Negotiation in The European Union Bargaining or Problem Solving

Journal of European Public Policy
ISSN: 1350-1763 (Print) 1466-4429 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpp20
Negotiation in the European Union: bargaining or

problem-solving?
Ole Elgström & Christer Jönsson
To cite this article: Ole Elgström & Christer Jönsson (2000) Negotiation in the European
Union: bargaining or problem-solving?, Journal of European Public Policy, 7:5, 684-704, DOI:
10.1080/13501760010014902
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760010014902
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Journal of European Public Policy 7:5 Special Issue: 684–704
Negotiation in the European

Union: bargaining or problem-
solving?
Ole Elgström and Christer Jönsson
Downloaded by [Panteion University] at 04:38 06 June 2016
ABSTRACT EU negotiations are characterized by the coexistence of a bargaining

and a problem-solving approach. The permanence of EU negotiations discourages
tough bargaining behaviour, as does the prevalence of strong consensus norms. On
the other hand, evidence exists of very confrontational behaviour that often leads
to lowest common denominator solutions. We argue that the mode of negotiation
to be found in the EU decision-making processes is contextually determined.
Empirically it is demonstrated that day-to-day negotiations in the EU are to a large
extent problem-solving exercises. Under certain circumstances, however, conictual
bargaining occurs. The pattern varies with, therefore, level of politicization and type
of policy, and according to the stage in the decision-making process. We also
suggest that processes of learning have resulted in changes in the EU’s negotiation
style: problem-solving has become increasingly institutionalized within the EU
machinery.
KEY WORDS Bargaining; consensus; contextual analysis; institutionalization;
learning; problem-solving.
INTRODUCTION
‘The European policy process has been peculiarly dependent on negotiation as
a predominant mode of reaching agreements on policy and of implementing
policies once agreed,’ argues Helen Wallace (1996: 32) and she adds: ‘Much
of the literature is misleading in suggesting that the model is either a negotia-
tion model or something else. The analytical question is what characterizes the
negotiation process, not whether it exists.’ Today her thesis about the centrality
of negotiations nds widespread support among EU specialists. The European
Union (EU) is variably characterized as a ‘negotiated order’ (Smith 1996), as
‘the negotiating state’ writ large (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1995: 21–2),
and as an ‘integrated system of multi-level bargaining’ (Grande 1996: 325).
However, when it comes to characterizing the negotiation process, practi-
tioners and observers alike disagree. Our experience from teaching negotiation
theory to Swedish civil servants involved in EU matters is that, for each
theoretical statement or research nding we present, some agree that ‘this is
Journal of European Public Policy
ISSN 1350–1763 print/ISSN 1466-4429 online © 2000 Taylor & Francis Ltd
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/13501760010014902
O. Elgström and C. Jönsson: Negotiation in the EU 685
exactly the way it is in the EU’, while others claim ‘it is not like that at all’.
Similarly, the academic literature proffers contradictory generalizations about
EU negotiations. The obvious conclusion is that there is variation rather than
one typical negotiation process in the EU. The purpose of this article is not to
settle the disputes among practitioners and academics, but rather to sort out
the principal dimensions of the disagreements and speculate about patterns of
variation. To accomplish this, we draw on existing literature but will also
provide some modest empirical input from an ongoing research project.
BARGAINING AND PROBLEM-SOLVING

We proceed from a common distinction in the negotiation literature between
bargaining and problem-solving (cf. Hopmann 1996: ch. 6). The distinction
between bargaining and problem-solving may refer to either (a) different

approaches to the study of negotiations by researchers, (b) different approaches
to negotiations by individual negotiators, (c) different types of negotiations, or
(d) different aspects present in all negotiations. As will become clear in the
following, we will focus on (a); our ontologial assumption is (d); and, in
describing various theoretical approaches and hypotheses, we cannot avoid
language reminiscent of (b) and (c).
The essential, dening difference between a bargaining and a problem-
solving approach (or between distributive and integrative negotiations, as these
phenomena are also commonly called) seems to lie in their respective focus on
self-interests versus common interests. Bargaining is characterized by every
participant’s insistence on getting as much as possible for him- or herself,
without caring about the consequences for other players: ‘claiming value’ in the
parlance of Lax and Sebenius (1986). Problem-solving focuses on reaching
Pareto-optimal solutions, where none of the participants is worse off because
of the deal: ‘creating value’ (Lax and Sebenius 1986) or ‘expanding the pie’ (cf.
Raiffa 1982). The task is to identify, enlarge and act upon the parties’ common
interests (Walton and McKersie 1991). While bargaining is associated with a
concern about relative advantages, problem-solving is linked to the priority of
absolute advantages.
Problem-solving is often associated with creativity and the search for new,
inventive solutions (Gillespie and Bazerman 1997; cf. Kelman 1996). In
situations where the players are driven by a concern for their own interests, the
incentive to look actively for creative joint solutions is ordinarily absent.
Instead, the tendency is to end up with lowest common denominator
agreements.
Another dimension, often associated with distributive–integrative negotia-
tions, is conictual versus co-operative attitudes and behaviour. Bargaining is
perceived to involve manipulative tactics, threats and rm commitments, and
a win–lose attitude. Problem-solving implies information sharing, a joint
search for common interests and a win–win attitude (Fisher and Ury 1981).
686 Journal of European Public Policy
Confrontational bargaining is contrasted with friendly, integrative negotia-

tions. If this dichotomy is compared to the basic denition of problem-solving
versus bargaining approaches given above, it is clear, however, that a focus on
self-interests does not necessarily imply conict and confrontation. Actors,
driven by self-interest, do not need to use threats or other hostile behaviour.
The correlation between egotistic concerns and a conictual approach, and
between a common interest attitude and a problem-solving approach is less
than perfect.
THE TWO PERSPECTIVES AND THE EU: THEORETICAL

UNDERPINNINGS
The EU as a bargaining arena

This perspective emphasizes the intergovernmental character of EU negotia-
tions. According to state-centric models, EU decisions are determined by
bargaining among state executives and generally reect the lowest common
denominator (cf. Moravcsik 1993; Marks et al. 1996: 345; Friis 1996: 60).
Each government is primarily concerned with its own self-interests. No execu-
tive is willing to accept policies which seem contrary to his or her national
interest.
In the EU context, the most powerful explication of the intergovernmen-
talist logic is Fritz Scharpf’s argument regarding a ‘joint-decision trap’ (Scharpf
1988). Scharpf claims that two powerful institutional arrangements result in
substantive deciencies of joint policy-making in the EU: the fact that member
governments are directly participating in central decisions, and that the
agreement of constituent governments must be unanimous or nearly unan-
imous (Scharpf 1988: 254).
The EU is, in Scharpf’s eyes, characterized by a ‘bargaining style of
decision-making’, ‘in which the benets received under the present policy
become the base line below which nobody will settle’ (p. 264). The bargaining
orientation is based on the assumption that all participants will pursue their
individual self-interest, and that agreement will only be reached if each party
expects an outcome which is no worse than the status quo. The existence of
a veto will preclude any other type of agreement. In such a system, it will
obviously be very difcult to obtain major changes; in fact, there is a strong
inclination to preserve existing rules. Under the unanimity rule, there is thus
the risk that existing policies will continue even when confronted with
changed circumstances. Scharpf’s conclusion is that joint decision-making
systems, from which exit is precluded or costly, will tend to lead to sub-optimal
results.
For us, the most interesting feature of this model is its description of the
EU as an arena characterized by bargaining. To the realist assumptions that
governments are driven by self-interest and lack of trust is added the unanimity
rule, to produce a simple theoretical model. In such a system, we can expect
lowest common denominator solutions to be pervasive. The atmosphere is
permeated by distrust, and exchanges characterized by specic reciprocity – a
simultaneous exchange of equally valued goods (Keohane 1986). Though
bargaining, according to Scharpf, does not necessarily include conictual
strategies – that would belong to what he calls a ‘confrontational’ style – it
seems obvious that tough bargaining tactics are not excluded.
Fearon (1998: 282) adds another theoretical reason why we should expect
bargaining in the EU context. He argues that the longer the shadow of the
future (Axelrod 1984), the more likely the use of tough bargaining. If actors
expect to be tightly bound for a long time by a joint agreement, they are more
prone to see to it that the settlement is not in conict with their important
interests. Therefore, they ght vigorously for their positions. As EU decisions

are often binding and relatively likely to be implemented, this logic should
apply particularly well to the EU.
The only possibility of escaping the joint-decision trap is if decision-makers
turn to a problem-solving style of negotiation (Scharpf 1988: 161). Un-
fortunately, this is, according to Scharpf, not to be expected. The preconditions
of problem-solving – an orientation toward common goals, values and norms
– are difcult to create; and mostly absent in the EU. The lack of a widespread
European identication is the most visible evidence of this (cf. Héritier 1995:
208).
The EU as a problem-solving arena

This theoretical perspective highlights totally different characteristics of the
EU. The Union is portrayed as a highly institutionalized, continuous negotia-
tion machinery (cf. Jönsson et al. 1998; Wallace 1985: 455). Theoretically,
such features would lead us to expect an integrative type of negotiation
behaviour.
The time aspect is essential. ‘Permanent’ negotiations seem to be a pre-
condition for a co-operative mode of behaviour to be established, and for joint
codes of conduct to develop. When people work together for a long time in
a highly institutionalized environment, shared norms may be created, espe-
cially in a context where institutional actors (i.e. the Commission and the
Parliament) have the incentive to promote joint action. Helen Wallace thus
suggests that common principles of burden-sharing and a framework of equity
have evolved within the EU as a result of a shared conviction that distributive
and redistributive aspects are necessary consequences of EU co-operation, and
that these have to be dealt with (Wallace 1990: 215).
It is, however, not only the ‘shadow of the past’ that is important, but also
‘the shadow of the future’ (Axelrod 1984; cf. Friis 1996). Robert Axelrod
maintains that two prerequisites for co-operation to thrive are that the co-
operation is based on reciprocity, and that the shadow of the future is im-
portant enough to make this reciprocity stable (Axelrod 1984: 173). If players
in a negotiation game are certain to meet again, and the future is sufciently
important relative to the present, mutual co-operation between egoists is
possible. Such conditions obviously exist in the EU context. In Adrienne
Héritier’s (1996: 157) words, ‘participants know that their relationship is not
merely a temporary one, but meant to be durable. They therefore think twice
before ruthlessly seeking to maximize their individual interests.’ Continuous
negotiations thus facilitate co-operative solutions, especially in an environment
of mutual trust.
In such a setting, norms of stable, diffuse reciprocity are likely to emerge.
Diffuse reciprocity means that concessions in a bargaining exchange do not
have to be made at the same time, and are not necessarily absolutely equivalent
(Keohane 1986; Stenelo 1996). The actors are, in other words, convinced that
they will all benet in the long run. Expectations of this kind greatly facilitate
the settlement of complex negotiations. The prevalence of reciprocal under-
standings has been noted in the EU context (Wallace 1990: 225).
Unlike Axelrod, Scharpf argues that the existence of self-interested exchange
relationships is not enough to create a problem-solving decision-making style.
What is needed is an orientation emphasizing common interests and values
(Scharpf 1988: 260–1). These joint norms must be strong enough to produce
voluntary agreement even when sacrices in terms of self-interests are neces-
sary. Those who claim that the EU is characterized by integrative negotiations
assert that such norms do exist, that mutual, diffuse reciprocity is the rule, and
that mutual trust is a predominant feature of EU negotiations. Despite the
absence of a strong European identity, a ‘consensus culture’ and feelings of
solidarity exist on the European élite level, according to this school of thought.
‘Membership matters’, it is argued: the norms and values of states change as
a consequence of membership, and considerations of EU interests invade
traditional spheres of national interest formation (Sandholtz 1996; Kerremans
1996: 231; Spence 1995: 374–6). On the procedural level, informal codes of
conduct have developed with the important function of telling participants
which actions are not allowed. Such a ‘code of decency’, based on mutual
loyalties, is claimed to result in a readiness to compromise (Kerremans 1996:
223).
A nal theoretical argument points to the psychological effects of working
together for longer periods of time in small groups. A tendency for feelings of
solidarity to develop in such contexts has been noted (Janis 1982). Members
get to know each other, and interpersonal relationships are formed. Repeated
mutual interaction encourages a socialization process in which new loyalties
and identications are formed among group members. Attitudes of ‘belonging
together’ create pressure for members to reach consensus solutions, and this
necessitates joint problem-solving. As much of the day-to-day decision-making
in the EU takes place in small, semi-permanent groups, this would tend to
result in the predominance of integrative negotiations (cf. Kerremans 1996:

232; Spence 1995: 375).
Experiences from the eld: empirical ndings on bargaining or

problem-solving
In the spring of 1998, a questionnaire was sent to Swedish participants in EU
expert groups, working groups and comitology committees. The questionnaire
was sent to 421 individuals and included a broad section of Swedish ofcials
with EU experience. The response rate was 65 per cent (275 answers). The
answers reect Swedish ofcials’ perceptions of what is characteristic of EU
negotiations. They say more about day-to-day negotiations than about history-
making decisions.
The questions either asked for one exact answer or asked the respondents
to indicate one out of several alternatives. Typical questions of the latter type
asked ‘how often’ a certain phenomenon happened or ‘how important’ some-
thing was, or to what extent a certain trait characterized EU negotiations.
Respondents could choose between four or ve alternative answers, of the type
‘very often’, ‘rather often’, ‘rather seldom’, ‘seldom’ or ‘never’. A few questions
asked how well certain given propositions described group activities.
The rst general and very strong impression one gets from the data is the
preponderance of problem-solving in the processes. No less than 87 per cent
of the respondents afrm that ‘a spirit of co-operation’ characterizes group
activities to a very high or rather high degree. Only 1 per cent say that such
a spirit is totally absent. This can be compared with the corresponding gures
for the existence of a ‘spirit of conict’: only 18 per cent claim the existence
of such a phenomenon, while 34 per cent argue that it is totally absent. One-
fth of the ofcials answer that the most important thing in their groups is to
reach consensus (69 per cent if we include those who say that this is rather
often the case). Seven out of ten indicate directly that joint problem-solving
is very or rather frequent in their groups. This picture is conrmed by the
pattern one gets when asking about negotiation behaviour. Efforts to nd
shared interests are claimed to take place frequently by 76 per cent; at the same
time almost half of the respondents maintain that threats and deliberate
manipulations never occur.
Still, conictual behaviour and bargaining are not totally absent. In a
substantial number of cases, ofcials testify that elements of bargaining can be
found. One-fth of the respondents did claim that a spirt of conict exists in
their groups. A low degree of trust between group members is reported by 11
per cent. One-third of the respondents report that a majority does ride
roughshod over the minority. Deliberate manipulation does occur, according
to half of the ofcials, and threats are used, even if only infrequently.
In brief, day-to-day negotiations in the EU are clearly to a large extent
problem-solving exercises. Under certain circumstances, however, conictual
bargaining occurs. It is to the nature of these circumstances, and to the

contextual determinants of EU negotiations, that we turn next.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT

Negotiation theorists since Schelling (1963) have stressed that all negotiations
include both conictual and co-operative aspects. ‘Without common interests
there is nothing to negotiate for, without conict nothing to negotiate about’
(Iklé 1964: 2). Even in the most integrative game, the joint gains have to be
divided between the players – and even highly antagonistic encounters require
a measure of co-operation, in the sense that both players actually have to say
‘yes’ to the nal agreement (Lax and Sebenius 1986).
This ambivalence is noticeable in the EU context as well. Paul Meerts, while
claiming that there is a ‘cooperative and synergistic atmosphere within the EU’
(Meerts 1997: 463), also concedes that there is ‘a greater distrust and a more
uncertain and negative climate than one would expect’ (p. 472). Even if the
members ‘hesitate to twist arms’, they still do it (p. 473). Helen Wallace
denes EU negotiations as an ‘unusual form of integrative bargaining’ (1990:
213, 218), but she also argues that concerns for domestic repercussions result
in a tendency to non-concession making (1985: 455), and that interpretations
of EU negotiations in terms of zero-sum games and cynical power games are
possible (1990: 224).
Our argument is that both aspects of negotiation exist, side by side, in the
EU, and depend on contextual, or circumstantial, factors. One is more likely
to encounter problem-solving, or bargaining, under some circumstances than
others. In this study, ve different contextual factors, extracted from the
literature on EU decision-making, are singled out for discussion:
decision-making rule
level of politicization
stage in the decision-making process
type of policy
network characteristics.
Decision-making rule
A unanimity rule tends to lead to agreements where the most reluctant actor
determines the pace and the level of achievement. No player has any incentive
to agree to a policy decision which is below his or her BATNA (Best
Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement; see Fisher and Ury 1981), often the
status quo, if he or she has a veto. In this way, the veto seems to encourage
the promotion of self-interests. This is the basic argument made by
Scharpf.
On the other hand, it may well be argued that the unanimity rule is more
attuned to co-operative negotiations than majority voting. When only a
majority is required, you do not need to look for jointly agreeable solutions –
there is always the possibility of defeating the minority by outvoting it. The
threat of voting may be used in negotiations to press for concessions. The
majority rule thus seems to result in a higher propensity for antagonistic
behaviour, whereas the unanimity rule encourages consensus-seeking
behaviour.
It might also be argued that unanimity voting produces a need for creativity:
‘how can we design a solution which everyone can accept?’. The same can,
however, be said about majority voting; creativity might well be needed to
construct stable coalitions.
Linking voting rules to types of issue, Mark Pollack suggests that the
availability of a veto makes it more difcult to reach agreements on distributive
and regulative policies. This is consistent with the Scharpan logic above
(Pollack 1994: 140–1). More intriguingly, Pollack goes on to propose that the
veto might, on the other hand, facilitate redistributive bargains. The logic
behind this is that redistribution often requires package-deals to get all players
on board, and that the best incentive to get powerful actors to listen to weaker
powers is their threat of a veto – only then do the strong understand that they
have to come up with side-payments or other linkages. As package-deals are
often seen as vital instruments for reaching common interests, this means that
unanimity may trigger integrative negotiations in such policy elds.
In brief, the relationship between voting rules and negotiation approaches
is complex. Unanimity seems to produce a bargaining approach, driven by self-
interest, with the possible exception of redistributive issues. On the other
hand, majority voting tends to produce a more confrontational climate. None
of the decision rules per se can be logically linked to creative problem-
solving.
Level of politicization
When realists tried to explain unforeseen state co-operation in international
organizations, they introduced a distinction between high and low politics.
While state predominance and competition was to be expected in areas where
important national interests were at stake, more co-operative behaviour could
be allowed in less politicized surroundings of a technical nature, ‘low
politics’.
We argue that ‘level of politicization’ is a term better able to catch the
essence of the phenomenon which we are after than ‘high and low politics’.
The latter concepts have proved difcult to operationalize, and issue-areas that
have traditionally been considered technical can quickly be transformed into
‘high politics’ if the issue becomes politicized. Mad cow disease (BSE) is a
prominent example. Politicization also better reects the interplay between
domestic politics and EU politics; when public opinion or inuential interests
become engaged, an issue may rapidly move from being handled by bureau-
crats to the agenda of top politicians.
Levels of politicization and type of negotiation are sometimes, if only

indirectly, linked in studies of the EU. John Peterson recommends a research
strategy that ‘encourages us to look for identiable patterns of decision-making
at different levels of analysis, to specify which actors tend to dominate
decision-making at which levels, and to think about the implications for EU
policy outcomes’ (Peterson 1995a: 70). He introduces a distinction between
‘history-making decisions’ and ‘policy-shaping decisions at a meso-level’, and
claims that the rst reect a ‘distinctively political’ rationality, while the latter
mirror a ‘technocratic’ or ‘administrative’ rationality (1995a: 72–4). Even
though national interests are by no means absent from the meso-level, bargain-
ing there is more informal, and there is a ‘perceived need to forge consensus’
between actors on this level (1995a: 74).
In the same vein, Guy Peters (1997: 33) explicitly maintans that it is very
easy to see the probability of the joint-decision trap, associated with bargaining
and lowest common denominator solutions, when ‘the high politics of national
vetoes’ dominates. In day-to-day decision-making, on the other hand, the
situation is totally different. At this level, Peters ventures, ‘segmentation’ is the
key word; policy-making in the EU has become a highly fragmented enter-
prise, dominated by sector-specic actors. The result is that the style of
negotiations is ‘that of policy experts’ (Peters 1997: 29): co-ordination and co-
operation between actors with shared values and images, that is, problem-
solving.
It is argued that the fundamental distinction in EU policy-making is that
between politicized and non-politicized issues, with politicized areas permeated
by national interests and competitive strategies, and non-politicized issues by
segmented co-operation and a desire to preserve the arena as a locus for
generating future, joint benets.
Stage in the decision-making process

In the literature on EU decision-making, you sometimes nd the argument
that different theoretical approaches should be used when analysing the
different stages of the process. According to Jeremy Richardson, an epistemic
community approach is best suited for understanding agenda-setting, a net-
work approach for analysing policy formulation, an institutional approach for
decision-making, and an interorganizational approach for implementation
(Richardson 1996: 5).
The implication might be that different stages are also dominated by
dissimilar types of negotiation style, as various approaches can be associated
with different styles. If early stages are indeed marked by policy communities
and networks, we might expect a predominantly integrative style of negotia-
tions. Richardson argues that deliberations during this phase are often charac-
terized by unpredictability and uncertainty (Richardson 1996: 12–13).
Uncertainty is a fertile breeding-ground for mutual learning processes: all
parties have to learn about others’ priorities and may also be genuinely
uncertain about the effects of various policy alternatives. These are ideal
conditions for joint problem-solving to occur. There is a perceived need to
share information and to jointly nd out consequences and costs.
The decision-making phase would be associated more with a bargaining
style. The process is now more politicized and dominated by state representa-
tives (although many types of actors – not least the Commission – are certainly
involved also at this stage; see Marks et al. 1996: 366). In a sense, the
argument is similar to the one made on decision-making levels: ‘higher’ levels
are claimed to be linked to the preponderance of self-interests, whereas ‘lower’
levels are more ‘technical’ and thus more given to joint problem-solving.
During the implementation stage, we might again expect to encounter more
joint problem-solving. In comitology committees, interest group representa-
tives mix with ofcials from ministries, agencies and subnational organizations
(Marks et al. 1996: 368). Experts interact with experts with the goal of nding
commonly acceptable agreements, often on technical problems. Bargaining is
of course not absent, but is not the baseline to be expected (cf. Jönsson and
Tallberg 1998).
From this perspective, the major predictor of negotiation style is the stage
of the decision-making process. We would expect to nd conict and defence
of state interests in situations where decisions are actually made, and informa-
tion sharing and co-operation in the preparatory and implementing phases of
the process.
Type of policy
European community policies can be divided into policy types. Following
Theodore Lowi’s classication (Lowi 1972), four different clusters of EU
policy-making can be distinguished: constituent, in which the basic rules and
principles of the system itself are under consideration; redistributive, in which
the transfer of nancial resources from some actors to others is involved;
distributive, in which Community funds are allocated within sectors; and
regulatory, in which the member states agree to adopt common regulations on
the activities of public and private actors (cf. W. Wallace 1996).
These policy types are, it has been argued, dealt with in distinct political
arenas, comprised of different actors and governed by different decision rules.
Furthermore, they have also been supposed to generate distinctive styles of
bargaining (Pollack 1994: 96).
Constituent issues, typically handled by intergovernmental conferences,
concern high-level politics and questions of national interest. Because of the
importance of these issues, and the severe domestic repercussions involved if
politicians are not perceived to have defended these vital interests, constituent
policy-making must ordinarily be expected – if disagreement exists – to exhibit
tough bargaining. Policy-makers would tend to stick to their positions and
compromise agreements are reached in a slow, piecemeal fashion.
Redistributive policy-making is also expected to lead to tough negotiations,

which tend to acquire zero-sum-like characteristics: some win, while others
lose. And zero-sum negotiations are closely associated with conictual bargain-
ing. Redistributive issues, writes William Wallace, ‘pitch governments against
each other’ (1996: 445). ‘Redistributive bargaining’, adds Pollack, ‘tends to be
conictual and cross-sectoral’ (1994: 112).
At the same time, however, redistribution in the EU context is traditionally
associated with the creation of package-deals and with the use of side-payments
(Pollack 1994: 96). The linkages between single market reforms and regional
policy in the 1986 and 1992 deals are obvious examples. Package-deals can be
interpreted in two different ways: they might either be seen as inventive
solutions to negotiation deadlocks and thus as a prominent form of creative
problem-solving, or as results of ‘blackmailing’, that is, of deliberate efforts
from some actors to gain advantages in a situation where they for some reason
– for example, veto power – can exert pressure on the other parties. In the
latter interpretation, packages and side-payments are primarily viewed as
instruments of distributive bargaining. To summarize, redistributive issues are
associated with tough bargaining, but the package-deals which are often
needed to solve resulting deadlocks are sometimes cited as illustrations of
creative joint problem-solving.
Once these overarching, high-level redistributive decisions are taken, and
the overall contributions are taken as given, distributive issues are the stuff of
functional politics, characterized by intra-sectoral negotiations. Here, national
and Commission experts within each sector negotiate with each other and with
sectoral interests over sometimes very detailed questions. All in all, distributive
policy-making must be predicted to involve large elements of problem-solving.
Of course, within-sector conicts might be severe and give rise to hard
bargaining, but as the negotiations concern transfers of resources to bene-
ciaries in all member states (although to various degrees), and the actors are
like-minded experts, most factors speak in favour of generally harmonious
negotiations (cf. Pollack 1994: 112).
Regulatory issues are handled in legal or quasi-legal processes. The Commis-
sion plays the important role of initiator and drafter. Expert technical commit-
tees and working groups are usually crucial fora for negotiations. The
European Court of Justice is an ever-present back-stage actor, at times even
actively involved in policy-making.
Regulatory negotiations might arguably exhibit conictual elements. First,
any new EU regulation implies a certain loss of autonomy on the part of
member states (Pollack 1994: 110). This could result in member government
resistance, stemming from a hesitation to allow more supranational govern-
ance. Second, EU law creates winners and losers within each country, and may
thus stimulate activities from specialized interests which suffer from the
proposed regulation. If these interests are strong enough, governments may feel
pressured to engage in tough negotiations in the Council.
On the other hand, new regulations are often the result of spill-over effects
and belong to the sphere of what may be perceived as the necessary con-
sequences of intra-Community harmonization, which is seen as benecial to all
members. If this is the case, there must be a strong tendency not to resist
stubbornly specic parts of this positive overall process. In so far as partially
negative negotiation outcomes are seen as unavoidable and acceptable in light
of the positive-sum total, actors will engage in problem-solving in order to
minimize adverse effects and encourage concessions from other actors to
placate domestic opinion. As long as all members believe in the long-run
advantages of being a member, there is a strong incentive for a problem-solving
approach to regulative issues.
Network characteristics
In the wake of formal organizations, informal structures typically emerge

which we usually label networks. The proliferation of networks in the EU can
be seen as a condition as well as a consequence of the uidity and complexity
of the formal European framework (cf. Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1995:
8). As the dispersion of power renders heirarchical governance impossible,
networks provide an alternative mode of policy co-ordination (Schneider et al.
1994: 495). The term policy network, originally coined for domestic politics,
has been applied to the EU by several authors. A policy network includes a
relatively stable set of public and private organizational actors, linked through
communication and the exchange of information, expertise and other policy
resources. The prevalent assumption in the literature on domestic policy
networks is that they tend to generate co-operation and problem-solving rather
than conict and bargaining. Informal networks enable the participating actors
to exchange information more freely and to develop and sustain trust.
Yet, in comparison with domestic ones, policy networks in the EU tend to
be much more heterogeneous (Héritier 1995: 208). Therefore, the co-operative
and problem-solving potentials of networks may not be equally obvious as in
domestic settings. To be sure, there are several observers who argue that EU
networks are ‘settings for the playing of positive-sum games’ (Peterson 1995b:
391), where actors ‘become partners of joint problem-solving’ (Jachtenfuchs
and Kohler-Koch 1995: 9). Yet, the crucial question to pose, it seems to us,
is which types of network are likely to generate co-operative behaviour and
problem-solving. The question rests on an assumption that all networks are not
alike but may differ along several dimensions.
It has been noted that the network literature suffers from a lack of explicit
hypotheses which systematically link the nature of a policy network with the
character of the policy process (Börzel 1997: 3). Without much guidance from
the theoretical literature, we propose three tentative hypotheses as to how types
of network may affect EU negotiations. They focus on the density, informality
and relational content of networks, respectively.
The term ‘density’ derives from graph theory where it refers to the ratio of
the number of observed links between nodes to the potential number of links.
In other words, it is a measure of the interconnectedness of a network, the
extent to which all possible relations are actually present. The higher the
density of a network, the greater the probability of problem-solving rather than
bargaining. Participants in dense networks interact frequently, know each other
well, and protect the boundaries of their network. Communication ows more
freely, and there are greater opportunities for ‘diffuse reciprocity’ in dense than
in non-dense networks.
Networks are usually associated with informality. One of the main advantages
of networks over formal organizations is that they allow informal interorganiza-
tional co-ordination. As demonstrated by Donald Chisholm (1989), informal
co-ordination avoids problems associated with hierarchy and representation,
while facilitating the development of trust and frank exchanges of information.
However, informality should be regarded as a variable or continuum rather than

a dening characteristic of networks. The informality of networks, in short, may
vary over time and across issues. Thus we hypothesize that the more informal a
network is, the greater the probability of problem-solving rather than bargain-
ing. Formalization entails rigid rather than exible coalitions and exchanges.
The other side of the coin is that informality increases exibility in terms of
available combinations of actors and negotiating positions.
As for relational content, nally, interdependence among the participating
actors constitutes the foundation of networks. These mutual dependencies are
rarely symmetrical. Therefore, resource dependency is sometimes posited as a
key component of network denitions (see, for example, Benson 1982: 148).
Resources are elements which the organization requires for its survival or
performance, such as money or information. Other authors emphasize that
networks are based on knowledge and ideas. Interorganizational relations
within a network are then seen to rest on the exchange of information, and
networks are frequently represented as ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas 1992). A
‘knowledge perspective’ on the policy process is frequently contrasted with a
‘power perspective’, as exemplied by the notion of resource dependencies. Yet
these two dimensions can be seen as interactive aspects of the relational
contents of networks (cf. Radaelli 1995). In the same vein, we can formulate
our third hypothesis thus: the more a network is knowledge-based and the less
it rests on asymmetrical resource dependencies, the greater the probability of
problem-solving rather than bargaining. Knowledge-based networks in general,
and epistemic communities in particular, are characterized by considerable
consensus. Asymmetries in resource dependencies, on the other hand, tend to
create frictions, following from a sense of vulnerability among the weak and a
temptation among the strong to translate their advantage into pressuring
tactics in negotiations.
The hypothesized effects of the contextual factors discussed above are summar-
ized in Table 1. Needless to say, we are talking about uncertain tendencies in
Table 1 Hypothesized effects of contextual factors
Problem-solving Bargaining
decis ion-making rule ? unanimity (?)
level of politicization non-politicized politicized
stage in decis ion- early stage decision-making stage
making process implementation
type of policy distributive issues constituent issues
regulative issues (?) redistributive issues (?)
network high density low density
characteristics informal formalized
knowledge-based based on asymmetrical
resource dependencies
need of further empirical research. Question marks in the table indicate a high
degree of uncertainty and ambiguity in the literature.
How context matters: Swedish perceptions

Is our overall nding of a predominant problem-solving approach with islands
of conictual bargaining a pattern which is consistent in all circumstances, or
does a contextual analysis give a more subtle and sophisticated answer?
The questionnaire covered different stages of the decision-making process
(agenda-setting and initial deliberations in expert groups, decision preparation
and decision-making in working groups, discussion on implementation in
comitology committees). In all types of group, problem-solving is the rule, and
bargaining an exception. Still, important differences do exist. Each type of
group exhibits clearly distinguishable response patterns and specic character-
istics. They differ as regards the relative weight of problem-solving behaviour,
and also in their relative emphasis on national interests.
Expert groups are, not surprisingly, heavily imbued with a spirit of expertise.
Members underline strongly the importance of nding substantive solutions
that are sustainable. Ninety per cent say that this is the most important
concern (compared with, for example, 66 per cent in committees). Members
also put less emphasis on national interests. ‘Only’ 62 per cent report that
members clearly demarcate the positions of their countries, while the corre-
sponding gure is 90 per cent in the other types of group. Expert groups also
take the interests of individual states into consideration to a lesser degree than
other groups. Experts are furthermore rather more sensitive to the wishes of the
Commission, and their groups much more prone to be dominated by an inner
circle than other groups.
Altogether, these traits produce a higher level of integrative solutions than
in any other type of group. According to 54 per cent of the expert group
members, their deliberations ‘often’ result in solutions which improve the lot of
everyone – compared to only about one-third in the other groups. This is
rather surprising, considering that expert groups are not very high on in-
dicators of problem-solving behaviour. The interpretation must be that these
integrative solutions are seen as ‘technically optimal’. Much more consideration
is given to substantially successful agreements, often advocated by the Com-
mission ofcials, than to national political concerns. In brief, the technical
nature of expert groups is very strong.
Council working groups are much more politicized. Here, there is a strong
tendency to emphasize national interests – but also to take the interests of
other states to heart, and try to nd solutions which do not go against the vital
interests of any other member. Ninety-eight per cent state that members give
emphasis to national interests. Eighty per cent of Swedes in the working
groups see it as a very important task to represent Swedish interets (53 per cent
in expert groups). At the same time, the spirit of co-operation is stronger in

these groups than anywhere else, and problem-solving behaviour is consistently
more frequent here than in expert groups and committees alike. For example,
we nd that members of working groups try more often to locate joint
interests and reach consensus, and are more open as regards revealing their own
positions than participants in other groups.
Consensus-seeking is thus characteristic of Council working groups. Co-
operation is the norm, even if this does not very often lead to integrative
solutions (such solutions are rather infrequent, as noted above). Problem-
solving behaviour is closely connected to efforts to nd agreements which do
not go against the interests of others. Nine out of ten report that consideration
is given to specic national interests, eight out of ten that members show great
understanding of other nations’ concerns. Almost one-third of the respondents
indicate that it never happens that another state is overridden – only 4 per cent
of the committee members give this answer!
The nature of comitology committees is more difcult to dene. Committees
are characterized by the fact that they exhibit the lowest degree of problem-
solving behaviour, that they are least inclined to engage in consensus-building
(although they very often do it!), but also that they are relatively less often seen
as arenas for negotiations between different interests. The spirit of expertise is
almost as prevalent as in expert groups, and they are quite sensitive to
Commission interests.
Our interpretation of this complex pattern, with relatively low frequency of
both problem-solving and bargaining, is that members of comitology commit-
tees do not primarily see their work as negotiations at all. We know from
existing research that these committees very seldom go against the proposals
from the Commission. In our case studies, some interviewees have shown
evident signs of resignation: ‘there is no point’ in confronting the Commission
because nothing will change anyway. Discussions in comitology committees
can be seen as debates between experts where the result is taken as almost
given, but where national solutions are still defended and taken into considera-
tion. Efforts are made to create consensus and unity, but it often happens that
individual members are overridden.
The answers to our questionnaire also give some information on the impact
of decision-making rules. We can compare the response patterns of those who
have indicated that the decision-making rule in their groups is by unanimity,
with the answers of those who belong to groups with qualied majority.
Unanimity should logically be expected to be correlated with efforts to reach
consensus. When asked to indicate if the proposition ‘the group tries to reach
consensus’ is consistent with their experiences, 93 per cent of the members of
unanimity-ruled groups conrm that this is the case. The difference, however,
is rather small in comparison with majority-rule groups: here 83 per cent give
the same answer. It is, at the same time, much more common to nd a spirit
of conict in unanimity groups. Thirty per cent give this answer, whereas only
about 10 per cent of members of majority groups experience such a spirit.

Another trait which can be detected in our material is a tendency for
unanimity-ruled groups to pay more attention to other members’ concerns.
Members take others’ interests into consideration to a somewhat higher degree,
and ride roughshod less often over recalcitrant states (but it does happen, even
in groups with unanimity: 10 per cent claim that such behaviour exists).
Furthermore, deadlocks and blocked situations are more frequent when una-
nimity is the rule. Interests seem to be less actively defended in majority-ruled
groups.
Finally, some data can be related to the density of networks. The respondents
were asked to write down how many times per year they had contact with
other members and with the Commission (besides contacts in connection with
formal meetings). We interpret higher levels of contact as indicating a higher
network density. The results are mixed. Many of the answers to our questions
on conictual versus co-operative behaviour did not produce any clear patterns
when linked to contact intensity. In some instances, however, such patterns
were found. More contacts with other members and with Commission ofcials
are associated with higher degrees of an experienced spirit of co-operation and
with a lower spirit of conict. More contacts are also connected to a higher
degree of trust between group members. High density thus seems to be related
to more co-operative negotiations. As our answers are not totally consistent,
this result should be treated with some caution.
CONCLUSION: FROM A STATIC TO A DYNAMIC

ANALYSIS
In general, our most impressive nding is that context clearly does have an
impact on negotiation processes. In the theoretical part of this article, we
suggested ve different contextual variables that could help to explain when
and where to expect bargaining and problem-solving, respectively. Our empiri-
cal ndings conrm that this perspective is fruitful. Even when focusing only
on day-to-day negotiations, bargaining as well as problem-solving behaviour

are found, though the latter is predominant.
A second major nding is the uncovering of what could be interpreted as a
management mode of negotiation in the EU. For some respondents, decision-
making is more of a discussion between experts than real negotiations. No less
than 86 per cent indicate that ‘a spirit of expertise’ characterizes their work to
a high or rather high degree. Three-quarters of the ofcials maintain that very
or rather often the most important thing for their group is to nd the best
substantial solution. And almost all respondents point to the frequent use of
‘substantive arguments’ in their groups. Our interpretation is that some EU
committees have taken on the characteristics of technical expert groups, where
experts jointly try to nd optimal solutions to technical problems. These
ofcials would probably say that they do not participate in negotiations at
all.
Some existing typologies of negotiation do indeed include a category of

‘organizational management’, signifying negotiations that are highly technical
and intended to reach a consensual, ‘objectively best’ solution (cf. Winham
1977; Druckman 1997: 88–9). Negotiations are then viewed as a process of
building agreement among organizational constituencies with stakes in the
outcome and with organizationally generated feelings of solidarity. In our view,
this management mode of negotiation is a sub-category of problem-solving. It
is a way of negotiating that seems to keep a rm grip on many EU committees,
especially in the early and late phases of the policy process.
Above, a stylized and essentially static picture is drawn of the potential
effects of different contextual variables on EU decision-making. This kind of
analysis highlights the logical linkages between various individual factors and
modes of negotiation. To understand the complex reality of EU policy-making,
however, we need to probe much deeper into the interplay between contextual
factors and focus on the dynamics of changing contexts. We would therefore
expect to nd developments of EU negotiation styles over time, as contextual
factors interact and are constantly re-created.
Another way of putting this is to emphasize learning and institutionalization
as crucial intervening processes. Actors learn from their experience. In this
case, learning about the effectiveness of different kinds of decision-making
procedures, ‘simple learning’ in the words of Jack Levy (1994: 286), seems to
be the key mechanism. Procedures that result in time-consuming quarrels and
in non-decision are abandoned in favour of more efcient decision-making
modes. Contextual developments may be perceived as strengthening the need
for procedural change.
At the same time, modes of negotiation, once adopted, tend to be in-
stitutionalized, that is, become taken-for-granted parts of institutional life.
Existing procedures tend to be perpetuated by repetition, especially if they are
initially evaluated as being successful in coping with perceived problems.
Ofcials and bureaucrats ‘get used to’ certain ways of reacting to and dealing
with dossiers and choose the same behavioural response as new challenges
appear. A dominant policy-making style therefore tends to be continually

reinforced and may even be hypothesized to expand in its decision-making
environment.
Learning and institutionalization may be used to explain tendencies that
have been observed in the EU context. According to Hayes-Renshaw and
Wallace:
Council negotiations have over the history of the EC been subject to a

push/pull between more integrative and more confrontational modes. In the
mid-1980s the more integrative mode gained ascendancy. It is hard other-
wise to account for the speed and the ease with which both the principles
and the details of the SEA were agreed, or to explain the subsequent high
output from Council negotiations.
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 259)
Arguably, problem-solving has thereafter continued to spread within the EU

machinery and has strengthened its grip as the predominant approach to
negotiation.
We argue that the turn to a more consensus-oriented approach was a result
of learning and of environmental pressures. Traditional bargaining had led to
protracted negotiations and to a lack of policy innovation. The need for
change was accentuated by ‘the British debate’ and by the need to socialize new
members. The normative consensus around the European common market
and the Single European Act (SEA) made the shift in negotiation mode
possible. The success of the SEA process consolidated and institutionalized
problem-solving as ‘the Community method’ of decision-making. Subsequent
expansions of the scope of the First Pillar procedures have increased the use of
integrative negotiation. In this way, the EU is changing itself into a problem-
solving apparatus.
Consistent with our reasoning above, however, there is a need to stress the
contextual character of these ‘advances’. As pointed out by Hayes-Renshaw and
Wallace, ‘we should not understate the persistence of obstacles to integrative
bargaining’ (1997: 262). In many policy areas, they claim, bargaining is still
the norm. Using our ve contextual factors, we hypothesize that problem-
solving has become the major mode of negotiation in non-politicized, reg-
ulative and distributive issue-areas, and especially in the agenda-setting and
implementation phases of the processes. The type of decision-making rule
seems less important; the ‘evidence shows a continuing reliance on consensus,
even where QMV [qualied majority voting] is possible’ (Hayes-Renshaw and
Wallace 1997: 53). In redistributive and constituent issue-areas, and where
high levels of politicization make protection of national self-interests a major
goal, bargaining is still prevalent. In arenas where negotiations are perceived
to be highly technical, organizational management has become the typical
approach to negotiation.
Address for correspondence: Ole Elgström, Department of Political Science,

Lund University, Box 52, SE – 221 00 Lund, Sweden. Tel: 00 46 462228947 .
Fax: 00 46 462224006. email: ole.elgstrom@svet.lu.se/Christer Jönsson,
Department of Political Science, Lund University, Box 52, SE – 221 00
Lund, Sweden. Tel: 00 46 462228929. Fax: 00 46 462224006. email:
christer.jonsson@svet.lu.se
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are grateful to our colleagues in the research project ‘The European Union:
Negotiations in Networks’ for their comments and for valuable discussions.
The project is nanced by the Swedish Research Council for the Social
Sciences and Humanities whose support is gratefully acknowledged. Earlier
versions of the article were presented at the ECPR Standing Group on

International Relations/International Studies Association Joint Conference,
Vienna, September 1998 and at the colloquium on ‘The EU as a Negotiated
Order’, Loughborough University, October 1999. We thank all participants for
their useful comments.
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Negotiation in the European Union: bargaining or

Ole Elgström & Christer Jönsson

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Negotiation in the European

ABSTRACT EU negotiations are characterized by the coexistence of a bargaining

BARGAINING AND PROBLEM-SOLVING

between bargaining and problem-solving may refer to either (a) different

Confrontational bargaining is contrasted with friendly, integrative negotia-

THE TWO PERSPECTIVES AND THE EU: THEORETICAL

The EU as a bargaining arena

interests. Therefore, they ght vigorously for their positions. As EU decisions

The EU as a problem-solving arena

result in the predominance of integrative negotiations (cf. Kerremans 1996:

Experiences from the  eld: empirical  ndings on bargaining or

bargaining occurs. It is to the nature of these circumstances, and to the

THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT

Levels of politicization and type of negotiation are sometimes, if only

Stage in the decision-making process

Redistributive policy-making is also expected to lead to tough negotiations,

In the wake of formal organizations, informal structures typically emerge

However, informality should be regarded as a variable or continuum rather than

Table 1 Hypothesized effects of contextual factors

How context matters: Swedish perceptions

in expert groups). At the same time, the spirit of co-operation is stronger in

about 10 per cent of members of majority groups experience such a spirit.

CONCLUSION: FROM A STATIC TO A DYNAMIC

on day-to-day negotiations, bargaining as well as problem-solving behaviour

Some existing typologies of negotiation do indeed include a category of

appear. A dominant policy-making style therefore tends to be continually

Council negotiations have over the history of the EC been subject to a

(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 259)

Arguably, problem-solving has thereafter continued to spread within the EU

Address for correspondence: Ole Elgström, Department of Political Science,

versions of the article were presented at the ECPR Standing Group on

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