De La Salle Lipa

College of Law

1985 and 1998 Bar Questions and Answers in Land Titles and Deeds

Christine Elaine M. Honrade

JD2

March 3, 2018

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 1985 Bar Questions and Answers in Land Titles and Deeds
I.
A bought a house and lot in a subdivision, subject to the condition, annotated
on the certificate of title, that they shall be used for residential purposes only. Ten
years later, A sold the property to B, who converted it into a restaurant. The owner
demanded its closure, but B refused alleging (1) that although he subsequently
came to know the title issued to him bears such an annotation, he was unaware of
it at the time of the sale as the seller did not tell him so and the deed of sale in his
favor makes no mention of it; (2) that his lot has been re-classified by ordinance
as commercial; and (3) that it has in fact become commercial because of its
proximity to some stores and a shopping center in an adjoining subdivision. Rule
on the validity of said defenses.
Suggested Answer: There are now three decisions of the Intermediate
Appellate Court. The first decision was incorporated in 1984 in the Silverio case.
The facts are identical. There was a legitimate exercise of the police power. The
stipulation in the contract of sale, which was properly annotated at the back of the
title will have to give way to that legitimate exercise of the police power of the State.
Besides (under Art. 1266 of the New Civil Code), we have here an obligation,
which cannot be complied with because of a legal impossibility by reason of that
ordinance. The classification supersedes the annotation.

United BF Homeowners’ Associations, Inc. vs. The (Municipal) City Mayor,

Parañaque City
515 SCRA 1
2007
Facts:
The Municipal Council of Parañaque enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 97-085
entitled. Sections 11.5 and 11.6 of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 reclassified El
Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF Homes Parañaque from residential to
commercial areas. The homeowners’ association alleged that the reclassification
of certain portions of BF Homes Parañaque from residential to commercial zone is
unconstitutional because it amounts to impairment of the contracts between the
developer of BF Homes Parañaque and the lot buyers. The association cited the
annotation on the lot buyers’ titles which provides that “the property shall be used
for residential purposes only and for no other purpose.” The municipality alleged
that the passage of Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police
power by the Municipal Council of Parañaque and that such ordinance can nullify
or supersede the contractual obligations entered into by the petitioners and the
developer.
Issue:
Whether or not Municipal Ordinance No. 97-085 should prevail over the
restrictions annotated at the back of the certificate of titles
Ruling:
Yes, Municipal Ordinance No. 97-085 should prevail over the restrictions
annotated at the back of the certificate of titles.

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 The Court has upheld in several cases the superiority of police power over the
non-impairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts
is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public
health, safety, morals and general welfare.
In Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., the Court
held that contractual restrictions on the use of property could not prevail over the
reasonable exercise of police power through zoning regulations. The Court held:
“With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual
obligations assumed by the defendant-appellee– referring to the restrictions
incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates
of Title issued to defendant-appellee—it should be stressed, that while non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since
it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., “the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people.” Invariably described as “the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers” and “in a sense, the greatest and most powerful
attribute of government,” the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been
a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long Distance
Company v. City of Davao, et al., police power “is elastic and must be responsive to
various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of
precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a
democratic way of life.” We were even more emphatic in Vda. de Genuino v. The
Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., when We declared: “We do not see why the public
welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made to
prevail through the state’s exercise of its police power.”
Resolution No. 27. s-1960 declaring the western part of Highway 54, now E.
de los Santos Avenue (EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as
an industrial and commercial zone, was obviously passed by the Municipal Council
of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the
health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality.
Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially where
Lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway;
industrial and commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main
traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila
area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and
pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its
route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal
Council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing
the subject resolution.”
Likewise, in Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court upheld
Metro Manila Commission Ordinance No. 81-01, which reclassified Jupiter Street
in Makati into a high-density commercial zone, as a legitimate exercise of police
power. The Court held that the power of the Metro Manila Commission and the
Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare
prevails over the deed restrictions on the lot owners in Bel-Air Village which
restricted the use of the lots for residential purposes only. The Court held:
‘It is not that we are saying that restrictive easements, especially the
easements herein in question, are invalid or ineffective. As far as the Bel-Air
subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, they are valid and enforceable. But they are,
like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the

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 greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power.
Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the “law between the
contracting parties,” but while it is so, it cannot contravene “law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.” Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent
to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance
the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. x x x’
Similarly, in this case, Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 is a legitimate exercise
of police power and the reclassification of El Grande and Aguirre Avenues in BF
Homes Parañaque is not arbitrary or unreasonable.

II.
After finding on a bus an envelope containing two Torrens certificates of title in
A’s name, B, posing as A and forging his signature, sold the two parcels of land,
described in the Titles to X, who bought them in good faith and for value and to
whom transfer certificates were issued in his name. He then conveyed one parcel
to Y, a bona fide purchaser for value, while the other was levied upon to satisfy the
judgment against X.
Who has a better right to the aforementioned parcels of land, A, Y, or the
judgment creditor? Discuss.
Suggested Answer: Y has a better right than A over the parcel of land he bought
from X in good faith and for value, because Y bought the land from the registered
owner X, and therefore Y is a purchaser for value and in good faith, whose title is
protected by P.D. 1529.

Peralta vs. Heirs of Bernardina Abalon

727 SCRA 477
2014
Facts:
The subject parcel of land was registered in the name of Bernardina Abalon,
who sold the same to Restituto Rellama. Rellama subdivided the land into three
portions, in which portions B and C ended up with Marissa Andal, Arnel Andal, and
Leonil Andal. Claiming that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Abalon in favor
of Rellama was a forged document, and claiming further that they acquired the
subject property by succession, they being the nephew and niece of Bernardina,
who died without issue, Mansueta Abalon and Amelia Abalon filed the case against
Rellama, Spouses Peralta, and the Andals. Rellama alleged that the deed of
absolute sale executed by Bernardina is genuine and that the duplicate copy of
Original Certificate of Title of the property had been delivered to him upon the
execution of the said deed of transfer. The Spouses alleged good faith.
Issue:
Who has a better right among the claimants?
Ruling:
Marissa Andal, Arnel Andal, and Leonil Andal have a better right among the
claimants.

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 A person who is dealing with a registered parcel of land need not go beyond
the face of the title. A person is only charged with notice of the burdens and claims
that are annotated on the title.
Section 55 of the Land Registration Act provides protection to an innocent
purchaser for value by allowing him to retain the parcel of land bought and his title
is considered valid. Otherwise, the title would be cancelled and the original owner
of the parcel of land is allowed to repossess it.
Jurisprudence has defined an innocent purchaser for value as one who buys
the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or
interest therein and who then pays a full and fair price for it at the time of the
purchase or before receiving a notice of the claim or interest of some other persons
in the property. Buyers in good faith buy a property with the belief that the person
from whom they receive the thing is the owner who can convey title to the property.
Such buyers do not close their eyes to facts that should put a reasonable person
on guard and still claim that they are acting in good faith.
After executing the Deed of Sale with Bernardina Abalon under fraudulent
circumstances, Rellama succeeded in obtaining a title in his name and selling a
portion of the property to the Andals, who had no knowledge of the fraudulent
circumstances involving the transfer from Abalon to Rellama.
When Rellama sold the properties to the Andals, it was still in his name; and
there was no annotation that would blight his clean title. To the Andals, there was
no doubt that Rellama was the owner of the property being sold to them, and that
he had transmissible rights of ownership over the said property. Thus, they had
every right to rely on the face of his title alone.
The established rule is that a forged deed is generally null and cannot convey
title, the exception thereto, pursuant to Section 55 of the Land Registration Act,
denotes the registration of titles from the forger to the innocent purchaser for value.
Thus, the qualifying point here is that there must be a complete chain of registered
titles. This means that all the transfers starting from the original rightful owner to
the innocent holder for value – and that includes the transfer to the forger – must
be duly registered, and the title must be properly issued to the transferee.
In the instant case, there is no evidence that the chain of registered titles was
broken in the case of the Andals. Neither were they proven to have knowledge of
anything that would make them suspicious of the nature of Rellama’s ownership
over the subject parcel of land. Hence, we sustain the CA’s ruling that the Andals
were buyers in good faith. Consequently, the validity of their title to the parcel of
the land bought from Rellama must be upheld.

III.
The register of deeds refused to record a deed of sale executed in favor of a
Filipino woman on the ground that she is an alien, because her husband is an
alien, and although she secured an absolute divorce from him abroad, the divorce
is void since our law, which governs her status, does not recognize absolute
divorce. Rule on the legality of the register of deeds' refusal to register.
Suggested Answer: I believe the Register of Deeds erred in refusing to register
the same for the reason stated in the question. When all the formal requisites for
registration are presented, it is the duty of the RD to effect the registration. And

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this duty is clearly ministerial and mandatory in character. The main purpose of
registration is merely to give notice to the public, either actually or constructively.
In one case, the Supreme Court ruled that suspected invalidity of the contract is
not a valid ground to refuse registration. In the instant case, unlike in Krivenko
where vendee was admittedly an alien, the vendee is a Filipino. The only reason
the RD refused to register is because she was married to an alien. Aside from the
fact that they have divorced, it is not even certain or clear that she lost her Filipino
citizenship by reason alone of her marriage. This depends upon the laws of her
husband's country. The question whether she lost Filipino citizenship, under these
facts, should be decided after registration.

Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation vs. Paruñgao

688 SCRA 485
2013
Facts:
Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation was the registered owner of Hacienda
Bacan, an agricultural land, in Negros Occidental, which was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-105742, and it remained so despite the sale of the
land, in favor of Atty. Jose Miguel Arroyo, in a tax delinquency sale. Thereafter, the
Department of Agrarian Reform commenced an administrative process to acquire
the property, and several investigations and valuations were made over the land.
Then, Atty. Arroyo caused the annotation of a Declaration of Trust on the title,
declaring that he purchased the property as a mere trustee of Rivulet and claims
no interest thereon. Then, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO)
requested the Register of Deeds (RD) of Negros Occidental to issue the title in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, but it was not acted upon because the
Certifications of Deposit (CODs) were in the name of Rivulet while the title carried
an annotation of Declaration of Trust in favor of Atty. Arroyo. Meanwhile, Rivulet
demanded the RD not to cancel the title in its name and not to issue certificates of
land ownership award, but the RD still did the contrary.
Issue:
Whether or not the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental should cancel the
title over Hacienda Bacan in the name of Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation
Ruling:
Yes, the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental should cancel the title over
Hacienda Bacan in the name of Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation.
The issuance of title in the name of the Republic was a necessary part of the
implementation of the government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
As such, it is the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds to register the land in the
name of the Republic after full payment has been made and no injunctive relief
can be issued, except by the Court, pursuant to Section 5549 of R.A. No. 6657, as
amended by R.A. No. 9700. While the Court issued a TRO, records reveal that the
acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished prior to its issuance,
rendering the same of no practical purpose. Besides, the installation of farmer-
beneficiaries on Hacienda Bacan was undertaken only after respondent
Undersecretaries had sought the legal support and clearance of the OSG,
notwithstanding that the first paragraph of Section 24 of R.A. No. 6657 as amended
by R.A. No. 9700 provides that the award to beneficiaries, including their receipt

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of a duly registered emancipation patent or CLOA and their actual physical
possession of the awarded land, shall be completed not more than one hundred
eighty (180) days from the date of registration of the title in the name of the
Republic.

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 1998 Bar Questions and Answers in Land Titles and Deeds
I.
Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, concerning adverse claims on
registered land, provides a 30-day period of effectivity of an adverse claim, counted
from the date of its registration. Suppose a notice of adverse claim based upon a
contract to sell was registered on March 1, 1997 at the instance of the BUYER, but
on June 1, 1997, or after the lapse of the 30-day period, a notice of levy on
execution in favor of a JUDGMENT CREDITOR was also registered to enforce a
final judgment for money against the registered owner. Then, on June 15, 1997
there having been no formal cancellation of his notice of adverse claim, the BUYER
pays to the seller-owner the agreed purchase price in full and registers the
corresponding deed of sale. Because the annotation of the notice of levy is carried
over to the new title in his name, the BUYER brings an action against the
JUDGMENT CREDITOR to cancel such annotation, but the latter claims that his
lien is superior because it was annotated after the adverse claim of the BUYER
had ipso facto ceased to be effective. Will the suit prosper? [5%]
Suggested Answer: The suit will prosper. While an adverse claim duly
annotated at the back of a title under Section 70 of P.D. 1529 is good only for 30
days, cancellation thereof is still necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the
inscription thereof will remain annotated as a lien on the property. While the life of
adverse claim is 30 days under P.D. 1529, it continues to be effective until it is
canceled by formal petition filed with the Register of Deeds. The cancellation of
the notice of levy is justified under Section 108 of P.D. 1529, considering that the
levy on execution cannot be enforced against the buyer whose adverse claim
against the registered owner was recorded ahead of the notice of levy on
execution.

Torbela vs. Rosario

661 SCRA 633
2011
Facts:
The Torbela siblings, owners of Lot No. 356-A, which was originally part of Lot
No. 356, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16676, executed a Deed
of Absolute Quitclaim over the Lot No. 356-A, in favor of Dr. Andres Rosario, in
which the siblings bound themselves to transfer the lot to Dr. Rosario, which then
resulted to the cancelation of the OCT and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 52751, in the name of Dr. Rosario. Thereafter, Dr. Rosario
executed another Deed of Absolute Quitclaim, acknowledging that he only
borrowed the lot from the Torbela siblings and was already returning the same to
them.
After Dr. Rosario obtained a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP), which was secured by a mortgage over the lot, Cornelio T. Tosino, on
behalf of the Torbela siblings, executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, which was
annotated on the TCT, but a petition for the cancellation of the notice was not filed.
After the payment of the loan in DBP and the cancellation of the mortgage over the
lot, Dr. Rosario acquired another loan from the Banco Filipinas, which was secured
by a mortgage over the same lot; however, Dr. Rosario failed to pay the loan, and

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the mortgage was foreclosed and was sold to Banco Filipinas, as the highest
bidder in the public auction.
The Torbela siblings, seeking to recover the lot, argued that Banco Filipinas is
not a mortgagee and buyer in good faith; but Banco Filipinas contended that it is a
mortgagee in good faith, because according to Section 70 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529, the notice of adverse claim has already been cancelled, 30 days after
its execution.
Issue:
Whether or not the notice of adverse claim has already been cancelled 30 days
after its execution so as to make Banco Filipinas a mortgagee in good faith
Ruling:
No, the notice of adverse claim is not considered as cancelled 30 days after its
execution without a petition for its cancellation so as to make Banco Filipinas a
mortgagee in good faith.
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is
to apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land
and to preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency
of the controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the
disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
The Court stressed in Ty Sin Tei v. Lee Dy Piao that “[t]he validity or
efficaciousness of the [adverse] claim x x x may only be determined by the Court
upon petition by an interested party, in which event, the Court shall order the
immediate hearing thereof and make the proper adjudication as justice and equity
may warrant. And it is ONLY when such claim is found unmeritorious that the
registration thereof may be cancelled.” The Court likewise pointed out in the same
case that while a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled in a number of ways, “the
same is not true in a registered adverse claim, for it may be cancelled only in one
instance, i.e., after the claim is adjudged invalid or unmeritorious by the Court
x x x”; and “if any of the registrations should be considered unnecessary or
superfluous, it would be the notice of lis pendens and not the annotation of the
adverse claim which is more permanent and cannot be cancelled without adequate
hearing and proper disposition of the claim.”
With the enactment of the Property Registration Decree on June 11, 1978,
Section 70 thereof now applies to adverse claims:
“SEC. 70. Adverse claim.—Whoever claims any part or interest in registered
land adverse to the registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registrations, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree for registering the same,
make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged right, or interest, and how or
under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in
which the right or interest is claimed. The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and
shall state the adverse claimant’s residence, and a place at which all notices may be
served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an adverse claim
on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days
from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest:
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the
same ground shall be registered by the same claimant. Before the lapse of thirty days
aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where

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 the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant
a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall
render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be
invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court,
after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous,
it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more than
five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may
withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that
effect.”
Whether under Section 110 of the Land Registration Act or Section 70 of the
Property Registration Decree, notice of adverse claim can only be cancelled after
a party in interest files a petition for cancellation before the RTC wherein the
property is located, and the RTC conducts a hearing and determines the said claim
to be invalid or unmeritorious.
No petition for cancellation has been filed and no hearing has been conducted
herein to determine the validity or merit of the adverse claim of the Torbela siblings.
Entry No. 520469 cancelled the adverse claim of the Torbela siblings, annotated
as Entry Nos. 274471774472, upon the presentation by Dr. Rosario of a mere
Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage.

II.
In 1965, Renren bought from Robyn a parcel of registered land, evidenced by
a duly executed deed of sale. The owner presented the deed of sale and the
owner's certificate of title to the Register of Deeds. The entry was made in the
daybook, and corresponding fees were paid, as evidenced by official receipt.
However, no transfer of certificate of title was issued to Renren, because the
original certificate of title in Robyn's name was temporarily misplaced after fire
partly gutted the Office of the Register of Deeds. Meanwhile, the land had been
possessed by Robyn's distant cousin, Mikaelo, openly, adversely and continuously
in the concept of owner since 1960. It was only in April 1998 that Renren sued
Mikaelo to recover possession. Mikaelo invoked a) acquisitive prescription and b)
laches, asking that he be declared owner of the land. Decide the case by
evaluating these defenses. [5%]
Suggested Answer: a. Renren's action to recover possession of the land will
prosper. In 1965, after buying the land from Robyn, he submitted the Deed of Sale
to the Registry of Deeds for registration together with the owner's duplicate copy
of the title, and paid the corresponding registration fees. Under Section 56 of PD
No. 1529, the Deed of Sale to Renren is considered registered from the time the
sale was entered in the Day Book (now called the Primary Entry Book).
For all legal intents and purposes, Renren is considered the registered owner
of the land. After all, it was not his fault that the Registry of Deeds could not issue
the corresponding transfer certificate of title.
Mikaelo's defense of prescription cannot be sustained. A Torrens title is
imprescriptible. No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. (Section 47, P.D.
No, 1529)
The right to recover possession of registered land likewise does not prescribe,
because possession is just a necessary incident of ownership.

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 b. Mikaelo's defense of laches, however, appears to be more sustainable.
Renren bought the land and had the sale registered way back in 1965. From the
facts, it appears that it was only in 1998 or after an inexplicable delay of 33 years
that he took the first step asserting his right to the land. It was not even an action
to recover ownership but only possession of the land. By ordinary standards, 33
years of neglect or inaction is too long and maybe considered unreasonable. As
often held by the Supreme Court, the principle of imprescriptibility sometimes has
to yield to the equitable principle of laches, which can convert even a registered
land owner's claim into a stale demand.
Mikaelo's claim of laches, however, is weak insofar as the element of equity is
concerned, there being no showing in the facts how he entered into the ownership
and possession of the land.

De Leon vs. De Leon-Reyes

791 SCRA 407
2016
Facts:
Alejandro De Leon possessed two parcels of public lands. Sometime between
1995 and 1996, the government granted free patents, covering the lots, to Nenita
De Leon-Reyes, the daughter of Alejandro. The Register of Deeds issued Original
Certificates of Title (OCT) over the lots, in the name of Nenita. In 2002, she filed
an action for recovery of possession of the lots against Pedro De Leon, his brother,
who has been possessing the lots since 1971.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for recovery of the parcels of land, instituted by Nenita
in 2002, against Pedro, who has been in possession of the same since 1971, is
already barred by prescription and laches
Ruling:
No, the action for recovery of the parcels of land, instituted by Nenita in 2002,
against Pedro, who has been in possession of the same since 1971, is not yet
barred by prescription and laches.
Nenita’s right to recover possession of the property had not been barred by
laches. As the registered owners of the subject properties, Nenita and her family
have the imprescriptible right to recover possession thereof from any person
illegally occupying it.
As we held in Spouses Ocampo v. Heirs of Bernardino U. Dionisio, prescription
and laches cannot apply to land registered under the Torrens system. No title to
registered land, in derogation of that of the registered owner, shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.

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