Second Amended Petition For Enforcement of COIA 120712

VIRGINIA:
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY

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THOMAS A. WOOLMAN, :
Petitioner, :
vs. :
: Case No. CL17-155
JOHN D. LESINSKI :
:
Respondent :
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SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ACT
COMES NOW, Thomas A. Woolman, by counsel, and pursuant to Rule 1:8, Rule
3:12, and Rule 3:16 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, and this Court’s Letter
Opinion and Order entered April 9, 2018, August 7, 2018 and December 5, 2018 Letter
Opinions1 and for his Amended Petition under the Virginia State and Local Government
Conflicts of Interest Act, Virginia Code §§2.2-3100, et seq., Title 2.2, Chapter 31 of the
Code of Virginia (hereinafter referred to as “the Conflicts Act” or by its initials: “COIA”),
including mandamus, injunctive relief and declaratory judgment against Respondent John
D. Lesinski and respectfully states as follows:
(1) At all relevant times pertinent to the acts, defaults and violations of law complained
of in this Petition, the Conflicts Act, which is remedial in nature, provides and has provided
as follows:
1By filing this Second Amended Petition, Petitioner waives no rights or issues under Code § 8.01-
384 or otherwise with respect to any of the claims, assertions or requests for relief set forth in his
original Petition filed October 2, 2017, or his First Amended Petition filed April 30, 2018, all
which are hereby incorporated herein by reference and/or preserved. On April 24, 2018, Petitioner
duly noted his exceptions to the entry of the Court’s April 9, 2018 Order, and on September 10,
2018 duly noted his exceptions to the Court’s August 7, 2018 Letter Opinion, and all such
exceptions and objections are hereby preserved under Rule 5:25 of the Rules of the Supreme Court
of Virginia in the event of an appeal of the final judgment of this Court, notwithstanding that
certain of those claims or requests for relief are not included or have been substantially altered or
deleted from this Second Amended Petition.
WOOLMAN VS. LESINSKI (CL17-155) page 1 of 21

SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF VIRGINIA CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ACT
(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
§ 2.2-3100. Policy; application; construction.
The General Assembly, recognizing that our system of representative government is
dependent in part upon . . . its citizens maintaining the highest trust in their public officers
and employees, finds and declares that the citizens are entitled to be assured 2 that the
judgment of public officers and employees will be guided by a law that defines and
prohibits inappropriate conflicts and requires disclosure of economic interests.
***
This chapter shall be liberally construed to accomplish its purpose.
***
§ 2.2-3112. Prohibited conduct concerning personal interest in a transaction; exceptions.
A. Each officer and employee of any state or local governmental or advisory agency
who has a personal interest in a transaction shall disqualify himself from participating
in the transaction if * * * (ii) he is unable to participate pursuant to subdivision B 1, 2,
or 3. Any disqualification under the provisions of this subsection shall be recorded in the
public records of the officer's or employee's governmental or advisory agency. The officer
or employee shall disclose his personal interest as required by subsection E of § 2.2-3114
or subsection F of § 2.2-3115 and shall not vote or in any manner act on behalf of his
agency in the transaction. The officer or employee shall be prohibited from (i) attending
any portion of a closed meeting authorized by the Virginia Freedom of Information Act
(§ 2.2-3700 et seq.) when the matter in which he has a personal interest is discussed and
(ii) discussing the matter in which he has a personal interest with other governmental
officers or employees at any time.
2
See, Neal v. Fairfax County Police Department, at al. Record No. 170247, decided April 26, 2018 and
compare Code 2.2-3126(B) to Code § 2.2-3800(B)(3) [“In support of his motion, Neal cited the General
Assembly’s stated purpose in creating the Data Act, including the increased possibility of harm that can
come from developments in information technology and the effect this can have on ‘[a]n individual’s
opportunities to secure employment, insurance, credit and his right to due process.’” (Slip Op. at 4) * * *
A statute whose purpose is to “provide protections to those otherwise not in a position to effectively defend
themselves” is “remedial.” Board of Supervisors v. Rhoads, 294 Va. 43, 51, 803 S.E.2d 329, 333 (2017)
* * * The Data Act expressly declares its remedial purpose is to “preserve the rights guaranteed a
citizen in a free society” by “establish[ing] procedures to govern information systems containing
records on individuals.” Code § 2.2-3800(B)(4). * * * Further, to achieve the legislature’s stated
purpose, Code § 2.2-3809 provides a mechanism for relief to ‘[a]ny aggrieved person’ by which that
person ‘may institute a proceeding for injunction or mandamus against any person or agency that has
engaged, is engaged, or is about to engage in any acts or practices in violation of the provisions of this
chapter.’ (Emphases added.) ‘Every statute is to be read so as to promote the ability of the enactment
to remedy the mischief at which it is directed.’ Board of Supervisors v. King Land Corp., 238 Va. 97,
103, 380 S.E.2d 895, 897 (1989) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Remedial statutes are to
be liberally construed “so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy in accordance with the
legislature’s intended purpose.” University of Virginia v. Harris, 239 Va. 119, 124, 387 S.E.2d 772, 775
(1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis removed). “All other rules of
construction are subservient to that intent.” Id. [Slip Op. at 6-7]
(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
***
D. * * * Official action taken under circumstances that violate this section may be
rescinded by the agency on such terms as the interests of the agency and innocent third
parties require.
(2) Petitioner Woolman (hereinafter “Woolman”), is (and was at all relevant times
pertinent to the acts, defaults and violations of law complained of in this Petition) a citizen
of the Commonwealth of Virginia, and has been domiciled and been a resident, a taxpayer
and registered to vote and has voted in every primary and general election since 2010 in
Hampton Magisterial District, Rappahannock County, Virginia where he has been
domiciled owned real property and paid taxes since 2010. Not all residents of Hampton
Magisterial District are registered voters or pay real estate taxes. According to the U.S.
Census Bureau, the total population of Rappahannock County is 7,373 of which only 5,769
are registered voters. The population of the Hampton District is 1,483 of which 1,236 are
registered voters. Of that number, in the 2015 General Election in which Respondent
Lesinski was elected to the Board of Supervisors, only 718 registered voters of Hampton
District (58 percent), including Woolman, actually voted, and of that number 59.05 percent
voted against Lesinski.3 These factors distinguish Woolman from “the general public.”
(3) Respondent, John D. Lesinski (hereinafter “Lesinski”), is (and was at all relevant
times pertinent to the acts, defaults and violations of law in which he was complicit and
complained of in this Petition), the elected member of the Governing Body of
Rappahannock County, Virginia (the Board of Supervisors, hereinafter "the Board") from
Hampton Magisterial District where Woolman lives, owns property, votes and pays taxes.
As such Lesinski was and is an “officer” of a “government agency” as those terms are
defined in Virginia Code § 2.2-3101.
(4) Arthur L. Goff, (hereinafter “Goff”) is (and was at all relevant times pertinent to the
matters recited in this Second Amended Petition), the duly elected Rappahannock County
3 Source: Virginia State Board of Elections: (Last Modified on 11/03/2015 11:04 PM)
http://results.elections.virginia.gov/vaelections/2015%20November%20General/Site/Locality/RAPPAHANNOCK%
20COUNTY/Index.html
(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
Attorney for the Commonwealth, and as such is an “officer” as defined in Code § 2.2-3101.
The office of the Attorney for the Commonwealth is a “government agency” defined in
Code § 2.2-3101 and is “his agency” as described in Code § 2.2-3112(A). Since November
2016, Goff also was and is currently an employee of the Board in his capacity as Deputy
County Attorney and/or County Attorney and as such was and is an “employee” of a
“government agency” as those terms are defined in Code § 2.2-3101.
(5) Woolman has a direct and substantial interest in the matters and transactions
described in this Petition, and is aggrieved by the Lesinski’s alleged violations of the
Conflicts Act by being deprived of rights under the Conflicts Act and other legal privileges
and immunities, including the equal protection of the law and his statutory right to be
assured under the Conflicts Law that public officials in the jurisdiction where he lives,
votes and pays taxes comply with this statute that was enacted for his benefit.4 Woolman
is also aggrieved in a direct, personal and pecuniary way by virtue of the fact that Lesinski’s
actions by improperly voting on transactions involving appropriations of public funds for
his own personal benefit incrementally increase Woolman’s tax burden by adding
Lesinski’s pro-rata share of legal defense costs (hereinafter more fully described) to the
Rappahannock County budget to which Woolman is forced to contribute via payment of
Rappahannock County real estate and personal property taxes. Likewise, Woolman is
aggrieved by the failure of the Attorney for the Commonwealth for Rappahannock County
to enforce the Conflicts Act as it pertains to Lesinski’s alleged violations.5 Absent the
granting of extraordinary relief (mandamus and injunctive relief) as requested in this
Amended Petition,6 there will be a de facto suspension of the execution of the Conflicts
4 Virginia Code §2.2-3100(A)

5 Petitioner does not waive and hereby preserves his exceptions to the Court’s August 7, 2018 and
December 5, 2018 Letter Opinions to the extent the Court has ruled “This Court stands by its
analysis that the issue of prosecutorial recusal lies within the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s
discretion.” (December 5, 2018 Letter Opinion at 2].
6 See, this Court’s April 9, 2018 letter opinion at 4 and 5 sustaining the demurrer to Count Five of
the original Complaint. The Court found that private citizens have no right of action to enforce
(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
Act that deprives Woolman of rights under the Conflicts Act and other legal privileges and
immunities, including but not limited to equal protection of the laws guaranteed to him
under the laws and the Constitution of Virginia,7 and guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.
(6) As a taxpayer of Rappahannock County and as a citizen of the Commonwealth of
Virginia, Woolman is specifically empowered by statute to seek “declaratory judgment or
other judicial relief as provided by law” by virtue of the last paragraph of Code § 2.2-
3126(B).8 That “other judicial relief” is the injunctive relief and mandamus which is
authorized to prevent a “failure of justice” as mentioned in Virginia Code § 17.1-5139 as
well as imposition of the civil penalties for violation of the Conflicts Act as set forth in
Code § 2.2-3124(A).
(7) Lesinski had or has a “personal interest” as that term is defined in the Conflicts Act,
including Virginia Code § 2.2-3101, in the all of the “transactions” hereinbelow more fully
the criminal portions of the Conflicts Act, to which finding Woolman has noted his exception.
7 Article I. BILL OF RIGHTS SECTION 7. LAWS SHOULD NOT BE SUSPENDED
“That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without
consent of the representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be
exercised.”
See, Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706, 720-722 (2016) [“Virginia has steadfastly held to the
separation-of-powers principle first recognized in its 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights. The anti-
suspension provision has been repeated, without alteration, in all subsequent versions of the Constitution
of Virginia. See Va. Const. art. I, § 7 (1830); Va. Const. art. I, § 7 (1851); Va. Const. art. I, § 7 (1864); Va.
Const. art. I, § 9 (1870); Va. Const. art. I, § 7 (1902); Va. Const. art. I, § 7 (1971).”]
8 Virginia Code §2.2-3126(B) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“Irrespective of whether an opinion of the attorney for the Commonwealth or the Attorney
General has been requested and rendered, any person has the right to seek a declaratory
judgment or other judicial relief as provided by law.” (emphasis added)
9 § 17.1-513. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS.
“The circuit courts shall have jurisdiction . . . to issue writs of mandamus in all matters of
proceedings arising from or pertaining to the action of the boards of supervisors or other
governing bodies of the several counties for which such courts are respectively held or
in other cases in which it may be necessary to prevent the failure of justice and in which
mandamus may issue according to the principles of common law.” (emphasis added)
(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
described infra. either because Lesinski has or may “realize a reasonably foreseeable direct
or indirect benefit . . . as a result of the action of the agency considering the transaction,”
or because Lesinski did, in fact, directly realize a direct “benefit . . . as a result of the action
of the agency considering the transaction.” 10
(8) At a minimum, regardless of whether or not he was absolutely prohibited under
Code § 2.2-3112(A) from participating in the transactions hereinafter described, and even
assuming Lesinski was eligible to invoke one or more of the conditional exemptions from
such prohibition set forth in subsection B of Code § 2.2-3112, Lesinski was nonetheless
required to disclose his respective personal interests in the all transactions in which he had
any personal interest under the Conflicts Act and make a declaration that he was “able to
participate in the transaction fairly, objectively, and in the public interest” in order to take
advantage of one or more of the conditional exemptions. With respect to the transactions
hereinafter described, Respondent Lesinski failed to invoke an exemption under Virginia
10 Code § 2.2-3101(16) defines “Personal interest in a transaction” as follows:

“‘Personal interest in a transaction’ means a personal interest of an officer or employee in
any matter considered by his agency. Such personal interest exists when an . . . employee
. . . represents or provides services to any individual . . . and such . . .represented or
served individual . . . (ii) may realize a reasonably foreseeable direct or indirect
benefit or detriment as a result of the action of the agency considering the transaction.
Code § 2.2-3101(19) defines “transaction” as follows:
“‘Transaction’ means any matter considered by any governmental or advisory agency,
whether in a committee, subcommittee, or other entity of that agency or before the agency
itself, on which official action is taken or contemplated.” (emphasis added)
Code § 2.2-3112(B) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“B. An officer or employee of any state or local government or advisory agency who has
a personal interest in a transaction may participate in the transaction:
2. When a party to the transaction is a client of his firm if he does not personally
represent or provide services to such client and he complies with the declaration
requirements of . . . subsection I of § 2.2-3115.” (emphasis added)
Under the Virginia State Bar Professional Guidelines, "Firm" or "law firm" denotes a
professional entity, public or private, organized to deliver legal services, or a legal department
of a corporation or other organization. See Comment, Rule 1.10.
(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
Code § 2.2-3112 or make the required declarations in a timely way as required by Code
§ 2.2-3115(H).
(9) As hereinafter more specifically set forth, each of the actions and omissions of
Lesinski to recuse hiumself, or, in the alternative, to make the required disclosures and
declarations, commencing in August 2014 were in knowing, wanton, willful and flagrant
disregard for Virginia law, including the Conflicts Act.11 Respondent Lesinski’s failures
after August 23, 2017 – the date of receipt of the advisory opinion from Virginia Conflicts
of Interest and Ethics Advisory Council [as defined in Code § 2.2-3101(6), hereinafter
referred to as “The Advisory Council”] more fully described in paragraph 33, infra., –
were in brazen disregard for the requirements of the Conflicts Act.
(10) Woolman is aggrieved by the acts and omissions herein described as a citizen, and
also has a direct and substantial pecuniary interest in the hereinafter described
appropriations as a taxpayer because, inter alia, such appropriations incrementally increase
his Rappahannock County tax burden.
COUNT ONE:
COIA VIOLATION WITH RESPECT TO COUNTY
LANDFILL “IMPROVEMENTS” TRANSACTION
(11) All of the allegations of paragraphs (1) through (10) are incorporated herein by
reference, as if repeated verbatim.
(12) Commencing in July 2016, the Rappahannock County Board of Supervisors
discussed a transaction that was indicated on the agenda as “Potential Improvements to the
Landfill” at its meetings held on July 6, 2016, August 1, 2016, September 19, 2016,
October 3, 2016, November 7, 2016 and December 5, 2016. On information and belief,
this transaction involved permitting an out-of-county business to store some of its
11 Code § 2.2-3101.1 required that “[a]ll officers and employees shall read and familiarize
themselves with the provisions of this chapter.” In addition, see, e.g., Barson v. Commonwealth,
726 S.E.2d 292, 298 (2012) ["An ancient maxim of the common law is ignorantia legis neminem
excusat. [citation omitted] But if ignorance of the law excuses no one, then all who are subject to
the law are presumed to know what the law requires and to conduct themselves accordingly.”]
(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
inventory of farm and/or heavy equipment at the Rappahannock County Landfill near
Amissville in order to avoid having to pay personal property tax in the adjoining County
where the business was, in fact, headquartered. On information and belief, the proposal
involved a business associate of Lesinski, Ben Luke, the son of the then Rappahannock
County Attorney, Peter H. Luke.
(13) At all six aforementioned meetings of the Board, Lesinski recused himself from the
closed session topic of “potential improvements at the landfill,” and was not present for
the discussion. However, at no time during which the transaction involving the
“improvements at the landfill” was under consideration or discussion by the Board of
Supervisors at the aforementioned six meetings, Lesinski never made any oral disclosures
about the nature of his personal interest in the transaction as required by Code § 2.2-
3115(F), nor was there any such written disclosure reflected in the public records of the
Board of Supervisors until May 2018, long after this proceeding was filed.
(14) Lesinski’s omission and failure completely to disclose the nature of his personal
interest in the “improvements at the landfill” transaction was in direct violation of the
Conflicts Act which requires that any officer local government who has a personal interest
in any transaction before the governmental agency “and who is disqualified from
participating in that transaction pursuant to subsection A of § 2.2-3112 or otherwise elects
to disqualify himself,” shall “forthwith” make disclosure of (1) the existence of his interest,
including the full name and address of the business and (2) the address or parcel number
for the real estate if the interest involves a business or real estate.12 Each one of Lesinski’s
12 Subsection (F) of Virginia Code §2.2-3115 provides as follows:

“F. Any officer or employee of local government who has a personal interest in any
transaction before the governmental or advisory agency of which he is an officer or
employee and who is disqualified from participating in that transaction pursuant to
subsection A of § 2.2-3112 or otherwise elects to disqualify himself, shall forthwith make
disclosure of the existence of his interest, including the full name and address of the
business and the address or parcel number for the real estate if the interest involves a
business or real estate, and his disclosure shall be reflected in the public records of the
(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
violations arguably constituted a Class 3 misdemeanor under Code § 2.2-3120 and
malfeasance in office pursuant to Code § 2.2-3122.
(15) As Attorney for the Commonwealth for Rappahannock County, Goff has taken no
action to enforce the applicable provisions of the Conflicts Act which he is obligated to do
under Code § 2.2-3126(B). Since Goff is legally and ethically barred from so doing or
otherwise from acting on behalf of his agency – the office of Attorney for the
Commonwealth -- because of his ongoing attorney-client relationship with Lesinski in
Bragg I (and, after January 2018 in Bragg II). Goff’s failure either to (a) enforce the
Conflicts Act against Lesinski, or (b) disqualify himself under Code § 19.2-155 results in
a de facto suspension of the execution of the Conflicts Act by Goff which unilateral
suspension is proscribed by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Virginia.
(16) As the Attorney for the Commonwealth for Rappahannock County, Goff’s failure
to see to the faithful enforcement of the Conflicts Act by his agency deprived Woolman of
rights under the Conflicts Act and other legal privileges and immunities, including the
rights vouchsafed to him under Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Virginia, as well
as the right to equal protection of the laws guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States of America and for which he has no adequate
remedy at law. These extraordinary circumstances require an extraordinary remedy:
issuance of injunctive relief and writs of mandamus pursuant to Code § 17.1-153 (“other
judicial relief as provided by law” as set forth in Code § 2.2-3126(B), as well as the
imposition of civil penalties against Lesinski pursuant to Code § 2.2-3124(A).
agency for five years in the office of the administrative head of the officer's or employee's
governmental or advisory agency.” (emphasis added)

(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
COUNT TWO:
VIOLATION OF THE CONFLICTS ACT WITH RESPECT TO
TRANSACTIONS RELATING TO PAYMENT OR
REIMBURSEMENT OF LEGAL FEES IN BRAGG I
(17) All of the allegations of paragraphs (1) through (16) are incorporated herein by
reference, as if repeated verbatim.
(18) In September 2016, a Freedom of Information Act enforcement action was initiated
in the Circuit Court of Rappahannock County, Virginia alleging multiple violations of the
Virginia Freedom of Information Act, and seeking injunctive relief against the Board of
Supervisors of Rappahannock County and also seeking imposition of civil penalties against
certain individual members of the Board of Supervisors, including Lesinski, pursuant to
Code § 2.2-3714 based on allegations that the individual members of the Board had
knowingly and willingly violated FOIA. (CL16-180, hereinafter “Bragg I”)
(19) The Board was represented in Bragg I by then County Attorney, Peter H. Luke
(“Luke”) and then Commonwealth’s Attorney and also part-time Deputy County Attorney,
Goff. At the request of Lesinski and the other individual respondents, Luke and Goff also
undertook to represent the individual respondents in Bragg I, including Lesinski.
(20) At its October 2, 2016 regular meeting, the Board of Supervisors, adopted a
resolution establishing a “Litigation Fund,” and stating, in pertinent part, as follows:
A RESOLUTION AND SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION OF THE BOARD OF
SUPERVISORS OF RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY, VIRGINIA
IT IS HERBY RESOLVED:
Whereas, the Board of Supervisors of Rappahannock County
has received a copy of a “draft” Complaint threatening to
sue the County and each member of this Board, individually,
for alleged Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) violations,
which allegations this Board denies; and,
* * *
Whereas, FOIA suits of the type mentioned are not covered
by the County’s insurance;
* * *

(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
Therefore This Board hereby adopts and ratifies as the policy of
Rappahannock County the provisions of §§15.2-1520 and 15.2-1521
of the Code of Virginia, and for this purpose hereby makes a
supplemental appropriation of $100,000 to existing line item
#100-4-01103-1001100, Litigation Supplement, to be disbursed on
order of this Board in accordance with such statutes.
(21) Subsequent thereto, at its November 7, 2016 regular meeting, the Board of
Supervisors, including Lesinski, voted to approve an October 10, 2016 invoice for Court
Reporter services totaling $175 and attorney’s fees paid to Goff and Luke in connection
with Bragg I. Without invoking any conditional exception to the mandatory recusal
provisions of Code § 2.2-3112(A), or making any disclosure or declaration as required by
Code § 2.2-3115,13 Lesinski voted in favor of the payment. No pro-ration of the amount
authorized for payment was made with respect to the benefit to Respondent, Lesinski who
was a direct beneficiary of the payment as a respondent in Bragg I.
(22) Subsequent thereto, at its December 5, 2016 regular meeting, the Board discussed
and, with the affirmative vote of Lesinski, voted to authorize a payment from the
13 At all relevant times, subsection H of Code § 2.2-3115 has provided as follows:

“H. An officer or employee of local government who is required to declare his interest
pursuant to subdivision B 1 of § 2.2-3112 shall declare his interest by stating (i) the
transaction involved, (ii) the nature of the officer's or employee's personal interest affected
by the transaction, (iii) that he is a member of a business, profession, occupation, or group
the members of which are affected by the transaction, and (iv) that he is able to participate
in the transaction fairly, objectively, and in the public interest. The officer or employee
shall either make his declaration orally to be recorded in written minutes for his agency
or file a signed written declaration with the clerk or administrative head of his
governmental or advisory agency, as appropriate, who shall, in either case, retain and make
available for public inspection such declaration for a period of five years from the date of
recording or receipt. If reasonable time is not available to comply with the provisions of
this subsection prior to participation in the transaction, the officer or employee shall
prepare and file the required declaration by the end of the next business day. The officer
or employee shall also orally disclose the existence of the interest during each meeting
of the governmental or advisory agency at which the transaction is discussed and such
disclosure shall be recorded in the minutes of the meeting.” (emphasis added)

(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
aforementioned litigation fund of an invoice dated November 1, 2016 $132.45 for Court
Reporter services and $8,880 for attorney’s fees paid to outside counsel, Walker Jones,
P.C., in the Bragg I case. Without invoking any conditional exception to the mandatory
recusal provisions of Code § 2.2-3112(A), or making any disclosure or declaration as
required by Code § 2.2-3115, Lesinski voted in favor of the payments. No pro-ration of the
amount authorized for payment was made with respect to legal services for Lesinski’s
benefit, who was a beneficiary of the payment as an individual respondent in Bragg I.
(23) Subsequent thereto, at its January 4, 2017 regular meeting, the Board, with the
affirmative vote of Lesinski, voted to authorize a payment out of the aforementioned
litigation fund in the amount of $4,260 for litigation defense counsel plus $275.85 for Court
Reporter services in Bragg I. Without invoking any conditional exception to the
mandatory recusal provisions of Code § 2.2-3112(A), or making any disclosure or
declaration as required by Code § 2.2-3115, Lesinski voted in favor of the payment. No
pro-ration of the amount authorized for payment was made with respect to legal services
for the benefit of Lesinski, who was a direct beneficiary of the payment as a respondent in
the Bragg I.
(24) Subsequent thereto, at its August 9, 2017 special meeting, the Board of Supervisors,
after consulting with Goff and on Goff’s recommendation, voted to authorize Goff to
counsel to employ the law firm of Walker-Jones, LLC as outside counsel to assist in the
appeal of the decision in the Bragg I case in Supreme Court of Virginia, Record No.
171022. Without invoking any conditional exception to the mandatory recusal provisions
of Code § 2.2-3112(A), or making any disclosure or declaration as required by Code § 2.2-
3115, Lesinski voted in favor of the transaction.
(25) Subsequent thereto, at its October 2, 2017 regular meeting, the Board of
Supervisors, with the affirmative vote of Lesinski, voted to authorize a payment out of the
aforementioned litigation fund to outside litigation counsel in the Bragg I case for services
rendered in connection with drafting and filing the Brief in Opposition to the Petition for
Appeal in the Supreme Court of Virginia totaling of $3,537.75. Without invoking any
(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
conditional exception to the mandatory recusal provisions of Code § 2.2-3112(A), or
making any disclosure or declaration as required by Code §2.2-3115, Lesinski discussed
the transaction with other government officials and voted in favor of the payment. No pro-
ration of the amount authorized for payment was made with respect to the benefit to
Lesinski, who was a direct beneficiary of the payment as a respondent in Bragg I.
aforementioned litigation fund to outside litigation counsel in the Bragg Case for services
rendered or expenses in connection with the pending Appeal in the Supreme Court of
Virginia totaling of $259.82. Without invoking any conditional exception to the mandatory
required by Code § 2.2-3115 even though this action was already pending, Lesinski voted
in favor of the payment. No pro-ration of the amount authorized for payment was made
with respect to the benefit to Lesinski, who was a direct beneficiary of the payment as a
respondent in Bragg I.
(27) Subsequent thereto, at its January 3, 2018 regular meeting, the Board of Supervisors,
with the affirmative vote of Lesinski, voted to authorize a payment out of the
aforementioned litigation fund to appellate counsel (Walker-Jones) in Bragg I for services
Virginia a total of $16.50. Without invoking any conditional exception to the mandatory
required by Code § 2.2-3115 even though this action was already pending, Lesinski voted
(28) Subsequent thereto, at its February 5, 2018 regular meeting, the Board of
Supervisors, with the affirmative vote of Lesinski, voted to authorize a payment of the
(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
Virginia a total of $76.67. Without invoking any conditional exception to the mandatory
required by Code § 2.2-3115, even though this action was already pending Lesinski voted
(29) Subsequent thereto, at its March 5, 2018 regular meeting, the Board of Supervisors,
aforementioned litigation fund to appellate counsel in Bragg I for services rendered or
expenses in connection with the pending Appeal in the Supreme Court of Virginia a total
of $120.00. Without invoking any conditional exception to the mandatory recusal
provisions of Code § 2.2-3112(A), or making any disclosure or declaration as required by
Code § 2.2-3115, even though this action was already pending Lesinski voted in favor of
the payment. No pro-ration of the amount authorized for payment was made with respect
to the benefit to Lesinski, who was a direct beneficiary of the payment as a named
(30) Subsequent thereto, at its May 7, 2018 regular meeting, the Board of Supervisors,
Virginia a total of $3,185.93. Without invoking any conditional exception to the mandatory
required by Code § 2.2-3115, even though this action was already pending Lesinski voted
named respondent in Bragg I.

(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
(31) Subsequent thereto, at its October 1, 2018 regular meeting, the Board of
Virginia a total of $472.50. In a written declaration form filed dated the same day as the
meeting, Lesinski invoked one of the exceptions to the mandatory recusal provisions of
Code § 2.2-3112(A), but the minutes of the meeting do not reflect any oral disclosure of
the existence of Lesinski’s interest during the meeting as specifically required by
subsection H of Code § 2.2-3115. Lesinski voted in favor of the payment. No pro-ration
of the amount authorized for payment was made with respect to the benefit to Lesinski,
who was a direct beneficiary of the payment as a named respondent in Bragg I.
Virginia a total of $3,788.75. In a written declaration form filed dated the same day as the
Code § 2.2-3112(A), but, on information and belief, Lesinski made no oral disclosure of
the existence of his interest during the meeting as specifically required by subsection H of
Code § 2.2-3115. Lesinski voted in favor of the payment. No pro-ration of the amount
authorized for payment was made with respect to the benefit to Lesinski, who was a direct
beneficiary of the payment as a named respondent in Bragg I.
(33) Subsequent thereto, at its December 5, 2018 regular meeting, the Board of
Virginia a total of $1,155.00. In a written declaration form filed dated the same day as the
(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
Code § 2.2-3112(A), but, on information and belief, Lesinski made no oral disclosure of
the existence of his interest during the meeting as specifically required by subsection H of
Code § 2.2-3115. Lesinski voted in favor of the payment. No pro-ration of the amount
authorized for payment was made with respect to the benefit to Lesinski, who was a direct
beneficiary of the payment as a named respondent in Bragg I.
(34) Each and every of the foregoing votes with respect to Bragg I counsel fees and
expenses was a separate “transaction” as defined by the Conflicts Act with respect to each
and every one of which Lesinski had a “personal interest” as one of the named individual
respondents in Bragg I case. Lesinski received a direct benefit from each such
“transaction” to the extent it aided him in the avoidance of civil penalties sought against
him personally in Bragg I. As noted, supra., (see fn. 13) the Conflicts Act specifically
provides that every “officer or employee shall also orally disclose the existence of the
interest during each meeting of the governmental or advisory agency at which the
transaction is discussed.” (emphasis added). Each such vote on each such appropriation
by Lesinski effectively resulted in an incremental increase in Woolman’s liability for
Rappahannock County personal property and real estate taxes.
(35) With respect to the October 2, 2018. November 5, 2018 and December 3, 2018
declarations, Petitioner asserts that Lesinski’s statement that he was acting “fairly,
objectively and in the public interest” were patently false. On the contrary, the votes
benefited no one but Lesinski and his individual co-Respondents, because only they are
potentially liable for civil penalties under Code § 2.2-3714 in the Bragg I litigation, not
the Board or the County taxpayers. Petitioner alleges that each of Lesinski’s declarations
were false, and no public interest was served by Lesinski voting to appropriate money to
insulate himself from the consequences of his own knowing and willful wrongful acts and
omissions as alleged in Bragg I.
(36) Each omission and failure of both Lesinski to make the required elections,
disclosures and declarations on the record as to the existence and the nature of their
respective personal interests in each transaction prior to discussion of, or participation in,
(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
each vote on the appropriations and disbursements in connection with Bragg I was in direct
violation of the Conflicts Act. On information and belief, at this time of this filing, no such
disclosures nor any of the declarations from Lesinski is reflected in any of the Board’s
official minutes.
(37) Absent the invocation on each such occasion of the conditional exemption of Code
§ 2.2-3112(A) coupled with the making of required Code §2.2-3115(H) disclosures and
declarations on each and every meeting or other occasion that any of the foregoing
“transactions” was voted upon or discussed with governmental officials or employees each
and every act of participation in or discussion and approval of the aforementioned
appropriations and disbursements by Lesinski was a separate violation of the Conflicts Act
and arguably a Class 1 misdemeanor under Code § 2.2-3020 and constituted malfeasance
in office under Code § 2.2-3122 and for which Lesinski could be liable to removal from
office under the Conflicts Act.
(38) At various times between October 2016 and August 2017, questions were raised by
a number of Rappahannock County citizens regarding the lawfulness of participation by
Lesinski and other governmental officers in the transactions relative to the various
appropriations from the “litigation fund” in connection with Bragg I.
(39) At the November 2016 Board meeting, Goff and Luke opined orally that because
more than three members of the Board were involved in “the transaction,” what they
described as the “safe harbor” provisions of Code § 2.2-3112(B)(1) permitted the four
Board members with an interest in the transaction due to their being individual
Respondents in Bragg I to discuss the transaction and to vote on the transaction without
violating the Conflicts Act.
(40) In response to subsequent ethical concerns raised in August 2017 about the
applicability of the Conflicts Act to the Board members voting on appropriations for their
individual legal defense fees and costs in Bragg I, and after learning that a private citizen
had requested an informal advisory opinion on the matter from The Advisory Council,
Goff, who was then acting concurrently as the County Attorney employed by the Board,
(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
personal litigation counsel for Lesinski in Bragg I, as well as Commonwealth’s Attorney
for Rappahannock County, Virginia, Goff, acting on behalf of Lesinski and the other Board
members, made his own request opinion to The Advisory Council for an advisory
concerning the propriety of the appropriations and disbursements and the applicability of
the so-called “safe harbor” provisions of Code § 2.2-3112(B)(1).
(41) On August 23, 2017, the Executive Director of The Advisory Council replied, viz.:
From: Stewart Petoe <spetoe@dls.virginia.gov>
Date: Wednesday, August 23, 2017 at 3:13 PM
To: Arthur Goff <artgoff@earthlink.net> Subject: Re: COIA
Dear Mr. Goff:
My apologies for the brief delay in responding to your email. To answer your first question, you are correct.
It is permissible for a Board of Supervisors to create and fund a litigation fund as you described. Virginia Code
section 15.2-1520 specifically empowers localities to employ “counsel approved by the governing body to
defend it, or any member thereof . . . in any legal proceeding to which the governing body, or any member
thereof . . . may be a defendant, when such proceeding is instituted against it, or them by virtue of any actions
in furtherance of their duties. . .”
As you have noted, this authority exists “[n]otwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, general or
special.” This Code section also provides that “All costs and expenses of such proceedings so defended
shall be charged against the treasury of the locality, or political subdivision and shall be paid out of funds
provided therefor by the governing body thereof.” This leads to the firm conclusion that nothing in the State
and
Local Government Conflict of Interests Act (COIA)prohibits the Board of Supervisors from creating their
litigation fund.
In response to your second question, while an individual Board member would have a personal interest in the
transaction of voting to authorize the use of the litigation funds to defend himself in a civil lawsuit in which he
had been sued in his personal capacity, your fact pattern indicates that there are actually four defendants in
the law suit, as well as the Board itself.
Therefore, while the four members all have a personal interest in this transaction, they are covered by
the exemption found in Virginia Code section 2.2-3112 (A) (2), which states that a person who has a personal
interest in a transaction “may participate in the transaction if he is a member of a business, profession,
occupation, or group of three or more persons the members of which are affected by the transaction and he
complies with the declaration requirements of . . . subsection H of 2.2-3115.” (emphasis added) In short,
it is permissible, and is not a violation of COIA, for the Board to authorize the use of litigation funds to employ
counsel to represent the four members who were individually sued.
The Board may also authorize the use of litigation funds to employ counsel to represent the Board, if such
counsel is separate. However, proper disclosures must be made by all parties voting on this
transaction who have a personal interest in this matter, pursuant to the guidelines of Virginia Code
section 2.2-3115(H). This may even include the other Board members who are not being sued in their
personal capacity, depending upon the compensation they receive as members of the Board. [emphasis
added]
I hope this answers your questions. If you have any other questions, though, please do not hesitate to contact
me.
Thank you for contacting the Council for informal guidance.
Very truly yours,
G. Stewart Petoe Executive Director
Virginia Conflict of Interest and Ethics Advisory Council
900 E. Main Street
Richmond, VA 23219

(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
(42) On information and belief, Goff received the advisory opinion from The Advisory
Council and promptly disseminated it to Lesinski and all other members of the Board on
the same day it was received via electronic mail, August 23, 2017.
(43) Even after receiving a copy of the aforementioned advisory opinion from The
Advisory Council on August 23, 2017 that specifically recited the disclosure and
declaration requirements of Code § 2.2-3115 as a quid pro quo for invoking subsection
((B)(1) of Code § 2.2-3112, Lesinski failed to make all of the required elections, disclosures
or declarations as required at the Board’s meetings after August 23, 2017. Each and every
one of these failures and omissions by Respondents was a separate violation of the
Conflicts Act that was knowingly committed in wanton, willful and brazen contempt for
the Conflicts Act.
(44) Pursuant to Code § 2.2-3126(B) of this remedial statute entitles “any person” to seek
“other judicial relief as provided by law,” Woolman hereby petitions the Court, after
making the appropriate findings of fact, for a writ of mandamus directing Lesinski to make
the required elections, disclosures and declarations with respect to each and every
transaction hereinabove described as required by Code § 2.2-3112 and Code § 2.2-3115,
and to issue a mandatory injunction enjoining Lesinski from participating in any
transactions or discussing such transactions with other governmental officers or employees
without making the required elections, disclosures and declarations required under the
Conflicts Act. In addition, the Court should determine the pro-rata amount of the
$22,076.22 in counsel fees and expenses voted on by the Board (or such amount as may be
proven at trial) that are attributable to Lesinski personally, order him to reimburse that
amount to the County Treasurer and impose a civil penalty in an equivalent amount, all as
provided by Virginia Code §2.2-3124(A).

(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court, pursuant to Virginia
Code §§ 2.2-3100 et seq., Code §§ 8.01-184 et seq., Code § 17.1-513, grant the following
relief:
A. Make findings of fact that Lesinski violated the Virginia Conflicts of Interests Act
in multiple ways and on multiple occasions as herein alleged in Count One, Count
Two and Count Three; issue a writ of mandamus pursuant to Code § 17.1-513
against Lesinski commanding Lesinski to make all required disclosures of his
personal interest in the transactions hereinabove described and any future
transactions in which he has a personal interest as mandated by the Conflicts Act;
and impose a civil penalty against Lesinski as provided by Code § 2.2-3124(A)
in an amount equal to the amount of money attributable to such violations and,
in addition, the forfeiture of the pro rata share of counsel fees and expenses
attributable to Lesinski arising from the transactions described herein in such
amount as the Court may determine.
B. Grant declaratory judgement that unless he fully complies with Code § 2.2-
3115(H), Lesinski is precluded by the Conflicts Act from discussing with any other
government officers or employees any pending or future transactions relative to
appropriations for Bragg I or Bragg II on account of his personal interest in the
transaction(s), that Lesinski may not act or vote in connection with the
transaction(s), and that for either of Respondents to do so would be prohibited
conduct and constitute a violation of the Conflicts Act;
C. Grant injunctive relief “or other judicial relief as provided by law” enjoining
Lesinski from engaging in further discussions with other government officers or
otherwise participating in any transaction relating to appropriations for Bragg I,
Bragg II due to his personal interests in the transaction(s), all as provided by the
Conflicts Act, Code § 2.2-3126(B), and or a writ of mandamus ordering him not to
participate in or discuss such transactions without making proper disclosures
required thereby;
D. Grant unto Petitioner all such other and further judicial relief as to which he may be
entitled and the nature of his cause may require to achieve the ends of justice and
the goals and purposes of the Virginia State and Local Government Conflicts of

(DECEMBER 7, 2018)
Interest Act, and to protect his rights under the Constitution of Virginia and the
Constitution of the United States of America.
Dated: December 7, 2018 THOMAS A. WOOLMAN

by counsel
_____________________________
David L. Konick VSB No. 17495
P.O. Box 57
Washington, Virginia 22747-0057
Phone 540-937-5067
Counsel for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing pleading were served upon counsel
for Respondent via first class mail or facsimile this 7th day of December 2018 in accordance with
Rule 1:12 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia:
Robert T. Mitchell, Esquire [rmitchell@hallmonahan.com]
Hall, Monahan, Engle, Mahan & Mitchell [(540) 662-4304]
9 East Boscawen Street
Winchester, Virginia 22604-8482
Counsel for John D. Lesinski
David L. Konick

(DECEMBER 7, 2018)

Second Amended Petition For Enforcement of COIA 120712

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VIRGINIA:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RAPPAHANNOCK COUNTY

WOOLMAN VS. LESINSKI (CL17-155) page 1 of 21

4 Virginia Code §2.2-3100(A)

10 Code § 2.2-3101(16) defines “Personal interest in a transaction” as follows:

12 Subsection (F) of Virginia Code §2.2-3115 provides as follows:

WOOLMAN VS. LESINSKI (CL17-155) page 9 of 21

WOOLMAN VS. LESINSKI (CL17-155) page 10 of 21

13 At all relevant times, subsection H of Code § 2.2-3115 has provided as follows:

WOOLMAN VS. LESINSKI (CL17-155) page 11 of 21

WOOLMAN VS. LESINSKI (CL17-155) page 14 of 21

WOOLMAN VS. LESINSKI (CL17-155) page 18 of 21

WOOLMAN VS. LESINSKI (CL17-155) page 19 of 21

WOOLMAN VS. LESINSKI (CL17-155) page 20 of 21

Dated: December 7, 2018 THOMAS A. WOOLMAN

WOOLMAN VS. LESINSKI (CL17-155) page 21 of 21

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