Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
ABSTRACT
Spanish American countries exhibited during the nineteenth century many
of the features Koselleck associated with the Sattelzeit, the transitioning pe-
riod into our contemporaneity. However, the region’s history was marked by
social instability and political upheaval, and contemporaries referred to such
experiences of time as precarious. In this article I explore the connection
between this precarious time and the emergence of the sociopolitical concept
of morality in New Granada (present-day Colombia) during the first thir-
ty-five years of the republic (1818–1853). I focus on two conceptual moments
as exemplified by the reflections put forth by Simón Bolívar (1783–1830),
military and political leader of the independence period, and José Eusebio
Caro (1817–1853), publicist, poet, and political ideologue of the Conserva-
tive Party.
KEYWORDS
Simón Bolívar, Colombia, José Eusebio Caro, experience of time, moral,
morality, New Granada, Republicanism
1. José Eusebio Caro, “La bendición nupcial” (1843), in Obras escogidas en prosa y verso:
Publicadas e inéditas, Rafael Pombo, ed. (Bogotá: El Tradicionalista, 1873), 47.
2. Historia de la revolución de la República de Colombia en la América Meridional (Be-
sanzón: Imprenta de José Jacquin, 1858), 1, 44. All translations are mine unless otherwise
stated.
Contributions to the History of Concepts Volume 11, Issue 2, Winter 2016: 85–109
doi:10.3167/choc.2016.110206 ISSN 1807-9326 (Print), ISSN 1874-656X (Online)
Francisco A. Ortega
3. Ibid. For other prominent historians who shared a view of preindependence life as
peaceful and quiet, see José María Vergara y Vergara, Historia de la literatura en Nueva
Granada (Bogotá: Echeverria Hermanos, 1867); José Manuel Groot, Historia eclesiástica y
civil de Nueva Granada, escrita sobre documentos auténticos, 3 vols. (Bogotá: Impr. á cargo
de F. Mantilla, 1869–1870).
4. Due to the collapse of the Spanish government and the widespread confusion, news of
Bonaparte’s invasion only arrived in New Granada in August of that year, when the frigate’s
commander Juan José Llorente delivered a complete account of the events in Cartagena. See
José Manuel Restrepo, Historia de la Revolución de la República de Colombia (Paris: Librería
Americana, 1827), 106.
5. For a systematic study of the emergence of a lexicon associated with constitutionalism
and republicanism in the region, see the two-volume Diccionario político y social del mundo
iberoamericano (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2009 and 2014),
coordinated by Javier Fernández-Sebastián. For the New Granada región, see Francisco
A. Ortega Martínez and Yobenj Aucardo Chicangana-Bayona, eds., Conceptos fundamen-
Events and news seemed to follow each other at dizzying speeds, and pro-
tagonists—both royalists and patriots—claimed to be living through the most
unusual of times. There were signs heralding a new collective experience of
the present: the proliferation of calls to hold extraordinary meetings at city
councils (cabildos extraordinarios); the reference to local infighting as “our
revolution” (understood as the occurrence of unexpected events effecting a
break with the past); the widespread perception of innovations in all areas
of social and political life; and a generalized sense of uncertainty and crisis.6
On 10 August 1809, Spanish American patriots in Quito organized a govern-
ing junta and declared autonomy from Spain, but two months later Spanish
authorities brutally suppressed it. The news spread like wildfire, and remon-
strations against Spanish despotism were heard in Bogotá, Caracas, and other
cities. Other juntas popped up throughout the region, and by the end of 1811
Caracas and Cartagena had declared absolute independence. By then events
were perceived as pregnant with fecund possibilities but also as unexpected,
random, and even threatening; they were embraced by some with great excite-
ment while others feared them as divisive and threatening.
Public discourse gained importance as the vehicle to address the com-
motions and inspire and conceive futures that could not have been imagined
before. The press registered the novelty: citizens now “fluctuate in an Ocean
of unconnected ideas, inexperienced, and lacking foundations” and called for
“our Franklins and our Washingtons to spread the lights and fix our incon-
stancy and uncertainty.”7 Nevertheless, publicists were impatient, as words no
longer signified clearly, and vented their frustration at the difficulty in express-
ing the scope of ongoing political transformations. Revolutionary patriot Jorge
Tadeo Lozano wrote in his “Fragments of a Genuine Dictionary” that “there
is nothing that tarnishes our intellectual eyeglass, as the equivocal meaning
of words; unfortunately such is the disorder that is now seen in this area, we
run the risk of experiencing the same catastrophe suffered by the builders of
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Francisco A. Ortega
Babel’s Tower.”8 Words had not just become imprecise or confusing; they had
become public arenas of dispute; they were wielded as weapons to carry out
a “more dangerous war than the one conducted with bayonets and canons.”9
According to Antonio Nariño, another passionate revolutionary, publicists
in Spain spoke of “brotherhood, equality, or integral parts,” all of them pur-
porting to signify a new relation between the peninsula and its colonies, but,
warned Nariño, those words were but “bait for your credulity.” In reality
Spanish Americans “could not pronounce the word freedom without being
insurgents.” There is one dictionary, he claimed, for Spaniards and another
for Spanish Americans:
In the former, words such as freedom and independence are virtuous; in the
latter, they are evidence of crime and insurrection; in the former, conquest is
Bonaparte’s weightiest offence; in the latter, it is an expression of Ferdinand
and Isabella’s glory; in the former, freedom of commerce is the right of the
Nation; in the latter, a sign of ingratitude against four traders in Cadiz.10
fundamental principles of society ran the risk of being undercut.”13 Such pre-
sentiment of the untethering of social experience motivated plentiful reflec-
tions. Some authors refuted the thesis and appealed to a time of restoration.
Soon after the Spanish reconquest of New Granada in 1816, a royalist clergy-
man recalled in Bogotá’s cathedral the “horrific scenes of a dreadful and fatal
revolution, spreading like an electrical fire to burn most of our Americas.”14
These scenes, claimed the priest, “reveal to us a spectacle worthy of eternal
memory, so that our sons and successors are warned and forewarned of the in-
finite evils that, as a mighty whirlwind, have shaken and pushed us to the edge
of the abyss.”15 A momentary act of madness, the revolution had not affected
the capacity of the past to guide mankind in the present; men merely refused
to abide by it. The archbishop of Caracas, Narciso Coll y Prat, suggested in his
1818 report to King Ferdinand VII that “all things … have their time: there is a
time for speaking, and a time to remain silent.” For the archbishop those who
ignore their time and act without observing its circumstances “are useless to
the Church of God who, only in due time, sent his only son to teach the secrets
of the Divinity, and unite the peoples of the earth under one belief; harmful
to the State, whose destruction or preservation relies on time; unfit for pub-
lic business, and unfit for domestic business, for both of them are regulated
by time.”16 Coll y Prat’s passage purported to explain his behavior during the
revolution, when he, a fierce royalist, apparently collaborated with insurgents.
He claimed he was operating under the changing appearance of human events
but acted in accordance with the eternal “law of the Lord.”17 His reflection
referenced the third section of the book of Ecclesiastes—“There is a time for
everything, / and a season for every activity under the heavens”—a popular
biblical book of wisdom that speaks against vanity and the frailty of human
experience. For Coll y Prat the genre of history preserves and reproduces time
13. Ángel Cuervo and Rufino Cuervo, Vida de Rufino Cuervo y Noticias de su época, vol.
2 (Paris: A. Roger y F. Chernoviz, 1892), 286–287.
14. Antonio de León, Discurso político moral 1816 sobre la obediencia debida a los reyes y
males infinitos de la Insurrección de los pueblos (Santa fe, New Granada: Imprenta de Bruno
Espinosa, 1816), 3.
15. Ibid., 3.
16. Narciso Coll y Prat, “Exposición que al Rey de 1818,” Memoriales sobre la indepen-
dencia de Venezuela (Caracas: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1960), 111. Thanks to
Alexander Chaparro for bringing this passage to my attention. For Venezuela, see Francisco
José Virtuoso, La crisis de la catolicidad en los inicios republicanos de Venezuela (1810–1813)
(Caracas: Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 2001).
17. Ibid., 112. Coll y Prat continues: “What would become of the Province of Venezuela,
my Lord, if I had not worked in these circumstances, under the command of the insurgents
and, subsequently, under the command of those who administered it under the name of
Your Royal Highness?”
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By late 1818, Bolívar convened the Congress of Angostura with the objective
of designing a well-balanced constitution for the new republic.28 In his inaugu-
ral speech, he proposed an institutional design that could combine republican
liberty and legal equality with an effective moralization of society. This was
especially necessary because “[o]ur moral constitution had not attained yet the
necessary consistency to reap the benefits of a government entirely represen-
tative.”29 Due to this collective unpreparedness, “[m]orals and enlightenment
[must be] the poles of a republic; morals and enlightenment are our prime
necessities.”30 Along with the classical tenants of representative government,
Bolívar proposed the creation of a hereditary senate and a fourth power that
functioned as a “moral branch of government.” With regard to the latter, Bolí-
var said:
Let us take from Athens her Areopagus, and the guardians of customs and
laws; let us take from Rome her censors and domestic tribunals; and form-
ing a holy alliance of those useful [moral] institutions, let us revive on earth
the idea of a people which is not contented with being free and strong, but
wants also to be virtuous. Let us take from Sparta her austere institutions,
28. The Congress of Angostura, composed by delegates from Venezuela and New Granada,
congregated in the midst of the Independence War. Delegates agreed to meet again, when
circumstances permitted greater representation, and draft the constitution. The Congress
met again in Cucuta in 1821 and drafted the Constitution of the Republic of Colombia.
29. An Address of Bolívar at the Congress of Angostura, 24.
30. Ibid., 34.
and forming with these three springs a fountain of virtues, let us give our
republic a fourth power, having jurisdiction over childhood and the heart of
men, public spirit, good customs and republican morals.31
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Francisco A. Ortega
were raised against its rigorous nature, its religious undertones, and the fear
that it would turn into a despotic institution.38 An early critic recalled Ben-
jamin Constant’s distinction of the two freedoms and pointed out that our
modern liberties are not Rome’s.39 Today we require, above all, “[i]ndividual
security, personal guarantee, incompatible with the inquiries and investiga-
tions of the censors of Rome.”40 The critic singled out the unrealistic, intrusive,
and potentially abusive elements of the proposal. According to these critics the
Areopagus encroached on modern civil liberties, undermined representative
government, and exhibited very little regard for the distinction between pri-
vate and public.
Though Bolívar claimed he brought the institution of the moral power
from the “depths of obscure antiquity,” it is not difficult to see important affin-
ities with another of Constant’s contemporaneous formulation.41 In 1815 Con-
stant proposed in his Principes de politique the idea of a fourth power whose
main function was to moderate the relations among the executive, the legisla-
tive, and the judicial.42 For Constant, the fourth power was the attribute that,
in a constitutional monarchy, distinguished the powers of the king from those
of the executive. Divested of all practical functions, the royal or neutral power
remained distant from political struggles and became disinterested, so that
it could surveil and conciliate among the other public powers. Furthermore,
In our Constitution the President of the Republic becomes like the sun—
firmly set in the center and giving life to the universe. This supreme authority
must be perpetual because systems without hierarchies [such as democracy]
require more than others a fixed point around which magistrates and cit-
izens, men and things, revolve. Give me a fixed point, said a philosopher
from antiquity, and I will move the world. For Bolivia, this fixed point is the
President for life. Therein lies our entire order.43
Furthermore, both Bolívar’s moral power and Constant’s neutral power are of
a higher order than the three classical public powers; as Marcel Gauchet has
referred to them, they are metapowers, hierarchically superior, supplementary
powers that mediate between the sovereign people and its delegate powers.44
The need for these powers arises as a consequence of the apparent flimsiness of
representative institutions. As Bolívar wrote in 1828, when the authority “has
to look outside its own resources, and rely on others who should be subjected,”
it incurs a great contradiction because government must strive “to be the cen-
ter and the house of force” while accepting that the “origin of its movement
does not correspond to it.”45
However, whereas Constant’s neutral power moderated the excesses in-
herent to the political system, Bolívar´s moral power “is not concerned with
politics except in its relations with morality”; it concentrated on “acts consti-
tuting habits or customs,” its object of attention was “every political or social
body that could be demoralized,” and its objective was “to correct breaches
of custom.”46 Therefore, the moral branch of government went beyond poli-
tics and law insofar as its scope of action was not just “what may violate the
Constitution, but also whatever should infringe on public respect”; not just
what “is repugnant to customs but that which weakens them as well.”47 Bolí-
var’s proposal signaled a shift from the established language of individual citi-
zenship and republican virtues toward a sustained concern with private social
43. Proyecto de Constitución para la República de Bolivia y Discurso del Libertador (Lima:
Alejandro Valdés, 1826), 7.
44. Marcel Gauchet, La Révolution des pouvoirs: La souveraineté, le peuple et la représen-
tation, 1789–1799 (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 273–274.
45. “A los representantes del pueblo en la Convención Nacional,” April 1828, in Bolívar,
Doctrina del Libertador, 311.
46. “El proyecto para instituir un Poder Moral,” 151.
47. An Address of Bolívar at the Congress of Angostura, 35.
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Francisco A. Ortega
Bolívar’s effort to provide an institutional place for the fourth power illus-
trates the emergence of morality as an important sociopolitical concept of the
postrevolutionary period. The collapse of the Republic of Colombia in 1830
53. Bolívar, “A los representantes del pueblo, en la Convención nacional” (1828), in Bolí-
var, Doctrina del Libertador, 310.
54. “División del Magdalena del Ejercito de Colombia dirije una exposición a la gran
Convención de Ocaña sobre reformas constitucionales … ,” Cartagena, 25 February 1828.
In Germán Carrera Damas, ed., Materiales para el estudio de la cuestión agraria en Venezu-
ela, 1800–1830, vol. 1 (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela, 1964), document 299,
p. 499; emphasis added.
55. Bolívar, “A los representantes del Pueblo,” 263.
56. Ibid., 263.
57. Ibid., 310.
58. Proyecto de Constitución para la República de Bolivia, 15. For a detailed discussion,
see Guillermo Aveledo, “Republicanismo y Religión en Simón Bolívar (1812–1830),” Re-
vista de Investigaciones en Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades UKU PACHA 11, no. 18 (2014).
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Francisco A. Ortega
and the creation of the Republic of New Granada provided a new opportu-
nity for the development of strong, stable institutions that could reconcile lib-
erty with an orderly republic. The Constitution of 1832 rejected the idea of a
moral power and posited instead the preeminence of education as the main
public instrument to moralize the masses and ensure civility.59 The relative
peacefulness of the transition, the ability of the civilian faction to control the
military, and subsequent fair elections aroused, once again, a general sense
of optimism. A few years later, José Eusebio Caro (1817–1853), conservative
political philosopher, journalist, and poet from the Republic of New Granada,
reminisced about the decade:
Much of this was due to the fact that education “broadened its coverage, be-
came more reflective, more appropriate, and more accessible and easy,” as
enlightenment, according to Caro, trickled down to the inferior classes and
social progress seemed possible.61 As Caro wrote:
59. Francisco de Paula Santander, the elected president of New Granada, reinstated the
ambitious 1826 education law he had drafted as vice president of Colombia. The law sought
to educate citizens along intellectual, physical, and moral lines. See Jesús Alberto Echeverry
Sánchez, Santander y la instrucción pública, 1819–1840 (Bogotá: Foro Nacional por Colom-
bia, 1989).
60. José Eusebio Caro, El Granadino, 16 September 1842. For the intellectual background
of José Eusebio Caro, see Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, El pensamiento colombiano en el siglo XIX
(Mexico City and Bogotá: Alfaomega-CESO, 2001); Robert Henry Davis, “Acosta, Caro and
Lleras: Three Essayists and Their Views of New Granada’s National Problems, 1832–1853”
(PhD diss., Vanderbilt University, 1969). See also Simón Aljure Chalela, José Eusebio Caro:
Bibliografía (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1967).
61. Caro, El Granadino, 16 September 1842.
62. Ibid. A ruana is a Colombian woolen covering resembling a poncho.
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Francisco A. Ortega
Mechanics there are no rewards or punishments, and “the reader will find not a
single maxim about what actions should or should not be executed.”68
Instead, his science of morality undertook “[t]he description of actions in
the most general sense; the general description of the effects of each of these
actions, [and] … the analytical description of these facts,” with the goal of
arriving at a scientific understanding of the workings of human actions upon
each other and the collective.69 Chief among motivators was his perception
that New Granada was a society inhabited by “a huge pile of men in ceaseless
movement.” 70 Caro is indeed a thinker of movement: “Movement is life.”71 The
essay aimed to develop a science to calculate and classify human movement:
Let us go from the end of any city—Bogotá, for instance—to the other: let us
go from the Convent of San Diego to the new wares factory … In the most re-
mote streets, in the loneliest and marginal districts, it is difficult that one day
goes by, one hour, half an hour, a quarter of an hour goes by without a mov-
ing figure animating the scene, without man endowing the scene with life.72
Humans of all species, of all sexes, all ages, all conditions; white, Indian,
black, young, old, children, women, artisans, beggars, soldiers, monks, mer-
chants; humans of all faces, of all dresses, all sizes; men on foot, men on
horseback; in troops or separated, located in front or at the back, follow-
ing each other or merely meeting each other; all these humans, all this mad
whirl of humans, obstruct the exits and entrances, swarm the gates, stores
and street pavements; and cast from their bosom a sort of hoarse roar, similar
to that produced by the thick bubbling that bumps and jostles in a boiling
cauldron: they all move.74
In such actions, two elements enter in mathematical relation: mass and dis-
tance. In the moral world … the political strength of the cities must conquer
by means of time the obstacles of distance, … the nature of the terrain, bad
roads, the lack of vehicles, the diversity of languages, etc. But (and note this
well) the steamboat and the progresses of navigation and railways tend to
make barriers disappear … and lead us to near instantaneousness.77
75. Ibid., 155. Caro adds that all movement carries within itself the “vestiges of other
peoples’ indefatigable actions”; it bears the trace of another man’s action. Ibid., 134.
76. José Eusebio Caro, “Mecánica social: Algunas observaciones,” in Pombo, Obras es-
cogidas en prosa y verso, 201.
77. Ibid.
78. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1780),
reprinted with corrections in 1823. In 1821 Toribio Núñez translated the book and pub-
lished it in Salamanca as Principios de la ciencia social ó de las ciencias morales y políticas
(Salamanca: Imprenta Nueva, por don Bernardo Martin, 1821). By 1835, as Caro worked
on his Mecánica social, Toribio published a compendium of Bentham’s work under the title
Ciencia social según los principios de Bentham (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1835).
79. Charles Comte, Traite de legislation, ou exposition des lois generales suivant lesquelles
les peuples prosperent (Paris: A. Sautelet, 1826), 5. I quote from the 1836 Spanish translation
that Caro might have owned, Tratado de lejislación ó Esposición de las leyes jenerales con
arreglo a las cuales prosperan, decaen o se estancan los pueblos (Barcelona: Imprenta de don
Antonio Bergnes, 1836), 3. Carlos Gélvez Higuera has shed light on the relationship of Caro
with Comte. See Carlos Rubén Gélvez Higuera, “José Eusebio Caro y La mecánica social:
El liberalismo de un conservador” (PhD diss., Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2011),
32–34. I stand corrected by his observations.
80. José Eusebio Caro, “Sobre el principio utilitario,” El Granadino, no. 14, 23 October
1842; emphasis in original.
The revolution came and everything disappeared, like smoke … Wealth dis-
sipated, bankruptcies multiplied, professions were interrupted, the bloom-
ing youth was mown during the war, schools and colleges closed, everyone
became a soldier, the country was militarized, the Republic became an im-
mense barrack. During the war all progress ceased … ; and, after victory, the
holy cause of liberty was almost discredited and our national pride … has
been lost entirely.81
War left in its wake rampant crime, lack of respect, and constant social unrest.
In contrast with earlier prospects, New Granadans now faced “extreme public
and private misery. Government, unable to provide for ordinary expenses, was
reduced to request a loan of one hundred to two hundred thousand pesos,
offering to pay interest of up to 2 percent monthly.”82
In a letter to the president published in a prominent newspaper, Caro de-
scribed the country as a den of thieves who appealed to demagogy to achieve
their selfish goals. Caro, who fought alongside government troops, blamed the
war on power-hungry firebrands who manipulated people by inflating their
aspirations. Such callous disregard for the public good threatened the political
system and led to riots and civil unrest. But these demagogues had been suc-
cessful because of the general state of immorality of New Granadans. For Caro,
it was clear that as long as society remained ignorant, politics was vulnerable
to agitators and destined to destabilize the country. Once again, the image
of an unhinged society haunted commentators. Minister of Interior Lino de
Pombo pleaded in 1843 to “throw the anchor down to stop this damned revo-
lutionary voyage in which we embarked thirty years ago.”83
In such conditions scientific moral laws could not moor Spanish Amer-
ican republics. These societies were not only in movement; they also sat on
flimsy bases. In fact, argued Caro, New Granada was still in a state of gesta-
tion, “not yet even an embryo because it still finds itself in a chaotic state; just
beginning to organize.”84 A rigorous description of such an embryonic state
would not find an immovable principle. Furthermore, fighting for survival and
civilization—or rather, for the survival of civilization—required more than
the undaunted truths of science. In a well-known essay published in 1842,
Caro corrected himself and insisted that morality was not a science but a fun-
damental principle: “In true sciences, such as natural sciences and political
economy, one studies facts that can be observed in isolation, and the more
one collects observations, the more sciences advance.” Unlike them, in mo-
rality “one does not study facts but searches for a prior principle that qualifies
them.”85 Caro’s abandonment of scientific certainty forced him to declare that
there is “no more moral doctrine than the Gospel nor more moral law than
the Decalogue.”86
For Caro there were only two remedies, “either to withdraw from the dem-
ocratic government or these societies must acquire the public and private vir-
tues necessary to cope with freedom.”87 However, to withdraw from democracy
does not seem feasible: “[R]eason finds that monarchy … [and aristocracy] are
terribly inconvenient.”88 The monarchical “government is too lavish, too expen-
sive, and particularly fatal for countries that are new, poor and depopulated.”89
Furthermore, democracy is inevitable; all of the “peoples of the world move,
in a more or less regulated movement, more or less accelerated, toward dem-
ocratic freedom”; such “unstoppable movement naturally happens” through
trade, navigation, and printing.90 It is an expectation that cannot be denied. In
fact, the moral task of any government is to institute democracy:
To gradually call the people who have never exercised sovereignty into its ex-
ercise; to set up institutions that could teach them how to proceed; to put on
their hands the instruments so that they learn how to handle it; to shape their
customs and provide them with action; to strengthen their religious principle
… ; to place in the hands of the majority the real, truthful, permanent and
prevailing power, which today is found nowhere, and whose lack has led us
to anarchy.91
But, as we have seen, democracy is difficult and dangerous. Let us briefly re-
call Bolívar’s view of the republic as institutionally unfinished and Colombians
as ill-prepared citizens. For him morality was a precondition for political life
and hence the Areopagus. In 1845 Caro produced a similar diagnosis: “[I]n
Spanish America … public powers lack something that forces us to appoint
swordsmen as presidents.”92 By then the fourth moral power was no longer
The newspaper explained in its first issues that it sought to “promote and
defend the civilization in New Granada and the whole of South America.”
Caro defined civilization as “the ensemble of all kinds of resources that hu-
mans have accumulated for their perfection and happiness.”96 According to
him the means available to civilization are instruction, wealth, and morality.
Of the three, morality stands out as the only one that is absolute. One could
be more or less wealthy or more or less educated, but a rich and educated man
can still be a Robespierre or Marat. “This man will be a barbarian and of the
worst kind.”97 An enlightened nation, like France at the end of the eighteenth
century, sunk into chaos and anarchy. There was no intermediate state in mo-
rality. People are moral or immoral, and this condition determines the true
state of a civilized nation.98 Only morality offered New Granadans the guar-
antee to advance on the path toward material, social, and political progress.
Thus, only the work of morality, the constant working on domestic virtues, as
a supplement to government and a requirement for citizenship, smoothed the
path toward civilization. As Caro argued, morality “strengthens instincts of
sociability, founds wealth and well-being, condemns slavery and oppression;
proscribes tyranny and violence; sows the seeds and favors the growth of all
virtues.”99
If Liberals—or Reds, as Conservatives called them—agitated for politi-
cal enfranchisement, Caro and his comrades insisted that the dispute was
not political but moral. As Caro claimed, by adopting the republican form,
the political question was already solved: “[E]njoying, as we enjoy universal
FREEDOM, under a republican constitution, the question cannot be other
than the MORAL ISSUE, that is, the question of how the parties use FREE-
DOM.”100 Consequently, for Caro “[t]he big question … is how to moralize the
people,” how to prepare them for the political institutions they have adopted.101
It is a specifically Spanish American concern, since in countries like England
or the United States political disagreements were made possible because of the
prevailing moral consensus among the members of these societies. Instead,
Caro writes, the observer “finds that what separates political parties in Vene-
zuela and New Granada” is not a matter of opinion on how to proceed within
established institutions; here the dispute itself “is the moral issue, the question
of public policy, the question of the means ambition may legitimately utilize
[in order to achieve its goals], the personal animosities that have as source
96. José Eusebio Caro, “¿Qué es la civilización?” La Civilización, no. 1, 9 August 1849.
97. Caro, “La cuestión moral.”
98. Ibid.
99. Caro, “¿Qué es la civilización?”
100. Caro, “La polémica de los rojos,” La Civilización, no. 7, 20 September 1849.
101. Caro, “La cuestión moral.”
and motive the moral question.”102 Therefore, “the struggle is between security
and violence, order and disorder, the peaceful and loyal government against
mutiny and uprisings. The struggle is between voting with words and voting
with daggers.”103
The fiery language fashioned asymmetrical counterconcepts: “The oppo-
site of civilization and morality is immorality and barbarism.” Such language
did not seek nor admit moderation; it sought the annihilation of the other: the
end of the “Red Party.” As stated by Caro, the political existence of the Lib-
eral Party “is incompatible with freedom, with order, peace; and this fight will
continue, because the Conservative Party is as immortal as morality itself, and
the Red Party should disappear as crime and license.”104 Political parties were
above all moral forces that either acted in favor of order and self-preservation
or became agents of anarchy and disintegration. Clearly, more than political
conflicts, what took place in New Granada was a civilizational confrontation.
The editors of La Civilización proposed three strategies to moralize soci-
ety: strong repressive government, mandatory education, and reliance on the
church to reach all sectors of society. “To govern, to preach, to educate: here
it is the means, the power, the very weaponry of civilization.”105 Accordingly,
a republican democratic government must be ready to permanently repress
evil through the application of material punishment to crime.106 Furthermore,
authorities have to take into account that man is weak, eminently corruptible,
and inclined to vice; he needs to be led, even forced to comply. From this point
of view, repression is a defense of the possibility of justice and is justice at the
same time. Because, as Caro writes, “without God and without moral repres-
sion, what is left for the ignorant multitude?”107
However, repression alone is despotism. That is why strong authority
should be combined with a mandate to extend elementary public popular edu-
cation nationwide.108 The main goals of public education were to secure a solid
morality, to learn the necessary skills to prosper and progress, and to acquire
the basic understanding of a citizen’s rights and responsibilities. Caro was
fond of employing the metaphor of the republic as an immense schoolroom:
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. José Eusebio Caro, “La libertad i el Partido Conservador,” La Civilización, no. 5, 6
September 1849.
105. Caro, “La cuestión moral.”
106. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
108. Caro produced several reports on education and frequently presented projects to
better the country’s educational system. See, for instance, “Sobre la educación pública en
la Nueva Granada” (1840) and “Informe sobre la instrucción pública” (ca. 1843), both in
Pombo, Obras escogidas.
“Give us a serious teacher, a strong government that can maintain order while
the people learn, and when the critical time of elections comes, it has enough
strength to prevent revolutions and save the homeland!”109 Finally, Caro envi-
sioned a protagonist role for the Catholic Church as the main agent of social
moralization in the country: whether the archbishop of Bogotá as the great
patron of the Catholic Church; the Jesuits administering missions in remote
areas of the country, providing frequent confession in the cities, or administer-
ing the education of children;110 or regular priests in charge of the country’s re-
ligious and moral education.111 Only with these three strategies, thought Caro,
could the moral chasm that threatened to rip the country apart be mended;
only then would compliance with the law be the result of personal choice.
Only then would the precariousness of republican historical time cease.
Behind the fragile republic dwells the possibility of a republic founded on true
moral law; behind the precarious experience of the republic there is everlast-
ing time. Private and public virtues harmoniously comingle and produce a
Catholic vivere civile. The subject of time, precarious and eternal, occupied
Caro throughout his life and became a dominant theme during the last decade
of his life (1843–1853): “Oh time! Only God knows your dark secret.”112 It is in
his poetry, more than anywhere else, where Caro elaborated an explicit notion
of eternal time that could, at times, constitute a denial of earthly life:
the differences between tongues and nations will disappear, as well as hand
laborers, for they all will become businessmen [as] machines will do all
human labor. Menial workers will disappear and instead the modern engi-
neer will emerge, that is, the intelligent man responsible for commanding
machines, the man who is the living and prophetic announcement of all the
laborers of the world.115
These words were not simply inspired by the possibilities of technological de-
velopment. More importantly, they were written at a time when conflict be-
tween artisans and patricians was at its peak and civil war seemed inevitable.
114. As in, for instance, the unfinished philosophical poem “La bendición nupcial” (ca.
1843–1846), which Caro considered to be his greatest poetic creation.
115. Quoted from Uribe, Pensamiento, 155–156.