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CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
ON THE
“JESSICA LAL CASE”
SUBMITTED TO SUBMITTED BY
PROF. SADAF ALI KHAN ZAIBA REHMAN
GU16R0272
L.LB (V SEM)
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the accused is guilty of murder of Jessica lal?
Whether Manu Sharma is appealable under Section 302, 201/ 120B
IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act?
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that when pressure is built inside the cartridge case, which results in the pushing out of
the bullet from the barrel, there is difference in the marks to the extent that it may be
either clear or unclear and flattened or deepened thus no opinion can be rendered on
account of this dissimilarity in the absence of the weapon of offence and test firing.
Further once the report of Rup Singh is rendered inadmissible the two gun theory of the
defence becomes wholly inadmissible and what remains is that the two empties found at
the spot are .22" bore cartridges, that the live bullet found in the Tata Safari is a .22"
cartridge and that the gun belonging to the appellant is a .22" bore pistol which was used
for the commission of the crime of murder of Jessica Lal.
ARGUMENTS OF PETITIONER
Ganesh Bhavan Patel vs. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 4 SCC 371. In that case, the
witnesses were known and could have been examined when the Investigating Officer
visited the scene of occurrence or soon thereafter. In the present case, there were about
100 or more persons present at the party. The identity of all such persons took substantial
amount of time to determine. Consequent to the large number of witnesses, their
interrogation also consequently took a substantial amount of time. Unlike the said
decision, in the present case, there are no concomitant circumstances to suggest that
the investigator was deliberately making time with a view to give a particular shape to the
case. The details of investigation conducted on each day are very clearly brought out in
the evidence of the various witnesses. Furthermore, the identity of the appellant as a
suspect in the present case was not the consequence of any delay. Thus, the delay, if any,
in recording the evidence of witnesses in the present case cannot be considered as an
infirmity in the prosecution case.
The judgment in Maruti Rama Naik vs. State of Mahrashtra, (2003) 10 SCC
670, relied on is also distinguishable. The delay in recording the statement in that case
was coupled with the unnatural conduct of the witness and that was what made the
evidence of the said witness unreliable, which is not so in the present case.
The other judgment in Jagjit Singh vs. State of Punjab (2005) 3 SCC 689 is
also distinguishable. In that case, the delay in recording the evidence of PW-6 was
coupled with several other factors which made her testimony unreliable, including the
finding that she implicated the appellant only at the prompting of her father and that
otherwise she had not named the appellant as an accused.
Furthermore, there was no explanation regarding the delay in that case. The facts of that
case are, therefore, clearly different from the present case.
In Mohd. Khalid Vs. State of W.B., (2002) 7 SCC 334, this Court held that
mere delay in examination of the witnesses for a few days cannot, in all cases, be termed
to be fatal so far as the prosecution is concerned. There may be several reasons. When the
delay is explained, whatever be the length of the delay, the Court can act on the testimony
of the witness if it is found to be cogent and credible. In Prithvi vs. Mam Raj , (2004) 13
SCC 279, it was held that delay in recording the statement of the witness can occur due to
various reasons and can have several explanations and that it is for the Court to assess the
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explanation and, if satisfied, accept the statement of the witness. The same principle has
been reiterated in Ganeshlal vs. State of Mahrashtra (1992) 3 SCC 106.
Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned Solicitor General, by relying on the decision of this
Court in Chandra Mohan Tiwari vs. State of M.P., (1992) 2 SCC 105 submitted that
where the High Court's conclusion was based on evaluation of evidence which was not
erroneous or perverse and was based on an independent analysis of evidence which fully
establishes the case of the prosecution as against the trial Court's conclusion, there is no
reason much less the compelling reason to disagree with the finding of guilt by the High
Court. He also pressed into service another decision of this Court in Jaswant Singh vs.
State of Haryana, (2000) 4 SCC 484.
It has been argued that the judge knew that the issue was whether two empties were fired
from the same gun and argued that the Court must lay down in clear terms the duties of a
public prosecutor i.e., to tell the truth even if the same is in favour of the accused.
It has been further argued that the judge has seen and, therefore, any judge would have
noticed that the controversy was whether these two bullets were fired from the same
weapon or not. The Judge also found out that this query went to the CFSL and CFSL
answered the same.
It has been argued that, therefore, the Judge knew that to answer this query weapon was
not required. It has been argued that the Court must read in between the lines.
It is pointed out by the State that the contention of the prosecution was that the trial Court
could not have first put a specific finding of its own opinion to the expert witness and
then ask him questions.
The argument that the judge knew that the issue in question was whether the two empties
found on the spot were fired from the same gun is wrong and misleading. The judge
knew that as per the charge framed against Manu Sharma it was he alone who was
charged with the possession and use of a gun.
On behalf of the prosecution, it is pointed out that the entire argument of the accused that
an expert opinion was sought at the far end of the charge sheet to seek a favourable
opinion in favour of the prosecution in fact suggests that the I.O. in question was
oblivious of the fact that such an opinion could work to the detriment of the case of the
prosecution i.e. two empties having been fired from the same weapon of offence
belonging to accused Manu Sharma. Clearly the said opinion was far from conclusive and
would have only created confusion in the case of the prosecution. In other words, an
expert is only an expert if he follows the well accepted guidelines to arrive at a
conclusion and supports the same with logical reasoning which is a requirement of law as
laid down in the Indian Evidence Act.
The defence seeks to reply upon the testimony of PW- 2 with regard to the two gun
theory put forward. In this regard, the defence seeks to corroborate the said part of PW-
2's testimony with the testimony of the two ballistic experts. It has also been contended
by the defence that the testimony of a hostile witness must be corroborated by the other
reliable evidence on record in order to be admissible. The law is very clear that where a
witness for the prosecution turns hostile, the Court may rely upon so much of the
testimony, which supports the case of the prosecution and is corroborated by other
evidence.
It was argued by Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned senior counsel for the appellant-Manu
Sharma that the prosecutor had suppressed vital evidence relating to the laboratory
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reports which were useful for the defence in order to establish the innocence of the
accused. Learned senior counsel further argued that the prosecutor had not complied with
his duty thus violating fair trial and vitiating the trial itself.
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