SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]

LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.

DECISION

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris

Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui,
husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are:

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our

Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City and as a result of their marital union,
[1]

they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all
surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out
that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in
1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street,
Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the
College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent.

Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988
and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent
admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that
everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the
representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then
on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would
come to an end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her
husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in December 1988,
respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then
met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with
respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail.
The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on
that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed
on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more
particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainants husband,
Carlos Ui. In her Answer, respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui
[2]

sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the
knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy,
China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of
their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in
fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985 . Upon their return to Manila,
[3]

respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his
children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui
wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second
marriage before they would live together. [4]

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she
would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and
renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988,
respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted
that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery
of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii
sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2)
children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law
firm she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the
[5]

wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has
been communicating with her.

It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit

because they were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent
discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him.
Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he
resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was
respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother,
Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her
parents funds. By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in
[6]

the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for

having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case
against respondent.

In her Reply dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that
[7]

respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and
had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and
that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children
with Carlos Ui.

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant
also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of
Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S.
No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to
establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the
criminal complaint against respondent reads:

Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence

of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly
discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same
evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living
with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part
of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship"

of respondents started and was discovered by complainant
sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living
at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan,
MetroManila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their
conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when
respondent Carlos left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic)
the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie
established by complainants evidence, this same evidence had
failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents
cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San
Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and
indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense
charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement
only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not
make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S.
vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).

It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in

support of their respective positions on the matter support and
bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant

complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. [8]

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to

the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed on the ground of
[9]

insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui

lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant

filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission wherein
[10]
she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for
submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She
alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar,
respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on
October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her
averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage duly certified by the State
[11]

Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of
Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in
Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui
and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22,
1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the
reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress
upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock. It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a
[12]

violation of Articles 183 and 184 of the Revised Penal Code, and also
[13] [14]

contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false
allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are
indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy
to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), respondent

[15]

averred that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate
because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed
such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of
the marriage certificate in her possession.

Respondent filed her Memorandum on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone
[16]

issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for
which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred
that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:

(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with

the requirement of good moral character for the practice of
the legal profession; and

(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent

conducted herself in an immoral manner. [17]

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was
the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos
Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no
reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of
a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his
courtship. [18]
On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was
highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to
her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated
that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage
to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that
respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted
respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June
1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and
admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the
marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present
evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.

Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of

respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a
garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a
picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another
picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house
and the garage, does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They
[19]

have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a

photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during
the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint
filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable
cause for the offense charged and the dismissal of the appeal by the
[20]

Department of Justice to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any
[21]

immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine,
respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith
and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless,
nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she
believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she
parted ways with him.

In the Memorandum filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she
[22]

prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent
committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which
resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondents
mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband
since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs.
Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. It was thus highly improbable that
[23]

respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been
informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant
likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the
Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an
intercalated date.

In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum , respondent stated that

[24]

complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment.

Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no
showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to
complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married
man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent.

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline
submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that:

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was

courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single.
The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in
the light of contemporary human experience.

Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he

represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm
commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to
fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men.

The records will show that when respondent became aware the
(sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in
July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she
returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her
brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only
talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed
to visit. At no time did they live together.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find

any act on the part of respondent that can be considered as
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and
should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without
cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal
and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl.

x..........................x..........................x"

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED

and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality
against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris
Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to
 her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty."

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to
enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar
examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of
due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics.
The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

b. a resident thereof;

c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

d. a person of good moral character;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral

turpitude, are filed or pending in court;

f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations. (Italics supplied)

[25]

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the
bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly,
possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a
ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held -

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar,
then the continued possession of good moral character is also a
requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession.
Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to
have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by

reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A
member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard

as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
 appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may
not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful,

flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community."
(7 C.J.S. 959).[26]

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she
met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love
with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth
to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she
left him.

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of
respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how
the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before.
This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are
burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle
their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to
believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a
compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in
finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate
involvement with him.

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents

suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and
moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that
she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it
appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and
this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987,
Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is
simply incomprehensible considering respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was
very open in courting her.

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent
was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that
her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed
was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes
conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion
of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such
[27]

conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that
is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. [28]
We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards." Respondents act of immediately distancing
[29]

herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that
alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the
law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainants bare
assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests
upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if
she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. This,
[30]

herein complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to

her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she
merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided
her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any
normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult
to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the
year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience
and highly improbable.

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an

attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of
the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage
Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on
that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest

standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing
less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from
misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as
officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L.

Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a

photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date
thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed
on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman and Acting C.J.), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena,

JJ., concur.

Ui vs. Bonifacio
Adm. Case No. 3319, June 8, 2000

Facts:

Complainant Lesli Ui found out that her husband Carlos Ui was carrying out an illicit relationship with
respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot two children. Hence, a complaint for disbarment
was filed by complainant against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an
illicit relationship with the complainant’s husband. It is respondent’s contention that her relationship
with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988, when
respondent discovered Carlos Ui’s true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent
averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her.

Issue:

Whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred
from the practice of law.

Held:

The complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, was
dismissed.

All the facts taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in
managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed
as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For
immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of
good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary
action, the same must be “grossly immoral,” that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006

MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON ALEXANDER RONQUILLO,

represented by their Attorney-in-Fact SERVILLANO A. CABUNGCAL, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law for unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They allege that respondent sold them a piece of property
over which he has no right nor interest, and that he refuses to return to them the amount they have
paid him for it.

Complainant Marili C. Ronquillo is a Filipino citizen currently residing in Cannes, France, together with
her minor children, Alexander and Jon Alexander.

In May 1999, complainants and respondent entered into a Deed of Assignment.1 For the price
of P1.5M, respondent transferred, in favor of the complainants, his rights and interests over a
townhouse unit and lot, located at 75 Granwood Villas Subd., BF Homes, Quezon City. Respondent
also obligated himself to deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he executed with Crown
Asia, the townhouse developer, dated April 19, 1996. Upon full payment of the purchase price,
respondent further undertook to have Crown Asia execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property
in favor of the complainants.

Respondent received from complainants P750,000.00 upon execution of the Deed of Assignment. The
balance was to be paid by complainants in four equal quarterly installments of P187,500.00 each.
Thus, complainants issued in favor of respondent four postdated checks in the amount of P187,500.00
each. Respondent was able to encash the first check dated August 17, 1999.2

Complainants subsequently received information from Crown Asia that respondent has not paid in full
the price of the townhouse at the time he executed the Deed of Assignment. Respondent also failed to
deliver to complainants a copy of the Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown Asia. For
these reasons, complainant Marili Ronquillo ordered the bank to stop payment on the second check
she issued to respondent in the amount of P187,500.00.

On March 6, 2000, complainants, through their counsel, wrote respondent, informing him that they
were still willing to pay the balance of the purchase price of the townhouse on the condition that
respondent work on Crown Asia’s execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor. In the
alternative, complainants demanded the return of the amount of P937,500.00, plus legal interest,
within ten days.3 The amount of P937,500.00 represents the P750,000.00 down payment and the first
quarterly installment of P187,500.00 which complainants paid respondent.

In a letter dated May 2, 2000, addressed to complainants,4 respondent claimed that he was "working
now on a private project which hopefully will be realized not long from now," and requested for "a
period of twenty days from May 15, 2000 within which to either completely pay Crown Asia or return
the money at your (complainants’) option." The period lapsed but respondent did not make good his
promise to pay Crown Asia in full, or return the amount paid by complainants.

On February 21, 2002, complainants’ counsel sent respondent a second letter5 demanding the return
of the amount of P937,500.00, including legal interest, for failing to comply with his promise. The
demand was unheeded.

Hence, this administrative complaint6 that respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Allegedly, respondent violated his oath under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and he ought to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the
instant disciplinary case was assigned for investigation, report and recommendation, found
respondent guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct proscribed under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. In her Report dated October 9, 2003, she recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of
Governors, through Resolution No. XVI-2003-226, dated October 25, 2003, approved the
recommendation of Commissioner San Juan.

We agree.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation
of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." "Conduct," as used in this rule, does not refer exclusively to the performance of a lawyer’s
professional duties. This Court has made clear in a long line of cases7 that a lawyer may be disbarred
or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court.
In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a contract
with complainant Marili representing to have the rights to transfer title over the townhouse unit and lot
in question. When he failed in his undertaking, respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be gainsaid that it was unlawful for
respondent to transfer property over which one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent was
likewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right from
complainants. He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price of the
subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign said property
at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase
price amounting to Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P937,500.00), despite
knowing he was not entitled to it, made matters worse for him.

Respondent’s adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the money she paid him,
which was the fruit of her labor as an Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is morally
reprehensible. By his actuations, respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of morality required
by the Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect reposed in him as a
member of the Bar, and an officer of the court.

Respondent’s culpability is therefore clear. He received a letter from complainants’ counsel

demanding the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the complainants, or, in the
alternative, the return of the money paid by complainants. In reply to said letter, respondent
acknowledged his obligation, and promised to settle the same if given sufficient time, thus:

xxx

I am working now on a private project which hopefully will be realized not long from now but I need a
little time to fix some things over. May I please request for a period of 20 days from May 15, 2000
within which to either completely pay Crown Asia or return the money at your option. (Emphasis
supplied)

In no uncertain terms, respondent admitted not having full ownership over the subject townhouse unit
and lot, as he has yet to completely pay Crown Asia. Respondent even failed to produce the
Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown Asia over the subject unit, which would show the
extent of his right of ownership, if any, over the townhouse unit and lot in question.

To be sure, complainants gave respondent sufficient time to fulfill his obligation. It was only after
almost two years had passed, after respondent promised to pay Crown Asia or return to complainants
the amount they paid him, that complainants sent respondent a second letter8 demanding solely the
return of the amount of P937,500.00, including legal interest. By this time, it was indubitable that
respondent would not be able to perform his end of their agreement.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral
character.9 The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.10 Lawyers must
conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the
public at large,11 and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.12

Be that as it may, we cannot grant complainants’ prayer that respondent be directed to return the
money he received from them in the amount of P937,500.00. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its
officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still
fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.13 Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the
amount of money that should be returned to the complainants.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Homobono T. Cezar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6288 June 16, 2006MARILI C. RONQUILLO, ALEXANDER RONQUILLO and JON
ALEXANDER RONQUILLO, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact SERVILLANO A.
CABUNGCAL,Complainants,vs.ATTY. HOMOBONO T. CEZAR,Respondent.

FACTS: Complainant Marili Ronquillo together with her minor children Alexander Ronquillo and Jon
Alexander Ronquillo and respondent Atty. Homobono Cezar entered into a deed of assignment covering certain
rights and interest over a townhouse located at Quezon City for the amount of 1.5 million pesos. It was settled
that upon payment of the downpayment of the 1.5 million pesos, respondent must furnish complainants a deed of
assignment transferring the said right and interest over the pertained property. Respondent also obligated himself
to furnish the complainants with a copy of the contract to sell with Crown Asia, the townhouse developer, and
upon full payment shall execute with the latter a Deed of Absolute Sale over the said property in favor of the
complainants. However, upon payment of the remaining balance, respondent failed to perform the subsequent
obligations, to wit: delivering the contract to sell which was to be executed by the respondent with Crown Asia
and to execute in favor of the complainants and deliver the Deed of Absolute Sale to the same. Complainants
also received a notice from Crown Asia that respondent did not actually deliver the full payment of the price of
the said townhouse at the time the Deed of Assignment was executed. Complainants then deliver to respondent
two (2) demand letters demanding for the return of the amount paid to the respondent or the performance of
respondents obligation, to pay to Crown Asia the full amount of the town house and deliver to complainants a
copy of the contract to sell and Deed of Absolute Sale. However, despite of the demand letters, respondent failed
to comply with the demands prompting complainants to file an administrative case before the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, after thorough investigation conducted, found that herein
respondent is guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct proscribed under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violating his oath
under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Resoponsibility.

RULING: The Court Agrees. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar
may be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1)deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office; (3)grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5)
violation of the lawyers oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
"Conduct," as used in this rule, does not refer exclusively to the performance of a lawyers professional duties.
This Court has made clear in a long line of cases7that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. In the instant case, respondent
may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a contract with complainant Marili representing to
have the rights to transfer title over the townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking,
respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot
be gainsaid that it was unlawful for respondent to transfer property over which one has no legal right of
ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of
right from complainants. He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price of the
subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign said property at the time
of the execution of the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price amounting to Nine
Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to it,
made matters worse for him. Respondents adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the money
she paid him, which was the fruit of her labor as an Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is morally
reprehensible. By his actuations, respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of morality required by the
Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect reposed in him as a member of the Bar,
and an officer of the court. The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good
moral character.9The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.10Lawyers must conduct
themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large,11and a
violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 389 February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.

Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.

Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.

REGALA, J.:

On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno,
a member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all
the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein
do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former
Rules of Court.

The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the
complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The
respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent
likewise testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on
June 1, 1958, disclaimed the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and
disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.

After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality.
The complaint recites:

That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando
Puno were engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a
movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment before
going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo, Manila;
that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent
proposed to complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway
we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of
respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and before
they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as 'Mr. and
Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the
room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside and
respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant begged respondent
not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have promised to marry you';
and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again
assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that
thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed
himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed; that when respondent
was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to
respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00
 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together;
that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to
have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait until they were
married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already
on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of
marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth
to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a
promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute
a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the Philippine
Bar.

The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.

A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the
complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that
on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however,
admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November,
1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice
law. Without stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence,
respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.

This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor
Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral
argument. There was no appearance for the respondents.

Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional
evidence in his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo,
Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his
investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of
Court.

After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.

Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She
testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register
as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of
marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and
Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.

Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to
Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a
telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a
letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant
and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City
in November, 1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry
her.
1äw phï1.ñët

Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met
in Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was
likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which
was duly identified by the respondent to be his.

Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital.
This is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil
Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's
Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.

To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter
testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated
by the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated
November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.

The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed
to discredit complainant's testimony.

In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and
complainant were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were
sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp.
12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and
respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)

Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise
of marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual
passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .

One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the
old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license
or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and
the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In
re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies
the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and
Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of
morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took
complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did
not present evidence to show where he was on that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil.
303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet
the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is
hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly
so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very
means by which it may assist him.

With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the
complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of
Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a
lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number,
our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in
his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In
re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583;
Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact,
"grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule
138, Rules of Court).

Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act
and has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important
that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance
with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and
to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is
ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

QUINGWA VS. PUNO (19 SCRA 439)

FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a
member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. Complainant is an
educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years.
The respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing
the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. Complainant submitted to
respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of
marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of
voluntariness and mutual passion. Complainant gave birth to a baby boy
supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate and to show how
intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was,
the latter testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked
from her.

The respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a
special defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds
for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules
of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno should be disbarred/suspended.

HELD: YES. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the
Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court).
It is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege to maintain good moral character. When his integrity is challenged
by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must
meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs
that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at
all times is expected of him. With respect to the special defense raised by the
respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the
allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section
25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the
statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to
be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a
lawyer. The inherent powers of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.
Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be
removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also
for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of court states that:

A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as

attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus
disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it
is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of law must
conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As
stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:

The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the
profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral
character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and
to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but
the administration of justice.

Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a

consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief,

Public Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO, respondent.

[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON

BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity
 as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, respondents.

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that

appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-
2667.[1]

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information

Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and
pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed
that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment
cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the
case will not involve separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo
also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is
payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision
thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public
Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the
August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of
The Philippine Star. [2]

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as

Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and
Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court. [3]

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has
come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation;
that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer
advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the
rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he
prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the
Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a
lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is
dignified. [4]

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation. On June 29, 2002, the IBP
[5]

Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306, finding [6]

respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and
suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that a
repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution
was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002. [7]

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for

Reconsideration, which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606
[8]

dated October 19, 2002 [9]

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No.
157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief,
Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated with
A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest
whether or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of
the pleadings. Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating
[10]

that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting

the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum
[11]

on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for
a party without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a

business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the
[12]

primary consideration.Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making

venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The [13]

gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public

[14]

service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration

of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves. The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a
[15]

business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in

which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving

thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. [16]

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He

himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he
professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings
hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he
pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate
the rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal
services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Newspaper. Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be
[17]

published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell. Such acts of respondent
[18]

are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself
as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly
erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an
institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of
permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an
annulment may be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of
the case, he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been
[19]

disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to
do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the
dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it
would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar. Thus, the use of simple
[20]

signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence
address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals
bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is
now acceptable. Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
[21]

the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and

informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal
Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions;
public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching
positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal
and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names
of clients regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot
be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which
is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program.Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law
list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive
or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but
not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T.

SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon
receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman),Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman ), abroad, on official business.
Khan vs. Simbillo, A.C No. 5299, August 19, 2003

FACTS:

A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads:“Annulment of
Marriage Specialist [contact number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number
but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband, Atty. Simbillo was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided thecase will not
involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were
also published.An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the IBP for investigation
and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the
name of Atty. Simbillo did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed against him
but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition
against advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any wayby the prohibition.

ISSUE:Whether or not Simbillo violated Rule2.03 & Rule3.01.

HELD:
Yes! The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public
service and money. Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and
administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary interest. Worse,
advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” he erodes and undermines the sanctity of
an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise disinclined to
dissolve their marriage bond. Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper
it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the lawyer’s
name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly publish
in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published the contents of
which are likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar.

EN BANC

[A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005]

OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Mosib Ali
[1]

Bubong for having been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the
position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the
administrative case earlier filed by complainant against respondent. In said
case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance
of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli
Datu, Mona Abdullah, Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae Bauduli Datu,
[2]

Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the
criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali
Datus are relatives of respondent. [3]
 The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The
investigating officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges
brought against him, thus:

It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case
but that he has no case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore,
premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against
respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence. [4]

The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in
a report dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon
exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the
custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave
misconduct for his imprudent issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the
criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against Hadji
Serad Bauduli Datu and the latters co-accused. As a result of this finding,
Secretary Drilon recommended respondents dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by
Secretary Drilon and ordering respondents dismissal from government service.
Respondent subsequently questioned said administrative order before this
Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition claiming that
[5]

the Office of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove
him from office. He also insisted that respondents in that petition violated the
[6]

laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he
abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him
(herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition for
failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned
order. Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was
[7]

denied with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.

On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now
before us, seeking the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it
has become obvious that respondent had proven himself unfit to be further
entrusted with the duties of an attorney and that he poses a serious threat to
[8]

the integrity of the legal profession. [9]

In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with
his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to
him, both law and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial
[10]

duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land
registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In
the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his
office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821
in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of
criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed
by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latters co-defendants. Respondent explains
that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces
tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the
various land titles involved in said dispute. He further claims that the dismissal
of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the
evidence presented by the parties. Complainants allegation, therefore, that he
influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.
Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995, this Court referred this matter to
[11]

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and
recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the
investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner
Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order relative to the transfer of venue
of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides:

ORDER

When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.

The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of
evidence vis--vis this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president
of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this
case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action.
[12]

On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution

approving Commissioner Fernandezs recommendation for the transfer of venue
of this administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region
governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the
investigation, report, and recommendation. The IBP Resolution states:
[13]

Resolution No. XII-96-153

Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong

RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C.

Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western
Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter
concerned to conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.

Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar

Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George
C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive
the evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and
recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of Governors. [14]
 In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato
Chapter informed the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the
[15]

investigating panel had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a
[16]

series of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP
Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by recommending that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for five years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for
the transmittal of the records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur
Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as
Commissioner Fernandezs Order dated 23 February 1996.
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP
Cotabato Chapter to comment on respondents motion. Complying with this
[17]

directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondents motion for the

transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City. On 25 September
[18]

1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi
City for the reception of respondents evidence. This order of referral, however,
[19]

was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268
issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides:

RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the

transmittal of the case records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is
directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report
the same to the Board of Governors. [20]

Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08

October 1998 a motion praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato
Chapter be stricken from the records. Respondent insists that the
[21]

investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to
conduct the investigation of this case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and
Commissioner Fernandezs Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested IBP
Marawi City with the power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he
was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato
Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process.
Complainant opposed this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of
[22]

laches. According to complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by

IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the
hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent
did nothing to defend himself. He also claims that respondent did not even
bother to submit his position paper when he was directed to do so. Further, as
respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains
that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally, complainant
contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a
duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato
Chapter.
 In an Order dated 15 October 1999, Commissioner Fernandez directed
[23]

IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted
by the investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position paper
were duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a
member of the IBP Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished
Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panels order dated 4 August
1997. Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the
[24]

local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten
notation reading Atty. Mosib A. Bubong.
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo,
Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the
report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive
had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-
2001-271 issued on 30 June 2001, to wit:

RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for

the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to
conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60)
days from receipt of notice.
[25]

Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her
father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case. According to her, her father
passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic
brotherhood, she was requesting the withdrawal of this case. [26]

Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP
CBD to direct the chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao
to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to
conduct an investigation of this case. This motion was effectively denied by
[27]

Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated 19 July 2002. According to Atty.

[28]

Castillo

After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the
report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of
respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to
make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of
Cotabato City.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga

del Norte is hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission
on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days from date hereof.

In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the

findings and conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:

The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the
President in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein
respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:
 a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,

b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting

law.

And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In
the Comment filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is
good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of
manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by
the way, was filed against respondents relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office
of the President in Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial
evidence were taken into account and fully explained, before the Decision therein was
rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by
the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very
strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present
case.

In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing
the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato. [29]

In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors

adopted and approved, with modification, the afore-quoted Report and
Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the
period of suspension from the practice of law which should be imposed on
respondent whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of
IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP Board of Governors
found a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
IBP which the latter denied as by that time, the matter had already been
endorsed to this Court. [30]

The issue thus posed for this Courts resolution is whether respondent may
be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the
government. We resolve this question in the affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a
lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the
express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of
lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government official is of
such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government
[31]

office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he

committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a
lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal
profession. [32]
 Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, we [33]

ordered the disbarment of respondent on the ground of his dismissal from

government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared

[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress
upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose
shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy
and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid
discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and
justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its
prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are
expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which,
throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character. [34]

Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig, this Court
[35]

found sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct

perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the
Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case

[A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission
which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she
must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is
a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice. (Emphasis supplied)
[36]

In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the

Office of the President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his
qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of
Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land
registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated
his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain
his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
is explicit on this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public
duties.

Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in the

public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal
profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law
calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter,
requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on
the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by
reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. As we have [37]

previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A.

Rayos: [38]

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of

interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out
by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven.
This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no
private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and
prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administrative of justice. [39]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED

and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy
of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar,
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, andGarcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., no part.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.
OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent. A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005

FACTS: This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been
found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City. It
appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by
complainant against respondent, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT); and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli
Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali
Datus are relatives of respondent. The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent,
absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him. The case was then forwarded to the DOJ
for review, then SoJ Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and
infidelity in the custody of documents, but held guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance
of TCT and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law instituted against
Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latter’s co-accused. As a result of this finding, former President FVR
issued AO No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon. Respondent questioned
said AO before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition claiming that
the Office of the President did not have the authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office and
insisted that respondents violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V.
Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated
his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent), but was
dismissed for failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order. Respondent MR was denied with finality. On
the disbarment proceeding, complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had
proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney and that he poses a serious
threat to the integrity of the legal profession. Respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular
with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law and
jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi
City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of the documents presented by the
applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office
warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor. Respondent
also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-
Squatting Law and explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces
tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles
involved in said dispute. The IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February
1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez denied the order relative to the transfer of venue of this case
and penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. The finding of
Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by
evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of
respondent in the present case. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification,
which pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice of law from a five-year
suspension to a two-year suspension to be proper. On 17 January 2003, respondent MR was denied as
by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.

ISSUE: WON respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the
employ of the government.

RULING: We resolve this question in the affirmative. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not
cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express
provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. Although the
general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
bar for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer
if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession. In the case at
bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and subsequently
affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the
Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land
registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only
to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads: Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the
government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the
people’s confidence in the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal
profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less
than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law. As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased
complainants daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on
the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the complainant to
prosecute the same. As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty.
Orlando A. Rayos: A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record,
the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a
civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of
preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or
the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administrative of justice. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and
his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.