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Comments
Miroslav Hrocha
a
Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

Online publication date: 15 October 2010

To cite this Article Hroch, Miroslav(2010) 'Comments', Nationalities Papers, 38: 6, 881 — 890
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 Nationalities Papers
Vol. 38, No. 6, November 2010, 881 –890

Comments
Miroslav Hroch∗

Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic

(Received 5 August 2010; final version received 13 August 2010)

After having published a book, an author must take into account that his text remains
unprotected, and becomes an object of new readings which reflect different social and pol-
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itical conditions, and the interests of subsequent generations of readers. Consequently, an

author’s concepts and opinions are open to various reflections and can be used as argu-
ments or tools of analysis, as inspirations, models, or targets of criticism. These processes
occur independently of an author’s expectations and original goals. In a broader sense, we
can agree with antiquity: “Habent sua fata libelli.” My book on the “Social Preconditions
of National Revival” has been no exception, and it is a great pleasure for me to realize that
this book has survived so many decades to live its “second life,” and that its original mean-
ings and concepts inspire new interpretations, even if they have sometimes been misunder-
stood or exploited as arguments in totally different conditions and settings. It is a pleasant
surprise to observe that my methods, typologies and generalizations can be (successfully?)
discussed and used, naturally in a modified version, as tools to analyze developments and
conflicts in very distant countries and times. Alexander Maxwell has given an excellent
and well-informed overview of this differentiated and sometimes controversial second
life. All other contributions to this issue, analyzing concrete cases, could be understood
as indications that my scientific efforts have made sense, and sometimes inspired research-
ers up to the present day.
Instead of discussing individual contributions, I prefer to concentrate my comments
into four basic points, all of which are more or less present in each contribution.

1. Time and space

As a historian, I have never felt qualified to develop general theories that purport to uni-
versal validity, even though I do not intend to call into question the importance of such
theories. For this reason, I never regarded the universal, all embracing phenomenon
called “nationalism” as the object of my studies. I instead researched social changes
and processes, concrete human activities, and the motivations behind them. This research
focused on those activities which enabled nation formation under conditions of a non-
dominant ethnic group (or ethnic community).
These social and cultural changes proceeded according to a concrete timing, which
could be described in terms of a chronology. The “nation” was a changing community
and its original structure and concept differed from what emerged at the end. This is

∗
Email: miroslav.hroch@ff.cuni.cz

ISSN 0090-5992 print/ISSN 1465-3923 online

# 2010 Association for the Study of Nationalities
DOI: 10.1080/00905992.2010.515976
http://www.informaworld.com
 882 M. Hroch

one reason why I stressed the importance of distinguishing different periods in the process
of nation formation. The second argument for periodization is that nation formation pro-
ceeded asynchronously, i.e. according to a different timing in different regions between
the second half of the eighteenth century and the twentieth century. We must also take
into account that general conditions of culture and economy have changed. This asyn-
chrony cannot be reduced to the simple-minded West-East scheme. Some West-European
nation formation processes started later than Eastern ones (Catalan, Basque, Scottish,
Flemish), and in both Eastern and Western cases we find national movements with an
“open end,” i.e. where the outcome of national agitation is still undecided. This category
includes both of Farhan Siddiqi’s Pakistani cases studies, as well as the Belarusians and
Cossacks. The authors are well aware that they are considering an open-ended category
of national movements, but it would be very interesting to know whether Nelly Bekus
and Ian Appleby see other possible alternatives to nation formation and the spread of col-
lective identities in their regions.
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A researcher’s perspective changes according to the gap separating his own lifetime
from the era during which national movements developed. There is a difference in chrono-
logical perspective between contemporary studies of nineteenth century processes, when
national movements took place in a rather distant past, and studies of national movements
in the present day. In the former case, historians have the possibility to study the past,
present and future of the nation formation processes and, consequently, are able to dis-
tinguish successful national movements from unsuccessful. In the latter case, we know
usually only the past and the present: historians generally have difficulties predicting
future events. In this respect, there is no relevant difference between the European and
non-European situations; and the Baloch and Sindhi national movements have their par-
allels in Europe. Consider, for example, the case of Provençals, Bretons, or Galicians,
as well as the Belarusians and Cossacks.
It yields no scientific results to regard a given national movement as wrong, or lacking
perspective. German intellectuals in the mid nineteenth century denied the possibility of a
Czech nation formation; Magyar politicians made similar judgments about the Slovak
national movement as late as the early twentieth century. In both cases, it was not primarily
a matter of good or bad will, but of a different understanding of the term “nation.” To
German eyes of 1848, for example, no nation could exist without its own political
history. Friedrich Engels and, three decades later, Karl Kautsky similarly denied the exist-
ence of a nation without its own bourgeoisie.
We can follow also another comparative dimension of this different timing for national
movements. Appleby draws a parallel between the circumstances and driving forces of
nineteenth century national movements, and movements which, like the Cossack national
mobilization, began only after 1990. This is a legitimate parallel that fully corresponds to
my attempts to model the contemporary “new nationalism” on my observations about
“classical” national movements (published in Nations and Nationalism 1995). In a
broader sense of the word, all reflections about the possibility of using the ABC model
as a tool of analysis for contemporary national movements presuppose – perhaps uncon-
sciously – a similar parallel with nineteenth century national movements. When compar-
ing past and present in this way, we naturally find analogies, but also significant
differences. Both help us to understand more clearly the controversial aspects of recent
nation formation processes.
To those authors analyzing the chances of success for an open-ended national move-
ment in our own time, I would recommend studying the role of several factors that played
– at least in my research – a decisive role in the transition to Phase C for “classical”
 Nationalities Papers 883

national movements, and which could therefore be regarded as integrating (or disintegrat-
ing) circumstances:
1. the results and impact of the learned endeavors of Phase A, insofar as it existed at
all, concerning the language, past, habits etc. of the given ethnic community;
2. the degree of social communication both inside of the ethnic community, and
between its members and state authorities;
3. the level of social mobility, both territorial, and vertical;
4. nationally relevant conflicts of interests; and
5. the role of external factors, both negative (political oppression) and positive (exter-
nal help). All these circumstances played irreplaceable roles in the transition from
Phase B to Phase C in “classical” nineteenth century national movements.
Nation formation also proceeds on a concrete territory, albeit with many complicated over-
lapping processes. Our image of what has to be understood as “nation” seems to be
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strongly influenced by our contemporary experience with the modern nation state in
Europe, and perhaps also in Latin America, as a compact territory, where the “national”
space corresponds grosso modo to the state territory. Nowadays, we can nevertheless
observe national movements operating over a non-compact territory, e.g. the Basques,
Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia, or less-well-known cases of “unofficial” nationalities in
Russia. An increasing number of researchers believe that these earlier European develop-
ments have many parallels with ethnic or ethno-national movements in Africa and Asia.
Even though the basic framework of the nation formation was the territory of Europe,
the “nation” is becoming globalized as a term, and also perhaps as a social community.
Much like capitalism, the modern nation is a genuinely European phenomenon which
was “exported” to other continents. It is, however, nice to observe that my models,
which were developed on European empirical data, have sometimes been used as analyti-
cal tools to research nation formation processes outside of Europe. In this context, I find it
important to remember that we must carefully locate national movements, and the
phenomena called “nationalism,” in concrete territorial contexts. For this reason, the
second part of my comments concerns words and concepts.

2. Words and concepts

Nation formation never starts as a total invention. The concept of the nation-to-be is
always constructed from the past using some pre-existing elements: ethnic, political, cul-
tural, or geographical. These pre-existing elements include also the terms themselves, and
roots and connotations of these terms existed in the European traditions, represented above
all by Christianity, the Enlightenment and Romanticism, distinctively different than in the
cultures of Asia and Africa.
In analyzing processes of nation formation, I felt no need for the term “nationalism.”
Nevertheless, I had to acknowledge its differentiated meanings, and above all the many
meanings of the term “nation.” In this context, I would like to stress two important
points regarding this term.
Firstly, there is a difference in linguistic tradition. In English, the term “nation” has
traditionally been used in connection with state since the seventeenth century, but in the
German (and Central European) traditions, the term has been primarily defined through
linguistic and cultural ties. I have no problems speaking about a Flemish nation in
Czech or German, but I understand that English speakers have difficulties doing so.
 884 M. Hroch

Neglecting this difference very often leads to misunderstandings. Similar problems arise
when using the term “nationalism.”
Secondly, there is no doubt that we can empirically distinguish two basic types of
nation formation in nineteenth-century Europe. One began under conditions of a state-
nation which existed continuously through the Middle Ages and the Early Modern
period, and whose ruling elites developed a codified language of administration and
high culture. Examples include France, England, Sweden, Portugal, and the Netherlands.
The development of a modern nation in these cases proceeded as an internal transform-
ation towards a constitutional state of equal citizens, partially through revolutions, par-
tially through reform. The speed of this transformation corresponded roughly to the
speed of social transformation from feudal to capitalist society.
The second type of nation formation began under different conditions: a non-dominant
ethnic group attempted to achieve all the relevant attributes of a fully formed nation,
through a national movement. It is self-evident that the situation of a state nation and
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that of a national movement led to different understandings of the term “nation.” Under-
standably, it is the European “small nations” that inspire research into those political
movements and ideas in Asia or Africa that are nowadays described as “nationalism,”
(i.e. national movements).
This basic typology distinguishing state nations from small nations must not be neg-
lected also for another reason: it gives us the key to understanding differences in political
cultures and stereotypes. Nations which belong to the second type (the “small nations”)
never regarded their existence as self-evident: they felt endangered for a very long
time, developed widely-held myths of the common people as the basis of the nation,
and so on. While the nation formation in the case of state-nations was in most cases “pre-
destinated” by the existing statehood, national movements among small nations may have
an open end. Only successful national agitation, and consequently the acceptance of new
national identity by the mass of the population guaranteed an irreversible national exist-
ence. One cannot describe all these important differences using the universal and unifor-
mizing term “nationalism.”
According to this differentiation, we could construct four different meanings of the
term “nation”: firstly the English state-nation, secondly the English small nation, thirdly
the continental (including French) state-nation defined by both the state and language,
and finally the continental small-nation, defined by language.
Since this genuine European term had already developed from its Latin origin “natio”
in almost all European regions in Early Modern times, its export to other continents some
centuries later was accompanied by a further confusion: how to translate this word into
local languages without a Latin tradition? Which of the four aforementioned understand-
ings was translated? Probably, the English state-national meaning predominated, but there
are many cases where singular African or Asian tribes are called “nations,” and defined by
their ethnicity.
Nevertheless, we must not forget that the internal differentiation of concepts and goals
in individual national movements sometimes also correspond to their specific social struc-
ture. It is significant if, as Henio Hoyo indicates, social diversity led one and the same
national movement to develop multiple concepts of the nation, of who belongs to it and
who would be excluded from it. His Mexican example is not unique. We can find parallels
to creole exclusivism in the Polish or Magyar national movements: the Natio Polonica (or
Hungarica) did not include all inhabitants, but merely the nobility. The failed construct of
the “Austrian nation” in the first half of the nineteenth century included all inhabitants of
the Empire without regard to their ethnicity, because they belonged under the rule of one
 Nationalities Papers 885

and the same Habsburg Emperor. On the other hand, an important segment of the German
speaking nobility in Bohemia and Moravia regarded themselves as exclusive members of
this Austrian national community, while another segment shared its identity with a Bohe-
mian territorial nation.
For all these reasons, I like Sı̂nziana Păltineanu’s attempt to draw parallels with
Begriffsgeschichte. All researchers have to define their terms, and have the freedom to
construct their own concepts. Yet at the same time, we all are hostages or even prisoners
of our words – and this was also the case during the “Sattelzeit.” Did the activists of one
and the same national movement understand the term “nation” in the same sense through-
out the time between Phase A and Phase C? It is not difficult to discover that they some-
times differed significantly in their understanding of the term, especially during Phase
B. Perhaps my description of Phase C could be enlarged: to unify or codify popular under-
standings of the term “nation” was also important.
On the other hand, how did the activists of national movements outside of Europe
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render this imported concept of “nation” (mostly understood in its English sense) in
their own languages? Did they already have a proper word for it, or were they forced to
create a neologism? Păltineanu is right that this is not only a matter of translating the pol-
itical and social languages of the time, but also a translation “that took place at a meta-
level.” She recommends awareness of processes “of translation and transfers that take
place in different cultural contexts.” I find this reflection very promising, and could
imagine a fascinating comparative socio-linguistic project on the linguistic roots and con-
notations of such terminological innovation in individual languages, both in Europe and
beyond.
If the historian tries to be independent of political interpretations of terms, he must not
forget that “nation” and “nationalism” are not the only terms used in this context. We
already know some alternative terms which could be helpful in order to distinguish this
vast field more precisely. Firstly, the term “ethnic community,” at least in Anthony
Smith’s interpretation, corresponds to the pre-national stage of nation formation. Sec-
ondly, the term “nationality” is unfortunately used in rather different contexts. Thirdly,
the term “national minority” has to be mentioned: to me, it denotes an ethnic group
whose members belong to a “mother nation” living on the opposite side of a political fron-
tier. All these three terms, together with the term “national identity” (and “national identi-
fication”), enable more accurate distinctions, especially if we try to locate an “open ended”
national movement. The fact that activists of these movements refer to themselves and to
the object of their agitation as “nation” is important, but this does not determine the result
of their efforts.

3. The comparative method under conditions of globalization

While there are some understandable critical comments concerning my typology and gen-
eralizations, my comparative approach seems to be accepted. What a difference to the
1960s, when the aim of historical research was still understood as the traditional discovery
of new data from archives, and comparison was acceptable merely as a tool for defining
specificities and singularities! Since I presumptuously desired to discover a mechanism
or model for nation formation, I had to develop a comparative method, not to discover
singularities, but as an instrument of generalization. Consequently, I crossed the border
of traditional historiography and I found the corresponding theoretical basis in what I
understood as Marxist methodology. I did not identify Marxism as a political program,
 886 M. Hroch

as Gellner erroneously suspected, but as a method of social and historical analysis. Today,
perhaps, the term “historical materialism” would be more appropriate.
Naturally, half century later, when the walls between history and social sciences are
breaking down, the comparative method is becoming almost fashionable. Nevertheless,
we have to avoid spontaneous, superficial comparisons. I always differentiated between
simple comparison and a comparative method, which must follow some procedure.
Firstly, it is necessary to define the objects of comparison. Then one must formulate the
relationship to some chronology, either diachronic or synchronous. Above all, one must
to clarify analogical (i.e. comparable) situations, stages, or relationships. For my research,
I elaborated the ABC periods seeking comparable analogical situations in various national
movements, and decided to focus on Phase B as such a comparable situation. Finally, one
must define the criteria of comparison; in my case, the social composition of national
activists.
Symptomatically, the basic results of this comparison are almost forgotten today, over-
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shadowed by the interest in the ABC model. Some results have been partially misunder-
stood, as in the case of Păltineanu, who considered it a most remarkable finding that “no
class of social group had a stable place in the structure of the patriotic communities.” In my
opinion, the most important result of my comparison was that “the most lively participants
of national movements came from those groups into which social ascent out of the ranks of
the oppressed nationalities was possible and customary” (131).
I am repeating the banal principles of comparative method because they also have to be
respected in the case of diachronic comparison between classical national movements of
the nineteenth century and contemporary movements. While Siddiqi and Hoyo have fol-
lowed this principle, Bekus and Appleby, unfortunately, have not.
Nevertheless, when comparing results of comparisons, misunderstandings cannot be
avoided. Siddiqi has difficulties in accepting one of my central explanatory models (that
of “nationally relevant conflict of interests”) because he interprets these conflicts as
merely the consequence of emerging capitalist development, a process which he believes
absent from Pakistan. This is a misunderstanding: I include in this category also conflicts
which were significant for late feudal agrarian society, such as the conflict between Esto-
nian (or Latvian or Ruthenian) speaking peasants and German (or Polish) landlords;
between the Lithuanian countryside and Jewish towns. In subsequent work based on my
older model, I have begun including into this category struggles for political power, for
positions in higher administration, or for places in high schools and universities.
The fascinating comparison between contemporary Pakistani and classical European
national movements provokes a comment on possibilities of such a global comparison.
As already mentioned, my concept of the nation as a specifically European development
is based not only on European linguistic tradition in terminology, but also on the fact that
in European modernization capitalism went arm in arm with civil society and constitution-
alism. In consequence, a community of equal citizens is a basic characteristic of the
modern European nation. I am not sure if the term “modern nation” means the same
thing in a society with a capitalist economy lacking civil rights, or a society with civil
rights lacking capitalism.
Nevertheless, one misunderstanding has to be clarified: most European national move-
ments started in a pre-capitalist and pre-constitutional (i.e. late absolutist) society, and, if
successful, eventually achieved a “full” social structure corresponding to the stage of
social and economic development in their region. I wonder whether this type of nation for-
mation is possible in non-European societies. In other words, I am well aware of many
analogies in human behavior and in the motives for political activities. Nevertheless, I
 Nationalities Papers 887

am still not convinced that communities which call themselves “nations” – in Africa, the
Indian subcontinent or even in China – belong to the category “modern nation.” On the
other side, there is no doubt that the ABC model, which could be transformed into a
general model of all social movements, can be used as an analytical tool for studying
Asian nation-forming processes.
A final remark: searching for an analogy between Pakistan and European national
movements, Siddiqi finds type III, the “insurrectional” national movement, most relevant.
I would support this observation with further arguments: only the Balkan national move-
ments have a weak Phase A, only in the Balkans did the ruling Ottoman elites not seek to
assimilate the non-dominant ethnic groups, and only in the Balkans do we have mass
movements before modernization (based on earlier tribal ties). Even during the nineteenth
century, Western European opinion already doubted that Balkan national movements qua-
lified as “European nations” in the proper sense of the word, suspecting that their political
elites only imitated the Western model of nationalism.
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4. The ABC periodization

I have repeatedly stressed that it was never my ambition to present theories of nation for-
mation, and that my intention in developing the ABC model was to prepare an appropriate
analytical framework for comparative analysis. After having read Alexander Maxwell’s
excellent overview, I feel confirmed in my conviction that it is sometimes more productive
to develop models and analytical frameworks than construct abstract theories.
Nevertheless, there are also some theoretical elements in this ABC model. It is, above
all, an understanding of nation formation as a process. The aforementioned distinction
between state-nations and “small nations” is a distinction between “institutionalized”
nation formation and anti-institutional national movement. This model of national move-
ments allows, as Maxwell demonstrates, a more precise orientation in the course of
national movement, and a more exact location of individual events, ideas and personalities
into a concrete social and cultural context, even when this context crosses beyond the
European horizon.
I have also found some misunderstandings in interpretations of the ABC schema.
Bekus complains that the ABC model does not include, or does not take into account,
the development of ideology. This observation is correct: the model does not reflect the
development of national ideas and ideologies, but this omission is intentional. All division
into periods must proceed according to concrete, distinct criteria, else one cannot adopt a
comparative procedure. In the case of the ABC schema, the basic criterion was not the
development of ideas, but the course of the national movement, specifically the degree
of its social support, understood as the intentional spread of national identity among
members of the ethnic community. Since the nation existed only if its members were
aware of belonging to it, the spread of national consciousness, alternatively of national
identity, became my central criterion.
Naturally, I had to calculate with three basic groups of national demands and goals:
cultural, social and political. Many interpreters put the cultural program into the context
of Phase B, joining the political program with Phase C. This is a slightly simplified modi-
fication, because in some few cases, national movements had already developed their pol-
itical programs during Phase B (the Norwegians, Greeks, and Irish). On the other side, with
the emergence of a mass movement, political programs were formulated everywhere.
One additional modification of my model which I have made since 1985 deserves
mention. Trying to describe Phase B more accurately, I have distinguished two stages.
 888 M. Hroch

In the first stage of Phase B, national activists have begun their agitation, but do not find
any strong echo among their countrymen: they play piano without strings, as the famous
poet Jan Kollár complained. Sooner or later, however, their agitation finds its audience,
becomes increasingly successful and this can be characterized as the second stage of
Phase B. In some national movements, however, this stage lasted many decades before
it achieved a mass character (e.g. Slovenes, Slovaks). For others, it was a rather short
period.
Some critics say that my book neglects the importance of politics, of struggles for pol-
itical power. Since my research focused on Phase B, when in most cases the national
program did not include explicitly political demands, this is understandable. In other
words, the difference between Phases B and C helps us to understand the radicalization
of national conflicts with the transition from Phase B to C. Insofar as national efforts
were oriented towards the codification and intellectualization of the language, or to devel-
oping national culture, national leadership was about prestige in the public space. There is
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no problem in enlarging the field of prestige; nobody among leading state elites felt endan-
gered by prestigious cultural achievements of the national movement. With a political
program, however, the demand for participation in political power emerged. While pres-
tige can be enlarged ad infinitum, political power cannot: it must be shared. This means
that state elites started to feel endangered only after Phase C developed its program.
Some authors discuss the situation of nation states which emerged earlier then the tran-
sition to Phase C. What about national movements which were allowed to exist as a nation,
and achieved full or limited independence as a result of specific external events, as was the
case for Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians after the First World War? National
movements as organized efforts to achieve all the attributes of a fully formed nation natu-
rally end when this goal was realized. It is difficult to imagine a national movement exist-
ing inside a national state: against whom would this movement be directed? For this
reason, I cannot agree with any proposal to enlarge the model by introducing a “Phase
D.” It is more exact and consistent to say that, in this case, nation formation continued
under changed conditions; namely, as efforts to win mass support for a new national iden-
tity in an existing national state. This endeavor was successful in the case of Lithuanians
during the interwar period; and for Macedonians, Albanians and Slovaks after World War
II. It was unsuccessful or interrupted by oppression in the case of Belarusians and Ukrai-
nians: their national movements never experienced Phase C, according to my criteria.
If Nelly Bekus dates the beginning of Phase C to 1917 or 1918, than she mistakes (and
misinterprets) a significant peak in Phase B – a declaration of independence from enthu-
siastic activists – for the beginning of Phase C in my sense of the word. Interwar censuses
demonstrate the low level of national identity in this territory, even if it was progressively
spreading. If Bekus were right, then the identity issues in Belarus, and the development of
this new independent nation state after the collapse of the Soviet Union, would be totally
different. After having achieved Phase C, the nation forming process becomes irreversible
and can no longer be stopped: consider the example of Baltic national movements under
Soviet occupation. The sad story of Belarus is that the successes achieved during Phase B
of their national movement were interrupted by Stalin’s brutal Russification. The Belaru-
sian movement started again after 1990, but remains an open-ended story. To call this
repeated performance “Phase D” is only a matter of individual attempts to find a new
description for a well-known situation. Under these specific forms of Phase B, one external
factor played decisive role: the Stalinist politics of Russification. The politics of Magyar-
ization played a similar role in Hungary after 1867, especially in the Slovak case. This
infrequent European experience can, however, serve as a useful model for understanding
 Nationalities Papers 889

tensions between the official nation and the “natural” ethnic or tribal communities in the
artificially created “nations” created from former colonies in Africa, and in some newly-
formed Asian states. An interesting parallel could also be drawn with the problem of
“right” and “wrong” nationality in the USSR, as Appleby described.
Last but not least, the importance of Phase A should be remembered. Since most
researchers of “nationalism” are interested in political conflicts, or at least in aggressive
verbalizations, quiet but engaged scientific research appears to be less attractive. It is dif-
ficult to find expressions of “nationalism” in the texts of educated scholars, who were
motivated by their love to their homeland and its people. Nevertheless, these texts
were, at least in European context, decisive in defining what the nation-to-be is, who
belongs to it, and the content of its past. Learned activities and discussions regulated lin-
guistic codification and the beginnings of a new or revitalized national literature. Phase A
consequently became an essential precondition not only for effective arguments during the
Phase of national agitation, but also for its successful spread among its target population.
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Since enlightened scientific attitudes and ethical principles of enlightened patriotism

motivated most of these scholarly activities, Phase A could be regarded as a specifically
European phenomenon. Even in those parts of Europe where enlightened ideas were
almost or completely absent, above all in the Ottoman Empire, the lack of a fully-
fledged Phase A meant a relevant handicap, because work that had elsewhere been com-
pleted during Phase A had to be done during Phase B. In other words, scientific research
became an instrument of national agitation. Controversies over how to define the nation, or
who belongs to it, resulted, with tragic consequences that have continued the present day.
This Balkan experience also has parallels outside of Europe. The presence or absence of
Phase A must therefore not be neglected when analyzing the formation of nations.

Conclusion
It is satisfying for every author to know that his results remain interesting, inspiring, and
also the object of critical interest after several decades. It is even more encouraging to con-
sider that even though my models and generalizations were based on empirical research on
nineteenth century European history, they are regarded as workable analytical tools in
studies on the twentieth century, and also for non-European national movements.
At the same time, this circumstance evokes a skeptical reflection. Can we really use
models based on European historical research to analyze contemporary history, or pro-
cesses in Asia, Africa and Latin America? Two differences deserve comment. Firstly,
the historian comparing nineteenth century national movements knows the result; in
other words, knows which national movements were successful and which failed. This
enables a better orientation and categorization of events than is possible for contemporary
history, where one does not yet know the consequences.
Secondly, the difference of socio-cultural patterns must be stressed. In nineteenth
century Europe, the nation formation processes proceeded under rather uniform conditions
of modernization: traditional, late feudal societies transformed into modern capitalism;
societies of privileged estates transformed into constitutional political systems of civic
society. In a contemporary global capitalist world system, nation forming processes, as
with those in Mexico or Pakistan, may proceed with strong relics from traditional or
even tribal society. At the same time, the political conditions of these movements rest
more or less on a working constitutional basis and on the principles of equal citizenship
– both imported from Europe. The problem to be analyzed and solved by more competent
researchers is this: could some kind of “modern nation” be successfully formed in
 890 M. Hroch

politically modernized (“civic”) states, but under conditions of a traditional pre-modern

society? The answer forms an open and important field of research. How can we define
in a distinctive and non-controversial way the differences between European nation-
states and the project (or even reality) of new nations-to-be in non-European societies?
These two categories are comparable, but not identical. A consensus about which distinc-
tions to draw would enable more reliable generalizations.
Prague, 5 August 2010
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