 4,000 of so Court aristo- rats, Owners of great estates and incumbent f bi: fo ohh Ba S of bishoprics and ee Y posts, looked Contemptuously on the far ater of rural hobereaux, who, bereft of capital and vig ten little more to cling to their names, titles and d, too, the small country © million-strong sel hta al privileges iliey Geen Bal privileges of Robility, lord it over vidalgos, who formed ence on the doz, Y 1gnominious di i ruled €N OF so teally great ma gates w] lepend © country—the ¢ 5 hates who effectively ———— The Social Pattern 15 e Ester- Galitzines , in fact if not ad semi: ions of a ancient fami. alth who ng their t estates | Similarly, in Hungary, owners of Bi hazys and Palffys and, in Russia, th Igoroukis claime social pre-emi M name, over a hord ate, rural gentry. In Venice, th of proud, thor ent order be mn the t Barnaboiti 1, more recently, acq the Gold mpover nd he jumped-up men of uired titles of nobility by ha Book. In England alo: , there istinction made b the traditional Knights of the €s, who held high sat in the Lords, owned boroughs and m ns to the Hx es inscribed was a clear ve cour try squire: Shire) and the I Cabinet office se of Commons. Britain, too, was distinctive (a distinction shared only with the United Provinces) in that her aristoc joyed no more than the barest r s of older legal privileges and nities. An 1 by his “peers”; but were equal before the public office and a bleman might still claim the tight to be otherwise, peer and commoner to in land, Jaw and had, legally, equal equal right to hold property ture. All but the eldest sons of peers ed as commoners. Thi rowing tendency for wealth alone, and th power and prestige that wealth could bring, to determine social classification. Elsewhere, the tocracy enjoyed important legal privil ghts of juri diction and immun ty from varying typ France, the noblesse formed less of a closed caste than in many states of central and-eastern E: Lope, as it was not registered as & corporate body and was not debarred from all professions and tr, to wealthy commoners-— though to ft manufa were clas Se of taxation: In ades. Besides, access to the nobility still remained open by the shrinking numbers. purchase of hereditary offices. Thus, since the seventeenth cen- tury, a new and wealthy administrative nobility, the noblesse de robe, had town up to challenge the social status and preten- sions of the old-established noblesse a épée (nobility of the Sword): by this time, it ptovided most of the Secretaries of State and Intendants and, even more important, it dominated _ the Parlements—the great hereditary legal corporations that, in _ times of weak or divided government and idle or incompetent | fulets, were able to exercise considerable political authority. Such authority was denied to all but very few of the older FE nobility but, as owners of estates, they still exercised many of the privileges of the old feudal lords of the manor: rights of local justice and village surveillance; tights of monopoly, : ich as the exclusive tight to hunt and to maintain a mill, an (Cvrn Of a wine-press (danalités); and, above all, to exact a | wide range of feudal dues, rents and services from their _ Peasants, In addition, the French nobility as a whole enjoyed a considerable degree of exemption from direct taxation, They were virtually immune from payment of the principal and most _ Onerous of these taxes, the taille (levied on both estimated _ income and on land); and, in large measure, too, they _ €vaded payment of their proper share of the vingtiéme and Capitation, introduced, to supplement . pe SIV seit teers Geni eee yi st | t exception to the noblesse, enjoyed Hh 68 ae pla: in addition to the ase decived ale Be -y stom fents and feudal dues, they d tithe (which might amount to one-twelfth of the vield. of land) ae ations to the Exchequer by the payment Percentage of their roe the ocd of Outside eer Bit. aristocracy tended ere: the exemptions and privileges of nobles from commo; more clear-cut and the gulf separating the szlachta retained gee eo? Sharply defined. In Poland their serfs; in Pca oe pe powes of life and death over (ince i ey had eajoyed [ nobles could own land and, cy ; adon pratuit, or “ d been sttictly cur- on the autocratic aoe The Social Pattern 17 rulers of Prussia and Russia who, in the course of a century, had largely re-cast and re-defined the functions and privileges of their aristocracies. In Prussia, under Frederick William I and Frederick II, the nobility had been transformed into a class of hereditary State servants, obliged to serve the monarch by holding office in the army or the administration; as compensa- tion, they were given extended powers of jurisdiction and economic control over their tenants and peasants. In Russia, Peter the Great had gone even further and devised a strict Table of Ranks, the higher grades in which were reserved for the landowning class who, in return for a stated period of compulsory service to the Tsar, were granted a highly privi- leged hereditary status and increased authority over their serfs. The system had, however, been whittled down under his suc- cessors. In 1762, Peter III had freed the greater nobles from the legal obligation to serve the State and, under Catherine's Charter of Nobility (1785), the Russian dvoryanstvo became, in name at least, something more closely akin to the French type of noblesse. In some countries, the social pre-eminence of the aristocracy was matched by the authority and responsibility they exercised in the nation’s political life; in others, this was far from being the case. On the one hand, there were countries like Prussia, where State service by the aristocracy was not only enforced but had come to be considered an honour; or Russia, where the tradition of State service, though it was no longer compulsory, lingered on; on the other, there were states like France, Spain; ‘the Two Sicilies, Denmark and many of the smaller Germanic principalities, in which the aristocracy, while retaining their privileges and dancing attendance at Court, had ceased to play any effective part in political affairs. In Hungary, the greater nobles filled the highest offices in Church and administration and dominated the national assembly; and even the poorer members of the gentry, whose representatives sat in the lower chamber of the assembly, administered justice and raised taxes in their districts. The Polish and Swedish aristocracy had, for a large part of the century, enjoyed a “golden age”. Thé 18 Europe on-the Eve of the French Revolution Polish nobles controlled the diets and the government's poli- * . cies, besides appointing tax-collectors and running local goy- ernment. In Sweden, the noble heads of families had, for fifty " years, held the whip-hand in the diets and the secret committee of the four estates, and had occupied every seat in the Royal Council. In both countries, there had been a re-assertion of royal authority in 1772; but, in Poland, the diets continued to form a sort of “democtacy” of nobles and country gentlemen and, in Sweden, it was not until 1809 that public office became open to members of the non-privileged estates. In such matters, the position of the British landowning classes was closer to that of the Swedish than to that of any other continental aristocracy. They certainly enjoyed no legal or prescriptive right to monopolize high office and their victory over monarchy in 1689 had been far less thorough than that of the Swedes in 1720. But, while sharing power with the Crown, they continued to exercise a remarkable degree of effective influence in government, in both Houses of Parlia- tment and in local administration. The House of Lords still retained, in its own tight as a legislative and judicial body, 4 degree of authority that was almost equal to that of the Commons; in addition, it could immeasurably supplement these powers by its near-monopoly of Cabinet posts, its family con- nexions and its ownership of “pocket” and “rotten” bo- foughs. As Lords Lieutenant of the counties and justices of oa and gentry enjoyed virtually complete gal cna, a Sovernment. It is true that both royal and without doors” had been at work since 1760 to swing the balance in favour of the monarchic of — popular element in the Constitution—we shall hear more of this in the next chapter; and the younger Pitt's return in the general election of 1784 must be seen, to some extent at least. as a ae for “aristocracy”. Yet the general picture re oy little changed : in 1783, Pitt was still the only member E is Own Cabinet who did not have a seat in the Lords; and ‘Was not until after the Reform Act of 1832 that the Eng- The Social Pattern 19 lish aristocracy began to lose its overwhelming ascendancy in both government and Parliament. The growth of towns and trade would, sooner or later, dis- rupt this “aristocratic” society and whittle away its defences, But, as yet, the growing class of merchants and bankers, en- tiched by trade and financial operations, tended to become absorbed by it, or at least to come to terms with it, rather than to offer any resolute challenge. This might happen in 4 variety of ways—either by marrying their daughters to sons of the nobility, by the purchase of office or estates, by the acquisi- tion of titles and distinctions, or by creating their own exclu- sive patriciates in municipal government, guilds or administra- tion. In eastern Europe, where towns were still few and merchants formed an insignificant minority, this process had not gone far; yet, even here, a merchant prince like Nikita Demidov, founder of a great dynasty of iron-masters, could bask in the Tsar's favour; and Hungarian merchants, such as the Henchels and Hallers, were able to acquire title-deeds of nobility. The great trading cities of Germany—Hamburg, Leipzig and Frankfurt-am-Main—and Bern and Ziitich in Switzerland had long-established native patriciates of mer- chants, which, with growing prosperity, had become more proudly exclusive and more jealous of their social distinctions and inherited privileges. In Prussia, the rising middle class found scope for their energies and social pretensions as royal servants in a rapidly expanding and privileged State bureau- ctacy. In the United Provinces, a wealthy patriciate of mer- chants governed the great cities of Holland, dominated its provincial estates, and sent representatives to the Estates General to sit alongside those of an older, but poorer, aristo- ctacy of the land. In France and England, the social impact of these classes had assumed different forms. The costly ventures of Louis XIV had provided a fertile breeding-ground for French con- tractors, merchants and financiers. It had been royal policy to draw into the service of the State the sons of men enriched 20 .Europe on the Eve of the French Revolution by trade and finance. Colbert, the greatest of Louis’ mini was the son of a merchant-dra Simon, an aristocratic critic, contemptuously dismis: Mc as; and S petiod as “un régne de vile bourgeoisi in Moliére’s Le bourgeois gentilhomm: I his i i 5 way lit nto daughter to 2 marquis; this was one way of clir aristocratic society. Later, great finan and ba ke the four Paris brothers and Samuel Bernard, might « bankers to the Court or founders of commercial ¢ np afford to “live nobly” on the’ Own account and to sf their fingers at the common run of courtiers, In the ¢ ae century, rich bourgeois built mansions and bought estates and, by setting up as lords of the manor, enjoyed the full exercise of seigneurial rights attaching to their propertie: Claimed that the feverish re-building of Pa is, which was s marked a feature of the last quarter of a century Revolution, was due rather to bourgeois than to aristocratic enterprise. A select few became Farmers-General and made great fortunes by “farming” the toyal taxes and administe ing the internal customs, More commonly, rich bourgeois had been inclined to invest their money by the purchase, for them selves or their heirs, of one of the numerous offices that might fall vacant, or be newly created, in the judiciary, the central administration, or the government of a chartered town. Thi the State might meet its debts and the wealthy merchant class satisfy its social ambitions by acquiring titles and privileges as members of the noblesse de robe, or of its provincial cou the noblesse de cloche. As long enough to pay the intetest on it social advancement temair cantile and financial ¢ the stoutest defenders and Jaurés before the $1n. as the State remained solvent $ loans and such channels of ned open to them, the French mer asses could be relied upon to be of the Throne and of the aris Society On which it rest ed. ‘We shall see in a later happened when thes n S¢ avenues began to be closed. In England, these Social status and autho: Commercial and coloni, among tocratic chapter wk asses had acquired a &teater measure of ight. Enriched by the Wats of the Common- rity in their own fi ial expansion and 1 the allies of lorious revolution” of and to identify the Crown and nst Louis XIV. sely in the Commons, alongside t es marries mndon met selves were al in do ks, no more than the truth ‘our me great London merchant turned yankers and ading companies administration. ned, of the : pe fs ae é 5 only the rise of a new class of “‘ interloping régime. It was only the rise of a new middling sort’, eager to chal- f their older, more p of tk me ysperous and priv sperou: sught a substantial part of the merchant ' with he Parliament : of this interest into conflict with the Kin rd Parliament: o } ~xt chapter, more will be said in the next chap é ae England. peculiar in that she alone, having i d on industrial “ revolution’, was creating a new anc t class of private manufactur who were a tick dustrial, rather than to grow rich on the proceeds of industrial, rather cantile, capital. In Russia and Bohemia, large-scale sain, we indepenc 22 Europe on the Eve of the French Revolution e of the State, or of fs, far more than of 1 Provinces, while ecline or to manufacture was generally the provi landowners disposing of the labour 0 the middle-class entrepreneur. In the Uni trade still flourished, manufacture tended to ¢ stagnate, In France, manufacture was rducted either in large State enterprises, such as the Royal the Gobelins and Savonnerie, by master craftsmen in small workshops, or by merchant-manufacturers d estic labour of peasant weavers and spit * manufactories ” of try. Such private dyn as were being Wendels in iron and the Van Robais in te: quite exceptional. In England alone, a distinct class of i du ] entrepreneurs was atising in the wake of the technica tions introduced by the Darbys, Hargreaves, Cort, Arkwright and Watt. Where Gregory King had, in his survey made no provision for manufacturers, Colquhoun, in 1803, noted no fewer than 25,000 “ manufacturers employing caf ital in/all branches, wool, cotton .. .” Though the ma hin factory was slow to make its appearance, the industrial was already emerging in the neighbourhood of riv canals and leaving its mark on social development. Its new men sprung from farming and bears cial stock, were tapidly amassing fortunes and finding a place in society—men like Samuel Whitbread, the brewer; Jedediah Strutt, the hosier; John Wilkinson, the iron-master; and Josiah Wed wood, the potter. It took time, of course, for such men, de- spite their wealth, to be accepted on anything like equal terms by “aristocratic” soci C Society; and James Watt could wri 1787 that “our landed gent] : eek etd no better than slaves who cu eaders, lemen reckon us poor mechanics tivate their vine: s”’. It took t A yards”’. It took sna before such men began to realize fully their own set ae as a new social force: by the 1780's, they had ts ia ae to play any distinguishable part in national pol oy : cee claims of Manchester and Birmingham e pe , rmingham. rieorias 80 large a part in determining the actions of ents in the next century, had yet to ena As land was the predominant source of wealth, so the peas ealth, ve ant vi t farmer High 1 older rising from more were ital and poor share-croy ] ¢ perhaps were landless la s or rente Franche-Comté and han one in twenty—in parts rais—were serfs, though not fu justice. But, though his legal to the land or deprived of royal were less oppressive than in many other states, peasant bore a heavy burden of taxation: he paid t tench ithe to the Churc the Si ecclesiasti and payments ranging f d) and the cens (feudal re incidence of si peasant, in the bad harvests anc universally vexatious and In central and easte! uro West, the peasar sti se to the soil and largely + exactions lord. In De € serfdom had come more success, in 17 lands to spe tors di xe 8town worse. In Germa c solitary southern state of B de 4783), setfdom also persisted. In Brande East Prussia, far from be’ ng ing and becoming intensified from the €xport trade, regi the Output of grain: in Ra Prussia, the days a week—or even five or Prussian army and b Frederick William | nobility, as we have trol, ented their six—fo; ureaucracy extend and Frederic Great, the S Seen, were allowed both economic and Russia, too, as the the form of taxation or of sery. Sentry and aristocrs whole new populs s of hithe Producers had been subjected to serfdom. The Peasants of the Ukraine, wrote a y 1784, “have | ly undergo, Jed t Jed judicial, over the Severnment inc teased its d ice to the St si ne a deplorable chan ting English sct . npire by h nt t Mad f ; } | M erp aboure 10Mes x WHOL ante po! Mok E lk Amst country to ano traditions of the even in handicrafts and s clearly divided; though, ¢ authority to prevent authority to in times of disorder. Ih p or distinct ¢ F in many trades was s } sk sleeping in his masters t on occasion, marrying his dé ing his shop old guild-system de the wealt found himself red worker with nothi ing a master For the journey the the level of wages was ing concern etely rep formed by London building and could, as yet, achieve ssed and such nd papet an increase in W quenc the rising cost of bread. b Thus, though the i per cent between 1730 and little over 22 pet cent; and, in London, while wa almost stable, the price of bread would became increasingly frequent during the la century) tise from a norm of 13d. or r4d. to 2d. pound. Meanwhile, small Thu 1789 men and w and independent craftsmen, also felt the pin prices, that continually threatened to destroy the n lean years otkshop im: of rising sue of wages might divide them, s keepers, small employers and wage-earners would, as sumets, be inclined to see their overriding economic interest 2 : tio f be influenced by follow ; a of f 5 | ok Albert So: Régime in and all w e considered equally legiti aa it seems true enough. Though ment was towered over th h ferences in the wa and the states in which thi m beings ol ment, or had been supe There were, for example, evident c etwe tation of hereditary absolute monar E 128 Sweden, Prussia and the Austrian Empire; Britain alone “limited”; or parl ntary, monar and ) was in practice what the Austrian was ary V autoctacy of Russia was of a different from I monatchies of France or Spain and the oriental despotism Turkey; and the Republics of Switzerland, Genoa and Ve were very differently constitr Republic of the United Provinces. Yet, ences, all European governments, on the eve of the Fr Revolution, were either ‘ mo. ed from chic” or aristocrat they all had in common that they severely restricted what poli tical writers called the ‘democratic ‘clenient in the C stitution. Nor is this surprising, as government was bound to reflec within fairly narrow limit s, the prevailing aristocratic an hierarchic society that has been desctibed in the last Though the claims of aristocracy were 28 cha everywhere being in 30 Europe on the E' rench Kx drastically pruned expenditure on “I i up an efficient civil at i a ‘Treasu 1 one of the stronges II had turned legacy to good effect a dominions and further enlarging the : to do this, he h a A he land-owning « s¢ : tration in return for extensive legal and # Thus, the despotism of Frederick William I h ed by his son, though its ful pe the time of his successors In France, the n iy was, in the A Prussia and most other Ge ALY up at Versailles a formida ncentration of at e old nobility had been stripped of political powe A decorative attendance at Cc ne , e stemmed government, justice oh a Church and State: Sole mained the residual au } estates, and the purcha 1 holders of a limit ( bstance had become gr é gency of the Duke of Orleans el e devolution of a d, for a short while, Parlemen thority nobility had enjoyed a g eater asure of freedom and Louis XV had, on the death of Ca Fleury (1743), returned to his gteat-grandfather’s system; | it soon became evident that it was in name rather than in The King, more devoted to the hunt and the pleasures « Court than to affairs of state, allowed government to dri its direction to be disputed by rival factions, in which Secret to aries of State, pretenders to office, Princes of the Blood toyal mistresses (such as the vers each had a part to play fallen from office in x 147, tical independenc atile Madame de Pompa ) The Marquis d’Argenson, f wrote of the Council at this time as of t a certain dev + centralizing efic se a ateady Gh ML more We shall hims lost his throne in the i Unique among the of t Poland. It was a moi elect as the price of traditional “liberties ") nally a mona * of nobles, Poland was, in a unanimity of votes ( Jaw to be enacted. M further weak by the meagreness 0 ing army. The combined re both government and le to the predat pours, Prussia and Russia. The 1 between thes eff ed by its d ry ambitions 0 of partitions of Polan which, starting in 17 years to come. Wit ed her Unique, too, in its own way was the “lim of Britain. Formall that of France, Pr it was closer to that of Sweder or Spain; but, in practice, wa. ntial. differer apart from them all, The ¢ the more advanced social and economic developme country that we noted in the last chapter. Eng themselves on their “ mixed” or “balanced” Constit “And herein,” wrote Sir William Blackstone in 176 sists the excellence of the English government, that all pa it form a mutual check upon each other. In the legisla Hive people are a check upon the nobility, the nobility a check the people, by the mutual privilege of tejecting what other has resolved ; while the King is a check upon both, shmet t t 33 f w e the he ¢ d M . F € he € ( I j " a ig f es, called Ss. Here nobility, w vived z ditary 4 3 d only heredi : : the last year a population of 130,000 had th i : nobles—to attend the meetings of the land was a federation of cantons t I are there w n element of democracy; but the mos pro: of them—the c Ss of Bern and Basel—were 5 rverne a merchant ar the affiliated c f home of C nd Rousseau, was ruled | y leged group of “citizens tights against the insistent inevitable that i ntries where pow 0 dis tributed—in uneasy bal between monar Cfacy, or in the exclusive co; ocratic or ol atchics—tensions should arise and demands be voiced for an extension of authority by some and a share in gove others, The great question was : should th Sought by arging the author ty of an monarch at the expense of the estates; should ar other “intermediate bodies” be Strengthened as a check on the power of the Crown: or should the pow th be balanced, or eclipsed, by ie hands of the people for existing ills b the “ arist tion? nlig) istocratic of be vesting greater res; themselyes? In short, sh 's be found by st ‘Ocratic”, onsibility i ‘ould the remedy rengthening the “ monarchic’ or the “ popular” element in the constitu The answers given turally yaried from country to 36 Europe on the * ee Woltairey who corresponded ‘ Catherine and f rick the G of both “ burghe Geneva. I French revolu Corsican patriots nned merely underlines tl themselves t of their authors. they circulate and th read and absorb them Among those who were even corresponded with theit monarchs and rulers of the lat generally known Despotism (or ‘ Repenta called it) may be termed promoters had dipped int to rule according to gave some evidence of having the welf their subjects at heart. But, f set out to modernize the administrat ds monarchy, often at the expense of the Church or of other “intermediate bodies”. Stran monarchs to whom the label “ enlightened ently been attached—Frederick the G: Russia enough, has t and Ca were, in some respects, Jeast worthy of the n Frederick ruled Prussia with a firm hand, supervised in pé the work of his bureaucracy, introduced judicial and ¢ tional reforms and promoted State industries; but nearly all developments mapped out for him by h Revolution 38 Europe on the Eve of the Frenc alone of the “enlightened desp carry through a consistent and comprehensive policy, com ung radical social measures with the assertion of the power of the Crown over every imaginable subordinate authority, whether Church, nobility, provincial estates or chartered towns. In pursuit of the former aim, he completed the abolition of tor- ture, abolished personal serfdom (though not labour s by his Unterthanspatent of 1781, limited the lord's + punish his peasants, and did away with the corvée dealings with the Catholic Church, he anticipated much of t work of the French revolutionaries of 1789: he di further 7oo monastic houses and used their funds to promote education and poor relief; he abolished the Inquisition; he freely tolerated Protestants and extended the civil rights of Jews ; he silenced the clerical opposition and permitted public criticism of the Church; he made marriage a civil contract; he attempted to undermined the authority of the Pope in his dominions; com- pelled the bishops to take an oath of allegiance to t Emperor; and turned the clergy into salaried servants of the State In his war with the nobility, he withdrew their right to claim tax-exemption in the various provinces, drastically weakened their authority over their peasants, and used his poli- tical police to suppress their protests. He was equally ruthless in dealing with Provincialism : he imposed the German Jan- guage on his Hungarian and Bohemian dominions, suppressed the local authorities in Milan and Lombardy, and restricted the operations of the ancient guilds and town assemblies of the Netherlands, 5 But * enlightened despotism”, in so far as if was “enlight- » was almost universally a failure. It succeeded Best Syke was limited administrative reform rather than Sa ectico ras Frederick II made no profession of a the eA te for all her early talk of light- social reform ep ~ peasantry, gave up all thought of Gee ir; ‘i ‘ugachey's rebellion of the 1770's. Gus- ucceeded in tipping the balance significantly in favour of : monarchy in Sweden; but reforming ministers like 39 al and Stru > in Denmark saw most of en they fell from office. In France, the Maupeou and Turgot to reform the taxe tc all, the experience of Joseph Il, who her to build for the future -s how narrow were the limi ” might successfully middle class, Joseph all group operate had to } slans of enlightened officials at Vieni ion and the supp a ful machinery to mention the gi were q i ficient ad C Y; Pro- hom his reforms and his ted and antagonized. The s revolted and Hungary almost ve his dominions from dis- ; ot, Leopold II, were com- pelled to m toyed his handi- work. Yet one important legacy remained: “ Josephism”’, 1 to the established Church and the privileged classes, had roused a “ great hope” among the ens fed and downtrodden ant ser bourgeois and craftsmen a and his succes ssions that virt while anath and the | 9 of the cit nd many of the “ Josephians” of the 1780's were to become the “ Jacobins” of t nineties Perhaps an even more striking feature of the times than “enlightened” monarchy was the vety tangible reality of the “feudal” or “aristocratic” reaction. This might fake the form of a collusive deal between mon- atchy and nobility; it might take that of a gradual and peaceful extension of the influence of aristocracy in society and admini- stration; or, again, it might take the form of a more deliberate attempt by the privileged orders to regain lost ground or to redress the balance in their favour. We have seen examples of the first in Russia and Prussia; examples of the second can be found in England, France and Sweden. In England, a seat in Parliament could, since the time of Queen Anne, be held the achievements o! 40 Europe on the Eve of the French Revolution only by those owning considerable proper peerages tended to be conferred only on members « Jed class; and the justices of the peace were becoming an increasingly exclusive caste. Wh f reas only one-third officers were nobles in 1719 rds of so in 1760. In France, Louis XIV’s practice of‘ promoting bout geois, or roturiers (commoners), to high office in at Church and State had been gradually abandoned k 5 rs; in 1789, not one bishop and not Ir was a former commoner} all but three of the Ki s since 1718 had been noble; several of the Parlements were now refusing to admit commoners to their ranks; and an ordon 178x made it almost impossible henceforth for 1 €ven an anobli of recent vintage, to qualify as an office date in the army unless actually rising from the France, too, the landownets, whether noble or bow: tecently begun to look more closely into their archi to seek out and revive old manorial tights, long into disuse, or to invent new ones. ‘Thus the peasants suffered more than ever from the exactions of their Seigneurs. More spectacular were the open collisions between ti cracy and monarchy, often fought out in the name of “ tradi- tional liberties” or accompanied by appeals to “ natural law” or to the precepts of Montesquieu or Rousseau. There was an clement of such an aristocratic tesurgence in the parliamentary Opposition to George III in England: its leaders were Whig Ce — disgruntled ex-ministers like the Dukes of New- fe "4 SeciaA ie ee and the Marquis of Rocking: the politics of Poland Pere bat too, even alter: t772) 1D ok Foland and Sweden; but it was ‘haps parti- cularly striking in France Rint Belo} ea and the Austrian Netherlands (or igium). In France, it was the heredi i 5 Bsletianis, esiske ac Nese ereditary magistrates of the ord thse ‘etgy or the older aristocracy of 7 set the pace. After the death Evouis XIV. the Parlements had tesurrected th De ee ah ing their remonstrances, or a a ; Protests, against those govern: Governments and the Conflicts within States 41 of which they disapproved. From the century, the government, perpetually in jculties, had made a number of efforts to reform nm and to compel, or to cajole, the privileged ken surrender of their immuni In General, Machault, to impose 4 new vingtiéme, or one-twentieth tax on incomes, 4 inst the position of the Parlements, the clergy and their - Court, Similar proposals in 1763 provoked a the Parlement of Paris borrowed language of the day in accusing he Sovereign, the law combined s time ending against ”; once more the Parlem Minister, Bi In 1770-71, the Chancellor, Maupeou and the N: and the offe ents won the contest, dismissed from office. took the offensive: amitting open de- thout ished their offices vi in the place of the old; , proceeded to reform the highly successful experiment while it lasted ; “outcry was such that Louis XVI, on his compelled to dismiss Maupeou and te the magistrates in office. Terrays successor, Turgot, was a Physiocrat, a close friend of the philosophes, and even more determined than Machault or Maupeou to carry out reforms. The almost inevitable hap- pened: his attempts to abolish the guilds and the corvée and : ed such a storm of disapproval from the Parlements and other interested parties that Louis, for the ke of peace, withdrew his support. With Turgot’s depart- ure went the last serious chance (admittedly still a slender one) ing the old institutions of France before the Revolu erest in all this is that the Parlements, sh mainly concerned to defend privilege and uphold tra- ditional immunities, were led, in the course of these disputes, compensation while Terray, tt accession in 1774, Terray and to reinsta to reform the taxes provo alculated to arouse a response guage that was 42. Europe on the Eve of the French Revolution and among other social classes, whose interests were very different from their own. This, as we sk to prove a factor of some importance in the yea In Belgium, the innovations of Joseph II stitrec thing like a national revolution; and, like t I | Jude to revolution in France in the same year, it was led by the privileged classes and was concerned to restore tl than to re-build the State on new foundations. Yet, in Joseph, the Belgian aristocrats and in other countries, based their arguments not only o precedent, but on the writings of the philosop experience of the Americans. In the Belgian province three estates—representing the clergy, the nobility guildsmen of the ancient cities—had cherished privil “liberties”. The nobility and clergy enjoyed mi privileges than the humbler Thi: become virtually a hereditary caste, clung as ten the higher “orders” to their old traditions. So 1787, Joseph reorganized the whole administrative ar system of Belgium, abolished manorial courts, es and town councils, and relaxed the trading monopolies of the guilds, he met with the combined opposition and rebellion of all three estates. Led by the largely patrician “Estates party i of the lawyer Van der Noot, the Belgians drove out the Austrians in 1789 and proclaimed a United States of Bel- a closely modelled on the American Articles of Con dete Meal denne py, formed fee LE Sree a oe into being under another The “ Vonckists ” a pee some part in the revolution tional reform; and, o} i oe Pepe eels fat cons 3 and, once the Austr; had been expelled they were blackened by their ri ie ae : Pe Saito ed eir rivals as desiring to destroy the e ancient liberties of the land; they si : nia aol a hundreds and driven into exile, many with ae Aye they were able to return only of the Austrians, who regained control in Decem ricians, like thei n. his’ Governments and the Conflicts within States 43 We shall hear more of these Belgian democrats in ber 1790.7 the context of the revolution in France. countties, too, the “ middling” people were begin- In other emselves and to press their claims In th city-state Switzerland, a small-sc kind took place in 1768 Z second of the three categories into which the inhabitants of ded, had long resented the domination of the the city were di fundred, monopolized off e governing or veto, their 1 claimed the right to ble General Council, or legislative body. arming support, the tk ‘0 the rizing popu of their demands; but when the the Natives, who w excluded +] of artisan and enjoyed yhile bi uu the lev short voiced their own grievanc by the combined action of pat- gains of 1768, however, were vovernment (patrons of not in Switzerland) intervened on pt ired and helped to restore tic constitution of the city. e had been, in the seventeen-sixties oyal no political after, they ticians and Burgh short-lived: in 1782, the French volution in America b behalf of th the old aris Hur revival that challenged both th and aristocratic control of Parliament. When John Wilkes, the middle-class radical, was, after his return from exile in nent but carried his right to ed opposition of George Ill and the sit against the comb y, this marked a signal victory for both the frecholders of Middlesex who elected him and for middle- class political opinion in al. It also gave a new edge to the radical movement that had, for the past dozen years, been developing in the City of London in favour of shorter parlia- Commons’ majorit 1 For the foregoing, see R. R. Palmer, The Age of she Democratic Rer 341-57. 7 44 Europe on the Eve of the French Re volution ments and “a more equal representation of the peop to a point, this radical challenge ran in harness W ith tk cratic opposition in Parliament, represented by mi like Rockingham and Burke, who had their own reasons for wish ing to curb the “ influence” of the Crown. But the partner eager to ship was short-lived, as the opposition Whigs, while carry a limited measure of “ economical” reform, were quite unwilling to support demands for shorter parliaments, abolish “rotten” boroughs or substantially to enlarge the electorate. So when the reform movement revived in 177% Christopher Wyvill and his Yorkshire and London “ tors”, the advocates of radical reform, were quite unable to come to terms with the Whig opposition and ended up, in the 1784 election, by supporting the new Tory (and King’s) party of the younger Pitt against Charles James Fox and his new partner, Lord North. The degree to which the former 4 had by now fallen out is illustrated by Wyvill's comment on the result : a victory for the Fox-North coalition, he wrote to 4 friend, would “have changed our limited Monarchy into 4 mere Aristocratical Republic”. The association of the “middling” interest with Pitt proved to be a set-back for reform; but the movement revived, as we shall see in a later chapter, under the impact of the revolutionary events in France. It seems evident that, in England, both radicals and opposi- tion Whigs were stirred by events in America: both groups espoused the cause of American “liberties”; merchants in London, Bristol and Liverpool resented the interruption or loss of valuable colonial trade; and Nonconformists were in- a © ee bi a Calvinist brethren in New Englans n other parts of Europ: ini iddl ee and Beene was te ra eee American Revolution, “the first great ee a oN system. This certainly agent, es oo an the Americans evoked in Euro : eee in Europe: Professor Palmer has associa- es 2 Cited by N. C. Phillips, Yorksbii Bea, (cohiacans, ta toe apes National Politics Governments and the Conflicts within States 45 sks on America that appeared in three between 1760 and 1790; and idly expanding The demc ions that this or four the pre: cf 1ag evoted to the New World in the r impressive still m countries is more nd even re rms of the by writers, de; but, for intellectual ferment y and France itself— confined to discus- This was not so of Belgium and Volunteers and the mry C ed West- Dublin Parliament from its sion, pamphl writing f true, of cor nor Poland; nor ni movem an compe! ional minster, in ndependence, es, where something | one, broke out riot movement ¢ influe had already been strong Prov treaty with the n 1778, when the of Amsterdam made a s 1 States afid floated a loan on their i the opposition of the Orange sh party of the Stadholder, William V), ‘on the side of the Americans and the iot party, which emerged from these events, ng democratic le class party; and, ha ged simultaneously the authority of the nt families that con: ye proved to be was a and that of the r trolled the ities. This double challen both of strength and of weakness: support, but it made it easier for its monarchic and “ aristocratic” enemies, normally at loggerheads, to unite against them. it won the Pat- @ source tiots popula The French now threatened to intervene on behalf of the Patriots and the English on behalf of the Orangists. The English were well advised by their minister t 46 Europe on the a Ket at The Hague, Sir James ‘ ne ion c : ag allies to send in 20,000 iret vided r : and faced wit I 1K n ey F € : d left to their fat But Patriots eakness : : which would have disqualified them from 1 demo: ctatic’’ revolution t successful ¢ usior : > picked out by the ican, John A mY Dutch well and was certainly no dem eh ther that they had been ‘ to the s ne f common people of their own cx a 1 100 | much on the French Inattention to “the sense of the commor was, if aa fact, to prove the Achilles’ heel of mo fe ” “democratic”. revol ir h ar évents in Fra ace of 1 thinke ¢ i: advanced their views seemed t r , day, had shown any clearly marked syr hy fc wer : orders” or “ fourth estate fe ctive of middle 5 ot ; or “enlightened” opinion, the existing s y after their own fashion. desperate remedies by se i hardship, rioted or rebelled or at in : In Russia, seventy-three peasant risir er : the yeats 1762-69 alone, and the uw that marked the early years of Catherine culmina great insurrection led by the Cossack f san, Pugac 5 ; In the same yeat was a tising in Bohemia, when 15,000 peasan Prague; others followed in Transylvania in 178 in 1786, and in Austria in 1789—the last Joseph II’s agrarian reforms. In France, undet Richelieu and Louis XIV, peasant rebellion had been almost ende in the eighteenth century, witl was not finally suppressed until 1775 th growing agrarian ity 2 and the passing of the great famines, rural jacqueries and *A contributory factor was that the French Court was alarmed at the prospect of giving sup La Pré-Révolution francaise, port to a “pure democracy” (J. Eg 7-1788 (Paris, 1962), p. 70) enters, farriers, Ic ers and hatters between 48 1789. Yet, even so, for reasons noted in the last chapter, workers were, at this time, more often concerned with the price of food than with their money-wage and food riots were more frequent than industrial disputes. This was so even in cities and in Vienna, Rome and y may have been the most familiar cause of popular e. It was less frequently the case in Paris, where special measures were taken to feed the population; but, even h here were half- a-dozen major outbreaks of the kind between 1709 and 1775. In London, food-rioting was the exception rather than the tule, and the targets of popular violence were more often “outsiders” like Roman Catholics, Jews, Scots, Irish and Dissenters, or press-gangs and unpopular politicians. Never- theless, such riots often involved an element of deeper social Ptotest; and the “Wilkes and Liberty” movement, by pro- viding London's “ lower orders” with a political slogan, marked a new stage in their political development. But, whatever their nature, the protest movements of the common people were, generally, severely repressed by the authorities and frowned On, of actively condemned, by thos¢ of the “middling sort”, even when they were themselves engaged in €ncounters with Crown or atistocracy.* In France, the bourgeois militias of country towns joined royal troops and maréchaussée in a nt the ats householders, in 1780, enrolled themselves niiase G Voluntary associations” to protect Ok on tae for ie sordon Mioters, once their activities 4 wider social protest; and we saw that fo om Y oe Burghers, were “ too inattentive exception ee < % People’, We have noted a small i i ¥ ft 7] middle-class radicals se le 1760's and early seventies, when d with London's “ lower orders” in Europe on the Eve of the French Revolution ‘It is also notaby the last years of hi ¥ery movement enlightened” le that, it ra} F veer eaten aloha dominion, Joseph II, in 8 OF Desients and "oops and police to crush those quelling peasant disturbances and food: | Governments and the Conflicts within States 49 promoting the cause of John Wilkes; but the experience was short-lived. The dilemma of many would-be middle-class reformers at this time was reflected in the anguished question of ac lent of the Gloucester Journal in September my apprehensions of Tyranny of Government qual to those I have from the Licentiousness of the People?” ‘Twenty y t, the French Third Estate, faced with a similar problem, = prompted by circumstance, rather than P I E y > by their 1 ng of Rousseau, to turn to the people for support. t the least of the reasons why it was the French alone who, in 1789 and in the years to come, carried through a“ democratic revolution ”, Chapter II THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATES n European States once War was still the normal arbiter betw the niceties of diplomacy had been exhausted. It was usual, and considered proper, to precede hos ities by a ; declaration of war; yet this practice was sometime dispensed with; England, for example, opened her hostilities against France in the Seven Years’ Wat by seizing several hundreds of her vessels before making a declaration While such irregu- Jarities were frowned on, there was little evidence as yet of any widespread body of opinion ready to condemn wat = a instrument of national policy. Where denunciations of this kind were voiced, they were dismissed as Utopian by those who read them and aroused little sympathy among govern ments or peoples. The notion of a social contract” between States and of an underlying “law of nations” that should govern relations between them had, however, begun to be dis- cussed in a small circle of international jurists and advanced thinkers. Among the latter was the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, whose Project for setiling an Everlasting Peace im Europe (2713) by means of an international federal authority w4s later recommended by Rousseau. There was also Richasd Price, the English radical, who, in 1776, proposed the cred tion of a Senate, representing all the States of Europe and armed with powers to intervene in and settle their disputes The Swiss jurist, Emmerich Vattel, while not subscribing to thesé visionary designs, condemned wat as a scourge that was U justifiable “on any other ground than that of avenging injury received, or preserving ourselves from one with whi we are threatened”. French Physiocrats and English economm ists, who were beginning to link peace with free trade, saw the) problem in different terms. “Nothing is so evident,” wrote} 50 formal e Conflicts between States 51 in 1767 “as that war is inconsistent with Sie James Steus the prosperity of a jern state.” Writers as varied as Pope, Hume and Herder ridiculed the military virtues and were contemptuous of conventional notions of heroism and honour. But s acgely unheeded. A few statesmen, it is true t and Vergennes in France and the young responded to their arguments; but for Prussia and Russia and the more * Austria—all of whom were had no message what- equally unimpressed. casion, custom, presctip- the rights (of nations) of the citizen-army of the tion and for derive” against war is to beat the Gentry and merchants, over-taxed or momentarily protest against the er spoil $, Mig of a protracted war, but public opinion, in ined unmoved. Nor was this altogether surpris- s, touched but a small part of mounting cos general, rem ing when war, in many countri the population and when the profits that it brought to some might easily appear to outweigh the hardships that it beought to others, Even Adam Smith, who condemned the wasteful- Ness of war, argued in 1763 that far from being a disadvantage in a well-cultivated country that many get rich by it, When the Netherlands is the seat of war, all the peasants &tow rich, for they pay no rent when the enemy is in the In France and “war i Country, and provisions sell at a high rate.” England, peasants and townsmen rioted against press-gangs and Militia Acts—like those 5,000 Hexham colliers in the North of England who, in March 1761, lost 42 dead and 48 wounded in a bloody encounter with the militia. But, in England at least, there was little popular opposition to war as Such, The opposite might even be the case: the jingoism of William Pitt, the great war-minister of the 1750's and sixties, was matched by that of his supporters of both the “ middling” and “ inferior” sort; and, in 1780, after five years of the dis- ‘52 Europe on the Eve of the French astrous American War, there were ample signs of popular hostility to Catholics, Frenchmen and Spaniards—the tradi- tional national enemies—but there appeared to be little popu- inst the war itself. The same mood, however, might not prevail in countries like Prussia and Austria, where war imposed heavier burdens in terms of peasant conscripts, taxes and rising prices. In Austria, for exar , Joseph I's war against Turkey in 1788 was universally lar, while the conclusion of peace a year Jater was met with tions of joy and relief. ‘While, then, the belief of rulers in the remained constant, the objects that they sought to its prosecution were slowly changing, In the fi befitted an age of toleration and “ enlightenme: mained of the “ ideological” preoccupations of centuries. For Cardinal Richelieu and even fo the narrower considerations of religious orthodoxy had, when if came to war-time alliances, tended to be overshadowed by the more pressing motive of “reason of state”. To the rulers of the eighteenth century they were things of the past and the State, or “national”, interest, had taken over entirely. Ex ceptionally, such slogans as the defence of “‘the Protestant interest” might be invoked to justify England's alliance with Frederick of Prussia in 1756, but they served a merely pro pagandist aim and were not considered seriously as guides to conduct by kings, ministers or military leaders. “Holy alli ances”, or “ concerts” of Europe were, in fact, to remain in ao rey Europe's old rulers began, in the ake Me eeick S cae threatened. by the progress " absolute monarch ae ar eee tS. Io a wars would ents t be fi aha Sees rae long as feudal etki rane oe Bicnie i i 5A4 a Is 0} land-tenure petsisted, rulers woul > see the extension of their tettitoties in ferms of a fresh Sage of landed estates. In the eighteenth century, Wo : © survival of such concepts in the series of Wars mecession—over the Spanish dominions, Poland, Silesia a4 unpop between States Bavaria; in the French monartchy’s preoc Family Compact with the Spanish Bourbons; and in t £ geting hostility of Bourbons « France's long In fact, it was so many Britain for colonial possessions i this concept, but more universal and persistent, ’ nth century, ance by forming to restrain the ambitions of the largest was t. other In the seve achieve the ba Spain and France. E id had fought Louis XIV, as she had ea against Philip II, to t C i the Low Countries, facing her own at power. After state was powerful enough pattern had become more e continental bal- by a 1 1713, no sing! ern Europe, a flexible. In the half ance had generally been achieved by rai Spain, Prussia ar ng France with ia on the one side against the Austrian Habsburgs, usually supported by Great Britain and the l nited Prov , on the other: other states, in the East, in Italy and fitted in as the occasion might determine. But, | } ieturbed during these years, the pattern had been rudely disturbed by the emerge ing the East e of Russia as a great power domina and the Baltic and, after x 740, by the meteoric rise of Prussia as a powerful counterweight to the Austrian Empire in the centre. Meanwhile, Sweden had ceased to be a military importance, Poland was virtually eclipsed, and the Ottoman Empire was being driven on to the defensive by the expansionist aims of Russia and Austria. The result was to shift the centre of the European balance away from the West, where it had remained so long, to bring to the fore such issues 4s Polish Partition and the ‘ Eastern Question ”, and to drive the western powers into new alignments The other important factor that altered the balance among European powers and provided new scope for international Sonflicts was the growth of frade and of colonial empires 54 Europe on the Eve of the French Revolution overseas. England had, in the War of the Spanish Succession, won the precious asiento from Spain, considerably extended her possessions in America and the West Indies, and emerged as the dominant colonial power. Her subsequent wars, fought against France and Spain in 1739-63, had tipped the balance further in her favour by conquests in ndia and North America. In these, England had had the advantage of naval ascendancy and the ability to concentrate he *rgies on Over seas engagements, while subsidizing her European allies from a well-stocked Treasury. France enjoyed a more developed machinery for war and diplomacy, but she had continually been diverted from the colonial contest by her out-dated pre Occupations with dynastic ambitions in Europe and the mirag¢ of her Family Compact with the Spanish Bourbons. One result of Britain’s colonial gains had been the re. ppraisal of their value, not only in trade and treasure but in terms of foreign policy and the balance of power. Early in the century, Defoe had proclaimed that “to be Masters of the Marine Power is to be Masters of all the Power and all the Commerce in Europe”; and John Campbell, in The Present Stat of Exrope, argued in 1750 that “the Interest and Commerce of the British Empite are so inseparably united that they may bt very well considered as one and the same”. : colonial values, it should be noted that contemporary opinion ascribed the place of first importance to the pos: on of the slave and sugar islands of the West Indies—and not without om reason, as the value of Britain’s annual trade with het a ee a with a little me fa wees a Louth pad alee Ceakdeina Newfokeany ~ with India and £882,000 wit Nor is it surprisi ARE tft i ; Baines shold aa Ge shift in the balance of colonitl especially in those whose els aoa Seer oe aia and dominion through Britain’ oe ct ene eo S-growing supremacy. And 5 at oo ms ae century, we find a French pamphlets Suing that “ dominance of the sea would give a nation In the scale of} The Conflicts between States 55 ad the French minister Choiseul claim- universal mona ing that the lish, “‘ while pretending to protect the balance on land which no one threatens are entirely destroying no one defends’’. Such considera- bringing about a change in France's ic ambitions 1 to abanc (she even h of from the pr Bavaria), her traditior ads freer In this, and, were m of the seas and the balance of handed methods and increasing 1763 onward: France, Spain, the ain, from So Bri domination, ‘ound herself virtually isolated in Europe, and Provin the “neutral” United Nort Powers combined with the Americans, in the war of 1775 to strip her of her North American colonies, Other factors that, in the course of the century, were influ- encing the nature, scope and conduct of wars were the devel- Opments in military technique and organization and the growth, in some count! of a middle s public opinion. There was a tendency for armies to become | but this Was no’ lly the case, and there was certainly no in- clination to build “ national ” armies or to resort to the kind of m e mobilization effected by the French at the time of the Revolution. The greatest increase took place in the rising great Powers, Russia and Prussia: Russia’s military strength rose trom 132,000 men in 1731 to 458,000 in 1796 and Prussia’s from 38,000 in 1714 to 80,000 in 1740; and Prussia’s forces accounted, at one stage of the Seven Years’ War, for 4-4 per cent of her population, which was a far higher propor- tion than was considered practicable elsewhere. France's atmies were little larger than they had been during the wars of Louis XIV, and the Maréchal de Saxe, one of her greatest military theorists, held the view that, in battle, “ soultitudes universa 56. Europe on the Eve of the French Revolution serve only to perplex and to embarrass”. Another limiting factor was the persisting notion thaf the productive should be used only sparingly in warfare: foreign levies, de serters from other armies, or social misfits would serve tht purpose better. In England, a considerable part of those fectuited at home were vagrants and criminals, the latter faced with the choice of enlistment or transportation. France's great war-minister, the Count of Saint-Germait, believed that “as things are, the army must inevitably consist of the scum of the people and of all those for whom society has no use”; and even Frederick the Great had argued that “‘in wartime recruits should be levied im one’s own country only when the bitterest necessity But limitation in numbers was, to some extent at least, compensated for by an improvement in military tech: niques and organization. Rulers were taking a more persond and informed interest in the equipment and direction of theit armies: the military exploits of Frederick Il have become legendary, and even George II of England and Hanove buckled on his sword to Jead his troops into action at Dettin- gen in 1743. This growing concern of rulers was furthet reflected in the founding of schools and academies of militaty education ; it was during this period that the Russians estab- lished their Noble Cadet Corps at St. Petersburg, the Fr ach their Royal Military School in Paris, and the English theif academy for engineers at Woolwich. From such institutions flowed a spate of manuals on military problems, leading to 42 increase in the fire-power of armies and in the mancuvrability of weapons.. The bayonet came into general use; shrapnel was first demonstrated, in 1787, at Gibraltar; and Gribeauval’s radical reforms in France, which provided her armies with lighter and more mobile artillery, left a priceless legacy to the armies of the Revolution and Empire. Se a issues of war and peace, as all Be ae 3 igher policies of State, were the sole P e muler, advised by a small circle of his intimates: compels”. The Conflicts between States ‘57 e carried on behind fhe closed ncellery, and di In France, under Louis most ludicrous proportions: as tion-ridden, the King had ad. an inner cabal of Discussions on such matters wer doors of the sions were a ly guarded secret XV, hed al vernt became more opted the hak advisers astic poli and procl Eng et or ¢ Joset, the cabir ation with mote his own private dyn- nce with th I ce, od up for long a dly ha blast of parliamentary questions and debates. Yet Parliam ed full control of the conduct of f affairs; and, in the deb: n the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapel: 1748, Henry Pelham had re: tha ent ninded the Commons that “ power of making peace and war is by our Constitution most wisely lodged solely lutely necessary tc their execution’ Countries in that ton on foreign policy, in effect determined its outcome and ditection; and no minister, however staunchly supported by the Crown, could long survive its active displeasure. Thus, Walpole had been forced into war with Spain against his Wishes; Carteret had been driven from office owing to the fail- ure of his anti-Bourbon policy; and, above all, Lotd North, though promoting a policy in the American War that ac. corded with the wishes of the great majority in Parliament, Was hustled out of office in 1782, when this policy proved to an inglorious failure. In all this, what was new was not so much the assertion of Parliament's tights against the King as the growth of an informed middle-class public opinion outside Patliament itself, that compelled the House of Commons to take notice of its wishes. It was the pressure “ without doors" 58 Europe on the Eve of the French Revolution ndon and with of the rising class of “ interloping” merchants of I the great commercial cities, France and Spain, that made Walpole before resigning office. By was cattied to office in 1757, not | e of the majority in Parliament but by the influence of tht ody of opinion powerful merchant-interest outside. A sim supported Pitt when he resigned office i siderably embarrassed George III's gov of the peace preliminaries, be! and Spain, that culminated in the aty concluding stages of the American War it was the pe: tather than the war-party that received the supj outside public, and it was with its blessing that tk ham-Shelburne Ministry took office, on the re North, in 1782. Such pressure had become the r with the growth of an independent political press. London's eighteen newspapers were devoting cc iE Space to “foreign intelligence”; and the Annual Regisie for one, had, for years, been instructing its complexities of European politics. Other coun’ their newspapers; but wherever the conduct of forei was a closely guarded secret, they could not hope to be so informed; and, wherever parliamentary institutions were Jack ing, middle-class Opinion would have little opportunity influencing the policies of governments, Exceptionally, ft France, a powerful financier like Paris-Duverney mi at, earlie in the century, persuade Cardinal Fleury, the King to heed his warnings against costly military adventures. Bil it was not until the American War that the veils of secrecy it diplomatic and military affairs began to be pierced by the insistent intervention of a wider teading and thinking public One reason, no doubt, why the French government was wil ing to engage its forces in America was the popularity that the are ie feel see among politically-minded French ; ‘e similar echoes, as we have seen, in Get and cot s condut ieved to be s Trea y of Rocking gnation d lers s ministel States 59 many and othe to be one of in creasi The Versailles Treaty American War, most Christian Majesties g importance in tk rich ended the etween “their Britannic and lain C of England and F universal, a: 1f aL 1€s€ easier nd even to translate ome exte: £ } of | into practice 90th tries from in Euro their recent te and French Re tions, to b ots” of Aus’ Russia a the various ways, t up the pie 1 tunities for ex- from mutua ed wounds, new pansion lay open in the E Strangely enough, I from any continu ns did arise 1's main proble not the part of France or the ponsible d animosity on United States of America, who had been mainly for her defeat. $ approaching tional bankruptcy (of wt more will be said next chapter) and made only half-hearted att e 2If in the wider affairs of Eur though losing her ade with pe; and Englan American colonies, was soon able to res then on a new foundation; so that France, which had €ntered the war to gain India and the t Indies, proved to have gained little from it in practice. For England the e her financial position (she had Spent £100 million on the war) and to end her 20-year-old ‘solation in Europe by re-forming old friendships, as with me Dutch, and entering into new alliances. Pitt, the Prime Minister, who had read m Smith and been convinced by Many of the arguments of the new school of political econ- yorous n Main problems were to rest omy, set about the work of peaceful reconstruction in v Style: he increased the annual revenue, reduced the na debt, kept public expenditure on a tight string, and even Signed highly advantageous “Free Trade” agreement (the 60 ones Tr tures and commer manu: system could only work business and trading community of war remained here was t € culties of Austria active interventions eye in the East, he t powder dry Thoug! at first to thwarted ambitions 0: plans was that of exchang This roused against him the who found a champion in I of German Princes that ensued compelled Joseph to aba I put into operation his alt velopment of Belgium. force the Dutch to open Antwerp. Though England was ala her ig interest, she was st It on Dutch; and it assistance, were able to persuade Joseph to g for the Scheldt and’ signed a treaty of alliance United Provinces (1785). This was a tempor England’s diplomacy; but Joseph’s mounting ¢ Belgium, the financial problems of France and conflicts within the United Provinces combined to pr army under P her advantage. The French alliance had strengthened the) Joseph II, Dutch urban patriciates and the rising Patriot groups 19 the provinces in theit opposition to the pro-English party of tht Stadholder, William V. ‘The Stadholder was suspended f his offices by the estates of Holland; but the rev ior agitation of the Patriots alarmed the patricians who, to dct had, on E by sharing am: Poland, In x77 the French who, 62 Europe on the Eve of the French Revolution point, the Triple All the conflict, intervene armistice on Denmark, A mutiny and defeated in Finland, made peace accepted the status quo. Austria's intervention, too, was short-lived February 1790; and his brother, Li recover Belgium and to restore his au! anxious to limit the scope 0! and forced a initiative ity in disintegrat ing dominions, accepted the mediation of Triple Allianct and, by the Treaty of Reichenbach wi (October 1790), agreed to withdraw from the Turkish War. But the Russians had no such compelling re 1s for Jing to the wishes of the Anglo-Prussian alliance; so Cz disposed of the Swedes in the north, conc more fully against the Turks. Potemkin had reduced now the fortress of Ismail on the Danube fell to Su his armies occupied all the territory betw and Dniester. The Russian drive towards C c the Mediterranean had, by this time, thoroughly ala English, who demanded that Catherine make peace Turks and restore her conquests. When Catherine refused 1 return Oczakoy, which she valued as a Black Sea base, E B land was, for a month, on the brink of war with Russi! (March 1791). But the Triple Alliance was already br up; and while England had nothing to fear from France, feared that she could achieve no decisive result in the Eas without the support of Prussia. Poland proved to be the stumbling-block. In 1790-91, while Russia’s attention w% Otherwise engaged, the Poles had carried out a minor revolt’ tion led by the more liberal of their nobles. One of theit aim was to weaken the influence of Russia and to protect thea selves against further Russian encroachments: so they turned to Prussia for help. The Prussians were willing to give it~ but in return for Danzig and Thorn, The demand led, in tut vane Stages, to renewed demands on Poland by Russia a0 ue the Triple Alliance broke up and Prussity ustria—though deeply divided over Germanji herine, hav The Conflicts between States 63 the Netherlands and Turkey—were able once more, by further pattitions in 1792 and 1795, to compose their differences at of the unhappy Poles. the expen But, meanwhile, a revolution of infinitely greater conse- In its stages, it could not entanglements ¢ ope’s rulers and quence was convulsing France. but ben f from from the conflicts had to face at home and abroad. Yet, sooner or were compelled to face the new problems that it pose 0 concert their efforts to meet them. How they, and their peoples, re: d to the « lenge will be the subject of later chapters. cr TWO The I Revolution WHY WAS From the foregoing chapters it must be be no simple ans 0 scale revolution in Frai far the Americans had poli ed here; certainly in Belgium and in Poland there was something like a national tevolution against the Austrians in the one case and against the Russians in the other; in the United ~Provinces,-there was an attempted born) political revolution by the Patriot party ; eva in 1768, a coup d'état by the city’s Burgt hich, for a few years, redressed the balance of the constitution in their favour, But in none of these conflicts was there a decisive victory for any social group ovet af Other; none was “ democratic”’, in so far as none transferred, Ot was intended to transfer, the weight Of political authority to the people at large; and none went on, by progressive Stages, to effect a th ta mation of existing society. This happenéd’ only in France; and while some of these countries, and some others besides, later followed in the wake of the revolutionary changes taking place in France, this is not the question we ate concerned with at present. Why, then, was there such a revolution in France? His- totians, being adepts~af “reading history backwatds, have answered the question in very different ways according to their RE, 65 Cc revolution in 1776 The French Revolution Own prejudices and to those of their contem i ag be interesting to see how certain of they a ; ae historians of the past have viewed the prot Ps ering an explanation that may, possibly, appear} ‘yy : on oe to-day. ; person of note to comment on the ma ee ue who, though not a historian, was an re = a ino and has greatly influenced the thinking? one © about it since. To Burke, the society described ce io was by no means undesirable and, therefor a rough transformation, Its political insta 10, he considered, were Susceptible of gradual imp A‘ they had stood the test of time a with. As an Anglo-Irishman, he hi be Superior to the French; but f Fran isti : ce the existing absolute Monarchy, aristocracy and higle lergy, th ‘By, though by no means perfect, were nearly as goods ique of literary men and philosophes, wi i Aes bis at the established Church, and traditional aristocra, % ah Cager to settle accounts with th ion mye ad, i the wake of these sinister inf of : conspiraq” -tlaborated by emigrés of the 17904 has, with its later modification : those to -whom the Revolt’ eae nee Start to finish. led to explain it

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