JUDICIAL

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963 validity of the donation, the same must be litigated
not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil
action.
DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of
the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted heirs,
namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
AL., petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES, namely: approved by this Honorable Court, without
FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
AL., respondents. prove their case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on
Instance of Bulacan holding that the probate court in Special their part, argued that the deed of donation itself
Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of was determinative of the original conjugal character
the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the question to the properties, aside from the legal presumption
of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein. laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that
since the donation was null and void the deceased
Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the
his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it
Court of Appeals as follows:
in his will.

Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband

On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the
and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958 and a
Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an order
testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate
declaring the donation void without making any
was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of
specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is,
Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on
whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the
October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor
reason that, considered under the first category, it
of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and
falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which
Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and Arturo,
prohibits donations between spouses during the
Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo.
marriage; and considered under the second
Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959.
category, it does not comply with the formalities of a
Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of
will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article
the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was
805 of the same Code, there being no attestation
substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate
clause. In the same order the court disapproved both
heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and
projects of partition and directed the executor to file
Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia,
another," dividing the property mentioned in the
Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio
Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of
partition in the testate proceeding in accordance the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the
with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the
Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with said properties were conjugal properties of the
the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the
alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and
On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition emphasizing the contention previously raised in
to the executor's project of partition and submitted a their memorandum that the probate court had no
counter-project of partition of their own, claiming jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the
1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the
deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili
belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal and taking exception to the court's declaration of the
partnership of the spouses. nullity of the donation "without stating facts or
provision of law on which it was based." The motion
for new trial was denied in an order dated October
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24,
3, 1960.
1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively, set the
two projects of partition for hearing, at which
evidence was presented by the parties, followed by On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from
the submission of memoranda discussing certain being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition for review
legal issues. In the memorandum for the executor by certiorari.
and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that
the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court
Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not
erred in not declaring that the probate court, having limited
to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena
and special jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate
Reyes had donated to him her half share of such
title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.
partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs of
Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or
grounds to question the validity of the donation; and In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a
(3) that even assuming that they could question the general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed

Page 1 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

upon on testate or intestate proceedings,"1 except where one of husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the
the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to
inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the
pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his
final determination in a separate action.2 However, we have heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of
also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by
deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the
question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are
probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the
Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-
and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the
property under judicial administration may be taken conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be
cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being
proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and,
prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232). consequently, it complies with the requirement of the
exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the
widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the
the testator.
trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in upholding
the power of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the
testate proceedings, the question as to whether the properties Petitioners contend additionally that they have never
herein involved belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court,
Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband for the purpose of the determination of the question of
exclusively? ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the
admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were
the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a
questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The
question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by appellants
respondents, as representatives or substitutes of the deceased
that the trial court had completely no authority to pass upon
widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another.
the title to the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the
As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be
subject is null and void and does not bind even those who had
deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same
invoked its authority and submitted to its decision because, it
proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to insist,
is contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an
as they do, on the approval of their project of partition and,
action can not vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants'
thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to
contention is correct, then there can be no exception to the no-
the character of the properties is correct, entirely without
jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the case
regard to the opposition of the respondents". In other words,
of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking
by presenting their project of partition including therein the
through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: "Determination of title to
disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the
property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.
wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the
The responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court
question of ownership of the properties — which is well within
lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of
the competence of the probate court — and just because of an
the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure,
opposition thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either
which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal
their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court.
rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an independent
Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise
ordinary action) which may be waived". Strictly speaking, it is
the objection are the ones who set the court in motion.5 They
more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not over the
can not be permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing,
subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies
adjudges question against them.6
between heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of
properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized
to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are
of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties
and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not
Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the
and payment of all the debts and expenses.3 Thereafter, inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also
distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried
the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require
nature of an action of partition, in which each party is required that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of
to bring into the mass whatever community property he has in the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs
his possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the the act constituting estoppel, because silence without
interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the knowledge works no estoppel.7 In the present case, the
ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take deceased widow acted as she did because of the deed of
part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing
court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if
incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the required
so long as no interests of third parties are affected.4 formalities similar to a will.

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in
question of ownership of certain of the properties involved — accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs
whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the against appellants. So ordered.

Page 2 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65

assailing an order dated 24 January 1991 issued by herein
[G.R. No. 102126. March 12, 1993.] respondent presiding judge-designate Bethel Katalbas-
Moscardon of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch
ANGELICA LEDESMA, Petitioner, v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF 51 which considered the supplemental action for partition
CIPRIANO PEDROSA represented by Nelson Jimena, (after annulment of the marriage) as terminated due to the
Honorable Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon in her death of one of the spouses (husband) and the pendency of
capacity as Presiding Judge-Designate, Branch 51, RTC, intestate proceedings over his estate.
Bacolod City, Respondents.
Petitioner Angelica Ledesma’s marriage to Cipriano Pedrosa
Hector P. Teodosio of Defensor and Teodocio Law Office was declared a nullity by the Regional Trial Court of Negros
for Petitioner. Occidental, Branch 51 on 8 February 1984 in Civil Case No.
1446. 1 The dispositive portion of the order annulling the
Edmundo G. Manlapao for Private Respondent. marriage also provided thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . that the properties acquired by plaintiff Cipriano Pedrosa
SYLLABUS and defendant Angelica Ledesma at the time they were living
together as common-law husband and wife is (sic) owned by
them as co-owners to be governed by the provision on co-
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; FINAL DISPOSITION OF ownership of the civil code; that the properties acquired by
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS, A MERE INCIDENT TO plaintiff and defendant after their marriage was solemnized on
LEGAL SEPARATION. — On the finality of the judgment March 25, 1965, which was annulled by this Court in the
decreeing the spouses’ legal separation as of January 4, 1973, above-entitled proceeding, forms (sic) part of the conjugal
the remaining issue for Our resolution is the final disposition of partnership and upon dissolution of the marriage, to be
their conjugal partnership of gains which partnership, by liquidated in accordance with the provision of the civil code." 2
reason of the final decree, had been automatically dissolved.
The law (Article 106, 107 of the Civil Code) clearly spells out Surprisingly it took some time before the next order
the effects of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal implementing the above disposition was issued on 4 May 1989,
property. The death on November 30, 1979 of herein petitioner the pertinent part of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
who was declared the guilty spouse by the trial court, before
the liquidation of the conjugal property is effected, poses a new ". . . It appearing from the records that the court has to verify
problem which can be resolved simply by the application of the and determine the correct inventory of the properties of
rules on intestate succession with respect to the properties of Cipriano Pedrosa and Angelica Ledesma, the parties, including
the deceased petitioner. Thus, the rules on dissolution and the receiver, through their respective attorneys, are ordered to
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains under the submit their respective inventory, if one has not been
aforecited provisions of the Civil Code would be applied submitted yet, before June 1, 1989. . . ." 3
effective January 4, 1973 when the decree of legal separation
became final. Upon the liquidation and distribution Pending receipt by the court of the ordered inventory, Cipriano
conformably with the law governing the effects of the final Pedrosa died. A separate petition for the probate of his last will
decree of legal separation, the law on intestate succession and testament was filed. 4 Nelson Jimena was named executor
should take over in the disposition of whatever remaining and substituted Pedrosa in the partition proceedings (Civil
properties have been allocated to petitioner. This procedure Case No. 1446).chanrobles.com : virtual law library
involves details which properly pertain to the lower court. The
properties that may be allocated to the deceased petitioner by Due to disagreement of the parties on the characterization of
virtue of the liquidation of the conjugal assets, shall be the properties, the court in the partition proceedings ordered
distributed in accordance with the laws of intestate succession (30 March 1990) the submission of comments, objections and
in Special Proceedings No. 134. (Macadangdang v. Court of manifestations on the project of partition submitted by the
Appeals, G.R. No. L-38287, October 23, 1981) parties. During a lull in the proceedings, the presiding judge
also passed away. On 24 January 1991 the following now-
2. ID.; ID.; FINAL DISPOSITION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP questioned order was issued by the herein respondent
OF GAIN, INCIDENTAL TO AN ANNULMENT CASE. — The presiding judge-designate who took
Macadangdang decision involved legal separation but, with over:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
equal reason, the doctrine enunciated therein should be
applied to a marriage annulment which is the situation at bar. "It is informed by Atty. Pio Villoso that insofar as the status of
The respondent presiding judge is directed to decide the this case is concerned, the plaintiff who has long been dead,
partition (liquidation) case (Civil Case No. 1446) within thirty was substituted by the administrator, now the plaintiff Nelson
(30) days from receipt of notice of this decision to determine Jimena, and Atty. Vicente Sabornay, as the receiver.
which of the properties of the conjugal partnership should be Furthermore, the judgment as to the annulment of the
adjudicated to the husband and the wife. This is but a marriage had already been rendered partially by then
consequence or incident of its decision rendered in the same Presiding Judge Quirino Abad Santos, Jr., on February 8, 1984.
case annulling the marriage. What is being litigated here by the parties affects the property
division to dissolve the partnership. However, the plaintiff died
and an intestate proceeding is now pending before Branch 43
D E C I S I O N whereby the said Nelson Jimena was actually the appointed
administrator, and who was substituted as plaintiff in this
case.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
PADILLA, J.:
With all these informations, and considering the nature of the
action, the Court finds the substitution of the original plaintiff

Page 3 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

improper, as the defendant herein can pursue her claim over determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal
the properties before the intestate proceedings being assets.chanrobles law library
instituted. Action for intervention in order that the judgment in
this particular proceeding can be implemented, can be raised x x x."cralaw virtua1aw library
in the intestate Court. Likewise, the appointment of the
receiver conflicts with that of the judicial administrator ". . ., the decision of the trial court dated January 4, 1973
considering that with the filing of the intestate case, the decreeing the legal separation between then spouses Antonio
properties of the deceased plaintiff are in custodia legis and Macadangdang and Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang had long
this Court losses jurisdiction in determining further the become final and executory and the division of the conjugal
distribution of the properties. property in a ‘supplemental decision’ is a mere incident of the
decree of legal separation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In view of the above, without prejudice to the defendant’s right
to file as intervenor in the intestate proceedings with the Since We have ruled on the finality of the judgment decreeing
judgment annuling the marriage, the proceedings becomes the spouses’ legal separation as of January 4, 1973, the
moot and academic with the pendency of the intestate remaining issue for Our resolution is the final disposition of
proceeding before Branch 43. This case is therefore deemed their conjugal partnership of gains which partnership, by
TERMINATED." 5 reason of the final decree, had been automatically dissolved.
The law (Article 106, 107 of the Civil Code) clearly spells out
With the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration by the effects of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal
the respondent court, this special civil action was initiated. property.

Petitioner argues that respondent judge reneged in the The death on November 30, 1979 of herein petitioner who was
performance of a lawful duty when she refrained from declared the guilty spouse by the trial court, before the
rendering a decision in the partition case (Civil Case No. 1446) liquidation of the conjugal property is effected, poses a new
and considered the same closed and terminated, due to the problem which can be resolved simply by the application of the
pendency of intestate proceedings over the deceased rules on intestate succession with respect to the properties of
husband’s estate (Sp. Proc. No. 4159). 6 It is likewise the deceased petitioner.
erroneous, petitioner contends, to rule that petitioner’s remedy
is a motion for intervention in said intestate proceedings to Thus, the rules on dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
implement judgment in the marriage-annulment case, since partnership of gains under the aforecited provisions of the Civil
petitioner has already presented all her evidence in the Code would be applied effective January 4, 1973 when the
annulment case to prove which properties acquired during the decree of legal separation became final. Upon the liquidation
marriage pertain to her. and distribution conformably with the law governing the
effects of the final decree of legal separation, the law on
The case of Macadangdang v. Court of Appeals, 7 where a intestate succession should take over in the disposition of
similar issue was involved — the husband having died after the whatever remaining properties have been allocated to
legal separation of the spouses had been finally decreed but petitioner. This procedure involves details which properly
before the actual liquidation of their community of properties pertain to the lower court.
— is on point. The Court therein said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
The properties that may be allocated to the deceased
"WE do not find merit in petitioner’s submission that the petitioner by virtue of the liquidation of the conjugal
questioned decision had not become final and executory since assets, shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of
the law explicitly and clearly provides for the dissolution and intestate succession in Special Proceedings No. 134."cralaw
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute virtua1aw library
community of property as among the effects of the final decree
of legal separation. Article 106 of the Civil Code thus The Macadangdang decision involved legal separation but, with
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library equal reason, the doctrine enunciated therein should be
applied to a marriage annulment which is the situation at bar.
‘ARTICLE 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the The respondent presiding judge is directed to decide the
following effects:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library partition (liquidation) case (Civil Case No, 1446) within thirty
(30) days from receipt of notice of this decision to determine
1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each which of the properties of the conjugal partnership should be
other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; adjudicated to the husband and the wife. This is but a
consequence or incident of its decision rendered in the
2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal same case annulling the marriage. Petitioner’s letters to the
community of property shall be dissolved and liquidated, but Court indicate that she is seventy (70) years of age and the
the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the prolonged action for partition (liquidation) has taken a toll on
profits earned by the partnership or community, without her resources. Justice and equity demand the disposition of her
prejudice to the provisions of Article 176; case with dispatch. Any properties that may be adjudicated to
the deceased husband Pedrosa can then be distributed in
x x x’ accordance with his last will and testament in the special
proceedings involving his estate (Sp. Proc. No. 4159).
The aforequoted provision mandates the dissolution and
liquidation of the property regime of the spouses upon finality ACCORDINGLY, the respondent Judge’s order dated 24 January
of the decree of legal separation. Such dissolution and 1991 considering Civil Case No. 1446 closed and terminated
liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. for being moot and academic is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
This legal effect of the decree of legal separation ipso facto or Respondent Judge or whoever may have succeeded her is
automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of, the ordered to decide said action for partition (liquidation) within
judgment decreeing legal separation for the purpose of thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision.chanrobles virtual

Page 4 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

lawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Page 5 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner
raises the following issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an
estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes
VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner, vs. THE
of administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial administration
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA
proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the
NAGAC, respondents.
decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be appointed as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the surviving
GANCAYCO, J.: spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita
Pereira Nagac?
Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the
decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts? Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no
estate of the deceased for purposes of administration for the
following reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA,
May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the
PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole
deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased
beneficiary and in support of this claim she submitted letter-
instead of the surviving spouse?
replies from these institutions showing that she is the exclusive
beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings
These are the main questions which need to be resolved in this deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB
case. and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as
supported by several receipts; and, finally, the only real
property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air
between the petitioner and the private respondent as the only
Lines, passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite
surviving heirs of the deceased.
without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten
months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his
sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent. Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for
petitioner to decide what properties form part of the
estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself.
On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch
She points out that this function is vested in the court in
19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special
charge of the intestate proceedings.
Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the
deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1 In her verified petition, Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties
private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria specified do not belong to the estate of the deceased on the
Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful of
that the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We
deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-
death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the
Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings deceased. 5
and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security
System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court
National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and
before which the administration proceedings are pending. The
Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at
trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the
Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the
discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the
spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in
decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the
London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary
transferees of some of the assets, if any. 6 The function of
forms part of the estate of the deceased.
resolving whether or not a certain property should be included
in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion administrator is one clearly within the competence of the
to dismiss the petition of private respondent 2 alleging that probate court. However, the court's determination is only
there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the
administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by
does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said the parties.7
estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.
Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased
In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We
Court, appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by
administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by
Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. petitioner for the reasons herein below discussed.
The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and
personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property,
thereof within three months after receipt of the order. 3
the same should be judicially administered and the competent
court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no
brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an
affirmed the appointment of private respondent as executor therein. 8 An exception to this rule is established in
administratrix in its decision dated December 15, 1987. 4 Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs
are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate,

Page 6 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

they may agree in writing to partition the property without wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his
instituting the judicial administration or applying for the being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter.15
appointment of an administrator.
We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a
not preclude the heirs from instituting administration sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of
proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these
they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason
action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is
the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the
an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed
different course of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a
an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial
sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the
to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to
or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an be substantial especially since the only real property left has
administration proceeding without good and compelling been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding
reasons. 11 for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the
risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a
similar nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies
left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple
without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to
are protected in any event.
a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to
apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It
has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the
administration and the appointment of an administrator are administration proceedings are pending was not justified in
superfluous and unnecessary proceedings . 12 issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason
for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial
proceeding.
administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are
all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the
circumstances of each case. With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into
the issue of who, as between the surviving spouse Victoria
Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be
In one case, 13 We said:
preferred to be appointed as administratrix.

Again the petitioner argues that only

WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the
when the heirs do not have any dispute as
Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby
to the bulk of the hereditary estate but
revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without
only in the manner of partition does
prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a
section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
new action for partition of the property left by Andres de
apply and that in this case the parties are
Guzman Pereira. No costs.
at loggerheads as to the corpus of the
hereditary estate because respondents
succeeded in sequestering some assets of SO ORDERED.
the intestate. The argument is
unconvincing, because, as the respondent

judge has indicated, questions as to what
property belonged to the deceased (and
therefore to the heirs) may properly be
ventilated in the partition proceedings,
especially where such property is in the
hands of one heir.

In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an

appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity
of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask
for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same
objective could be achieved in an action for partition and the
trial court is not justified in issuing letters of
administration. 14 In still another case, We did not find so
powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the
husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as
judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have
legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his

Page 7 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

G.R. No. 75773 April 17, 1990 examining the witnesses of Leonardo, presented no evidence of
her own, oral or documentary.
TOMAS JIMENEZ, VISITACION JIMENEZ, DIGNO JIMENEZ,
ANTONIO JIMENEZ, AMADEO JIMENEZ, MODESTO JIMENEZ On September 29, 1981, the probate court ordered the
and VIRGINIA JIMENEZ, petitioners, exclusion of the five (5) parcels of land from the inventory on
vs. the basis of the evidence of private respondent Leonardo
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. Jimenez, Jr. which consisted among others of: (1) Tax
AMANDA VALERA-CABIGAO, in her capacity as Presiding Declaration showing that the subject properties were acquired
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXVII, Lingayen, during the conjugal partnership of Lino Jimenez and
Pangasinan, LEONARDO JIMENEZ, JR. and CORAZON Consolacion Ungson; and, (2) a Deed of Sale dated May 12,
JIMENEZ, respondents. 1964 wherein Genoveva Caolboy stated, that the subject
properties had been adjudicated by Lino Jimenez to his
children by a previous marriage, namely: Alberto, Leonardo,
FERNAN, CJ.:
Alejandra and Angeles.5 The motion for reconsideration of said
order was denied on January 26, 1982.6
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse
and set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May
Petitioner Virginia Jimenez then went to the Court of Appeals
29, 1986 which dismissed the petition
on a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed thereat as
for certiorari and mandamus in AC-G.R. No. 06578 entitled
CA-G.R. No. SP-13916, seeking the annulment of the order
"Tomas Jimenez, et. al. vs. Hon. Amanda Valera-Cabigao."
dated September 29, 1981 as well as the order of January 26,
1982. On November 18, 1982, the Court of Appeals dismissed
The facts are as follows: the petition because (1) Genoveva Caolboy, petitioners'
mother, had admitted that the subject parcels of land had been
adjudicated to the children of the previous nuptial; (2) the
The marriage of Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez and Consolacion
subject properties could not have been acquired during the
Ungson produced four (4) children, namely: Alberto, Leonardo,
marriage of Lino Jimenez to Genoveva Caolboy because they
Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During the existence of the
were already titled in the name of Lino Jimenez even prior to
marriage, Lino Jimenez acquired five (5) parcels of land in
1921, long before Lino's marriage to Genoveva in 1940; (3) the
Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.
claim of Virginia Jimenez was barred by prescription because it
was only in 1981 when they questioned the adjudication of the
After the death of Consolacion Ungson, Lino married Genoveva subject properties, more than ten (10) years after Genoveva
Caolboy with whom he begot the seven petitioners herein: had admitted such adjudication in a public document in 1964;
Tomas, Visitacion, Digno, Antonio, Amadeo, Modesto and and, (4) petitioner Virginia Jimenez was guilty of laches. This
Virginia, all surnamed Jimenez. Lino Jimenez died on August decision became final and executory.7
11, 1951 while Genoveva Caolboy died on November 21, 1978.
Two (2) years after, petitioners filed an amended complaint
Thereafter, in April 1979, Virginia Jimenez filed a petition dated December 10, 1984 before the Regional Trial Court of
before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII, docketed thereat as Civil Case No.
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 5346, praying to be 16111, to recover possession/ownership of the subject five (5)
appointed as administratrix of the properties of the deceased parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino Jimenez and
spouses Lino and Genoveva. Enumerated in her petition were Genoveva Caolboy and to order private respondents to render
the supposed heirs of the deceased spouses which included an accounting of the produce therefrom. Private respondents
herein co-petitioners and the four children of Lino Jimenez by moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that
Consolacion Ungson, his previous wife.2 the action was barred by prior judgment in CA-G.R. No. SP-
13916 dated November 18, 1982 and by prescription and
laches. However, petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss
In October, 1979, herein private respondent Leonardo Jimenez,
contending that (1) the action was not barred by prior
Jr., son of Leonardo Jimenez, Sr., filed a motion for the
judgment because the probate court had no jurisdiction to
exclusion of his father's name and those of Alberto, Alejandra,
determine with finality the question of ownership of the lots
and Angeles from the petition, inasmuch as they are children of
which must be ventilated in a separate action; and, (2) the
the union of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson and not of
action instituted in 1981 was not barred by prescription or
Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and because they have
laches because private respondents' forcible acquisition of the
already received their inheritance consisting of five (5) parcels
subject properties occurred only after the death of petitioners'
of lands in Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan.3
mother, Genoveva Caolboy in 1978.

On March 23, 1981, petitioner Virginia Jimenez was appointed

On February 13, 1985, the trial court resolved to dismiss the
administrator of the Intestate Estate of Lino Jimenez and
complaint on the ground of res judicata. 8 On May 31, 1985,
Genoveva Caolboy.4 On May 21, 1981, she filed an inventory of
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the resolution was
the estate of the spouses Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy
denied. As earlier intimated, the petition
wherein she included the five (5) parcels of land in Salomague,
for certiorari and mandamus filed by petitioners before the
Bugallon, Pangasinan. As a consequence, Leonardo Jimenez, Jr.
appellate court was likewise denied due course and dismissed
moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventory
in a decision dated May 29, 1986.9
on the ground that these had already been adjudicated to
Leonardo Sr., Alberto, Alejandra and Angeles by their deceased
father Lino Jimenez. Private respondent Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. Hence, this recourse.
presented testimonial and documentary evidence in support of
his motion while petitioner Virginia Jimenez, other than cross-

Page 8 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

The issue in this case is whether in a settlement proceeding Jimenez, Sr. (referring to private respondents,) forcibly
(testate or intestate) the lower court has jurisdiction to settle intruded into and took possession of the disputed properties
questions of ownership and whether res judicata exists as to only in 1978, after the death of Genoveva Caolboy. Since the
bar petitioners' present action for the recovery of possession action for reconveyance was instituted in 1984, it would
and ownership of the five (5) parcels of land. In the negative, is appear that the same has not yet prescribed or otherwise
the present action for reconveyance barred by prescription barred by laches.
and/or laches?
There are a number of factual issues raised by petitioners
We reverse. Petitioners' present action for recovery of before the lower court which cannot be resolved without the
possession and ownership is appropriately filed because as a presentation of evidence at a full-blown trial and which make
general rule, a probate court can only pass upon questions of the grounds for dismissal dubitable. Among others, the alleged
title provisionally. Since the probate, court's findings are not admission made by petitioners' mother in the deed of sale is
conclusive being prima facie, a separate proceeding is vehemently denied, as well as the fact itself of adjudication,
necessary to establish the ownership of the five (5) parcels of there being no showing that the conjugal partnership of Lino
land. 11 Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson had been liquidated nor that
a judicial or extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Lino
Jimenez was undertaken whereby such adjudication could
The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction
have been effected.
and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which
result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the
property, can only be settled in a separate action. The grounds stated in the motion to dismiss not being
indubitable, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 16111.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is
determine whether they should or should not be included in
the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent
administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then appellate court is hereby REVERSED. Civil Case No. 16111 is
the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an reinstated and the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting XXXVII is directed to proceed in said case with dispatch.
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
SO ORDERED.
The provisional character of the inclusion in the inventory of a
contested property was again reiterated in the following cases:

Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 14 Junquera vs. Borromeo, 15 Borromeo vs.
Canonoy, 16 Recto vs. de la Rosa. 17 It has also been held that in
a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court
cannot resolve with finality. 18 This pronouncement no doubt
applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the
case at bar.

Res judicata does not exist because of the difference in the

causes of actions. Specifically in S.P. No. 5346, the action was
for the settlement of the intestate estate of Lino Jimenez and
Genoveva Caolboy while Civil Case No. 16111 was an action for
the recovery of possession and ownership of the five (5)
parcels of land. Moreover, while admittedly, the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V in S.P. No. 5346 had
jurisdiction, the same was merely limited jurisdiction. Any
pronouncement by said court as to title is not conclusive and
could still be attacked in a separate proceeding. Civil Case No.
16111, on the other hand. was lodged before the Regional Trial
Court of Pangasinan, Branch XXXVII in the exercise of the
court's general jurisdiction. It was, in fact, such "separate or
ordinary proceedings" contemplated by the rules for a final
determination of the issue of ownership of the disputed
properties. To repeat, since the determination of the question
of title to the subject properties in S.P. 5346 was merely
provisional, petitioners are not barred from instituting the
appropriate action in Civil Case No. 16111.

Indeed, the grounds relied upon by private respondents in

their motion to dismiss do not appear to be
indubitable.1âwphi1Res judicata has been shown here to be
unavailable and the other grounds of prescription and laches
pleaded by private respondents are seriously disputed. The
allegation in the complaint is that the heirs of Leonardo

Page 9 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

G.R. No. L-39532 July 20, 1979 assets in the testator's will, the two San Lorenzo Village lots
were included as part of the testate estate.
Testate Estate of Jose M. Valero, FLORA VALERO VDA. DE
RODRIGUEZ and ROSIE VALERO DE That inclusion provoked Mrs. Rustia, the adopted child of Mrs.
GUTIERREZ, petitioners-appellants, Valero, and Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez, the legitimate
vs. children of the testator, Jose M. Valero, to file (through Mrs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CARMEN VALERO- Rustia's lawyer) in the testate proceeding a motion for the
RUSTIA, respondents-appellees. exclusion of the two San Lorenzo Village lots from the
testator's inventoried estate.
AQUINO, J.
Adduced as reason for the exclusion is the fact that since
February 16, 1966 Mrs. Rustia has been the registered owner
This is supposedly a case about collation. As factual
of the lots as shown by two Torrens titles, copies of which were
background, it should be stated that the spouses, Beatriz
attached to the motion.
Bautista and Jose M. Valero, did not beget any child during
their marriage In 1951 Beatriz adopted Carmen (Carmencita)
Bautista. Jose wanted also to adopt her but because, by his first The executor opposed the motion on the ground that the two
marriage, he had two children named Flora Valero Vda. de lots were donated to Mrs. Rustia and the donation would
Rodriguez and Rosie Valero Gutierrez. he was disqualified to allegedly involve collation and the donee's title to the lots. The
adopt Carmen. Jose manifested in the adoption proceeding that executor revealed that he was informed by Mrs. Gutierrez and
he consented to the use by Carmen of his surname Valero. (See Mrs. Rodriguez (supposed movants) that the two lots should be
Civil Case No. 12475, Manila CFI; Art. 338[1], Civil Code and art. included in the inventory. Thus, the issue of collation was
28, Child and Youth Welfare Code.) prematurely raised.

On September 18, 1964, Jose M. Valero donated to Carmen B. The probate court in its order of August 9, 1973 excluded the
Valero (who was already married to Doctor Sergio Rustia) his two lots from the inventory of the testator's estate but with the
one-half proindiviso share (apparently his inchoate share) in understanding "that the same are subject to collation".
two conjugal lots, with the improvements thereon, located at
San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Rizal, with an area of 1,500 square
On December 4, 1973 or one hundred twelve days after Mrs.
meters. His wife, Beatriz, consented to the donation. However,
Rustia was served with a copy of that order, she filed a motion
the deed of donation was not registered.
for its reconsideration. She insisted that she is the owner of the
two San Lorenzo Village lots as indicated in the Torrens titles.
On January 13, 1966, Jose M. Valero, who was then seventy- No one opposed that motion. At the hearing of that motion,
three years old, executed his last will and testament wherein Mrs. Rustia's lawyer apprised the court that the executor
he enumerated the conjugal properties of himself and his wife, informed him over the phone that he was not opposing the
including the two San Lorenzo Village lots. In that will, he did motion.
not mention the donation. He devised to his wife properties
sufficient to constitute her legitime and bequeathed the
The probate court in its order of December 14, 1973 ruled that
remainder to his two children, Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs.
the two lots were unconditionally excluded from the inventory
Gutierrez.
of Jose M. Valero's estate, meaning "that they are not subject to
collation". That order is the bone of contention in this case.
About a month later, or on February 15, 1966, the Valero
spouses, by means of a deed of absolute sale, conveyed the San
Mrs. Rodriguez (without being joined by her sister, Mrs.
Lorenzo Village lots and the improvements thereon to Carmen
Gutierrez) filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order of
B. Valero-Rustia for the sum of one hundred twenty thousand
December 14, 1973. She alleged that the two San Lorenzo
pesos. The sale was registered on the following day. Transfer
Village lots were really conveyed to Mrs. Rustia by way of
Certificates of Title Nos. 163270 and 163271 were issued to
donation because the consideration for the sale was allegedly
the vendee, Mrs. Rustia.
only one-fifth of the true value of the lots. Mrs. Rodriguez
further contended that the order of August 9, 1973 was final in
On December 4, 1967 she mortgaged the two lots to the character.
Quezon City Development Bank as security for a loan of fifty
thousand pesos (page 204, Rollo).
In reply, Mrs. Rustia countered that the prior order was
interlocutory and that in 1966 the true value of the two lots
Beatriz B. Valero died intestate on September 12, 1972, was around P120,000 and that their value increased
survived by her husband and her adopted child. Her estate is considerably in 1973 or 1974. Moreover, the relatively low
pending settlement in Special Proceeding No. 88896 of the price of the sale could be attributed to the fact that Mrs. Rustia
Court of First Instance of Manila. Mrs. Rustia was named and her husband lived with the Valeros and were taking care of
administratrix of her adopted mother's estate. them.

More than a month later, or on October 18, 1972, Jose M. The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration. Mrs.
Valero died testate, survived by his two children, Mrs. Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez, in their petition for certiorari in
Rodriguez and Mrs. Gutierrez. His will was duly probated in the Court of Appeals, assailed the probate court's order
Special Proceeding No. 88677, also of the Court of First declaring that the two lots were not subject to collation.
Instance of Manila. Lawyer Celso F. Unson, the executor,
submitted an inventory wherein, following the list of conjugal

Page 10 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

The Court of Appeals held that the order of exclusion dated We have examined the expedientes of the two cases. We found
August 9, 1973 was interlocutory and that it could be changed that the proceedings have not yet reached the stage when the
or Modified at anytime during the course of the administration question of collation or advancement to an heir may be raised
proceedings. and decided. The numerous debts of the decedents are still
being paid. The net remainder (remanente liquido) of their
conjugal estate has not yet been determined. On the other
It further held that it was immaterial whether the two lots
hand, up to this time, no separate action has been brought by
were donated or sold to Mrs. Rustia as "a mere subterfuge to
the appellants to nullify Mrs. Rustia's Torrens titles to the
avoid payment of the donor's and donee's taxes". According to
disputed lots or to show that the sale was in reality a donation.
the Appellate Court, it was immaterial because under article
1061 of the Civil Code, only compulsory heirs are required to
make collation for the determination of their legitimes and, In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of
under section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, only heirs are collation and to decide whether Mrs. Rustia's titles to the
involved in questions as to advancement and Mrs. Rustia is not disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below have
an heir of the testator, Jose M. Valero (Vda. de Rodriguez vs. not reached the stage of partition and distribution when the
Valero Rustia, CA-G. R. No. SP- 02944, August 28, 1974, per G. S. legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be determined.
Santos, Gaviola, Jr. and De Castro, JJ.).
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals
From that decision, an appeal was made to this Court. The and the orders of the, lower court dated August 9 and
appeal was not given due course. However, upon motion for December 14, 1973, excluding from the inventory of Jose M.
reconsideration and over Mrs. Rustia's opposition, the appeal Valeros estate the two San Lorenzo Village lots now registered
was later allowed. in the name of Carmen B. Valero-Rustia, but we delete from
that decision and the two orders any ruling regarding collation
which is a matter that may be passed upon by the probate
The appellants' only assignment of error is that the Court of
court at the time when it is seasonably raised by the interested
Appeals should have held that the probate court's order of
parties, if it is ever raised at all. No costs.
exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was not interlocutory but was a
final and appealable order valid that the order of December 14,
1973 modifying the order of August 3 is void. SO ORDERED.

We hold that the order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was

not a final order. It was interlocutory in the sense that it did
not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village
lots. The probate court in the exclusion incident could not
determine the question of title.

The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining

whether a certain property should or should not be included in
the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title
thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership
which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran's Comments
on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473;
Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).

We hold further that the dictum of the Court of Appeals and the
probate court that the two disputed lots are not subject to
collation was a supererogation and was not necessary to the
disposition of the case which merely involved the issue of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of the testator's
estate. The issue of collation was not yet justifiable at that early
stage of the testate proceeding. It is not necessary to mention
in the order of exclusion the controversial matter of collation.

Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and
whether Mrs. Rustia's Torrens titles thereto are indefeasible
are matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all.
How those issues should be resolved, if and when they are
raised, need not be touched upon in the adjudication of this
appeal.

The intestate and testate proceedings for the settlement of the

estates of the deceased Valero spouses were consolidated, as
ordered by the lower court on November 21, 1974, so that the
conjugal estate of the deceased spouses may be properly
liquidated, as contemplated in section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court and Act No. 3176 (Pages 223 and 235-6, Rollo).

Page 11 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction
G.R. No. L-62431-33 August 31, 1984
PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) and
HONOR MOSLARES, respondents.
Azucena E. Lozada for petitioner.
Estrella Funelas Iral & Associates and Tomas Trinidad for
respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on June 30, 1982 in CA-G.R. Nos.
12599-R, 12600-R, and 12601-R entitled "Honor P.
Moslares, petitioner v. Honorable Reynaldo P. Honrado, et
al., respondents, was filed as part of the effort to expedite
the final settlement of the estate of the deceased NICOLAI
DREPIN.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing
considered, judgment is hereby
rendered:
(a) making permanent the temporary
restraining order issued:
(b) declaring null and void the impugned
orders of April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980,
September 30, 1980, and October 20,
1980, for having been issued in grave
abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction, with the September and
October orders having the additional
defect of due process violation;
(c) declaring null and void the Deed of
Undertaking and Deed of Sale in favor
of respondent Pio Barretto Realty
Development, Inc., for being mere
consequences of null orders;
(d) ordering the Register of Deeds of
Rizal to cancel the transfer certificates of
title issued to Pio Barreto Realty
Development, (TCT Nos. N-50539,
N-50540, N-50541) and to transfer the
same to the Estate of Nicolai Drepin with
the annotation that this transfer to the
estate is subject to the final decision in
Civil Case No. 41287 of the CFI of
Pasig, Metro Manila; and
(e) denying the prayer for the exclusion
of the three titled lots involved from
Page 12 of 37
Special Proceedings Nos. 7257, 7261,
and 7269 of the CFI of Makati Branch
Civil Case No. 41287 abovementioned.
The proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Drepin
were initiated shortly after his death on July 29, 1972 with
the filing of a petition for probate of his holographic will on
August 23, 1972.
In this holographic will the late Drepin listed twenty-two (22)
persons as his alleged creditors, and within the six (6)
months after publication within which to file claims against
the estate, twelve (12) persons filed their respective claims.
The total amount of obligations that may be chargeable
against the Drepin Estate is P1,299,652.66.
The only asset of the testate estate of Drepin consists of
three (3) parcels of titled land with an area of approximately
eighty (80) hectares, and another parcel with an area of
eighty-one (81) hectares still pending registration. The estate
is saddled with claims of creditors named in the Drepin will
and creditors who have filed their claims within the
reglementary period. The only way to pay their claims is to
sell the Drepin lots, so that from the proceeds of the sale, the
debts of the estate could be paid, and any remaining balance
distributed to the Drepin heirs.
Since the filing of the petition for probate of the Drepin will,
on August 23, 1972, nine (9) offers had been made for the
purchase of the Drepin lands, among them, that of GM
Management Phils., dated August 15, 1978, through its
President Honor P. Moslares. Basis for Moslares' letter
proposal is a deed of sale with mortgage executed by the
decedent in his favor on October 9, 1970. It appears that on
said date, the deceased sold 80.3980 hectares of land
absolutely and perpetually to Honor P. Moslares for the sum
of P2,600,000.00 with a downpayment of P300,000.00. To
secure the payment of the remaining P2,300,000.00, the
latter mortgaged the land to the former. The parties further
agreed not to register the sale yet until P1,300,000.00 shall
have been paid to Drepin and P1,000.000.00 paid to
Drepin's creditors.
Subsequently, on June 25, 1971, Drepin and Moslares
entered into a "Joint Venture Agreement". Said agreement
listed Drepin as the registered "owner" of the lots and
denominated Moslares as "developer" tasked with converting
the lands into a residential subdivision. The agreement
specified:
(h) That the Developer agrees to
reserve the right of the registered Owner
of the land to ask for immediate CASH
payment against an "Absolute Deed of
Sale " on the said above mentioned
properties, subject of this "Joint Venture
Agreement" on the amount of not less
than TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND
(P2,300,000.00) PESOS, after the big
loan is granted to the Developer in or
about thirty (30) days to forty-five (45)
days from the signing of this Joint
Venture Agreement and the "Special
Power of Attorney",
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction
(i) However, if the Owner of the property
Mr. Nicolai Drepin not choose to be paid
on this said above mentioned property in
CASH of TWO MILLION THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P2,300,000.00) PESOS, this "joint
venture agreement is still in full force
and effect, OTHERWISE if full payment
of TWO MILLION THREE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P2,300,000.00) PESOS
receipt is acknowledged by the said Mr.
Nicolai Drepin, the "Joint Venture
Agreement" is automatically cancelled
and declared no force and effect.
Before the agreement could be implemented, Nicolai Drepin
died.
Upon learning of the existence of Special Proceedings No.
7257, 7261 and 7269 herein respondent Moslares, on
August 15, 1978, informed the Judicial Administrator
Atty. Tomas Trinidad that he is already the owner of the
properties made subject matter of the Special Proceedings
and proposed that he be permitted to pay the balance on the
sale with mortgage in accordance with the terms of his
written proposal. The probate court, on August 17, 1978
issued an order approving respondent Moslares' proposal
and authorizing administrator Trinidad to enter into the
appropriate agreement. This was reiterated by the court in its
order dated January 9, 1979, with the condition that GM
Management Phils. had only up to February 28, 1979 to
comply with its letter-offer dated August 15, 1978 and "failure
on their part to comply with the same within the period
specified, the contract with the decedent shall be deemed
resolved and ineffective." Counsel for heir claimant Cornelia
Tejano was Revise given up to said date to make and submit
a more beneficial offer. Neither GM Management nor
counsel for Tejano was able to perform as required.
Requests for revision of payment and extension of period
within which to pay the balance of P1,600,000.00 were made
by Moslares. Further, he filed a Manifestation and Urgent
Motion proposing transfer of the certificate of titles over the
land subject of the proceedings so as to enable him to
generate funds to liquidate the payable balance. The same
were left unacted upon by the probate court.
Meanwhile, on September 25,1979, A Deed of Undertaking
was entered into by respondent Moslares and the
Administrator to implement the Contract of Sale with
Mortgage. Such deed provided for the mode of payment
which Moslares was to follow as well as the clearing and
transfer of the certificates of title in the name of Moslares.
The latter proviso was to enable Moslares to secure the loan
needed to pay for the balance of the purchase price.
Postdated checks were issued by Moslares to cover the
amount embraced in said undertaking. Approval of the
agreement with Moslares was strongly urged by the
Administrator. No action was taken by the court thereon. At
the hearing of October 19, 1979, Moslares tendered
P1,600,000.00 to the Judicial Administrator. This was
opposed by counsel for heir Tejano, Atty. Ramon
Encarnacion, on the ground that respondent Moslares had
only until February 28, 1979 within which to pay the same.
Attorney Encarnacion thereupon brought to the attention of
the court an offer to buy the properties for P3,000,000.00 by
herein petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc.
Because of the differing contentions and the new offer, the
Page 13 of 37
probate court ordered the parties to submit memoranda and
set a conference on November 28, 1979 to discuss the new
offer.
On November 12, 1979, respondent Moslares submitted his
memorandum containing three points to wit:
l. Actually, Honor P. Moslares is already
owner of the Property, subject matter of
this proceedings, and as such, could no
longer be the subject matter of this
testate proceedings. The payment made
by Honor P. Moslares to the Judicial
Administrator through this Honorable
Court on 19 October, 1979, is in
compliance with the Contract entered
into between him and the late Nicolai
Drepin, in 1970;
2. The Order of this Honorable Court
dated 9 January, 1979, particularly with
reference to the period, mentioned in
No. 1, page 2 of the Order of this
Honorable Court giving Honor P.
Moslares up to 28 February, 1979,
within which to comply with his letter-
offer to the Court dated 15 August,
1978, is not yet final, said period having
been extended;
3. The Order of this Honorable Court
dated 9 January, 1979, particularly No.
2, Page 2 thereof, barred Counsel for
Cornelia B. Tejano from making any
further offer, his right to do so having
expired on 28 February, 1979.
Thereupon, the probate court judge directed Moslares
through the administrator Atty. Trinidad, to furnish copies of
— (1) Deed of Absolute Sale; (2) Special Power of Attorney;
and (3) Joint Venture Agreement. The same were promptly
submitted.
On February 28, 1979, March 6, 1980 and April 15, 1980,
letters to Judicial Administrator Trinidad were sent by
respondent Moslares seeking further extension of time within
which to pay the balance of his obligation to the estate, and
for favorable recommendations to the probate court in his
reports saying: "Help me now, this is ours. We can make
money of all this sacrifice we had on the pass (sic)."
On April 15, 1980, the probate court reiterated its order
dated August 17, 1978 authorizing the Administrator to
finalize the sale with GM Management Phils. and giving
respondent Moslares ten (10) days from date to deposit the
necessary amount to cover the value of the checks as each
fallsdue. Failure to do so would result in the automatic
rescission of the authority to sell to GM Management Phils.
and the Administrator would be permitted to accept other
offers in the best interest of the Estate. This order was the
probate court's prompt action on a "Report with Motion for
Cancellation of Order Approving Sale to GM Management,
Phils. Honor P. Moslares, if it fails to make good the April 15,
1980 check "As Token Payment in Good Faith", filed by
administrator Trinidad on the same day, April 15, 1980.
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction
GM Management sought reconsideration and amendment of
the Order of April 15, 1980 to conform to the provisions of
the Deed of Undertaking.
On May 23, 1980, administrator Trinidad filed a "Report with
Motion to Authorize Administrator to Screen Offers to
Purchase Estate and Others.
On May 31, 1980, respondent Moslares filed another
manifestation praying that his pending motions be acted
upon and that the motion of administrator Trinidad be denied
for lack of merit.
On June 30, 1980, administrator Trinidad made the following
"Observation and Report on the Motion of Buyer GM
Management Phils. for reconsideration" —
2. Two checks, one for P50,000.00 and
one for P250,000.00 were deposited on
April 28, 1980 after the Order of the
Probate Court. BOTH BOUNCED. DAIF
(Drawn against insufficient funds).
3. Another check for P300,000.00 is now
held by the Administrator, postdated for
today, June 30, 1980 and Administrator
just received, June 29, 1980 a telegram
asking to withhold deposit until after 30
days from amendatory order of the
Probate Court.
xxx xxx xxx
6. The motion of Administrator is
reiterated.
On July 2, 1980, the probate court issued the following order:
Finding the Motion of the Administrator
well-taken and in the best interests of
the Estate, the administrator is
authorized to enter into agreement with
any other interested parties on a first
paid first served basis without prejudice
to G.M. Management Philippines to
continue with its offer and make good
the same in as an ordinary buyer on the
same first paid first served basis.
Respondent Moslares filed a motion for reconsideration of
said July 2, 1980 order on the ground that:
1. The Honorable Probate Court has no
jurisdiction over the three (3) parcels of
land, consisting of 80.3980 hectares
subject matter of the Deed of Sale which
the late Nicolai Drepin, conveyed to
Movant Honor P. Moslares. The only
right which pertains to the ESTATE, is
the right to demand from Honor P.
Moslares, the balance of the Deed of
Sale, which has been fixed by this
Honorable Court at ONE MILLION SIX
HUNDRED THOUSAND
Page 14 of 37
(P1,600,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency;
2. As of November, 1979, the law that
governs between the ESTATE and
MOVANT, Honor P. Moslares, is the
DEED OF UNDERTAKING executed by
the Administrator in favor of Movant
Honor P. Moslares, pursuant to the
authority given by the Honorable
Probate Court to the Administrator
contained in the Order dated August 15,
1978, reiterated in the Order dated
January 9, 1979, and in the Order dated
15 April 1980; and
3. The Honorable Probate Court has no
jurisdiction to decree rescission of the
Contract into (sic) between the decedent
and Movant Honor P. Moslares on the
9th day of October, 1970.
This motion for reconsideration was opposed by
administrator Trinidad as well as the Tejano heirs through
counsel, arguing that the probate court has jurisdiction to
issue the questioned orders because petitioner submitted
himself to the court's jurisdiction and his checks bounced
also that the Deed of Undertaking was validly cancelled as a
result of the valid rescission of Trinidad's authority to sell to
petitioner.
On September 30, 1980, the probate court issued an order
denying respondent Moslares' motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit. And on October 10, 1980 administrator
Trinidad executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Pio Barretto
Realty, Inc. transferring the titles to the properties in question
in the name of the latter. The same was duly registered. On
October 20, 1980, the probate court approved the report of
administrator Trinidad dated October 16, 1980, with xerox
copies of the Deed of Sale in favor of Pio Barretto Realty,
Inc. of the estate of Nicolai Drepin pursuant to respondent
court's order authorizing the sale, and of the approved Deed
of Undertaking with the vendee.
An urgent Motion and Manifestation was filed by respondent
Moslares on April 8, 1981 praying that his motion for
reconsideration of the orders be already resolved, followed
by an Omnibus Motion on April 27, 1981 to resolve all
pending motions and praying that the Deed of Sale and
Deed of Undertaking in favor of Pio Barretto be cancelled.
The same remained unacted upon.
On May 18, 1981, respondent filed Civil Case No. 41287
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, Metro
Manila to determine title and ownership over the Drepin
lands.
On June 23, 1981, a petition for certiorari was filed by
respondent Moslares before the Court of Appeals which
issued a temporary restraining order. Judgment was
rendered by respondent court in favor of respondent
Moslares, the dispositive portion of which has been quoted.
Barretto filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
on November 12, 1982. Hence, this petition.
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction
In its decision, the Court of Appeals laid down the two
principal issues involved in the case, as follows:
(1) whether or not the respondent judge (Judge R. Honrado)
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in refusing to exclude the parcels of land
involved from the testate proceedings of the Drepin estate;
and
(2) whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the impugned orders dated April 15, 1980, July 2,
1980, September 30, 1980, and October 20, 1980.
We are in full accord with the respondent court's resolution
of the first issue, and we quote:
For continually presuming that the three
titled lots were part of the Drepin estate
and for refusing to provisionally pass
upon the question of exclusion, did the
respondent court act without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion?
We hold that even with such
presumption and refusal, the respondent
court still acted within its jurisdiction and
not with grave abuse of discretion. After
all, the jurisprudence and rule are both
to the effect that the probate court "may"
provisionally pass upon the question of
exclusion, not "should". The obvious
reason is the probate court's limited
jurisdiction and the principle that
questions of title or ownership, which
result to inclusion in or exclusion from
the inventory of the property, can only
be settled in a separate action. Hence,
even if respondent court presumed an
the way that the properties sold by
Drepin to petitioner were part of Drepin's
estate, that would not prevent nor defeat
petitioner's remedy in a separate suit.
And We hold that Civil Case No. 41287
is just such a suit instituted to settle the
question of ownership over the lots
covered originally by TCTs Nos.
259060, 259061 and 259062, despite
the claim for damages, because of the
composite effect of the prayer in the
complaint thereof ...
xxx xxx xxx
In effect, We are saying that the
question of whether the properties sold
by Drepin to Petitioner should be
excluded from the probate proceedings
below, can not be determined with
finality by Us in this case, because in
this petition We are merely reviewing the
acts of the respondent CFI as a probate
court. Any ruling by the probate court to
include those properties "is only
Page 15 of 37
provisional in character and is without
prejudice to a judgment in a separate
action on the issue of title or ownership"
(Sebial v. Sebial, L-23419, June 27,
1975, 64 SCRA 385). Consequently, in
reviewing the exercise of such limited
probate jurisdiction, We cannot order
an unqualified and final exclusion of
the properties involved, as prayed
for; to do so would expand the
probate court's jurisdiction beyond
the perimeters set by law and
jurisprudence. It is fitting and proper
that this issue be ventilated and
finally resolved in the already
instituted Civil Case No. 41287, even
as We hold that respondent court's
act of not excluding the lots involved
did not constitute grave abuse of
discretion. In view of this limitation, We
need not resolve the issue of whether
there was novation of the Deed of Sale
with Mortgage, or not.
This same elemental principle, we found occasion to
reiterate in the cases of Junquera v. Borromeo (19 SCRA
656); Borromeo v. Canonoy (19 SCRA 667); Recto v. dela
Rosa (75 SCRA 226); Lachenal v. Salas (71 SCRA
202); Bolisay v. Alcid (85 SCRA 213); Vda. de Rodriguez v.
Court of Appeals (91 SCRA 540).
However, from here, the road forks as we disagree with the
respondent court's findings on the second issue.
In his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
respondent Moslares assails the issuance of the four
impugned orders by the probate court on the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction to rescind the Deed of Sale with the
Mortgage entered into by the deceased during his lifetime,
due to the limited jurisdiction of the probate court merely to
settle and liquidate the estates of a decedent and not to pass
upon questions of title to property.
On the other hand, the petitioner argues that in voiding and
nullifying the four orders of the probate court, the Court of
Appeals, in effect, would have the former court recognize the
alleged ownership of Mr. Moslares over the three titled
Drepin lots involved in this case contrary to its
pronouncement in settling the first issue.
It is to be noted that the last agreement entered into by the
deceased prior to his death, that is, the Joint Venture
Agreement listing Drepin as owner of the properties in
question, and the surrender to administrator Trinidad of the
certificates of title, had led the probate court to enter or
include said properties in its inventory of the deceased's
estate. Thus, provisionally, ownership thereof was
recognized as vested in the estate. Subsequently, in the
course of the probate proceedings, the sale of the properties
was found to be necessary to settle the deceased's
obligations. It was then that herein private respondent
Moslares submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court in
an "Offer to Buy" said properties, based on his previous
agreement with the deceased during the latter's lifetime.
It is noteworthy that contrary to Moslares' assertion of
ownership, he had offered to buy the Drepin lands from the
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction
probate court. Surely, this is not conduct ordinarily expected
of one who is the owner of the property. Further, the fact that
subsequent to the Deed of Sale, the deceased as buyer and
as absolute owner entered into an agreement with the
respondent merely as developer of the lands in question
evidences a change of cause or object as well as a change
of relation between the parties. Moslares' own acts negate
his claims in this petition that he had acquired ownership of
the properties. Thus, the transparency of respondent's
argument becomes readily apparent.
Having submitted his letter-proposal to the court, the same
was approved, allowing Moslares to pay the balance of the
purchase price agreed upon by respondent and the
decedent in the amount of One Million Six Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P1,600,000.00) specifying the time and
manner of payment thereof. Thus, he was given preference
and priority over other persons or groups offering to buy the
estate. Having failed to comply with the conditions of
payment of the contract, the same was rescinded by the
probate court. Now, respondent questions this
rescission which he maintains to be beyond the
jurisdiction of the court.
Estoppel works to preclude respondent from questioning the
jurisdiction of the court. By offering to buy the properties in
question, respondent has clearly recognized the jurisdiction
of the probate court to which he had effectively submitted
himself. It is well settled that a party is estopped from
disputing the jurisdiction of the court after invoking it himself
(Tible v. Aquino, 65 SCRA 207). After voluntarily submitting
a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits,
it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power
of the court (People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 278; Capilitan v.
dela Cruz, 55 SCRA 706; Summit Guaranty and Insurance
Co., Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 110 SCRA 241; Tajonera v.
Lamoroza, 110 SCRA 438). A party will not be allowed to
make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions.
Doctrine of estoppel bars a party from trifling with the courts
(Depositario v. Hervias, 121 SCRA 756).
The merits of the case likewise lead to similar conclusions.
It cannot but be conceded that the limited jurisdiction of a
probate court prohibits it from determining rights to property
left by a decedent which depends on the contract (Goodin v.
Casselman 200 N.W. 94, 51 N.D. 543). However, actions of
the probate court, in the case at bar, do not refer to the
adjudication of rights under the contract entered into by the
deceased during his lifetime. It is to be noted that the
dealings of the respondent with the court arose out of the
latter's bid to sell property under its authority to sell,
mortgage or otherwise encumber property of the estate to
pay or settle against the estate (Rule 89, Revised Rules of
Court). Thus, respondent bound himself under an agreement
with the court separate and distinct from that which he had
with the decedent. In rescinding such contract, the court
merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an
agreement which had ceased to be a working proposition.
Surely, this is well within the power of the probate court.
Though of limited and special jurisdiction, it cannot be
denied, however, that when the law confers jurisdiction upon
a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary
powers to exercise such jurisdicton to make it effective
(Zuniga v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 740).
Page 16 of 37
We cannot allow an absurd situation to arise where the
Drepin estate will never be settled and liquidated because
even if Moslares cannot pay the agreed purchase price of
the Drepin lands, still the probate court can no longer sell the
lands to other prospective buyers. Under the theory of
respondent, it is insisted that the probate court has no
authority to cancel his unfulfilled offer to buy, notwithstanding
the fact that he failed miserably to comply with the terms of
his own offer to buy. It is to be remembered that Moslares
had already been granted undue leniency by the probate
court to meet his obligations to pay. But, the saga of
Moslares' bouncing checks remains. Three reports of
Administrator Trinidad had been submitted as annexes to the
petition for certiorari. The report, dated June 30, 1980
showed that two of Moslares' checks were dishonored,
having been drawn against insufficient funds. The August 18,
1980 report stated that: "All the checks submitted to the
probate court for payment bounced." And in the report dated
April 15, 1981, it was further averred by the administrator
that "... believing that the bouncing checks were not intended
to defraud the Estate," "he refrained from prosecuting Honor
P. Moslares criminally under the law on dishonored checks."
It is also to be emphasized that it was not respondent's
contract of sale with decedent that had been invalidated but
rather the administrator's authority to sell to respondent.
Although the court recognized the Deed of Sale with
Mortgage, still the same was not being enforced as such but
was used only as basis for the terms and conditions of
respondent's agreement with the court. To enforce the same
is truly beyond the scope of the probate court's jurisdiction.
The court's actions constitute a refusal to pass upon the
validity of the contract to sell.
Further, the probate court has ample discretion in
determining whether conditions of a particular sale would be
beneficial to the estate and this is generally respected by the
appellate courts (Court of First Instance v. Court of Appeals,
106 SCRA 114, Fernandez, et al., v. Montejo, 109 Phil. 701).
To attack the nullity of the order of the probate court to sell
property of the deceased, it must be shown that the contract
of sale is null and void (Rafols v. Barba, 119 SCRA 147).
The infirmity of the subject deed of sale is premised on the
alleged nullity of the order of the court authorizing the sale.
The validity of said order may not be attacked in a collateral
proceeding, the supposed ground for declaring it void for
lack of jurisdiction not being apparent on the face thereof
(Rafols v. Barba, supra). Nevertheless, respondent could
have prevented the sale of the Drepin lands. Section 3, Rule
89 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Persons interested may
prevent such sale, etc., by giving bond.
— No such authority to sell mortgage, or
otherwise encumber real or personal
estate shall be granted if any person
interested in the estate gives a bond, in
a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned to pay the debts, expenses
of administration, and legacies within
such tune as the court directs; and such
bond shall be for the security of the
creditors, as well as of the executor or
administrator, and may be prosecuted
for the benefit of either.
provides respondent with the legal means by which he could
have forestalled the sale of the Drepin lands to the petitioner.
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

(Court of First Instance v. Court of Appeals, supra) If third

persons oppose an application for leave to sell the property
of the decedent, claiming title to the property, the title claim,
cannot be adjudicated by the probate court, but it can hold
approval of the sale in abeyance until the question of
ownership shall have been decided in a proper action
(Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501). But this, he failed to do.
Ergo, we find no reason to disturb the questioned orders of
the probate court.

Moreover, the respondent is not without remedy if truly his

claim of ownership is proper and meritorious. Since the
probate court has no jurisdiction over the question of title and
ownership of the properties, the respondents may bring a
separate action if they wish to question the petitioner's titles
and ownership (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 91
SCRA 540). Though an order of the probate court approving
the sale of the decedent's property is final, the respondent
may file a complaint in the proper court for the rescission of
the sale. (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 72).
Likewise, the initial question of respondent regarding the
propriety of including the properties in question in the
inventory of the probate court as he claims ownership
thereof may therein be finally and conclusively settled (Vda.
de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, supra; Lachenal v. Salas,
71 SCRA 202). The respondent has ample protection of his
rights for the province of the probate court remains merely
the settlement of the estate and may not be extended
beyond (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, supra).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for

certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court), dated June 30,
1982 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent
restraining order issued against the trial court is hereby
DISMISSED. The impugned orders of the probate court
dated April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980, September 30, 1980 and
October 20, 1980 are accordingly REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 17 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

[G.R. No. 108581. December 8, 1999] distribution of the estate of the deceased spouses. Private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which
nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF February 1, 1991.
APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as
Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing
DOROTHEO, respondents. that the case filed by private respondents before the Court of
Appeals was a petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends
D E C I S I O N that in issuing the two assailed orders, Judge Angas cannot be
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: said to have no jurisdiction because he was particularly
designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise assails the
Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity
intrinsically void in an order that has become final and of Alejandros will that was earlier admitted to probate.
executory still be given effect? This is the issue that arose from
the following antecedents: Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of
the estate of the late Alejandro and to maintain the status
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro quo or lease of the premises thereon to third parties.[3] Private
Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without respondents opposed the motion on the ground that petitioner
her estate being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in has no interest in the estate since she is not the lawful wife of
1977, after Alejandros death, petitioner, who claims to have the late Alejandro.
taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed a special
proceeding for the probate of the latters last will and The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision
testament. In 1981, the court issued an order admitting or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter
Alejandros will to probate. Private respondents did not appeal how erroneous it may be. In setting aside the January 30,
from said order. In 1983, they filed a Motion To Declare The 1986 Order that has attained finality, the trial court in
Will Intrinsically Void. The trial court granted the motion and effect nullified the entry of judgment made by the Court of
issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads: Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse or
set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so
would be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is hereby issued essence of review. It has been ruled that a final judgment on
declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the wife of the late Alejandro probated will, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole
Dorotheo, the provisions of the last will and testament of world.[4]
Alejandro Dorotheo as intrinsically void, and declaring the
oppositors Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due
Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late spouses time from a judgment or order of the trial court, the same
Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, whose respective attains finality by mere lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing
estates shall be liquidated and distributed according to the the will became final and the question determined by the court
laws on intestacy upon payment of estate and other taxes due in such order can no longer be raised anew, either in the same
to the government.[1] proceedings or in a different motion. The matters of due
execution of the will and the capacity of the testator acquired
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is the character of res judicata and cannot again be brought into
entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being
prior to his death although she admitted that they were not for once and forever closed.[5] Such final order makes the will
married to each other.Upon denial of her motion for conclusive against the whole world as to its extrinsic validity
reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, and due execution.
but the same was dismissed for failure to file appellants brief It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally
within the extended period granted.[2] This dismissal became with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated,
final and executory on February 3, 1989 and a corresponding particularly on three aspects:
entry of judgment was forthwith issued by the Court of Appeals
on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued by the lower
court to implement the final and executory whether the will submitted is indeed, the decedents last will
Order. Consequently, private respondents filed several motions and testament;
including a motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them
the Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties compliance with the prescribed formalities for the execution of
of the late Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the wills;
TCTs, private respondents filed a motion for cancellation of
said titles and for issuance of new titles in their names.
Petitioner opposed the motion. the testamentary capacity of the testator;[8]

An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B.

Angas setting aside the final and executory Order dated and the due execution of the last will and testament.[9]
January 30, 1986, as well as the Order directing the issuance of
the writ of execution, on the ground that the order was merely Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination
interlocutory, hence not final in character. The court added of whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the
that the dispositive portion of the said Order even directs the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and

Page 18 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

was not acting under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence according to the laws of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option
and that the will is genuine and not a forgery,[10] that he was of but to implement that order of intestate distribution and not to
the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not reopen and again re-examine the intrinsic provisions of the
expressly prohibited by law from making a will.[11] same will.

The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on
regarding the same may still be raised even after the will has the law of successional rights that testacy is preferred to
been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an intestacy.[20] But before there could be testate distribution, the
extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically will must pass the scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by
valid. Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator law considering that the deceased testator is no longer
provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful available to prove the voluntariness of his actions, aside from
heirs of their legitime or rightful inheritance according to the the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually onerous in
laws on succession, the unlawful provisions/dispositions nature and that no one is presumed to give - Nemo praesumitur
thereof cannot be given effect. This is specially so when the donare.[21] No intestate distribution of the estate can be done
courts had already determined in a final and executory until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and
decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of
determination having attained that character of finality is intestacy apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it
binding on this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not is extrinsically valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic
that this Court finds the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a validity that is whether the provisions of the will are valid
final and executory decision of which the party had the according to the laws of succession. In this case, the court had
opportunity to challenge before the higher tribunals must ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the
stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to avail of intrinsic provisions thereof were void. Thus, the rules of
the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it
was aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed Furthermore, Alejandros disposition in his will of the alleged
to have fully agreed and is satisfied with the decision or share in the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he
order. As early as 1918, it has been declared that public policy described as his only beloved wife, is not a valid reason to
and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional reverse a final and executory order. Testamentary dispositions
errors, judgments of courts must at some point of time fixed by of properties not belonging exclusively to the testator or
law[14]become final otherwise there will be no end to properties which are part of the conjugal regime cannot be
litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium - the very object given effect. Matters with respect to who owns the properties
of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to that were disposed of by Alejandro in the void will may still be
controversies.[15] To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, properly ventilated and determined in the intestate
certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late
spur on the slothful.[16] The only instance where a party spouses estate.
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation
Petitioners motion for appointment as administratrix is
set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
rendered moot considering that she was not married to the late
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
Alejandro and, therefore, is not an heir.
imputable to negligence,[17] which circumstances do not concur
herein. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the
intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from SO ORDERED.
an unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and
executory Order of January 30, 1986 wherein private
respondents were declared as the only heirs do not bind those
who are not parties thereto such as the alleged illegitimate son
of the testator, the same constitutes res judicatawith respect to
those who were parties to the probate proceedings. Petitioner
cannot again raise those matters anew for relitigation
otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should be
remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same
issue had already been resolved adversely by some other
court.[18] It is clear from the executory order that the estates of
Alejandro and his spouse should be distributed according to
the laws of intestate succession.

Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely

interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by the trial court. In
support thereof, petitioner argues that an order merely
declaring who are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is
entitled cannot be the basis of execution to require delivery of
shares from one person to another particularly when no
project of partition has been filed.[19] The trial court declared in
the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not the legal wife
of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate children
(petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the
will.But it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial
court also said that the estate of the late spouses be distributed

Page 19 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

G.R. No. L-42257 June 14, 1976 It invoked the rule that generally "questions of title to property
cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings,
except when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased
ILDEFONSO LACHENAL, ELIAS LACHENAL, IRENEA L.
in which event it is optional upon them to submit to the
SANTOS, FLORA L. SANCHEZ and NATIVIDAD D.
probate court the question as to title to property and when so
LACHENAL, petitioners,
submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment
vs.
thereon. The reason is that questions of collation or of
HON. EMILIO V. SALAS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
advancement are generally inevitably involved therein which
Instance of Pasig, Rizal, Branch I, and FLAVIANA L.
are proper matters to be passed upon in the due course of
LEONIO, respondents.
administration. And it has also been held that with the consent
of the parties, matters affecting property under administration
AQUINO, J.: may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of the
intestate proceedings provided the interests of third persons
are not prejudiced." (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Victorio Lachenal died on November 20, 1969. His testate
Court, 1970 Edition, page 473, citing Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-
estate is pending settlement in the Court of First Instance of
18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892, 899; Pascual vs. Pascual,
Rizal, Pasig Branch I (Special Proceeding No. 5836). His son,
73 Phil. 561; Vda. de Manalac vs. Ocampo, 73 Phil. 661;
Ildefonso Lachenal, was named executor of his will. Among the
Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Dinglasan vs. Ang Chia, 88
properties included in the inventory of his estate is a fishing
Phil. 476; Baquial vs. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).
boat called Lachenal VII.

On January 5, 1976 the executor and his co-plaintiffs in Civil

On April 1, 1971 the executor filed in that proceeding a motion
Case No. 3597 filed these special civil actions of prohibition
to require the spouses Lope L. Leonio and Flaviana Lachenal-
and certiorari against the probate court.
Leonio to pay the rentals for the lease of Lachenal VII and to
return the boat to Navotas, Rizal for drydocking and repair.
The issue is whether the probate court should be allowed to
continue the hearing on the ownership of the fishing boat
Mrs. Leonio, who was a daughter of the testator, opposed the
or whether that question should be left to the determination of
executor's motion. She countered with a motion to exclude the
the Caloocan court where the subsequent separate action (now
fishing boat from the decedent's estate. She claimed that she is
in the pre-trial stage) for the recovery of the motorboat is
the owner of the boat because she purchased it from her father
pending.
in 1967. The executor opposed the motion for exclusion.

We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined

The probate court in its order of January 28, 1972 designated a
in Civil Case No. 3597 because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope
commissioner to receive the evidence of the parties relative to
L Leonio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to
the ownership of the motorboat. Mrs. Leonio had already
his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person
finished the presentation of her evidence before the
with respect to his estate. "The administrator may not pull him
commissioner.
against his will, by motion, into the administration proceeding"
(De la Cruz vs. Camon, 63 O.G. 8704, 16 SCRA 886; De Paula vs.
The executor did not present his countervailing evidence. Escay, infra).
Instead, on July 8, 1975 he and the testator's other children
named Flora, Elias and Irenea, and the children of a deceased
This case falls under the general rule that questions as to title
child filed in the Caloocan City Branch of the Court of First
to property cannot be passed upon in the testate or intestate
Instance of Rizal an action against the Leonio spouses and the
proceeding but should be ventilated in a separate action
other three children of the testator named Crispula, Modesto
(Ongsingco vs. Tan, 97 Phil. 330, 334; Bernardo vs. Court of
and Esperanza, for the recovery of the motorboat Lachenal VII,
Appeals ,117 Phil. 835; Magallanes vs. Kayanan, L-31048,
allegedly valued at P150,000, together with back rentals and
January 20, 1976; Recto vs. Dela Rosa, L-42799, March 16,
damages (Civil Case No. 3597).
1976).

It was alleged in the complaint that Victorio Lachenal in 1964

Where a party in a probate proceeding prays for the inclusion
leased the said motorboat to his son-in-law, Lope L. Leonio, for
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property, the
a monthly rental of P2,000 and that after Victorio's death, the
court may provisionally pass upon the question without
executor of his estate demanded from Leonio the return of the
prejudice to its final determination in a separate action (Garcia
boat and the payment of the back rentals.
vs. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353; Guinguing vs. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144, 147;
Junquera vs. Borromeo, L-18498, March 30, 1967, 19 SCRA
On July 20, 1975 the said plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3597 filed 656; Borromeo vs. Canonoy, L-25010, March 30, 1967, 19 SCRA
in the probate court their own motion to exclude the said 667).
motorboat from the decedent's estate on the ground that the,
probate court has no jurisdiction to decide the question as to
The Court of First Instance is a court of general original
its ownership because that matter has to be resolved by the
jurisdiction invested with power to take cognizance of all kinds
Caloocan court where Civil Case No. 3597 is pending.
of cases: civil cases, criminal cases, special proceedings, land
registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty and
The probate court denied that motion. It held that it has insolvency cases (Sec. 39, Judiciary Law; De Paula vs. Escay, 97
jurisdiction over the issue of ownership because the heirs had Phil. 617, 619; Manalo vs. Mariano, L-33850, January 22, 1976).
agreed to present their evidence on that point before a
commissioner.

Page 20 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of In the instant case, in as much as the controversy over the
First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its fishing boat concerns members of the same family, the
limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land Caloocan court should endeavor before trial to persuade the
registration, etc.) is in reality not a question of over the subject litigants to agree upon some compromise (Arts. 222 and 2029,
matter. It is in essence a procedural question involving a mode Civil Code; Sec. 1[j], Rule 16, Rules of Court).
of practice "which may be waived" (Cunanan vs.
Amparo, supra, page 232; Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484
WHEREFORE, the probate court's orders of September 17 and
rejurisdiction over the issue).
October 20, 1975, asserting its jurisdiction to decide the title to
the fishing boat, Lachenal VII, are set aside. No costs.
Probate jurisdiction includes all matters relating to the
settlement of estates and the probate of wills of persons (Sec.
SO ORDERED.
599, Act 190), particularly the administration of the decedent's
estate, the payment of his debts, questions as to collation or
advancements to the heirs, the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, and the partition and distribution of the estate (De
La Cruz vs. Camon, supra).

For the recovery or protection or the property rights of the

decedent. an executor or administrator may bring or defend in
the right of the decedent, actions for causes which survive.
Actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest
therein, from the decedent's estate, or to enforce a lien thereon,
and actions to recover damages for an injury to or property,
real or personal, may be commenced against an executor or
administrator (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court).

In the instant case, the executor, by virtue of section 2 of Rule

87, filed a separate action in the Caloocan court for the
recovery of the fishing boat and back rentals from the Leonio
spouses.

In the De la Cruz case, supra, it was held that rentals allegedly

due to the decedent's estate may not be collected by the
administrator by filing a motion in the testate proceeding. The
said rentals do not constitute property in the administrator's
hands and are not thus within the effective control of the
probate court. The proper procedure in collecting such rentals
is to file an independent action in the Court of First Instance so
that the right of the estate thereto may be threshed out in a
full-dress trial on the merits.

The ruling in the De la Cruz case applies with stronger force to

this case because here the executor seeks to recover not only
the rentals but also the leased property itself, as to which the
wife of the lessee had asserted adverse title.

Normally, it is expedient and convenient that the question of

title to property, which arises between the decedent's estate
and other persons, should be adjucated in a separate action
because such a question requires the presentation of
appropriate pleadings (complaint, motion to dismiss, answer,
counterclaim and reply). A resort to the modes of discovery
may be necessary so that the issues may be clearly defined and
the trial may be expedited. Those matters can be effectively
accomplished in an ordinary action rather than in the
testamentary or intestate proceeding (Mangaliman vs.
Gonzales, L-21033, December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 462).

The court may also have to resolve ancillary issues as to

damages and counterclaims for money or property. Ultimately,
execution has to be issued. The execution of a judgment is
usually made by the Court of First Instance in an ordinary
action and not in a special proceeding (See Magallanes vs.
Kayanan, supra).

Page 21 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

G.R. No. L-42678 April 9, 1987 filed a motion to cite said Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista in
contempt of court. 5
PEDRO E. BAYBAYAN, CIPRIANO EVANGELISTA, and
SPOUSES BARTOLOME and CONSUELO As a consequence, herein petitioners Pedro Baybayan, Cipriano
BAYBAYAN, petitioners, Evangelists, and the spouses Bartolome and Consuelo
vs. Baybayan, claiming to be the registered owners of the lots
HON. NARCISO A. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge CFI involved, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan Branch XIV; Deputy Sheriff CONSTANCIO Pangasinan, Rosales Branch docketed therein as Civil Case No.
PAGADUAN; EULALIA EVANGELISTA, NORBERTO, 231-R, against the Deputy Sheriff and the herein private
PAULINA, FELIZA, all surnamed PADUA; DIONISIA, respondents, for the quieting of their title, plus damages, and to
LAUREANO, JOSEFINA, LEONARDO, ANASTACIA, restrain said defendants from enforcing the writ of execution
VALENTINA, all surnamed ORPIANO; SERVILLANO, issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R. 6
GERTRUDES, PASTORA, LORENZO, FAUSTA, all surnamed
DELFIN; and DIONISIO, FAUSTINA, AMADO BENJAMIN, all
Meanwhile, at the hearing of the motion for contempt in Spec.
surnamed ORIA, respondents.
Proc. No. 24-R, the question of the Identity of the lands subject
of Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, was brought up, so that the probate
court ordered a relocation survey and commissioned a
geodetic engineer to undertake said survey. After the survey,
the commissioner submitted to the Court a report stating,
PADILLA, J.:
among others, that the lands which were delivered by the
Deputy Sheriff to the heirs of Vicente Oria, pursuant to the writ
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Order of possession issued by the probate court, are registered in the
issued by the respondent Judge on 4 December 1975, which names of herein petitioners under TCT No. 50269 and TCT No.
dismissed, without prejudice, the petitioners' complaint filed in 50270 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. 7
Civil Case No. 23 1 -R of the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, as well as the Order, dated 24 December 1975,
By reason thereof, the probate court, in an order dated 30
which denied petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of
October 1975, dismissed the contempt charge against Jose Diaz
said order.
and Cipriano Evangelista. However, the same court ordered the
petitioners to amend their complaint filed in Civil Case No.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: 231-R since "it is necessary that an amended complaint be filed
by Pedro Baybayan in order to determine whether or not the
property in question is part of the property under Spec. Proc.
On 19 January 1960, herein private respondents Norberto
No. 24-R, inasmuch as it is now the property claimed by him
Padua, Paulina Padua, Felisa Padua, Dionisia Orpiano,
which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 50269." 8
Laureano Orpiano, Leonardo Orpiano, Josefina Orpiano,
Valentina Orpiano, Servillano Delfin, Gertrudes Delfin, Pastors
Delfin Lorenzo Delfin, Fausta Delfin, Dionisio Oria, Faustina Pursuant thereto, the herein petitioners filed an Omnibus
Oria, Amado Oria, and Benjamin Oria, all claiming to be the Motion in Civil Case No. 231-R, to which was attached an
nephews and nieces of one Vicente Oria who died intestate amended complaint wherein some defendants were
sometime in 1945 in Balungao, Pangasinan, filed a petition for dropped. 9 The respondent Judge, however, found that the
the summary settlement of the decedent's estate, the value of Amended Complaint did not comply with his order of 30
which did not exceed P6,000.00. The petition was filed in the October 1975 to exclude Lot E and dismissed the case, "without
then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Tayug Branch. The prejudice on the part of the plaintiffs to file a proper complaint
case was docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. T-300. 1 for the recovery of ownership or possession of the property in
controversy which is Lot B in the relocation plan and formerly
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 23684, now under
After due publication and hearing, the probate court issued an
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 50269." 10
order adjudicating the estate to the heirs of the decedent, who
were ordered to submit a project of partition. 2 Sometime in
1971, the case was transferred to the Resales Branch of the The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan where it was docketed as order, 11 but the motion was denied on 24 December
Spec. Proc. No. 24-R. 1975. 12 Thereupon, they filed with this Court a petition for
certiorari for the review of the orders of the lower court. The
Court treated the petition as a special civil action for
On 18 September 1974, the probate court confirmed the
certiorari. 13
adjudication earlier made and ordered Eulalia Evangelista to
deliver the respective shares of her co-heirs; to make an
accounting of the produce thereof from 1960; and to deliver Counsel for the petitioners, in this petition, contends that the
said produce to her co-heirs or pay its equivalent. A writ of respondent Judge had no authority under the law, both
execution was subsequently issued pursuant thereto. 3 substantive and procedural, to issue the questioned orders
because the order to amend the complaint was issued in, and in
connection with Spec. Proc. No. 24-R where the herein
A writ of possession was also issued sometime thereafter, and
petitioners are not even parties.
the private respondents were placed in possession of their
respective shares. 4 However, when a representative of the
private respondents went to cultivate the portion adjudicated The contention, in our opinion, is not meritorious. While it may
to said private respondents, he was prevented by Jose Diaz and be true that the order to amend the complaint filed in Civil Case
Cipriano Evangelista. In view thereof, the private respondents No. 231-R was issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, so that it cannot
ordinarily bind the herein petitioners who are not parties in

Page 22 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

said special proceedings, it appears, however, that the

petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the probate court, when they filed an Omnibus
Motion in Civil Case No. 231-R, wherein they prayed for leave
to amend their complaint in accordance with the order of the
probate court of 30 October 1975. They cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of the respondent trial Judge to whom they
submitted their cause voluntarily. 14

We find, however, that the respondent Judge committed a

grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioners, for their
alleged failure to amend their complaint to exclude therefrom
Lot E which the respondent Judge found, in his order of 30
October 1975, issued in the probate court, to be owned by the
petitioners Cipriano Evangelists and Consuelo Baybayan. The
findings of the respondent Judge as to the ownership of Lot E
after the hearing conducted in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R do not
justify the order to amend the complaint since the
determination of the ownership of the said lot by the
respondent Judge presiding over a court exercising probate
jurisdiction is not final or ultimate in nature and is without
prejudice to the right of an interested party to raise the
question of ownership in a proper action. 15

It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and

reiterated in a long fine of decisions, that "when questions
arise as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the
estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person
to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased
and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the
courts of administrative proceedings. The Court of First
Instance, acting, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the
Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
as a court of first instance." 16

Besides, the order to amend the complaint is vague and hazy

and does not specify what the amendments should be or how
the complaint should be amended so that the petitioners
should not be faulted if the amended complaint subsequently
filed by them in Civil Case No. 231-R does not contain the
allegations that the respondent Judge would want to appear
therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and a writ issued,

setting aside the Orders issued by the respondent Judge on 7
December 1975 and 24 December 1975, in Civil Case No. 231-R
of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 23 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972 widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a
second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon Francisco's death,
Tasiana instituted testate proceedings in the Court of First
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEFA TANGCO, JOSE DE BORJA,
Instance of Nueva Ecija, where, in 1955, she was appointed
administrator-appellee; JOSE DE BORJA, as administrator,
special administratrix. The validity of Tasiana's marriage to
CAYETANO DE BORJA, MATILDE DE BORJA and CRISANTO
Francisco was questioned in said proceeding.
DE BORJA (deceased) as Children of Josefa
Tangco, appellees,
vs. The relationship between the children of the first marriage and
TASIANA VDA. DE DE BORJA, Special Administratrix of the Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits
Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja, appellant. . and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some
eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the
courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been
G.R. No L-28568 August 18, 1972
unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put
an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE FRANCISCO DE BORJA, entered into on 12 October 1963,2 by and between "[T]he heir
TASIANA O. VDA. DE DE BORJA, special Administratrix and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage, namely,
appellee, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate
vs. Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse
JOSE DE BORJA, oppositor-appellant. of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis
Panaguiton Jr." The terms and conditions of the compromise
G.R. No. L-28611 August 18, 1972
agreement are as follows:

TASIANA 0. VDA. DE BORJA, as Administratrix of the

A G R E E M E N T
Testate Estate of the late Francisco de Borja, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs. THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into
JOSE DE BORJA, as Administrator of the Testate Estate of by and between
the late Josefa Tangco, defendant-appellant.
The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p his first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the
Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,
Of these cases, the first, numbered L-28040 is an appeal by
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, special administratrix of
the testate estate of Francisco de Borja,1 from the approval of a A N D
compromise agreement by the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch I, in its Special Proceeding No. R-7866, entitled,
The heir and surviving spouse of
"Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, Administrator".
Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
Case No. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose Borja Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis
from the disapproval of the same compromise agreement by Panaguiton Jr.
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II, in its
Special Proceeding No. 832, entitled, "Testate Estate of
W I T N E S S E T H
Francisco de Borja, Tasiana O. Vda. de de Borja, Special
Administratrix".
THAT it is the mutual desire of all the
parties herein terminate and settle, with
And Case No. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de
finality, the various court litigations,
Borja from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
controversies, claims, counterclaims, etc.,
Branch X, in its Civil Case No. 7452, declaring the Hacienda
between them in connection with the
Jalajala Poblacion, which is the main object of the aforesaid
administration, settlement, partition,
compromise agreement, as the separate and exclusive property
adjudication and distribution of the assets
of the late Francisco de Borja and not a conjugal asset of the
as well as liabilities of the estates of
community with his first wife, Josefa Tangco, and that said
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, first
hacienda pertains exclusively to his testate estate, which is
spouse of Francisco de Borja.
under administrator in Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch II.
THAT with this end in view, the parties
herein have agreed voluntarily and
It is uncontested that Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his
without any reservations to enter into
wife Josefa Tangco on 6 October 1940, filed a petition for the
and execute this agreement under the
probate of her will which was docketed as Special Proceeding
following terms and conditions:
No. R-7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch I. The
will was probated on 2 April 1941. In 1946, Francisco de Borja
was appointed executor and administrator: in 1952, their son, 1. That the parties agree to sell the
Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator. When Francisco Poblacion portion of the Jalajala
died, on 14 April 1954, Jose became the sole administrator of properties situated in Jalajala, Rizal,
the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco. While a presently under administration in the

Page 24 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco (Sp. Proc. Development Bank of the Philippines and
No. 7866, Rizal), more specifically the heirs-children of Francisco de Borja.
described as follows:
4. Thereafter, the buyer of Jalajala
Linda al Norte con el "Poblacion" is hereby authorized to pay
Rio Puwang que la directly to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
separa de la Borja the balance of the payment due her
jurisdiccion del under paragraph 2 of this Agreement
Municipio de Pililla (approximately P766,500.00) and issue in
de la Provincia de the name of Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Rizal, y con el pico Borja, corresponding certified
del Monte checks/treasury warrants, who, in turn,
Zambrano; al Oeste will issue the corresponding receipt to
con Laguna de Bay; Jose de Borja.
por el Sur con los
herederos de
5. In consideration of above payment to
Marcelo de Borja; y
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, Jose
por el Este con los
de Borja personally and as administrator
terrenos de la
of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, and
Familia Maronilla
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja, for
themselves and for their heirs, successors,
with a segregated area of approximately executors, administrators, and assigns,
1,313 hectares at the amount of P0.30 per hereby forever mutually renounce,
square meter. withdraw, waive, remise, release and
discharge any and all manner of action or
actions, cause or causes of action, suits,
2. That Jose de Borja agrees and obligates
debts, sum or sums of money, accounts,
himself to pay Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
damages, claims and demands
de Borja the total amount of Eight
whatsoever, in law or in equity, which
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000)
they ever had, or now have or may have
Philippine Currency, in cash, which
against each other, more specifically Sp.
represent P200,000 as his share in the
Proceedings Nos. 7866 and 1955, CFI-
payment and P600,000 as pro-rata shares
Rizal, and Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija,
of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and
Civil Case No. 3033, CFI Nueva Ecija and
Matilde, all surnamed de Borja and this
Civil Case No. 7452-CFI, Rizal, as well as
shall be considered as full and complete
the case filed against Manuel Quijal for
payment and settlement of her hereditary
perjury with the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal,
share in the estate of the late Francisco de
the intention being to completely,
Borja as well as the estate of Josefa
absolutely and finally release each other,
Tangco, Sp. Proc. No. 832-Nueva Ecija and
their heirs, successors, and assigns, from
Sp. Proc. No. 7866-Rizal, respectively, and
any and all liability, arising wholly or
to any properties bequeathed or devised
partially, directly or indirectly, from the
in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja
administration, settlement, and
by Last Will and Testament or by
distribution of the assets as well as
Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or
liabilities of the estates of Francisco de
purportedly conveyed to her for
Borja and Josefa Tangco, first spouse of
consideration or otherwise. The funds for
Francisco de Borja, and lastly, Tasiana
this payment shall be taken from and
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja expressly and
shall depend upon the receipt of full
specifically renounce absolutely her
payment of the proceeds of the sale of
rights as heir over any hereditary share in
Jalajala, "Poblacion."
the estate of Francisco de Borja.

3. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de

6. That Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Borja hereby assumes payment of that
Borja, upon receipt of the payment under
particular obligation incurred by the late
paragraph 4 hereof, shall deliver to the
Francisco de Borja in favor of the
heir Jose de Borja all the papers, titles and
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now
documents belonging to Francisco de
Development Bank of the Philippines,
Borja which are in her possession and
amounting to approximately P30,000.00
said heir Jose de Borja shall issue in turn
and also assumes payment of her 1/5
the corresponding receive thereof.
share of the Estate and Inheritance taxes
on the Estate of the late Francisco de
Borja or the sum of P3,500.00, more or 7. That this agreement shall take effect
less, which shall be deducted by the buyer only upon the fulfillment of the sale of the
of Jalajala, "Poblacion" from the payment properties mentioned under paragraph 1
to be made to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de of this agreement and upon receipt of the
Borja under paragraph 2 of this total and full payment of the proceeds of
Agreement and paid directly to the the sale of the Jalajala property

Page 25 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

"Poblacion", otherwise, the non- The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not applicable to
fulfillment of the said sale will render this the case at bar. This is apparent from an examination of the
instrument NULL AND VOID AND terms of the agreement between Jose de Borja and Tasiana
WITHOUT EFFECT THEREAFTER. Ongsingco. Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically
stipulates that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana
Ongsingco —
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties
hereto have her unto set their hands in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the 12th of shall be considered as full — complete
October, 1963. payment — settlement of her hereditary
share in the estate of the late Francisco de
Borja as well as the estate of Josefa
On 16 May 1966, Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval
Tangco, ... and to any properties
the agreement of 12 October 1963 to the Court of First
bequeathed or devised in her favor by the
Instance of Rizal, in Special Proceeding No. R-7866; and again,
late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and
on 8 August 1966, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or
in Special Proceeding No. 832. Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de
Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to
Borja opposed in both instances. The Rizal court approved the
her for consideration or otherwise.
compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it
void and unenforceable. Special administratrix Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the
approval (now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while Guevara case is not applicable to the cases at bar. There was
administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of disapproval here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco
(G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will.
Ecija. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by
Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual in the estate of Francisco de Borja
The genuineness and due execution of the compromised
and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other
agreement of 12 October 1963 is not disputed, but its validity
claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a
is, nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground
decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from
that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement
the moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in
without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that
interest (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 777)3 there is no
the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage
legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity)
between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3)
disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately after such
that even if it were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.
death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined
until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.4 Of course, the
In assailing the validity of the agreement of 12 October 1963, effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is
Tasiana Ongsingco and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However, the
on this Court's decision in Guevara vs. Guevara. 74 Phil. 479, aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of
wherein the Court's majority held the view that the the transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that
presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the the numerous litigations between the parties (the approving
settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of order of the Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App.
intestacy when the decedent left a will, is against the law and pp. 79-82) are to be considered settled and should be
public policy. It is likewise pointed out by appellant Tasiana dismissed, although such stipulation, as noted by the Rizal
Ongsingco that Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Revised Rules Court, gives the contract the character of a compromise that
explicitly conditions the validity of an extrajudicial settlement the law favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to
of a decedent's estate by agreement between heirs, upon the avoid a multiplicity of suits.
facts that "(if) the decedent left no will and no debts, and the
heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
It is likewise worthy of note in this connection that as the
judicial and legal representatives ..." The will of Francisco de
surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja, Tasiana Ongsingco was
Borja having been submitted to the Nueva Ecija Court and still
his compulsory heir under article 995 et seq. of the present
pending probate when the 1963 agreement was made, those
Civil Code. Wherefore, barring unworthiness or valid
circumstances, it is argued, bar the validity of the agreement.
disinheritance, her successional interest existed independent
of Francisco de Borja's last will and testament and would exist
Upon the other hand, in claiming the validity of the even if such will were not probated at all. Thus, the
compromise agreement, Jose de Borja stresses that at the time prerequisite of a previous probate of the will, as established in
it was entered into, on 12 October 1963, the governing the Guevara and analogous cases, can not apply to the case of
provision was Section 1, Rule 74 of the original Rules of Court Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja.
of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will
Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered into by
or not. He also relies on the dissenting opinion of Justice
and between "Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of
Moran, in Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479, wherein was
the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand, and on
expressed the view that if the parties have already divided the
the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja
estate in accordance with a decedent's will, the probate of the
by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it
will is a useless ceremony; and if they have divided the estate
is clear that the transaction was binding on both in their
in a different manner, the probate of the will is worse than
individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even
useless.
without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same.
The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and
one that is submitted and approved by the Court, is that the

Page 26 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

latter can be enforced by execution proceedings. Art. 2037 of her share formed part of the estate of Francisco de Borja and
the Civil Code is explicit on the point: could not be sold until authorized by the Probate Court. The
Court of First Instance of Rizal so understood it, and in
approving the compromise it fixed a term of 120 days counted
8. Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the
from the finality of the order now under appeal, for the
parties the effect and authority of res
carrying out by the parties for the terms of the contract.
judicata; but there shall be no execution
except in compliance with a judicial
compromise. This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of
Rizal had no jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose
de Borja (Annex A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir
It is argued by Tasiana Ongsingco that
in the estate of Josefa Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal
while the agreement Annex A expressed
Court, but she was an heir of Francisco de Borja, whose estate
no definite period for its performance, the
was the object of Special Proceeding No. 832 of the Court of
same was intended to have a resolutory
First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This circumstance is irrelevant,
period of 60 days for its effectiveness. In
since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco was only her
support of such contention, it is averred
eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the estate
that such a limit was expressly stipulated
itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she owned
in an agreement in similar terms entered
from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija
into by said Ongsingco with the brothers
could not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided
and sister of Jose de Borja, to wit,
hereditary share, Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of
Crisanto, Matilde and Cayetano, all
whomsoever she chose. Such alienation is expressly recognized
surnamed de Borja, except that the
and provided for by article 1088 of the present Civil Code:
consideration was fixed at P600,000
(Opposition, Annex/Rec. of Appeal, L-
28040, pp. 39- 46) and which contained Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his
the following clause: hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser
III. That this agreement shall take effect
by reimbursing him for the price of the
only upon the consummation of the sale
sale, provided they do so within the
of the property mentioned herein and
period of one month from the time they
upon receipt of the total and full payment
were notified in writing of the sale of the
of the proceeds of the sale by the herein
vendor.
owner heirs-children of Francisco de
Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and
Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a
that if no sale of the said property fortiori sale thereof to a coheir could not be forbidden.
mentioned herein is consummated, or the
non-receipt of the purchase price thereof
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose
by the said owners within the period of
de Borja (Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a
sixty (60) days from the date hereof, this
compromise as to her status and marriage with the late
agreement will become null and void and
Francisco de Borja. The point is without merit, for the very
of no further effect.
opening paragraph of the agreement with Jose de Borja (Annex
"A") describes her as "the heir and surviving spouse of
Ongsingco's argument loses validity when it is considered that Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco
Jose de Borja was not a party to this particular contract (Annex Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of her
1), and that the same appears not to have been finalized, since civil status. There is nothing in the text of the agreement that
it bears no date, the day being left blank "this — day of October would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the
1963"; and while signed by the parties, it was not notarized, surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in
although plainly intended to be so done, since it carries a consideration of the cession of her hereditary rights.
proposed notarial ratification clause. Furthermore, the
compromise contract with Jose de Borja (Annex A), provides in
It is finally charged by appellant Ongsingco, as well as by the
its par. 2 heretofore transcribed that of the total consideration
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of 21
of P800, 000 to be paid to Ongsingco, P600,000 represent the
September 1964, in Special Proceedings No. 832 (Amended
"prorata share of the heirs Crisanto, Cayetano and Matilde all
Record on Appeal in L-28568, page 157), that the compromise
surnamed de Borja" which corresponds to the consideration of
agreement of 13 October 1963 (Annex "A") had been
P600,000 recited in Annex 1, and that circumstance is proof
abandoned, as shown by the fact that, after its execution, the
that the duly notarized contract entered into wit Jose de Borja
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, in its order of 21
under date 12 October 1963 (Annex A), was designed to
September 1964, had declared that "no amicable settlement
absorb and supersede the separate unformalize agreement
had been arrived at by the parties", and that Jose de Borja
with the other three Borja heirs. Hence, the 60 days resolutory
himself, in a motion of 17 June 1964, had stated that the
term in the contract with the latter (Annex 1) not being
proposed amicable settlement "had failed to materialize".
repeated in Annex A, can not apply to the formal compromise
with Jose de Borja. It is moreover manifest that the stipulation
that the sale of the Hacienda de Jalajala was to be made within It is difficult to believe, however, that the amicable settlement
sixty days from the date of the agreement with Jose de Borja's referred to in the order and motion above-mentioned was the
co-heirs (Annex 1) was plainly omitted in Annex A as improper compromise agreement of 13 October 1963, which already had
and ineffective, since the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) that been formally signed and executed by the parties and duly
was to be sold to raise the P800,000 to be paid to Ongsingco for notarized. What the record discloses is that some time after its

Page 27 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

formalization, Ongsingco had unilaterally attempted to back between the parties. But as the question may affect the rights
out from the compromise agreement, pleading various reasons of possible creditors and legatees, its resolution is still
restated in the opposition to the Court's approval of Annex "A" imperative.
(Record on Appeal, L-20840, page 23): that the same was
invalid because of the lapse of the allegedly intended
It is undisputed that the Hacienda Jalajala, of around 4,363
resolutory period of 60 days and because the contract was not
hectares, had been originally acquired jointly by Francisco de
preceded by the probate of Francisco de Borja's will, as
Borja, Bernardo de Borja and Marcelo de Borja and their title
required by this Court's Guevarra vs. Guevara ruling; that
thereto was duly registered in their names as co-owners in
Annex "A" involved a compromise affecting Ongsingco's status
Land Registration Case No. 528 of the province of Rizal, G.L.R.O.
as wife and widow of Francisco de Borja, etc., all of which
Rec. No. 26403 (De Barjo vs. Jugo, 54 Phil. 465). Subsequently,
objections have been already discussed. It was natural that in
in 1931, the Hacienda was partitioned among the co-owners:
view of the widow's attitude, Jose de Borja should attempt to
the Punta section went to Marcelo de Borja; the Bagombong
reach a new settlement or novatory agreement before seeking
section to Bernardo de Borja, and the part in Jalajala proper
judicial sanction and enforcement of Annex "A", since the latter
(Poblacion) corresponded to Francisco de Borja (V. De Borja
step might ultimately entail a longer delay in attaining final
vs. De Borja 101 Phil. 911, 932).
remedy. That the attempt to reach another settlement failed is
apparent from the letter of Ongsingco's counsel to Jose de
Borja quoted in pages 35-36 of the brief for appellant The lot allotted to Francisco was described as —
Ongsingco in G.R. No. 28040; and it is more than probable that
the order of 21 September 1964 and the motion of 17 June
Una Parcela de terreno en Poblacion,
1964 referred to the failure of the parties' quest for a more
Jalajala: N. Puang River; E. Hermogena
satisfactory compromise. But the inability to reach a novatory
Romero; S. Heirs of Marcelo de Borja O.
accord can not invalidate the original compromise (Annex "A")
Laguna de Bay; containing an area of
and justifies the act of Jose de Borja in finally seeking a court
13,488,870 sq. m. more or less, assessed
order for its approval and enforcement from the Court of First
at P297,410. (Record on Appeal, pages 7
Instance of Rizal, which, as heretofore described, decreed that
and 105)
the agreement be ultimately performed within 120 days from
the finality of the order, now under appeal.
On 20 November 1962, Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, as
Administratrix of the Testate Estate of Francisco de Borja,
We conclude that in so doing, the Rizal court acted in
instituted a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
accordance with law, and, therefore, its order should be
(Civil Case No. 7452) against Jose de Borja, in his capacity as
upheld, while the contrary resolution of the Court of First
Administrator of Josefa Tangco (Francisco de Borja's first wife),
Instance of Nueva Ecija should be, and is, reversed.
seeking to have the Hacienda above described declared
exclusive private property of Francisco, while in his answer
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time defendant (now appellant) Jose de Borja claimed that it was
elapsed in the appeal has affected her unfavorably, in that conjugal property of his parents (Francisco de Borja and Josefa
while the purchasing power of the agreed price of P800,000 Tangco), conformably to the presumption established by
has diminished, the value of the Jalajala property has increased. Article 160 of the Philippine Civil Code (reproducing Article
But the fact is that her delay in receiving the payment of the 1407 of the Civil Code of 1889), to the effect that:
agreed price for her hereditary interest was primarily due to
her attempts to nullify the agreement (Annex "A") she had
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is
formally entered into with the advice of her counsel, Attorney
presumed to belong to the conjugal
Panaguiton. And as to the devaluation de facto of our currency,
partnership, unless it be proved that it
what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30 June 1970,
pertains exclusively to the husband or to
33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were
the wife.
to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the
values of currency and properties of the estate", is particularly
opposite in the present case. Defendant Jose de Borja further counterclaimed for damages,
compensatory, moral and exemplary, as well as for attorney's
fees.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion), concededly acquired by
Francisco de Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge
Tangco, is the husband's private property (as contended by his Herminio Mariano, held that the plaintiff had adduced
second spouse, Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part of sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, and declared the
the conjugal (ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) to be the exclusive private
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, property of the late Francisco de Borja, and his Administratrix,
presiding) declared that there was adequate evidence to Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to be entitled to its
overcome the presumption in favor of its conjugal possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed to this
character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code. Court.

We are of the opinion that this question as between The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the
Tasiana Ongsingco and Jose de Borja has become moot and character of the Hacienda in question as owned by the conjugal
academic, in view of the conclusion reached by this Court partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the
in the two preceding cases (G.R. No. L-28568), upholding late Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the
as valid the cession of Tasiana Ongsingco's eventual share Reamended Inventory that, as executor of the estate of his
in the estate of her late husband, Francisco de Borja, for the deceased wife Josefa Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings
sum of P800,000 with the accompanying reciprocal quit-claims No. 7866 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953

Page 28 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

(Exhibit "2"); and again, in the Reamended Accounting of the of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of the Civil Code of the
same date, also filed in the proceedings aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Philippines.
Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de Borja, herself, as
oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted therein an
The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the
Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of the
Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more, xxx xxx xxx
Tasiana Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco
de Borja, in Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of First
(4) That which is purchased with
Instance of Nueva Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955,
exclusive money of the wife or of the
an inventory wherein she listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the
husband.
heading "Conjugal Property of the Deceased Spouses Francisco
de Borja and Josefa Tangco, which are in the possession of the
Administrator of the Testate Estate of the Deceased Josefa We find the conclusions of the lower court to be untenable. In
Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of First the first place, witness Gregorio de Borja's testimony as to the
Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4"). source of the money paid by Francisco for his share was plain
hearsay, hence inadmissible and of no probative value, since he
was merely repeating what Marcelo de Borja had told him
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact
(Gregorio). There is no way of ascertaining the truth of the
that they are plain admissions against interest made by both
statement, since both Marcelo and Francisco de Borja were
Francisco de Borja and the Administratrix of his estate, in the
already dead when Gregorio testified. In addition, the
course of judicial proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija
statement itself is improbable, since there was no need or
Courts, supporting the legal presumption in favor of the
occasion for Marcelo de Borja to explain to Gregorio how and
conjugal community, the Court below declared that the
when Francisco de Borja had earned the P17,000.00 entrusted
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not conjugal property, but
to Marcelo. A ring of artificiality is clearly discernible in this
the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de Borja. It
portion of Gregorio's testimony.
did so on the strength of the following evidences: (a) the sworn
statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951 (Exhibit "F")
that — As to Francisco de Borja's affidavit, Exhibit "F", the quoted
portion thereof (ante, page 14) does not clearly demonstrate
that the "mi terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion de Jalajala,
He tomado possession del pedazo de
Rizal) " refers precisely to the Hacienda in question. The
terreno ya delimitado (equivalente a 1/4
inventories (Exhibits 3 and 4) disclose that there were two real
parte, 337 hectareas) adjunto a mi
properties in Jalajala owned by Francisco de Borja, one of
terreno personal y exclusivo (Poblacion
72.038 sq. m., assessed at P44,600, and a much bigger one of
de Jalajala, Rizal).
1,357.260.70 sq. m., which is evidently the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion). To which of these lands did the affidavit of
and (b) the testimony of Gregorio de Borja, son of Bernardo de Francisco de Borja (Exhibit "F") refer to? In addition,
Borja, that the entire Hacienda had been bought at a Francisco's characterization of the land as "mi terreno personal
foreclosure sale for P40,100.00, of which amount P25,100 was y exclusivo" is plainly self-serving, and not admissible in the
contributed by Bernardo de Borja and P15,000. by Marcelo de absence of cross examination.
Borja; that upon receipt of a subsequent demand from the
provincial treasurer for realty taxes the sum of P17,000,
It may be true that the inventories relied upon by
Marcelo told his brother Bernardo that Francisco (son of
defendant-appellant (Exhibits "2", "3", "4" and "7") are not
Marcelo) wanted also to be a co-owner, and upon Bernardo's
conclusive on the conjugal character of the property in
assent to the proposal, Marcelo issue a check for P17,000.00 to
question; but as already noted, they are clear admissions
pay the back taxes and said that the amount would represent
against the pecuniary interest of the declarants, Francisco
Francisco's contribution in the purchase of the Hacienda. The
de Borja and his executor-widow, Tasiana Ongsingco, and
witness further testified that —
as such of much greater probative weight than the self-
serving statement of Francisco (Exhibit "F"). Plainly, the
Marcelo de Borja said that that money legal presumption in favor of the conjugal character of the
was entrusted to him by Francisco de Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) now in dispute has not
Borja when he was still a bachelor and been rebutted but actually confirmed by proof. Hence, the
which he derived from his business appealed order should be reversed and the Hacienda de
transactions. (Hearing, 2 February 1965, Jalajala (Poblacion) declared property of the conjugal
t.s.n., pages 13-15) (Emphasis supplied) partnership of Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco.

The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower
sworn statement overweighed the admissions in the court that claims for damages should be ventilated in the
inventories relied upon by defendant-appellant Jose de corresponding special proceedings for the settlement of the
Borja since probate courts can not finally determine estates of the deceased, the same requires no pro
questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that announcement from this Court.
the testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco
de Borja acquired his share of the original Hacienda with
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court
his private funds, for which reason that share can not be
of First Instance of Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby
regarded as conjugal partnership property, but as
affirmed; while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-
exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article 1396(4)
28611 are reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3) cases.

Page 29 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION G.R. No. 162956 Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on
REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and EUTIQUIO DICO, JR., behalf of his minor daughter Deborah Ann C. Enriquez
Petitioners, (Deborah Ann), also known as Dina Abdullah Enriquez
Alsagoff, on the other hand, alleges that their predecessor-in-
interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia Seguera
Cabrera (collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned pro-indiviso
Present: share in the subject parcel of land or 1051 sq. m. They further
allege that Spouses Cabrera were survived by two daughters

Graciana, who died single and without issue, and Etta, the wife
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, of respondent Peter and mother of respondent Deborah Ann
who succeeded their parents rights and took possession of the
- versus - CARPIO, 1051 sq. m. of the subject parcel of land. During her lifetime,
Graciana sold her share over the land to Etta. Thus, making the
CORONA, latter the sole owner of the one-half share of the subject parcel
of land. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on to
*AZCUNA, and petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann by virtue of an Extra-
Judicial Settlement of Estate. On June 19, 1999, petitioners
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. Peter and Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m.
for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and Catalina Fernandez
PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, for himself and Attorney-in-Fact of (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents in the case at
his daughter DEBORAH ANN C. ENRIQUEZ, and SPS. bar. After the sale, Spouses Fernandez took possession of the
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ and CATALINA FERNANDEZ, said area in the subject parcel of land.[4]
Respondents. April 10, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the

x subject land, they discovered that certain documents prevent
them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated
March 16, 1957 stating that his share in Lot No. 1851, the
D E C I S I O N
subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by

Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only
owned of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia
PUNO, C.J.: and the rest of the property is co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso,
Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 Judicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes
of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of dated April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of title in the name of the
Appeals (CA) dated September 29, 2003 in CA G.R. CV No. herein petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real Estate
68147, entitled Peter B. Enriquez, et al. v. Faustino Reyes, et al., and Confirmation of Sale dated March 21, 1997 executed by the
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of alleged heirs of Dionisia Reyes and Anacleto Cabrera. Alleging
Cebu City, Branch XI dated June 29, 2000, which dismissed the that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and fictitious,
complaint filed by the respondents herein.[1] the respondents filed a complaint for annulment or
nullification of the aforementioned documents and for
The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land damages. [5]They likewise prayed for the repartition and
known as Lot No. 1851 Flr-133 with an aggregate area of 2,017 resubdivision of the subject property.[6]
square meters located in Talisay, Cebu.[2]
The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed the
According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion Reyes, case on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs were
Julieta C. Rivera, and Eutiquio Dico, Jr., they are the lawful heirs actually seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of
of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera since they can not demand the partition of
Anacleto Cabrera as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title the real property without first being declared as legal heirs and
(TCT) No. RT-3551 (T-8070). On April 17, 1996, petitioners such may not be done in an ordinary civil action, as in this case,
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of but through a special proceeding specifically instituted for the
Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial Settlement) involving a purpose.[7]
portion of the subject parcel of land. On March 21, 1997, the
petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and
a Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale (the directed the trial court to proceed with the hearing of the
Segregation and Confirmation) over the same property. By case.[8] The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein
virtue of the aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551 (T- petitioners was similarly denied.[9]
8070) was cancelled and new TCTs were issued: (1) TCT No. T-
98576 in the name of Anacleto Cabrera covering Lot 1851-A;
Hence this petition.
(2) TCT No. T-98577 covering Lot 1851-B in the name of
petitioner Eutiquio Dico, Jr.; (3) TCT No. T-98578
covering Lot 1851-C in the name of petitioner Faustino Reyes; The primary issue in this case is whether or not the
(4) TCT No. T-98579 covering Lot 1851-D in the name of respondents have to institute a special proceeding to
petitioner Esperidion Reyes; (5) TCT No. T-98580 determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they
covering Lot 1851-E in the name of petitioner Julieta G. Rivera; can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of
(6) TCT No. T-98581 covering Lot 1851-F in the name of Felipe Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial
Dico; and (7) TCT No. T-98582 covering Lot 1851-G in the Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the
name of Archimedes C. Villaluz.[3] Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale
executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of

Page 30 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer a property or properties belonging to the
certificates of title issued by virtue of the above-questioned estate of the deceased.[22]
documents.

We answer in the affirmative.
In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an
action for the Declaration of Non-Existency[sic], Nullity of
An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc., a review of
for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention the allegations therein reveals that the right being asserted by
or redress of a wrong.[10] A special proceeding, on the other the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
hand, is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a who they claim co-owned one-half of the subject property and
right or a particular fact.[11] not merely one-fourth as stated in the documents the
respondents sought to annul. As correctly pointed out by the
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is trial court, the ruling in the case of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay
allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court.[12] A real v. Hon. Roy del Rosario[23] is applicable in the case at bar. In
party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or the said case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be the legal
injured by the judgment in the suit or the one entitled to the heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for
avails thereof.[13] Such interest, to be considered a real interest, annulment of the transfer certificates of title issued in the
must be one which is present and substantial, as distinguished name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation on the ground that the
from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or subject properties rightfully belong to the petitioners
consequential interest.[14] A plaintiff is a real party in interest predecessor and by virtue of succession have passed on to
when he is the one who has a legal right to enforce or protect, them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled:
while a defendant is a real party in interest when he is the one
who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done ...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the
to the plaintiff by reason of the defendants act or omission legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel
which had violated the legal right of the former.[15] The purpose Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or
of the rule is to protect persons against undue and unnecessary even a semblance of it except the
litigation.[16] It likewise ensures that the court will have the allegations that they are the legal heirs of
benefit of having before it the real adverse parties in the the aforementioned Yaptinchays that they
consideration of a case.[17] Thus, a plaintiffs right to institute an have been declared the legal heirs of the
ordinary civil action should be based on his own right to the deceased couple. Now, the determination
relief sought. of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
couple must be made in the proper
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a special proceedings in court, and not in an
property was registered sue to recover the said property ordinary suit for reconveyance of
through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a property. This must take precedence over
complaint for reconveyance and partition, or nullification of the action for reconveyance.[24]
transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents
related thereto, this Court has consistently ruled that a
declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action
In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their
since the matter is within the exclusive competence of the
allegations, have yet to substantiate their claim as the legal
court in a special proceeding. [20] In the recent case of Portugal
heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject
v. Portugal-Beltran,[21] the Court had the occasion to clarify its
property. Neither is there anything in the records of this case
ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:
which would show that a special proceeding to have

themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case
and Guilas in which the adverse parties for there is a lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by
are putative heirs to the estate of a parties who are not real parties in interest.While a declaration
decedent or parties to the special of heirship was not prayed for in the complaint, it is clear from
proceedings for its settlement is that if the the allegations therein that the right the respondents sought to
special proceedings are pending, or if protect or enforce is that of an heir of one of the registered co-
there are no special proceedings filed owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new
but there is, under the circumstances transfer certificates of title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there
of the case, a need to file one, then the is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper
determination of, among other issues, forum.
heirship should be raised and settled
in said special proceedings. Where
special proceedings had been instituted
Furthermore, in Portugal,[25] the Court held that it would be
but had been finally closed and superfluous to still subject the estate to administration
terminated, however, or if a putative heir proceedings since a determination of the parties' status as
has lost the right to have himself declared heirs could be achieved in the ordinary civil case filed because
in the special proceedings as co-heir and it appeared from the records of the case that the only property
he can no longer ask for its re-opening, left by the decedent was the subject matter of the case and that
then an ordinary civil action can be filed
the parties have already presented evidence to establish their
for his declaration as heir in order to
right as heirs of the decedent. In the present case, however,
bring about the annulment of the
nothing in the records of this case shows that the only property
partition or distribution or adjudication of
left by the deceased Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot, and

Page 31 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

neither had respondents Peter and Deborah Ann presented any

evidence to establish their rights as heirs, considering
especially that it appears that there are other heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera who are not parties in this case that had signed one of
the questioned documents.Hence, under the circumstances in
this case, this Court finds that a determination of the rights of
respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera in a special proceeding is necessary.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of

the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the decision of
the Regional Trial Court dated June 29, 2000 DISMISSING the
complaint is REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Page 32 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005] In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not
related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not
entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she
perjured herself when she made false representations in her
Affidavit of Adjudication.
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS
PORTUGAL JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of
PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent. Adjudication and the TCT in her name be declared void and
that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel
the TCT in respondents name and to issue in its stead a new
D E C I S I O N one in their (petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and
CARPIO MORALES, J.: exemplary damages and attorneys fees and litigation expenses
be awarded to them.

Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court
Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 2002[1] Decision of the issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other things,
Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court the issues as follows:
(RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124[2] which dismissed, after
trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased
a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
From the records of the case are gathered the following
material allegations claims of the parties which they sought b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant
to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q.
trial of the case: Portugal Sr.?
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married
Paz Lazo.[3] c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course
and can still be contested by plaintiffs.
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la
Puerta.[4]
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy the complaint.[16] (Underscoring supplied)
whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-
petitioner.[5] After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18,
2001,[17] after giving an account of the testimonies of the
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,[6] later baptized
parties and their witnesses and of their documentary
as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.[7]
evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial,
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the that petitioners status and right as putative heirs had not been
estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of
November 2, 1964. In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel
rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]
land located in Caloocan in his favor.
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City court held:
issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering
the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to
Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo. the case at bar.
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
x x x
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.

On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a
Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and testimonial evidence
adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the
34292/T-172[13] in Portugals name was subsequently cancelled preliminary act of having a status and right to the estate of the
and in its stead TCT No. 159813[14] was issued by the Registry decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the
of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is
respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1,
Beltran, Jr. 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative
later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the term in the former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to
Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC enforce, a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the
of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint against decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint
respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication failed to state a cause of action.
executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her
name.

Page 33 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or
jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to establish their status right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special
and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party
(Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
2, supra).[19] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring the protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an
supplied). ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus
impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law prohibits
or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals,
permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment
questioning the trial courts ratio decedendi in dismissing the
of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in
case as diametrically opposed to this Courts following ruling
an ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special
in Cario v. Cario,[20] viz:
proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge upon
this axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a supplied).
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,[22] thus
marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a
affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the case.
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a the appellate court to have erred when
final judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court
of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes I.
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory
complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
II.
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, . . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel]
and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and contrary ruling
validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the in Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower
determination of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. court failed to render judgment based on the evidence
13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence must be presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . .
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of .[24] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
(Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied). WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Supreme Court that the questioned CA decision be reversed,
and a new one entered in accordance with the prayers set forth
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001)
in the instant complaint based on the above disquisition and
subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay (in
evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
1999), the appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable,
however, to the case in this wise:
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court
find that the pronouncements in Cario apply, a decision be
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in
entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the
the Cario case was the validity of the two marriages contracted
issues of which of the two marriages is valid, and the
by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death benefits
determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila
was the bone of contention between the two women both
preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title
named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario)
issued in the name of Leonila.
both of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that
SPO4 S. Cario contracted two marriages with said two women
during his lifetime, and the only question was: which of these Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are
two marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the death likewise prayed for.[25] (Underscoring supplied).
benefits of the deceased Cario was thus, merely an incident to
the question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court
other hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu.
misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect
encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this
The main issue here is the annulment of title to property. Court as a reading of Cario shows; that Cario allows courts to
The only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased Jose pass on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or
Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here determination of the case; and that contrary to the appellate
come two contending parties, herein plaintiffs-appellants and courts ruling, they had established their status as compulsory
defendant-appellee, both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of heirs.
the decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties herein
have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x.

Page 34 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it,
petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the
their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for children of the decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
annulment of respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the
TCT issued in her name. On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues
raised for determination was whether they are the legitimate
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel children of Rafael Litam.
Yaptinchay,[26] the therein petitioners executed on March 17,
1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, owners-claimants of the two lots Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael
mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found
that a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the substantially correct the trial courts findings of fact and its
name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty and conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy
Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof Tam et al. do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael
to the therein individual respondents. The therein Litam and the persons named therein as father [and] it does
petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had
The therein respondents moved to dismiss the case for failure in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof;
of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and that [t]he other documentary evidence presented by
and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the [them] [is] entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove
motion to dismiss in this wise: the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and
Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said
decedent.
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the
a semblance of itexcept the allegations that they are the legal lower court should not have declared, in the decision
heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat they have been appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the
declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil
determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding.
not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must
take precedence over the action for reconveyance . . .[27] (Italics In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,
in the original; underscoring supplied). there was a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of
Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of said court
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedents maternal
that the petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva,
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the decedents paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to
the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of reconsider the courts order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole
Appeals,[29] this Court held that the declaration of heirship can heir of the decedent, she claiming that she too was an heir. The
be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of
petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil
right. case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition,
recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted
was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, which rendered judgment
a special proceeding for issuance of letters of administration
in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in
court affirmed the said judgment.
his petition that he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in
Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who
therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the posed, among other issues, whether Branch 26 of the RTC of
decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition
1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines and recovery of Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of
another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the decedent [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still
left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court, this Court held
issuance of letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, the that [i]n the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid
surviving spouse of the decedent. The CFI granted the petition confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents
and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosas request, estate, a court should not interfere with [estate]
her nephew Arminio Rivera. proceedings pending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI
Judge of Pampanga.[32]
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his
purported siblings filed a civil case before the same court, This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the
against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein
and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to
In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to
substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of
the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and
Marcosa. In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an
adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in
some unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate of the
were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it

Page 35 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate court settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or if
directed that the records of the case be archived. there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the
circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive determination of, among other issues, heirship should be
father to annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion, raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special
preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed
immediately deliver to her the two lots allocated to her in the and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right
project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the to have himself declared in the special proceedings as co-heir
testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary
her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her. civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order
to bring about the annulment of the partition or
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court,
distribution or adjudication of a property or properties
noting the parties agreement to suspend action or resolution
belonging to the estate of the deceased.
on Juanitas motion in the testate estate proceedings for the
delivery to her of the two lots alloted to her until after her In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that
complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February
trial. 15, 1988[35] the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the
second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the
Court.[36] Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when
order setting it for trial on the ground that in the amended
a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially
complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the
administered and the competent court should appoint a
partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule
she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was
78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed
seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April
to name an executor therein.[37]
27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there was
no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of
estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has
possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
1966, denied the motion.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
Court. parcel of land,[38] to still subject it, under the circumstances of
the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence,
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and
not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
directive that the records of the case be sent to the archives
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
proceedings had not been legally terminated as Juanitas share
And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the
under the project of partition had not been delivered to her.
civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in
Explained this Court:
fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed
jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not trial.
been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there
because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to
not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his administration proceedings since a determination of
share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case
(Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, filed by petitioners the trial court should proceed to evaluate
for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and
his share through a proper motion in the same probate or render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during
administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
probate or administrative proceedings if it had already
been closed, and not through an independent action, 1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by
which would be tried by another court or Judge which may the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r]
intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. 2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and
Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of
vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455,
460-461).[34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied). 3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in
due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of
the trial court setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the 4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their
civil case to continue because it involves no longer the two claim under the complaint.[40]
lots adjudicated to Juanita.

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its SET ASIDE.

Page 36 of 37

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
Limited Jurisdiction

xxx

Page 37 of 37