ELOY IMPERIAL, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF LEGASPI
CITY, CESAR VILLALON, JR., TERESA VILLALON, ANTONIO
VILLALON, AUGUSTO VILLALON, ROBERTO VILLALON,
RICARDO VILLALON and ESTHER VILLALON, respondents.

G.R. No. 112483, October 8, 1999

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

FACTS:

Leoncio Imperial was the registered owner of a 32,837-square

meter parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 200, also
known as Lot 45 of the Cadastral Survey of Albay. On July 7, 1951,
Leoncio sold the said lot for P1.00 to his acknowledged natural son,
petitioner herein, who then acquired title over the land and proceeded to
subdivide it into several lots. Petitioner and private respondents admit that
despite the contract's designation as one of "Absolute Sale", the
transaction was in fact a donation.

On July 28, 1953, or barely two years after the donation, Leoncio
filed a complaint for annulment of the said Deed of Absolute Sale,
docketed as Civil Case No. 1177, in the then Court of First Instance of
Albay, on the ground that he was deceived by petitioner herein into
signing the said document. The dispute, however, was resolved through a
compromise agreement, approved by the Court of First Instance of Albay
on November 3, 1961 3, under which terms: (1) Leoncio recognized the
legality and validity of the rights of petitioner to the land donated; and (2)
petitioner agreed to sell a designated 1,000-square meter portion of the
donated land, and to deposit the proceeds thereof in a bank, for the
convenient disposal of Leoncio. In case of Leoncio's death, it was agreed
that the balance of the deposit will be withdrawn by petitioner to defray
burial costs.

On January 8, 1962, and pending execution of the above judgment,

Leoncio died, leaving only two heirs — the herein petitioner, who is his
acknowledged natural son, and an adopted son, Victor Imperial. On
March 8, 1962, Victor was substituted in place of Leoncio in the above-
mentioned case, and it was he who moved for execution of judgment. On
March 15, 1962, the motion for execution was duly granted.

Fifteen years thereafter, or on July 26, 1977, Victor died single and
without issue, survived only by his natural father, Ricardo Villalon, who
was a lessee of a portion of the disputed land. Four years hence, or on
September 25, 1981, Ricardo died, leaving as his only heirs his two
children, Cesar and Teresa Villalon. Five years thereafter, or sometime in
1986, Cesar and Teresa filed a complaint for annulment of the donation
with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No.
7646. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata, by virtue
of the compromise judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Albay. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, but the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for further
proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a renunciation of legitime that may be presumed

in the case.

RULING:

None. No renunciation of legitime may be presumed from the

foregoing acts. It must be remembered that at the time of the substitution,
the judgment approving the compromise agreement has already been
rendered. Victor merely participated in the execution of the compromise
judgment. He was not a party to the compromise agreement.

More importantly, our law on succession does not countenance tacit

repudiation of inheritance. Rather, it requires an express act on the part of
the heir. Thus, under Article 1051 of Civil Code:

The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in a public or

authentic instrument, or by petition presented to the court having
jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate proceedings.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. DAVID REY GUZMAN,
represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, LOLITA G. ABELA, and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN, MEYCAUAYAN BRANCH

G.R. No. 132964 ; February 18, 2000

BELLOSILLO (ponente)

FACTS:

Simeon Guzman, a naturalized American citizen, died in 1968

survived by his spouse Helen, an American citizen, and his son David Rey
leaving properties located in Bulacan. On December 29, 1970, the heirs
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of his estate. On December
10 1981 and in August 9, 1989 Helen executed a Quitclaim Deed
assigning, transferring and conveying to her son David her interest on all
the parcels of land subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
of the Estate of Simeon Guzman in the Philippines.

On October 18 1989 David acknowledged ownership over the

parcels of land under the Quitclaim of Helen by executing a Special
Power of Attorney and empowered Atty. Lolita G. Abela to sell or
otherwise dispose of the lots. Later, the Office of the Solicitor General,
based on a letter it received from Atty. Batongbacal which informed them
of a defect in David’s ownership, filed a Petition for Escheat against
David Rey with prayer that the subject parcels of land be forfeited in
favor of the government.

ISSUE:

Whether Helen validly repudiated her interest on the subject parcels

of land.

RULING:

No, the repudiation is not valid because Helen has already accepted
her share of the inheritance when she executed executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Simeon Guzman on December
29, 1970, which divided and adjudicated between Helen and David the
two (2) of them all the property in Simeon's estate. By virtue of such
extrajudicial settlement the parcels of land were registered in her and her
son's name in undivided equal share and for eleven (11) years they
possessed the lands in the concept of owner. As the Article 1056 of the
Civil Code provides, the acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance, once
made is irrevocable and cannot be impugned, except when it was made
through any of the causes that vitiate consent or when an unknown will
appears. Nothing on record shows that Helen's acceptance of her
inheritance from Simeon was made through any of the causes which
vitiated her consent nor is there any proof of the existence of an unknown
will executed by Simeon. Thus, pursuant to Art. 1056, Helen cannot
belatedly execute an instrument which has the effect of revoking or
impugning her previous acceptance of her one-half (1/2) share of the
subject property from Simeon's estate. Hence, the two (2) quitclaim deeds
which she executed eleven (11) years after she had accepted the
inheritance have no legal force and effect. Nevertheless, the nullity of the
repudiation does not ipso facto operate to convert the parcels of land into
res nullius to be escheated in favor of the Government. The repudiation
being of no effect whatsoever the parcels of land should revert to their
private owner, Helen, who, although being an American citizen, is
qualified by hereditary succession to own the property subject of the
litigation.
MICHAEL C. GUY vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO
MARELLA, JR.,

and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI,

represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES

G.R. No. 163707 ; September 15, 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO (ponente)

FACTS:

On June 13, 1997, minors Karen and Kamille, represented by their

mother Remedios Oanes, filed a petition for letters of administration
before the RTC of Makati City, claiming that they are duly acknowledged
illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who died on October 29, 1992. Sima
Wei was survived by his spouse, Shirley Guy and several children.
Petitioner argues that the status of the private respondents should have
been established during the lifetime of the putative father pursuant to Art.
175 of the Family Code. The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion
to Dismiss, which a Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss
was filed claiming that private respondents have already been paid thus
they have already waived, abandoned their claim. This was evidenced by
a Release and Waiver of Claim dated June 7, 1993, which states that the
private respondents have already received financial and educational
assistance.

ISSUE:

Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private

respondents from claiming their successional rights.

RULING:

No, the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios, and

not the heirs themselves, does not bar private respondents from claiming
successional rights because there can be no waiver of hereditary rights
without judicial approval. The waiver merely states that Remedios
received Php 300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters
“by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims
of whatsoever nature and kind… against the estate of the late Rufino Guy
Susim.”
 Parents and guardians may not repudiate the inheritance of their
wards without judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to
an alienation of property which must pass the court’s scrutiny in order to
protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the
Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar
respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.

To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and

unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to
give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not
be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly
evince an intent to abandon a right. Considering that the document did not
specifically mention private respondents’ hereditary share in the estate of
Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
AGDEPPA vs. HEIRS OF IGNACIO BONETE
G.R. No. 164436, January 15, 2010
Nachura, J.:

FACTS:

In 1979, respondent Dorotea Bonete, widow of the late Igancio

Bonete, obtained a loan in the amount of P55,000.00 from Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP)in order to buy farm implements. The loan
was secured by a parcel of agricultural land. In 1982, Dorotea received a
notice of collection from DBP. Respondents alleged that herein petitioner
and counsel, Atty. Littie Sarah A. Agdeppa (Littie Sarah) accompanied
Dorotea to DBP and obligated herself to pay the loan. Thereafter, Dorotea
was made to sign a document as Little Sarah’s security for the amount
which the latter paid to DBP in connection with the said loan. Since 1982,
Littie Sarah and her representatives had been gradually easing them out of
the subject property and that they were ordered to stop the cultivation of
their respective ricefields. Eventually, respondents were forcibly ejected
from the subject property.

On this account, respondents inquired from the Register of Deeds and

found that the title to the subject property, which was in the name of
respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, the late Ignacio Bonete, had already
been canceled and transferred to Littie Sarah under TCT No. T-75454 by
virtue of a purported deed of sale. According to Dorotea, Littie Sarah
took advantage of her by letting her sign a contract, ostensibly as security
for the loan from DBP, which later turned out to be a deed of sale. Thus,
respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession
and/or Annulment of Deed of Sale of the Subject Property before the
RTC. Littie Sarah filed a Motion to Dismiss. Respondents filed an
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. On May 21, 1990, the RTC issued
an order dismissing the complaint and held that respondents were not real
parties in interest and lacked the personality to sue. Respondents went to
the CA which reversed and set aside the RTC Order, and remanded the
case to the RTC for further proceedings because Dorotea, being the
former owner of the subject property, was a real party in interest.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents are real party in interest.

RULING:

While it is true that respondents committed a procedural infraction

before the RTC, such infraction does not justify the dismissal of the case.
Misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal of the action.

It bears stressing that TCT No. T-56923, covering the subject property,
was issued in the name of Dorotea. This is established by the record, and
petitioners themselves admit this fact. However, because TCT No. T-
75454, allegedly issued in favor of Littie Sarah, and the purported deed of
sale, allegedly executed by Dorotea in favor of Littie Sarah, are not on
record. Considering the allegations in the pleadings, it is best that a trial
on the merits be conducted.

A liberal construction of the Rules is apt in situations involving

excusable formal errors in a pleading, as long as the same do not subvert
the essence of the proceeding, and they connote at least a reasonable
attempt at compliance with the Rules. The Court is not precluded from
rectifying errors of judgment, if blind and stubborn adherence to
procedure would result in the sacrifice of substantial justice for
technicality. To deprive respondents, particularly Dorotea, of their claims
over the subject property on the strength of sheer technicality would be a
travesty of justice and equity.
SPOUSES PATRICIO and MYRNA BERNALES vs. HEIRS OF
JULIAN SAMBAAN
G.R.No. 163271, January 15, 2010
Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS:

Spouses Julian and Guillerma Sambaan were the registered owner of a

property located in Bulua, Cagayan de oro City. The respondents and the
petitioner Myrna Bernales are the children of Julian and Guillerma.
Myrna, who is the eldest of the siblings, is the present owner and
possessor of the property in question. Julian died in an ambush in 1975.
Before he died, he requested that the property in question be redeemed
from Myrna and her husband Patricio Bernales. Thus, in 1982 one of
Julian’s siblings offered to redeem the property but the petitioners refused
because they were allegedly using the property as tethering place for their
cattle.
In January 1991, respondents received an information that the subject
property was already transferred to Myrna Bernales. The Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 7, 1970 bore the forged signatures of their
parents, Julian and Guillerma.
On April 1993, the respondents, together with their mother Guillerma,
filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale and
cancellation of TCT No. T-14204 alleging that their parent’s signatures
were forged. The trial court rendered a decision on August 2, 2001
cancelling the TCT and ordering another title to be issued in the name of
the late Julian Sambaan.
Petitioners went to the CA and appealed the decision. The CA
affirmed the decision of the lower court. A motion for reconsideration of
the decision was, likewise, denied in 2004. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale is authentic as to prove the

ownership of the petitioners over the subject property.

RULING:

It is a question of fact rather than of law. Well-settled is the rule that

the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Factual findings of the lower
courts are entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, and in fact
accorded finality when supported by substantial evidence on the record.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It is that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,
might conceivably opine otherwise. But to erase any doubt on the
correctness of the assailed ruling, we have carefully perused the records
and, nonetheless, arrived at the same conclusion. We find that there is
substantial evidence on record to support the Court of Appeals and trial
court’s conclusion that the signatures of Julian and Guillerma in the Deed
of Absolute Sale were forged.

Conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent
reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real
evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying in the case. The fact that the CA adopted the findings of fact of
the trial court makes the same binding upon this court.

Thus, we hold that with the presentation of the forged deed, even if
accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, the registered
owner did not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the
forged deed acquire any right or title to the said property.