Chapter 14

Mark Soledad v P- Abratique

FACTS: Mark Soledad was found guilty of violation of RA 8484 or the Access Devices
Regulations Act. Henry Yu, the private complainant, was enticed by Soledad to apply for a low
interest credit card. He submitted his Globe handyphone gold card, identification cards, and
statements of account. Later, it was discovered that he had applications for five mobile phone
numbers (plan) and with credit card companies including MetrobankCard Corp. However, the
pictures appearing therein were those of Mark Soledad while the signatures were forged.
During the entrapment operation, NBIs Special Investigator (SI) Salvador Arteche [Arteche],
together with some other NBI operatives, arrived in Las Pias around 5:00 P.M. [Arteche] posed
as the delivery boy of the Metrobank credit card. Upon reaching the address written on the
delivery receipt, Arteche asked for Henry Yu. Soledad responded that he was Henry Yu and
presented to Arteche two identification cards which bore the name and signature of private
complainant, while the picture showed the face of Soledad. Soledad signed the delivery receipt.
He was arrested thereafter.
Soledad assails the validity of the information. He contends that though he was informed of the
charge, the act of the possession of an access device fraudulently obtained, which is the
gravamen of the offense was not alleged in the information. The information reads:
“That on or about the 13th day of August 2004, or prior thereto, in the City of Las Pias, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating with certain Rochelle Bagaporo a.k.a. Juliet Villar/Tess and a certain Ronald
Gobenciong a.k.a. Carlo and all of them mutually helping and aiding each other, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud complainant HENRY YU by applying a credit
card, an access device defined under R.A. 8484, from METROBANK CARD CORPORATION,
using the name of complainant Henry C. Yu and his personal documents fraudulently obtained
from him, and which credit card in the name of Henry Yu was successfully issued and delivered
to said accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice
of the real Henry Yu.”
ISSUE: Was the accused sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusation against him?
DECISION: Yes. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the
guidelines in determining the sufficiency of a complaint or information. It states: “SEC. 6.
Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date
of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.”
The Information contained all the necessary details of the offense committed, sufficient to
apprise petitioner of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As aptly argued by
respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, although the
word possession was not used in the accusatory portion of the Information, the word possessing
appeared in its preamble or the first paragraph thereof. Thus, contrary to petitioners contention,
he was apprised that he was being charged with violation of R.A. No. 8484, specifically section
9(e) thereof, for possession of the credit card fraudulently applied for.
The preamble or opening paragraph should not be treated as a mere aggroupment of descriptive
words and phrases. It is as much an essential part [of] the Information as the accusatory
paragraph itself. The preamble in fact complements the accusatory paragraph which draws its
strength from the preamble. It lays down the predicate for the charge in general terms; while the
accusatory portion only provides the necessary details.
Even if the word possession was not repeated in the accusatory portion of the Information, the
acts constituting it were clearly described in the statement [that the] credit card in the name of
Henry Yu was successfully issued, and delivered to said accused using a fictitious identity and
addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu. Without a doubt,
petitioner was given the necessary data as to why he was being prosecuted.

Abellana v People-Alden
FACTS: In 1985, Petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and Saapia to
which was secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, two parcel of land located in Cebu City.
On 1987, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him to which was
signed by the private respondent spouses in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu without
the presence of private respondents.
On August 12, 1999, an information was filed charging the petitioner with Estafa through
falsification of Public Document.Petitioner pleaded not guilty, the trial court rendered the
decision finding the petitioner guilty of Falsification of a Public Document and not of the crime
charge under the information. He was directed to return the properties to the spouses and to pay a
sum of P 130,000 with legal interests, nominal damages,attorney's fees, litigation expense and
exemplary damages, plus cost of the suit.
Petitioner upon appeal raised the issue whether an accused acquitted of the crime charged
may nevertheless convicted of another crime or offense not specifically charged in the
information. CA reversed the decision that it violated the constitutional right of the petitioner to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. However, the CA affirmed the
trial courts decision with respect to the civil liability. Hence this petition.
HELD: The CA opined that the conviction of the petitioner for an offense not alleged in the
Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged violated his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Here, the CA set aside the trial courts Decision because it convicted petitioner of an
offense different from or not included in the crime charged in the Information. To recall,
petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of public document. However, the RTC
found that the spouses Alonto actually signed the document although they did not personally
appear before the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead convicted petitioner
of falsification of public document. On appeal, the CA held that petitioners conviction cannot be
sustained because it infringed on his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

Dela cruz v people-Apolonio

P v Parazo-Baucas
Crime: rape and frustrated homicide
Accused: Marlon Parazo, 28-year-old
Defense on Appeal: absence of a sign language expert, which if true would warrant the setting
aside of his judgment of conviction.Mrs. Eufrocina Zenaida Francisco, mother of Marlon
admitted that her son was born deaf and mute. He never had any formal education.The Barangay
Chairman of Caimito, Palayan City, Mr. Antonio Sebastian, Mrs. Juliana Baltazar, a retired
schoolteacher, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, Field Office, Palayan City,
testified that Parazo was indeed deaf and mute.Based on the collateral information gathered from
persons who have known the patient since childhood, together with the results of the diagnostic
test at UP-PGH and evidenced by the psychological report, it is now established that Marlon
Parazo is suffering from (1) Profound Hearing Loss, left ear; (2) Severe Hearing Loss, right ear;
(3) Mental Retardation, Mild.Records show that Parazo was tried below without the benefit of a
sign language expert. The fact that he was helped and assisted by a person who has been known
to him since 1983, as noted by the trial court is of no moment, absent any clear showing that
appellant was aided by a competent sign language expert able to fully understand and interpret
the actions and mutterings of Parazo.The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could
have conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was
charged and who could also have communicated the accused’s own version of the circumstances
which led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accused’s final plea of not guilty can
excuse these inherently unjust circumstances.The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign
language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the
charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The
accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was
determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.Decision by the lower
court is set aside; and appellant is hereby GRANTED a RE-ARRAIGNMENT and RE-
TRIAL, with the assistance of counsel and a competent sign language expert.
People vs Larena- Bautista
Facts: Appellant Cesar Larena was charged with five counts of rape before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 16 of Zamboanga. The complainant was his 13-year old daughter, Dolores Larena,
which relationship was not specified in the information. Complainant testified that the first time
she was sexually abused by her father was at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning on December 5,
1993. She went home from the hospital to get their clothes and while she was inside their
parents' room, her father forcibly had a sexual intercourse with her. This incident was followed
by three more incidents on January 20, 1994, February 10, 1994 and March 12, 1994 which
usually happened at around midnight inside their bedroom when her sisters were sleeping.
She did not reveal all those incidents to anyone because of the continuing threats from her father
to kill all of them. Again, on April 19, 1994, at around 4:30 in the morning, her father woke her
up to boil water in the kitchen. While she was putting the kettle on the stove, her father pulled
her towards him and had a sexual intercourse with her while she was made to sit his lap with her
back towards him. At this point, her mother went down to the kitchen and saw them. When the
appellant was no longer around and because of the prodding of her mother, she revealed
everything to her mother.
On the other hand, the appellant denied having raped her daughter. After trial, the appellant was
convicted as charged and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the
incident that took place on December 5, 1993, was before the effectivity of R.A. 7659. He was
also sentenced to suffer four (4) death penalties in the other four rape cases.

Held: Settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses are
entitled to great weight on appeal as it is in a better position to decide the question of credibility,
having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of
testifying.
The trial court, in rendering said decision against herein accused-appellant, noted that his
negative testimony merely denying the commission of five (5) counts of rape against his own
daughter was not corroborated by the testimony of any other witness as opposed to the positive,
credible and convincing testimony of his daughter, Dolores and his wife, Teresa.
Time and time again, the Court has stated that denial, like alibi, is a weak defense which
becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification of the accused by the complaining
witness. As between positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth on one hand,
and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
While the failure to allege the relationship between accused-appellant and the complainant
appears to be a mere technicality, it nevertheless saves accused-appellant from the supreme
penalty of death imposable for qualified rape because he was not properly informed that he is
being accused of qualified rape. Due process demands that an accused in a criminal case
should be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is brought
to trial in order to enable him to prepare for his defense. In meting out the death penalty upon
accused-appellant for qualified rape, the trial court violated accused-appellant's constitutional
right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The appellant was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the five cases of rape.

Sales v CA-Cabigting
P v Crisologo-Carlos
FACTS:
Zosimo Crisologo alias “Amang”, a deaf-mute, was charged for robbery and homicide
committed on 1 May 1976 in Calamagoy, Poblacion Magsaysay, Davao del Sur. Accused was
allegedly informed of the charged against him through sign language but apparently no sign
language expert or representative was available. The accused through a counsel de oficio waived
the reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded without any evidence
being presented on his part. Finally, without the services of an expert in sign language ever being
utilized at any stage of the proceedings, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of robbery with homicide and sentenced to die by electrocution. Executive clemency was
recommended, however, in view of the accused's infirmity and his nearly ten-year detention as a
suspect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was given due process of law and the insufficiency of the
purely circumstantial evidence presented to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence be in his favor.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have
conveyed to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged
and who could also have communicated the accused's own version of the circumstances which
led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accused's final plea of not guilty can excuse these
inherently unjust circumstances.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in
writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his
fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by
which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused
could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life
and liberty were at stake.
The Constitution of this state expressly provides that an accused has a right to be heard by
himself and counsel, also, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; against him, and,
further to be confronted by the witnesses, who are to testify against him. In constructing this
constitutional provision it needs no discussion in deciding that all this must be done in a manner
by which the accused can know, the nature and the cause of the accusation he is called upon to
answer, and all necessary means must be provided, and the law so contemplates, that the accused
must not only be confronted by the witnesses against him, but he must be accorded all necessary
means to know and understand the testimony given by said witnesses, and must be placed in a
condition where he can make his plea rebut such testimony, and give his own version of the
transaction upon which the accusation is based.
P v Corral(Amadeo Corral)-Dino
G.R. No. L-42300, January 31, 1936FACTS: Appellant was charged having voted
illegally at the general elections held on June 5, 1934. After due trial, he was convicted on the
ground that he had voted while laboring under a legal disqualification. The judgment of
conviction was based on section 2642, in connection with section 432. of the Revised
Administrative Code. It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by final judgment of
this court promulgated on March 3, 1910,1 to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor.
No evidence was presented to show that prior to June 5, 1934, he had been granted a plenary
pardon. It is likewise undisputed that at the general elections held on June 5, 1934, the voted in
election precinct No. 18 of the municipality of Davao, Province of Davao.HELD: The
manifest purpose of such restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections. The
presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or other base offenpse
indicative of moral turpitude, is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold office.
Upon the facts established in this case, it seems clear that the appellant was not entitled to vote
on June 5 1934, because of section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code which disqualified
from voting any person who, since the 13th day of August, 1898, had been sentenced by final
judgment to offer not less than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been
removed by plenary pardon. As above stated, the appellant had been sentenced by final judgment
to suffer eight years and one day of presidio mayor, and had not been granted a plenary pardon.
The disqualification for crime imposed under section 432 of the Revised Administrative Code
having once attached on the appellant and not having been subsequently removed by a plenary
pardon, continued and rendered it illegal for the appellant to vote at the general elections of
1934. Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for the appellant
that the disqualification imposed on the latter must be considered as having been removed at the
expiration of his sentence. This claim is based upon an erroneous theory of the nature of the
disqualification. It regards it as a punishment when, as already indicated, the correct view is that
it is imposed, "for protection and not for punishment,. the withholding of a privilege and not the
denial of a personal right." Judicial interpretation and long established administrative practice are
against such a view.
P v Resavaga -Lopez, Missing case

Formilleza v SB­Dulnuan

FACTS: Petitioner Leonor Formilleza was caught in an entrapment operation allegedly 
receiving bribe from Mrs. Estrella Mutia, Formilleza's co­employee. 

Formilleza was an employee of the regional office of the National Irrigation Administration 
(NIA) in Tacloban City, Leyte and Mutia while an employee of the same office from February, 
1978 up to March, 1985. However, on December 31, 1983, Mutia's appointment was terminated 
but she remained an employee pursuant to the verbal instructions of NIA's regional director.  

Seeking a permanent status or at least a renewed appointment at the office, Mutia asked the 
regional director for advice who in turn referred her to Formilleza who was then in charge to 
determine the employees to be appointed or promoted. 
Mutia alleged that Formilleza refused to attend to her appointment papers unless the latter were 
given some money. 

Mutia reported her problem to the PC who in turn arranged for an entrapment operation. 

The first attempt to entrap Formilleza was on February 28, 1984. The plan did not materialize as
the petitioner did not show up at the designated rendezvous at the NIA building canteen.    

The   second   attempt   was   on   February   29,1984   and   it   yielded   results.   Mutia   and   Formilleza
proceeded to the canteen along with two of their colleagues. Mutia maintains that after they had
finished taking their snacks, she handed the marked money bills under the table with her right
hand  to  Formilleza  who received  the  same  with  her  left  hand.  At  that  moment,  PC  Officer
Sergeant Bonjoc approached Formilleza and held her hand holding the money bills. Sergeant
Abanes brought out his camera and took photographs of the sequence of events. He was able to
take seven photographs.  

The Sandiganbayan convicted Formilleza of Indirect Bribery. 

ISSUE: WON Formilleza was guilty beyond reasonable doubt 

HELD:  No. The Supreme Court ruled that the essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined
in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code  is that the public officer concerned must have accepted
the gift or material consideration.  

There must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the gift so offered and
consider   the   same   as   his   own   property   from   then   on,   such   as   putting   away   the   gift   for
safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign,
circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that
the crime of indirect bribery has been committed.  

So, did the petitioner accept the supposed bribe money? 

The Sandiganbayan noted that the photographs of the entrapment show that the petitioner was
accosted by the PC soldiers after she accepted the marked money. An examination of the seven
photographs that were allegedly taken immediately after the passing of the money shows that the
petitioner was standing up when the PC agents apprehended her. This corroborates petitioner's
story that Mrs. Mutia suddenly placed something in her hand which she did not know to be
money and when she saw that it was money she threw it away.  
There was no picture showing petitioner to be seated which should be her position immediately
after the money was handed to her under the table, which should be the case according to the
version   of   the   prosecution.   None   of   the   photographs   show   the   petitioner   in   the   process   of
appropriating or keeping the money after it was handed to her. Two of the seven photographs
that were taken outside the canteen appear to be of no relevance to the operation. 

However, what is revealing is that two collegues were present around the table in the canteen
with the petitioner and Mrs. Mutia when the latter allegedly handed the money to the petitioner.
Under the circumstances and in such a public place it is not probable that petitioner would have
the nerve to accept bribe money from Mrs. Mutia even under the table. 

If the petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs. Mutia at the canteen, the
petitioner would not have invited her officemate Mrs. Sevilla to join them. Mrs. Sevilla stated
she did not see the alleged passing of the money. She could not have seen the money as it was
passed on under the table or when, as petitioner said it was quickly placed in her hand when she
stood up. What Mrs. Sevilla is sure of is that when they were about to leave the canteen, two (2)
men approached petitioner, one of whom took pictures, and the petitioner shouted at Mrs. Mutia,
"What are you trying to do to me?" The reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guilty
conscience. 

Moral certainty, not absolute certainty, is needed to support a judgment of conviction, Moral
certainty is a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to
act upon a given matter. Without this standard of certainty, it may not be said that the guilt of the
accused in a criminal proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 

P v Labado-Flora
Ko Bu Lin v CA-Follante
P v Cabale-Garduce (May 8, 1990)
Facts:
On June 7, 1968, 8PM, in Barrio Magaupas, Southern Leyte, four men (Demetrio Cabale,
Florencio Daniel, Benito Terante alias "Bodoy", and Bonifacio Cualteros) arrived at the store of
Rufina Rosello, an octogenarian. Two men went inside and demanded money from Rufina, while
the other two stayed outside and fired shots in the air, warning all those not involved to stay
away. Rufina refused to give them money so they dragged her outside to a bamboo bed where
they strangled her.
As this was going on, Ricarido Fernando, riding on a motorcycle, arrived at the scene. When he
did not stop as ordered by the men, his motorcycle was kicked and he fell. He was ordered to lie
flat on the ground while one man took P492 from his pocket. He was then repeatedly kicked.
Rufina was strangled to death. The men went back to the store and came out with her alkansiya.
Ricarido suffered injuries and was incapacitated to work for 15 days.
During the initial investigations, Florencio Daniel admitted that he participated in the
commission of the robberies and pointed to Demetrio Cabale and Benito Terante as his
companions.
They were charged in two separate informations before the CFI of Maasin, Southern Leyte:
Robbery in Band with Less Serious Physical Injuries, for the crime committed against Ricarido;
and Robbery in Band with Homicide, for the crime committed against Rufina.
For Robbery in band w Homicide, Daniel, Cabale and Terante were found guilty and sentenced
to death. For the Robbery w LSPI, Daniel and Terante were sentenced to prison correccional to
prision mayor, while Cabale was sentenced to prision mayor.
Cualteros was acquitted of both charges on reasonable doubt, but was still ordered to indemnify
the victims.
In view of the death penalty imposed upon Cabale, Daniel, and Terante in records were
forwarded to the SC. However, upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution under which the
death penalty is no longer imposable, the accused Daniel, when asked whether or not he would
like to continue with the review of the decision as an ordinary appeal, informed the Court that he
was no longer interested in pursuing an appeal and was willing to serve the reduced penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Accordingly, the judgment against him was considered final.
Since the judgment against Cabale has also become final due to his escape from detention, only
the appeal of the accused Terante is left for consideration. He manifested his desire to continue
and pursue his appeal.
He denied having participated in the commission of the offenses charged in the informations, and
interposed the defense of alibi. According to him, he was in the copra drier, located at Barrio
Suba, Sogod, Southern Leyte from 7PM that day to June 10, standing watch over piles of
coconuts to be made into copra.
Main contention: He also claimed that there was an irregularity in his arraignment since it was
done after the cases had been submitted for decision, so that he was not afforded the chance to
prepare properly for his defense; and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt since the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are inconsistent and
improbable.
Issue: WON Terante was afforded his right to be informed.
Held: Yes. No right was violated. The SC did not find merit in his appeal.
While the arraignment of the appellant was conducted after the cases had been submitted for
decision, the error is non-prejudicial and has been fully cured.
In People vs. Atienza, where a similar issue was raised, the Court said: "Counsel for the appellant
attacks the procedure followed in the trial already referred where the two accused were arraigned
after the prosecution had rested its case, and he claims that the trial court erred in considering
such evidence, especially since the trial court itself had declared all the proceedings had before
arraignment as null and void. The error, if any, is non-prejudicial. The interests of the appellant
have not suffered thereby. His counsel entered into trial without any objection on the ground that
his client had not yet been arraigned. Said counsel cross-examined the witnesses for the
prosecution. When the fiscal offered to reproduce all his evidence by presenting again his
witnesses, instead of accepting said offer, he agreed or rather did not object to having that same
evidence for the government declared by the court as reproduced. We hold that this error or
irregularity has not prejudiced the right or interests of the appellant, and considering that
appellant's counsel had full opportunity of cross-examining all the witnesses who took the
witness stand for the government and that furthermore he agreed to the reproduction, of the
evidence from the prosecution, the error or defect had been substantially or fully cured."
In this case, counsel for the appellant entered into trial without objecting that his client, the
appellant herein, had not yet been arraigned. Said counsel had also the full opportunity of cross-
examining the witnesses for the prosecution. Then, when the cases were being retried after the
appellant had been arraigned, appellant's counsel filed a joint manifestation with the prosecution,
adopting all proceedings had previous to the arraignment of the appellant.
There was, therefore, no violation of the appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

P v Regala-Gonzales
Facts: The accused Rudy Regala was convicted of murder with assault against an agent of person
in authority. In June 13th 1964, Rudy Regala allegedly stabbed PC Sgt. Juan Desilos Jr. after the
former tried to enter the “Exit Gate” where Sgt. Desilos was controlling the traffic. The public
dance and Coronation of Princess has just finished. Sgt. Desilos forbid the entry of Regala and
his companion in the Exit gate which led to the stabbing incident.
Issue: Whether or not the accused should be convicted of a complex crime of Murder with
assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
Ruling: The conviction was erroneous. The prosecution did not allege the essential element of
assault upon an agent of a person in authority. The information alleged that Sgt. Desilos was a
PC officer and was attacked during performance of his duty however that cannot be adequate
substitute for the essential requisites to justify a conviction of a complex crime. The information
can only be considered as an aggravating circumstance to the crime of homicide which is
contempt for/ insult to public authority.

The right to meet witnesses face to face/Right of Confrontation

Dela Cruz v Papa-Lacaden
FACTS:
The Intestate Estate of Angela M. Butte (the Estate) filed an action for cancellation of titles,
recovery of properties, and damages against several defendants, including petitioner spouses
Reuben and Minerva Dela Cruz before the (RTC) of Antipolo City. On October 21, 1999 the
Estate presented Myron C. Papa as its executor, to testify on the substance of the complaint. At
the conclusion of Myron’s testimony on that day, the RTC required the Estate and the latter
agreed to present Myron anew at the next scheduled hearing to identify the originals of certain
exhibits, after which counsels for the defendants, would begin to cross-examine him.
But the Estate never got around recalling Myron to the witness stand. He was diagnosed as
suffering from stage four colon and liver cancer, prompting respondent Ramon C. Papa IV, the
Estate’s co-administrator, to seek repeated postponements of hearings in the case to allow Myron
undergo intensive treatment. Later, the Estate filed a motion for leave to have the defendants
cross-examine Myron by deposition at the hospital where he was confined. The RTC granted the
motion and eventually set the deposition-taking on September 2001 but Myron passed away on
August 2001.
On November 2001 one of the defendants moved to expunge Myron’s direct testimony. The Dela
Cruzes for their part moved to dismiss the case for failure of the Estate to prosecute it. On March
13, 2002 the RTC issued an order, denying the two motions based on the ground that the Estate
had no control of the circumstances that caused the delay in the case. On December 5, 2003 the
Dela Cruzes filed a motion to strike out Myron’s testimony on the ground of failure to cross-
examine him. Meanwhile, the Estate filed its formal offer of evidence.
In a March 4, 2005 Order, the RTC granted the Dela Cruzes’ motion to strike out Myron’s
testimony on the ground that, due to the Estate’s fault, such testimony was never completed,
depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-examine him. Because the RTC denied the
Estate’s motion for reconsideration, it filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus
before the Court of Appeals (CA) On July 25, 2008 the CA rendered a Decision, granting the
petition and setting aside the RTC’s order that struck out Myron’s testimony. The CA denied the
Dela Cruzes’ motion for reconsideration.
Although the CA likewise set aside the RTC’s denial of the respondent’s documentary evidence
and its admission of the Dela Cruzes’ demurrer, it held that the RTC may not be compelled by
mandamus to admit the documentary exhibits in issue, since the matter of admitting them is
discretionary upon it. Because the CA declined to reconsider, the Dela Cruzes filed this petition
for review, seeking reinstatement of the RTC’s Order dated March 4, 2005.
ISSUE:
The key issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in reinstating Myron’s testimony after
the RTC ordered the same stricken out for depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-
examine him.
RULING:
Yes, ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals’
decision and resolutions, and REINSTATES the order of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City which strikes out Myron’s testimony on the ground that, due to the Estate’s fault, such
testimony was never completed, depriving the defendants of the opportunity to cross-examine
him
The CA said that the defendants were guilty of unreasonable delay in objecting to Myron’s
testimony. Myron died on August 16, 2001 yet the other defendants moved to expunge his
testimony only on November 15, 2001. On the other hand, the Dela Cruzes filed a similar motion
only in December 2003. Citing Section 36, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the CA held that they
should have objected to Myron’s testimony when it was offered or soon after the reason for
objecting to its admission became apparent. The CA characterized the defendants’ actions as
betraying an "intention to defeat the (Estate’s) action through a technicality." Because it could no
longer present other witnesses who may testify on and identify its documentary evidence, thus
resulting in its inadmissibility.
But it is evident that the defendants’ right to cross-examine Myron did not yet come up when he
finished his direct testimony on October 21, 1999. The Estate undertook to return him to the
witness stand to identify for it the originals of certain documents. Consequently, when Myron
was taken ill, the obligation to move the case forward continued to be on the Estate’s side. Rather
than move it, however, the Estate repeatedly asked for the deferment of Myron’s testimony on
the chance that he could recover and return to court. It took the Estate more than a year to
remedy the situation by asking the RTC to allow the cross-examination of Myron in the hospital
where he was confined. But having their turn to cross-examine Myron is different from their
being accorded an opportunity to cross-examine him. The RTC set the deposition taking on
September 7, 2001 but Myron died before that date, on August 16, 2001. Consequently, it was
not the defendants’ fault that they were unable to cross-examine him.
Still, wanting to give the Estate the chance to present additional evidence, on March 13, 2002 the
RTC denied the defendants’ motions. But the Estate did nothing for about a year and eight
months until December 3, 2003 when, rather than present additional evidence, it asked leave to
close its case with a formal offer of its documentary exhibits. Clearly, it was only at this stage
that the Estate signaled its intention to still avail itself of Myron’s unfinished testimony. And the
Dela Cruzes did not lose time to act. The RTC granted the motion. It did so correctly since the
Estate showed a lack of interest in offering a substitute testimony for that of Myron’s.
Since the Estate presented its documentary exhibits and had the same authenticated through
Myron’s testimony, it stands to reason that the striking out of the latter’s testimony altogether
wiped out the required authentication for those exhibits. They become inadmissible unless the
RTC, in its discretion, reopens the trial upon a valid ground and permits the Estate to rectify its
mistakes.
P v Talingdan-Donato
Crime: Murder
Facts:
 On August 2, 1975, between 7:30 to 8:30 p.m. m Cabaruan, Dolores, Province of Abra,
the victim Bernardino Biniegas, a member of the police force of that town and his wife, Adelina,
were inside their house conversing with each other. As they were about to sleep they heard a
voice calling ‘Pari, pari.’ Consequently, the victim stood up, peeped through a slit in the window
and saw four persons. His wife then asked him who were the persons outside and the victim
identified them as Leonico Talingdan and accused-appellants Rolando Talingdan, Raymundo
Tierra, and Alceto Tallied.

Thereafter, the victim pushed the window and was met by a volley of shots inflicting wounds on
him. As the victim told his wife went to his aid. The victim told his wife that the aforenamed
persons were the ones who fired at him. Meanwhile, Honorata Biniegas, the victim’s mother who
was living in the next house, upon hearing the shots, went down her house and saw the
appellants and a fourth man who, henceforth, ran away from the scene of the crime. Appellants
Talingdan and Tierra were armed with rifles.

Thereafter, the victim’s neighbor came to his aid and brought him to a place called Talogtog.
Later, the mayor and others arrived at Talogtog, loaded the victim in their jeep and brought him
to the Abra Provincial Hospital for treatment.

At the hospital, at about 3:00 a.m. of the following day (August 3, 1975), PC CIC Josefino
Valencia arrived and took the ante-mortem statement of the victim identifying appellants and
Leonico Talingdan as the perpetrators.

*Previous to the incident: Biniegas (victim), was investigating a case involving a theft of large cattle where
appellants were the suspects.

* They were identified as the perpetrators of the crime through the dying declaration of the victim and the
testimonies of the victim’s wife, mother and PC CIC Valencia.

Contention of the accused:

1. that Bineigas’ statement is worthless since he can no longer be cross-examined because

he was already dying.

2. And that the testimony of the victim’s wife should not be given credence since she did
not personally see them in the act of shooting ( hearsay only).

3. they presented the defence of alibi. They claimed that they were not in the place where
the crime happened.

Held:
 Court ruled that the dying declaration of the victim, Bernardino Biniegas is admissible in
evidence. A dying declaration is made by a person under a consciousness of impending death concerning
the cause and circumstances of the injury from which he thereafter dies. The requisites for its
admissibility are as follows: c

a. that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s
death;

b. that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an
impending death;

c. that the declarant is competent as a witness;

4. that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the
declarant is the victim. (Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court)

In the case at bar, the requisites were all satisfied. When Bernardino Biniegas made his statement, he was
still in full possession of his mental faculties, although he was then weak due to his wounds. He declared
with clarity and certainty that he was shot with a carbine by Asing Barbosa, Boyet Talingdan, Remie
Tierra and Leonico Talingdan because of a criminal case his assailants wanted him to drop.

The contention that Bernardino Biniegas’ statement is worthless since he can no longer be cross-examined
was sufficiently answered by the Court of Appeals. A dying declaration is an exception to the
constitutional right of an accused to confront and cross examine the witness against him. It is
admissible being one of the exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay evidence on grounds of necessity
and trustworthiness.

PC CIC Josefino Valencia who conducted the investigation of the shooting incident was the one who took
the ante-mortem statement of Bernardino Biniegas. He testified that the victim was already in serious
condition when his statement was taken. He then requested Dr. Herminio B. Venus and Estrella Damian,
two of the people who were present when Biniegas made his dying declaration to sign the statement as
witnesses.

Adelina Biniegas, wife of the victim testified that her husband revealed to her the identities of his
assailants. The appellants contend that her testimony should not be given credence since she did not
personally see them in the act of shooting. In refutation, the Court of Appeals explained that the
statements made by the victim to his wife are part of the res gestae which is another exception to the
hearsay rule. The victim’s revelation of the identities of the appellants as the ones who called him was
made before and subsequent to the shooting incident. (People v. Roca, 162 SCRA 696 [1988]). Its
admissibility is beyond question. The wife’s testimony is therefore worthy of belief.

P v Villaluz-Lumasac

Facts:
Respondent Pedro Berroya was charged of murder before Pasig, Rizal Circuit Criminal Court presided by
former Judge Onofre Villaluz. During trial, the prosecution presented all its witnesses except two vital
ones (Alejandro Gonzaga and Alfredo Gadiar) for they could not be located despite the combined efforts
of national and local law enforcement agencies after an arrest order was issued by the trial court to
compel them to appear and testify.

Since the two could not be found, Lydia Ver, the attending stenographer during the preliminary
investigation of Berroya before the QC Fiscal’s Office, was presented to establish the authenticity of the
transcripts of stenographic notes of the testimony of Gonzaga and Gadiar taken by question and answer,
including their extensive cross-examination by Berroya’s counsel.

The prosecution offered the transcripts in evidence, but the same was rejected as hearsay by Villaluz,
although on reconsideration they were admitted as part of the testimony of stenographer Ver.chanrobles
law library : red
Now, the present petition was filed praying for an order to annul the ruling of the trial court and
commanding it to admit the transcripts not merely as part of the testimony of Ver, but as "testimony at a
former trial" pursuant to Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
1) May the previous testimonies of Gonzaga and Gadiar in the preliminary investigation be admitted
in evidence?
2) Was right of confrontation of the accused absolute?

Held:

1) Yes, they may be admitted in evidence. Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 41 provides:

"Testimony at a former trial. — The testimony of a witness deceased or out of the Philippines, or unable
to testify, given in a former case between the same parties, relating to the same matter, the adverse party
having had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may be given in evidence."

Further, Rule 115, Section 1(f) of the Rules of Court says:

". . . Where the testimony of a witness for the prosecution has previously been taken down by question
and answer in the presence of the defendant or his attorney, the defense having had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness, the testimony or deposition of the latter may be read, upon satisfactory proof
to the court that he is dead or incapacitated to testify, or cannot with due diligence be found in the
Philippines.”

2) No. Right of confrontation means that the witnesses against the accused must be produced to testify,
subject to cross-examination. This right however is not absolute. For it is generally recognized that it is
sometimes impossible to produce again a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, as
when the witness has died or is otherwise unavailable, in which event, his previous testimony in its
entirety is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, as an exception to the hearsay rule, particularly
where the party against whom the evidence is offered had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness
who gave the testimony.

The reason for the exception has been aptly expressed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Because such testimony has been delivered under the sanction of an oath and subject to the right of the
adverse party to cross-examine the witness giving it, it is not open to the objections ordinarily urged
against hearsay evidence. It is admitted on the principle that it is the best of which the case admits . . .

"The real basis for the admission of testimony given by a witness at a former trial is to prevent the
miscarriage of justice where the circumstances of the case have made it unreasonable and unfair to
exclude the testimony."

P v Valero-Macatulad
Lucila Valero “Rosing” and Alfonsito Valero"Pipe" were accused in the Municipal Court of San
Rafael, Bulacan of double murder and another of frustrated murder.
Note: the complaints against Alfonsito Valero were dismissed "on the ground that he is a deaf-
mute and, therefore, all the proceedings against him were beyond his comprehension".
F: Ceferino Velasco, father of the victims, has a vegetable garden in his yard. He uses an
insecticide called Polidol to spray the vegetable and uses the same insecticide to kill rats.
Ceferino dipped sliced bread into an insecticide called endrin, dried them up and later used the
poisoned bread as a bait to kill rats.
One morning, Ceferino was seen throwing poisoned rats into a river near his house. That same
morning, his children, Michael (9 months) and Annabel (1 year and 9 months) died of poisoning
after eating bread containing endrin, a commercial insecticide (poisonous). Imelda, another
minor child, tasted the poisoned bread and would have died as a consequence were it not for the
timely medical assistance given her. All these three minor children were in the balcony of their
house when they partook of the poisoned bread. Ceferino’s 3 puppies also died of poisoning.
The evidence of the prosecution and the defense conflict as to the source of the poisoned bread.
Prosecution: The evidence of the prosecution shows that the poisoned bread was given to the
children by Alfonso, a deaf-mute brother of the Lucila, and that it was her who gave the bread to
Pipe for delivery to the children.
Defendant: Lucila denies that she ever gave bread to her deaf-mute brother, Pipe, for delivery to
the minor children. The evidence for the defense tends to show that the Velasco children might
have eaten one of the sliced poisoned bread used by their father in poisoning rats in his garden.
Prosecution’s witnesses:
(You can go to #2 agad)1. Rodolfo Quilang-First testified that he saw the defendant Lucila Valero
deliver (he just actually saw him go inside the gate)"something wrapped in a piece of paper" to
her deaf-mute brother Pipe with the alleged instruction by sign language to deliver the same to
the Velasco children. 3 years after the poisoning of the Velasco children, Quilang stated that he
actually saw Pipe deliver the wrapped object to the children. In short, his testimony was
conflicting which shows his lack of credibility.
2. Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco-Both Ceferino and Jaime did not see the delivery by the
defendant to her deaf-mute brother "something wrapped in a piece of paper". They never saw or
heard her giving any instruction to Pipe to deliver the wrapped object to the children. Both
claimed that they learned or obtained the information from Pipe after interviewing him by
means of sign language.
What Jaime asked from Pipe was "Who gave the bread to the children?" In reply, it seems that
Pipe pointed to his sister who was standing nearby. But Pipe could not have said that his sister
handed over the poisoned bread to the children because the evidence of the prosecution shows
that Pipe himself, gave the bread to the children. It is clear that Pipe did not understand the sign
language of Jaime and vice-versa. When Ceferino asked who gave the bread, Pipe allegedly said
that the bread came from her (witness demonstrated by swaying his right arm and pointing his
forefinger sidewise.)
I: W the evidence is sufficient to convict the accused even if the testimony was based on a
information from a deaf-mute who was not presented during trial
H: No, the accused was denied her right to confrontation
There is nothing in the record showing that Pipe communicated to the prosecution witnesses by
comprehensible sign language that his sister was the source of the poisoned bread.
Pipe who was the alleged source of the vital information for the prosecution was never presented
as a witness either for the prosecution or for the defense. Jaime and Velasco were presented as
prosecution witnesses to convey to the Court what they learned from Pipe by sign language.
The evidence is purely hearsay. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no probative
value.
To give weight to the testimonies of Federico Jaime and Ceferino Velasco, whether considered as
hearsay evidence or as part of res gestae and make the same the basis for the imposition of the
death penalty gravely violates the constitutional right of the defendant to meet the witnesses face
to face and to subject Pipe to the rigid test of cross-examination, the only effective means to test
the truthfulness, memory, intelligence, and in this particular case, the ability of the deaf-mute,
Alfonso Valero alias Pipe, to communicate with the outside world. In conflict between a
provision of the constitution giving the defendant a substantive right and mere technical rules of
evidence, we have no choice but to give effect to the constitution.
Even Ceferino and Jaime admitted on cross-examination that their interpretations of the sign
language of Pipe were only guess work. The trial Court committed the grave error of accepting
and of giving weight to the testimonies of Jaime and Ceferino interpreting the alleged
extrajudicial information to them by sign language of Pipe, when the source of the information
himself, Alfonsito Valero alias Pipe, would have been an incompetent witness had he taken the
witness stand. Acquitted
Sir might ask:
● The prosecution claims that the motive of the poisoning was the quarrel between Demetria Manalastas,
mother of the victims, and Lucila Valero. The cause of the quarrel was the interference of the defendant to
protect the children from the scolding and maltreatment to their own mother. SC:the quarrel was not a
sufficient cause to commit a heinous crime.

● The rats, the dogs, or maybe even his minor children must have found the poisoned slices of bread (first
scattered by Ceferino) somewhere in the barn or in the house, scattered them, and the children, not knowing
the danger of the poison, ate them. The thought that he might have poisoned his own children must have
caused Ceferino some kind of trauma. So galling to a father is the thought that he, himself, might have
caused the death of his two children and the near death of a third child, albeit unintentionally, that his
natural reaction is to escape from it by throwing the blame to someone else not only to appease his own
conscience but also to avoid embarassment before his relatives, friends and neighbors.

P v Bundalian-Madrid
FACTS: On June 11, 1964, Hon. Gaudencio E. Antonino, then a Member of the Philippine
Senate, filed a sworn complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila charging Mario
Bundalian with the crime of libel. Sometime in November 1967, Senator Antonino died. He died
before he testified in the libel case in question.
HELD: The right of confrontation to the witnesses is not violated. We find no decisive
significance in the circumstance that Senator Antonino died before he was able to testify. The
right of confrontation and cross-examination as guaranteed by Sec. l(f), Rule 115, of the Rules of
Court and Sec. 19, Article IV, of the Constitution, does not mean that the offended party should,
testify in the case. Indeed, there is no requirement that the offended party in a criminal case must
take the witness stand even if he were not dead. Clearly, neither may such obligation be imposed
where the offended party is already dead. The right of confrontation and cross-examination is
guaranteed to an accused with respect to any witness who may testify against him, but not in
respect of those who are not made to testify. As regards the latter, no harm or prejudice is caused
the accused against which he needed to be protected.
Talino v Sandiganbayan-Masedman
FACTS:
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants, his
testimony therein imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not admissible against the latter who
was not able to cross-examine him.
The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate informations with
estafa through falsification of public documents for having allegedly conspired to defraud the
government in the total amount of P26,523.00, representing the cost of repairs claimed to have
been undertaken, but actually not needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through
falsification of the supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments. Docketed as CC Nos.
6681, 6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases were tried jointly for all the accused until after the
prosecution had rested, when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and petitioner Talino
asked for separate trials, which were allowed. They then presented their evidence at such trials,
while the other accused continued defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which
one of them, Pio Ulat gave damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail his
participation in the questioned transactions. 4 In due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat and Renato Valdez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving the other defendants for
insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it
violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether or not the testimony in a separate trial was considered by
the respondent court against the petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole basis of his
conviction.
DECISION:
NO. It was not considered in its finding of facts but the court has this to say on the issue.
In its decision, the respondent court * makes the following remarks about the separate
trial:
It would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial because the accused
Pio B. Ulat said so many incriminatory things against the other accused when he took the stand
in his own defense. But because Basilio, Talino and Macadangdang were granted separate trials
and they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a matter of fact, they were not even required to
be present when the other accused were presenting their defenses, the latter's testimonies cannot
now be considered against said three accused.
The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter
of right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought after the presentation of the
evidence of the prosecution. 6 While it is true that Rule 119, Section 8, of the Rules of Court
does not specify when the motion for such a trial should be filed, we have held in several cases
that this should be done before the prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although, as
an exception, the motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution shall have rested, where
there appears to be an antagonism in the respective defenses of the accused. 7 In such an event,
the evidence in chief of the prosecution shall remain on record against an accused, with right of
rebuttal on the part of the fiscal in the separate trial of the other accused. 8
The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in
granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed
justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one
encountered and regretted by the respondent court, in according the accused the right of
confrontation.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution
9 to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are
and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted
to be made against his back or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is
made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and
must shroud their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not
permitted unless the affiant is presented in court and hearsay is barred save only in the cases
allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration.
We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court
did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner. The part of that
decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's
own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle
the government.
The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial evidence
other than Ulat's testimony, we see no reason to disturb them. It is futile for the petitioner to
invoke his constitutional presumption of innocence because his guilt has in the view of the trial
court been established beyond reasonable doubt, and we agree.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioner.
P v Seneris-Mayaoyao
Facts: Accused Pilar de Angeles Pimentel, charged with parricide, hired accused Mario Nemenio
and Salim Doe to kill her husband with a prize of money. Eduardo Pimentel, husband of the
accused was attacked and stabbed with a knife which caused his death. Accused Mario Nemenio
admitted his guilt and after promulgation of hi judgment, he offered to testify against his co-
accused.
He testified during the cross-examination that he and Salim Doe were hired by Pilar Angeles de
Pimentel, for the consideration of P3,000.00 to kill Eduardo Pimentel, husband of respondent
Pilar Angeles de Pimentel who then stabbed the said victim to death. That he did not know the
Identity of the victim Eduardo Pimentel at the time of the stabbing in the evening of September
6, 1977. He was guided solely by respondent Pilar Angeles de Pimentel, who pointed out her
victim spouse to him. However, Nemenio was killed by police officer when he was allegedly
escaping from prison.
Judge Seneris issued an order declaring as inadmissible the entire testimony of the deceased
witness Mario Nemenio y delos Santos on the principal ground that the defense was not able to
complete its cross-examination of said witness.
Issue: W the testimony of the deceased witness is inadmissible.
Held: Testimonies were admissible in evidence because the cause for the non-completion of the
cross-examination of petitioner's witness was a fortuitous event as he was killed and was not
attributable to the party offering witness. The cross-examination made by the counsel of private
respondent of the deceased witness was extensive and already covered the subject matter of his
direct testimony as state witness relating to the essential elements of the crime of parricide, and
what remained for further cross-examination is the matter of price or reward allegedly paid by
private respondent for the commission of the crime, which is merely an aggravating
circumstance and does not affect the existence of the offense charged, the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion in declaring as entirely inadmissible the testimony of the state
witness who died through no fault of any of the parties before his cross-examination could be
finished.
And that the situation is one whereby the cause of non-completion of the cross-examination of
the deceased witness was attributed neither to the fault of petitioner nor the private respondent.
The cross-examination was completed insofar as the essential elements of the crime charged.

Ortigas Jr v Lufthansa-Milan
Toledo v People-Munoz (Tan vs. CA)
Tan vs CA
Facts: This is a case aimed at establishing a children-to father, illegitimate relationship between
petitioners and the principal respondent Francisco Tan, and to compel the latter to support
petitioners.
On July 22, 1955, Carmelita Tan and Rodolfo Tan, thru their mother Celestina Daldo as
guardian ad litem, sued respondent Tan in the CFI of Manila for acknowledgement and support.
However, Daldo moved to dismiss the foregoing civil case upon the ground that the parties had
come to an amicable settlement, and prayed that the same be dismissed with prejudice and
without recourse of appeal. On the same day (March 26, 1956), Daldo subscribed before the
clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila an affidavit categorically stating that respondent
Francisco Tan “is not the father of my said minor children named Carmelita and Rodolfo but
another person whose name I cannot divulge.” and that she prepared said affidavit precisely “to
record what is true and to correct what misinterpretation may arise in the future”.The CFI then
issued the dismissal of the complaint . One year and eight months after the dismissal (November
25, 1957), petitioners thru their grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem, commenced
the present action before the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court for acknowledgement and
support, involving the same parties, cause of action and subject matter. On September 10 1960,
Judge Juan P. Enriquez (judge of CFI of Manila) was detailed to preside over there JDRC in the
absence of the presiding Judge who has already declared that “the present case is res judicata by
reason of the dismissal with prejudice of the case of the CFI of Manila and that, even on the
merits, plaintiffs have not made out their case with sufficient evidence” and dismissed the
complaint, without costs. Petitioners then moved to reconsider. On January 31, 1961, Judge
Natividad Almeda Lopez reconsidered the decision of Judge Enriquez and rendered that
Carmelita and Rodolfo were illegitimate children of Francisco which ordered the latter to support
them with P200 per month. Respondent Tan appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the last
judgement and dismissed the complaint with costs against the appellees. The threshold question
is the inadmissibility of the testimony of petitioners in the former case. It was noted that the
witnesses did not appear to testify for a number of times at the trial subpoenaed by the JDRC.
Issue: Whether or not the witnesses’ refusal to appear to testify may be given as evidence?
Held: No. The controlling statute is Sec 37, Rule 123 or 1940 RC, now Sec 41, Rule 130 which
states that
Sec. 41. Testimony at at former trial— The testimony of a witness deceased or out of the
Philippines, or unable to testify, given in a former case between the same parties, relating to the
same matter, the adverse party having had an opportunity to cross-examine him, may be given in
evidence.
In this case, the witness in question in question were available. Only, they refused to
testify. No other person that prevented them from testifying is cited. Certainly, they do not come
with the legal purview of those unable to testify
Besides in the situation here presented, petitioners are not at all bereft of remedy. They
could have urged the court to have said witnesses arrested, punished for contempt.After all, these
remedies are in the statute books to help litigants in the prosecution of their cases. Petitioners
failed to avail of these remedies, went ahead and submitted their case.
We note petitioners' argument that to follow strictly the law of admissibility of testimony
in former trials, is to permit party litigants to buy witnesses to dissuade them from testifying
again. Nothing extant in the record will as much as intimate that respondent was responsible for
the non-appearance of these witnesses. The danger of tampering with witnesses is a problem that
attends trials in many a time and in number of imaginable situations. And, petitioners argument
works both ways. Because, witnesses at the former trial can be bought not to testify at the second
trial, in just the same way that they could have been bought to give their original testimony.
Solution of this problem lies elsewhere, not in the non-enforcement of Section 41, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
The judgement of CA under review was affirmed.

PEOPLE VS. BARDAJE

Facts:
Marcelina Cuizon, a 14 year old girl, filed a complaint against Adelino Bardaje and five others in
Samar, accusing them of the crime of rape. The incident happened from December 14 to
December 17. Adelino was arrested on December 17 and signed an alleged confession admitting
that he kidnapped and molested Marcelina. The fiscal filed an information accusing Adelino and
others the crime of Rape with Illegal Detention.
Before arraignment, the information was amended to include that Marcelina was deprived of
liberty for three days. After the trial, Adelino was found guilty of Forcible Abduction with Rape
with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and aid of armed men.
Adelino’s version is that they are sweethearts who eloped as planned during the said
period. He admitted having carnal knowledge of her but denied that he raped her. On the
morning of December 17th, two soldiers accompanied by Marcelina’s father, apprehended him,
physically abused him, and made him sign a document - an extrajudicial confession, implicating
5 other persons even though it’s not true.
 Also, the medical certificate of Marcelina was presented in court as evidence stating that
there were no evidence of external injuries on the vulva or any part of the body and the presence
of old lacerations.

Issue:

W/N Adelino Bardaje’s guilt was sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt based on the
testimonial and documentary evidence presented.

Ruling:

No, Adelino Bardaje’s guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. The court found
Marcelina’s charge highly dubious and inherently improbable.

The medical findings showed that "no evidence of external injuries was found around the
vulva or any part of the body" of Marcelina, which the court finds strange because she was
allegedly "dragged" slapped" into unconsciousness, "wrestled" with, and criminally abused.
Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than witnesses put together.
The “old healed laceration” in the hymen, according to the testimony of the physician, would
have occurred two weeks or even 1 month before. This shows that Marcelina and Adelino had
amorous relationship.
Marcelina’s admission that she was taken to a small one-room hut shared with a woman
and two children and where she was ravished seems to be highly improbable. The same is true
for the second hut where she was brought to.

On the right of the accused “to have compulsory process issued to secure the
attendance of witnesses on his behalf. Adelino had stated that while Marcelina was in the house
of Ceferino Armada, she curled the hair of Narita, one of the latter’s children as well as the hairs
of the other girls in the vicinity.

ADELINO wanted to have Narita testify on his behalf, and a subpoena had been issued to
her. But instead of taking effective steps to have Narita brought to Court, the lower court gave
responsibility for Narita's attendance to the defense, expressly stating that, if the defense was not
able to bring her to the Court, her testimony will be dispensed with.

The record shows:

ATTY. BOHOL
I appear as counsel for the accused. Up to now, Your Honor, the witnesses we have been
expecting have not yet arrived. This representation, with the consent of the Clerk of Court have
wired the Chief of Police of Sta. Rita, Samar to bring Ceferino Armada and Narita Armada
tomorrow for the hearing, continuation of this case for those persons mentioned to testify, your
Honor, for the accused. We pray, Your Honor, that we be given time to hear from the Chief of
Police to bring those persons tomorrow, Your Honor.
COURT
What will be the nature of the testimonies of those witnesses.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
How about the other girl?
ATTY. BOHOL
Narita Armada will substantially be corroborative, Your Honor.
COURT
Suppose the two witnesses do not arrive tomorrow, for which this case is set also?
ATTY. BOHOL
If we receive information and find that those witnesses could really not come for this case, Your
Honor, I will be constrained to submit the case for decision based on the testimony of the
accused. However, Your Honor, if it will be all right with the Honorable Court and we find that
there is hope that within this week Ceferino Armada could come here, in view of the distance, I
pray before the Honorable Court that we be given time within this week to present Ceferino
Armada, and upon his failure, submit the case for decision

COURT
The Court will not allow that anymore, anyway this case is set for tomorrow. The Court wail
grant the postponement today on condition that any witness not presented tomorrow will be
considered waived after all as you have manifest, 4 their testimonies will be corroborative.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
What I mean is that you should have taken the necessary precaution for the attendance of your
witness today considering that there is a subpoena for the witnesses.-

ORDER - for the reason that accused have no more witnesses to present today, the trial of this
case is hereby Postponed for tomorrow, July 26, 1967 at 8:30 A.M., with the warning that
witnesses not presented during that day shall be considered waived. 15

Considering that this case involved a prosecution for a capital offense, the lower Court acted
precipitously in not having Narita brought to Court, by ordering her arrest if necessary
ADELINO was deprived of his right "to have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance
of witnesses on his behalf."

P v Santos-Pena (di ko sure kung eto yun, di kasi mahanap yung case na to e, sorry :( )
FACTS: For automatic review herein is the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City convicting the accused-appellants for violation of Section 15, Article III of RA
6425 as amended by RA 7659, and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
Appellant Danilo Sy denied having conspired with the other accused in selling shabu to poseur
buyer PO2 Nening Villarosa and presented facts on the basis of defense evidence. The trial court
gave full faith and credit to the version of the prosecution. It found the testimony of poseur buyer
PO2 Villarosa to be direct, positive and credible. It also found the accused acted together to
achieve the goal of getting hold of a million pesos in the sale of shabu. The court did not believe
the defense of alibi invoked by the appellants since they were at the motel where the poseur
buyer claimed to have delivered the money and got the shabu; and held that the requirement of
physical impossibility to be at the locus criminis was not proven. It also ruled out that there was
illegal raid since none of the accused could even mention any possible reason for the imagined
raid. It concluded that what was conducted was a buy-bust operation where the appellants were
caught in flagrante delicto, hence, no need for warrant of arrest.
RULING: The Supreme Court found that the evidence for the prosecution failed to produce a
moral certainty to sustain appellants' conviction. According to the Court, when the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one which is consistent with
the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
meet the test of moral certainty, and is not sufficient to support a conviction. In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The decision
of the h Trial Court of Caloocan was reversed and set aside for failure of the prosecution to prove
the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. Not one of the exceptions when
warrantless arrest may be effected was present in the case at bar, hence, the search made in the
motel was clearly illegal and the shabu seized thereat were inadmissible in evidence against the
appellants. All the accused-appellants herein were acquitted and released from custody.
Soliman v Sandiganbayan-Saavedra
Facts: Petitioner Manuel Soliman was convicted of qualified theft by Sandiganbayan for having
allegedly conspired with his co-workers in the Malacañang garage to steal 1,000 liters of
gasoline. All his co-accused were acquitted with the exception of Bernardo Cube, the driver of
the truck where the stolen fuel was carried, who had escaped and could not be tried.A requisition
was made by the Malacañang garage for 9,000 liters of gasoline which was filled in Pandacan.
1,000 liters was retained in the delivery truck which the accused were allegedly intending to sell.
It was foiled as a surveillance team prevented the sale. The driver was arrested and implicated his
other co-accused.In finding the petitioner guilty, the Sandiganbayan relied heavily on the
supposed confession of Cube, who was at large and never tried. However, the confession had not
been formally and specifically offered in evidence by the prosecution. The Court also relied on
the alleged confession of Soliman, although he alleged the confession was elicited by
interrogators who manhandled him.The Court also made the conjecture that since Soliman had
gone to the Pandacan depot and later rode with Cube in the delivery truck that brought the
gasoline to Malacañang, he really conspired with Cube. Although Soliman explained that he was
ordered by a superior to follow up on the requisition, Sandiganbayan held that the said person
should have been presented as a defense witness.
Issue: : Could Soliman be held guilty for qualified theft given the circumstances surrounding
his case?
Held: (In Atty’s voice) NO. Because the conviction had no basis in the first place.

First, the confession of Cube was not offered in evidence, in contravention of the Section 35
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court stating that “The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.” It
cannot stand as a basis of his conviction then.

But, assuming it was offered as evidence, Cube's confession should have been barred altogether
as pure hearsay since the petitioner did not have the chance to confront and cross-examine his
accuser. Allowing them to use such confession as basis without the defendant being given the
opportunity to cross examine violates the latter’s constitutional right to meet the witnesses face
to face. Hence, it cannot be the basis for his conviction.
Also, the alleged confession of Soliman is inadmissible as evidence because he was man-handled
by his investigators into making such confession. Proof to this was a medical certificate of his
injuries from the PGH and his subsequent confinement in the Singian Memorial Hospital.

P v Lacuna-Toyoken
P v Clores-Kawi
FACTS: On December 20, 1971, about 12:55 o'clock in the afternoon, accused Jaime Clores and
Mario Holiday, who were both patients in Ward VI of the New Bilibid Prisons Hospital, entered
Ward V, the adjoining ward where the victim, Bayani Salido, was confined and where the
complaining witness, Benito Satorre, was assigned as attendant-helper. The deceased, Bayani
Salido, was then sitting down and varnishing his project, a barracuda.
His back was towards Jaime Clores. With this relative position, Clores walked towards Salido
and suddenly stabbed him at the shoulder Almost simultaneously, accused Mario Holiday
approached Benito Satorre who was then lying on his right side on his "tarima" (bed) and
stabbed him twice. Satorre struck the base of the weapon with a karate blow and moved to his
left side, slid down the "tarima," and got hold of a piece of wood with which to defend himself .
Seeing Satorre armed with a piece of wood, Holiday stepped backward. After the stabbing,
Clores and Holiday ran towards Ward VI.
Immediately after the incident, Satorre gave his written statement to the prison authorities In the
course of the taking of his statement, Satorre pointed to Holiday and Clores, who were then both
present, as the assailants. Aside from Satorre, Melencio Canin, another eyewitness to the
stabbing incident, also gave voluntarily his written statement to the investigators of the New
Bilibid prisons. Clores also gave his statement voluntarily. Holiday likewise gave a written
statement to the investigators .
In their appeal, Holiday and Clores stated that there statements should not be admitted as
evidence since they were extracted out of force, they were made to sign papers which they did
not know its content.
Issue: Should the statement of Canin, a witness, be admitted despite not being presented as
witness to be cross examined?
RULING: No. Appellants' assignment of error regarding the admission in evidence of their
statements despite their proven involuntariness must therefore, be sustained. So also the
assignment of error with respect to the admission of the statement of one Melencio Canin who
was not presented as a witness to be cross-examined on his supposed statement, which the trial
court, nevertheless, considered, along with the other testimonial evidence of the prosecution in
sentencing the appellants to the extreme penalty of death.
Excluding the supposed confessions of appellants, the testimony of the only eye-witness to the
incident, Benito Satorre, does not make out a picture that would prove conspiracy. He could not
even give any reason why Holiday would want to stab him, not being a gang member, or why
Clores stabbed Salido. Satorre claims to have seen Clores stab Salido while, at the same instance,
Holiday was allegedly stabbing him twice. He did not testify to seeing appellants enter the ward
where he was, or how they entered. It is only in the statement of Melencio Canin where the
appellants are alleged to have entered the ward, but they took different directions from the
doorway-Clores towards Salido, Holiday towards Satorre. Aside from the fact that this
statement of Canin should also be excluded because, the declarant was not presented as a
witness and was therefore not confronted by appellants nor cross-examined on his
statement, the acts attributed therein to appellants would be insufficient to prove
conspiracy, even if given the assumption of truth. If there had been conspiracy, both
appellants would have concertedly attacked Salido first, before turning to another victim of the
same gang, also concertedly. But this other victim was neither a gang member nor was he even
scathed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court should be modified so as to find Jaime Clores
guilty of homicide only, not murder as charged, for the killing of Bayani Salido.
Carredo v Pc
FACTS: Elias Carredo was charged with Malicious Mischief in the Municipal trial court. He
deposited a cash bond for his provisional liberty. He also filed a written waiver of appearance,
which states that “he could be identified by witnesses who are testifying at the time that said
accused was not present.”
Despite the waiver, the hearings were rescheduled because the prosecution witness was
not able to identify the accused due to the latter’s absence. The defense counsel contends that the
trial could already commence notwithstanding the absence of the accused because of the waiver
of the filed written waiver of appearance. Nevertheless, the municipal judge issued an order for
the arrest of petitioner, the confiscation of the cash bond, and at the same time ordering the
bondsman, who is the petitioner himself, to show cause why no judgment should be rendered
against the bondsman. The matter was elevated to the RTC for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not an accused who, after arraignment, waives his further appearance during
the trial can be ordered arrested by the court for non-appearance upon summons to appear for
purposes of identification.

HELD: The accused can still be ordered and arrested, notwithstanding his waiver. It is important
to state that the provision of the Constitution authorizing the trial in absentia of the accused in
case of his non-appearance after arraignment despite due notice simply means that he thereby
waives his right to meet the witnesses face to face among others. An express waiver of
appearance after arraignment, as in this case, is of the same effect. However, such waiver of
appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is thereby deprived of its
right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification by its witnesses
which is vital for the conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a right of the accused does not
mean a release of the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so
required. The accused may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to the court.
FULGADO VS. CA
FACTS: Ruperto Fulgado, an aged man with poor health, filed a civil case on September 17,
1967 for cancellation of several contracts of sale and rendering of an accounting against Rufino
Custodio, Simplicia Custodio, Arsenio Piguing, Ismael Porciuncula and Dominga Macarulay. On
the date set for pre-trial (Feb. 1, 1968), the defendants and their counsel did not appear. Hence,
they were declared in default by the Court. The Court allowed presentation of evidence of the
plaintiff ex-parte. The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of Fulgado. The Defendants
appealed the decision and the Court of Appeals allowed them to present their own evidence and
cross-examine the witnesses. The case was remanded to the trial court.
In the trial Court, the defendants asked the setting of the cross examination of the witnesses,
Ruperto Fulgado and Jose Fulgado, on August and September 1975. On the date set, the judge
was on leave so it was reset on January 15, 1976. However, on November 25, 1975, Ruperto
Fulgado died while Jose Fulgado already left the country. Because the witnesses cannot be cross-
examined anymore, the Trial Court declared that their testimonies are inadmissible and rendered
a decision in favor of Custodio et.al.
ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the civil case because of the failure to cross-examine a dead witness
proper?
DECISION: No. There is no disputing that where there was no such opportunity (to cross examine) and the
want of it was caused by the party offering (plaintiff), the testimony should be stricken out. However, where
the failure to obtain cross-examination was imputable to the cross examiner's fault, the lack of cross-
examination is no longer a ground for exclusion according to the general principle that an opportunity, though
waived, will suffice. From the records presented, it is manifest that private respondents had enough
opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff Ruperto Fulgado before his death, and Jose Fulgado before his
migration to the United States. Conceding that private respondents lost their standing in court during the time
they were in default, they were no longer in that situation on June 6, 1974 when the Court of Appeals set aside
the default judgment. Despite knowledge of Ruperto's failing health (he was then 89 years of age) and
Jose's imminent travel to the United States, private respondents did not move swiftly and decisively. They
tarried for more than one year from the finality of the Appellate Court's decision on June 27, 1974 to ask
the trial court on July 3, 1975 to set the already much delayed case for hearing "in any date of August and
September ... ."

The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is, in law, imposed on the party who wishes to exercise
said right. This is so because the right, being personal and waivable, the intention to utilize it must be
expressed. Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation thereof. Thus, it should be the
counsel for the opposing party who should move to cross-examine plaintiffs witnesses. It is absurd for the
plaintiff himself to ask the court to schedule the cross-examination of his own witnesses because it is not his
obligation to ensure that his deponents are cross-examined. Having presented his witnesses, the burden shifts
to his opponent who must now make the appropriate move. Indeed, the rule of placing the burden of the case
on plaintiffs shoulders can be construed to extremes as what happened in the instant proceedings.
Where death prevents cross-examination under such circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can be
ascribed to the plaintiff or his witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that has been obtained in the
direct examination.

As to the witness Jose Fulgado who is reportedly abroad, private respondents could have resorted to the
various modes of discovery under the Rules of Court to cross-examine Jose. D, During the hearing of May 4,
1976, counsel for private respondents unwittingly or wittingly disclosed that they knew that Jose was in the
country "for a visit" but they did not exert any effort to have him subpoenaed.

Altogether, the acts of private respondents constitute a waiver, and consequently, a forfeiture of their right to
cross-examination. And having failed to make use of this right, the consequences should rightfully fall on them
and not on their adversary.

TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
BORJA V. MENDOZA
FACTS: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not
arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia
and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to
the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the
failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without
any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the
appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be
annulled because there was no arraignment.
ISSUE: Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned.
HELD: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be
informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only
on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove
the evidence against him. It is also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It is
required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the
precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible
loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the
very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized
against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him.
Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an
arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel
being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the
sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The absence of an arraignment can
be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial
trial.
NOLASCO vs ENRILE
This case involves three defendants: Cynthia Nolasco, Willie Tolentino, and MilaAguilar,
communist Party of the Philippines members. Nolasco and Tolentino have already been released
by order of the President, and so this case ONLY involves Aguilar.
Facts
Aguilar was charged with rebellion, but during the time of the charge (1973-1977), the crime of
rebellion was not a capital offense. P.D. No. 1834, which became effective in 1981, made
rebellion a capital offense. Sometime in 1978, Aguilar et.al were charged before Military
Commission No. 25 (MC-25) with Subversion. Aguilar remained at large until her arrest in
1984.In the meantime, in the rebellion case, arraignment was held in 1978 without Aguilar being
present. The other defendants refused to plead, and pleas of “not guilty” were entered for them
including one for Aguilar. In 1982, the trial commenced but sometime in 1984 the SC issued a
TRO enjoining the Special Military Commission 1 from proceeding with the rebellion case. As
for the subversion case, it was initially dismissed but was subsequently revived. A plea of “not
guilty” has also been entered for Aguilar, notwithstanding that she had not yet been arrested up to
then. Aguilar was arrested in 1984 together with Nolasco. Tolentino was arrested on the same
day. A Presidential Detention Action was issued against the three. After, Information was filed
against them for illegal possession of Subversive Documents in the MeTC. That Court ordered
the release of the three defendants on the same day on a P600.00 bail for each. In the Rebellion
Case, SMC-1 ordered Aguilar held in custody while in the Subversion Case, MC 25 also directed
Aguilar's confinement during the pendency of the trial. Aguilar also questioned the jurisdiction
of the Commission (MC 25) over her, but the Commission upheld its jurisdiction
Issue: Whether arraignment in absentia is valid
Held: The rulings at bar in the subversion case are fully applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the
rebellion case, i.e. her arraignment in absentia was null and void; 15 consequently, "the military
commission had lost jurisdiction to try her as of January 12, 1981 (date of effectivity of G.O. No.
69 which phased out military commissions") and "a new complaint or information should be
filed against her before the civil courts; 16and that "in the light of the attendant facts,
particularly, that AGUILAR was still not arraigned in the[Rebellion] case as of January 12, 1981,
that [Special Military Commission No. 1 17 had lost jurisdiction to try AGUILAR in the
Rebellion case when she was brought before the tribunal on August 16, 1984 to appear before the
ongoing trial of the other defendants. Moreover, with the lifting of Martial Law on January17,
1981, Military Commissions were dissolved and they could no longer try civilians.
Respondent MC 25, in its Answer invoked Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 39 to justify
a plea in absentia, stating that she was informed of the date set for trial and apprised of the
content of the charge sheet through the prescribed service. The cited provision, allowing trial in
absentia, and which presupposes arraignment in absentia (through publication), was promulgated
in 1972. It should give way to the 1973 Constitution, effective January 17, 1973, which provides
that "after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. In the Constitutional
provision, "arraignment" cannot be construed as inclusive of "arraignment in absentia." As a
matter of fact, in the codification made in Presidential Decree No. 1835, Section 5 provides:
SEC. 5. After the arraignment of an accused who is charged with subversion, the trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused, provided that he has been duly notified and
his failure to appear is unjustified. Judgment may be promulgated in absentia and the penalty of
confiscation of his properties in the Philippines may be immediately executed.
The codal section replaces Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 39, and it should be borne in
mind that actual arraignment is an element of due process. Even military tribunals are bound to
observe fundamental rules of law and arraignment in absentia would be violative of due process.
The said respondent shall refer the case against petitioner Mila Aguilar to the proper provincial
or city Fiscal, or civilian government prosecutor, so that the corresponding Information may be
filed against her before a civil Court of competent jurisdiction. The date of the referral shall be
immediately advised to this Court.

PEOPLE VS. SALAS

PEOPLE v. JUDGE PRIETO
Facts: Respondent Judge ordered the arrest of Dario Gamayon for his continuous failure to
appear in Court every time his criminal case was called for trial, and forfeiture of Gamayon’s
bond, giving the bondsmen thirty days from notice to produce the body of the accused and show
cause why judgment should not be rendered against them for the amount of their undertaking.
On motion for reconsideration, the respondent Judge set aside his order. Apparently, he was
misled by his misreading of the constitutional provision, now added to the present fundamental
law. He failed to take into account that the constitutional right to bail would be rendered
nugatory if, by the mere fact that the trial could proceed in the absence of the accused, the
undertaking in a bail bond and the Rules of Court provision could be ignored.

The government instituted this certiorari proceeding claiming that respondent Judge was not
justified in reconsidering a previous valid and correct order just because of the innovation in the
Constitution as to the trial being held in the absence of an accused.
Issue: Was Judge Prieto correct in reversing his original order given the circumstance that the
trial is done in absentia?
Held: No. The Supreme Court held that respondent Judge's previous order ought to have
remained undisturbed.
There was a deliberate failure of respondent Judge to respect what is so clearly provided in the
Rules of Court. It is quite categorical. As set forth above: "If the defendant fails to appear as
required, the bond is declared forfeited . . . ." The very caption of such section reads: "Forfeiture
of bail."
Bail "is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the
law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in
the bail bond or recognizance."
Clearly, the innovation introduced by the present Constitution goes no further than to enable a
judge to continue with the trial even if the accused is not present under the conditions therein
specified. It does not give him the right to jump bail. Where, as in this case, it is undisputed that
[Gamayon] had gone abroad, the usual procedure provided by the Rules of Court to determine
the liability of his bondsmen should be followed.

GIMENEZ V. NAZARENO
Facts:
1. On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio
and private respondent Teodoro de la Vega Jr., were charged with the crime of murder.

2. On August 22, 1973 all the above-named. accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E.
Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

3. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private respondent escaped from his detention
center and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case
(the petitioners herein) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case
against all the accused praying that private respondent de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking
the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:

SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustified. (Emphasis supplied.) *

4. After due trial, or on November 6,1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case
against the five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent.

5. Hence, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration

Issue:
whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who has been duly
tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-
examine witnesses who testified against him

Held:

To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the
arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his
person and this continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape from the
custody of the law.

Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution aforecited a "trial in
absentia"may be had when the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an
arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to
do so is unjustified.
In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia.

The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973 Constitution, correctly
proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the
absence of private respondent, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the private
respondent and rendered a decision as to the other accused only.

Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence
presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who who escape from
custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and moss e the witnesses against
him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional
provision on trial in absentia.

The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be
violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment
of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the
accused was given the opportunity to be heard.

Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine
and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice,
he virtually waived these rights

CARREDO V. PEOPLE

RIGHT TO SECURE WITNESSES AND PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE

PERFECTA, PRIMITIVO and QUIRINO CAVILIvs.HON. TEODORO N. FLORENDO,

CLARITA, ULPIANO, ESTRELL, and PLACIDACAVILI, ET AL.
(G.R. No. 73039 October 9, 1987)

FACTS:
Private respondents filed Civil Case No. 6880 against herein petitioners for which summons was
issued to them. Summons was not served to Primitivo and Quirino, but only to Perfecta. Atty.
Jose P. Alamino filed a motion for extension to answer in behalf of the defendants, manifesting
the representation of his client Perfecta Cavili that she will inform her brothers Primitivo and
Quirino about the case. After failing to file an answer within the time allowed, they were
declared in default, and judgment by default soon followed.

However, an order for new trial was issued upon order of Atty. Jose P. Alamillo, on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction and, with a meritorious defense that the properties sought to be partitioned
have already been the subject of a written partition agreement between the direct heirs of the
parties.
When the case was re-raffled, Judge Cipriano Vamenta set aside the order for new trial and
reinstated the judgment by default. The Supreme Court reversed the said decision and ordered
new trial upon petition for certiorari filed by respondents. Respondent judge Florendo
disqualified petitioner Perfecta as a witness upon a motion for her disqualification filed by
private respondents, alleging that Perfecta has lost her standing in court and she cannot be
allowed to participate in all premise the even as a witness. Petitioners filed this petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether Perfecta should be disqualified to appear as witness.

RULING: No. She should be qualified to appear as witness. Section 18, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court states who are qualified to be witnesses. It provides: Section 18. Witnesses; their
qualifications. — Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who, having
organs of sense, can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may
be witnesses. Neither parties nor other persons interested in the outcome of a case shall be
excluded; nor those who have been convicted of crime; nor any person on account of his opinion
on matters of religious belief. There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in
default from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide
default as an exception. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses (under Sections 19
and 20 of Rule 130 and Section 15 of Rule 132)excludes the operation of causes of disability
other than those mentioned in the Rules. As a general rule, where there are express exceptions
these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be
implied.

Rule 18, Section 2, likewise, does not support respondent’s contention. Under this rule, a party
declared in default shall not be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings nor to take part in the
trial. A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the proceedings, and
examine or cross-examine witnesses.
There is nothing in the rule, however, which contemplates a disqualification to be a witness or an
opponent in a case. Default does not make him an incompetent. As opposed to a party litigant, a
witness is merely a beholder, a spectator or onlooker, called upon to testify to what he has seen,
heard, or observed. As such, he takes no active part in the h of rights between the parties. A party
in default may thus be cited as a witness by his co-defendants who have the standing and the
right to present evidence which the former may provide. To reject Perfects Cavili's presentation
of testimonial evidence would be to treat Primitivo and Quirino, as if they too were in default.
The petition is hereby GRANTED. The order of the respondent court disqualifying Perfecta
Cavili dela Cruz as a witness in Civil Case No. 6880 is hereby SET ASIDE.
FAJARDO V. GARCIA
CRIME: MURDER
FACTS:
Oscar Fajardo, Cesar Fajardo and Rodrigo Doliente, with the crime of murder, a plea of not
guilty was entered. After which, the case was set for trial.
Prosecution disclosed that at the time of the arrest of petitioners on the evening of September 11,
1972, all of them were suffering from wounds on different parts of their bodies.
Next day, at the detention cell in Subic, the father of the accused Oscar Fajardo and Cesar
Fajardo sent for a doctor, Dr. Herminio Academia by name, to examine and thereafter treat such
wounds ( medical certs were given afterwards)
At the trial: during the reception of the evidence for the defense on March 19, 1974, petitioner
Oscar Fajardo testified.
Then when the judge asked counsel for the defense where Dr. Herminio Academia was, the
answer was that said doctor had left the country for abroad and was then residing in the US. It
was after the direct examination of petitioner Oscar Fajardo that respondent Judge was asked for
leave to serve written interrogatories on Dr. Herminio Academia at his place of residence in the
US.
It was argued that his testimony on the examination and treatment of the wounds on the bodies of
all of the accused would be crucial for the defense, the offense charged being of a very serious
character. Respondent Judge asked that a motion to that effect be filed That was done, but in May
of 1974, such motion was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
May an accused compel the trial court to issue subpoena to a Physician who is already working
in the United States to testify on his trial ent of the accused? Would the failure of said witness to
appear and testify for the accused violates his right to subpoena witnesses and the production of
evidence in his favor?
HELD:
No. Such witness is beyond the jurisdiction of the Philippine Courts. Further, his right to
subpoena witnesses and the production of evidence will not be violated since the hospital could
produce said records and another physician could testify on the contents thereof.
The constitutional guarantee to an accused to compulsory process to secure the production of
evidence in his behalf was not violated by the trial judge who refused to grant the request of the
accused for leave to serve written interrogatories to his doctor who treated their injuries who
already left abroad. That the said medical testimony on the injuries they sustained was vital to
their defense can still be adduced thru other witnesses and hospital records.

People vs Agbayani (Sorry kakikita ko lang na may assigned cases - Dulnuan. )