Managing India's Nepal Policy the Raj and After

Author(s): Parshotam Mehra

Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 29, No. 15 (Apr. 9, 1994), pp. 849-852
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4401059
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 PERSPECTIVES

tions towards neighbouring Garhwal and

Managing India's Nepal Policy Kumaon and in so doing came head-on
inito conflict with the John Company then
The Raj and After engaged in more or less similar
operations-expanding and consolidating
Parshotain Mehra its dominion in the hills.
Happily, the first Anglo-Nepalese war
(1814-15) was also to prove the last.
Demands for a review of Indo-Nepalese relations and suggestions that an
Though worsted in battle, the Gurkhas yet
Indian initiative is essentialfor giving a "positive tone" to these relations
demonstrated a fighting capability and
in future need to be viewed against the backdrop of how the relatiotnship power of resilience that won them the
between the two couaitries evolved over century and a half of British enemy's respect, a fact amply demon-
colonial rule. strated in the ens4ing treaty of peace. For
barring some territoial acquisitions to safe-
guard their position in the north, the British
ARECENTanalysison 'Managing Nepal's Sikkim is tiny by comparison and Bhutan, left Nepal more or less to its own devices.
India Policy?' makes interesting reading.' though larger in area, is yet small in num- The immediate post-war political land-
Sadly, for its author, the breath-taking bers. More, of the three, Nepal's relations scape in Kathmandu was one of uncer-
changes that have come over the political with Tibet and China were perhaps better tainty and relativc confusion-until the
landscape in the Himalayan kingdom in defined and, in the Indian context, more emergence of the Ranas. Who from a
the wake of the end of Panchayati raj and relevant. Another factor may bear men- position of mere non-entities in the 1830s
thd holding of largely free, and fair, gen- tion. The relatively small indigenous popu- assumed an almost unchallenged hold over
eral elections (May 1991) under the mul- lation of Lepchas in Sikkim and of the the apparatus of government by the 1 850s.
tiple party system2 have ushered in a ma- Bhotias in neighbouring Bhutan find them- All the while their leader Jang Bahadur
jor systemic restructuring of Kathmandu' s selves outnumbered, if not completely graduated from the days of 'active hostil-
policies, both at home and abroad. In the swamped, as in Sikkim, by the Gurkhas. ity' of Bhimsen Thapa to a position of
event, some of the assumptions on which Creating in their wake grave problems of 'restricted intercourse' with, and 'friendly
the thesis rests would appear to have lost ethnic imbalances that bid fair to threaten isolation' towards, his powerful southern
validity. And yet they are deserving of their fragile polities. And from which neighbour. A measure of his growing clout
close scrutiny. , India's own north-east is not immune was the recall of the ever-nosey British
While reviewing a bunch of recent stud- either-viz, the politics of Gorkhaland resident, Brian Hodgson (1843), whose
ies on Nepal a few years ago, the present and of incorporating Nepali/Gorkhali as a outer facade of fostering trade and com-
writer drew attention to- some important separate language in the 8th schedule of merce concealed a determined bid to ex-
facets which may serve as a necessary the Constituion. tend the British hold' The recall itself did
backdrop to an understanding of Nepal's much to allay Jang Bahadur'-s mounting
India's policy.3 To start with, over the HAzY BEGINNINGS fears of British motives while happily for
centuries, the country has maintained 'a him Hodgson's successor ruled that the
cautious equidistance' between its two The Raj's relations with the Gurkha armed threat card had been over-played.
powerful, and populous, neighbours to- kingdom may be said to have their hazy For Gurkhamilitary power, he confided in
wards the north and in the south; its stra- beginnings at a time when the John Com- hispoliticalmasters, was "tn utter nullity".
tegy for survival revolving largely around pany was mounting a big effort to explore By the time the two Shamshers, Bir and
keeping that equidistance. Again, two trade prospects in the north. This became Chandra, emerged (1885), the Ranas had
major landmarks in Nepal' s historical evo- especially urgent in the wake of a series of consolidated their hold over the land while
lution over the past couple of hundred famines in-Bengal in the last decades of the Ranas had consolidated their holdover
years and more have been the advent of the 18th century synchronising with the the land while the British had come torely
Gurkha rukle (1767) and the rise (c 1849) emergence of Prithvinarayan Shah as the increasingly on GurkJh recruitment for
and fall (1950) of the Rana stranglehold. undisputed master of the Himalayan king- their armed forces. In the event, Bir
Finally, the 1960 coup of King Mahendra dom. Nor was Nepal the sole quarry; Brit- Shamsher's visit to Calcutta (1893) to
(r 1954-72) in dismissing a popularly ish efforts were part of a larger design that meet govemor,general Lansdowne under-
elected government and the sharp deterio- embraced the missions of George Bogle lined the contours of the new relationship.
ration of the economic situation in its and Samuel Turner to the neighbouring The Raj promised a 'reasonable' supply of
wake. Followed by a well nigh complete land of Tibet. That the company could not arms in return for an assurance that tiere
turn around by his son and successor who, make much headway in either direction were no clandestine deals with other (Eu-
30 years later, was made to opt for a return was not for want of trying. ropean) Powers and no arms exports to
todemocratic norms (April 1990). It would Nepal's bout of hostilities with Tibet Tibct. And while Kathmandu may no doubt
be interesting, as no doubt instructive, to (1788-89) inflicted a veritable body blow have been disappointed in its expectations
relate these events to India's own record on the latter and soon invited a war with of 'one rifle for one Gurkha recruit', the
of managing its Nepal policy both under China (1791-93). For the resurgent British broadly kept to their pledge of an
the Raj and, more importantly, in the Gurkhas who for some time now haduninterrupted car- supply, conscious that the
decades since. ried all before them, it was a humiliating Nepalese rulers could spoil their much-
In the cluster of the three Himalayan reverse. The more galling in that Chinese valued Gurkha recruitment.
states, Nepal occupies an important, nay armies had marched virtually unchecked Thbe opening years of the century saw
almost pivotal, place. And this not only by to the outskirts of Kathmandu. Rebuffed in the British entangled in Tibet over what
reason of its size and population. For the north, the Gurkhas turned their depreda- appeared a virtual nton-issue. Ostensibly

Economic and Political Weekly April 9, 1994 849

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the objective was to foster unhindered As one draws to the close of British rule other Powers and whose independence it
trade with the land of the lama; in reality,
in India, two points need to be heavily was an essential British interest to defend.
it;was to pre-empt the Russians in their underlined. Orne, in mapping out the con- And oVer which therefore 1HMG was bound
allegedly nefarious designs on the coun- tours of their relations with the Gurkhas, to maintain an unobtrusive guardianship.
try. Characteristically, Whitehall seriously the British had the advantage of dealing It may be useful at this stage to recall the
debated the possibility of using Nepal to with a relatively stable, if notoriously late Olaf Caroe's 'India and the Mongo-
wage a proxy war. Chandra Shamsher, regressive regime in Kathmandu. For the lian Fringe' which may be rated the Raj's
'only too willing' to ingratiate himself, Rana oligarchy despite its internecine swan song in terms of its definitive policy
was game. With Beijing in no position to squabbles, managed to remain in the framework vis-a-vis the entire north-east-
intervene, he yearned for an opportunity saddle, if partly because the Raj turned its ern frontier, including Nepal.4 It was a
to beat the lamas and purloin some cov- face sternly against fishing in its troubled 'Note' by India's then foreign secretary
eted territory. waters. As for itself, no sooner did it widely circulated for comment among of-
Sadly for him, Curzon, the overbearing discover the excellent fighting qualitics of ficials in Assam and along the eastern
proconsul, overruled his political mas- the Gurkha soldier-in many ways a cut frontiers-not a 'Memorandum to the Brit-
ters at home and assigned Chandra above John Tommy---than it was only ish Foreign Office'. Again, the date it bore
Shamsher a secondary, if relatively unim- took keen to make use of this great human was January 18, 1940, not 1946.5 >
portant, role. In the event, Young-hus- resource to fight its battles. And not in the And finally, Olaf did not suggest, As has
band could draw upon Nepal for his much- subcontinent alone, but in the remotest been averred, that the Himalayan states
needed supply of yaks for transport and its corners of the empire. More so in that they "should be integrated irrevocal4ly with
Lhasa agent Jit Bahadur' s good offices to were mercenary soldiers who in return for India through economic measures''6 All
browbeat the lamas. But the Sahibs must their pittances remained steadfastly loyal that he did was to say that "the whole of
mount their own expedition and pocket to their masters. this frontier and not only Tibet is regarded
the accruing gains. In the bargain, the Raj lent a helping by China as redenta". In the event, it was
Not that Nepal's help was of no mo- hand, within well-defined limits, in arm- "an elemen ary precaution to take steps to
ment. To the contrary. For not only duringing and equipping the Nepalese forces. fasten in the Indian orbit all that Mongo-
the negotiations leading to the conclusion And perpetuating the Rana stranglelhold. lian fringe" from Nepal to the farthest
of the Lhasa convention (September 1904) Nor did it fancy having an interest in tribal areas of Assam 'flow precisely was
but also in the lean post-Curzon period breaching Kathmandu's sedulously the fastening to be aclhieved remained
that followed. More specifically, the guarded isolation. In the result, suchundefined inter- but, for the record, there is not
Nepalese envoy played a crucial role in national status as the country enjoyed in a word on economic measures, much less
the years of Chinese ascendancy (1905- the wake of the A$nglo-Nepalese treaty ofon integrating the area irrevocably with
1 1) and much more its decline (1912). Jit 1923 was largely through the courtesy of India.
Bahadur helped carry out the evacuation Whitehall or its Indian adjunct. Nor was On Nepal, the 'Note' made two signifi-
of the rabble of a, Chinese soldiery who, in Kathmandu under the Ranas overly cant comments which may be of some
the aftermath of the October 191 1 revolu- enamoured of the outer frills and trap- contemporary relevance. One, "her
tion on thes mainland threatsned peace in pings of a so*reign state. [Nepal's] connection with China is often
Tibet. This made possible'the return of the Nothing much changed in the few de- forgotten, but never by the Chinese". Two,
13th Dalai Lama from his years of exile in cades that the Raj now endured. In 1933, the Nepalese are 'a philoprogenitive race'
India to his own land (1912) and laid the the post of British Resident at Kathmandu, who had spread widely inito Sikkim and
basis for theconvening of the tri-partite the nomenclature of which had already, in Bhutan-and in AMsam. This tendency
SimlaConference (1913-14). deference to Nepalese sensibilities, been towards expansion was "in different de-
changed was formally recognised as one grees feared and hated by other states".
TREATY OF 1923 of His Majesty's ministers while a Nepalese Above all, by the Tibetans who "dislike
Legation in London obtained recognition and fear" Nepalese encroacchments.
Events leading to the 1923 treaty as a juridically independent state. It was
recognising Nepal's independence, "both nonetheless 'a very special' treaty rela- POST-RAJ SCENARIO
internal and external", underline the grow- tionship for not only did Nepal supply a
ing importance the Raj attached to large contitngent of regular troops to the A word on the post-Raj scenario. On the
Kathmandu in its relations with the Indian army but it was also dependent on morrow oLIndian independence (1947),.
Dalai Lama and the government in Beijing. India for an important part of its annual the Ranas, increasingly shaky at home,
Here, Charles Bell's mission to Lhasa revenue in the shape of subsidy. More, were keen to clinch a deal with New Delhi
(1921-22) to help it with a modest supply barring a Nepalese representative at Lhasa, as a modicum of assurance against overt
of arms and the Treaty of Rawalpindi it had not established diplomatic relations interference. India may have delayed
(1921) marking the end of British tutelage with other Powers. The country was de- matters-and, as a matter of fact, did-but
over Kabul must be viewed as essential pendent for her trade on transit through its hands were forced by developments
backdrops. Between Nepal and Tibet India, receiving a refund of Indian cus- across the border in Tibet where the new
it was a delicate balancing act, for any toms duty on all imports (via India). The Chinese communist regime threatened
supply of arms to the Lama' s government, British were equally-clear that the Gurkha 'liberation'. To no one's surprise there-
thereby adding to its strength, was anath- source of recruitment must be maintained fore, the 1950 treaty with Nepal was at
ema to Nepal's rulers who viewed their at all costs and that the Raj could not best a holding operation resting squarely,
neighbouring land as a veritable colony tolerate another less friendly regime southwith a few minor, almost cosmetic, modi-
where they flaunted their extra-territorialof the I-Iimalayas. fications, on the earlier treaty of 1923. Not
rights and privileges. As to Beijing, the In the Imperial pattern then obtaining, long after, a revolt in Kathmandu brought
Ranas had by 1912 dropped all pretence of Nepal's position may bear comparison to about by long-simmering discontent at
an inferior or subordinate status; the last that of Muscat in the Persian Gulf: a home and overt, as well as covert, help
quinquennial mission of tribute to the Son juridically independent state in treaty from re- ctross the border spelt the doom of
of Heaven was despatched in 1908, lations not only with Britain but also with the long-decrepit Rana rule. Understand-

850 Economic and Political Weekly April 9, 1994

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ably, the old monarchy, now restored to fuel agreement expired on thie last day of worth ? 20 million arrived in June 1988.8
full authority, sought an assurance of New March, Kathmandu faced a severe fuel as India viewed the deal with a meagure of
Delhi's goodwill. well as goods cfunch. To no one's surprise concern. A substantial military relation-
Even as it did so, India's emphasis on its it cried 'foul' and denounced the 'block- ship between Beijing and Kathmandu, it
'specialrelationship' with Kathmandu pro- ade'. New Delhi stoutly repudiated the must have argued, would upset the mili-
voked hostile reactions and was anathema charge, pointing out that the Nepalese hadtary status quo in the IHimalayas. More, it
to the hypersensitive political elite in the dilly-dallied on negotiations. was clearly violative of the letter and
Nepalese capital because of its presumed In the ensuing parleys, India main- spirit of the 1950 treaty and the secret
denigration of the country's national sov- tained that trade could not be treated to the
letters exchanged on the occasion. The
ereignty. Independent, democratic India exclusion of other matters and suggestedlatter
a clearly stipulating that "neither gov-
began to be viewed as a greater challenge comprehensive review of the entire gamut ernment 'shall tolerate any threat to the
than the alien if autocratic Raj it had of relations between the two countries. All security of the other by a foreign aggres-
replaced. In the event, King Mahendra's this while, non-renewal of the treaties sor. To deal with any such threat, the two
magic formula of "non-alignment with choked major channels of communication governments shall co-ordinate measures".9
equal friendship for all" and "diversifica- and inflicted severe economic damage on Specifically on the question of arms, in
tion" found, to start with at any rate, wide, the Himalayan kingdom. And in its wake 1965 India had modified its 15-year ear-
popular acceptance. The idea was to ef- precipitated a major political upheaval. lier commitment to "agree to underwrite
fect a careful balancing so as to obtain For its part, Kathmandu presently discov-as far as possible the entire requirements
greater freedom of manoeuvre and a cau- ered that however warm foreign sympa- of the Nepalese army". US and British
tious tacking back and forth between thies and fervid aid commitments,- they assistance was to be sought only when
Nepal's two great neighbours as circum- offered no panacea. Short-time palliatives New Delhi was "not in a position" to meet
stances might necessitate. Despite its high- at best, they spelt out no long-term solu- Kathmandu's requirements; such short-
sounding rhetoric, this could best be a tion. More to the point, China's much- falls, however, were to be "militarily co-
tactic, not a policy. And one with severe touted enduring support notwithstanding,ordinated" by New Delhi.10
limitations on its utility. its real commitment to Nepal's economic
Kathmandu's growing emphasis on its sustenance remained as fragile and cau- PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT
historical role as a link, a channel of tious as ever.
communication, between the civilisations It has been argued that ,the Nepalese A word on the pro-democracy move-
of south and east Asia was to underline its monarchy's pro-China stance was a result ment launched in February 1990 and the
own independence. For New Delhi it was of its fundamentally autocratic character. repression unleashed to suppress it. Both
to be a non-aligned nation, not a compliant Even the Ranas' reception of the 1950 in India and the world outside, the move-
ally; its new stance helped by the glaring treaty, a respectable Nepalese academic ment elicited widespread sympathy and
exposure of India's vulnerability, and has suggested, was motivated in that it support. Not unexpectedly, the king had
weakness, in the 1962 border war with was "expected to provide a durable guar- sought an assurance of Chiinese backing as
China. Not long thereafter, Nepal under antee" to their shaky regime. Later King he manoeuvred to a head-on collision with
King Birendra formulated its zone of peace Mahendra's policies "supposed to have the massive opposition to his partyless
proposal (1975) which, by imnplication, been guided by nationalism and far- panchayati raj regime. Sadly for him,
would take the country out of its security siVhtedness" were, in reality, expedients" Beijing's sympathies remained proforma;
obligations with India and place its rela- geared to serve only the ruler's interest". in the light of the fallout from its own
tions with New Delhi and Beijing on the So also his zone of peace proposal which holocaust atTiananmen Square (June 1889)
same footing. With China's active support was a "bundle of contradictions" launched there could possibly ha've been no mean-
the proposal was pushed with such zeal "without any homework". In sum, the ingful support to contain the upheaval in
that by 1990 it had been endorsed by as monarchy was guided "more by short- Kathmandu.
many as 115 nations. term strategies of regime survival than by The interinm government installed in
genuine national interest' . April 1990, after the Maharaja's surrender
CRISIS IN RELATIONS More explicitly, both King Mahendra to pro-democracy forces, was not unre-
and later his son, King Birendra, were sponsive to Indian sensibilities. Nor was
The recent crisis in Indo-Nepalese rela- hostile to India and wanted to minimise New Delhi for that matter wanting in
tions starting with New Delhi's decision Indian influence largely because they saw reciprocity. Briefly, in less than four
not to renew the trade and transit treaties it as supportive of pro-democracy forces weeks-and on the eve of his visit to New
in March 1989 and its preference for a in the kingdom or, at the very least, those Delhi-the new prime minister announced
single treaty to replace the previous drawing inspiration fromlndia. China for a postponement, and later cancellation, of
arrangement may be briefly reviewed. The its part saw nothing objectionable in an the final consignment of Chinese muini-
1978 treaties for trade and transit expired autocratic regime and was more than will- tions. A bare 10 per cent of the total
on March 23, 1989. Earlier, in 1950, 1960 ing to lend support, should it serve its purchase, it was slated for delivery in May
and 1971, a single treaty had regulated specific foreign policy objectives vis-a- 1990.
both trade and transit and New Delhi now vis India. By stirring up hostile senti- New Delhi for its part had clearly under-
insisted that the former practice be re- ments, a supposedly anti-India, pro-Chi- lined that it was "not against" China or
vived. Its line of reasoning was nese monarchy could divert its people's anyone else; only that itclaimed a modicum
unexceptional-if Kathmandu desired a attention from their miserable economic of sensitivity to its security requirements.
special economic relationship, it would pligh( and at 'the same, time stall if not As it was, India's mounting concern with a
have to give way on a special security deny a democratisation of the country's whole range of Clhinese activities-road-
relationship. With the treaties expiring, political system. building, exchanges between military es-
New Delhi closed down 13 of its 15 transit A major irritant in Indo-Nepalese rela- tablishmeits, participation in sensitive de-
points on the India-Nepal border, allow- tions is said to have been New Delhi's velopment projects-had been ignored.
ing the two at Raxaul and Jogbani to cater umbrage on Chinese arms sales to Kathmivandu backtracked only when
to essential goods. As a supplementary Kathmandu of which the first instalment B3eijing's inability to act as an effective

Economic and Political Weekly April 9, 1994 8S1

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counterweight stood starkly exposed. For dence pf Nepal,if ever threatened, is a Foreign Secretary to the Government of In-
when push came to shove, the Chinese vital British interest". 'Tunnel vision, or dia (1939-45) and later Governor, NWFP
discovered that they were unable to do otherwise, one half wonders if today, a (1946-47). His The Pathans 550 BC - AD
1957 has been rated a definitive study on the
much. An additional factor that must have little over half a century later, the earlier
subject.
weighted heavily in their calculations has perspective or perception holds and is
5 Dhruba Kumar, op cit. A detailed rejoinder
been briefly alluded to, the Tiananmen valid for the Raj's political legatees. Or
to Caroe's 'Note' was sent by Sir Basil Gould,
Square massacre. For in its wake relationshas New Delhi's 'vital interest' ceased to then India's Political Officer in Sikkim. For
with the west deteriorated fast. Besides, less vital or even less relevant? the text, Gould to India, IOR, L/P and S/12/
Beijing had by now (1988-89) begun to 36/23, Part I. As a generatrule most of the
mend its fences with New Delhi and, in the Notes correspondence in the Foreign Department
event, could hardly risk trouble. was endorsed to India Office in London; the
India was not remiss in responding gen- 1 Dhruba Kumar, 'Managing Nepal's India latter routed it, in due course, to the Foreign
Policy?', Asian Survey, XXX, 7, July 1990, Office.
erously to friendly overtures. For during
theNepaleseprime minister Koirala's visit
pp 697-710. 6 Dhruba Kumar, op cit.
2 Fred Gaige and John Scholz, 'The 1991 7 Lok Raj Baral, 'India-Nepal Relations: Con-
(December 1991), New Delhi yielded to
Parliamentary Elections and Nepal: Politi- tinuity and Change' Asian Survey, XXXII,
his pressure to de-link trade from transit. 9, September 1992, pp 815-29.
cal Freedom and Stability', Asian Survey,
In the event, two, not one, separate treaties XXXI, 11, November 1991, pp 1040-60 of- 8 Johen W Garver, 'India-China Rivarly in
were concluded. In return, Kathmandu has fers a critical analysis of the background Nepal: The Clash over Chinese Arms Sales',
adopted a more positive attitude in shar- against which the elections were held-'af- Asian Survey, XXXI, 10, October 1991,
ing water resources, promised not to buy ter three decades of oppression and under- pp 956-75.
arms from China and endorsed New Delhi's ground opposition'. 9 For the text of the letters exchanged, which
position on a nuclear weapons free zone in 3 Parshotam Mehra, 'Nepal in Some Recent were kept under the wraps until 1959, see
Studies: An Overview', Indian Historical S D Muni, Foreign Policy of Nepal, 1973,
south Asia. Hopefully, SAARC should no
Review (New Delhi), VIII, 1-2, pp[ 95-107. appendix 5, pp 286-87.
longer be a forum for small countries to
4 'India and the Mongolian Fringe, Note by 10 A full text of the' 'secret' document was
gang up against India.
Foreign Secretary', January 18, 1940, India published in the Statesman (New Delhi),
The Indian prime minister Narasimha Office Records, L/P and S/12/36/23, May 27, 1989. See also LeoE Rose, Strategy
Roo's return visit to Kathmandu (October Part I.The 'Note' has been reproduced in for Survival, 1973, p 273.
1992) served only to reinforce New Delhi's Parshotam Mehra, The North-Eastern Fron-11 The Times of, Itdia (New Delhi), March
friendly stance: simplification of the tier:A Documentary Study of the Internecine 23, 1992. Inter alia, Nepal affirmed that 'it
system for export of goods to India; Rivalry. between India, Tibet and China, 2 had not allowed and would not allow' Tibet-
increase in standby credit; liberalised Vols, (I, 1906-14; II, 1914-54), Oxford Uni- ans in Nepal to engage in any anti-Chinese
versity Press, 1979, 1980, II, pp 111-24. political activities on her soil.
guidelines for investment and co-opera-
Olaf Kirk-patrick Caroe (1 892-1981) entered 12 Dhruba Kumar, ' i ,it.
tion in the field of water resources; an
the Indian Civil Service in 1919 and was 13 Lok Raj Baral, op cit.
agreement on the modernisation of the
Nepalese army.
Earlier, a goodwill visit of prime minis-
ter Koirala to Beijing (Maich 1992) would
appear to confirm the shift in his country's
policy. Overtly at any rate, the Chinese
have taken no umbrage on Kathmandu's
closer ties with New Delhi. Tbe fact that I OUR LATEST PUBLICATIONS
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