INTRODUCTION

PRELIMINARY MATTERS

What is Legal Ethics?

It is the embodiment of all principles of morality and refinement that should govern the conduct of
every member of the bar.

Specifically, it refers to that branch of moral science which treats of the duties which an attorney owes
to the court, to his client, to his colleagues in the profession and to the public. (Malcom)

TERMS

Amicus curiae – an experienced and impartial attorney invited by the court to appear and help in the
disposition of the issues submitted to it (Rule 168, Section 36 Rules of Court)

Attorney – a person who is a member of the Philippine Bar and who, by the warrant of another,
practices law, or who acts professionally in legal formalities, negotiations or proceedings, by authority of
his client.

Attorney ad hoc – a person appointed by the court to defend an absentee defendant in the suit in
which the appointment was made

Attorney-at-law - that class of persons who are licensed officers of the court empowered to appear,
prosecute, and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities, and liabilities are developed by
law as consequence

Attorney-in-fact – an agent whose authority is strictly limited by the instrument appointing him. His
authority is provided in the special power of attorney or general power of attorney or letter of attorney.
He is not necessarily a lawyer.
 Attorney of record – attorney whose name, together with his address, is entered in the record of a case
as the designated counsel of the party litigant in the case and to whom judicial notices relative thereto
are sent (Rule 7, Section 5 Rules of Court)

Bar – the legal profession

Bar association – an association of members of the legal profession like the IBP where membership is
integrated or compulsory

Bench – the judiciary

Client – one who engages the services of a lawyer for legal advice for purposes of prosecuting or
defending a suit in behalf and usually for a fee.

Counsel – is an adviser, a person professionally engaged in the trial or management of a cause in court;
a legal advocate managing a case at law (Villegas v. Legaspi, 113 SCRA 39, 1982)

Counsel de parte – an attorney retained by a party litigant, usually for a fee, to prosecute or defend his
cause in court

Counsel de oficio – an attorney appointed by the court to defend an indigent defendant in a criminal
action or to represent a destitute party in a case. (Rule 138, Section 31 Rules of Court)

House counsel – one who acts as attorney for business though carried as an employee of that business
and not as an independent lawyer

Lawyer – general term for a person trained in the law and authorized to advice and represent others in
legal matters

Lawyer “of counsel” – an experienced lawyer, who is usually a retired member of the judiciary,
employed by law firms or consultant
 Lead counsel – the counsel of either side of a litigated action who is charged with the principal
management and direction of a party’s case, as distinguished from his juniors or subordinates.

Notary public – appointed by a Court whose duty is to attest to the genuineness of any deed or writing
in order to render them available as evidence of facts therein and who is authorized by the statute to
administer oath

Practicing lawyer – one engaged in the practice of law who by license are officers of the court and who
are empowered to appear, prosecute, and defend a client’s cause

Pro-se – an appearance by the lawyer on his own behalf

Public prosecutor – He is a quasi-judicial officer and as such, he should seek equal and impartial justice.
He should be as much concerned with seeing that no innocent man suffers as in seeing that no guilty
man escapes. His primary duty is not to convict but to see to it that justice is done. He should see to it
that the accused is given fair and partial trial and not deprived of any of his statutory or constitutional
rights. Consequently, the suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing
the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action. He should
recommend the acquittal of the accused whose conviction is on appeal, if he finds no legal basis to
sustain the conviction.

Private prosecutor – A private prosecutor may intervene in the prosecution of a criminal action when
the offended party is entitled to indemnity and has not waived expressly, reserved or instituted the civil
action for damages. All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public
prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in
writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case
subject to the approval of the Court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of the
public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn

Trial lawyer – one who personally handles cases in court, administrative agencies or boards which
mean engaging in actual trial work, either for the prosecution or for the defense of cases of clients

SOURCES OF LEGAL ETHICS

1. The 1987 Philippine Constitution

2. Applicable jurisprudence

3. Code of Professional Responsibility

4. New Civil Code

5. Rules of Court

6. Revised Penal Code

7. Local Government Code

NATURE OF OFFICE OF ATTORNEY (Agpalo)

• The title “Attorney” is reserved to those who has:

1. obtained the necessary degree in the study of law;

2. Successfully taken the bar exams;

3. admitted to the IBP;

4. Remain members thereof in good standing; 5. Been authorized to practice law in the
Philippines.

• The practice of law is not a natural property or constitutional right but a mere privilege. It is not
a right granted to anyone who demands it but a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of
sound judicial discretion.

• It is in the nature of a franchise conferred only for merit which must be earned by hard study,
learning and good conduct.

• It is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and
moral fitness. Those standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission.

• The attorney’s continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred depends upon his complying with
the ethics and rules of the profession.

• Law is a profession and not a trade because its basic ideal is to render public service and secure
justice for those who seek its aid. The gaining of a livelihood is only a secondary consideration.

PRIVILEGES OF AN ATTORNEY (Agpalo)

1. Privilege and right to practice law during good behavior before any judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative tribunal.
2. Attorneys enjoy the presumption of regularity in the discharge of his duty. (His statements, if
relevant or material to the case, are absolutely privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor. He can
speak freely and courageously in proceedings without the risk of criminal prosecution.)

3. Other privileges inherent in his status as quasi-judicial officer:

a. Passing the bar is equivalent to First-grade Civil Service eligibility for any position in the classified
service of the government, the duties of which require knowledge of law.

b. Second-grade eligibility for any other government position not requiring proficiency in the law.

4. The court, in admitting him to practice, presents him to the public as worthy of its confidence
and as a person fit and proper to assume and discharge the responsibilities of an attorney.

5. Has the privilege to set the judicial machinery in motion.

• He can stand up for his right or the right of his client even in the face of a hostile court.

• He has the right to protest, in respectful language, any unwarranted treatment of a witness or
any unjustified delay.

• The rights and privileges which they enjoy as officers of the court are necessary for the proper
administration of justice as for the protection of attorney and his client.

• There can be no strong bar without courageous and fearless attorneys.

• As a man of law, his is necessarily a leader in the community, looked up to as a model citizen.

• Integrity, ability, and learning often make him qualified to administer the Executive
Departments or the Legislative bodies.

STATE REGULATION

The power of admission to the practice of law is vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court:

1987 Philippine Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5 (5)

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx… 5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The constitutional power to admit candidates to the legal profession is a judicial function and involves
exercise of discretion (In re: Almacen 31 SCRA 562).

The power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law includes:

1. authority to define the term

2. prescribe the qualifications of a candidate to and the subjects of the bar examinations

3. decide who will be admitted to practice

4. discipline, suspend or disbar any unfit and unworthy member of the bar

5. reinstate any disbarred or indefinitely suspended attorney

6. ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar

7. punish for contempt any person for unauthorized practice of law and

8. in general, exercise overall supervision of the legal profession

1987 Philippine Constitution, Article XII, Section 14 (2) xxx… The practice of all professions in the
Philippines shall be limited to Filipino

citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.

IN THE MATTER OF INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, 1973

FACTS: In 1970, convinced that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar
integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the
advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277
entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor."
There were oppositions on the integration on the grounds among others, of (1) its constitutionality and
(2) the same being outside the power of the Court to do so.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the integration of the Bar is unconstitutional.

2. Whether or not the Court has the power to integrate the Bar.
HELD:

1. The constitutionality of the Bar Integration hinges on its effects on the lawyer's constitutional
rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from
him. Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of
the Philippines. This requires membership and financial

support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and
the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. Designed to improve the
position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion
among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of
the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with
minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court. It does not in any manner violate the
lawyer’s freedom of association and freedom of speech.

2. The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law."

May the legislature enact laws to regulate the practice of law?

Generally, the legislature cannot enact laws to regulate the practice of law. The Legislature, in the
exercise of its police power, may however, enact laws regulating the practice of law to protect the public
and promote the public welfare. But the legislature may not pass a law that will control the Supreme
Court in the performance of its function to decide who may enjoy the privilege of practicing law, and any
law of that kind is unconstitutional as an invalid exercise.

Any legislative or executive judgment substituting that of the Supreme Court in matters concerning the
admission to the practice of law or the suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of an attorney infringes
upon and constitutes an invalid exercise of the legislative or executive power.

The legislature may pass a law prescribing additional qualifications for candidates for admission to
practice or filling up deficiencies in the requirements for admission to the bar. Such a law may not,
however, be given retroactive effect so as to entitle a person, not otherwise qualified, to be admitted to
the bar, nor will such a law preclude the Supreme Court from fixing other qualifications or requirements
for the practice of law. (In re Cunanan, 94 Phil 543)

REQUIREMENTS TO THE ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW

Citizenship, Residence, Age, Good moral character, Legal education

RULE 138, RULES OF COURT, Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar —

Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

IN RE ARTHUR CASTILLO REYES, 1993

(Citizenship)

Petitioner graduated from UP College of Law in 1939, passed the bar in 1939, inducted to and served in
the US Armed Forces in the Far East during WWII and thus became eligible for citizenship under the
1990 US Immigration Act, became a naturalized citizen of the US in 1993. His name was struck from the
Roll of Attorneys. Only Filipino citizens may practice law in the Philippines. This requirement is
prescribed by the Constitution, XII 14, and the ROC, 2 Rule 138

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

1. must be a citizen of the Philippines;

2. At least 21 years of age;

3. of good moral character;

4. must be a resident of the Philippines;

5. Must produce before the Supreme Court a satisfactory evidence of good moral character;

6. And that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines (Sec. 2, Rule 138, RRC);

7. Must have complied with the academic requirements;

8. Must pass the bar examinations

9. Take the lawyer’s oath; and s

10. sign the Roll of Attorneys

What is good moral character?

No definition and criteria in law for “good moral character” (Agpalo)

Good moral character is the absence of a proven conduct or act which has been historically and
traditionally considered as a manifestation of moral turpitude. The act or conduct showing moral
turpitude need not amount to a crime; and even if it does constitute an offense, a conviction upon a
criminal charge is not necessary to demonstrate bad moral character although it may show moral
depravity. (Agpalo)

Question of moral turpitude is for Supreme Court to decide which is why applicants are required to
disclose any crime which they have been charged. Concealment or withholding from the court
information about charges and indictments is a ground for disqualification of applicant or for revocation
of license. Even if the crime concealed does not involve moral turpitude, the act of concealment makes
him/her unfit to be a lawyer. (Agpalo)

Applicant assumes burden of proof to establish qualifications in asking admission. But after having
presented prima facie evidence, burden to overcome the prima facie showing shifts to those objecting
his/her admission. (Agpalo)

An applicant must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude have been filed or
pending in court in the Philippines. The concealment or withholding from the court of the fact that an
applicant has been charged with or indicted for an alleged crime is a ground for disqualification (Agpalo)

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING

IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS (Good Moral Character)

FACTS: In his failure to disclose in his application that he has pending criminal cases, Haron S. Meling
was disqualified from taking the bar examination, was not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign
the Roll of Attorneys should he passes the Bar Examinations, and his membership in the Shari’a Bar was
suspended. Meling averred that he did not disclose of the criminal cases filed against him since the
retired judge advised him of settlement of the case which would result in its termination.

ISSUE: Whether or not Haron S. Meling is qualified to take the Bar Examination.

HELD: Haron S. Meling is not qualified to take the Bar Examination. The practice of law, in any court, is
not a matter of right but merely a privilege which requires that an applicant not only has knowledge of
the law but is also of good moral character as a requisite to the admission to the practice of law. It is a
standard that in the application for bar examination, the applicant is required to declare under oath that
“there is no any pending case or charge against him/her.” This requirement is imposed by the Court to
determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. In the case at
bar, Meling however, did not disclose that he has pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence
constitutes concealment. This concealment of Meling’s reflects of his lack of the requisite good moral
character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a
Bar.

QUINGWA V. PUNO

(A.C. 389, February 28, 1967) (19 SCRA 439)

FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a complaint against Att y. Armando Puno charging him with gross immorality
and misconduct. Quingwa alleged that Att y. Puno succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
through a promise of marriage bu t refused to comply upon learning that she was pregnant. Atty. Puno
denied having sexual i ntercourse with Quingwa and refused to acknowledge Armando Quingwa Puno,
Jr. as his child. The Court finds for Quingwa and ruled in her favor.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno be disbarred.

HELD: Yes. One of the requirements for all applican ts for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must
produce before the Supreme Court sat isfactory evidence of good moral character. If good moral
character is a qualificati on for the privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the
continuance of t he practice and the exercise of the privilege. When his integrity is challenged by
evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and
overcome th e evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of
moral ity and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Atty. Puno did not present evidence to
defeat the allegations against him.

Rule 138 SEC. 6 of the Rules of Court Pre-Law.—No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall
be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before
he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and

recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high

school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with

any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, English, Spanish,
history and economics

IN RE: TELESFORO A. DIAO (Pre-law)

FACTS: About two years after being admitted to the bar, Telesforo Diao was charged due to false
representation in his application for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic
qualifications. The Solicitor General, after investigation, recommends that Diao's name be erased from
the roll of attorneys, because he (Diao) had not completed his high school training and never attended
Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma there from, before taking up law subjects, the
required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Education.

Issue: Whether or not Diao should be disbarred due to his false representations on his academic
qualifications.

Held: Diao should be disbarred due to his false representations on his academic qualifications. He was
not definitely qualified to take the bar exam because he never completed his high school training and
never obtained his A.A diploma, violating Section 6 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides —"
No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that
he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission
thereto the completion of a fouryear high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of
concentration: political science, logic, English, Spanish, history and economics."
Rule 138 SEC. 5 of the Rules of Court Additional requirements for other applicants.—All applicants for
admission other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the
examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and

successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law, school or university, officially approved and

recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate
from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be
required by the court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examination unless he has satisfactorily completed the
following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial
law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social
legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

RE: APPLICATION OF ADRIANO HERNANDEZ, 1993

(Law Proper)

An applicant who desires to take the bar examinations must not only have studied law in a local school
but must be able to present the certifications required under sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138. Since
graduates of foreign law schools cannot submit said certifications, they shall not be allowed to take the
bar examinations.

CUI V . CUI

(G.R. No. L-18727, August 31, 1964)

FACTS: The Hospicio is a charitable institution establish ed by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña
Benigna Cui, now deceased. When the spouses di ed, the administration passed to Mauricio Cui. When
the latter died, Dr. Teodoro Cui , only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, a
series of controversie s and court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator. Dr.
Teodoro resigned. Je sus Cui and Antonio Cui averred among themselves that they shall be the rightful
administ rator of Hospicio de San Jose de Barili as provided in Section 2 of the Deed of Donation in th e
order of preference. It stated that the administrators shall have the qualification of que posea titulo de
abogado among others. Petitioner contended that having the degree of Bach elor of Laws constitute
“titulo de abogado” while the respondent Romulo cui who also claimed to be the administrator
contended that it shall mean a member of the bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not “titulo de abogado” means a member of the bar.

HELD: The Court ruled in affirmative. Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado"
means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar
after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. The English equivalent of "abogado"
is lawyer or attorn ey-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that
class of p ersons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend,
and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to th e practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme
Court. According to Rule 138 such ad mission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's
oath and receivin g a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the
profe ssion. Possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses
may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of
Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were
allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. Yet certain ly it would be incorrect to say
that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" beca use they lack the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university .

Rule 138 SEC. 10 of the Rules of Court Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing.—

Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination
rooms.

The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall
b

given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone.

Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be

difficult to read his answers without much loss of time, the Supreme Court may allow such examinee

to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.

The committee of bar examiners shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution
of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination
papers. No oral examination shall be given.

IN RE AMPARO

(Bar Examination)
 FACTS: Amparo is a bar examinee who was caught by the head watcher reading a piece of paper during
the bar examination in Criminal Law. He refuses to surrender the paper until the head watcher
threatened to report him to the authorities. The paper contains the list of duration of penalties and
formula computing them, which Amparo justifies as just a piece of paper that fell out of his pocket as he
tried to get his handkerchief. A report was filed and an investigation ensued.

ISSUE: Whether or not Amparo is guilty for his actions.

RULING: He violated Rule 133, Section 10 of the Rules of Court on prohibiting examinees from bringing
papers, books, or notes into the examination room. Amparo committed an overt act indicative of an
attempt to cheat by reading notes. The report of the bar showed that he did not passed the bar thus
the court ordered he will not be allowed to re-take the bar the following year.

IN RE VICTORIO D. LANUEVO (Bar Examination)

FACTS: An administrative case of disbarment is filed against Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, a Bar Confidant for
having took advantage of his position and manoeuvred the passing of an examinee in the bar
examinations and his admission to the bar. Atty. Lanuevo allegedly deceived bar examiners to re-
evaluate and/or re-correct the answers of an examinee, claiming that he acted in good faith believing
that the same is worthy of re-evaluation and that the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in
order was left alone to the examiners' decision. Petitioners on the other hand maintained that Atty.
Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, cannot initiate actions for re-evaluation of answers of any bar examinees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, a Bar Confidant, has authority to initiate steps towards re-
evaluation of the answers of bar examinees.

HELD: Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, a Bar Confidant, had no authority to initiate steps towards the re-
evaluation of the answers of bar examinees. The Office of the Bar Confidant has nothing to do in the re-
evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or
after their notebooks is submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted
to Atty. Lanuevo by the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in
all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general average. Any request for re-evaluation should be
done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act
thereon. Thus, the Court ruled that Atty. Lanuevo be disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of
attorneys.

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH

 (Lawyer’s Oath)

(G.R. No. 712, March 19, 1997)

(270 SCRA 26)

FACTS: In 1991, Al Caparros Argosino was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
where he was sentenced with two years imprisonment. He was later granted by the court with 2-years
probation. In 1993, Argosino passed the bar examinations. The Court however deferred his oath-taking
due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not Argosino be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

HELD: The lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at
ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath.
If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned. The Court however, allow Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and
practice the legal profession give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the youth’s
tendency to be rash and uncalculating.

OLBES V. ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE

(A.C. 5365, April 27, 2005) (457 SCRA 341)

FACTS: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of a loan.
After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five checks for P50,
000 with different maturity date. All checks were dishonoured. Thus, Atty. Deciembre filed a case for
estafa against the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to file a disbarment case against
Atty. Deciembre for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault.

HELD: YES. “A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by
inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for truth
and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless crusader.” By taking the lawyer’s oath, an attorney
becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and
impartial administration of justice. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession. It is
also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his
malevolent act.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

PRACTICE OF LAW

1. CONCEPT

It is a privilege.

It is a profession, not a business

ESSENTIAL CRITERIA IN DETERMINING ENGAGEMENT IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW

A. Compensation

- implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active practice and that his professional
services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his
said services
B. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training
and experience;

C. Habituality

- Implies customary or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer. Practice of law is more
than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action; and

D. Attorney-Client relationship

- Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of a lawyer-client relationship. Thus,
activities like teaching of law or writing law books or articles which involve no attorney-client
relationship do not qualify a lawyer as being engaged in the practice of his profession as a lawyer

WHO MAY PRACTICE LAW

Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law. [Sec. 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court]

CAYETANO V. MONSOD

(G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991)

(201 SCRA 210)

FACTS: Christian Monsod was nominated by the then President Corazon C. Aquino as Chairman of the
COMELEC. Renato Cayetano opposed th e nomination alleging that Monsod does not possess
the constitutional requirement of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. Monsod maintained that he i s a member of the Philippine bar and has practiced the law in
various sectors.

ISSUE: Whether or not Christian Monsod possesses th e constitutional requirement for appointment
of having been engaged in the practice of law.
HELD: YES. Practice of law has been defined as any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal principle, practice o r procedure, and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the
profession.” Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry , a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both the rich and the poor - verily satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

AGUIRRE V. RANA

(B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003) (403 SCRA 342)

FACTS: Edwin Rana is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to sign the roll
of attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of the Donna Marie Aguirre who charges him with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
Apparently, Rana appeared as counsel to an election candidate before the Municipal Board of Election
Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Masbate before he took his oath and signed the rolls of attorneys. In his
comment, Rana alleges he only provide specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a person
who knows the law. He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar
Confidant finds that Rana actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as counsel
for the candidate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.

HELD: The court held that Rana did engage in unauthorized practice of law. It held that all the activities
he participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the fact that he is not yet a member
of the Bar. The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to those morally upright and
with the proper knowledge and skills. It involves strict regulation, one of which is on the moral character
of its members. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. Because the
court finds respondent not morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he
already took his oath, he was denied admission to the bar.

ALAWI V. ALAUYA

(A.M. SPC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997)

FACTS: Sophia Alawi is a sales representative of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao

City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of

court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be

friends. Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on instalments by

Alauya of a housing unit. A housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home

Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Subsequently, Alauya wrote a letter to the President

of Villarosa advising termination of his contract on the grounds that his consent was vitiated by

gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by Alawi and

proceeded to expound using acerbic language. Alauya also wrote the NHMFC repudiating as

void his contract with Villarosa and asking for cancellation of his loan. Finally, Alauya wrote 3

other letters to officers of the SC to stop deductions from his salary regarding the loan from

NHMFC. NHMFC also wrote the SC requesting it to stop said deductions. Learning of the

letters, Alawi filed a complaint alleging that Alauya committed malicious and libellous charges

and usurped the title of attorney.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alauya being a member of SHARI’A BAR can use the title

“ATTORNEY”.

HELD: NO. The title “ATTORNEY” is reserved only for those who have been admitted as

members of the Integrated Bar. Court has already had an occasion to declare that persons who

pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar and may practice law

only before Shari’a courts Alauya’s wish of not using “counsellor” because of confusion with

“councilor” is immaterial because disinclination to use said title does not warrant his use of the

title “attorney”.

2. QUALIFICATIONS (See discussions, pages 2-5)

3. RIGHT OF PARTY TO REPRESENT HIMSELF

A. Natural Person

a. A Layman – may or may not

In Civil Cases before the MTC

- Has the right to conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent or a friend appointed by
him (Sec. 34 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court)
In Civil Cases before any other court

- Has the right to conduct his litigation personally but if he gets someone to aid him, that
someone must be an authorized member of the Bar

- If so, he will be bound by the same rules of procedure and evidence as those applicable to a
party appearing through counsel; otherwise, ignorance will be unjustifiably rewarded

- He may not be heard to complain later that he has been deprived of the right to the assistance
of counsel.

In Criminal Cases

- Involving grave and less grave offenses, an accused who is a layman must always appear by
counsel

- He cannot conduct his own defense as his right to counsel may not be waived without violating
his right to due process of law.

- in a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is not available, the judge may appoint a
non-lawyer who is a resident of that province, of good repute for probity and ability to the accused in his
defense. [Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court]

b. A Lawyer

In Civil Cases – may or may not

- Has the right to conduct his litigation personally

- If so, he will be bound by the same rules of procedure and evidence as those applicable to a
party appearing through counsel; otherwise, ignorance will be unjustifiably rewarded

- He may not be heard to complain later that he has been deprived of the right to the assistance
of counsel.

In Criminal Cases – may or may not

B. Juridical Person

- Must always appear in court by a duly licensed member of the bar except in MTC where it may
be represented by its agent or officer who need not be a lawyer. The reason is that, by its very nature, a
juridical person cannot appear except through an agent, and an agent is prohibited from representing
another in court other than in the municipal trial court unless that agent is a duly licensed member of
the Bar
- Reasons are: (1) Nature of the privilege and on the confidential and trust relation between
attorney and client; (2) A corporation cannot perform the conditions required for membership in the
bar, such as the possession of good moral character and other special disqualifications, the taking of an
oath and becoming an officer of the court, subject to its discipline, suspension or removal; (3) The
relation of trust and confidence cannot arise where the attorney is employed by a corporation to
practice for it, his employer and him owing, at best, a secondary and divided loyalty to the clientele of
his corporate employer; and (4) The intervention of the corporation is destructive of that confidential
and trust relation

C. Legal Aid Program

- A senior law student, who is enrolled in a recognized law school’s clinical education program approved
by the Supreme Court may appear before any court without compensation, to represent indigent
clients, accepted by the Legal Clinic of the law school. The student shall be under the direct supervision
and control of an IBP member duly accredited by the law school.

D. Under the Labor code, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter, if a. they
represent themselves, or if

b. They represent their organization or members thereof (Art 222, PO 442, as amended).

E. Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can represent a claimant before the Cadastral Court (Act no.
2259, Sec. 9).

CRUZ V. MINA

(G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007)

FACTS: Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as

private prosecutor in a Criminal Case for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the

complaining witness. The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his

appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court

and jurisprudence that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend
of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior

conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to

be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case. However, the MeTC denied permission

for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing

limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court should take

precedence over the ruling of the Court in jurisprudence and set the case for continuation of

trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an

agent or friend of a party litigant.

HELD: The Court ruled in affirmative. Section 34, Rule 138 provides that in the court of a

justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or

friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a

party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be

either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Thus, a law student may appear

before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of

the bar. The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior

institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect

arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the

private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

LIMITATIONS IN THE APPEARANCE OF A LAYMAN ON BEHALF OF ANOTHER

1. Layman should confine his work to non-adversary contentions. He should not undertake purely
legal work such as examination of witnesses or presentation of evidence.

2. Services should not be habitually rendered.

3. Should not charge or collect attorneys’ fees. (PAFLU v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Central, 42
SCRA 302)

4. PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PRACTICE OF LAW

A. Public Officials who cannot engage in the private practice of Law in the Philippines:

a. Judges and other officials as employees of the Supreme Court (Rule 148, Sec. 35, RRC).

b. Officials and employees of the OSG(Ibid.)

c. Government prosecutors (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109).

d. President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants (Art. VIII Sec.
15, 1987 Constitution).

e. Members of the Constitutional Commission (Art IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution)

f. Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. IX, Sec. 8 (2nd par), 1987 Constitution)

g. All governors, city and municipal mayors (R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 90).

h. Those prohibited by special law

B. Public Officials With Restrictions In The Practice Of Law

a. No Senator as member of the House of Representative may personally appear as counsel before
any court of justice as before the Electoral Tribunals, as quasi-judicial and other administration bodies
(Art. VI, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution).

b. Under the Local Government Code (RA 7160, Sec. 91) Sanggunian members may practice their
professions provided that if they are members of the Bar, they shall not:

• appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

• appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

• collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official;

• use property and personnel of the government except when the Sanggunian member concerned
is defending the interest of the government.
c. Under RA 910, Sec. 1, as amended, a retired justice or judge receiving pension from the
government, cannot act as counsel in any civil case in which the Government, or any of its subdivision or
agencies is the adverse party or in a criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense in relation to his office.

5. LAWYERS AUTHORIZE TO REPRESENT THE GOVERNMENT

Any official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear

for the Government of the Philippines: a. Solicitor General

b. Assistant Solicitor General

c. Solicitors and Trial Attorneys

d. State Prosecutors or special counsel in the DOJ

e. Provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants

f. Other attorneys in other legal offices of the government

6. LAWYER’S OATH

“I,__________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to

the

Republic of the Philippines; I will support its constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the

doing of any in court; I will not willingly nor wittingly promote or sue any groundless, false or

unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and

will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without
any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.” (Form 28, RRC)

7. LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

RULE 138-A of the Rules of Court

IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY

SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730)

FACTS: Plaintiff in civil Case was represented by M r. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office
of Legal Aid; UP-College of Law Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the presentation of
the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief w ithout the presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo
questioned the appearance of Mr. Ca rmona during the hearing because the latter was not
accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. Ju stice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing
before the trial court under Rule 138-A s hould be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. On the
other hand, UP-OLA, submits that "th e matter of allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a
duly accredited supervisi ng lawyer should be . . . left to the sound discretion of the court after
having made at least one supervised appearance."

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court ho ld that a law student appearing before the
Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising lawyer.
Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides:

Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a membe r of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited
by the law school. Any and all plea dings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed,
must be signed the by supervisi ng attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

The matter of allowing a law student to appear befo re the court unaccompanied by a supervising
lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. The phrase "direct supervision and
control" requires no less than the physical presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing.
This is in accordance with the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit:

1 . to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or

inexperience of law students, who, not having as ye t passed the test of professional competence,
are presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their own;

2 . to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect itself
from any potential vicarious liability arisi ng from some culpable action by their law students; and

3 . to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a
particular profession without possessing the qualif ications, particularly a license, as required by
law.
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In infe rior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides;

Section 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of
an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior c ourt as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.

PROCEEDINGS WHERE LAWYERS ARE PROHIBITED FROM APPEARING

1. Proceedings before the Small Claims Court

No attorney shall appear in behalf of or represent a party at the hearing, unless the attorney is the
plaintiff or defendant (Sec. 17, Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases)

However, if the court determines that a party cannot properly present his/her claim or defense and
needs assistance, the court may, in its discretion, allow another individual who is not an attorney to
assist that party upon the latter’s consent (Sec. 17, Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases).

2. Proceedings before the Katarungang Pambarangay

During the pre-trial conference under the Rules of Court, lawyers are prohibited from appearing for the
parties. Parties must appear in person only except minors or incompetents who may be assisted by their
next of kin who are not lawyers. (Formerly Sec. 9, P.D. No. 1508; Sec. 415, Local Government Code of
1991, R.A. 7160)

REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW OF NON-LAWYERS

1. Declaratory relief;
2. Petition for Injuction;

3. Contempt of court;

4. Criminal complaint for Estafa against a person who falsely represented himself to be an attorney
to the damage of a party;

8. DUTIES OF A LAWYER

Rule 138 SEC. 20 of the Rules of Court. Duties of attorneys.—it is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the Philippines.

(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice
or false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with
his knowledge and approval;

(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or
delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his
personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the
end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER

1. To society

a) Respect for law and legal processes

b) Efficient and convenient legal services

c) True, honest fair, dignified and objective information on legal services

d) Participation in the improvement and reforms in legal system

e) Participation in legal education program

f) Lawyers in Government Service

2. To the legal profession

a) Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(i) Membership and dues

b) Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession

c) Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues

d) No assistance in unauthorized practice of law

3. To the courts

a) Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts

b) Respect for courts and judicial officers

c) Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice

d) Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety which tends to influence or
gives the appearance of influence upon the courts

4. To the clients

a) Availability of service without discrimination

(i) Services regardless of person’s status

(ii) Services as counsel de officio

(iii) Valid grounds for refusal

b) Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients

(i) Confidentiality rule

(ii) Privileged communications

(iii) Conflict of interest

(iv) Candid and honest advice to clients

(v) Compliance with laws

(vi) Concurrent practice of another profession

c) Client’s moneys and properties

(i) Fiduciary relationship

(ii) Co-mingling of funds

(iii) Delivery of funds

(iv) Borrowing or lending

d) Fidelity to client’s cause

e) Competence and diligence

(i) Adequate protection

(ii) Negligence

(iii) Collaborating counsel

(iv) Duty to apprise client

f) Representation with zeal within legal bounds

(i) Use of fair and honest means

(ii) Client’s fraud

(iii) Procedure in handling the case

g) Attorney’s fees

(i) Acceptance fees

(ii) Contingency fee arrangements

(iii) Attorney’s liens

(iv) Fees and controversies with clients

(v) Concepts of attorney’s fees

(a) Ordinary concept

(b) Extraordinary concept

h) Preservation of client’s confidences

(i) Prohibited disclosures and use

(ii) Disclosure, when allowed

i) Withdrawal of services

TERMS:

Acceptance fee – It is an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get paid for his efforts
regardless of the outcome of the litigation (Funa, 2009).

Ambulance chasing – is an act of chasing victims of accidents for the purpose of talking to the said
victims (or relatives) and offering his legal services for the filing of a case against the person(s) who
caused the accident(s)

Attorney’s lien – a type of lien referring to a right to retain the funds, documents, and papers against
the client until the attorney’s fees is fully paid

Barratry – an act of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or otherwise;
lawyer’s act of fomenting suits among individuals and offering his legal services to one of them.

Champertous contract – It is one where the lawyer stipulates with his client in the prosecution of the
case that he will bear all the expenses for the recovery of things or property being claimed by the client,
and the latter agrees to pay the former a portion of the thing or property recovered as compensation. It
is void for being against public policy.
 Charging lien – the right of a lawyer to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money,
and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments which he has secured in a litigation of his client,
from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered
upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused
written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same
right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and
secure the payment of his fees and disbursements. (Sec. 37, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court)

Collaborating counsel – Is one who is subsequently engaged to assist a lawyer already handling a
particular case for a client. (Pineda, 2009)

Conflict research – It is examining the causes of action between the prospective client and the lawyer’s
current clients.

Contingency fee arrangement – Contingent fee where the lawyer is paid for his services depending on
the success of the case. This applies usually in civil suits for money or property where the lawyer’s fee is
taken from the award granted by the court.

Contingent fee – conditioned on securing a favourable judgment and recovery of money or property
and the amount of which may be on percentage basis

Crime of maintenance – A lawyer owes to society and to the court the duty not to stir up litigation.

Deceitful conduct – an act that has the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation,
artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the fact, to the prejudice and damage of
the party imposed upon. (CPR Annotated, PhilJA)

Defenseless persons – those who are not in a position to defend themselves due to poverty, weakness,
ignorance or other similar reasons.

Dishonest conduct - the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; be untrustworthy; lacking
in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness.
 Doctrine of imputed knowledge – The knowledge acquired by an attorney during the time that he’s
acting within the scope of his authority is imputed to the client. It is based on the assumption that an
attorney, who has notice of matter affecting his client, has communicated the same to his principal in
the course of professional dealings.

Fiduciary duty – The principle that an attorney derives no undue advantage that may operate to the
prejudice or cause an occasion for loss of a client. The relationship between the lawyer and client is one
of mutual trust and confidence of the highest degree.

Forum shopping – prohibited act of filing repetitious suits in different courts. It may take any of the
following forms:

• Going from one court to another in the hope of securing a favorable relief in one court, which
another court has denied.

• Filing repetitious suits and proceedings in different courts concerning the same subject matter
after one court has decided the suit with finality; or

• Filing a similar case in a judicial court after receiving an unfavorable judgment from an
administrative tribunal.

Gross ignorance – transgression of any provision of law which need not be a penal law

Grossly immoral conduct – one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree, and committed under such
scandalous and revolting circumstances (Figueroa v. Barranco, SBC Case No. 519, July 31, 1997)

Gross misconduct – any inexcusable, shameful, or flagrant, unlawful conduct on the part of the person
concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of cause, a conduct by a predetermined, obstinate, or intentional purpose

Hot potato doctrine – It refers to the prohibition from dropping smaller clients (like hot potatoes) in
order to pick up more lucrative clients.

Immoral conduct – a conduct which is wilful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
 Influence peddling – an act taken against the lawyer that, he shall not state nor imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal, or legislative body

Integrated Bar of the Philippines – an official national body composed of all persons whose names now
appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. (Sec. 1, Rule 139-A
of the Rules of Court)

Integration of the Bar – The Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population, and this requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition
sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court (Pineda).

Mandatory continuing legal education – the means to ensure that throughout the lawyer’s career, they
keep abreast with the law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law

Moral turpitude – imports an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the duties which one person
owes to another or to society in general which is contrary to the usual accepted and customary rule of
right and duty which a person should follow. The question as to whether an offense involves moral
turpitude is for the Supreme Court to decide.

Oppressed persons – those who are the victims of the cruelty, unlawful, exaction, domination or
excessive use of authority.

Quantum meruit – means "as much as he deserves", and is used as the basis for determining the
lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract, but recoverable by him from his client

Retainer – It may refer to two concepts:

1. Act of a client by which he engages the services of an attorney to render legal advice or to
defend or prosecute his cause in court; or

2. Fee which a client pays to the attorney.

 Retaining lien – the right of an attorney to retain the funds, documents and papers of his client which
have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements
have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof.

Unlawful conduct – It refers to a transgression of any provision of law which need not be a penal law.
The presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission
within the terms of this Rule.

1. To society

a) Uphold the Constitution, Obey the laws of the land, Respect for law and legal processes

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

BAUTISTA V. GONZALES

(A.M. No. 1625, February 12, 1990)

(182 SCRA 161)

FACTS: Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales was suspended for having violated the provision on Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code which expressly prohibit s a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest
involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession. This is in view of Atty.
Gonzales’ tran sferred to himself one-half of the properties of his client which are the subject of
litigation, while the case was still pending.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ramon Gonzales committe d the act of misconduct, hence his suspension.

HELD: YES. The Canon of the new Code states that " a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for l aw and legal process." Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders
of the duly constituted au thorities therein. Any violation of this oath, constitute act of misconduct
which may result to th e suspension or disbarment of a lawyer by the Supreme Court. Atty. Gonzales
violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest
involve d in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession.

REDDI V. SEBRIO

(A.C. No. 7027, January 30, 2009)

FACTS: Tanu Reddi asked for the disbarment of Atty. Diosdado C. Sebrio, for having committed unlawful,
dishonest and deceitful conduct act of misconduct which constitute violations of the lawyer’s oath and
provisions of t he Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) when he offered properties for sale to Reddi
on the misrepresentation that Reddi was dealing with the true owners thereof. It turned out however ,
that said properties were either fictitious, not susceptible to sale, simulated, or inexistent. Sebrio
admitted having received the sum amount of money for the purchase of real estate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Diosdado Sebrio has com mitted act of misconduct, a valid ground for
disbarment.

HELD: YES. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Cou rt provides that “a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorn ey by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such offi ce, xxx or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, xxx. In the instant case, Atty. Sebrio’s admission that he received a sum of
money from Redd i which he could not properly account for and his taking advantage of the latter’s
ignorance of the real estate business in the Philippines, constitutes gross misconduct and depic ts his
character short of the standards required of him as a member of the bar and an officer of the court.

ZALDIVAR V. GONZALES

(G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988)

(166 SCRA 316)

FACTS: Enrique Zaldivar filed a complaint against r espondent Raul M. Gonzales for having issued
allegedly scornful statements to the media i n relation to the proceedings of the former. The Court, in its
Resolution, requires Gonzales to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and be
subjected to administrative sanctions for making said public statements.
ISSUE: Whether or not lawyers are entitled to the s ame degree of latitude of freedom of speech
towards the Court.

HELD: Lawyers are not entitled to the same degree o f latitude of freedom of speech towards the Court.
While the Court may allow criticism it has r uled that intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. The
lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration
of justice.

ROBERTO SORIANO V. ATTY. MANUEL DIZON

(AC 6792, January 25, 2006)

FACTS: In one traffic incident Atty. Manuel Dizon shot one Soriano, a taxi driver for no justifiable
reasons. Consequently, Atty. Dizon was convicted for frustrated homicide but was allowed probation,
conditioned on payment of civil liabilities. However, four years after

judgment was rendered, Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligation. Soriano filed complaint

before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for Dizon’s disbarment. CBD recommended that
respondent be disbarred for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and for
violating Rule. 1.01 of Can on 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. The IBP adopted the recommendation of the CBD and sent their resolution to the
Supreme Court for review.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the crime of frustrated homicide com mitted by Atty. Dizon involved moral
turpitude.

2. Whether or not Atty. Dizon’s guilt warrants his disbarment.

HELD:
1. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the C BD that the crime of frustrated

homicide committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude. The court defined moral

turpitude as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the priva te and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary t o justice, honesty, modesty, or good

morals.” Moral turpitude was shown when Atty. Dizon shot a taxi driver for no

justifiable reason. His act definitely did not constitute self-defense. It was he who was the aggressor
because he first tried to punch Soriano. The latter was merely defending

himself when he counter-punched Dizon. Dizon’s violent reaction to a simple traffic incident indicated
his skewed morals.

2. The Supreme Court held that Dizon also violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, which provides that “A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the

laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.” Dizon failed to obey the laws of the
land through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm. He failed to

respect legal processes through his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities, the condition for his
probation.

Canon 1, Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct

Rule 138, Sec. 20 (d) of Rules of Court - Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney: (d) To
employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent
with truth and honour, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law

What is unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct?

Unlawful conduct is defined as an act or omission which is against the law. Dishonesty involves lying or
cheating. (Agpalo)

Immoral or deceitful conduct is that which is willful, flagrant or shameless and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. (Aguirre)
Instances of Dishonesty and Deceit which Resulted to Discipline by the Supreme Court:

1. Misappropriation of client’s funds

2. Act of fraudulently concealing dutiable importation or smuggling

3. Giving false statements under oath in an Information Sheet submitted in connection with the
lawyer’s application for the position of Chief of Police

4. Wanton falsehood made in an ex parte petition in court wherein the lawyer attached affidavit of
his grandfather and which affidavit he notarized knowing that the supposed affiant is already dead

5. Maneuvering re-conveyance of property in the name of a lawyer instead of the client – in a case
involving sale with pacto de retro

6. Submission or presentation of mutilated copies of certain documents to court for the purpose of
deceiving and misleading it

7. Falsification of grades in the Bar Examinations

8. Collecting several thousand pesos on the pretense that counsel would allegedly appeal the
complaint’s case to the Supreme Court of the United States, and that it was necessary to him to go to
Washington, D.C. which he did, knowing that the decision could no longer be appealed because it is
already final

9. Introducing someone to buy a piece of land knowing that it is not for sale

10. Delayed failure to account money collected for the client

11. Stealing evidence attached to the court records

Cases of Gross Immorality and the Resulting Consequences

1. Abandonment of wife and cohabiting with another woman. DISBARRED (Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,
Adm. Case No. 1392, April 2, 1984)

2. A lawyer who had carnal knowledge with a woman through a promise of marriage which he did
not fulfill. DISBARRED (In re: Disbarment of Armando Puno, A.C. No. 389, February 28, 1967)

3. Seduction of a woman who is the niece of a married woman with whom respondent lawyer had
an adulterous relation. DISBARRED (Royong v. Oblena, A.C. No. 376, April 30, 1963)

4. Lawyer arranging marriage of his son to a woman with whom the lawyer had illicit relations.
DISBARRED (Mortel v. Aspiras,A.M. No. 145, December 28, 1956)
5. Lawyer inveigling a woman into believing that they have been married civilly to satisfy his carnal
desires. DISBARRED (Terre v. Terre, A.M. No. 2349, July 3, 1992)

6. Lawyer taking advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine and asked a lady
student to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under threat that if she refused,
she would flunk in all her subjects. DISBARRED (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, A.M. No. 1334 November 28,
1989)

7. Bigamy perpetrated by the lawyer. DISQUALIFIED FROM ADMISSION TO THE BAR (Royong vs.
Oblena, A.C. No. 376, April 30, 1963)

8. Concubinage coupled with failure to support illegitimate children. SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY

(Laguitan v. Tinio, A.M. No. 3049, December 4, 1989)

9. Maintaining adulterous relationship with a married woman. SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY (Cordova

v. Cordova, A.M. No. 3249, November 29, 1989)

10. A retired judge who penned a decision 7 months after he retired, antedating the decision and
forcing his former court staff to include it in the expediente of the case. DISBARRED (Radjaie v. Alovera,
A.C. No. 4748, August 4, 2000)

11. Forging a Special Power of Attorney. SUSPENDED FOR 3 YEARS (Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. v. Pilla,
A.C. No. 3637, January 24, 2001)

12. Attempting to engage in an opium deal SUSPENDED FOR 1 YEAR ( Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350,
September 1, 1933)

13. Facilitating the travel of a person to the U.S. using spurious travel documents. DISBARRED
(Sebastian v. Calis, A.C. No. 5118, September 9, 1999)

NUNEZ V. ATTY. RICAFORT

(A.C. No. 5054, May 29, 2002)

FACTS: Soledad Nunez authorized Atty. Romulo Ricafort to sell her parcels of land. After having sold the
lots, Nunez demanded from Atty. Ricafort the proceeds of the sale but the latter failed to deliver the
money. Atty. Ricafort paid only a partial amount and issued post-dated checks to cover the balance.
Said checks however, were dishonoured because the account against which they were drawn was
closed. Consequently, Nunez filed a motion to cite Atty. Ricafort for contempt for his acts of misconduct
and for his acts unbecoming of a lawyer.
 ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort has committed acts of misconduct in his dealings
with Nunez.

HELD: YES. Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “A lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct”. In the case at bar, Atty. Ricafort
gravely abused the confidence that his client has given in him and committed dishonesty when he did
not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. He even closed the account against which the
checks for the payment of unpaid balance were drawn, which depicts that he never had the intention of
paying his obligation.

CORDON V. ATTY. BALICANTA

(A.C. No. 2797, October 4, 2002)

FACTS: Atty. Bacalinta helped settle the estate of Rosaura Cordon’s husband and entice Rosaura to
organize a corporation known as Rosaura Enterpri se which develops real properties into a high scale
commercial complex. Thereafter, the Atty . Bacalinta single-handedly ran the affairs of the corporation.
Using spurious resolution, Att y. Bacalinta contracted a loan from the LBP and because of its failure to
pay, the bank foreclo sed the property and sold the corporation’s right to redeem the property
mortgaged to a third person through a fake board resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bacalinta may be disbarred.

HELD: YES. Atty. Bacalinta’s actions clearly viola ted Canon 15 to 16 of the same Code. The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates upon e ach lawyer, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal p rocesses. Specifically, he is forbidden to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not
only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain one’s good
standing in that exclusive and honoured fraternity .

MECARAL V. VELASQUEZ

(A.C. No. 8392, June 29, 2010)

FACTS: Atty. Danilo Velasquez was charged before IB P Committee on Bar Discipline with Gross
Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct by Mecar al. Mecaral was his secretary and she became
his lover and common-law wife. Atty. Velasqu ez then brought her to the mountainous area of San
Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran. She was l eft there with a religious group, of which Atty. Velasquez was the
leader. At first, he visite d her daily, but later the visits became scarce. This prompts Mecaral to return
home to Naval, Bilir an. Angered, Atty. Velasquez brought her back to San Agustin where, on his
instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected her with drugs. When she tried to escape,
the members of the group tied her spread-eagled to a bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and
fe d stale food, she was guarded 24 hours a day by the women members. Her mother sought the help of
the Provincial Social Welfare Department which immediately dispatched two women v olunteers to
rescue her. The religious group refused to release her, however, without the instruction of Atty.
Velasquez.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Velasquez guilty of gro ss immoral conduct and violated Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD: Yes. Atty. Velasquez’ act of converting his secret ary into a mistress is grossly immoral which no
civilized society in the world can counten ance. The subsequent detention and torture of the
complainant is gross misconduct that only a beast may be able to do. Therefore, the Atty. Velasquez
had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

FIGUEROA V. BARRANCO JR.

(S.B.C. 519, July 31, 1997)

FACTS: Patricia Figueroa and Simeon Barranco were t own-mates and teen sweethearts. Their intimacy
yielded to a child Simeon. Subsequently, S imeon first promised he would marry her after he passes the
bar examinations. Their relatio nship continued and Simeon allegedly made more than twenty or thirty
promises of marriage. Pa tricia learned that Simeon married another woman. Meanwhile, Simeon
successfully passed the 19 70 bar examinations. But before he could take his oath, Patricia filed a
petition to disqual ify Simeon to take the Lawyer’s Oath on the ground of gross immoral conduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Simeon in engaging in premarital relations with Patricia and making
promises to marry her constitute gross immoral conduct?

HELD: The SC ruled that the facts do not constitute gross immoral conduct warranting a permanent
exclusion of Simeon from the legal profes sion. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with
complainant and promises to marry su ggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does
not constitute grossly immor al conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the
act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so
co rrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree. It is wilful, flagrant, or shameless act, which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of respectable members of the community.

BARRIOS V. MARTINEZ

(A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004)

(442 SCRA 324, 2004)

FACTS: Atty. Martinez was convicted of the crime fo r violation of BP 22. He was also involved in another
estafa case pertaining to his legal serv ices rendered on the victim of Dona Paz tragedy when Atty.
Martinez keep for himself the su m of money that the victim get from Sulpicio as compensation for
himself. Consequently, Atty. Martinez is subject to disbarment.

ISSUE: Is the act of Atty. Martinez considered to be a ground for disbarment?

HELD: YES. Atty. Martinez is guilty of violation of BP 22 which imports deceit and violation of his
attorney’s oath and his duty under the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers to
refrain from engaging into any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

RE: A.C. NO. 44 OF THE RTC BRANCH 4 TAGBIL ARAN CITY AGAINST ATTY. OCCENA

(A.C. No. 2841, July 3, 2002)

FACTS: Under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late William Ogan, the residue of his
estate was divided among his seven children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, was named in the will
as executrix of the estate. As su ch, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, as her lawyer.
The settlement of the estate have been pending for thirteen (13) years when it was transferred under
the sala of Judge Rui z who found out that the principal cause of delay was the failure of Atty. Occeña to
obey lawfu l court orders such as the submission of the latest inventory of all securities of the estate,
take possession of all certificates of stocks or the replacements belonging to the estate and as
well as its inventory, and by willfully prolonging the litigation through his various maneuvers.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Occeña’s acts constitute a gross violation of his oath as a lawyer?

HELD: Not only did Atty. Occeña commit deceit, malp ractice, grossly immoral conduct and wilful
disobedience to a superior court. Beyond the se transgressions, he violated the lawyer’s oath by his acts
of disobeying lawful court orders and willfully prolonging the litigation through his maneuvers.

FOODSPHERE INC. V. MAURICIO JR

(A.C. 7199, July 22, 2009)

FACTS: Foodsphere Inc. was found liable for damages to its customer when its liver spread sold turned
out to contain worms. Foodsphere refused to pay, instead offered to return actual medical and
incidental expenses supported by receip ts. Atty. Mauricio, a writer/ columnists, proposed to
Foodsphere to settle the matter for a c ertain sum part of which would go to his Batas Foundation, and
directed them to place paid a dvertisements in his tabloids and radio and television programs.
Otherwise, he threatened them to proceed with the publication of articles maligning, discrediting and
imputing vices and defe cts to Foodsphere and its products. Foodsphere filed a complaint for
disbarment and cri minal complaints against Mauricio for libel and threatening to publish libel

ISSUE: Can Atty. Mauricio be disbarred in the instant case?

HELD: YES. The acts of Atty. Mauricio are a violati on of Rule 1.01 of Code of Professional Responsibility
which requires lawyers to refrain fr om engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
He engaged in deceitful condu ct by taking advantage of the complaint against Foodsphere Inc. to
advance his interest – t o obtain funds for his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships and
advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.

SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA V. ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA

(A.M. 3249, November 29, 1989) (179 Phil 680)

FACTS: Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality and acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar. Later, in a telegraphic message, Salvacion informed the Commission
that she and her husband had already “reconciled”. The Commission required the parties to appear
before it for confirmation and explanation but neither party responded and nothing was heard from
either party since then. Thus, the IBP reprimand Atty. Cordova for his acts, admonish him that any
further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with more severely, and order him to support his
legitimate family as a responsible parent should.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against the respondent for immorality and acts unbecoming a
member of the Bar will be continued despite the fact that the complainant and the respondent have
already reconciled?

HELD: The complaint against the Respondent for immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar
will continue because the most recent reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming
the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the
respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as a member of the Bar
and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the bar is required to
show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and dispensed
with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as a
continuing condition for membership in the Bar in good standing.

ADVINCULA V. ATTY. MACABATA

(A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007)

FACTS: Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarment case Atty. Ernesto Macabata on the grounds of Gross
Immorality. Cynthia sought for legal advice from Atty. Macabata regarding her collectibles from
Queensway Travel and Tours. In a couple meetings they have, Atty. Macabata gave Cynthia a ride
home. As the she gets off the car, Atty. Macabata allegedly held her arm, kissed her cheek and
embraced her tightly and in some other time he forcefully held her face, kissed her lips and held her
breast. Cynthia hires another lawyer for her case. They had exchange of messages thru sms where the
Atty. Macabata apologized. Atty. Macabata admitted kissing Cynthia on the lips however countered
that there was no harassment, intimidation or lewdness instead everything was spontaneous.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral, or which constitute serious
moral depravity that would warrant disbarment or suspension from the practice of law

HELD: The acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks are mere gestures of friendship and camaraderie,
form of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of Atty. Macabata, though, in turning the head of the
complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even if
considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral. The complainant
miserably failed to establish the burden of proof required of her. However, her efforts are lauded to
stand up for her honor. The complaint for disbarment against the respondent, Atty. Ernesto Macabata,
for alleged immorality is dismissed. However, he is reprimanded to be more prudent and cautious in
dealing with his clients.
UI V. BONIFACIO

(A.C. No. 3319, June 8, 2000) (333 SCRA 28, 2000)

FACTS: A case for disbarment was filed against Atty. Bonifacio on grounds of immoral conduct for
allegedly having an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui, husband of Leslie Ui. Atty. Bonifacio contended (1)
that when she met Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a bachelor but with children to an estranged
Chinese woman who is already in Amoy, China; (2) that they got married in USA therefore legalizing
their relationship; (3) that when she knew of the real status of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship;
and (4) that she and Carlos Ui never lived together as the latter lived with his children to allow them to
gradually accept the situation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bonifacio be disbarred.

HELD: The practice of law is a privilege. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of
due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. A lawyer may be disbarred
for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A
member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. In the case at bar,
Atty. Bonifacio was not proven to have conducted herself in a grossly immoral manner. Thus, she may
not be disbarred in this case.

IN RE GUTIERREZ, 1962

(G.R. L-363, July 31, 1962)

FACTS: Attorney Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. After serving
a portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was released on the
condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow of Samaco filed a disbarment
case against Gutierrez by reason of the latter’s conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted pardon.

HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted his
sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction
for murder without regard to the pardon. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his
being purged from the profession.
Canon 1 Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

IN RE: TERRELL

(G.R. No. 1203, May 15, 1903) (2 Phil 266)

FACTS: Howard D. Terrell was ordered to show cause in the Court of First Instance, in the city of Manila,
why he should not be suspended as a member of the bar. Allegedly, he assisted in the organization of
the “Centro Bellas Artes” Club, after he had been notified that the said organization was made for the
purpose of evading the law then in force in said city and for acting as attorney for said “Centro Bellas
Artes” during the time of and after its organization, which organization was known to him to be created
for the purpose of evading the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Terrell should be suspended from the practice of law.

HELD: YES. He violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that prohibits
lawyer to counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system. He should not allow his services to be engaged by an organization whose members are violating
the law, to defend them when they get caught.

ESTRADA V. SB

(G.R. No. 159486-88, November 25, 2003)

(416 SCRA 465)

FACTS: Atty. Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred that the respondent justices have violated
the Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by authorizing the assumption of Vice-
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of the 1987 Constitution. Unable to
get a favourable action, Atty. Paguia made his criticisms and comments using the media. The Court
warned Atty. Paguia to refrain from doing such malicious acts and conduct himself in the manner
accorded to a professional lawyer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Paguia committed a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
 HELD: YES. The Supreme Court will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court for, if well
founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any
wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who
have been privileged by it to practise law in the Philippines.

RENERIO SAMBAJON, et at. V. ATTY. JOSE A. SUING

(A.C. No. 7062, September 26, 2006)

FACTS: Renerio Sambajon filed a complaint before the NLRC for ULP and illegal dismissal

against the client of respondent Atty. Jose A. Suing. The NLRC ordered the respondent’s client

to pay Sambajon however, on the basis of the Waiver and Quitclaims purportedly signed a

sworn to by the seven complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case before the Labor

Arbiter in the present of respondent, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the said case insofar as the

seven complainants were concerned. Herein complainants four of the seven who purportedly

executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the

Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the considerations. In related move,

petitioner also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against respondent lawyer together

with its client-employer of herein complainants. In his Report and Recommendation, the IBP
Commissioner, who conducted an investigation of the administrative complaint at bar,

recommended that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded therefor

with warning.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent can be disbarred for his alleged manipulation of four alleged

RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who subsequently disclaimed

the same as bogus and falsified.

HELD: As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is
an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct. Besides, by respondent's own information, Labor
Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the true identity of those who executed the Release Waiver
and Quitclaims. That should have alerted him to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect
his clients' interest. But he was not and he did not. While the disbarment of respondent is, under the
facts and circumstances attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by
the IBP. This Court finds that respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order.

Canon 1 Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

Rule 138 SEC. 20 of the Rules of Court Duties of attorneys.—it is the duty of an attorney: (g) Not to
encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest

Among the unprofessional acts which come within the prohibition include the lawyer’s: (Agpalo)

a. Volunteering advice to bring lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or
trust make it his duty to do so;
b. Hunting up defects in titles or other causes of action and informing thereof in order to be
employed to bring suit or collect judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking out those claims for
personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients;

c. Employing agents or runners for like purposes;

d. Paying reward, directly or indirectly, to those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases
to his office;

e. Remunerating policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who
may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick
and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek professional services;

f. Searching for unknown heirs and soliciting their employment of him;

g. Initiating a meeting of the members of club and inducing them to organize and contest
legislation under his guidance;

h. Purchasing notes to collect them by litigation at a profit;

i. Furnishing credit reports in expectation of possible employment; and

j. Agreeing with a purchase of future interests to invest therein in consideration of his services

Purpose of the Prohibition

To prevent ambulance chasing, this refers to solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by laymen
employed by an attorney for the purpose or by the attorney himself.

ONG V. ATTY. UNTO

(A.C. No. 2417, February 6, 2002)

FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Alex Ong against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law
and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the
complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter.
When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal
and administrative cases against the complainant. They, however, did not have any bearing or
connection to the cause of his client. The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards
to anyone who could provide him any information against the complainant just so he would have
leverage in his actions against the latter.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Unto’s act constitute act unbecoming of a lawyer.

HELD: YES. His action is malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did not have any
bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, Atty. Unto violated the
proscription in Rule 1.02 which requires that lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest,
encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. His behavior is inexcusable.

Canon 1 Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.

CASTANEDA V. AGO

(G.R. No. L-28546, July 30, 1975) (65 SCRA 506)

FACTS: Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against the Agos to recover certain machineries.
Judgment was made in their favor. Levy was made on Ago’s house and lots. Ago moved to stop the
auction but the same was dismissed. Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution but his motions were denied. Ago filed a complaint
upon the judgment rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and
that his wife ½ share in their conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy made. The same
was dismissed. Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of
possession; SC dismissed it. Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the petition.
Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition. Agos filed another petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the CA which gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy

HELD: No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff’s
sale, justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit,
must now enjoy them, for, the Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal remedies
and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended
prejudice of the petitioners.

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an

officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy and a
predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral
justice.
A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s cause must be encouraged
and is to be commended. What the SC does not and cannot countenance is a lawyer’s insistence despite
the patent futility of his client’s position. It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit or
lack of his case. If he finds his client’s cause as defenseless, then he is his duty to advice the latter to
acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the incontrovertible.

b) Efficient and convenient legal services

CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT

AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE PROFESSION.

Canon 2 Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or
the oppressed.

Rule 138 Sec. 31 of the Rules of Court – A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid fre

of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable

to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and

to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required

service, unless he is excused there from by the court for sufficient cause shown .

Legal aid is not a matter of charity. It is a means for the correction of social imbalance that may and
often do lead to injustice, for which reason it is a public responsibility of the Bar. The spirit of public
service should, therefore, underlie all legal aid offices. The same should be administered to indigent and
deserving members of the community on all cases, matters and situations in which legal aid may be
necessary to forestall an injustice. (IBP Handbook, Guidelines Governing the Establishment and
Operation of the Legal Aid Office, Art. 1, Sec. 1)

LEDESMA V. CLIMACO

(G.R. No. L-23815, June 28, 1974) (57 SCRA 473)

FACTS: Atty. Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of
Judge Climaco. Atty. Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros
Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as
counsel de parte. Judge Climaco denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two
defendants. Atty. Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the
COMELEC requires full time service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Judge denied the motion. So Atty. Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to appointment as
Election Registrar

HELD: NO. There was no incompatibility between duty of Atty. Ledesma to defend the accused, and his
task as an election registrar. Atty. Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to
the duty required of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is
burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere
trade. A lawyer may be required to act as counsel de officio to aid in the performance of the
administration of justice. The fact that such services are rendered without pay should not diminish the
lawyer's zeal.

The Constitution provides that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself

and counsel. "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel..." ---manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense
of an accused. The right to be assisted by counsel is so important that it is not enough for the Court to
apprise the accused of his right to an attorney, but is essential that the court assign on de officio for him
if he desires/ is poor. Thus, Ledesma should exert himself sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase
doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in good standing.

Canon 2 Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to
render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s
rights.

Canon 14 Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client unless:

a) he is in no position to carry out the work effectively or competently;

b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between a
present
client and the prospective client;

A valid reason to refuse is when the lawyer is not in a position to carry out the work effectively and
competently. However he shall still render legal advice (such as those pertaining to preliminary steps a
person can take). But he shall refrain from giving legal advice if the reason for not accepting the case is
that there involves a conflict of interest (between him and a prospective client or between a present
client and a prospective client). In the case mentioned above, rendering legal advice to the prospective
client will establish an attorney-client relationship between them and this will constitute a violation of
the rule prohibiting a lawyer from representing conflicting interests. (Agpalo)

Canon 2 Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.

Reason for Prohibition: (Agpalo)

• The general rule is that a lawyer cannot advertise his talent as a shopkeeper advertises his
wares. A lawyer is a member of an honourable profession whose primary purpose is to render public
service and help secure justice and in which remuneration is a mere incident. Such professional
consideration makes a lawyer radically different from a shopkeeper, a trader, a manufacturer or a
money lender whose primordial aim is private gain and whose principal tool, to sell his product or
service, is advertising. To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of
law, lower the profession in public confidence and lessen its ability to render efficiently that high
character of service to which every member of the bar is called.

• Advertising inescapably involves self-praise or puffing

• Advertising may lead to assertion of fraudulent claims, corruption of public officials, and attacks
on marital stability

• It may encourage lawyers to engage in overreaching, overcharging, under representation and

misrepresentation
• It will increase lawsuits and result in needless litigations and inciting to strife otherwise peaceful
citizens

Exceptions to this Rule: (Agpalo)

- publication in reputable law list with brief biographical and other informative data which may
include name, associates, address, phone numbers, branches of law practiced, birthday, day admitted to
the bar, schools and dates attended, degrees and distinctions, authorships, teaching positions,
associations, legal fraternities and societies, references and regularly represented clients must be
published for that purpose;

- an ordinary, simple professional card;

- publication of simple announcement of opening of law firm, change of firm;

- telephone directory (but not under designation of special branch of law);

- if acting as an associate (specializing in a branch of law), may publish a brief and dignified
announcement to lawyers (law list, law journal);

- working in a public office (which can be filled only by a lawyer);

- full time position as corporate counsel;

- if in media, those acts incidental to his practice (i.e., not his own initiative);

- write articles for publication giving information upon the law (and not individual rights or
advising through column/ TV broadcast, lest such be considered indirect advertising);

- If entering into other businesses (which are not inconsistent with lawyer’s duties) then it is
advisable that they be entirely separate and apart such that a layman could distinguish between the two
functions.

Canon 2 Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless the
circumstances so warrant.

What the rule prohibits is the competition in the matter of charging professional fees for the purposed
of attracting clients in favor of the lawyer who offers lower rates. The rule does not prohibit a lawyer
from charging a reduced fee or none at all to an indigent or to a person who would have difficulty paying
the fee usually charged for such services. (Agpalo)
c) True, honest fair, dignified and objective information on legal services

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Section 27 of Rule 138 of Rules of Court - The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

IN RE LUIS B. TAGORDA

(53 Phil 37, March 23, 1929)

FACTS: Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits
that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano that
states what he can do for the people as a lawyer and as a notary public. Also, he wrote a letter to a
lieutenant of his barrio asking him to inform the people in any town meetings that he will still exercise
his profession as a lawyer and notary public despite his election as a Board member, even adding that
he will only charge three pesos for registration of their land titles.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice for soliciting employment.

HELD: Tagorda is guilty of malpractice, for soliciting employment when he used card that states his
capabilities as a lawyer and a notary public and writing a letter informing the people that he still
exercises his profession despite election as a board member. This violates Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states: "A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statements of facts." and Section 27 of Rule
138 which states: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." Tagorda stands convicted of having solicited
cases in defiance of the law and those canons.
 DIRECTOR OF LEGAL AFFAIRS V. BAYOT

(A.C. No. L-1117, March 20, 1944)

(74 Phil 579)

FACTS: Atty. Bayot is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in Sunday Tribunal
on June 13, 1943 which reads as follows:

“Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided
if desired and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor.
Everything confidential”

“Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila

Room 105, Tel. 2-41-60”

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Atty. Bayot constitute act unbecoming of a lawyer.

HELD: YES. The advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by Atty. Bayot of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and a
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practice of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple
of Jehovah. “The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct.” (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

ULEP V. LEGAL CLINIC

(A.C. No. L-553, June 17, 1993) (223 SCRA 378)

FACTS: The Legal Clinic was organized by Nogales. It is composed mainly of paralegals. It makes ads
which pertain to the practice of the law profession such as:

SECRET MARRIAGE? P560 for a valid marriage. Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.

ANNULMENT. VISA. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

Pls call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am-6pm 7F Victoria Bldg., UN Ave, Mla

Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because (1) it is engaged in the practice of
law but its people are not lawyers and (2) its advertisements are unethical.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law 2. Whether or not their services can
be advertised.

HELD:

1. Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed. The
Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include various legal problems
wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction
however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

2. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The
standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce,
secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate.
Such is highly reprehensible. The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed.
The best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.

Canon 3 Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.

Canon 2 Rule 2.02 of Code of Judicial Conduct- A judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory.
 KHAN V. SIMBILIO ,

(409 SCRA 229, 2003)

FACTS: Atty. Simbillo advertised his services in a Philippine Daily Inquirer ad which read “Annulment of
Marriage Specialist 532-433/521-2667.” Atty. Ismael Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation in violation of Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

HELD: YES. The Court held that the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However,
for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office, and the residence address and fields
of practice, as well as advertisements in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data and the use of
calling cards are permissible. The publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise
allowed.

Canon 3 Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used.
The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in
all its communications that said partner is deceased.

DACANAY V BAKER & MCKENZIE

(A.M. 2131, May 10, 1985) (136 SCRA 349)

Filipino lawyers cannot practice law under the name of a foreign law firm, as the latter cannot practice
law in the Philippines and the use of the foreign law firm is unethical.

FACTS: Dacanay seeks to enjoin Torres and nine other lawyers from practicing law under Baker &
McKenzie (a law firm organized in Illinois, USA). Torres used the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie on a
letter to Rosie Clurman that asks her to release 87 shares of Cathay Products Int’l., Inc. to Gabriel (a
client). Dacanay denied any liability of Clurman and asked whether she is being represented by Baker &
McKenzie as counsel as well as the purpose of the letterhead. No reply coming from Clurman thus this
administrative case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyers should be enjoined from practicing law under Baker & McKenzie.

HELD: Yes, they should be enjoined. Baker & McKenzie is an alien law firm and cannot practice law in the
country. Using the name constitutes representation that being associated with the firm they could
render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in
foreign trade and investments. This is unethical because Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice
in the Philippines.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM

NAME – OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, ETC. AND PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF FIRM
NAME – SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, ETC. (1979)

FACTS: Two separate Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip and that of
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta who died, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their
firms, the names of partners who had passed away. They contended that the continued use of the name
of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be
taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They further contended that no
local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name.

HELD: Surviving partners cannot continue to use the names of the deceased partners. Continued use will
run counter to Art. 1815 CC which tacitly provides that names in a firm name of a partnership must be
those of living partners and, in case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be subject to
liability. The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can create undue advantage and
disadvantage in the practice of the profession.

Note:

This ruling has been abandoned by a new ruling in the latest jurisprudence decided by the Supreme
Court. It is said that the continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that
the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is deceased. The reason for allowing the
continued use of the name of the deceased partner is that all of the partners by their joint efforts over a
period of years contributed to the goodwill attached to the firm name, and this goodwill is disturbed by
a change in firm name every time a partner dies. The name of a law firm may not necessarily identify the
individual members of the firm, and consequently, the continued use of the firm name after the death
of one or more partners is not a deception.

Canon 3 Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the firm and his

name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law concurrently.

Rule 138 Sec. 35 of the Rules of Court - No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or
of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advice to clients.

No Senator or member of the House of Representative may personally appear before any court of
justice or before the Electoral Tribunal, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies xxx (1987
Philippine Constitution Article VI, Sec 14)

The President, Vice-President, the members of the cabinet and assistants shall not, unless otherwise

provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not,
during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any profession xxx

(1987 Philippine Constitution Article VII, Sec 13)

No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession xxx

(1987 Philippine Constitution Article IX, Sec 2)

SAMONTE V. GATDULA

(A.M. No. P-99-1292, February 26, 1999)

(303 SCRA 756)

FACTS: Julieta Borromeo Samonte charged Rolando R. Gatdula with grave misconduct consisting in the
alleged engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with his official functions as Branch
Clerk of Court. Samonte represents her sister as plaintiff in a civil case for ejectment. Contrary to their
expectation that execution will proceed, they instead received a temporary restraining order. Samonte
contends that the order was hasty and irregular as she was never notified of the application for
preliminary injunction. Gatdula blamed
 Samonte’s lawyer for writing the address in the complaint for ejectment and told her that if she
wanted the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain his law office, at the same
time giving his calling card with the name “Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Gatdula is guilty of infraction

HELD: Yes. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act of
solicitation which violates Section 7, subpar. (b)(2) of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical

Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which declares it unlawful for a public official or
employees to, among others: “(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless

authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with official
functions.” Respondent is reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law. He is further ordered
to cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private

practice of law.

Canon 3 Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.

Media publicity, as a normal by-product of efficient legal service, is not improper. What is improper is
for a lawyer to resort to adroit propaganda to secure media publicity for the purpose of attracting legal
business. The purpose of the rule is to prevent some lawyers from gaining an unfair advantage over
others through the use of gimmickry, press agentry, or other artificial means. (Agpalo)

CRUZ V. SALVA

(G.R. No. L12871, July 25, 1959) (105 Phil 1151)

FACTS: Fiscal Salva conducted the investigation of the case concerning the killing of Monroy, in the
session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City to accommodate the public and members of the press.
Also, he told the press that “if you want to ask question, I am allowing you to do so and the questions
will be reproduced as my own”.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the fiscal in sensationalizing the case unethical?

HELD: Yes. Fiscal Salva should be publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled and wide publicity
and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, whatever be
his motive, which is considered and found to be contempt of court. Canon 3 Rule 3.04 of the Code of
Professional Resp onsibility requires that a lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to
representative s of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.

Notarial Law

ANGELES V. IBAÑEZ

(A.C. No. 7860, January 15, 2009)

FACTS: A complaint was filed against Atty. Amado O. Ibañez for disbarment for notarizing the
“Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale” in the absence of the affiants, relying merely on the
representation of his confidential secretary Rosalina Angeles that the signatures appearing on the
“Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale” subject of the present complaint are those of her co-heirs.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ibanez violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he notarized the “Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale” in the absence of the
affiants.

HELD: YES. Respondent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his recklessness and his
failure to comply with the requirements of the law by relying on his confidential secretary. Section 2(b)
of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 reads: A person shall not perform a notarial act if the
person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -

(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) Is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. The physical presence of the affiants
enables the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signatures of the acknowledging parties and
to ascertain that the document is the parties’ free act and deed.

SPOUSES SANTUYO V. HIDALGO

(A.C. No. 5838, January 17, 2005) (448 SCRA 282)

FACTS: This is an administrative case against Atty. Hidalgo for being negligent in his notarial duty when
he allowed his secretaries by themselves affix the dry seals of the junior associates on documents
relating to cases handled by the firm. It turned out that in one instant, Spouses Santuyo was able to
notarize their Deed of Sale making it appear that it was signed by Atty. Hidalgo and carrying with it the
firm’s dry seal.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was negligent in his notarial duty

HELD: The SC found a notary public negligent in his duty for allowing office secretaries to perform his
notarial functions, i.e., safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial register. The Court held that
“considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive, respondent should have
been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such and should not have wholly
entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not have been commissioned as notary
public.”

SICAT V. ARIOLA

(A.C. No. 5864, April 15, 2005) (456 SCRA 93)

FACTS: This is a disbarment case against Atty. Gregorio Ariola for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon1 by
notarizing an SPA purportedly executed by a certain Benitez at a time when Benitez was already dead.

ISSUE: Is Atty. Ariola guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD: YES. The Court held that a notary public should not authenticate documents unless the persons
who signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personally appeared before them
to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless and routinary act. It converts a private document into a public instrument, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and due execution

SANTIAGO V. RAFANAN

(A.C. No. 6252, October 05, 2004)

FACTS: This is a disbarment case against Atty. Edison Rafanan filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of
the Bureau of Jail Management & Penology (BJMP). It charged Atty. Rafanan with violation of the Rules
on Notarial Practice, among others. Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing
several documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a) make the proper notation regarding
the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents
in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in
the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code.

Respondent claimed that he believed that the non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the
Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed. He opined that the notation of residence certificates
applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits
related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter,
the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the
residence certificates of the affiants.

ISSUE: Did Atty. Rafanan violate the Notarial Law?

HELD: Yes, the Court held that Atty. Rafanan violated the Notarial Law.

The Court in its Decision stated:

“The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are

required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the
proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of
issue and date as part of such certification. They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial
register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to “give to each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to
state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded.” Failure to perform
these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the
degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public
entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.”

In Vda. De Rosales v. Ramos, the Court explained the value and meaning of

notarization as follows:

“The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those
who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document
into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed
by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.”

d) Participation in the improvement and reforms in legal system

CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM BY INITIATING
OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE.

While the lawyer’s task in contributing to the improvement of the legal system is not a matter of strict
duty, it is a duty nevertheless that flows from the lawyer’s sense of public responsibility. The
improvement of the legal system cannot, however, be done by dreaming in a vacuum. The lawyer must
recognize that the law is a part of vast social network and whether he likes it or not, he has to interact
with the rest of society. There is thus the need on the part of the lawyer to transcend the narrow limits
of technical law. Intricately woven is the law with the social fabric that the legal profession cannot afford
to confine itself to narrowly technical legal questions. A lawyer must broaden out and continue to grow
in knowledge and competence in order to be able to make the law socially responsive. (Agpalo)

e) Participation in legal education program

CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS; PARTICIPATE IN

CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH

STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST
IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.
 OGKA-BENITO V. JUDGE BALINDONG

(A.M. No. RTJ-08-2103, February 23, 2009)

FACTS: Dr. Benito obtained a favourable judgment from the Ombudsman in an administrative
complaint she filed against the municipal treasurer of Balabagan, Lanao Del Sur for grave misconduct.
To implement said judgment, the Regional Director of the DILG-ARMM issued Department Order.
Meanwhile, respondents in the administrative case above-mentioned filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the RTC of Malabang, Lanao Del Sur. The petition was raffled to the sala of Judge
Balindong. The latter rendered an “order”/decision annulling the Department Order and issued a writ
of preliminary injunction. Dr. Benito charged Judge Balindong with gross ignorance of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.

HELD: YES. A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross ignorance
of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with laws and
procedural rules. They must know the law and apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise
expected to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law
taints the noble office and great privilege vested in him. Judge Balindong’s gross ignorance of the law
constituted inexcusable incompetence which was anathema to the effective dispensation of justice.
Since the Department Order was issued merely to implement the decision of the Ombudsman,
respondents in administrative case were actually questioning this decision and seeking to enjoin its
implementation by filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC. This is not allowed under
the law, rules and jurisprudence. Judge Balindong’s act of taking cognizance of a case which was plainly
not within his court’s jurisdiction failed to meet the high standards of judicial conduct.

THREE-FOLD OBLIGATION OF A LAWYER

1. First, he owes it to himself to continue improving his knowledge of the laws;

2. Second, he owes it to his profession to take an active interest in the maintenance of high
standards of high education.

3. Third, he owes it to the law public to make the law a part of their social consciousness.

BAR MATTER 850: MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE)

(Adopting the Rules on the Continuing Legal Education for Members of the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines) August 8, 2000

Purpose: To ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.

Requirements of Completion of MCLE

Members of the IBP, unless exempted under Rule 7, shall complete every three (3) years at least 36
hours of continuing legal education activities. The 36 hours shall be divided as follows:

a. 6 hours – legal Ethics

b. 4 hours – trial and pretrial skills

c. 5 hours – alternative dispute resolution

d. 9 hours – updates on substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence

e. 4 hours – writing and oral advocacy

f. 2 hours – international law and international conventions

g. 6 hours – such other subjects as may be prescribed by the Committee on MCLE

Parties Exempted from the MCLE

1. The President, Vice-President, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of executive

departments;

2. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;

3. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the SC, incumbent and retired justices of the judiciary,
incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the
Philippine Judicial Academy Program of continuing legal education;

4. The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Justice;

5. The Solicitor-General and the Assistant Solicitor-General;

6. The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;

7. The Chairman and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

8. The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
9. Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;

10. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least
10 years in accredited law schools;

11. The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professional Lecturers of the
Philippine Judicial Academy; and

12. Governors and Mayors

Other Exempted Parties

1. Those who are not in law practice, private or public

2. Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors

f) Lawyers in Government Service

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF
THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.

MACOCO V. DIAZ

(A.C. No. 853, June 22, 1940)

(70 Phil 97)

FACTS: This is a disbarment case against Fiscal Diaz. In order to redeem a property belonging to his
wife's father, which had been levied upon sold at public auction; Marcelino Macoco deposited with the
provincial sheriff the sum of P380. As no redemption could be done, the money was returned by the
sheriff to one Alberto Suguitan, then counsel for Marcelino Macoco. Suguitan used the money
according to himself and failed to turn it over to Macoco; whereupon, the latter entrusted its collection
to Fiscal Esteban B. Diaz. It appears that Diaz succeeded in collecting P300 from Suguitan, but he also
misappropriated this amount.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fiscal Diaz be disbarred

HELD: YES. Whatever might have been the agreement and with whomsoever Fiscal Diaz might have
entered it into, the undeniable fact remains that he misappropriated the money in breach of trust. This
makes him unfit for the office of an attorney-at-law. And his being a deputy fiscal and not law
practitioner at the time of the misappropriation, far from mitigating his guilt, aggravates it. Want of
moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.
COLLANTES V. ATTY. RENOMERON

(A.C. No. 3056, August 16, 1991) (200 SCRA 584)

FACTS: This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant Attorney
Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V & G for short), filed
against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter's irregular
actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163 pro forma Deeds of Absolute
Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The respondent was found guilty in the investigation
conducted in its agency hence, the petitioner filed for disbarment against respondent.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by for his
malfeasances as a public official.

HELD: Yes. The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968),
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source
of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action. The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official tasks. Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously and prohibits
them from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the
approval of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the
course of any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.

DIANA RAMOS V. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG

(A.C. No. 6788, August 23, 2007)

FACTS: Diana Ramos sought the assistance of Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions
against the spouses Jovellanos. Ramos tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the
Jovellanos. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait
outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled
and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each "appearance" in court, respondent charged her
P350. After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired
about the status of her cases in the trial courts. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed
any case against the Jovellanos and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).
ISSUE: Whether or not, the respondent violated the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility sufficient to warrant disbarment.

HELD: YES. Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More specifically,
lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are
subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe
utmost fidelity to public service. Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely
to public service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b) (2) of the
Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided
that such practice will not conflict with their official function.

Canon 6 Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but

to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of

establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

PEOPLE V. PINEDA

(20 SCRA 748)

FACTS: Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza and their 3 children were killed by
respondents. The respondent Judge directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file
single information and drop the other four cases. The City Fiscal sought reconsideration thereof. The
respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider.

ISSUE: May a City Fiscal be compelled to file a single information in this case.

HELD: NO. The benefit of the doubt belongs to the prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting attorney is
under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has
evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different
conclusion.

SUAREZ V. PLATON

(G.R. No. 46371, February 7, 1940) (69 Phil 556)

FACTS: Atty. Fortunato Suarez was riding a train on his way to Calauag, Tayabas. Apparently he was very
vocal and he was despising the abuses made by government officers. Incidentally, Lieutenant Vivencio
Orais was aboard the train. Orais arrested Suarez and charged him with sedition. Orais however later
moved for the dismissal of the case upon the instruction of his superior. Thereafter, Suarez filed a case
against Orais for arbitrary detention. The Fiscal handling the case dismissed it on the ground that there
is insufficient evidence to prosecute the case. Eventually, the case was dismissed by Judge Servillano
Platon. Suarez wants the case reinstated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be reinstated.

HELD: No. The fiscals are well within their rights not to push through with the case if they find the
evidence to be insufficient. The prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence shall suffer.

Canon 6 Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
ALI V. BUBONG

(A.C. No. 4018, March 8, 2005)

FACTS: It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed
by complainant Omar P. Ali against respondent Atty. Musib Bubong. In said case, which was initially
investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal
exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title and manipulating the criminal complaint
filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears
from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.

ISSUE: Did atty. Bubong violate Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD: YES. In the case at bar, respondent’s grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the
President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking
advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the
rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated
his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the
bar. Rule 6.0 2 requires that a lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promot e or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Respondent’s conduct manifestly undermined the peop le’s confidence in the public office he used to
occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill- conceived use of his knowledge of
the intricacies o f the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.

MISAMIN V. SAN JUAN

(A.M. 1418, August 31, 1976) (72 SCRA 491)

FACTS: Atty. Miguel San Juan is a Captain of the Me tro Manila Police and a member of the Bar. He was
charged for coercing an employee Jose Misami n to agree to drop the charges file by him against his
employer for violation of the minimum w age law whom Atty. San Juan is allegedly representing. The
said matter was referred to t he Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The
solicitor-general dismissed the charges against Atty. San Juan for lack of evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal was proper.

HELD: The conclusion arrived at by the solicitor-ge neral was in accordance with the Tionko Doctrine
which states that “The serious consequence s of disbarment or suspension should follow only where
there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the
attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in
accordance with his o ath”. Wherefore the administrative case against the respondent is dismissed for
not having been duly proved.

Canon 6 Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

PNB V. ATTY. CEDO

(A.C. No. 3701, March 28, 1995) (243 SCRA 1)

FACTS: PNB filed a complaint against Atty. Cedo for violation of Rule 6.03 that states: A lawyer shall not,
after leaving Government Service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter
which he had intervened within said service. Cedo was the former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset
management Group of PNB. During Cedo’s stint with PNB, he became involved in 2 transactions: 1.) sale
of steel sheets to Ms. Ong; and 2.) Intervened in the handling of a loan of spouses Almeda. When a civil
action arose because of #1, Cedo, after leaving the bank appeared as one of the counsel of Ms. Ong.
Also, when #2 was involved in a civil action, the Almedas were represented by the law firm Cedo, Ferrer,
Maynigo & Associates of which Cedo was a Senior Partner. Cedo claims that he did not participate in the
litigation of Ms. Ong’s case. He also claims that even if it was his law firm handling the Almeda case, the
case was being handled by Atty. Ferrer.

ISSUE: Whether or not violated Rule 6.03.

HELD: YES. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between the atty. and the client,
inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters
that might only further prejudice the complainant cause. Whatever may be said as to w/n the atty.
utilized against his former client information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact that
their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other side.

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all the parties
concerned after the disclosure of facts. A lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.

OLAZO V. TINGA

(A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010)

FACTS: The complainant Jovito Olazo filed a sales application covering a parcel of land in Taguig. The
land was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition.

The Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves a parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo,
the complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to
direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. In addition, the
complainant alleged that the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance
of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent
wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy,
Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer
of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent’s actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct - when he
was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was
previously connected with.

HELD: R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain
restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private practice after their separation from the service.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency. By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or
her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her
official functions. The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of
lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section
7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with.
 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the term “intervene” which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person
who has the power to influence the proceedings. Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or
employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to
influence the outcome of the proceedings.

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the
sales application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on
Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the
practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the
preparation of a single document.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) V. SANDIGANBAYAN

(G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005)

FACTS: In herein case, PCGG questions the ethical propriety of a former Solicitor General, in the person
of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, who now stands as the private lawyer of the Lucio Tan group who was
benefitted in the liquidation proceeding of GENBANK which was declared insolvent. PCGG filed motions
to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan in Civil and counsel to Central Bank, “actively intervened” in the liquidation of
GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative reasoning that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the
procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It grounded its determination on ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 which clearly
stresses that the “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or
laws, or briefing abstract principles of law” are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term
“matter” in Rule 6.03 and therefore cannot be a ground for disqualification.
 Moreover, it explained that the term intervention in Rule 6.03 cannot be insubstantial and insignificant.
Given that the 1969 Code restricted the latitude of the term intervention, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the
prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in the government service, had
“substantial responsibility.” The 1983 Model Rules further constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a)
provides that “a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection with a matter in which the
lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee.”

2. To the legal profession

a) Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(i) Membership and dues

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

IN RE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR

FACTS: The oath-taking of the newly elected officers of the 1989 election of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) was suspended by the Supreme Court due to the widespread reports about the
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates. Among the allegations were the use of
government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of
which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws. There was also the billeting of out-of-town delegates in
plush hotels where they were reportedly “wined and dined continuously, womanized, and subjected to
endless haggling over the price of their votes for the national positions in the Integrated Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not the elected officers conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections in
violation of the IBP By-laws and made a travesty of the idea of a “strictly nonpolitical”

HELD: The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the ByLaws of the
IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their
obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, duty to promote respect for law and legal
processes, abstain from activities aimed at defiance of law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.

RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

(B.M. 1222, February 4, 2004) (421 SCRA 703)

FACTS: The Supreme Court, after inquiry and investigation, found out that there had been a leakage of
the questions in the 2003 Mercantile Law Bar Examination. The Court, therefore, nullified the results in
the examination on the said subject. The investigation revealed that a certain Atty. Danilo de Guzman,
one of the assistant attorneys at the Balgos and Perez Law Firm, was responsible for the leakage. Atty.
Marcial Balgos, a senior partner in the firm, happened to have been commissioned by Justice Jose Vitug
to prepare questions in mercantile law. Atty. de Guzman admitted to downloading the questions from
Atty. Balgos' computer and distributing the same to two of his fraternity brothers. From that point, the
leaked questions spread and an unknown number of examinees were able to obtain copies thereof.
Atty. de Guzman was thus disbarred, while Atty. Balgos was reprimanded for his negligence and lack of
due care in safeguarding the proposed questions in mercantile law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment of Atty. de Guzman was proper.

HELD: The disbarment was proper. Atty. de Guzman, by transmitting and distributing the stolen test
questions to some members of the his fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to give them undue
advantage over the other examinees in mercantile law, abetted cheating and dishonesty by his
fraternity brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 as well as Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. de Guzman was guilty of misconduct unbecoming a
member of the bar. He violated the law instead of promoting respect for it and degraded the noble
profession instead of upholding its dignity and integrity.

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR. REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM

PAYMENT OF IBP DUES

(B.M. 1370, May 9, 2005) (458 SCRA 209)

FACTS: In his letter, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues allegedly unpaid for the
years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of
the Philippine Civil Service, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA until his retirement in the year
2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the
Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in
government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that
he was inactive in the practice of law
Held: NO. The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non
to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. It
must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one of which
is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if
the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

b) Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession

Canon 7 Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or

suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar .

LEDA V. TABANG

(A.C. No. 2505, February 21, 1992)

FACTS: Evangeline Leda challenges Atty. Trebonian Tabang’s good moral character. It appears that the
two contracted marriage under as one of the exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code.
The parties agreed to keep their marriage a secret until Tabang had finished his law studies and had
taken the Bar examinations. After Tabang’s law studies and bar examinations, Leda blocked his oath-
taking claiming that Tabang had acted fraudulently when he filled out his application declaring he was
single and is thus unworthy to take the lawyer’s Oath for lack of good moral character.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Trebonian Tabang violated Rule 7.01 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES. The Court held that Atty. Tabang’s declaration in his application for Admission to the
1981Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in
utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of
Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a
false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the
Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.

Canon 7 Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person
 known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute
.

A lawyer should not readily execute an affidavit of good moral character in favor of an applicant
who has not live up to the standard set by law. He should volunteer information or cooperate in any
investigation concerning alleged anomaly in the bar examination. This is to help guard the profession
from candidates who are unfit or unqualified. He should expose without fear or favor before the SC
corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession and should not hesitate to accept professional
employment against a lawyer who has wronged his client. (Agpalo)

Canon 7 Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession.

Gross immorality reflective of unfitness to practice

A grossly immoral act is one that is as corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled
or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

TAN V. SABANDAL

(B.M. No. 44, February 24, 1992) (206 SCRA 493)

FACTS: Sabandal passed the 1987 Bar Examination. He was not allowed to take his oath by the Supreme
Court, in view of the finding by the latter of that he is guilty of unauthorized practice of law. In his
application for admission, Sabandal claimed that there is no pending case against him. It was later found
out that he has a pending civil case in his court for cancellation/reversion proceedings when the same
was still working as Investigator in the Bureau of Lands, wherein he was able to secure a free patent and
later a Certificate of Title over a swampland, which was later mortgaged to a bank and was foreclosed,
although, the case was amicably settled.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent can still be admitted to the Practice of Law?
HELD: No. Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right but is a
privilege bestowed upon those who are not only leaned in the law but also those who possess good
moral character. The acts of the respondent when he was still working with the Bureau of Land is a
manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service which cannot be erased by the dismissal of
the case. His failure to reveal the pendency of the said case in his petitions reveals his lack of candor and
truthfulness. The term “good moral character” admits broad definitions, including even common
dishonesty.

SABURNIDO V. MADRONO

(A.C. No. 4497, September 26, 2001)

(366 SCRA 1)

FACTS: Spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburnido filed an administrative complaint for

disbarment against Atty. Florante Madrono. Saburnido allege that Atty. Madrono has been

harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them in addition to committing acts of

dishonest. Previous to this case, Saburnido also filed 3 separate administrative cases against Atty.

Madrono, which led to the latter’s dismissal from the judiciary and forfeiture of his retirement

benefits.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Madrono’s act of filling multiple complaints constitute gross
misconduct that will warrant the imposition of administrative sanctions.

HELD: YES. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity

that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 7 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and

integrity of the legal profession. Clearly, Atty. Madrono’s act of filing multiple complaints

against the Saburnido reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act

evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual,

as Saburnido were instrumental in Atty. Madrono’s dismissal from the judiciary. There is in

Atty. Madrono’s tenacity in pursuing several cases against the Saburnido not the persistence of

one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.

ZAGUIRRE V. CASTILLO

(A.C. No. 4921, March 6, 2003) (398 SCRA 659)

FACTS: Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children when he had an affair with
Carmelita Zaguirre. This occurred sometime from 1996 to 1997, while Castillo was reviewing for the bar
and before the release of its results. Zaguirre then got pregnant allegedly with Castillo as the father.
The latter, who was already a lawyer, notarized an affidavit recognizing the child and promising for her
support which did not materialize after the birth of the child.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and should be punished
with the penalty of Indefinite Suspension.

HELD: The Court meted respondent the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The
attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his
child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable,
unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification. His repeated sexual
congress with a woman not his wife and now refuses to recognize and support a child whom he
previously recognized and promised to support is a clear violation of the standards of morality required
of the legal profession. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.

c) Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND

CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL.

JAVIER V. CORNEJO

(A.C. No. 778, August 14, 1936) (63 Phil 293)

FACTS: Atty. Javier was the lawyer of Severina Teodoro in a civil case where Severina won. The monetary
award was delivered by the opposing party to Javier as Severina’s lawyer. Javier however failed to
deliver said amount to her. Subsequently, Severina hired the services of another lawyer, Atty. Cornejo
who sent a demand letter to Javier. Javeir failed to pay yet again so Atty. Cornejo assisted Severina in
filing an administrative complaint against Javier. The administrative complaint against Javier was
eventually dismissed. After said dismissal, Javier filed an administrative case against Cornejo accusing
the latter of threatening him and instigating Severina to file an administrative case against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative complaint of Atty. Javier has merit.

HELD: No. The language used in the demand letter is not threatening. It was an honest effort on the
part of Cornejo to serve the interest of his client. The lawyer owes entire “devotion to the interest of his
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and exertion of his utmost learning and
ability”, to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. Cornejo could not have instigated Severina to file the administrative complaint. Severina
already knew of what remedy to seek against Javier if he fails to deliver what’s due her even before she
hired Cornejo. The Supreme Court also stated: “…mutual bickering and unjustifiable recrimination,
between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any
sympathy from this court.”

Canon 8 Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

The fact that one of the lawyers conducts him/herself improperly does not relieve the other from
professional obligation in his relation with him/her. (Agpalo)

FOODSPHERE V. MAURICIO, SUPRA

HELD: To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use
strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients. However, while a
lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use
of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. On many
occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a
lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.

CRUZ V. ATTY. CABRERA

(AC No. 5737, October 25, 2004)

FACTS: An administrative complaint filed by Ferdinand A. Cruz charges respondent Atty.

Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the code of Professional Responsibility. The

complainant, a fourth year law student, appears in court in his own behalf as he instituted a

case against his neighbour who is represented by the respondent as counsel. During a hearing,

the respondent engulfed with anger in a raising voice to the complainant saying “appear ka ng

appear, pumasa ka munsa”, wherein the manner, substance and the tone of voice and how the

words were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign,

ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public. The respondent uttered

remarks that the complainant finds arrogant and misconduct in the performance of his duties

as a lawyer. The complaint was referred to the IBP commissioner who recommended

suspension of respondent in the practice of law which was annulled by a resolution of the IBP

Board recommending dismissal of the case for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the manner of respondent may constitute misconduct?

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and

speedy disposition of cases. The Court held that respondent’s outburst of “Appear ka ng appear,

pumas aka muna” does not amount to violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. The court ruled that although the outburst of the respondent is uncalled for, it

is not to such a magnitude as to warrant his suspension in the practice of his profession. The

court thereby dismissed the case due to lack of merit.

Canon 8 Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give
proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

A lawyer should not steal the other lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by promise of
better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. Neither should he disparage another, make
comparisons or publicize his talent as a means to further his law practice. (Agpalo)

He may accept employment to handle a matter previously handled by another lawyer, provided that the
other lawyer has been given notice of termination of service. Without such notice, he shall only appear
once he has obtained conformity or has, at the very least, given sufficient notice of contemplated
substitution. A lawyer’s appearance in the case without notice to the first lawyer amounts to an
improper encroachment upon the professional employment of the original counsel.

A lawyer should not, in the absence of the adverse party’s counsel, interview the adverse party and
question him as to the facts of the case even if the adverse party was willing to do so. Neither should he
sanction the attempt of his client to settle a litigated matter with the adverse party without the consent
nor is knowledge of the latter counsel. (cf. Canon 9) (Agpalo)

A client’s proffer of assistance of additional counsel should not be regarded as evidence of want of
confidence but the matter should be left to the determination of the client. The 2nd lawyer should
communicate with the 1st before making an appearance. Should the 1st lawyer object, he should
decline association but if the 1st lawyer is relieved, he may come into the case. (Agpalo)

When there is conflict of opinions between two lawyers jointly associated in a case, the client should
decide. The decision should be accepted unless the nature of the difference makes it impracticable for
the lawyer whose judgment has been overruled to cooperate effectively. In this event, it is his/her duty
to ask client to relieve him/her. (Agpalo)

REYES V. CHIONG

(A.C. No. 5148, July 1, 2003)

FACTS: Atty. Ramon Reyes is the counsel for Xu. Atty. Victoriano Chiong, Jr. is the counsel for Pan. Xu
went into a business venture with Pan. Pan was supposed to set up a Cebu-based fish ball, tempura and
seafood products factory. He did not establish it, and so Xu asked that his money be returned. Xu then
filed a case of estafa against Pan. Prosecutor Salanga then issued a subpoena against Pan. Atty. Chiong
then filed a motion to quash, but he also filed a civil complaint for the collection of a sum of money and
damages against Xu and Atty. Reyes. Atty. Reyes was allegedly impleaded because he allegedly
connived with Xu in filing the estafa case which was baseless. IBP recommended that Chiong be
suspended for 2 years.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chiong should be suspended.

Held: YES. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel. If Chiong believed that the two had conspired to act illegally,
he could have instituted disbarment proceedings. As a lawyer, Chiong should have advised his client of
the availability of these remedies. Thus the filing of the cases had no justification. Lawyers should treat
their opposing counsels and other lawyers with courtesy, dignity and civility. Any undue ill feeling
between clients should not influence counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other.

ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA V. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO

 (A.C. No. 5938, December 3, 2002)

FACTS: While Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a client in the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO)
at the Hall of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a woman approached them. Atty. Alcantara saw the woman
in tears, whereupon he went to the group and suggested that Atty.

Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in another room. At this point, Atty.
Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his client, saying,
“Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina, ipapreso ang imo nga kliyente para mahibal-an na

anang sala.” (“Why do you settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will realize

his mistake.”)

ISSUE: did atty. Pefianco violate canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD: YES. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to
uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and candidly toward each
other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times. In this case, respondent’s
meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so cause the untoward incident. He had no right to
demand an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case of the woman had not or could not be settled.
Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his
view about the case.

ATTY. DELA ROSA V. CA

(A.M. No. CA 03-35, July 24, 2003)

FACTS: In a criminal case, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO directing the trial court and the City
Prosecutor to refrain from conducting any further proceedings until further orders. The Court of
Appeals further directed complainant to file his comment to the petition for review. Instead of filing
the required comment, complainant filed a motion to quash the TRO. The three accused through their
respective counsels filed written oppositions to the motion. Complainant then filed the instant
administrative complaint against respondent Justices for ignorance of the law and inexcusable
negligence when they issued the TRO without basis. Complainant in his pleadings to the three
respondent lawyers described them as “brilliant lawyers”, “legal supermen” or “sages,” which
amounted to sarcasm. This statement the Court did not countenance and consider it to be an act
unbecoming of a lawyer.
 ISSUES: Whether or not Atty. Dela Rosa is guilty of act unbecoming of a lawyer.

HELD: YES. It is the duty of a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues. As officers of the court, lawyers are mandated to conduct themselves
honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other. Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.
Obviously, complainant’s use of sarcasm in calling the three respondent lawyers “brilliant lawyers”,
“legal supermen” and “sages” fell short of this mandate. It served no useful purpose. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility
among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.

d) No assistance in unauthorized practice of law

CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
OF LAW.

Canon 9 Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Purpose of the Rule

To protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court.

PAFLU V. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR

(G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971)

(42 SCRA 302)

FACTS: In one labor case involving the above-mentioned pa rties, Cipriano Cid and Associates, counsel of
record for the winning complainants, fil ed a notice of attorney’s lien equivalent to 30% of the total back
wages. Atty. Atancio Pacis a lso filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Quintin Muning also filed
a “Petition for the Award of Services Rendered” equivalent to 20% of the back wages. Muning’s
petition was op posed by Cipriano Cid and Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer. The records
show th at the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid and Associates through Atty. Pacis. All the appearance s
made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Atty. Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin
Muning.

ISSUE: Whether or not a non-lawyer like Quintin Muning ca n recover attorney’s fees for legal services
rendered.

HELD: No, awarding of attorney’s fees to a non-lawyer is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is
immoral and cannot be justified. The re should be an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the
recovery of attorney’s fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client’s representative in court
is a lawyer. Sinc e respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship;
therefor e, he cannot recover attorney’s fees. The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession
should not be violated; that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of cou rt, which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or
benefit of an act done in violation of law; and that if were to be al lowed to non-lawyers, it would leave
the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in
chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-law yers are not amendable to disciplinary measures.

IN RE FELIPE DEL ROSARIO

(52 Phil 399, 1928)

FACTS: Felipe Del Rosario was a candidate in the bar exam ination who failed twice. Subsequently, he
was authorized the filing of a mot ion for the revision of his papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake
in the computation of h is grades. The court, acting in good faith, granted this motion, and admitted
Felipe Del Rosario to the bar. Thereafter, it was found out that he has pending criminal case. He
however was a cquitted. It is recommended by the city fiscal that Felipe del Rosario be ordered to
surren der his certificate of attorney and that he be forever prohibited from taking the bar examination.

ISSUE: Whether or not Felipe Del Rosario shall surrender his certificate of attorney.
HELD: YES. The acquittal of Felipe Del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these
proceedings. It is asking a great deal of the membe rs of the court to have them believe that Felipe del
Rosario was totally unaware of the illeg al machinations culminating in the falsification of public
documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary. To admit Felipe Del Rosario again to the bar
examination would be tanta mount to a declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to
pronounce. Th e practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it, but
is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards o f the
legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the pena lties of the
criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose inte grity is questionable as an
officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confiden ce, and then to permit him to hold
himself out as a duly authorized member of the bar.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. LADAGA

(A.M. No. P-99-1287, January 26, 2001) (350 SCRA 326)

FACTS: Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted as pro bono counsel for a relative in

a criminal case, without the previous authority from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as

required by the Administrative Code. An administrative complaint was filed against Atty.

Ladaga for practicing law without permission from the Department Head (CJ) as required by

law. Atty. Ladaga justified his appearance as he merely gave a free legal assistance to a relative

and that he was on an approved leave of absence during his appearances as such counsel.

Moreover, the presiding judge of the court to which he is assigned knew his appearances as

such counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a pro bono counsel for a relative

constitutes practice of law as prohibited by the Administrative Code.

HELD: Atty. Ladaga’s appearance as a pro bono counsel for a relative constitutes practice of law

as prohibited by the Administrative Code. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of the

statute should be customarily or habitually holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer and

demanding payment for such services. It does not pertain to isolated court appearances as in this

case. Nevertheless, for his failure to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department

(CJ) as required by law, respondent was reprimanded.

Canon 9 Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons
not licensed to practice law, except:

a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s
death,

money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the
agreement; or

b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or

c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan
is based in whole or in part, on a profitable sharing arrangement.

FIVE J TAXI V. NLRC

(G.R. No. 111474, August 22, 1994)

(235 SCRA 556)

FACTS: In a labor case for illegal dismissal and illegal deductions, private respondents obtained
favorable judgment and awarded of their back wages and the amount deducted from them. They were
represented by one Guillermo Pulia, a non-lawyer. The latter claimed for attorney’s fee for the legal
services he rendered.

ISSUE: Whether or not Guillermo Pulia as authorized representative of private respondents be allowed
attorney's fees or service fees.

HELD: NO. Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691
states that, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only: (1) if they represent
themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true
that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer
who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not
entitled to attorney's fees. Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his services necessarily imports the existence
of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer.

PACANA V. LOPEZ

(A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009)

FACTS: Pacana, being the trustee of the Multitel’s fund, sought the legal advice of Atty. Lopez at the
time Multitel had a problem due to failure of investment schemes. Pacana said a lawyer client
relationship was established between them although no formal document was signed. When Pacana
requested for an audited financial report of all the properties turned over to her, Lopez explained that
all the properties had been returned to her clients who had money claims against Multitel, in exchange
for quitclaim documents clearing Pacana from any liability. Pacana then filed a complaint against Lopez.
The latter insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she merely mediated
in the settlement of the claims her clients had against the Pacana, thus no attorney-client relationship
that exist between her and petitioner.
 ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Maricel Lopez
and Rolando Pacana.

HELD: There exist an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Maricel Lopez and herein petitioner
Rolando Pacana. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is
sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. The most upright and ethical thing which
Atty. Lopez should have done was either to advise complainant to engage the services of another
lawyer since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as
representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to
do both because that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of
interest.

IN RE CUNANAN

(94 Phil 534, March 18, 1954)

FACTS: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” By virtue
of the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had
obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. Many of the unsuccessful post war
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking the provision of the said law. To avoid
injustice to individual petitioners and to clear the doubts have been expressed as to its validity for being
contrary to public interest, the court resolved to review the validity of the said Act in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 972 is contrary to public interest.

HELD: RA No. 972 is contrary to public interest. The public interest demands of legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency especially because the legal problems evolved by the times
become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of
law that should be maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property,
life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to
dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. By its declared
objective, the law in question is contrary to public interest because it qualifies law graduates who
confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession.
3. To the courts

a) Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. His duties to the court are more significant than
those which he owes to his client. His first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to
that end, his client’s success is wholly insubordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the profession.

COBB-PEREZ V. LANTIN

(G.R. No. 22320, July 29, 1968)

(24 SCRA 291)

FACTS: The court ordered an execution sale of the p roperties in question of Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez
and her spouse. They and their counsel a ssailed the execution in a piecemeal fashion unduly delaying
the projected execution sal e many times. The court assessed treble costs against the petitioners to be
paid by their counsel s. Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners, seek
reconsideration of the decision contending that if there was delay it was because they happened to be
more asser tive, a quality of lawyers which is not to be condemned.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Crispin D. Baizas and A . N. Bolinas used tactics to delay the execution of the
judgment.

HELD: YES. It is the duty of a counsel to advise hi s client to the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case. Whe n he finds his client’s cause to be defenseless, then it is his duty to
advise the latter to acquies ce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer's oath to
uphold the cau se of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. In the case at
hand, despite their knowledge that their prayer would only be denied, counsel for petitioners still
pursue their claim before the court who has no jurisdiction over the case; a clear tactic to unduly delay
the execution of judgment.

ATTY. VAFLOR-FABROA V. ATTY. PAGUINTO

 (A.C. No. 6273 March 15, 2010)

FACTS: Complainant, Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabro a, who was Chairperson of the General Mariano
Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO) , was removed as a member of the Board of Directors (the
Board) and thereafter, respondent , Oscar Paguinto and his group took over the GEMASCO office and its
premises, the pump houses, w ater facilities, and operations. Complainant thus filed a complaint for
annulment of the proceedings of her removal as well as other members of the Board and a complaint
against respondent for disbarment alleging that respondent had violated the Code of Professional Re
sponsibility, particularly, among others, Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court, when having ordered to submit position papers and despite grant, on his mo tion, of
extension of time, did not file any position paper and further ignored the Court’s subs equent show
cause order. Moreover, respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against
complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s acts constitute a violation of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly, Canon 10.

HELD: Yes, lawyers are called upon to obey court or ders and processes and respondent’s deference is
underscored by the fact that wilful di sregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer
than any ot her to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to their processes. The Court
furth er noted that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of law for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility; however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. Hence, a
more severe penalty is thus called for; respondent was subjected to suspension for two years.

ISDRA TING-DUMALI V. ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES

(A.C. No. 5161, April 14, 2004)

FACTS: The complainant was among the heirs of Julit a and Vicente Ting. The respondent was the
brother-in-law of the complainant .The case ste mmed from the execution of the deed of extra judicial
settlement and gross misrepresent ation in court for the purpose of profiting from such forgery. The
wife of the respondent as well as another sister executed an affidavit stating that they are the only heirs
of the Ting sp ouses and falsify the signature of the complainant. The defense of the respondent was
anch ored on a clear oversight of non-inclusion the name of the complainant as heirs.

ISSUE: Whether the act of the respondent violative of his oath of profession as well as the canons of
professional ethics.
RULING: The court resolved the issue as violations of the lawyer's oath and the code of professional
responsibility. Respondent's acts o r omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring the intolerable
dishonor to the leg al profession. The Court found the respondent guilty of the provision of the lawyer's
oath and code of professional responsibility thereby rendering the latter unworthy to remain mem ber
of the legal profession. He is thus ordered barred from the practice of law and his nam e is ordered
stricken off the roll of attorneys.

Canon 10 Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CUARESMA V. DAQUIS

(G.R. No. 35113, March 25, 1975)

(63 SCRA 257)

FACTS: Marcelo Daquis entered into a conditional co ntract of sale of lot. Eugenio Cuaresma is one of the
occupants in the said lot in question. L ater, Marcelo Daquis instituted a Civil Case for writ of possession.
Judge Pacifico de Castro issued an order of demolition of the house of Eugenio Cuaresma. Atty.
Macario Directo, on behalf of Eugenio Cuaresma filed a petition for certiorari alleging that Cuaresma
has no knowledge of the existence of the Civil Case. On the other hand, Daquis maintained that
Cuaresma was ful ly aware of the existence of said civil case having filed a motion for intervention
thereof. Whe n asked by the Court to show cause why no serious disciplinary action should be taken
against him for deliberately making false allegations in such petition, Atty. Directo contends that all h e
wanted to convey was that the petitioner’s knowledge of the aforesaid civil case came only after the
decision was issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not a serious disciplinary action should be taken against Atty. Marcelo

Directo.

HELD: YES. The Canon of Professional Responsibility commands every lawyer not to do falsehood nor
mislead or allow court to be misled i n making their pleadings. Any violation of this canon is a ground for
disciplinary action. In the instant case, in as much as the assumption goes with good faith, Atty. Directo
is deemed to ha ve acted with such. However, a reprimand would suffice that Atty. Directo should be
much mor e careful in the preparation of his pleadings so as not to cast doubt to his honesty. Every
membe r of the bar should realize that candor in the dealings with the Court is of the very essence of
honourable membership in the profession.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. ADORABLE

(A.C. No. 8197, October 2, 1946)

(77 Phil 468)

FACTS: With the belief that the case pending decision in the Court of Appeals remained unacted upon
by the said Court, Miguel Penaranda fi led a motion for reconstitution. Instead of taking advantage of
Penaranda’s lack of knowledge o f what really happened in the Court of Appeals, Attorney Manuel F.
Zamora, counsel for com plainant and appellees acting under the highest standards of truthfulness, fair
play and no bility as member of the bar, informed the Supreme Court that the case had been decided in
fav or of said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, claimant-appellant's attorneys
filed a petition with the commissioner for reconstitution to make a report to this Court that the records
be declared reconstituted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Zamora has acted under the highest standards required of a member of the
bar.

HELD: YES. Attorney Manuel F. Zamora, instead of ta king advantage of Peneranda’s lack of knowledge
of what really happened in the Court of A ppeals informed the Supreme Court that the case had been
decided in favor of said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals. This not only to save the
appellant the trouble of waiti ng for the reconstitution of this case, it also save the tribunal the trouble
of deciding again a c ase already decided. Acting with truthfulness, fair play and nobility, these make
Atty. Zamora an example worthy to be remembered by all members of the bar.

YOUNG V. BATUEGAS
FACTS: Atty. Walter Young is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case for Murder sought the

suspension from the practice of law of Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino. Batuegas and Llantino,

as counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the “accused has

voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention.” Upon

personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana

allegedly surrendered, Atty. Young learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000.

Batuegas and Llantino claimed that on December 13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of

arrest was issued against their client, they filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with the

trial court. Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to

voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the

next day; hence, the certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered on

December 14, 2000.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino be suspended.

HELD: YES. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that

he will “do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court” and he shall “conduct himself

as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to

the courts as to his clients.” He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high

vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in

doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to

expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a

lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client’s rights and is expected to display the utmost
zeal in defense of his client’s cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.

HELD: Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from

them as members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court

if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the

truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was

under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby

contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a

contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted

to deception.

SOME CASES OF FALSEHOODS WHICH MERITED DISCIPLINE

1. Lawyers falsely stating in a deed of sale that property is free from all liens and encumbrances
when it is not so (Sevilla vs. Zoleta, 96 Phil. 979);

2. Lawyers making it appear that a person, long dead, executed a deed of sale in his favor
(Monterey vs. Arayata, 61 Phil. 820);

3. Lawyer, encashing a check payable to a deceased cousin by signing the latter’s name on the
check (In re: Samaniego, 90 Phil. 382);

4. Lawyer falsifying a power of attorney and used it in collecting the money due to the principal
and appropriating the money for his own benefit (In re: Rusina, 105 Phil. 1328);
5. Lawyer alleging in one pleading that his clients were merely lessees of the property involved,
and alleged in a later pleading that the same clients were the owners of the same property (Chavez vs.
Viola, G.R. 2152, 19 April 1991) where there are false allegations in pleadings.

6. Lawyer uttering falsehood in a Motion to Dismiss (Martin vs. Moreno, 129 SCRA 315).

7. Lawyer denying having received the notice to file brief which is belied by the return card
(Ragacejo vs. IAC, 153 SCRA 462).

8. Lawyer presenting falsified documents in court which he knows to be false (Bautista vs.
Gonzales, 182 SCRA 151) or introducing false evidence (Berrenguer vs. Carranza, 26 SCRA 673).

9. Lawyer filing false charges or groundless suits (Retuya vs. Gorduiz, 96 SCRA 526).

REQUIREMENTS OF CANDOR

1. A lawyer shall not suppress material and vital facts which bear on the merit or lack of merit of
complaint or petition.

2. A lawyer shall volunteer to the court any development of the case which has rendered the issue
raised moot and academic.

3. Disclosure to the court of any decision adverse to his position of which opposing counsel is
apparently ignorant and which court should consider in deciding a case.

4. He shall not represent himself as a lawyer for a client, appear in court and present pleadings in

the latter’s behalf only to claim later that he was not authorized to do so.
Canon 10 Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite
as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved.

Rationale:

If not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of the court may lose their proper and
correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. A
mere typographical error in the citation of an authority is not contemptuous.

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. THE INSULAR LIFE

ASSURANCE CO

(G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971)

(37 SCRA 244)

FACTS: In a labor case involving the parties above-mentio ned, petitioner Union’s complaint was
dismissed by Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez o f the Court of Industrial Relations for lack of merit.
Petitioners sought to cite for contempt t he respondent Judge on the ground that the former’s citation
of law to support his decision is different from the original text. On the other hand, respondent Judge
maintained that although the re has been a clerical error in citation, still the import of the underscored
sentences of the quot ation is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling of
the Court's decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Arsenio Martinez shall be held in contempt.

HELD: NO. In citing Supreme Court's decisions and r ulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and
lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for- punctuation mark.
Lawyers and courts take their bea rings from the Higher Court’s decisions and rulings. This is in accord
with article 8 of th e Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constituti on shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." If not faithfully and exactly quoted,
the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detri ment of
other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. In the instant case, alt hough the
respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels committed mistake in the cita tion used in their
decision, there was however no substantial change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which
they cited. For this reason, the punishment of contempt of cour t would be too much; hence, it does not
apply.

In citing the SC decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce
or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation-mark-for-punctuation-mark (Agpalo) ADEZ REALTY V.
CA

(G.R. No. 100643, December 12, 1995)

(215 SCRA 301)

FACTS: Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law for having found guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a decisi on of the Court of Appeals thereby misleading the Court in order
to obtain a favorable judgment. During the three years of his disbarment, Atty. Dacanay admitted his
guilt for the offense co mmitted and repeatedly pleas for compassion from the court with a prayer that
he be reinstated, asserting his readiness to meet the standards of the legal profession.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dacanay shall be reinstated for the practice of law.

HELD: Dacanay shall be reinstated for the practice of law. The practice of law is a privilege burdened
with conditions. Obedience to the standard s of mental fitness and morality and faithful compliance with
the rules of the legal pro fession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing
of the bar. The disbarment of Atty. Dacanay for three (3) years has given him to reflect on his
professional conduct, redeem himself and proves once more that he is worthy to practice law and be
capab le of upholding the dignity of the legal profession. His admission of guilt and repeated ple as for
compassion and reinstatement show that he is ready once more to meet the exacting sta ndards the
legal profession demands from its practitioners. Hence, the Court ruled that the disbarment of Atty.
Dacanay be lifted.

RIVERA V. ATTY. CORAL

(A.C. No. 3548, July 4, 2002)

FACTS: A “NOTICE OF APPEAL” from a decision of the court in an ejectment suit received by him was
filed in court by Atty. Napoleon Corral. Th e next day, Atty. Napoleon Corral came to the Office of the
Clerk of Court, and changed the d ate from February 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990. Realizing later that
there is no 29th in Febr uary 1990, he claimed that he received the Decision on the 28th of February
1990. Jose A. Rivera alleged that Atty . Napoleon Corral violated the proper ethics as a lawyer by
tampering and manually changing entries in the court’s record without the Court’s prior knowledge and
permission, conduct unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Napoleon Corral shall be suspended from the practice of law for conduct
unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.

HELD: YES. Atty. Napoleon Corral shall be suspended from the practice of law for having tampered and
changed entries in the court’s record without the Court’s prior knowledge. Rule 10.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility pr ovides that “A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper xx x or the text of a decision or authority xxx.” By altering the material dates to
make it appear th at the Notice of Appeal was timely filed, respondent committed an act of dishonesty.

Canon 10 Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.

Procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not
be used to derail such ends. They should not misuse them, as by filing multiple petitions regarding the
same cause of action of by deliberately misreading the law to seek a reopening of a case long decided.

(Agpalo)

QUE V. REVILLA

(A.C. No. 7054, December 4, 2009)

FACTS: In an unlawful detainer case, a decision was rendered by the RTC against respondent Atty.
Anastacio Revilla Jr.’s clients. Thereafter, Atty. Revilla filed series of petition all containing a prayer for
injunctive relief. Conrado Que, accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. before the IBP of committing abuse of
court remedies and processes, a violation of Rule 10.03 Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to
 "observe the rules of procedure and. . . Not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Anastacio Revilla has violated Rule 10.03 Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for committing abuse of court remedies and processes.

HELD: YES. Rule 10.03 Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for
a lawyer to "observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."
The successive filings of petitions all containing a prayer for injunctive relief, reveal the respondent’s
persistence in preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the lower courts against
his client. The respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

b) Respect for courts and judicial officers

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO
JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

Canon 11 Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.

IN RE VICENTE SOTTO , 82 Phil 595 (1949)

FACTS: Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written stateme nt in connection with the decision of the Supreme
Court in “In re Angel Parazo” which stateme nt was published in the newspapers. Atty. Sotto said that
the Court has not only erroneously interpreted the law, but that it is once more shows the
incompetency of narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. He threatened to pass a bill
reorganizing the Supreme so as to ch ange the members who decided the Parazo case. The court
required Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should not be charged with contempt of court. Atty. Sotto
contends in the exer cise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, he made his
statement in the pres s with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the
members of the Co urt and that he has not attacked the honesty or integrity of any one.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Sotto shall be held liable for contempt of Court.
HELD: YES. Mere criticism or comment on the correct ness or wrongness, of the decision of the court in a
pending case made in good faith may be a llowed because if well founded it may contribute to the
correction of an error if committ ed; but if it is done in bad faith, it should not given any merit. Atty.
Sotto does not merely critic ize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case; he also intends to
intimidate the members of this Court by threatening to pass a bill reorganizing the Supreme so as to
change the member s who decided the Parazo case. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts
Atty . Vicente Sotto, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which h e owes
fidelity, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. An attorney as an officer of the
court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication t o the courts.

GUERRERO V. VILLAMOR

(A.M. No. RTJ-90-483, September 25, 1998)

(179 SCRA 589)

FACTS: Consequent to the dismissal for Qualified Th eft against one Gloria Naval by respondent Judge
Adriano R. Villamor, the offended party, Geor ge D. Carlos, thru his lawyer Antonio T. Guerrero filed an
action for damages, against respo ndent judge for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. Respondent
Judge issued an Order o f Direct Contempt of Court against Guerrero for degrading the respect and
dignity of t he court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous language before the court.
Petitioners assert that no direct contempt could have

been committed against respondent judge in the comp laint for damages because whatever was
mentioned therein was not made "before" respondent judge while in session or in recess from judicial
proceedings or in any matter involving the exercise of judicial function of the Court while it is at work on
a case before it. Furthermor e, petitioners contend that the words used in the subject complaint were
merely words descriptive of plaintiff's cause of action based on his reaction and remorse and the wilful
infliction of t he injury on him and that the same are all privileged communications made in the course
of judicial proceedings because they are relevant

to the issue and therefore cannot be contemptuous.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge can issue an Order of Contempt against petitioner by
reason of the alleged contemptuous language in the complaint for damages against respondent.

HELD: Negative. The alleged derogatory language emp loyed in the complaint did not constitute direct
contempt but may only, if at all, constitute indirect contempt subject to defenses that
may be raised by said, petitioners in the proper pr oceedings. Stress must be placed on the fact that the
subject pleading was not submitted to resp ondent judge nor in the criminal cases from which the
contempt order was issued but was filed i n another court presided by another judge and involving a
separate action, the civil case for damages against respondent judge. However,

lawyers should bear in mind their basic duty "to ob serve and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers and to insi st on similar conduct by others. Observance of the respect due to
the courts and judicial officers is best demonstrated by the lawyer’s use of

respectful language.

Courts have ordered a male attorney to wear a necktie and have prohibited a female attorney from
wearing a hat. However, the prohibition of a dress whose hemline was five inches above the knee was
held to be acceptable as such “had become an accepted mode of dress even in places of worship.”
(Aguirre)

Respect begins with the lawyer’s outward physical appearance in court. Sloppy or informal attire
adversely reflects on the lawyer and demeans the dignity and solemnity of court proceedings. (Agpalo)

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD V. HON. CLORIBEL

(G.R. No. L-27072, January 9, 1970)

(31 SCRA 1)

FACTS: The Supreme Court decided against Mac Arthur International Minerals Co., client of counsels
involved in this case. Counsels Santiago, Uy, Regala & Sotto purportedly set forth a memoranda
personally signed by Santiago on his beha lf and purportedly for Uy, Regala & Associate, and Sotto
claimed that the SC overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation & obfuscation of
petitioners’ cou nsel and that never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such gimmick can be
used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public. They enumerated ce rtain
incidents which according to them were proof of unjudicial prejudice, with unjudicial favouritism in
favor of petitioners. They claimed that he needed to make those statements les t his client be deprived
of due process. Consequently, the counsels were charged with contem pt of court.

ISSUE: Whether or not counsels for Mac Arthur Int’l Minerals Co. shall be held guilty of contempt of
court.
HELD: YES. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court mandates every lawyer to observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justi ce and judicial officers. It is the duty of the lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. The Court finds in the language of
counsels the style that un dermines and degrades the administration of justice. A lawyer’s language
should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with
the dignity of the legal profession.

TIONGCO V. AGUILAR

(G.R. No. 115932, January 25, 1995)

(240 SCRA 589)

FACTS: A decision was rendered against herein petit ioners spouses Atty. Jose Tiongco and Leticia
Tiongco in their case for recovery of posse ssion and damages. Atty. Jose Tiongco as counsel for the
petitioners contested alleging that the Court did not at all read the petition in their case before it
concluded that the petition fa iled to sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed a grave
abuse of discretion. Mo reover, he described the respondent judge as a "liar," "thief" perfidious," and
"blasphemer". He also called the respondent judge a "robber," "rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft
and corrup tion, and "cross-eyed." Atty. Jose Tiongco was held in contempt of court for violation of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall observe and
main tain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Jose Tiongco has violat ed Canon 11 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.

HELD: Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibili ty provides that “a lawyer shall observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.” Atty. Tiongco had excee ded the bounds of decency and propriety in making the false and
malicious insinuation against the Court and his scurrilous characterizations is, indeed, all too obvious.
Such could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given what he wanted. When such anger
or hate is coupled with haughtiness or arrogance as when he even pointed out other intempe rate
words in his petition is a gross violation of Canon 11 of the Code of professional Responsibility.
NG V. ALAR

A.M. No. 7252, November 22, 2006

FACTS: Atty. Benjamin Alar is the counsel for the c omplainants in a labor case filed with the Labor
Arbiter which dismissed the complaint. On appeal, NLRC’s First Division upheld the dismissal. In his
Motion for Reconsideration with M otion to Inhibit (MRMI), Atty. Alar used improper and abusive
language full of diatribes cas tigating the Labor Arbiter and the ponente of the NLRC decision. Johnny
Ng, one of the respondent s, filed a disbarment case against Alar before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline for suc h misbehavior. Alar contended that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional
Responsibility does not apply to lawyers practicing at the NLRC, the latter not being a court and that LAs
and NLRC Commissioners are not judges nor justices and the Code of Judicial Conduct similarly do not
apply to them, not being part of the judiciary.

ISSUE: Is a lawyer’s misbehavior before the NLRC su sceptible of the provisions of the Code of

Professional Conduct?

HELD: The MRMI contains insults and diatribes again st the NLRC, attacking both its moral and
intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusa tions of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence.
Respondent used improper and offensive l anguage in his pleadings that does not admit any
justification. The assertion that the NLR C not being a court, its commissioners, not being judges or
justices and therefore not part of the judiciary and that consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct does
not apply to them, is unav ailing. The Court held that respondent became unmindful of the fact that in
addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law,
whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose conduct ought t o be
and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.

Canon 11 Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

DE GRACIA V. WARDEN OF MAKATI

(G.R. No. L-42032, January 9, 1976)

(69 SCRA 4)
A writ of habeas corpus was filed for the productio n of the body of Manuel De Gracia. The hearing for
the issuance of the writ has been d elayed due to a series of postponement. De Gracia was released
from custody even before the pr oper hearing making the petition for the writ moot and academic.

The Supreme Court however take note that there was a lapse in judicial propriety by counsel Salvador
N. Beltran who did not even take t he trouble of appearing in Court on the very day his own petition was
reset for hearing, a lapse explicable, it may be assumed, by his comparative inexperience and paucity of
practice be fore this Tribunal. It suffices to call his attention to such failing by way of guidance for his
future actuations as a member of the bar .

Canon 11 Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.

Canon 8 Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

FERNANDEZ V. HON. BELLO

(G.R. No. 14277, April 30, 1960)

(107 Phil 1140)

FACTS: Timotea Perreyras, the guardian over the per sons and properties of her brothers, with the help
of herein petitioner Atty. Manuel L. Ferna ndez as her counsel, asked the court for authority to sell a
nipa land owned in common by th e wards to pay for the debts owed to Maximiano Umañgay. The
request was granted and a va lid sale was made in favor of the latter. The interest in the land of
Maximiano Umañgay was i n turn sold to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez. Part of the purchase price was
given to Atty. Ferna ndez in payment for the services rendered by him as counsel of the deceased father
of the wards in a civil case. The record does not show that these payments were authorized by the
court. An inv estigation was conducted, thereafter, herein respondent Judge Bello found Atty. Manuel L.
Fernandez guilty of contempt for having taken a certain amount from the proceeds of the sal e without
court approval, finding this conduct of counsel to be anomalous and unbecoming f or the reason that he
instituted the guardianship proceedings only to enable him to coll ect unpaid attorney's fees due him
from the father of the wards. Atty. Fernandez sought to annu l said order alleging that that he acted in
good faith believing that he is entitled to receive the fees due him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Miguel Fernandez is guilty for contempt for having taken a

certain amount from the proceeds of sale of the wards’ property as payment for the legal

services rendered by him.

HELD: Atty. Miguel Fernandez is not guilty for contempt for having taken a certain amount

from the proceeds of sale of the wards’ property as payment for the legal services rendered by

him. The duty of courts is not just to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is

also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Atty. Fernandez was

entitled to receive payment for services rendered by him, which services are admitted to have

been due from the father of the wards. Meanwhile, respondent Judge wanted to strike out

portions of petitioner's motion for reconsideration for employing strong language. The language

used by the judge in characterizing the act of the petitioner as "anomalous and unbecoming"

and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee "through manoeuvres of documents from the

guardian-petitioner" must have provoked petitioner to use strong language and the judge has

nothing to blame but himself. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using
temperate language himself.

SANGALANG V. IAC

(G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988)

(177 SCRA 87)

FACTS: Atty. J Cezar Sangco, counsel for Spouses Jo se and Lutgarda Sangalang, was charged for
contempt for using intemperate and accusatory langu age, when the former assailed the decision of the
Court against his client. Atty. Sangco alleg ed that said ruling “is the most serious reflection on the
Court's competence and integrity and exemplifies its manifest partiality and the extraordinary efforts
exerted to justify such a rbitrariness and the very strained and unwarranted conclusions drawn
therefrom, are unpara lleled in the history of the Court ...” On his part, Atty. Sangco assert that he was
merely defending the interests of his clients.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. J. Cezar Sangco shall b e held guilt in contempt of court for using
intemperate and accusatory language.

HELD: YES. A lawyer's "first duty is not to his cli ent but to the administration of justice; to that end, his
client's success is wholly subordinate; an d his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics." Rule 11. 03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “A
lawyer shall abstain from scandalo us, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.”
Atty. Sangco has trans cended the limits of fair comment for which he deserves the Court's rebuke.

MONTECILLO V. GICA

(G.R. No. L-36800, October 21, 1974) (60 SCRA 234)

FACTS: In a criminal case for slander, Atty. Quirico Del Mar was able to obtain favorable
judgment for his client Jorge Montecillo. On appeal of the case, the Court of Appeals reversed

the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled threat

against the CA judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices “knowingly rendered an unjust

decision” and “judgment has been rendered through negligence” and that the CA allowed itself

to be deceived. The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone

with the court. He is charged for suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.

HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts. As an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high
esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice. It is manifest
that Del Mar has scant respect for t he two highest Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of all
eged error in deciding a case; he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claimi ng that
they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they act ed with intent and
malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

POBRE V. SENATOR SANTIAGO

(A.C. NO. 7399, August 25, 2009)

FACTS: An administrative case and disbarment procee ding was filed against Senator Meriam Defensor
Santigo for uttering in her privilege spee ch delivered in the Senate floor where she was quoted as
saying that she wanted “to spit on th e face of Chief Justice and his cohorts in the Supreme Court,” and
calling the Court a “Supreme Co urt of idiots.” She alleged that it was considered as part of her
Parliamentary immunity as such was done during the session.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of Senator Santiago is correct?

HELD: Yes, because her statements, being part of he r privilege speech as a member of Congress, were
covered by the constitutional provision on par liamentary immunity. Indeed, her privilege speech is not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.

However, as a member of the Bar, the Court wishes t o express its deep concern about the language
Senator Santiago used in her speech an d its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the
lady senator has undoubtedly cros sed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once
apparent that h er statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. Senator
Santiago should have taken to heart in the first place the ensuing passage in In Re: Vicente Sotto that “i
f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe tha t they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hand s, and disorder and
perhaps chaos would be

the result.”

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the res pect due to the courts should be allowed to
erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01
and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 11 Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge, motives not supported by the record or
have no materiality to the case.

The rule allows such criticism so long as it is supported by the record or it is material to the case. A
lawyer’s right to criticize the acts of courts and judges in a proper and respectful way and through
legitimate channels is well recognized. The cardinal condition of all such criticism is that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the wall of decency and propriety. (Agpalo)
The cardinal condition of all such criticism is that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the wall of
decency and propriety. (Agpalo)

IN RE FELICIANO GOMEZ

(43 Phil 376, May 16, 1922)

FACTS: Feliciano Gomez and Juan Cailles were rival candid ates at the election in 1919, for the position
of provincial governor of Laguna. Gomez wa s proclaimed elected. Cailles contested the election
successfully. At a public meeting held to celebrate the fiesta of the municipality of Lumban, Laguna,
Gomez is charged with having said, in effect, that the Supreme Court had decided the election protest
in favor of Cailles, b ecause Governor-General Wood, out of friendship for Cailles, had invited the
members of the court to Malacañang previous to formulating the decision, and there, following a se
cret conference, had offered them a banquet. These remarks of Gomez were published in La Nacion , a
newspaper of the City of Manila and are substantiated by four affidavits.

ISSUE: Whether or not Feliciano Gomez is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court felt at that time that decla ring Gomez in contempt will only seem to
vindicate his accusations against the high court. The Supreme Court said “litigants and lawyers should
not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at
losing cases, and that the bi g way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.” The rule in
the more progre ssive jurisdictions is that courts, when a case is finished, are subject to the same
criticism as other people. Judges may not vindicate a private wrong by a public method. Although the
hono r and integrity of the court may be assailed, judges, like other persons, are relegated to the courts
for redress.

Canon 11 Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.
1987 Philippine Constitution Article VIII, Sec. 6.

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

WHO ARE CONSIDERED AS PROPER AUTHORITIES

1. If administrative in nature

- To be filed with the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court

2. If criminal and not purely administrative in nature

- It shall be filed with the Office of the Ombudsman

3. If it involves a justice of the Supreme Court based on impeachable offenses

- It must be coursed through the House of Representatives and the Senate in accordance with the
Rules on Impeachment

*** An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available,
such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or
decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. (Santiago III v. Justice Enriquez, Jr. A.M. No. CA09-
47-J, February 13, 2009)

CABANSAG V. FERNANDEZ

(G.R. No. L-8974, October 18, 1957)

(102 Phil 152)

 FACTS: Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint against Geminiana Fernandez, et al. seeking to eject them
from a portion of land covered by a Torrens title. For almost five years, a decision has not yet been
reached due to the fact that the transcript of the records has not yet been transcribed and the Judge
could not proceed to hear the case before the transcription of the said notes. The stenographers who
took the notes are now assigned in other courts. Thereafter, Cabansag sent a letter to the Chief
Executive requesting the latter through its Presidential Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), to
act upon the case which had long been pending thru the careful manoeuvres of a tactical lawyer. Atty.
Manuel Fernandez, counsel for defendants, filed a motion praying that Apolonio Cabansag be declared
in contempt of court for an alleged scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the PCAC. On the other
hand, Cabansag and his counsels maintained that the letter is not contemptuous. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cabansag is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD: NO. Any act which tends to belittle or degrade or embarrass the court in its administration of
justice constitutes contempt of court. In the instant case, the criticism of Cabansag is directed, not to
the court, but to opposing counsel whose tactical manoeuvres has allegedly caused the undue delay of
the case. While it would have been proper for Cabansag to have his letter addressed to the Secretary of
Justice or to the Supreme Court rather than to the President, such act alone would not be
contemptuous. His conduct is justified considering that, being a layman; he is unaware of the technical
rules of law and procedure which may place him under the protective mantle of our constitution. But
the same does not apply with regard to his counsels. Being learned in the law and officers of the court,
they should have acted with more care and circumspection in advising their client to avoid undue
embarrassment to the court or unnecessary interference with the normal course of its proceedings.
Their duty as lawyers is always to observe utmost respect to the court and defend it against unjust
criticism and clamour. However, there is no proof that they acted in bad faith, hence a warning that a
commission of a similar misstep in the future would render them amenable to a more severe
disciplinary action would suffice.

MAGLASANG V. PEOPLE

(G.R. No. 90083, October 4, 1990) (190 SCRA 306)

FACTS: Upon conviction of Khalyxto Maglasang, his counsel, Atty. Castellano, filed for a petition for
certiorari through registered mail. Due to non-compliance with the requirements, the court dismissed
the petition and a motion for reconsideration. Atty. Castellano then sent a complaint to the Office of the
President where he accused the five justices of the 2nd division, with biases and ignorance of the law or
knowingly rendering unjust judgments. He accused the court of sabotaging the Aquino administration
for being Marcos appointees, and robbing the Filipino people genuine justice and democracy. He also
said that the SC is doing this to protect the judge who was impleaded in the petition and for money
reasons. He alleges further that the court is too expensive to be reached by ordinary men. The court is
also inconsiderate and overly strict and meticulous. He was then charged for violation of the provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Atty. Castellano’s acts constitute a violation of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES. In filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division with the Office of
the President, even the most basic tenet of our government system-the separation of powers between
the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches-has been lost on Atty. Castellano. The Supreme
Court is supreme-the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial
power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or
agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.' Atty. Castellano's complaint is a
vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an
impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.

MACEDA V. VASQUEZ

(G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993)

FACTS: Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman

against RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Abiera alleged that Maceda has falsified his

certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted

for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31,

1989, when in truth and in fact, Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and
10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Abiera alleged that Maceda falsified his

certificates of service for 17 months.

ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an

encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

HELD: In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard

to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches

into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in

violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution

exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from

the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this

power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all

laws, and takes the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of

the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from

their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the

same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within

the scope of their administrative duties.

c) Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE
SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

Rule 138 SEC. 20 (g) of Rules of Court — It is the duty of an attorney:

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or
delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

ALONTO V. HON. MEMORACION (Forum shopping)

(G.R. No. 83614, May 7, 1990)

(185 SCRA 73)

FACTS: Eldigario D. Gonzales is suspended from offi ce as Vice-President of the Mindanao State
University, Tawi-Tawi College of Technology and Oce anography (MSU-TCTO). He then filed a petition
compelling Ahmad Alonto, Jr. and the MSU Board of Regents (BOR) to allow him to re- assume his
position. Accordingly, the lower court i ssued a restraining order in his favor. However, Alonto did not
comply with the said order; instead they issued a Resolution placing Gonzales under preventive
suspension. The lower cou rt found Alonto guilty of contempt of court. After having denied their
motions for recons ideration of the order, Alonto made an appeal. Despite the action taken on their
notice of appeal, Alonto filed the instant petition alleging that their appeal was not prosecuted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ahmad Alonto Jr., et al is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD: YES. Forum-shopping, an act of malpractice th at is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the
courts and abusing their processes, is a g round for holding a lawyer in contempt of court. Petitioners
have not been candid with the Co urt. In their manifest, they maintained that the appeal was not
prosecuted which is an outright falsehood, a tactic to conceal from the Court the practice of forum-
shopping in seeking relief fr om the assailed orders of the trial court. These acts of petitioners constitute
an improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice and this violation constitutes
contempt of court.

PENTICOSTES vs. HIDALGO

(A.M. No. RTJ-89-331, September 28, 1990)

(190 SCRA 165)

FACTS: Prudencio S. Penticostes has filed a series of adm inistrative charges against Judge Rafael B.
Hidalgo of Regional Trial Court Branch 68 of Tar lac, Tarlac which were unsubstantiated charges and
done in pursuit of “a desire to unjusti fiably bring respondent to public disdain and ridicule" as
determined by the Office of the court Administrator. Despite the stern warning of the OCA, Penticostes
persisted.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Penticostes’ action is consiste nt with the Code of Professional

Conduct.

HELD: The Court ruled that considering the nature, frequ ency and indiscriminate filing of groundless
charges and despite the admonition previ ously given by resolution of the Court, which Penticostes
wilfully ignored and disobeyed by manifesting the intent to file more of the same, he imposed upon the
time, resources and forbe arance of the Court and diverted the energies of the respondent judge who
has been called upon to comment and defend his every action. This is not to say that a judge may not be
answerable for violation of the law and the Code of Judicial Conduct, but not every order or ru ling
adverse to a party can be made the basis for an administrative charge.

As a member of the bar, Penticostes has responsibil ities to the judiciary. The Code of Professional
Responsibility and the rules there und er impose obligations on the lawyer in relation to the court:
Canon 12 mandates that a law yer shall exert very effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administ ration of justice. Through his imprudent filing of administrative cases against
respondent judge, P enticostes has transgressed the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and miserab ly failed to observe conduct expected of a member of the bar under the Code
and in accordance with his lawyer's oath.

GABIONZA V. CA

(G.R. No. 112547, July 18, 1994)

(234 SCRA 192)

FACTS: Dennis T. Gabionza was a defendant in a civi l case but the case was dismissed by the lower
court. An appeal before the Court of Appeals was then instituted. The appellate Court dismissed the
petition for being violative of the p rovision of Circular No. 28-91 for having failed to indicate in the
caption thereof the docket numbe r of the case in the trial court whose orders are sought to be
reviewed. Gabionza admits that the docket number had not be en set forth in the caption of his Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals, however , he maintains that his Petition should
nevertheless hav e been deemed in substantial compliance with Circular No. 28-91, for the reason that
the do cket number of the case pending before the trial court was in fact set out in the body of his
Petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dennis T. Gabionza is in subs tantial compliance with Circular No. 28-91 in so far
as the requisite for caption of petition or complaint is concerned.

HELD: YES. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to promo te and facilitate the orderly administration of
justice and should not be interpr eted with such absolute literalness as to undermine its own ultimate
and legitimate objective which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. In the
instant case, Gab ionza has substantially complied with the original requirements of Circular No. 28-91
Caption of petition or complaint and that the objectives of that Circular were not being subverte d by
Gabionza's Petition in as much as the docket number of the case pending before the trial court was in
fact set out in the body of his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
TAKE NOTE: (Agpalo)

• The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but the administration of justice. As an officer of the
Court, it is the duty of the lawyer to advance the Court’s objective of having a speedy, efficient,
impartial, correct, and inexpensive adjudication of case and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments.

• The duty to assist in the administration of justice may be performed by doing no act that
obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of justice and by faithfully complying with all his
duties to the court and to his client. Examples of the former would include the duty to inform the court
of any change of his address or of the death of his client.

• Acts that amount to obstruction of the administration of justice may take many forms. They
include such acts as instructing a complaining witness in a criminal case not to appear at the scheduled
hearing so that the case against his client, the accused, would be dismissed

Canon 12 Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself on
the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its preferences. He should
also be ready with the original documents for comparison with the copies.

A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. (Rule 18.02)

Without adequate preparation, the lawyer may not be able to effectively assist the court in the efficient
administration of justice. Non-observance of this rule might result in:

1) The postponement of the pre-trial or hearing, which would thus entail delay in the early
disposition of the case;

2) The judge may consider the client nonsuited or in default or

3) The judge may consider the case deemed submitted for decision without client’s evidence, to
his prejudice. (Agpalo)

Canon 12 Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

MASINSIN V. THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO

(G.R. No. 86421, May 31, 1994 )

(232 SCRA 192 )

FACTS: In an ejectment suit against the spouses Masinsin, the lower court ruled against them. No
appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. Later, the Masinsins
through different counsels tried to nulli fy the same MTC decision before different branches of the
court. They file pleadings, one aft er another. The Court took notice of the filing of series of
unsubstantiated petitions by the Masin sins through their counsels which is a delaying tactic. The Court
finds the counsels guilt y of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer; hence they are censured and warned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels of the Masinsins are g uilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

HELD: YES. The utter lack of merit of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the deliberate intent
of the Masinsins to prolong and d elay the inevitable execution of a decision that has long become final
and executory. In no unc ertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer of the court, which
visibly tend s to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious
calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt power.
Petit ion is dismissed. Petitioner’s counsel of record is strongly CENSURED and WARNED that a simil ar
infraction of the lawyer’s oath in the future will be dealt with most severely.

Canon 12 Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his
failure to do so.

MARIVELES V. MALLARI

(A.C. No. 3294, February 17, 1993)

(219 SCRA 44)

FACTS: Mario S. Mariveles filed an administrative c omplaint for disbarment against his former counsel,
Attorney Odilon C. Mallari, whose legal se rvices he had engaged to handle his defense in Criminal Case
where he was charged with violatio n of B.P. Blg. 22. After an adverse decision was rendered, Mariveles
instructed Attorney Mallari to appeal the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals, which the
respondent did. However , in the Court of Appeals, despite numerous extensions of time, which he
obtained from the Court, Attorney Mallari failed to file the appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal of
the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mallari be disbarred.

HELD: YES. What was committed by Atty. Mallari is a blatant violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 12.03 — a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the per iod lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for
his failure to do so. R ule 18.03 — a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Suffice it to state that a lawyer has no business p racticing his profession if in the course of that
practice, he will eventually wreck and destroy the future and reputation of his client and thus disgrace
the law profession. Disbarment is the only recourse to remove a rotten apple if only to instil and
maintain the respect and confidence of all and sundry to the noble profession.

Canon 12 Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgement or
misuse Court processes.

PLUS BUILDERS INC. VS REVILLA

(A.C. No. 7056, February 11, 2009)

FACTS: The Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rende red a decision in favor of Plus Builders, Inc.
and against the tenants/farmers Leop oldo de Guzman, et.al, who were the clients of Atty. Revilla, Jr.
The PARAD found that the farmers were mere tenants and not rightful possessors/owners of the
subject land. The case reached the Supreme Court which sustained Plus Builders Inc.’s rights over the
land. Atty. R evilla, Jr. was found to have committed intentional falsehood and misused court processes
w ith the intention to delay the execution of the decision through the filing of several motions, petitions
for temporary restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the decision.
Atty. Revilla, Jr. maintains that the courses of action he took were n ot meant to unduly delay the
execution of the DARAB Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Revilla, Jr. is guilty of gross misconduct.

HELD: YES. In support of the cause of their clients, law yers have the duty to present every remedy or
defense within the authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense
of truth and justice. Unde r the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the duty to assist in the
speedy and eff icient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding
ex ecution of a judgment or by misusing court processes.
AGUINALDO V. AGUINALDO

(36 SCRA 137)

FACTS: A writ of execution is issued in favor of Vi ctoria Aguinaldo and Simeona Aguinaldo for the
reconveyance of a part of the property in litig ation. An appeal was made by Segundo Aguinaldo but the
same was denied. Cecilio Aguinald o contested the writ alleging that his father Segundo Aguinaldo died
during the pendency o f such appeal. Thereafter, the petitioners, in order not to render nugatory a
decision, final a nd executory in character, ask the court to have the heirs of the deceased Segundo
Aguinaldo su bstituted as defendants. The lower court granted them favor and substituted respondents
in p lace of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo citing the provision of Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rule s of Court
to the effect that whenever a party to a pending case dies, xxx it shall be the duty of his attorney to
inform the court promptly of such death, xxx and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative. Respondents contested s aying it’s too late to
apply said provision of the Rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in granting favor to petitioners.

HELD: NO. Defendant’s reliance that it is too late to apply the provision of Sec 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court is untenable. To cause plaintiffs to suffer for such neglect of duty is to cast an underserved
reflection on the law. The judgment had become final and the stage of execution reached. The Court
said “litigation must end and te rminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and
efficient administrat ion of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not,
through a mere artifice, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.” MALONZO V. PRINSIPE

(A.C. No. 6289, December 16, 2004)

(447 SCRA 1)

FACTS: In expropriation proceedings by the NAPOCOR against several lot owners in Bulacan, the
president of an organization of the lot owners entered into a contract for legal services with Atty. Pete
Principe. Complainant Julian Malonso, a member of the same organization, appointed on the other
hand a certain Danilo Elfa as his attorney-in-fact on the matter of negotiation with NPC. Thereafter,
there was an amicable settlement between NAPOCOR and the lot owners. More than two years after
the expropriation cases were instituted; Atty. Principe filed his motion to separate legal fees and filed
his “Notice of Entry of Appearance” claiming that he is the legal counsel of the lot owners. The other lot
owners including Malonso wrote a letter to NPC informing the latter that they have never authorized
Sandama’s President to hire the services of Atty. Principe’s law firm to represent them. Atty. Principe
filed several motions to ensure his claim to the 40% of the selling price of the properties being
expropriated. An investigation conducted by the IBP recommended Atty. Principe’s suspension from the
practice of law
 ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Prinsipe be suspended from the practice of law.

HELD: YES. Atty. Principe had violated among others Rule 12.04 which says that “a lawyer shall not
unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.” In its Resolution,
the IBP Board ordained his suspension from the practice of law. The SC however found that formal
requisites of the investigation and resolution had not been complied with and dismissed the case
requiring the IBP to comply with the procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in all cases involving disbarment
and discipline of attorneys.

Canon 12 Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or recess in the
trial, while the witness is still under examination.

The purpose of this rule is to avoid any suspicion that he is coaching the witness what to say during the
resumption of the examination. (Agpalo)

Canon 12 Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to
impersonate another.

A lawyer may interview witnesses in advance of trial or attend to their needs if they are poor but he
should avoid any such action as may be misinterpreted as an attempt to influence the witness what to
say in court. Court will not give weight on a testimony of a witness who admits having been instructed. A
lawyer who presents a witness whom he knows will give a false testimony or is an impersonator may be
subjected to disciplinary action. (Agpalo)

Canon 12 Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly
inconvenience him.
• The lawyer has a duty to always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and due
consideration (Agpalo)

• The client cannot be made the keeper of the lawyer’s conscience in professional matters. He has
no right to demand that his counsel abuse the opposite party and the latter’s witnesses or indulge

in offensive personalities. Improper speech is not excusable on the ground that it is what the client
would say if speaking in his own behalf

• If it is the judge who subjects the witness to harsh treatment, the lawyer has the right to protest
in a respectful and dignified manner the action of the judge and to make the incident of record without
being held liable administratively or for contempt of court

Canon 12 Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, and the like,
or

b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which
event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.

The underlying reason for the impropriety of a lawyer acting in such dual capacity lies in the difference
between the function of a witness and that of an advocate. The function of a witness is to tell the facts
as he recalls then in answer to questions. The function of an advocate is that of a partisan. It is difficult
to distinguish between the zeal of an advocate and the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested
witness (Agpalo)

PNB V. UY TENG PIAO

(G.R. No. L-35252, October 21, 1932)

(57 Phil 337)

FACTS: The lower court rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and against
Uy Teng Piao in one civil case. Upon failure by Uy Teng Piao to pay, its mortgaged land was sold at
public auction to the PNB. Later, the PNB secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his right to redeem the
property in question and sold the same to a third person. In his answer Uy Teng Piao alleged that he
waived his right to redeem the land upon an agreement that the bank would not collect from him the
balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court released PNB from the complaint.
One of the attorneys for the PNB testified that Uy Teng Piao renounced his right to redeem the parcel
of land, because a friend of the respondent was interested in buying it. The testimony of the attorney
was questioned from the fact of his being a witness and an attorney at the same time in a cause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the counsel for the respondent PNB could be a witness and at the same time an
attorney in the instant case.

HELD: The counsel for the respondent PNB, could not be a witness and at the same time an attorney in
the instant case. Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics provides that when a lawyer is a witness for his
client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the
like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel, except when essential to the ends of justice,
a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client. With respect to the testimony of the
bank's attorney, it is observe that although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at
the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness
unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from the active management of the case.

d) Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety which tends to influence or gives
the appearance of influence upon the courts

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM

ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF

INFLUENCING THE COURT

NESTLE V. SANCHEZ

(G.R. No. 75209, September 30, 1987)

(154 SCRA 542 )

FACTS: Two unions with pending cases before the Supreme Court had intermittent pickets in front of
the Padre Faura gate of the SC building, obstructing access to and egress from the Court’s premises.
They also constructed provisional shelters, set up a kitchen, littered the area causing it to be unhygienic
and un-sanitized, waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and harangued the court with
the use of loud speakers. Two justices called the leaders of the unions and their counsel to inform them
that the pickets constitute direct contempt of court, and that their petitions could not be heard until
the pickets stop. Atty. Espinas, the counsel for the unions, apologized and assured that the acts would
not be repeated .
ISSUE: Is Atty. Espinas guilty of contempt of court.

HELD: YES. Grievances must be ventilated through pr oper channels (appropriate petitions, motions or
other pleadings) in keeping with the res pect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice
entitled to proceed to th e disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside
interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice; for
though the rights of free speech and of assembly are constitutionally protected, an attempt to pressure
or influence courts of justice is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection.

Canon 13 Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.

LANTORIA V. BUNYI

(A.M. No. 1769, June 8, 1992)

(209 SCRA 528)

FACTS: In an ejectment case handled by Atty. Irineo Bunyi pending before the Municipal Court, it is
contended by Cesar L. Lantoria that At ty. Bunyi was the one who prepared the decisions and the judge
simply signed them. This is predicated on the letters sent by Atty. Bunyi to Lantoria. Thereafter, the
latter filed a complai nt against Atty. Bunyi for conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar. The case
was referred to th e Solicitor General who found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprof
essional conduct required of a member of the Bar and consequently recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law. Atty. Bunyi manifested that he did not offer the Ju dge any gift or
consideration to influence the latter in allowing him to prepare the draft decisio ns. He also offered his
apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted from his preparation of the draft
decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Irineo Bunyi shall be s uspended from the practice of law for conduct
unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

HELD: YES. CANON 13 of the Code of Professional Res ponsibility provides that a lawyer shall rely upon
the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court. Rul e 13.01 further provides that a lawyer shall not extend
extraordinary attention or hospitality t o, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges. In
the case at hand, Atty. Bunyi is guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court where
he had pend ing civil case by preparing the draft decision. These acts of respondent amounted to
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court.

Canon 13 Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

CRUZ V. SALVA See Canon 3, Rule 3.04

MARTELINO V. ALEJANDRO

(G.R. No. L-30894, March 25, 1970)

(32 SCRA 106)

FACTS: Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a
result of the alleged shooting on Marc h 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando
training on the island of Corre gidor. Later, Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the
general court-martial, following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor
in cident. Martelino contended that the case had received such an amount of publicity in the pre ss and
other news media and in fact was being exploited for political purposes in connectio n with the
presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. A fter deliberating, the
military court denied the challenge. Respondents assert that despite the publ icity which the case had
received, no proof has been presented showing that the court-mar tial's president's fairness and
impartiality have been impaired.

ISSUE: Whether or not the publicity given to the case prejudice Martelino’s right to fair trial.

HELD: NO. Televising a court trial would amount to a violation of due process. A carnival atmosphere
would be created. Jurisprudence also states that there is nothing that proscribes the press from
reporting events that transpire in the courtroom. But there is a reasonable likelihood that the
prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial. If publicity during the proceeding threatens the
fairness of the trial, a new trial shall be ordered. However, the case at bar is different. The publicity in
this case did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the government
for what was claimed to be a “massacre” of Muslim trainees. If there was a “trial by newspaper” it was
not of the petitioner but of the government. There is no showing that the courts martial failed to
protect the accused from massive publicity. Protection would include: controlling the release of
information; change the venue or postpone trial until the deluge of prejudicial publicity has subsided.
Even granting hat there is massive and prejudicial publicity, the petitioners do not contend that the
respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be.

IN RE ALMACEN

(G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970)

(31 SCRA 562)

FACTS: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Su rrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of Title” to the
Supreme Court as a sign of his protes t as against to what he call a tribunal “peopled by people who are
calloused to our pleas for justic e…”. He also expressed strong words as against the judiciary like
“justice… is not only bl ind, but also deaf and dumb.” The petition rooted from the case he lost due to
the absence of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court of
App eals. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute
resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that t his petition
to surrender his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title again as so on as he regained
confidence in the justice system.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

RULING: YES. Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
The Court also treats with forbear ance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations,
provided it is done in re spectful terms and through legitimate channels; for courageous and fearless
advocates are the stran ds that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. The reason is that an
attorney does not su rrender his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the court in fair and
respectful manne r, and the independence of the Bar, as well as the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the co urts. Criticism has been an important part of the traditional work of a lawyer. As a
citizen a nd as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise his right, but also to conside
r it his duty to avail of such right. But the cardinal condition of all such criticism is that is shall be bona
fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.

Canon 13 Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or agency of the
government in the normal course of judicial proceedings.
4. To the clients

NATURE OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

1. Strictly personal

2. Highly confidential

3. Fiduciary

ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP, HOW FORMED

1. Oral – when the counsel is employed without a written agreement, but the conditions and
amount of attorney’s fees are agreed upon.

2. Express – when the terms and conditions including the amount of fees are explicitly stated in a
written document, which may be a private or public document. Written contract of attorney’s fees is the
law between the lawyer and the client.

3. Implied – When there is no agreement, whether oral or written, but the client allowed the
lawyer to render legal services not intended to be gratuitous without objection and client is benefited by
reason thereof.

*** While a written agreement for professional services is the best evidence to show the relation,
formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The absence of a written
contract will not preclude a finding that there is a professional relationship.

ADVANTAGES OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT BETWEEN THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT

1. It is conclusive as to the amount of compensation.

2. In case of unjustified dismissal of an attorney, he shall be entitled to recover from the client full
compensation stipulated in the contract
RULES PROTECTING ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

1. Best efforts must be exerted by the attorney to protect his client’s interest;

2. The attorney must promptly account for any fund or property entrusted by or received for his
client;

3. An attorney cannot purchase his client’s property or interest in litigation;

4. The privacy of communications shall at all times upheld;

5. An attorney cannot represent a party whose interest is adverse to that of his client even after
the termination of the relation.

THREE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY THAT A LICENSED ATTORNEY AT LAW GENERALLY
ENGAGES IN THE PRACTICE OF HIS PROFESSION

1. Legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations;

2. Appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine
rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law; and

3. Preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by
ordinary layman. (CPR Annotated, PhilJA)

a) Availability of service without discrimination

CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.

(i) Services regardless of person’s status

Canon 14 Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter’s

race, sex, creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person
.

Rule 138, Sec. 20 (h-i) of the Rules of Court. Duties of attorneys.—It is the duty of an attorney: (h) Never
to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed. (i) In the
defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal
opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no
person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law

Canon 14 Rule 14.01 makes it his duty not to decline to represent the accused regardless of his opinion
as to his guilt. Note that in criminal cases, it is easy to take accused because of presumption of
innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt.

It is the lawyer’s duty to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be
just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under law. He is not to encourage
the commencement or the continuance of an action or delay any man’s cause, for any corrupt motive or
interest. He must decline to conduct a civil case or to make a defense when convinced that it is intended
merely to harass or injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong. If he were to take a bad
civil case for a plaintiff, it will only be to advise him not to file the action or to settle it with the claimant.
If he were to accept the defense of a bad civil case against a defendant, it will either be to exert his best
effort toward a compromise or, to tell his client to confess judgment. In criminal cases: easy to take
accused because of presumption of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt.

(Agpalo)

(ii) Services as counsel de officio

Canon 14 Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an appointment
as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any
of its chapters for rendition of free legal aid.
Rule 138, sec. 31 of the Rules of Court Attorney’s for destitute litigants.—A court may assign an attorney
to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the
party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to
secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so
assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause
shown.

Rule 138, Sec. 36 of the Rules of Court —Amicus curiae.— Experienced and impartial attorneys may be
invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.

Who is an Amicus curiae?

A friend of the court; a “bystander” (usually a counselor) who interposes or volunteers information upon
some matter of law in regard to which the judge is doubtful or mistaken. (Agpalo)

(iii) Valid grounds for refusal

Canon 14 Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client unless:

a) he is in no position to carry out the work effectively or competently;

b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between a
present client and the prospective client.

(iv) Same standard of conduct for paying and non-paying clients

Canon 14 Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees
shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.
b) Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

(i) Confidentiality rule

Canon 15 Rule 15.01 - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if
so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.

HORNILLA V. SALUNAT

(A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003)

FACTS: Hornilla filed a complaint against Atty. Salunat with the IBP Commission on Bar

Discipline for unethical practice regarding conflict of interests. Atty. Salunat is a member of the

ASSA Law Office and acted as the legal counsel for the Philippine Public School Teachers

Association. In a quarrel between the PPSTA and some of its board members pending SEC

resolution for unlawful spending and undervalued sale of real properties, Atty. Salunat appeared
as counsel for said board members. Atty. Salunat avers that he only appeared in behalf of ASSA

since he was a partner. Moreover, he only filed a Manifestation for extreme urgency.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salunat is guilty of unethical behavior as a member of the IBP.

HELD: YES. A lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the

same corporation’s board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would

be tantamount to representing conflicting interests which is prohibited by the Code of

Professional Responsibility. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent

interest of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is

the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.

Also, if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which

will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether

he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent

an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or

invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.

FACTS: Donald Dee and his father engaged the servi ces of Atty. Mutuc regarding the problem of the
alleged indebtedness of petitioner’s brother Dewey to Caesar’s Palace. Atty. Mutuc went to the casino
to negotiate with its president to le t Dewey off the hook, and go after the real debtor Ramon Sy. The
president of the casino then t old Mutuc that if he can make Ramon Sy acknowledge the debt, then
Dewey would be exculpate d. Thereafter Mutuc was able to convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the
debt and broug ht a letter to the casino asking for a discount, which resulted to the clearing of Dewey’s
name in the casino. Having resolved the problem, Mutuc proceeded to collect from Dee the re maining
balance of their agreed professional fee. However despite several letter of demand respondent Mutuc
never received his fees. This prompted Mutuc to file an action for collection of the fees. Dee alleged
that Mutuc at the time when he was rendering the alleged servi ces for the petitioner was actually
working for the interest and to the advantage of the casino , and that Mutuc is not justified to claim
professional fees considering that there was conflict of interest involved.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mutuc is guilty of representing conflicting interests.

HELD: No. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with contending positions.
However, at a certain stage of the contr oversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer may represent
conflicting interests with the consen t of the parties. A common representation may work to the
advantage of said parties since a m utual lawyer, with honest motivations and impartially cognizant of
the parties' disparate pos itions, may well be better situated to work out an acceptable settlement of
their differences, bein g free of partisan inclinations and acting with the cooperation and confidence of
said parties. Her e, even indulging petitioner in his theory that private respondent was during the period
in qu estion an agent of Caesar's Palace, petitioner was not unaware thereof, hence he actually consente
d to and cannot now decry the dual representation that he postulates.

(ii) Privileged communications

Canon 15 Rule 15.02 - A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of
matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

(G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996)

(262 SCRA 122)

FACTS: This case emerges from the institution of th e Complaint before the Sandiganbayan by the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Presid ential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in a PCGG Case.

The partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concep cion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law Firm)
performed legal services for its c lients. One of the firm’s clients is Mr. Cojuanco. The members of the
law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings. In the course
of their de alings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information relative to the
assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances. It is in this regard that t he PCGG
required the firm to disclose the identity of its client and the documents and inform ation related to its
client’s case. The law firm contest claiming that they cannot be compelled to d isclose their client’s
information by virtue of the lawyer-client privilege communication.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ACCRA lawyers be compelle d to disclose the identity of their clients and the
information related to their client’s case.

HELD: NO. The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name
or identity of his client. The reasons for this are that:

- The Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be
protected is flesh and blood.

- The privilege begins to exist only after the attorn ey-client relationship has been established.
The privilege does not attach until there is a client.

- The privilege pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

- Due process considerations require that the opposing party should know his adversary.

The general rule is however qualified by some exceptions. Client identity is privileged:
- Where a strong probability exists that revealing th e client’s name would implicate the client in
the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.

- Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability.

- Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless by revealing
the client’s name, the said name would fu rnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a crime.

Information relating to the identity of the client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when the
client’s name itself has an independent signifi cance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION

One that refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client
in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware discloses the information to no third
person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.

PURPOSE OF MAKING THE COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGED

1. To encourage a client to make a full disclosure of the facts of the case to his counsel without
fear

2. To allow the lawyer freedom to obtain full information from his client.

TEST IN DETERMINING WHETHER A COMMUNICATION TO AN ATTORNEY IS COVERED BY THE RULE ON

PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION
 Whether the communications are made to an attorney with view of obtaining from him personal
assistance or advice regardless of whether there is a pending or merely impending litigation or any
litigation.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

COMMUNICATION

Where the legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the
communications relating to that purpose made in confidence by the client are at his instance
permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor except if the protection be
waived. (Hadjula v. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 2007)

REQUISITES OF PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION

1. There is attorney-client relationship or a kind of consultancy requirement with a prospective

client;

2. The communication was made by the client to the lawyer in the course of the lawyer’s
professional employment;

3. The communication must be intended to be confidential.

*** The privilege continues to exist even after the termination of the attorney-client relationship. It
outlasts the lawyer’s engagement. The privileged character of the communication ceases only when
waived by the client himself or after his death, by the heir or legal representative. (Baldwin v. CIR, 94 F.
2d 355, 20 AFTR 940)

*** The party who avers that the communication is privileged has the burden of proof to establish the
existence of the privilege unless from the face of the document itself, it clearly appears that it is
privileged. The mere allegation that the matter is privileged is not sufficient. (People v. Sleeper, No.
22783, December 3, 1924)
(iii) Conflict of interest

Canon 15 Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

PORMENTO V. ATTY. PONTEVEDRA

(A.C. No. 5128, March 31, 2005) (454 SCRA 167)

FACTS: Atty. Alias Pontevedra is the family’s legal counsel of Pormento. In one civil case involving the
latter, Pormento averred that the same was dismissed because Atty. Pontevedra deliberately failed to
inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim, as a result of which, Pormento was deprived of his right
to appeal said order. Pormento also claims that in order to further protect his rights and interests over
the said parcel of land, he was forced to initiate a criminal case for qualified theft against the relatives of
the alleged new owner of the said land. Atty. Pontevedra is the counsel of the accused in said case.
Pormento claims that as part of his defense in said criminal case, Atty. Pontevedra utilized pieces of
confidential information he obtained from him while he is still his client.

In a separate incident, Pormento claims that he bought a parcel of land. Since there was another person
who claims ownership of the property, Pormento alleges that he heeded respondent’s advice to build a
small house on the property and to allow his (complainant’s) nephew and his family to occupy the house
in order for complainant to establish his possession of the said property. Subsequently, complainant’s
nephew refused to vacate the property prompting the former to file an ejectment case. Respondent
acted as the counsel of complainant’s nephew.

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of malpractice and misconduct by representing clients
with conflicting interests and should be disbarred by reason thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Pontevedra violates the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing
conflicting claims for his clients.

HELD: NO. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “A lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.”

There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test to determine if there is a representation of
conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double dealing in the performance thereof.

A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject
matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous
litigation in which he appeared for the former client. The reason for the prohibition is found in the
relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer
becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak
points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded
with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client’s secrets. A lawyer must
have the fullest confidence of his client; for if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the
loss thereof.

In the present case, the Court finds no conflict of interests when Atty. Pontevedra represented herein
complainant’s nephew and other members of his family in the ejectment case and in the criminal
complaint filed by herein complainant against them. The only established participation respondent had
with respect to the parcel of land purchased by complainant, is that he was the one who notarized the
deed of sale of the said land. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent
obtained any information from herein complainant that can be used to the detriment of the latter in the
ejectment case he filed.

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO V. ATTY. CARLOS SAGUCIO

(A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006)

FACTS: Respondent, Atty. Sagucio was a former Personnel Manager and Counsel of Taggat Industries
Inc. Thereafter in 1992, he was appointed as Asst. Provincial prosecutor of Tuguegarao Cagayan.
Employees of Taggat Industries, through their counsel Atty. Sagucio filed criminal charges against it for
withholding the payment of their wages and salaries without a valid cause. Taggat Industries through
complainant Ruthie-Lim charges respondent with engaging in private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor and for violation of Rule 15.03 of CPR.

ISSUES: Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat posits conflict of interests with his work as
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor.

HELD: NO. The issue of the matter of the criminal complaint was pertaining to the withholding of the
wages and salaries of the Taggat employees which occurred from April 1, 1996 to July 15, 1997.
Evidently, the respondent was no longer connected with the Taggat Industries during such period since
he is working as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor since 1992. Should there be apparent conflict of
interest, it must be supported by sufficient evidence that Atty. Sagucio used any confidential
information from his preceding employment with Complainant in resolving the filed criminal complaint.
 One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against his former
client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. In
essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to
refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously
represented him.

GONZALES V. CABUCANA

(AC No. 6836, January 23, 2006)

FACTS: Leticia Gonzales was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages where she was
represented by the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with
Atty. Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an associate/partner. A decision was
rendered in the civil case ordering the losing party to pay Gonzales. Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to
fully implement the writ of execution issued in connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales
to file a complaint against the said sheriff. Notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case where
respondent’s law firm was still representing Gonzales, herein respondent represented the Gatchecos in
the cases filed by Gonzales. Complainant contended that the respondent’s acceptance of the cases of
the Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship between complainants and respondent’s law firm
and renders respondent liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law for representing
conflicting interest.

HELD: Affirmative. It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Such prohibition is
founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relations is one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the
client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice. Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

TESTS TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS

1. Conflicting Duties - When, on behalf of one client, it is the attorney’s duty to contest for that
which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when possibility of such situation will
develop.
2. Invitation of Suspicion - Whether the acceptance of the new relation will prevent a lawyer from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or will invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.

3. Use of Prior Knowledge Obtained - Whether a lawyer will be called upon in his new relation to
use against the first client any knowledge acquired in the previous employment.

INSTANCES WHEN A LAWYER MAY NOT REPRESENT CONFLICTING INTERESTS DESPITE CONSENT OF
BOTH PARTIES CONCERNED

Where the conflict is:

1. Between the attorney’s interest and that of a client; or

2. Between a private client’s interests and that of the government or any of its instrumentalities.

EFFECTS OF REPRESENTING ADVERSE INTERESTS

1. Disqualification as counsel of new client on petition of former client.

2. Where such is unknown to, becomes prejudicial interests of the new client, a judgment against
such may, on that ground be set aside.

3. A lawyer can be held administratively liable through disciplinary action and may be held
criminally liable for betrayal of trust.

4. The attorney’s right to fees may be defeated if found to be related to such conflict and such was
objected to by the former client, or if there was a concealment and prejudice by reason of the attorney’s
previous professional relationship with the opposite party.

(iv) Mediator, Conciliator, Arbitrator of settling disputes

Canon 15 Rule 15.04 - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as mediator,
conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
(v) Candid and honest advice to clients

Canon 15 Rule 15.05 - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the
merits and probable results of the client’s case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of
the case.

Choa vs. Chiongson, 253 SCRA 371 (1996)

His client is entitled to and he is bound to give a candid and honest opinion on the merit or lack of merit
of his client’s case, neither overstating nor understating the prospect of the case. It is likewise
incumbent upon him to give his client an honest opinion on the probable results of the case, with the
end in view of promoting respect for the law and the legal processes.

Periquet vs. NLRC, 186 SCRA (1990)

As officers of the court, counsels are under obligation to advise their clients against making untenable
and inconsistent claims. Lawyers are not merely hired employees who must unquestionably do the
bidding of the client, however unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciation
of the facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.

GILLEGO V. DIAZ

(G.R. No. L-27428, May 29, 1971)

(39 SCRA 88)

The case at bar recalls to mind the Court admonition, in a similarly unmeritorious case that "The
circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove that appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to
delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves severe condemnation,
wasting as it does, the time that the courts could well devote to meritorious cases." In Lopez vs. Aquino,
the Court exhorted counsel that "the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that
needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more
faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that 'the signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is interposed for
delay' and expressly admonishes that 'for a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action'."

(vi) Non-influential to public official, tribunal, or legislative body

Canon 15 Rule 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body.

CJC Rule 2.03 - A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct
or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.

This rule protects against influence peddling. Some prospective clients secure the services of a particular
lawyer or law firm precisely because he can exert a lot of influence on a judge and some lawyers exact
big fees for such influence (Agpalo)

(vii) Compliance with laws

Canon 15 Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and principles of
fairness.

Art. 19 of NCC. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
TAKE NOTE: (Agpalo)

• A lawyer is required to represent his client within the bounds of the law. The CPR enjoins him to
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and warns him not

to allow his client to dictate procedure in handling the case. He may use arguable construction of the
law or rules which are favorable to his client. But he is not allowed to knowingly advance a claim or
defense that is unwarranted under existing law.

• A lawyer should comply with the client’s lawful requests. But he should resist and should never
follow any unlawful instructions. In matters of law, it is the client who should yield to the lawyer and not
the other way around.

• A lawyer must also observe and advice his client to observe the statute law, thought until a
statute shall have been construed and interpreted by competent jurisdiction, he is free and is entitled to
advice as to its validity and as to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning and extent

(viii) Concurrent practice of another profession

Canon 15 Rule 15.08 - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with
the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

CJC RULE 5.03 - Subject to the provisions of the proceeding rule, a judge may hold and manage
investments but should not serve as officer, director, manager or advisor, or employee of any business
except as director of a family business of the judge.

NAKPIL V. VALDES

(A.C. No. 2040, March 4, 1998) (286 SCRA 758)

FACTS: Atty. Carlos Valdes was the lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils. Jose Nakpil wanted to buy a
summer residence in Baguio City but because of lack of funds, he agreed that Atty. Valdes would keep
the property in trust until the Nakpils could buy it back. Atty. Valdes took out two loans to purchase the
property. Later, Jose Nakpil died. The ownership of the Baguio property became an issue in the intestate
proceedings as Valdes excluded it from the inventory of Jose’s estate. Valdes then transferred his title to
the property to his company. The administratrix filed an administrative case to disbar Valdes for (1)
maliciously appropriating the property in trust to his family corporation (2) including in the claims
against the estate the amounts of the two loans which he claimed were Jose’s loans and (3) for conflict
of interest, since his auditing firm prepared the list of claims of creditors who were also represented by
his law firm.

ISSUE: May Atty. Valdes be disbarred in this case.

HELD: The Court suspended Atty. Valdes. Business transactions between an attorney and his client are
disfavored and discouraged by policy of law because by virtue of a lawyer’s office, he is an easy position
to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, there is no presumption of
innocence or improbability of wrongdoing in favor of lawyers. MOREOVER, the proscription against
representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect
to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It applies
although the attorney’s intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good faith. Representation
of conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties give an informed consent to the
representation after full disclosure of facts. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent
of the conflict and the possible adverse effects must be thoroughly understood by his clients. The test to
determine whether there is conflict of interest in the representation is the probability, not the certainty
of conflict.

c) Client’s moneys and properties

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Art. 1491 of the NCC. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their

respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession.

Effects of Prohibited Purchase - A prohibited purchase is null and void ab initio; public interest and
public policy dictate that its nullity is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The
lawyer will be deemed to hold the property in trust for the client. The client is therefore entitled to
recover property and interest from his attorney with the fruits. The client should, however, return the
purchase price and the legal interests.

ORDONIO V. EDUARTE

(A.M. No. 3216, March 16, 1992)

(207 SCRA 229)

FACTS: In one civil case, Antonia Ulibari through h er counsel Atty. Josephine Eduarte, obtained a
favourable decision from the RTC. While the case was pending appeal, Antonia Ulibari conveyed 20
hectares of land to Atty. Eduarte as he r Attorney's fees for legal services rendered. All the titles of the
lands subject of the deeds of absolute sale and the deed of conveyance however remained in the name
of Antonia Ulibari. La ter, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty.
Eduarte on t he basis of an affidavit executed by her mother Antonia Ulibari stating that affiant never c
onveyed the subject parcel of land to Atty. Eduarte as her attorney's fees. The Commission on B ar
Discipline of the IBP, to which the case was referred for investigation, found Atty. Eduarte guilty of
violation of Article 1491 of the Civil

Code and part of the Oath of Office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Eduarte has violated the law in this case.

HELD: YES. Even if Antonia Ulibari knowingly and vo luntarily conveyed the subject property in favor of
Atty. Eduarte, the latter, in causing the execution of the Deed of Conveyance during the pendency of
the appeal of the case involving th e said property, has violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code which
prohibits lawyers from "acquir ing by assignment property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their

profession."

In the case at bar, the property was already in actual litigation first in the lower court and then in the
Court of Appeals. Whether the deed of conveyance was executed at the instance of the client driven by
financial necessity or of the lawyers is of no moment. In either case, an attorney occupies a vantage
position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in breach of the rule so amply protective
of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client and of the rights
of both. The act constitutes malpractice, even if the lawyer had purchased the property in litigation.

For having improperly acquired the subject property, under the foregoing circumstances, Atty. Eduarte
has violated not only Art. 1491 of the Civil Code but also Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
which provides that "the lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation
which he is conducting."
DAVID L. ALMENDAREZ, JR. V. ATTY. MINERVO T.LANGIT

(A.C. No. 7057, July 25, 2006)

FACTS: David L. Almendarez, Jr. filed a complaint before the IBP seeking the disbarment of Atty. Minervo
T. Langit for acts unbecoming a lawyer. Complainant was the plaintiff in an ejectment case. Respondent
served as complainant's counsel. While the case was pending, defendant in ejectment case Roger
Bumanlag deposited monthly rentals for the property in dispute to the Branch Clerk of Court. The trial
court rendered a decision in the ejectment case based on a compromise agreement executed by
complainant and Bumanlag. The court granted the Motion for Execution and Withdrawal of Deposited
Rentals filed by respondent as complainant's counsel. Complainant learned that respondent was able to
withdraw the rentals deposited by Bumanlag but respondent did not inform complainant. Complainant,
through his new counsel Atty. Miguel D. Larida, sent a final demand letter for the accounting and return
of the amount. Respondent failed to reply. The IBP found that respondent failed to account for money
he held in trust for complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for acts unbecoming of a lawyer and
betraying the confidence of his client.

HELD: YES. Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when he received the sum of money
representing the monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting for and returning such sum
to its rightful owner. Respondent received the money in his capacity as counsel for complainant.
Therefore, respondent held the money in trust for complainant. The Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code") states:

CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND

PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01—A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.03—A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property to his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided
for in the Rules of Court.

Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of the trial court's approval
of the motion to withdraw the deposited rentals. Upon release of the funds to him, respondent could
have collected any lien which he had over them in connection with his legal services, provided he gave
prompt notice to complainant. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for
himself by the mere fact that the client owes him attorney's fees. In this case, respondent did not even
seek to prove the existence of any lien, or any other right that he had to retain the money.

Respondent's failure to turn over the money to complainant despite the latter's demands

gives rise to the presumption that he had converted the money for his personal use and benefit. This is a
gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics, impairing public confidence in the
legal profession. More specifically, it renders respondent liable not only for violating the Code but also
for contempt, as stated in Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt — When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands
money of his client after it has been demanded he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the
Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a
bar to a criminal prosecution.

LOURDES R. BUSIÑOS V. ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT

(A.C. No. 4349, December 22, 1997)

FACTS: Complainant Lourdes R. Busiños filed a case of estafa against Respondent Atty. Francisco Ricafort
for misappropriating the sum of P32,000.00, of which P30,000.00 was entrusted to respondent for
deposit in the bank account of complainant’s husband while P2,000.00 represented the amount
respondent demanded from complainant supposedly for a bond in Civil Case but it was subsequently
dropped upon payment of the respondent of the amount allegedly owed to the complainant. However,
the administrative case was pursued by the complainant claiming gross misconduct on the part of the
respondent as to the delayed payment of his despite several demands from her and her lawyer, in
addition to the asking of P2,000.00 abovementioned, for which stated purpose such was not even
required.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco Ricafort is guilty of gross misconduct for his delayed
payment of his debt (the amount he illegally used and fraudulently obtained) despite several
demands.

HELD: Atty. Francisco Ricafort is guilty of gross misconduct for his delayed payment of debt. His belated
payment of the amount he illegally used and fraudulently obtained do not relieve him from any liability
if only to impress upon him that the relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its
nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring high degree of fidelity and
good faith. In view of that special relationship, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or
property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct. Moreover, the Respondent, by converting the money of his clients to his own personal use
without their consent, and by deceiving the complainant into giving him the amount of P2,000.00
purportedly to be used as a bond which was not required, is, undoubtedly, guilty of deceit, malpractice
and gross misconduct. By so doing, he betrays the confidence reposed in him by his clients. Not only has
he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable
profession.

Plainly, respondent breached Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

(i) Fiduciary relationship

Canon 16 Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.

PARIŇAS V. PAGUINTO

(AC No. 6297, July 13, 2004)

FACTS: Dolores Parińas engaged the services of Atty. Oscar Paguinto to annul her marriage to

Danilo Soriano. Parińas paid Atty. Paguinto P10, 000.00 in cash as partial payment of the acceptance
fee. An acknowledgment receipt evidenced this payment. Before the end of December 2001, Parińas
gave Atty. Paguinto P2, 500.00 for the filing fee. Atty. Paguinto led Parińas to believe that he had filed
the annulment case. Atty. Paguinto informed Parińas that the case was filed with the RTC-Manila before
Judge Ricaforte. However, Parińas later found out that Atty. Paguinto never filed the annulment case in
court. Parinas demanded the return of the filing fee given but Paguinto did not return the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Paguinto violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Yes, Atty. Paguinto violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected for or from the client. Acceptance of
money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to
the client’s cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but not
used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand. Atty. Paguinto
returned the money only after Parińas filed the

administrative case for disbarment.

LEMOINE V. BALON

(A.C. No. 5829, October 28, 2003) (414 SCRA 511)

FACTS: Daniel Lemoine filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insurance Company
(Metropolitan Insurance), the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As he encountered problems in
pursuing his claim, his friend, a certain Jesus Garcia (Garcia), arranged for the engagement of Atty.
Amadeo Balon’s services. Balon was charging 25% of the amount actually recovered payable upon the
successful recovery, among others. The said attorney’s fee was not agreed to by Lemoine. Lemoine left
for France but before he left he signed an undated special power of attorney allowing Lemoine to bring
any action against Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of the complaint as well as to negotiate,
sign and compromise, encash and receives payment. Metro Insurance issued a check worth 525k as full
settlement. Garcia told Lemoine that Balon had told him that the claim was still pending and that it was
subject to negotiation and that it had offered 350k or 50% of the policy. When Lemoine returned to the
Philippines and paid a visit to the Metro Insurance he was informed that the claim had been settled a
year prior. He then proceeded to the office of Balon to demand an explanation, however Balon was not
there. They had a phone conversation where he demanded the return of the proceeds of the claim.
Balon claimed that he had in his possession the proceeds but that there was a lien for his fees on
pending payment of his attorneys fees at 50% of the amount collected. In a letter, there were threats at
deportation and investigation by the NBI, DOLE and BIR where Balon is supposedly well connected.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Balon violated the CPR?

HELD: Canon 16 Rule 16.01 of the CPR states that a lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client. This commandment entails certain specific acts to be done
by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all money or property received for or from the client as
well as delivery of the funds or property to the client when due or upon demand. Atty. Balon breached
this Canon when after he received the proceeds of complainant’s insurance claim, he did not report it to
Lemoine. By Atty. Balon’s failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the benefit
of his client, he committed professional misconduct. Such misconduct is reprehensible at a greater
degree, for it was obviously done on purpose through the employment of deceit to the prejudice of
complainant who was kept in the dark about the release of the check, until he himself discovered the
same, and has to date been deprived of the use of the proceeds thereof.
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his duty of
fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the client’s cause but also degrades himself and besmirches the fair
name of an honorable profession.

That Atty. Balon had a lien on complainant’s funds for his attorney’s fees did not relieve him of his duty
to account for it. The lawyer’s continuing exercise of his retaining lien presupposes that the client agrees
with the amount of attorney’s fees to be charged. In case of disagreement or when the client contests
that amount for being unconscionable, however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his
possession to the payment of his fees. He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or
proper motion with the proper court to fix the amount of such fees.

LEONILA J. LICUANAN V. ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO

(A.M. No. 2361, February 9, 1989) (170 SCRA 100)

FACTS: A complaint was filed by Leonila J. Licuanan with the Office of the Court Administrator against
Atty. Manuel L. Melo, for breach of professional ethics, alleging that the latter who was her counsel in
an ejectment case, failed to remit to her the rentals collected by him on different dates over a twelve-
month period, much less did he report to her the receipt of said amounts. It was only after
approximately a year from actual receipt that Atty. Licuanan turned over his collections to her after
demand. Atty. Licuanan admitted having received the payment of rentals from complainant's tenant but
explained that he kept this matter from the complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his
success in collecting the rentals.

ISSUE: Whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of Atty. Licuanan in accounting for the funds
collected by him for his former client for which unprofessional conduct respondent should be
disciplined.

HELD: Yes. The conduct of Atty. Licuanan is a breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore and an
evident transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Under the Canon, money of the client or
collected for the client of other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be
reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstance be commingled with his
own or be used by him. Indeed, by his professional misconduct, Atty. Licuanan has breached the trust
reposed in him by his client. He has shown himself unfit for the confidence and trust which should
characterize an attorney-client relationship and the practice of law.

DUMADAG V. LUMAYA

(A.C. No. 2614, June 29, 2000) (197 SCRA 303)

FACTS: In one civil case involving a sale of a parcel of land filed by Maximo Dumadag through his counsel
Atty. Ernesto Lumaya, a compromise agreement has been reached whereupon the Avellanosas are to
pay Dumadag the amount of Php 4,644.00. The Avellanosas paid the said amount to Dumadag through
the latter’s counsel. However, Atty. Lumaya failed to deliver to Dumadag the said money despite the
latter’s demand. Thus, the administrative charge for unethical practice was filed by Dumadag against
Atty. Lumaya.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Lumaya is guilty of unethical practice.

HELD: YES. Canon 16 Rule 16.01 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to
account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

This rule Atty. Lumaya has violated making him guilty of unethical practice of law.

(ii) Co-mingling of funds

Canon 16 Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and
those of others kept by him.

(iii) Delivery of funds

Canon 16 Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be

necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgements and executions he has secured for his client
as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Rule 138 SEC. 37 of the Rules of Court —an attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his
lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof.

He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client,

from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered
upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have

caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have
the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his
lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

QUILBAN V. ROBINOL

(A.M. No. 2144, April 10, 1989) (171 SCRA 768)

FACTS: Congressman Luis R. Taruc broached the idea of donating or selling a parcel of land somewhere
in Quezon City to the squatters. Following such advice, the squatters formed the “Samahang Pagkakaisa
ng Barrio Bathala,” with Bernabe Martin as President. However, Martin sold the said land to Maximo
Rivera, a realtor, to the exclusion of the other Samahan members. The members of the Samahan filed a
civil case against Rivera but were dismissed. On appeal, they hired Atty. Santiago R. Robinol. The latter
was able to obtain a reversal of the said decision. The Court of Appeals ordered that Rivera be
reimbursed the amount of P41,961.65 for the expenses he incurred for the land. The officers of the
Samahan raised a total amount of P75,000.00 and gave it Atty. Robinol. However, he made no payment
to Rivera. As a consequence, complainants filed an administrative case against him for unethical
practice. On the other hand, Atty. Robinol claims lien over the subject money in lieu of the services
rendered by him invoking the principle of quantum meruit.

ISSUES: Whether or not respondent can be held guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct

HELD: YES. His violation was that he retained in his possession his clients’ funds intended for a specific
purpose. His act, under the circumstances, was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were
mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence. Atty. Robinol he is bereft of any legal right to
retain his clients' funds intended for a specific purpose the purchase of land. He stands obliged to return
the money immediately to their rightful owners. The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is
employed without a price agreed upon for his services in which case he would be entitled to receive
what he merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In this case, however, there was an express
contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumption quantum meruit therefore, is
inapplicable.

If client agrees with lawyer as to the amount of attorney’s fees and as to the application of the client’s
fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursement, a lawyer may deduct what is due him and remit the
balance to his client. If no such agreement or consent or if there is dispute or disagreement as to the
fees, he should return everything to client without prejudice to his filing a case to recover his unsatisfied
fees. (Agpalo)

This rule grants the lawyer a lien over the client’s funds in his possession as well as on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client, to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements. (Agpalo)
(iv) Borrowing or lending

Canon 16 Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to
a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.

Art. 1491 of the NCC. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their

respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession.

RUBIAS V. BATILLER

(G.R. No. L-35702, May 29, 1973) (51 SCRA 120)

FACTS: Francisco Militante claimed that he owned a parcel of land located in Iloilo. He filed with the CFI
of Iloilo an application for the registration of title of the land but the same was denied. He appealed to
the Court of Appeals. Pending that appeal, he sold to Rubias (his son-inlaw and a lawyer) the land.

The CA rendered a decision, dismissing the application for registration. Rubias filed a Forcible Entry and
Detainer case against Batiller. In that case, the court held that Rubias has no cause of action because the
property in dispute which Rubias allegedly bought from Militante was the subject matter of a land case,
in which case Rubias was the counsel on record of Militante himself. It thus falls under Article1491 of
the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rubias may purchase the land subject of the case he handles.

Held: NO. Article 1491 says that “The following persons cannot acquire any purchase, even at a public or
judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another…. (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting
attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and
rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.” The present case clearly falls under this, especially since the case was still pending appeal
when the sale was made.

IN RE RUSTE, 70 Phil 243 (1973)

FACTS: Atty. Melchor Ruste appeared as counsel for the San Juan spouses in a cadastral proceeding. An

11/12 share of the estate was adjudged in her favor. Atty. Ruste demanded for his fees. The couple did
not have enough money to pay him, so he asked them to execute in his favor a contract of sale of their
share of Lot No. 3764, intending to apply a portion of the would-be proceeds as payment for his fees.
The spouses complied. The land was sold but the proceeds was kept by Ruste and never reached the
hands of the San Juan couple.

ISSUES: Whether or not Ruste committed malpractice.

HELD: YES. Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses driven by
financial necessity (as contended by Ruste) or at their behest (as contended by the couple) is
immaterial. In either case, the lawyer occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a
harassed client in breach of the "rule so amply protective of the confidential relations, which must
necessarily exist between attorney and client and of the rights of both."

What is a Champerty?

A bargain by a stranger (the lawyer) with a party to a suit (the client) by which such third person
undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own expense and risk, in consideration of receiving, if
successful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be recovered.

What is a Champertous Contract?

Where the lawyer assumes all expenses of litigation and reimbursement is contingent on outcome of
case is prohibited. Champertous contracts are like wagers—the lawyer gets paid and reimbursed if he
wins the case and loses even what he had spent on the case if he loses.
d) Fidelity to client’s cause

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANTILLER V. POTENCIANO

(A.M. No. 3195, December 18,1989)

(180 SCRA 246)

FACTS: Humberto V. Potenciano is a lawyer. He is ch arged with deceit, fraud, and

misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an officer of
the court. In an action for ejectment fi led against Peregrina Cantiller, the latter lost and was ordered to
vacate. Cantiller then asked Att y. Potenciano to handle their case. She was made to sign by Atty.
Potenciano of what she descri bed as a "hastily prepared, poorly conceived, and haphazardly
composed petition for an nulment of judgment”. It was filed with the RTC however the judge of
the said court asked A tty. Potenciano to withdraw as counsel by reason of their friendship. Later,
Cantiller paid P otenciano P2,000.00 as demanded by the latter which was allegedly needed to be paid
to another ju dge who will issue the restraining order but eventually Potenciano did not succeed in
locating t he judge. Contrary to Potenciano’s promise that he would secure a restraining order, he
withdr ew his appearance as counsel for Cantiller. The latter was not able to get another lawyer as re
placement. Hence, the order to vacate was eventually enforced and executed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Potenciano breached his duties as counsel of Cantiller.

HELD: YES. When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort
for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of
a client's cause makes such lawyer u nworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him. A
lawyer has a duty to protect with utmost dedication the interest of his client and of the fidelity, trust
and confidence which he owes his client. More so where by reason of his gross negligence his client
thereby suffered by losing all her cases. Lawyers should be fair, honest, and respectable, above
suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The profession is not synonymous with an
ordinary busin ess proposition. It is a matter of public interest.
 ROLLON V. ATTY. NARAVAL

(A.C. No. 6424, March 4, 2005)

(452 SCRA 675)

FACTS: Consorcia Rollon, together with her son, went to the office of Atty. Camilo Naraval to seek his
assistance in a case filed against her for Collection of Sum of Money. After going through the
documents, Atty. Naraval agreed to be R ollon’s lawyer and required her to pay P8,000 as filing
and partial service fee. As per in struction of Atty. Naraval, Rollon’s son returned to his office to
follow up however the for mer told the son that he was not able to act on the case because he was busy.
After several foll ow-ups and still no action, Rollon decided to withdraw the amount paid to Atty.
Naraval for failu re of the latter to comply with their mutual agreement. Atty. Naraval said that he could
not ret urn the documents because the same were in his house and the P8,000 paid by Rollon because
he has no money. Rollon thus files an administrative charge against Atty. Naraval for unethical
practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Naraval is guilty of unethical practice of law.

HELD: YES. Canon 17 requires that a lawyer owes fid elity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in h im. Hence, practising lawyers may accept only
as many cases as they can efficiently handle. Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced. Once
lawyers agree to handle a case, they should undertake the task with dedication and care. If they do any
less, then they fail their lawyer’s oath.

The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount of P8 ,000 as filing and
partial service fee, Atty. Naraval failed to render any legal service in relation to the case of complainant.
His continuou s inaction despite repeated follow-ups from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling
ind ifference toward his client’s cause, in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Atty. Naraval
clearly fell short of the demands required of him as a member of the bar. His inability to properly
discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable not just to her, but also to this Co urt, to the legal
profession, and to the general public.

SUAREZ V. CA

(G.R. No. 91133, March 22, 1993)

(220 SCRA 274)

FACTS: In criminal cases for violation of BP 22 of the Bouncing Check Law against Romina Suarez, she
had for her counsel Atty. Vicente San Luis. At the trial of the case, when it is the defense turn to offer
evidence, Atty. San Luis did not appear. He left for good to USA without formally withdrawing himself
from the case neither did he inform Suarez that he would be leaving. Trial ensued and judgment was
rendered against Suarez. Thereafter, Suarez filed an admin case against Atty. San Luis for conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer for having abandoned her in court which results to her being prejudiced and
prevented from fairly presenting her defense .

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. San Luis is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

HELD: The legal difficulty Suarez finds herself in is imputable to the negligence of her de parte counsel,
Atty. Vicente San Luis, in abandoning the conduct of the case without formally withdrawing or at
least informing petitioner that h e would be permanently staying in the U.S.A. so that petitioner
could appoint another cou nsel. A lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client. He owes his
client full devoti on to his genuine interests, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, and
the exer tion of his utmost learning and ability. A lawyer is required to exercise ordinary diligence
o r that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character of the business h e
undertakes to do. Among his duties to his client is attending to the hearings of the case.

SOLATAN V. INOCENTES

(A.C. No. 6504, August 9, 2005)

(466 SCRA 1)

FACTS: The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office were retained by spouses Genito, owners of an
apartment complex. They represented the spouses in ejectment cases against non- paying tenants
occupying the Genito Apartments. Com plainant’s sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. A
complaint for ejectment for no n-payment of rentals was filed against her and a decision was rendered
in a judgment by defaul t ordering her to vacate the premises. Complainant informed Atty.
Inocentes of his desire to arrange the execution of a new lease contract by virtue of which he would be
the new les see of the apartment. Atty. Inocentes referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in
charg e of ejectment cases against tenants of the Genito Apartments. During the meeting with Atty. Ca
mano, a verbal agreement was made in which complainant agreed to pay the entire judgment
debt of his sister, including awarded attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Complainant issu ed a check in the
name of Atty. Camano representing half of the attorneys’ fees. Complaina nt failed to make any other
payment. The sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano enforced the writ of execution and levied
the properties found in the subject apartment. Complain ant renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to
release the levied properties and allow complain ant to remain at the apartment. Acting on Atty.
Camano’s advice, complainant presented an aff idavit of ownership to the sheriff who released the
levied items. However, a gas stove was not returned to the complainant but was kept by Atty. Camano
in the unit of the Genito Apar tments where he was temporarily staying. Complainant filed the instant
administrative case f or disbarment against Atty. Camano and Atty. Inocentes.

HELD: The fidelity lawyers owe their clients is traditionally characterized as “undivided.” This means
that lawyers must represent their clients and serve their needs without interference or impairment
from any conflicting interest. Unquestio nably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party with an interest
conflicting with that of his client resulting in detriment to the latter may be held guilty of disloyalty.
However, far be it t hat every utterance of an attorney which may have afforded an individual some
relief adverse to the former’s client may be labeled as a culpable act of disloyalty. While the levy
was mad e on chattel found in the apartment of the judgment debtor, Gliceria Solatan, the complainant
was the true owner of the properties. Consequently, the latter had a right to recover the same.
In fact, considering the circumstances, the questioned statement is in consonance with comp
lainant’s foremost duty to uphold the law as an officer of the court. The statement of Atty.
Camano in such a context should not be construed by this Court as giving advice in conflic t against the
interest of the spouses Genito as in fact the latter have no interest over the incorrectly levied properties.

We, thus, note that the act of informing complainant that the levied properties would be returned to
him upon showing proof of his ownership thereof may hint at infidelity to the interest of the
spouses Genito, but, in this circum stance, lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal of the
latter’s confidence so as to deserv e outright categorization as infidelity or disloyalty to his clients’ cause.

IN RE SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, 435 SCRA 417

FACTS: Atty. Leon G. Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On 1974, he
was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He was suspended from the practice of
law in Guam for misconduct, as he a cquired his client's property as payment for his legal services, then
sold it and as a consequen ce obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case. The
District Court of G uam would want the IBP to look into this case for appropriate action (suspension or
disbarment). On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that
although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, "there is no evidence to establish that
[Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines."

ISSUE: May a member of the Philippine Bar who was d isbarred or suspended from the practice of law
in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the same sanction as
a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction?

HELD: Maquera's acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension from the practice of law in
that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines.
Such acts are violative of a lawye r's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also
violative of the Code of Pro fessional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that "[a] lawyer
owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him."
Rule 138, Sec. 20 (e) of the Rules of Court: To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.

Rule 138, Sec. 20 (f) of the Rules of Court: To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witnesses, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged.

NGAYAN V. TUGADE

(G.R. No. 1991)

(193 SCRA 779)

FACTS: Ngayan asked Tugade to prepare an affidavit to be used as basis for a complaint against

Soriano and Leonido as a consequence of the latter’s entry into complainants’ dwelling. Ngayan

signed the affidavit without thoroughly reading it but she noticed one paragraph which did not

mention that Leonido was with Soriano when they both barged into complainant’s residence.

Upon being informed of this omission, Tugade crossed out the said paragraph. Ngayan asked

Tugade to make another affidavit and the latter promised to do so. For some reason, Ngayan

discharged Tugade as their counsel. He also found out that Tugade did not include the name of
Leonido in the criminal case filed. When the omission was remedied by their new counsel, the

adverse parties filed a motion for reinvestigation through their counsel, Atty. Gaminda, who

was a former classmate of Tugade. Tugade was also the lawyer of the brother of Leonido in an

insurance company. In the hearing for the motion for reinvestigation, the adverse parties in

affidavit which Tugade prepared for Ngayan, with one paragraph crossed out, Tugade himself

presented an affidavit controverting the discarded affidavit which he prepared for Ngayan. Thus

Ngayan charged Tugade for violation of paragraphs (e) and (f), Sec.20, Rule 138 Rules of Court

(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence…and to preserve the secrets of his client… (f) to abstain

from all offensive personality..against a party or witness…

ISSUE: Whether or not Tugade must be disciplined for violation of the said Rule.

HELD: YES. When Tugade furnished the adverse parties with a copy of the discarded affidavit,

thus enabling the adverse parties to use it as evidence against complainants, he betrayed the
trust and confidence of his clients in violation of paragraph (e) Sec.20 Rule 138. Tugade’s

actuations from the beginning show that he was partial to the adverse parties. This could be

explained by the fact that he was a former classmate of Atty. Gaminda, the adverse parties’

counsel, and also by the fact that he was the lawyer of Leonido’s brother in an insurance

company. Tugade submitted an affidavit containing facts prejudicial to his former client such as

the fact that the crime charged by Ngayan had already prescribed, and that Ngayan asked him to

make the offense graver to prevent the offense from prescribing. This constitutes an act of

offensive personality against complainants, violative of par. (f) Sec.20 Rule 138.

BUN SIONG YAO V. ATTY. LEONARDO A. AURELIO

(A.C. No. 7023, March 30, 2006)

FACTS: The complainant, Bun Siong Yao, is a majority stockholder of Solar Farms & Livelihood

Corporation and Solar Textile Finishing Corporation. He alleged that since 1987, he retained

the services of another stockholder, Atty. Leonardo Aurelio, as his personal lawyer, who also

happened to be the brother-in-law of his wife. In 1999, they had a disagreement. Atty. Aurelio

then filed cases against Yao and his wife. Yao alleged that the series of suits filed against him and
his wife is a form of harassment and constitute an abuse of the confidential information which

Atty. Aurelio obtained by virtue of his employment as counsel. The Complainant further argued

that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he filed several suits not

only against the complainant and the other officers of the corporation, but also against the two

corporations which he is both a stockholder and retained counsel. Atty. Aurelio, on the other

hand, claimed that he handled several labor cases in behalf of Solar Textile Finishing

Corporation; that since 1999 he was no longer the counsel for complainant or Solar Textile

Finishing Corporation; that he never used any confidential information in pursuing the criminal

cases he filed but only used those information which he obtained by virtue of his being a

stockholder of Solar Textile Finishing Corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Aurelio violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility.
HELD: Atty. Aurelio has violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He took

advantage of his being a lawyer in order to get back at the complainant. In doing so, he has

inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his dealings with complainant and

complainant’s companies for his own end.

It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and his client is a

fiduciary one as Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides, “a lawyer owes

fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on

him.” The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications

made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation

to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship.

The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the

litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another,

or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the

public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. Lawyers cannot be

allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance or as a tool for

instigating hostility against any person—most especially against a client or former client. As the

Court stated in Marcelo v. Javier, Sr.:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal

profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the

attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his

profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of

legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a

lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to

society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should

be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the

profession.

e) Competence and diligence

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Competence

It is that sufficiency of lawyer’s qualifications to deal with the matter in question and includes
knowledge and skill and the ability to use them effectively in the interest of the client

Diligence

It is “the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence”.
It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the cause of the
client.

Lawyer impliedly represents that:

• he possesses requisite degree of learning, skill, ability which is necessary to the practice of his
profession and which other similarly situated possess;

• he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him;

• he will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the
application of his knowledge to his client’s cause;

• He will take such steps as will adequately safeguard his client’s interest. A client may reasonably
expect that counsel will make good his representations. (Agpalo)

(i) Collaborating counsel

Canon 18 Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that
he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he
can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

However well meaning he may be, a lawyer cannot ask another lawyer to collaborate with him in a
particular case without the consent of the client. The fiduciary nature of attorney-client relationship
prohibits this. (Aguirre)

Some cases involve specialized fields of law and require special training. A lawyer should not accept an
undertaking in specific area of law which he knows or should know he is not qualified to enter. (Agpalo)

(ii) Adequate protection

Canon 18 Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Lawyer should safeguard his client’s rights and interests by thorough study and preparation; mastering
applicable law and facts involved in a case, regardless of the nature of the assignment; and keeping
constantly abreast of the latest jurisprudence and developments in all branches of the law (Agpalo)

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION V. LAGUESMA

(G.R. No. 100485, September 21, 1994)

FACTS: The North Luzon Magnolia Sales Labor Union filed with the DOLE a petition for certification
election among all the regular sales personnel of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon Sales Area.
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) opposed the petition and questioned the appropriateness of the
bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent union. The petition was heard with petitioner
being represented by Atty. Alvin C. Batalla of the Siguion Reyna law office. Atty. Batalla withdrew
petitioner's opposition to a certification election and agreed to consider all the sales offices in northern
Luzon as one bargaining unit. At the preelection conference, the parties agreed inter alia, on the date,
time and place of the consent election. Respondent union won the election. Thus, respondent union
became the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular sales personnel in all the sales offices
of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon Sales Area. Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor
claiming that Atty. Batalla was merely a substitute lawyer for Atty. Ona and was allegedly unfamiliar
with the collective bargaining history of its establishment. Petitioner claims it should not be bound by
the mistake committed by its substitute lawyer.

ISSUE: Whether or not SMC should not be bound by the mistake committed by its substitute lawyer in
this case.

HELD: The collective bargaining history of a company is not decisive of what should comprise the
collective bargaining unit. Insofar as the alleged "mistake" of the substitute lawyer is concerned, we find
that this mistake was the direct result of the negligence of petitioner's lawyers. It will be noted that Atty.
Ona was under the supervision of two (2) other lawyers. There is nothing in the records to show that
these two (2) counsels were likewise unavailable at that time. Instead of deferring the hearing,
petitioner's counsels chose to proceed therewith. Indeed, prudence dictates that, in such case, the
lawyers allegedly actively involved in SMC's labor case should have adequately and sufficiently briefed
the substitute lawyer with respect to the matters involved in the case and the specific limits of his
authority. Unfortunately, this was not done in this case. The negligence of its lawyers binds petitioner.

(iii) Negligence

Canon 18 Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection there with shall render him liable.

DINOY V. ROSAL

(Admin Case No. 3721, August 17, 1994)

FACTS: Mr. Julian C. Dinoy sent the Secretary of Justice an unverified letter charging Atty. Jesus Rosal
with having notarized a Special Power of Attorney in favor of one Estela Gentacutan, at a time when
some of the principals mentioned in the document were already dead. The matter was referred to the
IBP which finds the charge duly substantiated and recommends the suspension of Atty. Rosal from the
practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Jesus Rosal be suspended from the practice of law.
HELD: Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Consequently, it is the duty of the notarial
officer to demand that a document be signed in his presence by the real parties thereto; the notarial
officer must observe "utmost care" to comply with the elementary formalities in the performance of his
duties. This, the respondent fails to observe, thus, his suspension.

LEGARDA V. CA

(G.R. No. 94457, June 10, 1992)

(209 SCRA 722)

FACTS: Atty. Antonio Coronel is the counsel of one Victoria Legarda in a civil case for specific
performance filed against the latter by the New Cathay House Inc. When asked by Court to file their
answer, Legarda through Atty. Coronel ask for an extension of time which was granted. Thereafter,
Atty. Coronel did not lift a finger to file an answer. Neither did he file a motion for reconsideration after
judgment by the trial court; nor did he initiate moves towards an appeal of the decision which was
adverse and prejudicial to his client. Consequently, Atty. Coronel was required by the Court to show
cause why he should not be liable administratively for his acts and omissions which resulted in grave
injustice to his client.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Coronel be liable administratively for his acts and omissions in this
case.

HELD: YES. The facts of the case clearly show that Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence." He failed to observe particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires that "a lawyer
shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable." Undoubtedly, Atty. Coronel's failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and
attending to the interest of his client caused the latter material prejudice. It should be remembered
that the moment a lawyer takes a client's cause; he covenants that he will exert all effort for its
prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his
client's cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter. Moreover, a lawyer owes
fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court of which he is an officer. Atty. Coronel failed to obey
this Court's order even on a matter that personally affects him, such that one cannot avoid the
conclusion that he must be bent on professional self-destruction.

ATTY. SOLIDON V. ATTY. MACALALAD (A.C. No. 8158, February 24, 2010)
 FACTS: Macalalad is the Chief of the DENR Legal Division and that while he is in public service he was
allowed by the DENR Secretary to practice law. While in Samar, he was introduced to Atty. Solidon who
asked him to handle the titling of a land located there, the entire task was to be completed within 8
months. Initial payment has been made. To date, Macalalad has not filed any petition for registration
over the property. Solidon allegedly followed up with Macalalad through text and calls. Macalalad on
the other hand, claims that the failure was due to Solidon’s lack of communication with him in addition
to the lack of documentary evidence. IBP found that Macalalad failed to present any reasonable excuse
for the filing of the application; that this was a violation of 18.03, thus, his suspension.

ISSUE: Was the suspension of Atty. Macalalad proper?

HELD: Yes. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides for the rule on negligence and states: Rule 18.03 – “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” The mere failure of
the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation. A certain Cabo-
BOrata in an affidavit said that she was able to contact Macaladlad easily and that when asked about
progress of the case he was vague. Saying it was in process. Macaladlad never contested this claim.
Because of the time period fixed by the parties, he should have taken prompt action to communicate
with his clients. He should have initiated contact with them. He had already been paid and thus he
should have at least taken some steps toward the fulfilment of his task.

BARBUCO V. ATTY. BELTRAN

(A.C. No. 5092, August 11, 2004)

FACTS: Lucila S. Barbuco filed a Sworn Complaint against Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran for malpractice of
law, negligence and dishonesty. It appears that complainant, through her son,

Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing an appeal before the Court of
Appeals. Complainant’s appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for failure to file Appellant’s
Brief, pursuant to Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Complainant found out that
her appeal had been dismissed only when her son went to the Court of Appeals to verify the status of
the case. Respondent Beltran averred that the docket fees were paid on time and that he filed the
Appellant’s Brief with the Court of Appeals. However, the appeal was dismissed. Respondent then
alleged that he filed a motion for reconsideration, on the ground that he received the notice to file brief
on June 25, 1998; however, on June 26, 1998, he met a vehicular accident which physically
incapacitated him for several days; and that as a result of the accident, he suffered head injuries which
caused him to lose track of deadlines for the filing of pleadings.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Beltran be suspended for failing to file appellant’s brief resulting to the
dismissal of his client’s case?

HELD: Yes. Lawyer suspended for failing to file appellant’s brief resulting to the dismissal of his client’s
case. Rule 18.03 provides that: “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable”.

An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence.
Failure to file brief within the reglementary period certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so
if the delay of forty-three (43) days resulted in the dismissal of the appeal.

That Respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered physical injuries as a result thereof
cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering that he was a member of a law
firm composed of not just one lawyer. Respondent could have asked any of his partners in the law
office to file the Appellant’s Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for Extension of Time to file the
said pleading. Failure to timely file a pleading is by itself inexcusable negligence on Respondent’s part.

RIZALINO FERNANDEZ V. ATTY. REYNALDO NOVERO, JR

(A.C. No. 5394, December 2, 2002)

FACTS: Rizalino Fernandez and others filed a disbarment case against Atty. Reynaldo Novero, Jr. for
alleged patent and gross neglect in the handling of their civil case against the Bacolod City Water
District. The complainants imputed that the respondent did not attend the scheduled hearing nor seek
a postponement, for which reason the trial court considered respondent to have waived further
presentation of his evidence and directed him to formally offer his exhibits. However, respondent failed
to formally offer his exhibits, prompting the trial court to order the dismissal of the case. The
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal however he did not file his
motion within the reglementary period. He even tried to shift the blame on complainant by claiming
that the latter insisted on presenting his sister from Manila as their last witness. The truth was that
complainant’s sister had already testified. The respondent contended that complainant engaged his
legal services after the first counsel had withdrawn and he had no knowledge of what had happened in
the case before he handled it because complainant did not furnish him with the records and
stenographic notes of the previous proceedings despite his repeated requests. He alleged that he failed
to formally offer the exhibits because complainant tried to take over the handling of the case by insisting
on presenting more witnesses who failed to appear during trial. The Office of the Bar Confidant
submitted a report finding respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommending his suspension.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross neglect in the handling of the civil case?
HELD: The Supreme Court held that a counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or
omissions, even malfeasance or nonfeasance would be binding on his client. A lawyer owes to the client
the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that representation. The respondents attempt to
evade responsibility by shifting the blame on complainant due to the latter’s failure to turn over to him
records and stenographic notes of the case only highlights his incompetence and inadequacy in
handling the complainants case. The respondent Atty. Novero is found guilty of neglect of his client’s
case.

(iv) Duty to apprise client

Canon 18 Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

BLANZA V. ARCANGEL

(A.C. No. 492, September 5, 1967)

(21 SCRA1)

FACTS: Atty. Agustin Arcangel volunteered to be the counsel of Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion in a
labor case for pension claims. Later, the two ask the Court to take disciplinary action against Atty.
Arcangel for professional non-feasance on the following grounds: (1) his failure to attend to
complainant’s pension claims for six years; (2) his failure to immediately return the documents despite
repeated demands upon him; and (3) his failure to return to complainant Pasion, allegedly all of her
documents. Atty. Arcangel contended that the complainants failed to cooperate and pay for the
Photostat services and that there were no agreements as to his compensation as counsel. These the
complainants did not controvert.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Arcangel is liable as charge.

HELD: No. The Court ruled in this case that the evidence presented by the complainants is insufficient
to warrant the taking of disciplinary action against Atty. Arcangel. The Court is constrained to dismiss
the charges against Atty. Arcangel for being legally insufficient, yet, the court must counsel against his
acts as a member of the bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than
merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of law her is necessarily a
leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. Atty. Arcangel here has not lived up to that
ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants wait and hope for 6 long years. Upon their
refusal to cooperate, Atty. Arcangel should have terminated the professional relationship, instead of
keeping them hanging.

The standard of diligence required of a lawyer is that of a good father of a family. He is not bound to
exercise extraordinary diligence. There is want of required diligence when a lawyer fails without
sufficient justification to bring an action immediately, to answer a complaint within the reglementary
period, to notify his client of the date of the date of hearing, to attend the scheduled pre-trial
conference, to inform the client of an adverse judgment within the reglementary period to appeal, to
take steps to have the adverse decision reconsidered or appealed, to ascertain the correct date of
receipt of decision, to acquaint himself with what has happened to the litigation, to pay docket fee on
appeal, to claim judicial notice sent to him by mail or to file the appellant’s brief.

OFELIA R. SOMOSOT V. ATTY. GERADO F. LARA

(A.C. No. 7024, January 30, 2009)

FACTS: In support of her complaint for disbarment, the complainant alleged that she retained the
services of the respondent as her counsel in a collection case filed by Golden Collection

Marketing Corporation against her and other co-defendants. Her defense was that it was the
corporation who actually owed her. The respondent agreed to handle the case and duly entered his
appearance as counsel after securing his acceptance fee. However, that after filing the Answer to the
Complaint, the respondent lawyer fails to informed her of the developments in the case. She only heard
about the case when there was already a decision against her and her co-defendants. She even
belatedly learned that the respondent had sought his discharge as counsel without her knowledge and
consent. Contrary to the respondent's claim that he could no longer locate her, she claimed that the
respondent knew all along where she lived and could have easily contacted her had he been in good
faith. Respondent denied that he failed to exercise the diligence required of him as counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Lara is deemed incompetent in his services to Mrs. Ofelia
Somosot.

DECISION: YES. He violated the basic rule under Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." While it may be said that the
respondent did not completely abandon the case, his handling of the complainant's defense left much
to be desired. The complainant was never informed the development of the case and the omission
eventually led to the grant of the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which in turn led to
the decision against the defendants. The respondent failed to provide details on the developments that
led to the adverse rulings on the interrogatories/admissions and the judgment on the pleadings.

f) Representation with zeal within legal bounds

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW.

(i) Use of fair and honest means

Canon 19 Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful

objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present

unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding .

Rule 138 SEC. 20 (d) of the Rules of Court — It is the duty of an attorney:

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice
or false statement of fact or law

The rule is that in espousing his client’s cause, a lawyer should not state his personal belief as to the
soundness or justice of his case. The reasons: the lawyer’s personal belief has no real bearing on the
case; if expression of belief were permitted, it would give improper advantage to the older and better
known lawyer whose opinion would carry more weight; If such were permitted, omission to make such
assertion might be taken as an admission of the lack or belief in the soundness of his client’s cause.
(Agpalo)

PENA V. ATTY. APARICIO

(A.C. No. 7298 Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565)

FACTS: In herein case, respondent lawyer, in the exercise of his zeal to defend the interest of his client
sent a letter to the company who was his client’s employer. Unfortunately, the said demand letter
included “threats” amounting to blackmail, specifically the words were: BUT if these are not paid on
August 10, 2005, we will be constrained to file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages to
the tune of millions under established precedence of cases and laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the abovementioned words violated Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative ratiocinating that Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,”
reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice;
to that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics. In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a “lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding.” Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any
unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure
leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer’s client. In
the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he
threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he
would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax
evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of
laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail.

(ii) Client’s fraud

Canon 19 Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to
rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance
with the Rules of Court.

(iii) Procedure in handling the case

Canon 19 Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure on handling the case.

A lawyer should seek instruction from his client on any substantial matter concerning the litigation,
which requires decision on the part of the client. In procedural matters, the client must yield to the
lawyer. (Agpalo)

The rule is that in matters of law, it is the client who should yield to the lawyer and not the other way
around. The reason for this is that lawyer’s duty to the court is foremost. The dignity of the legal
profession may be compromised.

g) Attorney’s fees

Right to Attorney’s Fees (Agpalo)

• The practice of law is a profession and not a money-making trade. It does not operate to deny a
lawyer the right to attorney’s fees for his professional services. He has the right to have and recover
from his client a fair and reasonable compensation for his services, except in cases where he has agreed
to render service gratuitously or has been appointed counsel de oficio.

• Lawyers should avoid controversies concerning compensation so far as shall be compatible with
self-respect and with right to receive a reasonable recompense for services. Resort to law suits with
clients should only be done to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud. The impression is that those
instituting suits are mercenaries.

• As a general rule, a right of lawyer to reasonable compensation for services requires the
following:

1. that attorney-client relationship exists; and 2. that he rendered services to the client.

• A written agreement is not necessary to establish a client’s obligation to pay attorney’s fees. As
long as the lawyer is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and represent the interest of his client, an
absence of express undertaking does not defeat recovery of fees.

• Client’s obligation to pay attorney’s fees arises from the inanimate contract of facis ut des (I do
and you give) which is based on the principle that no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another.
• Generally, a person who had no knowledge of, or objected to, the lawyer’s representation may
not be held liable for attorney’s fees even though such representation redounded to his benefit. The
objection should be raised before and not after beneficial services shall have been rendered by the
lawyer; otherwise, the party who benefited may be required to pay counsel fees. For it is neither just
that client who retained lawyer should alone pay nor is it fair that those who, investing nothing and
assuming no risk, received benefits should not contribute their proportionate share to counsel fees
(based on equity).

• Non-lawyer cannot recover attorney’s fees even if there is a law authorizing him to represent a
litigant in court because basis of reasonable compensation is the existence of attorney-client
relationship and the rendition of services.

• Lawyer who is absolutely disqualified from engaging in private practice of law by reason of his
government position may neither practice law nor, should he do so illegally, charge attorney’s fees for
such services. Exception: fees for services already performed before lawyer qualified for public office
even though payment is made thereafter.

• Lawyer designated by court to render professional services, in the absence of law allowing
compensation, cannot charge government nor the indigent litigant for his professional services.
Appointment neither violates constitutional restriction against taking of property without just
compensation or the due process of law nor imposes upon the government the obligation to pay him his
fees because one of the obligations of an attorney willingly assumed when he took his oath as lawyer is
to render free legal services whenever required by the court to do so.

• Although a client has right to discharge lawyer anytime, dismiss or settle action or even waive
the whole of his interest in favor of adverse party, he cannot, in the absence of lawyer’s fault, consent or
waiver, deprive the lawyer of his just fees already earned.

What is Quantum Meruit?

It is when no price is stipulated for lawyer’s service, courts will fix amount on quantum meruit
basis, or such amount which his service merits.

The requisite for the principle is that there is an acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be charged
for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing
the task is expecting to be paid compensation.
It is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for

a person to retain benefit without paying for it.

The doctrine is also applicable where amount stipulated in written agreement is found to be
unconscionable or where client dismissed counsel before termination of case or where the lawyer
withdrew there-from for valid reasons.

Concepts of attorney’s fees (Compania Maritima v. CA, 318 SCRA 169)

(a) Ordinary concept

This refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has
rendered the latter.

(b) Extraordinary concept

It is the amount of damages which the court may award to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing
party.

Instances when Court will fix Amount of Attorney’s Fees based on Quantum Meruit

1. agreement is invalid for some reason other than illegality of object of performance

2. amount stipulated is unconscionable

3. no agreement as to fees existed between parties

4. client rejects amount fixed in contract as unconscionable and is found to be so 5. lawyer,

without fault, was unable to conclude litigation

CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

Rule 138 SEC. 24 of the Rules of Court Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.—An attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his

services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the

opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such

testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.

RA 5185 Section 6. Prohibition Against Practice. A member of the Provincial Board or City or

Municipal Council shall not appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein the province,
city or municipality, as the case may be, is the adverse party…xxx… nor shall he collect any fee for

his appearance in any administrative proceedings before provincial, city or municipal agencies of the
province, city or municipality, as the case may be, of which he is an elected official.

EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION V. ATTY. MICHAEL DIONEDA

(A.C. No. 5162, March 20, 2003) (399 SCRA 296)

FACTS: ETCHA and Atty. Michael Dioneda entered into a Retainer's Agreement wherein respondent
lawyer agreed to handle the case of ETCHA against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and BPI Family Savings Bank
by way of filing a complaint - in - intervention. ETCHA alleged that after respondent received the amount
of Php 20,000.00, he did nothing for the development of the case and to update the complaint – in -
intervention. ETCHA then demanded the return of the amount received by respondent since he did
nothing to protect the interest of the complainant. Respondent promised to return the amount but
after deducting therefrom a reasonable fee for the efforts exerted by him. He averred that the
agreement also included an earlier case with the HLURB where he was able to obtain a favorable
judgment for the complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dioneda is entitled to compensation based on the Retainer's Agreement? If
not, is he entitled to compensation based on quantum meruit?

HELD: He is not entitled to compensation neither based on the Retainer's Agreement nor on quantum
meruit. Generally, a valid written agreement fixing attorney's fees is conclusive as between the parties.
And when both parties are deemed to have impliedly repudiated the contract and placed themselves in
the position as though there was no express stipulation as to the attorney's fees, the lawyer's
compensation shall be determined on the basis of quantum meruit. Here, the Supreme Court
considered the demand of ETCHA for the refund of the entire amount received as attorney's fees and
the counter - proposal of respondent to deduct reasonable fees for the efforts exerted by him as implied
repudiation of the contract by both parties. However, to deserve compensation based on quantum
meruit the lawyer must prove by substantial evidence that he is entitled to a reasonable fee for his
efforts in pursuing his client's case with the court taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount
of his fees. It is noteworthy to point out respondent's failure to attend any hearing of his disbarment
case before the IBP without presenting any reason. Respondent's lamentable attitude towards his
client's case is clearly evident from his apparent disinterest in his own case for disbarment. Therefore,
for having missed the opportunities to present evidence in his favor without any satisfactory explanation
as to his non-appearance, he should be denied compensation based on quantum meruit due to the lack
of any factual basis to determine the value of his work as complainant's counsel.

ANGEL ALBANO vs. ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA

(A.C. No. 528, October 11, 1967) (21 SCRA 411)

FACTS: This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against respondent Atty.
Perpetua Coloma. In a letter addressed to the Court, complainant alleged that during the Japanese
occupation his mother, Delfina Aquino, and he retained the services of respondent as counsel for them
in one Civil Case. After which came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts had
been reorganized, respondent failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of
which they had themselves represented by another lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that
respondent intervened in the case to collect her attorney's fees. It was then alleged that during the
hearing they were surprised when respondent presented in exhibit a document showing that they
promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33-¹/3% of whatever could be recovered whether in land or
damages.

ISSUE: May Atty. Coloma be removed for her failure to comply with her obligations as counsel as she
served faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to the best of her knowledge and capacity?

HELD: No. If there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case it is complainant who, after benefiting from
the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to renege on their agreement for the payment of
the latter's contingent attorney's fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she had already won for
them said case in the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is
entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains and with
his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is
entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape
payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for
the party he represents, he himself would not get his due.
 QUIRANTE V. IAC

(G.R. No. 73886, January 31, 1989)

(169 SCRA 769)

FACTS: Atty. John Quirante represented Dr. Casasola in a case filed against Guerero for failure of the
latter to comply with his obligations as building contractor. The trial court rendered judgment in favor
of Casasola who was already dead when the court’s decision came. Pending petition for review filed by
the adverse party, Atty. Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney’s
fees pending adverse party’s filing of a petition for review on certiorari. He claims that he and Dr.
Casasola had an agreement that in case the court award damages to Casasola in excess of the 120,000
pesos bond of the building contractor, such amount shall be divided equally between the Casasola and
Quirante.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Quirante is entitled to the attorney’s fees pending petition for review filed
by the adverse party of the case filed by Casasola.

HELD: Atty. Quirante is not entitled to his attorney’s fees as of that time because a petition for review
on certiorari was still pending in court involving the same case in which Casasola was granted award of
damages. Since the main case from which Atty. Quirante’s claims for attorney’s fees is based has not
yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount thereof should be
held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for
recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is
due to the client.

TANHUECO vs. DE DUMO

(A.M. No. 1437, April 25, 1989) (172 SCRA 774)

FACTS: Hilaria Tanhueco filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Justiniano de Dumo for his refusal
to remit her money collected from debtors and refusal to return documents entrusted to him as a
counsel in certain collection cases. Tanhueco allegedly offered De Dumo 15% of what he may be able to
collect from debtors but De Dumo responded that in their agreement he gets 50% of what he may be
able to collect as contingent fee. De Dumo also admitted he did not turn over the P 12, 000.00 he
collected and applying it instead as part of his attorney’s fee.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive.

HELD: De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive because 50% is more than half of the total amount
due from Tanhueco’s debtors. His action is believed to be fraudulent because he took advantage of his
client who is an old and sickly woman. Canon 20 of the CPR states that: A lawyer shall charge only fair
and reasonable fees. Attorney’s fee which is found out to be unconscionable or unreasonable is subject
to court’s modification. A lawyer as an officer of the court has the duty to assist in the impartial
administration of justice between parties, and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control.

RAMOS V. ATTY. NGASEO

(A.C. No. 6210, December 9, 2004)

FACTS: This is a complaint for suspension of respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo for violation

of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Article 1491 of the Civil Code by demanding

from his client, complainant Federico N. Ramos, the delivery of 1,000 square meters of land, a

litigated property, as payment for his appearance fees. Atty. Ngaseo agreed to handle the case of

complainant Ramos, involving recovery of a piece of land, for an acceptance fee of 20,000 pesos,

appearance fee of 1,000 pesos per hearing, and in case of a favorable decision, to give 1,000 sq.

m. of the land to Atty. Ngaseo. The Court of Appeals rendered a favorable decision ordering the

return of the 2-hectare land to Ramos, and said decision became final and executory. Atty.

Ngaseo, thereafter, sent a letter to his client, Ramos, for the delivery of the 1,000 sq. meter

portion of the land which Ramos promised to him as payment for his appearance fees. Ramos

filed a complaint with the IBP charging his former counsel, Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the

Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land
which was the subject of litigation, and Art. 1491 of the Civil Code prohibiting lawyers from

acquiring property or rights which are object of their litigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ngaseo should be suspended for violating the Code of Professional

Responsibility and Art. 1491 of the Civil Code.

HELD: The prohibition under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code applies only if the sale or assignment

of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property.

Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of

paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches. In the instant case, there was already a final

and executory order made by the CA, hence, Art. 1491 no longer applies. Also, there was no

actual acquisition of the property in litigation since Atty. Ngaseo only made a written demand.

Nevertheless, Atty. Ngaseo violated Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation.

He is, therefore, reprimanded for his act.

Canon 20 Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

c) The importance of the subject matter;

d) The skill demanded;

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which
he belongs;

g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client form the service;

h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

A valid written contract is conclusive as to amount of compensation. Unless both parties set aside
contract and submit question of reasonableness of amount of fees for court to resolve on quantum
meruit basis, neither client nor lawyer may disregard amount fixed (Agpalo)

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 86100-03, January 23, 1990) (181 SCRA 367)

FACTS: Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari when the CA affirms the decision of the trial
court expressing its view that it should pay the charging lien on the civil case filed against them which
result into a dismissal. Based upon subsequent dismissal of the said case, private respondents filed a
motion to fix its attorney’s fees based on quantum meruit, resulting to an exchange between the
parties. Petitioners aver that they have paid services of its lawyers in full but the latter contends that
partial amounts forwarded to them did not consist of payment. To avoid adverse confrontation,
Metrobank offered to pay P600,000 in which case respondents refused. Both trial court and appellate
court commanded petitioner to pay the amount of P936,000 based on the charging liens of the
dismissed civil case against them.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for
payment of its attorney's fee.
2. Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien.

3. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current
market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.

HELD: The Court holds that respondent cannot charge a lien due to the dismissal of the civil case. Such
enforceability is only applicable to money claims and only to dismissed judgments if there is an
applicable law or pre-existing agreement between the parties. In addition, the fixing of attorney’s fees
is determined in a separate civil action. Accordingly, in fixing compensation based on quantum meruit,
three conditions are to be considered: (1) the importance of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the
extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer.

Likewise, the Court reiterates the legal profession’s manifest mandate for public service instead of
capital gain. Its aim is to uphold public interest and not profiteering. Appropriate proceedings may be
commenced by respondent to establish attorney’s fees.

Canon 20 Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in cases of referral, with the consent of the client, be entitled to a
division of fees in proportion to work performed and responsibility assumed.

URBAN BANK, INC. V. ATTY. MAGDALENO PEÑA

(A.C. No. 4863, September 7, 2001)

FACTS: Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to Urban Bank, Inc. (UBI) for P240 million.
As the land was occupied by unauthori zed sub-tenants, ISCI’s lawyer, Atty. Magdaleno Peña had to
negotiate with them for them to relocate but the said occupants, knowing that the land was already
transferred to UB I, refused to recognize Peña. Peña then had a phone conversation with Teodoro
Borlongan, presid ent of UBI, where Peña explained to him the situation. In said conversation, Peña
asked aut horization from Borlongan to negotiate with the tenants. Peña also asked that he be paid 10%
of the purchase price or ( P24 million) for his efforts. Borlongan agreed over the phone on the con dition
that Peña should be able to settle with the tenants otherwise he forfeits said 10% fee. Peña also asked
that said authorization be put into writing. The authorization was put into wr iting but no mention was
made as regards the 10% fee. Peña was able to settle and relocate t he tenants. Peña began sending
demands to UBI for the latter to pay him the P24 million fee a greed upon but UBI refused to make
payment hence Peña filed a complaint for recovery against UBI.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Magdaleno Peña is entit led to receive the P28 million.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable. Peña is entitled to payment for
compensation for services rendered as a gent of Urban Bank, but on the basis of the principles of unjust
enrichment and quantum meruit . In the first place, other than the selfserving testimony of Peña, there
was no other evide nce presented to support his claim that Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10% over
the phone . The written authorization later issued merely confirms the power granted him to negotiate
with the tenants. The written authorization proved the existence of agency but not the existence of any
agreement as to how much Peña should be paid. The Supreme Court emphasi zed that lawyering is not
a business; it is a profession in which duty to public service, not m oney, is the primary consideration.

Canon 20 Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the client
,

accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or
other

compensation whatsoever related to his professional employment from anyone other than the client.

Rule 138 SEC. 20 of the Rules of Court Duties of attorneys.—It is the duty of an attorney:

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with
his knowledge and approval

This rule is intended to ensure protection of lawyers in collection of fees. Moreover, it is designed to
secure the lawyer’s wholehearted fidelity to the client’s cause and to prevent that situation in which the
receipt by him of a rebate or commission from another in connection with the client’s cause may
interfere with the full discharge of his duty to the client. The amount received by lawyer from opposite
party or third persons in the service of his client belongs to the client except when the latter has full
knowledge and approval of lawyer’s taking (Agpalo)
Canon 20 Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and
shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice of fraud.

Rule 138 SEC. 24 of the Rules of Court Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.—An attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his

services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the

opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such

testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.

Rule 138 SEC. 32 of the Rules of Court Compensation for attorneys de oficio.—Subject to availability of
funds as may be provided by law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel
de oficio to be compensated in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule.
Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall not be less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor
more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in
less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital

offenses; (4) Five hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses .

CORPUS V. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. No. 40424, June 30, 1980) (98 SCRA 424)

FACTS: Atty. David rendered legal services to Mr. Corpus for his reinstatement in the Central Bank. They
have no agreement as to amount for the attorney’s fees. When they won the case, Atty. David
demanded for 50% of the amount awarded to Corpus. The demand of Atty. David was largely objected
by Mr. Corpus. Marino Corpus contends that David is not entitled to attorney's fees because there was
no contract to that effect. On the other hand, David contends that the absence of a formal contract for
the payment of the attorney's fees will not negate the payment thereof because the contract may be
express or implied, and there was an implied understanding between the petitioner and private
respondent that the former will pay the latter attorney's fees when a final decision shall have been
rendered in favor of the petitioner reinstating him to -his former position in the Central Bank and paying
his back salaries. The lower court as affirmed by the Court of appeals awarded 30,000 to Atty. David, in
which the latter did not accept.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Juan T. David is entitled to attorney’s fees to 50% of the amount of the
award recovered by Mr Marino Corpus?

HELD: No. While there was express agreement between Corpus and David as regards attorney's fees,
the facts of the case support the position of David that there was at least an implied agreement for the
payment of attorney's fees. Moreover, the payment of attorney's fees to David may also be justified by
virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give which is based on the principle that
"no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another." And such being the case, David is
entitled to a reasonable compensation. In determining a reasonable fee to be paid to David as
compensation for his services, on a quantum meruit basis, it is proper to consider all the facts and
circumstances obtaining in the case. The Court ruled that the reasonable compensation of David in this
case should be P20,000.00.

h) Preservation of client’s confidences

CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED

Rule 138, 20 (e) of the Rules of Court. Duties of attorneys.—It is the duty of an attorney: (e) To maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept
no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his knowledge and
approval…

Rule 130, sec. 21 (b) of the Rules of court. Privileged communication. —An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice
given thereon in the course of professional employment; nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer,
or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.

What is confidential communication?

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between

attorney and client in confidence and by means which so far as the client is aware, discloses the
information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given. Covers all actions, signs,
means of communication.

GENATO V. SILAPAN

(A.C. No. 4078, July 14, 2003)

(406 SCRA 75)

FACTS: Atty. Essex Silapan borrowed money from William Genato for a purchase of new car. His car and
house and lot were being mortgaged by Atty. Silapan as security for the loan. The latter issued post-
dated checks in return. When Genato encashed the checks, the same were dishonoured for the account
has been closed already. Despite repeated demands, Atty. Silapan failed to make payments; thus,
Genato filed a criminal case for violation of BP 22 against Atty. Silapan and a civil case for judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Atty. Silapan made an allegation that Genato engages into illegal
practices and even discloses Genato’s alleged intention to bribe government officials in connection with
a pending case.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to
complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainant’s alleged intention to bribe government officials
in connection with a pending case.

HELD: The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to
him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to
the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the
party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation
between them. It even survives the death of the client.

It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or
information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a
lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or
perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainant’s alleged
intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the
privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a
lawyer to advise a client as to how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the
attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense.

Be that as it may, Atty. Silapan’s explanation that it was necessary for him to make the
disclosures in his pleadings fails to satisfy the Court. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect
his rights as they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for him to use it against
Genato in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and Atty. Silapan’s
professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must conduct
himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His
relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.

Canon 21 Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except: a) When
authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;

b) When required by law;

c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by
judicial action.

Exceptions to the General Rule (Agpalo):

• In cases of contemplated crimes or perpetuation of fraud because a lawyer-client relationship

should only be for lawful purposes

• in case client files complaint against his lawyer or unreasonably refuses to pay his fees, the
lawyer may disclose so much of client’s confidences as may be necessary to protect himself or to collect
fees

Canon 21 Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in
the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Canon 21 Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give information from
his files to an outside agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting,
data processing, or any similar purpose.

Canon 21 Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates
thereof unless prohibited by the client.

Canon 21 Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose
services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the client.

Canon 21 Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client’s affairs even with
members of his family.

Canon 21 Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular case
except to avoid possible conflict of interest.
i) Withdrawal of services

CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE
APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRTUMSTANCES.

Canon 22 Rule 22.01 -A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases:

a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter
he is handling;

b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;

c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;

d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively;

e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the
retainer agreement;

f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and

g) Other similar cases.

CENIZA V. RUBIA

(A.C. No. 6166, October 2, 2009)

FACTS: Ma. Earl Beverly Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian Rubia with grave misconduct, gross

ignorance of the law and falsification of public documents. Ceniza engaged the services of Atty.
Rubia with regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza.

Allegedly, Atty. Rubia misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court when

in fact, upon verification, it was not. But upon the IBP investigation, the allegations filed by

Ceniza have no factual basis. However, IBP found that Rubia committed some acts for which

she should be sanctioned, she leave Ceniza with no representation and failed to maintain open

communication regarding the status of the said complaint due to overwhelming workload

demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of Companies.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rubia’s withdrawal of service is reasonable.

HELD: Rubia’s withdrawal of service is unreasonable because when she accepted to handle the

case of Ceniza she is expected to do her duties with utmost attention, skill and competence,

despite other workloads to do with other client. This is a violation of Canon 22 of the CPR that

states: A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for god cause and upon notice appropriate to

the circumstances. Being an officer of the court, who is task to assist in the administration of
justice, a lawyer is not permitted to withdraw his services if it will cause injustice to client.

Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of services.

Causes of Termination of Attorney-Client Relation (Agpalo)

• Withdrawal of the lawyer under Rule 22.01

• Death of the lawyer

• Death of client

• Discharge or dismissal of the lawyer by the client

• Appointment or election of a lawyer to a government position which prohibits private practice

of law

• Full termination of the case

• Disbarment or suspension of the lawyer from the practice of law

• Intervening incapacity or incompetence of the client during pendency of case

• Declaration of presumptive death of lawyer

• Conviction of a crime and imprisonment of lawyer

Note: Except for items 2 and 6, the lawyer has duty to notify the court in case of termination of
attorney-client relationship.

PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORP V. DE DIOS TRANSPORTATION CO

(G.R. No. 147010, July 18, 2003)

(406 SCRA 639)

FACTS: De Dios Transportation Co.(DDTC) and De Dios Marikina Transportation Corp. (DMTC) executed
a Deed of Conditional sale covering 58 buses and its franchise in favor of Coyukiat and Goldfinger and
later on failed to foll ow the contract which both parties agreed upon. Coyukiat and Goldfinger through
its counsel P adilla Reyes and De la Torre Law office filed a complaint against DDTC and DMTC for resciss
ion of contract and posted Bond issued by Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. the Trial Court ruled in
favour of DDTC and DMTC. Aggrieved, Coyukiat and Goldfinger filed their brie f through counsel Atty.
Ronaldo Reyes with the Court of Appeals but before the adverse party c an file their brief, Padilla Reyes
and De la Torre Law office filed its withdrawal of appearance as counsel and on the same day Luis Q.U
Uranza, Jr. and Associates filed its appearance as counsel for Coyukiat and Goldfinger. It filed a notice of
withdrawal of appeal but did not bear the conformity of their client and the adverse party were served
copies via registered mail thru t heir counsel. DDTC and DMTC contend that the filing of withdrawal of
appeal of Coyukiat and Goldfinger through new counsel without the client’s conformity to the
substitution and to such withdrawal of appeal was not self-executory.

ISSUE: Whether or not Luis Q.U Uranza, Jr. and Asso ciates as counsel failed to submit the proper
substitution requirements.

HELD: Yes. A proper substitution of counsel require s: written application for substitution, written
conformity of client and written consent of attorney to be substituted. In such case the written consent
cannot be secured, there must be fi led with the application proof of service of notice of the application
upon the attorney to be substituted. A substitution which does not comply with the required formalities
is ineffective to effect a change of counsel or to terminate

his authority

Who may Terminate Attorney-Client Relation

1. Client

Client has absolute right to discharge his attorney with or without just cause or even against lawyer’s
consent. Existence or nonexistence of a just cause is important only in determining right of an attorney
to compensation for services rendered. Discharge of an attorney or his substitution by another without
justifiable cause will not operate to extinguish the lawyer’s right to full payment of compensation as
agreed upon in writing.

2. Attorney

3. Court

4. Circumstances beyond control of parties

Canon 22 Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with
his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper
handling of the matter.

Kinds of Liens

1. Retaining Lien (general lien)

The right of an attorney to retain the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully
come into his possession until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid and to apply such funds
to the satisfaction thereof.

Reason and essence of lien:

Inconvenience or disadvantage caused to the client because of exercise of such lien may induce client to
pay the lawyer his fees and disbursements.

It is a general lien for the balance of the account due to the attorney from client for services rendered in
all matters he may have handled for the client, regardless of outcome.

It is dependent upon and takes effect from time of lawful possession and does not require notice
thereof upon client and the adverse party to be effective.

Passive right and cannot be actively enforced; amounts to a mere right to retain funds, documents and
papers as against the client until the attorney is fully paid his fees. However, lawyer may apply so much
of client’s funds in his possession to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client.

Requisites for validity (of retaining lien)

1. attorney-client relationship

2. lawful possession by lawyer of the client’s funds, documents and papers in his professional
capacity
3. unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees or disbursements

2. Charging Lien (special lien)

A charging lien is a right which the attorney has upon all judgments for the payment of money and
executions issued in pursuance thereof, secured in favor of his client. Covers only services rendered by
attorney in the action in which the judgment was obtained and takes effect only after a statement of
claim has been entered upon record of the particular action with written notice to his client and
adverse party.

Requisites for validity of charging lien

1. attorney-client relationship

2. attorney has rendered services

3. money judgment favorable to the client has been secured in the action

4. attorney has a claim for attorney’s fees or advances

5. statement of his claim has been duly recorded in the case with notice thereof served upon the
client and adverse party
DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS

NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS

PURPOSE OF DISCIPLINING LAWYERS

To ascertain that a lawyer still possesses those qualifications which are conditions precedent for the
continuous practice of law and; to deter others from similar misconduct, to protect the court and the
public from the misbehavior of its officers.

NATURE OF THE POWER TO DISCIPLINE

The power to discipline a lawyer is judicial in nature and can be exercised only by the courts. It cannot
be defeated by the legislative or executive departments.

POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT TO DISCIPLINE LAWYERS

1. Warning

2. Admonition

3. Reprimand

4. Censure

5. Disbarment

6. Suspension[Sec. 27, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court (RRC)]

7. Interim suspension

8. Probation (IBP Guidelines)

POWERS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO DISCIPLINE

LAWYERS

1. Warning
2. Admonition

3. Reprimand

4. Suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in Sec 27, Rule 138 until further
action of the Supreme Court in the case; (Sec. 16, Rule 139-B) and

5. Probation (IBP Guidelines)

OTHER SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES

1. Restitution

2. Assessment of costs

3. Limitation upon practice

4. Appointment of a receiver

5. Requirement that a lawyer take the bar examination or professional responsibility examination;

6. Requirement that a lawyer attend continuing education courses

7. Other requirements that the highest court or disciplinary board deems consistent with the
purposes of the sanctions

FORMS OF DISCIPLINARY MEASURES

1. Warning – an act of putting one on his guard against an impending danger, evil, consequence or
penalty;

2. Admonition – a gentle or friendly reproof, mild rebuke, warning, reminder, or counseling on a

fault, error or oversight; an expression of authoritative advice;

3. Reprimand – a public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person at fault by
his superior officer or the body to which he belongs;

4. Censure – official reprimand;

5. Suspension – temporary withholding of a lawyer’s right to practice his profession as a lawyer for
a certain period or for an indefinite period of time: a. Definite;
b. Indefinite – qualified disbarment; lawyer determines for himself how long or how short his
suspension shall last by proving to court that he is once again fit to resume practice of law.

6. Disbarment – it is the act of the Supreme Court of withdrawing from an attorney the right to
practice law. The name of the lawyer is stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys;

7. Interim Suspension – it is the temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law pending
imposition of final discipline; Includes:

a. Suspension upon conviction of a “serious crime”;

b. Suspension when the lawyer’s continuing conduct is or is likely to cause immediate and serious
injury to a client or public

8. Probation – it is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified conditions.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS (SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT)

1. Neither a civil action nor a criminal proceeding;

2. SUI GENERIS, it is a class of its own since it is neither civil nor criminal

3. Confidential in nature

4. Defense of double jeopardy is not available

5. Can be initiated by the SC, motu proprio, or by the IBP. It can be initiated without a complaint.

6. Can proceed regardless of interest of the complainants

7. Imprescriptible

8. It is itself due process of law

9. Whatever has been decided in a disbarment case cannot be a source of right that may be
enforced in another action;

10. In pari delicto rule not applicable;

11. No prejudicial question in disbarment proceedings;

12. Penalty in a disbarment case cannot be in the alternative; and

13. Monetary claims cannot be granted except restitution and return of monies and properties of
the client given in the course of the lawyer-client relationship.
OBJECTIVES OF SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT:

1. To compel the attorney to deal fairly and honestly with his clients;

2. To remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney;

3. To punish the lawyer;

4. To set an example or warning for the other members of the bar;

5. To safeguard the administration of justice from dishonest and incompetent lawyers;

6. To protect the public;

OFFICES AUTHORIZED TO INVESTIGATE DISBARMENT CASES

1. Supreme Court

2. IBP through its Commission on Bar Discipline or authorized investigators 3. Office of the Solicitor
General

GROUNDS

GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION OR DISBARMENT

1. Deceit

A fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device used by one or more persons to
deceive and trick another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party
upon which it was imposed. There must be false representation as a matter of fact.

2. Malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office –any malfeasance or dereliction of duty

committed by a lawyer

Malpractice refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Legal malpractice
consists of failure of an attorney to use such skill, prudence and diligence as a lawyer of ordinary skill
and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of tasks which they undertake, and
when such failure proximately causes damage, it gives rise to an action in tort. (Tan Tek Beng v. David,
A.C. No. 1261, Dec. 29, 1983)

3. Grossly immoral conduct

Grossly immoral conduct is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. (Vitug v. Rongcal, A.C. No. 6313,
Sept. 7, 2006)

Gross Misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of the person
concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of a cause, a conduct that is generally motivated by a predetermined, obstinate or
intentional purpose. (Yumol Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., A.C. No. 6585, April 21, 2005)

4. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude

Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything that is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals, an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty modesty, or good morals. (Soriano v.
Dizon, A. C. No. 6792, Jan. 25, 2006) (e.g. estafa, bribery, murder, bigamy, seduction, abduction,
concubinage, smuggling, falsification of public document, violation of BP 22)

5. Violation of oath of office

The specific grounds that would constitute violation of the lawyer’s oath are:

a. Commission of falsehood

b. Instituting baseless or unfounded complaints

c. Engaging in dilatory actions for an ulterior motive

d. Malpractice or reprehensible conduct in dealing with the court of his client. (Lapena, Jr., 2009)

6. Willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court

7. Corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to case without an authority to do so.
(see Sanctions to Practice of Law without authority)

*** Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should
be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. (Vitug v.
Rongcal, A.C. No. 6313, Sept. 7, 2006)
THE GROUNDS FOR DISBARMENT ARE NOT EXCLUSIVE

A lawyer may be removed from office or suspended from the practice of law on grounds other than
those specifically provided in the law. The statutory enumeration is not to be taken as a limitation on
the general power of SC to suspend or disbar a lawyer. (In Re: Puno, A.C. No. 389, Feb. 28, 1967)

QUINGWA V. PUNO, A.C. No. 398, February 28, 1967

The statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a
limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court
over its officers cannot be restricted.

STA. MARIA V. TUAZON, A.C. No. 396, JULY 31, 1964

The Supreme Court has disbarred or suspended lawyers for reasons not found in the statute as when
their acts are contrary to honesty and good morals or do not approximate the highest degree of morality
and integrity expected of the members of the bar.

AQUINO V. MANGAOANG, 425 SCRA 572

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this court will exercise its
disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes his case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.

DANIEL S. AQUINO V. ATTY. MARIA LOURDES VILLAMAR-MANGAOANG

(A.C. No. 4934, March 17, 2004)

FACTS: Complainant avers that prior to his present assignment, he was a Special Investigator of

the Legal and Investigation Staff of the Bureau of Customs, Customs Police Division, Ninoy

Aquino International Airport (NAIA) District Command, Pasay City, headed by

respondent. Complainant claims that prior to or during the preliminary investigation of the case,

NAIA Customs Police Officer Apolonio Bustos and respondent ordered the transfer of the gun

parts inside Gomez’s balikbayan box to another box. She then ordered Office Messenger Joseph

Maniquis to deliver to the State Prosecutor the balikbayan box without the gun parts.

According to complainant, respondent did this because Gomez was a close friend. The

switching of the balikbayan boxes and the substitution of the evidence resulted in the dismissal

of the criminal charges against Gomez. Complainant argues that respondent exercised

dishonesty, committed acts of legal impropriety, and compromised her duties and

responsibilities as a lawyer, an officer of the court and a public official, thereby causing damage

and prejudice to the government. In her Answer respondent avers that she could not have

switched the contents of the balikbayan box of Gomez because she was not in charge of the

physical disposition of the evidence. She pointed out that if complainant’s allegations were true,

he should have filed a complaint against her after the case against Gomez was dismissed.

However, he waited more than two years before bringing these unfounded and false accusations

against her.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent be disbarred for allegedly introducing false evidence in a

case and or breaching her duties to the legal profession.

HELD: Respondent should not be disbarred for allegedly introducing false evidence in a case

and for breaching her duties to the legal profession. The duty of the Court towards members of

the bar is not only limited to the administration of discipline to those found culpable of

misconduct but also to the protection of the reputation of those frivolously or maliciously

charged In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this Court

will exercise its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes his case by clear,

convincing and satisfactory evidence. In the case at bar, complainant failed to meet the required

evidentiary standard. In the absence of convincing or clearly preponderant evidence, as in this

case, the complaint for disbarment against respondent should be dismissed.

AMAYA V. TECSON, 450 SCRA 510

Disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension or
fine would accomplish the end desired.

MARIO S. AMAYA V. ATTY. DELANO A. TECSON

(A.C. No. 5996, February 07, 2005)

FACTS: Mario S. Amaya sought the disbarment of Atty. Delano A. Tecson for “highly irregular actuations
and/or grave negligence in handling an appeal with the Court of Appeals.” The complainant alleged that
he retained the services of the respondent to handle the said appeal when his former counsel suffered
a stroke due to acute hypertension. The respondent demanded P20,000.00 for the filing of the notice
of appeal, which the complainant immediately paid but was dismissed because of untimely filing of the
Tecson of the Notice of Appeal. The latter then requested another amount for the filing of motion for
reconsideration which was also eventually dismissed because of non-filing of Tecson of the prescribed
docket fee. Tecson then returned the money for litigation expenses to Amaya after such denial.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tecson be disbarred.

HELD: Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to
the similar duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. The Court rules that in failing to zealously attend to a
legal matter entrusted to him, the respondent failed to live up to the duties and responsibilities of a
member of the legal profession. It must be stressed however that disbarment is the most severe form
of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution
for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment
should not be decreed where any punishment less severe – such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine –
would accomplish the end desired. Considering that the respondent in this case returned the money for
litigation expenses to the complainant after the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Court sees
fit to reprimand the respondent for his actuations.

DEFENSES
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN DISBARMENT

1. Good faith in the acquisition of a property of the client subject of litigation (In Re: Ruste, A.M.
No. 632, June 27, 1940);

2. 2. Inexperience of the lawyer (Munoz v. People, G.R. No. L-33672, Sept. 28, 1973);

3. Age (Santos v. Tan, A.C. No. 2697, Apr. 19, 1991);

4. Apology (Munoz v. People, G.R. No. L-33672, Sept. 28, 1973);

5. Lack of Intention to slight or offend the Court (Rheem of the Philippines, Inc. v. Ferrer, G.R. No.
L-22979, Jan. 27, 1967);

6. Absence of prior disciplinary record;

7. Absence of dishonest or selfish motive;

8. Personal or emotional problems;

9. Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct;

10. Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings;

11. Character or reputation;

12. Physical or mental disability or impairment;

13. Delay in disciplinary proceedings;

14. Interim rehabilitation;

15. Imposition of other penalties or sanctions;

16. Remorse; and

17. Remoteness of prior offenses. (IBP Guidelines 9.32)

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN DISBARMENT

1. Prior disciplinary offenses;

2. Dishonest or selfish motives;

3. A pattern of misconduct;

4. Multiple offenses;

5. Bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules
or orders of the disciplinary agency;

6. Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the
disciplinary process;
7. Refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;

8. Vulnerability of victim;

9. Substantial experience in the practice of law; and

10. Indifference to making restitution. (IBP Guidelines 9.22)

CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ARE NEITHER MITIGATING NOR AGRAVATING

1. Forced or compelled restitution;

2. Agreeing to the client’s demand for certain improper behavior or result;

3. Withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;

4. Resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;

5. Complainants recommendation as to sanctions; or

6. Failure of injured client to complain. (IBP Guideline 9.4)

READMISSION TO THE BAR

Reinstatement, Defined

It is the restoration in disbarment proceedings to a disbarred lawyer the privilege to practice law. The
power of the Supreme Court to reinstate is based on its constitutional prerogative to promulgate rules
on the admission of applicants to the practice of law. (Sec. 5[5], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Conditions for Reinstatement

The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the Bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of
good moral character – a fit and proper person to practice law.
Guidelines to be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice
of law

1. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with
the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the
practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;

2. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where
he or she has appeared as counsel; and

3. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of
suspension

ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED

ENRIQUE ZALDIVAR V. RAUL GONZALEZ

(G.R. No. 80578, February 1, 1989) (166 SCRA 316)

FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating
the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition
issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from
investigating and filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the
investigation and he filed criminal informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper
interview where he proudly claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court. Zaldivar then filed a
Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side.
Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his
freedom of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the
Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six justices of the
Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to “go slow” on Zaldivar and to not embarrass the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily imply that the
justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements constitute the grossest kind
of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme
Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is
entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that
freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom
of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity
and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.

Guidelines to be observed in Case of Lifting an Order Suspending a Lawyer from the Practice of Law

The following guidelines were issued by the Supreme Court, the same to be observed in the matter of
the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:

1. After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court
shall render a decision imposing the penalty;

2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt
thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of
said motion shall render the decision final and executory;

3. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with
the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the
practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;

4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where
he or she has appeared as counsel;
5. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of
suspension;

6. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.

READMISSION TO THE BAR OF LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN DISBARRED

Considerations for Reinstatement

1. The applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment;

2. The nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred;

3. His conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement; (Prudential Bank v. Benjamin Grecia, A.C. No. 2756,
Dec. 18, 1990)

4. His efficient government service; (In re: Adriatico, G.R. No. L-2532, Nov. 17, 1910)

5. Applicant’s appreciation of the significance of his dereliction and his assurance that he now
possesses the requisite probity and integrity; and

6. Favorable endorsement of the IBP and pleas of his loved ones. (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, B.M. No.
144, Feb. 24, 1989)

Effects of Reinstatement

1. Reinstatement to the roll of attorneys wipes out the restrictions and disabilities resulting from a
previous disbarment (Cui v. Cui, G.R. No. L-18727, Aug. 31, 1964);

2. Recognition of moral rehabilitation and mental fitness to practice law;

3. Lawyer shall be subject to same law, rules and regulations as those applicable to any other
lawyer; and

4. Lawyer must comply with the conditions imposed on his readmission.

Effect of Executive Pardon pending Disbarment Proceeding

If during the pendency of disbarment preceding the respondent was granted executive pardon, the
dismissal of the case on that sole basis will depend on whether the executive pardon is absolute or
conditional.

1. Absolute or unconditional pardon - the disbarment case will be dismissed.

2. Conditional pardon - the disbarment case will not be dismissed on the basis thereof.

An absolute pardon by the President is one that operates to wipe out the conviction as well as the
offense itself. The grant thereof to a lawyer is a bar to a proceeding for disbarment against him, if such
proceeding is based solely on the fact of such conviction. (In re: Parcasio, A.C. No. 100, Feb. 18, 1976)

But where the proceeding to disbar is founded on the professional misconduct involved in the
transaction which culminated in his conviction, the effect of the pardon is only to relieve him of the
penal consequences of his act and does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as
the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess good moral
character. (In re: Lontok, 43 Phil. 293, Apr. 7, 1922)

READMISSION TO THE BAR OF LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN REPARTRIATED

Effects of Loss and Re-acquisition of Filipino Citizenship

General Rule: The loss of Philippine citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines.

Exception:

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the
bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage
in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to R.A. 9225. This is because “all Philippine citizens who
become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of R.A. 9225.” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with R.A. 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no
automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 can resume his law practice,
he must first secure from the SC the authority to do so, conditioned on:

1. The updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

2. The payment of professional tax;

3. The completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education, this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him
of legal developments; and

4. The retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. (Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law of Benjamin
Dacanay, B.M. No. 1678, Dec. 17, 2007)

LIABILITIES OF A LAWYER

CIVIL LIABILITY

1) Client is prejudiced by lawyer’s negligence and misconduct

2) Breach of fiduciary obligation

3) Civil liability to third persons

4) Libelous words in pleadings; violation of communication privilege

5) Liability for costs of suit (treble costs) – when lawyer is made liable for insisting on client’s
patently unmeritorious case or interposing appeal merely to delay litigation

CRIMINAL LIABILITY

1) Prejudicing client through malicious breach of professional duty 2) Revealing client secrets

3) Representing adverse interests

4) Introducing false evidence

5) Misappropriating client’s funds (Estafa)

REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW OF LAWYERS

1. Declaratory relief;

2. Petition for Injuction;

3. Contempt of court;

4. Criminal complaint for Estafa against a person who falsely represented himself to be an attorney
to the damage of a party;

5. Disqualification and complaints for disbarment; or

6. Administrative complaint against the erring lawyer or government official.

CONTEMPT OF COURT

A. Nature

It is exercised on preservative and not on vindictive principles and on corrective rather than the
retaliatory idea of punishment. It is criminal in nature.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. It is essential in the observance of order in
judicial proceedings and to enforcement of judgment, orders and writs.

B. Kinds of Contempt

1) Direct Contempt

It consists of misbehavior in the presence of or near a court or judge as to interrupt or obstruct the
proceedings before the court or the administration of justice.

2) Indirect or Constructive Contempt

One committed away from the court involving disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, judgment or command of the court, tending to belittle, degrade, obstruct, interrupt or embarrass
the court.

a) Civil contempt – failure to do something ordered by the court which is for the benefit of the
party.

b) Criminal contempt – consists of any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the
court.
C. Acts of a Lawyer Constituting Contempt

1. Misbehavior as officer of court

2. Disobedience or resistance to court order

3. Abuse or interference with judicial proceedings

4. Obstruction in administration of justice

5. Misleading courts

6. Making false allegations, criticisms, insults, veiled threats against the courts

7. Aiding in unauthorized practice of law (suspended or disbarred)

8. Unlawful retention of client’s funds

9. Advise client to commit contemptuous acts

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

B.M. No. 850 August 22, 2000

PURPOSE

Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to
ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics
of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.

REQUIREMENTS OF COMPLETION OF MCLE

Members of the IBP, unless exempted under Rule 7, shall complete every 3 years at least 36 hours of
continuing legal education activities. The 36 hours shall be divided as follows:

1. 6 hours – legal ethics

2. 4 hours – trial and pretrial skills

3. 5 hours – alternative dispute resolution

4. 9 hours – updates on substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence

5. 4 hours – legal writing and oral advocacy

6. 2 hours – international law and international conventions

7. Remaining 6 hours – such other subjects as may be prescribed by the Committee on MCLE.

Classes of Credits

1. Participatory credit – Attending approved education activities like seminars, conventions,

symposia, and the like; speaking or lecturing, or assigned as panelist, reactor, or commentator, etc.

in approved education activities; teaching in law school or lecturing in bar review classes.

2. Non-participatory – Preparing, as author or co-author, written materials (article, book or book

review) which contribute to the legal education of the author member, which were not prepared in the
ordinary course of his practice or employment; editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.

COMPLIANCE

What constitute non-compliance?

1. Failure to complete education requirement within the compliance period;

2. Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;

3. Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status)

within the prescribed period;

4. Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within 60
days from receipt of non-compliance notice;

5. Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period; or

6. Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE requirements.

EXEMPTIONS
1. The President, Vice-President and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive
Departments;

2. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;

3. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members
of the judiciary, incumbent members of Judicial Bar Council, incumbent members of the MCLE
Committee, incumbent court lawyers who have availed of the Philippine Judicial Academy programs of
continuing judicial education (Amendment to Bar Matter 850, Resolution of the Court En Banc, July 13,
2004);

4. The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Dept. of Justice;

5. The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;

6. The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;

7. The Chairman and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

8. The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;

9. Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;

10. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least
10 years in accredited law schools;

11. The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professional and Professorial
Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and

12. Governors and Mayors.

CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

A member who fails to comply with the requirements after the 60-day period shall be listed as
delinquent member by the IBP Board of Governors upon recommendation of the Committee on MCLE.

SOME JURISPRUDENCE ON DISCIPLINE OF LAWYER

IN RE MARCIAL EDILLON
(A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978) (84 SCRA 554)

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll
of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution
notwithstanding due notice. Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to
maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the
above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Edillon may be removed from the Rolls of Attorney for nonpayment of IBP
dues suffers constitutional infirmity.

DECISION: YES. The payment of IBP dues does not suffer constitutional infirmity. All legislation directing
the integration of the Bar has been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police
power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client,
but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court.

When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and

his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power
of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did
not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed
the public with an interest in his concerns.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his

constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. Such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
 YUSECO V. BERNAD

(A.M. No. 94-1-061-SC March 29, 1995)

(243 SCRA 19)

FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Atty. Joaquin Yuseco and Benjamin Grecia against
Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, charging him with suppressing facts and making false
statements in his report to the Court in the disbarment case against complainant Grecia for the purpose
of causing injury to him (Grecia). The complaint for disbarment against Benjamin Grecia was filed by
Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles Bartolome and the St. Luke's Medical
Center who charged him with dishonesty and grave misconduct in connection with the theft of some
pages of a medical chart used in evidence in a damage suit filed by Grecia's clients against the doctors
and the hospital. The disbarment case was assigned to respondent Deputy Court Administrator Bernad
for investigation, report and recommendation. Respondent submitted report in which Bernad found
therein respondent Benjamin Grecia guilty of the charges. Bernad refrained from recommending the
penalty but instead left the matter to the Court to determine, observing that whether the penalty
should be disbarment or suspension, the two are "severe forms of disciplinary action [which] should be
resorted to only in cases where a lawyer demonstrates an attribute or course of conduct wholly
inconsistent with approved professional standard."

ISSUES: Can respondent be disbarred on the following grounds:

(1) submitting a report and recommendation to the Supreme Court in the disbarment case without
furnishing complainant Grecia with a copy thereof;

(2) falsifying his written report by narrating facts which are absolutely false;

(3) deliberately not revealing his relationship with former Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan, whose
brother-in-law, Atty. Pompeyo Nolasco of the Quasha law firm, is the counsel for complainant-doctors
in the disbarment case as well as in Civil Case No. 3548-V-91 which Grecia had filed against the doctors
and the hospital.

HELD: First. Respondent had no duty to complainant to furnish him a copy of his report in the
disbarment case. That report was solely for Court’s use. What was important was that he was given a
copy of the Court's decision ordering his disbarment.
Second. The fourteen (14) cases or instances in which respondent allegedly made false statements in
his report to the Court are the same ones cited in complainant Grecia's motion for new investigation
and reconsideration which this Court denied way back on August 12, 1993.

Third. The Court agreed with the findings of respondent, his findings became those of the Court and
complainants have no basis for charging suppression of material facts. Indeed, "the Court assumes full
responsibility for all its acts.

Fourth. Atty. Nolasco is a brother-in-law of former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan. However
respondent points out that the disbarment case was assigned to him three months after Chief Justice
Fernan had retired from the Court. Indeed, aside from this allegation, there is no evidence in the record
to support the charge of complainants.

TAN V. BALAJADIA

(G.R. No. 169517, March 14, 2006)

FACTS: Rogelio, Normal all surnamed Tan and Maliyawao Pagayokan (petitioners) in their petition
alleged that Bendicto Balajadia (respondent) filed a criminal case against them for usurpation of
authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of
parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent
asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer."However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines showed that respondent has never been admitted
to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect contempt for
misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.

In his Comment, respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint affidavit that he is
a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino
prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit.
It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint affidavit against petitioners involving the
same subject matter. Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s secretary, executed an affidavit admitting the
mistake in the preparation of the complaint affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the
complaint-affidavit because he assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained the same
allegations with respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he had no
intention of misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.
In their Reply, petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect contempt for
having made untruthful statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the blame to
Atty. Aquino’s secretary.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is liable for indirect contempt.

HELD: SC ruled in the negative. Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing has
been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may
be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

In several cases, SC have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and
acting as such without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are punished because they are an
affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In
determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element,
and no one can be punished unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent’s claim that he never intended to
project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty.
Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the
drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on record. Taken together,
these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondent’s complaint-affidavit was,
indeed, the result of inadvertence.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the
result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect
contempt.

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or that he
intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his
lack of intent to illegally practice law.

JUDICIAL ETHICS
PRELIMINARIES

TERMS

De Facto Judge – An officer who is not fully vested with all the powers and duties conceded to judges
but, one who exercises the office of judge under some color of right. He has the reputation of the officer
he assumes to be, yet he has some defect in his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time.
(Luna v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-13744, Nov. 29, 1918)

De Jure Judge – One who exercises the office of a judge as a matter of right, fully vested with all the
powers and functions conceded to him under the law. (Luna v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-13744, Nov. 29,
1918)

Independent judiciary – one free from inappropriate outside influence

Inhibition – An act when a judge personally prevents himself from taking cognizance of the case. This is
made through a written petition to inhibit which shall state the grounds for the same. The explanation
of the judge whether or not to take cognizance of the case must also be in writing

Judicial Ethics – It is the branch of moral science which treats of the right and proper conduct to be
observed by all judges in trying and deciding controversies brought before them for adjudication which
conduct must be demonstrative of impartiality, integrity, competence, independence and freedom from
improprieties. This freedom from improprieties must be observed in both the public and private life of a
judge – being the visible representation of the law.

Qualifications of Justices in the Supreme Court of Court of Appeals One must be:

1. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines;

2. At least 40 years of age;

3. A person who has been, for 15 years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the
practice of law; and

4. A person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. (Sec. 7(2), Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)
Qualifications of Judges in the RTC One must be:

1. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines;

2. At least 35 years of age; and

3. For at least 10 years engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or held a public office in
the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.

Qualifications of Judges in the MTC One must be:

1. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines;

2. At least 30 years of age; and

3. For at least 5 years, engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or held a public office in the
Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.

THE NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY

CANON 1

INDEPENDENCE

Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the Rule of Law and a fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A
judge shall, therefore, uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional
aspects.

SECTION 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of
the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous
influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any
reason.

PEOPLE V. VENERACION
 249 SCRA 244 (1995)

In one criminal case for the crime of rape and homi cide, the judge found defendants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Under the law, particularl y RA 7659, the punishment for the crime of rape with
homicide is death. However, in the subjec t case, the judge imposed upon the accused the punishment
of reclusion perpetua. A court of la w is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of
the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-
defined instances.

SECTION 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in respect
of decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.

TAHIL V. EISMA

64 SCRA 378 (1975)

The discretion of the Court to grant bail must be based on the Court’s determination as to whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may be exercised only after the evidence has been
submitted at the summary hearing conducted pursuant to Sec. 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules. Respondent’s
admission that he granted bail to an accused upon the request of a Congressman, despite his belief that
the evidence of guilt against said is strong, is indeed reprehensible.

SECTION 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court or administrative agency.

SABITSANA, JR. V. VILLAMOR

RTJ NO. 90- 474, October 4, 1991

FACTS: Judge Villamor is the executive judge of RTC. Acting on such capacity, he designated Judge Pitao
as the acting MCTC judge of a municipality. Judge Villamor, by sending a note to Judge Pitao, assured
the wife of a certain accused in a criminal case, which had long been pending before the MCTC that
Judge Pitao should acquit the accused. However, Judge Pitao decided otherwise. This prompted Judge
Villamor to direct Judge Pitao to forward the record of the case to his sala. Judge Villamor then
acquitted the accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Villamor commit an act of misconduct?

HELD: Yes. A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. A judge
shall not influence in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court.
This is so because such interference does not only subvert the independence of judiciary but also
undermines the people’s faith in its integrity and impartiality. In the instant case, Judge Villamor’s act of
sending a note to Judge Pitao for the latter to decide a case in favor of the accused constitutes undue
interference

SECTION 4. Judges shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or
judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.

Judges’ Family includes:

1. Judge’s spouse

2. Son

3. Daughter

4. Son-in-law

5. Daughter-in-law

6. Other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree, or

7. Person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household
(NCJC of the Philippine Judiciary-Annotated, February 2007)

PADILLA V. ZANTUA

237 SCRA 670 (1994)

 Constant company with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the point that favors in
the future may be asked from respondent judge which he may find hard to resist. The actuation of
respondent Judge of eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer who has pending cases in his sala
may well arouse suspicion in the public mind, thus tending to erode the trust of the litigants in the
impartiality of the judge.

SECTION 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the
executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a
reasonable observer.

ALFONSO V. ALONZO-LEGASTO

A.M. No. MTJ 94-995, September 5, 2002

An executive judge has no authority to cause the transfer of court employees as the jurisdiction

to do so is lodge solely upon the SC through the Office of the Court Administrator. This is so

because of the need to maintain judicial independence. Moreover, a judge shall be free from

inappropriate connections with and influence from the executive and legislative branch. Here,

the judge did not act independently of the LGU when she asked the Mayor of QC to re- employ

the displaced employees instead of informing the SC through the OCA of the need to streamline
her court of its personal needs.

SECTION 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the particular
parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.

SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to
maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the Judiciary.

SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce
public confidence in the Judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.

Good Judges, Defined

In the case of Borromeo v. Mariano, G.R. No. 16808, January 3, 1921, good judges are those who:

1. Have the mastery of the principles of law,

2. Discharge their duties in accordance with law,

3. Are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and

4. Are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate with
the other two departments of the government

CANON 2

INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office, but also to the personal
demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to
be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
 ATTY. ARTURO ROMERO V. JUDGE GABRIEL VALLE JR.

147 SCRA 197, January 9, 1987

FACTS: Atty. Romero charged Judge Valle with grave misconduct and oppression. The case arose from a
dispute between Romero and Valle as to the proper marking of Iglesia Filipina’s inventory book in one
civil case where Judge Valle is the presiding judge of the RTC where the case was lodged. Atty. Romero
insisted that it should be marked as Exh F while judge claimed that it should be Exh G since there was
already an Exh F marked during the previous trial when counsel was absent. Counsel, however,
continued insisting in a loud voice, which irritated the judge. Valle admonished counsel not to bring his
passion to the court and to respect the court. He allegedly uttered embarrassin g remarks against Atty.
Romero and even challenged the latter for a fight. Valle then banged his gavel, left the rostrum, and
went to his chamber. Outside, he allegedly held a gun with his right hand in an angry and menacing
manner.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Valle has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.

HELD: Yes. Judge Valle, in losing his temper, failed to preserve order in his court. Judges have contempt
powers to endeavor counsel to appreciate his duties to the court. He should have cited counsel in
contempt instead of walking out of the courtroom. His act of carrying his licensed gun, though
permitted, was not an innocent gesture but with intent to intimidate counsel. He violated the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, which requires that “a judge’s official conduct should be free from the appearance of
impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.”

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the
Judiciary. Justice must not merely be done, but must also be seen to be done.

IN MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011

A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of plagiarism
even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical
or language from a party’s brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use
whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them, without fear of reprisal.
This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not
writing a literary work and, more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a
result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.
SECTION 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court
personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.

CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision
itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

SECTION 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.

DIMO REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC. V. DIMACULANGAN

G.R. No. 130991, March 11, 2004

For a judge to be inhibited, allegations of partiality and pre-judgment must be proven by clear

and convincing evidence. Here, mere allegation that the judge arbitrarily issued the TRO

without presenting evidence showing bias on his part is not sufficient. While Judge Santiago

acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he issued the TRO for such should only be enforceable

within his territorial jurisdiction, such error may not necessarily warrant inhibition at most it is

correctible by certiorari
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances
the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the
Judiciary.

TALENS-DABON V. ARCEO

259 SCRA 354 (1996)

The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but

also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system

have done justice. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary,

particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and

procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity,

probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then

can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus
creating confidence in the judicial system.

SECTION 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on
which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

Rule of Necessity, Defined

In the case of Parayno v. Meneses, G.R. No. 112684, Apr. 26, 1994, it is stated that a judge is not
disqualified to sit in a case where there is no other judge available to hear and decide the case.
Furthermore, when all judges will be disqualified as a result, it will not be permitted to destroy the only
tribunal with the power in the premises. The doctrine operates on the principle that a basic judge is
better than no judge at all. It is the duty of the disqualified judge to hear and decide the case regardless
of objections or disagreements.

SECTION 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make
any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair
the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that
might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.

SECTION 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are
unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are
unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to instances
where:

(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;

(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;

(c) The judge or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the
matter in controversy;

(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge
or lawyer was a material witness therein;

(e) The judge s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;

(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or
to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or

(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings.
SECTION 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding,
disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers,
independently of the judge s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for inhibition is immaterial
or un-substantial; the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties
and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings.

Grounds for Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges under the Rules of Court

1. Mandatory of Compulsory Disqualification

Grounds: Specific and Exclusive

Role of the Judicial Officer: no discretion to sit or try the case

2. Voluntary Inhibition

Grounds: no specific grounds but there is a broad basis for such

Role of the Judicial Officer: the matter is left to the sound discretion of the judge

QUERY OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF

MAIOLOS, BULACAN, ON TIHE CONFLICTING VIEWS OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT —

JUDGES MASADAO and ELIZAGA RE: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4954-M

FACTS: Judge Roy A. Masadao, Jr., rendered a decision in a criminal case finding the accused

guilty of the crime of estafa. Counsel for the accused, Atty. Efren C. Moncupa, filed a motion
for reconsideration. Retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes entered his appearance for the accused,

wherefore, Judge Masadao issued an order inhibiting himself from further sitting in the case on

the ground that retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes had been among those who had recommended him

to the Bench. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Luciano G. Elizaga. Judge Elizaga

returned the records of the case with an accompanying letter stating a refusal to act on the

aforesaid motion for reconsideration and assailing the re-raffling of the case as impractical and

uncalled for.

ISSUE: Who shall resolve a motion for reconsideration filed against the decision of Judge Roy

A. Masadao, Jr., after he had voluntarily inhibited himself from further sitting in Criminal Case

No. 4954-M of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 9, Malolos entitled "People of the

Philippines v. Jaime Tadeo"?

HELD: Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court embodies the rule on disqualification
and inhibition of judges.

No judge or judicial off icer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is

pecuniarily interested as heir. legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to

either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within

the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been

executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, in which he has presided in any

inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without written

consent of an the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

On the other hand, where no grounds for disqualification as above enumerated exist, as in the

case at bar, the rule on inhibition provides:

A judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,

for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above

It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney

of record of one of the parties to a suit is no ground for disqualification. The court held that the

fact "that one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a legal ground for

the disqualification of said judge. To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial judges to
whom the case would be transferred. Ultimately, confusion would result, for under a different

rule, a judge would be barred from sitting in a case whenever one of his former classmates (and

he could have many) appeared." Likewise, the rule applies when the lawyer of the defendant

was a former associate of the judge, when he was practising law.

Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend, classmate, associate or patron of a

presiding judge appears before him as counsel for one of the parties to a case. "Utang na

loob", per se, should not be a hindrance to the administration of justice. Nor should recognition

of such value in Philippine society prevent the performance of one's duties as judge. However,

where, as in this case, the judge admits that he may be suspected of surrendering to the

persuasions of utang na loob or he may even succumb to it considering that he "and the

members of his family, no less, shall ever remain obliged in eternal gratitude to Justice Reyes",

the negative answer to the question of judge Elizaga yields to exceptions in extraordinary cases.

CANON 4

PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

Prohibitions:

• Actual impropriety

• Appearance of impropriety

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

SECTION 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who
practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality.

SECTION 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of their
family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.

SECTION 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal profession to
receive clients of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.

SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to
preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.
 RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE ACUÑA

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891, July 28, 2005

FACTS: Judge Acuña was charged with improper conduct for allegedly making humiliating statements
such as “putris,” and “putang-ina”. In his answer, Judge Acuña claimed that those words are only his
favorite expressions and they are not directed to any particular person. He further maintained that his
behavior is justified by the fact that he is still mourning the sudden demise of his eldest son.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Acuna is guilty of improper conduct.

HELD: Yes. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in the conduct
and language. Indeed, judges should so behave at all times because having accepted the esteemed
position of a judge he ought to have known that more is expected of him than ordinary citizen. Here,
the judge’s use of humiliating and insensitive expressions like “putris” and ”putang- ina” is improper as
such intemperate language detracts from how he should conduct himself. Moreover, it does not matter
whether such expressions were directed to a particular person or not, as they give the impression of a
person’s ill manners.

SECTION 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary and financial interests and
shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of their family.

SECTION 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private
interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others
to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in the
performance of judicial duties.

SECTION 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or
disclosed for any other purpose related to their judicial duties.

UMALE V. VILLALUZ

G.R. No. L-33508 May 25, 1973

FACTS: Petitioner Leon Umale impugns the validity of the order of respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz
disqualifying or inhibiting himself from trying the robbery charge against sixteen (16) accused.
Petitioner Leon Umale is the complainant in the said robbery case. However, without any party moving
for his disqualification or inhibition, respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz voluntarily inhibited himself from
trying the case on the ground that before the criminal case was filed in his court, he already had
personal knowledge of the same; and directed the immediate forwarding of the records of the case to
the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, for proper disposition.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz can voluntarily inhibit himself without any motion
therefor by the parties on the ground of his personal knowledge of the case even before the same was
filed.

HELD: Yes. A judge may voluntarily inhibit himself by reason of his being related to a counsel within the
fourth civil degree (no expressly included as a ground in par. 1 of Rule 137); because Rule 126 (the old
rule) "does not include nor preclude cases and circumstances for voluntary inhibition which depends
upon the discretion of the officers concerned."

Herein respondent Judge has personal knowledge of the case. Such personal knowledge on his part
might generate in his mind some bias or prejudice against the complaining witness or any of the
accused or in a manner unconsciously color his judgment one way or the other without the parties
having the opportunity to cross-examine him as a witness.

A salutary norm is that he reflects on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his
mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. It is
possible that the respondent Judge might be influenced by his personal knowledge of the case when he
tries and decides the same on the merits, which would certainly constitute a denial of due process to
the party adversely affected by his judgment or decision. It is best that, after some reflection, the
respondent Judge on his own initiative disqualified himself from hearing the robbery case filed by
herein petitioner and thereby rendered himself available as witness to any of the parties and therefore
maybe subject to cross-examination.

SECTION 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may:

(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;

(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law,
the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;

(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or
otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

SECTION 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.
SECTION 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations
representing the interests of judges.

SECTION 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for nor accept, any gift, bequest,
loan, or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in
connection with the performance of judicial duties.

ATTY. DAVID G. OMPOC vs. JUDGE NORITO E. TORRES

FACTS: A civil case for ejectment was filed and it was assigned to Judge Norito Torres. While the case
was being tried, at one time he invited Atty. Ompoc to see him at his residence and he instructed the
former to bring his client along with him. At the meeting, Judge Torres gave them a guide what
evidence and argument they have to present. Also in that meeting, Judge Torres requested the client,
who is engage in the business of Car Decor to install a brand new air conditioner on his Toyota Hi-Ace
and said air conditioner was installed without Judge Torres paying for it. As the ejectment case
progressed, Judge Torres had been pestering Atty. Ompoc’s client with request for loans which Judge
Torres never acknowledged by means of a receipt and he was given by Atty. Ompoc’s client sums of
money in various amounts and on different dates. These loans have never been paid up to now and are
certainly will not be paid, to the end of time because Judge Norito Torres is smart enough not to sign
anything.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Torres committed gross misconduct.

HELD: Yes. Receiving money from a party litigant is the kind of gross and flaunting misconduct on the
part of the judge, who is charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice.
Members of the judiciary should display not only the highest integrity but must, at all times, conduct
themselves in such manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion.

SECTION 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence, direction
or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done, to be
done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.
SECTION 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a
token gift, award, or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made, provided that such gift,
award or benefit might not be reasonably perceived as intended to influence the judge in the
performance of official duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.

CANON 5

EQUALITY

Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the judicial
office.

SECTION 1. Judges shall be aware of and understand diversity in society and differences arising from
various sources, including, but not limited to, race, color, sex, religion, national origin, caste, disability,
age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status, and other like causes.

SECTION 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or
prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.

SECTION 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such as
the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any
irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.

SECTION 4. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to his or her influence,
direction or control to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge, on any
irrelevant ground.

SECTION 5. Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting, by
words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally relevant to
an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.

CANON 6

COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Competence and diligence are pre-requisites to the due performance of judicial office.

SECTION 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other activities.

SECTION 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only the
performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but also
other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court's operations.

SECTION 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and
personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this
purpose the training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to
judges.

ABAD V. BLEZA, 1986

As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Even on the
assumption that the judicial officer has erred in the appraisal of the evidence, he cannot be held
administratively or civilly liable for his judicial action. A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a
civil action for acts done by him in the exercise of his judicial function, however erroneous. Not every
error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has
erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable.

DAGUDAG V JUDGE PADERANGA

FACTS: Illegal forest products possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc were seized by the DENR. The
items were found to be lacking the required legal documents and were consequently abandoned by the
unknown owner. Later a certain Roger C. Edma filed a writ of replevin for the release of said confiscated
products. Respondent Judge issued the writ despite the fact that an administrative case was already
pending before the DENR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct
unbecoming a judge.

HELD: Yes. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First,
under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies. In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any
administrative remedy. Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take
cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. Third, the forest
products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin. Judge Paderanga’s acts
of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of
the law.

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that

competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that
judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper
performance of judicial duties. Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments and
show acquaintance with laws. The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending
before administrative agencies is basic.

SECTION 4. Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant developments of international law,
including international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights norms.

SECTION 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

FACTS: After the conducted judicial audit, respondent Judge Orlando P. Doyon was found to have
neglected his duties. The audit team reported that there were six civil cases and nine criminal cases
where no action was made for a considerable length of time and other cases which were already beyond
the period to resolve and beyond the reglementary period to decide. At the time the findings were
made, respondent judge has already retired which he also used as a defense in order to exculpate
himself.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Doyon is guilty of neglect and undue delay of rendering justice.

HELD: The Court held that the Constitution requires trial judges to dispose of all cases or matters within
three months. The New Code of Judicial Conduct also provides in Canon 6, Section 5 thereof that judges
shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness. The reason for this rule is that justice delayed is justice denied. Undue delay in
the disposition of cases results in a denial of justice which, in turn, brings the courts into disrepute and
ultimately erodes the faith and confidence of the public in the judiciary. Thus, the failure of judges to
render judgments within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition
of administrative sanction.

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient,
dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals
in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court staff and
others subject to their influence, direction or control.

SECTION 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial duties.