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PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN

"THE DAY AFTER"

The ABC made-for-TV film, "The Day After," which depicts

the aftermath of a nuclear attack on Kansas City, will air

nationally on Sunday, November 20 at 8:00 p.m. EST.

The film, despite some technical flaws, is a credible

portrayal of the chaos and suffering that would result from a

nuclear attack on a densely populated metropolitan area.

This plan is not designed to debate the film's accuracy

or to deny in any way the horror of nuclear war. Indeed,

we agree with the basic premise t h at nuclear war would be

terrible. The plan is rather intended as a means by which

the Administration can, on one hand, express its views before

the fact as to the wisdom of showing such a film and, on the

other hand, to calm the public fears afterwards. The aim

will be to channel peoples' emotional reactions to the film

into support for the President's efforts to strengthen deterrence

and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

The plan has two phases, pre-airing and post-airing.

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Because of the short time remaining before the film's air

date, the plan contains no background information or compre-

hensive list of themes. It is assumed that a large audience

in e x cess of 20 million will vi ew the film and that the

i mpact on public opinion vis~ vis our strategic nuclear and

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arms control policy will be negative. It is also assumed

that the Administration, particularly the White House, the

Departments of Defense and State, and the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEHA) will receive a significant number

of calls and letters of concern from the public. Along with

this, the media will dwell on public reaction and seek Admin-

istration comment. A number of TV talk shows are expected

to focus on the film and the subject of nuclear war. As

expected, nuclear freeze groups and the like will try to

capitalize on public sentiment generated by the film to renew

a push for a freeze resolution in Congress. Members of

Congress can expect an increase in constituent mail.

The question of how the film will affect European audiences

is not specifically addressed in the plan, although some elements

in the second phase of the plan may apply 'in dealing with

European reactions.

In carrying out the plan, we should not be concerned

that we are helping to publicize the film and adding to its

viewers. The film is already controversial and is expected

to draw a large audience. Not making known our attitiude

to the film could be more damaging than causing another

million or so people to watch it.

\Je must be careful, however, not to over-react to the

film or to seem overly anxious before it airs. We should be

somewhere in between -- on the job, calm, sympathetic, and

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responsive, and opposed in principle to fear-evoking enter-

tainment.

Severe outside reaction to the film may be better than

anything dramatic we might do. For example, Accuracy In

Media (AIM) may buy advertising on the show to urge ABC

stockholders to vote on a resolution condemning the film.

AIM has also sent out 450 letters to propective advertisers

on the show informing them of their position. As of three

weeks before air time, only 50 percent of the spots have

been sold.

In addition, public reaction may be more moderate than

expected. A representative of the Telecommunications Research

and Action Center (former National Citzens Committee for

Broadcasting), who saw film, said it did not change his

mind and doesn 1 t think it will change the public 1 s opinion.

This is the view of a sophisticated, Washington association

man; it remains to be seen how the people elsewhere will

react.

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MEDIA ACTIVITY EXPECTED BEFORE AND AFTER AIRING

LOCAL: It can be expected that local television stations

(both ABC affiliates and others), as well as newspapers and radio

stations, will attempt to "localize" the story for their particular

audiences, with an emphasis on just what such a situation would

mean to the citizens of

- - - - - - - -.
This will be a particularly important issue to media in

locations where a military installation is near a metropolitan

area, or where a military base is known to have nuclear weapons

and is thus a "target." Also, SAC bases and commanders, because

of emphasis in the movie on launching of the U.S. missiles,

will receive media attention.

To localize and dramatize the story, the media most likely

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will want:

o To interview (on camera, on air, personally) the base

commander himself

o To be allowed to film/tape/photograph on the installation

to illustrate the local story

(Several requests of this nature already have been received,

including one from an ABC affiliate in El Paso, in which OSD

Public Affairs was asked to direct the local commander to

conduct an interview with the TV station and to allow the

station to video tape on the base.)

 The news angle- is likely to revolve around the following

issues and questions:

o Will we be a target? (Is our city a high probability area?)

o Would what happened in Kansas City or Lawrence apply to us?

o What would happen here in a similar circumstance?

NATIONAL: It is expected that the national media may attempt

to tie together other "current" issues that have been raised

recently, which add other dimensions to the possibility of

nuclear exchange, such as:

o The recent report on the effects on the atmosphere

(darkness/freezing cold) of a nuclear exchange.

o The newly uncovered "secret" films of the aftermath of

the World War II atomic explosions.

o The Cuban Missile Crisis, and "how close we were."

o The "War Game" film, and how secure nuclear forces are

from accidental launch.

The national media will expect comm ents from high government

officials (White House, Congress, State, DOD, etc.)

The national media also will want to interview military

commanders of particularly visible or well-known installations.

In addition, the national media will want to interview various

mid-level officials who are recognized "experts" on some aspect of

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the nuclear question.

GENERAL: AliC already has announced tl1at there will be a special

segment following the airing of the film, during which "both sides

of the nuclear debate" wll be featured.

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LOCAL STATION PROGRAMMING

In the Washington, DC area, the following are the plans of the

network affiliated stations:

WJLA-TV, Channel 7 (ABC):

Two programs concerning the movie are scheduled (no name
or format finalized yet):
12:00 midnight to 2:00 a.m. following the movie
9:00 a.m. to 11 :00 a.m. Monday following.

WRC-TV Channel 4 (NBC):

Nothing planned at this time.

WDVl1-TV, Channel 9 (CBS):

Nothing planned at this time.

In other areas, this pattern is repeated: the ABC

affiliate will be doing special interest programming on
the movie and the whole subject of nuclear war/nuclear
disarmament, while the NBC and ChS affiliates do not
have any special programming planned.
(News programming is another matter, and of course such
programs are not pre-planned, but react to the news
itself.)
 QRAFT

SAMPLES OF PUBLIC AND MEDIA REACTION THUS FAR

Two very different viewpoints on the same movie:

The National Review (30 September 1983) praises ABC-TV for

its efforts "to support nuclear deterrence" through the
showing of the film. The article states that, "The producers
at ABC obviously want to impress upon us just what might
happen if our deterrent becomes unconvincing, tempting the
Soviets to treat Lawrence, Kansas, as if it were a Korean
airplane."

The Washington Times (Reed Irvine, 18 October 1983) views

the results of the film differently. Instead of being a
means of strengthening our resolve for effective deterrence,
the movie "is bringing joy to the hearts of the advocates
of nuclear freeze and other anit-nuke types on the eve of the
deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western
Europe."

The movie, and media coverage of it, would seem to increase

the distance, and the level of feelings, between the anti-nuke
and the pro-defense factions.

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 Human Events ("Inside Washington," 22 October 1983) discusses

the airing of the movie from the standpoint of "equal time" for

opposing viewpoints. Several pro-defense groups will be pressuring

ABC and its affiliates for balanced reporting of the issue, including

requests for the airing of the film, "Countdown for America."

The article also pointed out that many anti-nuke groups and

pro-freeze legislators have had access to the film, while pro-

defense groups have been denied all access.

Some media coverage may well be balanced, particularly the

more sophisticated media:

CBS Sunday Morning News (23 October 1983) presented a series of

comments from people in Lawrence, Kansas who had previewed

the movie. The coverage was balanced, and specifically

stated that the film never addresses the question -- arm

for peace or disarm for peace.

The pro-freeze movement is planning vigils and marches, and

other media events, in association with the showing of the film.

These events specifically will be to protest deployment of new

missiles by NATO in Europe.

(See other articles attached)

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN

PHASE ONE: Runs up to the time of the airing, November 20.

Its objective is to get people to question the propriety of
the film -- to question whether fear-provoking entertainment
on the subject of nuclear war is in our society's best interest.
In hand with that criticism, we could express the hope that
the film causes more people to become interested in the
President's arms reduction efforts and to support them more
vigorously.

Points of criticism are that the film:

exploits peoples' emotions, denies reason
will instill unnecessary fear in the public,
especially children
implies that nuclear war is inevitable
stresses nuclear war itself, rather than the steps
needed to prevent it
implies that US would be the one to start the war
generates an emotional response that could lead to
public pressures for deep cuts in defense spending, cuts
which would lead to unilateral disarmament and curtailment
of our strategic modernization program, resulting finally in
a precipitous weakening of our strategic deterrent and the
very nuclear war we want to prevent.
 DRAFT -9 -
ACTION PKOPOSALS
Pre-airing:

Draft brief official statement with three elements:

o Conceding nuclear war would indeed be horrible

o Opposing commercialization of fear

o Hoping people will come . to support President's arms

17
reduction proposals. (see sample; page l;:5:-)

Appropriate USG agencies should begin to respond to media

queries and grant interviews. (Up to now public affairs

officers and spokespersons have not commented on-record,

ostensibly because they have not seen the film.)

Prepare briefing materials for spokespersons and speakers;

materials would include Q & As, an outline of the film,

press articles and a sample statement, and would be

divided into pre-airing and post-airing commentary; would

also contain do 1 s and don 1 ts, e.g., avoid all direct

condemnation of the AHC network or the film's producers;

make no attempt to prevent people from seeing the film.

Draw up two lists of speakers

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o Adminsitration officials (see page -~1 2r for DoD speakers)

o Administration supporters

Outside support:

o Identify pro-Adrnin people, e.g., foreign affairs and

military experts, academics, ex-flag officers, religious

(more)
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leaders, corporate leaders, writers, reporters, scientists,

doctors, ex-Cabinet officers, former members of Congress,
celebrities, etc.

Indentify private sector groups that might be opposed

to film on other grounds, e.g., violence, and cite their
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views in background sessions. (See sample list page~

Set up media backgrounders and on-record interviews for

Pentagon, State and White House press corps with senior
officials who draw well and with well-known outside
supporters, e.g., ex-President.

Set up sessions with sympathetic syndicated journalists

to meet with Weinberger and Shultz.

Appearances on Sunday TV talk shows on the day the film airs

to discuss President's arms proposals; principals such
as Weinberger, Shultz, Eagleburger, and Mcfarlane.

In his Saturday radio adoress (Nov 19) the President should

warn Americans not to let scare tactics (without naming
film) force them to let down their guard, and then go on
to explain his arms proposals in simple language.

Morning network news, e.g., "Go<'.1d Morning America;"

sub-cabinet officials from State, DoD, or NSC to appear
several times during the week before the show.
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Popular publications; e.g., READERS DIGEST, PEOPLE Magazine,

TV GUIDE, GLAMOUR Magazine. Determine interest in having

exclusive interviews with principals.

Op Ed pieces for signature of sub-Cabinet officials warning

of scare tactics and pointing out US public opinion cannot

influence Soviet leadership to negotiate and reiterating

Administration's arms proposals and steps already taken,

e.g., recent re9uction in NATO warheads, confidence building

measures, others.

CWW to call TV GUIDE owner and ask if he plans article

on the film (implying that one on commercialization of

fear by TV would be interesting).

Appropos the call to TV GUIDE, have other principals

contact sympathetic media to suggest similar articles

and express willingness to be interviewed on subject.

Identify statements made by outside experts who support our

view, including collateral statements, e.g., a psychiatrist

deploring TV violence.
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PREPARATIONS FOR SECOND PHASE

(post-airing)

Set up advance screening of film in Pentagon.

Provide guidance for military commanders, service public

affairs offices on responding to media and public queries.

WH, DoD, State, etc. to draft standard letters to send in

response to mail which is likely afterwards (a fast response

demonstrates concern and smooth organization). Letters should

be cast differently for each agency and not mass duplicated.

Some responses must still be tailor-made.

To go with letters, prepare 3-4 page printed insert out-

lining all steps USG is taking to reduce danger of nuclear

war. (Insert should address topic of "launch on warning"

because of its emphasis in film.)

State to prepare pamplet to be entitled "Just What Can I Do

to Help Prevent Nuclear War." (This will channel peoples'

desire to do something.)

Prepare the troops:

o Give guidance to commanders to disseminate to troops on

handling questions from civ~lians and media.

o Prepare and distribute releases for DoD official and

nonofficial publications, e.g. Stars and Stripes and

base newspapers.
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Draft letters for response to public correspondence; prepare

2-3 different types of letters in anticipation of large

volume of public mail. These letters should be cast differ-

ently for each agency and should not appear to be mass

duplicated. Some responses will still have to be tailor-

made. Correspondence sections should receive quidance.

Hold murder boards for PAOs and offcial spokesperson

several days before film; FE1·1A must be especially well

prepared because of film's implication that USG is ill-

prepared for a nulcear disaster.

Provide ABC with public affairs telephone numbers that

viewers can call to express their views, and address

where they can write. (people who write us may vent

enough feeling to not write their Congressman)

Commission a poll to measure public's reaction to film

and if results are positive, cite them. This will have

to be tied to a poll before the film.

Identify platforms for speakers; need not be choir audiences,

but should be willing to listen. (See sample list page JZ)

Enlist support of veterans organizations; some have
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conventions coming up soon (see list page ,3:::8'). Also,

several have widely-circulated house organs.

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SECOND PHASE
(post-airing)

Avoid dead lines. Man the phones on the night of the

film at WH, State, DoD, and FEMA public affairs offices.

This will be reassuring to public callers -- show that

we are on the job. Might also allow us to get our comments

on AM TV news shows.

Presidential press conference next day, (Nov 21 -- not

televised live, nor to address film specifically).

Should be prepared to respond to queries about film.

(Simply his presence on TV during later newscasts later

would, in itself, be reassuring to Americans.) Also, in

the emotional aftermath of the film, people would be

more attuned to what he has to say; he could stress his

seriousness about arms reductions, outline his proposals

thus far; he could also shift onus to Soviets by urging

them to start negotiating seriously. He should not be

afraid to use humor to ease public tension.

The President could take some wind out of the sails of

the anti-nuclear rallies and marchs being planned to

coincide with the film by announcing some "modest yet

encouraging" development in US-Soviet relations, or more

specifically in the area of arms limitation/ reduction

in Europe.
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The President could announce that he will seek a meeting

with Andropov and couches it in terms of a step taken,

aside from all other considerations, toward eliminating

the threat of nuclear war. If Andropov refuses, the

focus shifts to Soviet intransience; there cannot be a

good enough reason, in the public's eyes, to refuse to

discuss peace. If he accepts, the President will be

credited with taking the initiative. If he stalls,

the critics will be still.

Second phase actions, aside from the President's untele-

vised news conference, would depend on the extent of public

reaction to the film and would come into full play only to

quell a large outpouring of anti-nuclear sentiment.

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AGENCY ROLES:

o White House (NSC) should coordinate overall effort.

o State should take the lead in arms control and inter-

national relations matters and should coordinate any

interagency speakers program (which State PA already

does for nuke freeze speakers).

o DoD should respond to military-related, strategic

and tactical questions.

o FEMA should respond to questions on civil defense

and disaster procedures.

o USIA should survey for any European media reactions

to the film.
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PRESS GUIDANCE BEFORE THE FILM

Although we have not seen the film, and therefore cannot

comment on it in detail, we do question whether an enter-
tainment film is an appropriate medium for treatment of
this most serious of possible subjects. The more solidly
informed and interested our people are on this issue,
the more assured we ~an be of continued success in our
efforts to prevent nuclear war.

Nuclear war would be horrible beyond imagination, and

we must do everything possible to prevent it from ever
occuring. That goal underlies our entire defense
and arms control program: we must preserv~ the deterrent
capability which has so successfully prevented nuclear
conflict; and we must establish a still more stable,
secure peace through deep reductions in world armament
levels.
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PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS WHICH MAY BE OPPOSED TO VIOLENCE ON TV

1. National Coalition on Television Violence

P.O. Box 2157 217/359-8235
Champaign, IL. 61820
Thomas Radecki, M.D. Chairman
Education and research organization committed to decreasing
violence on television and in film.
2. Foundation to Improve Television (Broadcasting)
50 Congress St. Suite 925
Boston, MA. 02109 617/523-5520
William S. Abbott, President
Against violence-oriented TV programming.
3. Telecommunications Research and Action Center (formerly
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting)
P.O. Box 12038 202/462-2520
Washington, D.C. 20005
Samuel A. Simon, Executive Director
Seeks to improve quality of broadcasting through concerted
public action.
4. Coalition for Better Television (Broadcasting)
P.O. Drawer 2440 601/844-5036
Tupelo, MS. 38801
Rev. Donald E. Wildmon, Founder
Strong religious orientation. Seeks to boycott advertisers
who sponsor programs containing violence.
5. National Federation for Decency (Broadcasting)
(same as number 4.)
 ~q- DRAFT
SAMPLE FORUMS AVAILABLE
(thru November)

November
Citizen's Congress on National Security 18-20
St. Louis, Missouri (Horn scheduled)
American Association of University Women 15
Salisbury, Maryland
Rice University 15 Or 17
Houston, Texas
Target Kansas City Forum 21
Kansas City (State Dept. may handle)
Town Hall Meeting 13
low~ Central Community College
Fort Dodge, Iowa (Troia scheduled)
Emanu-El Congregation 20
New York City (Troia scheduled)
American Association of University Women open
Addison, Illinois
Department of Philosophy, University of Maine open
The Maples, Orono, Maine
Department of Sociology, State University 16
Plattsburgh, N.Y.
Humanities Department, · Shimer College open
Waukegan, Illinois
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MILITARY ORIENTED ORGANIZATIONS

FORUMS SCHEDULED
(thru mid-1984)

AMVETS -- Approximately 75 members of the National Executive

Com~ittee will be in the Pentagon for defense and
military briefings, 2 December 83
Congressional Medal of Honor Society
-- Mid-Winter Conference, Capital Hilton Hotel,
Washington, D.C., 26-28 February 84; 1,000 attendees.
Veterans of Foreign Wars
-- Mid-Winter Meeting, Washington Hilton Hotel,
Washington, D.C. 2-6 March 84., 1,000 attendees.
Reserve Officers Association
-- Mid-Winter Meeting, Washington Hilton Hotel,
Washington, D.C., 19-22 February 84; 1,000 attendees.
Defense Orientation Conference Association
-- Approximately 60 DOCA members will be at the National
Defense University for briefings, 6-7 December 84.
VFW Eastern State Conference
-- Grossingers, N.Y., 18-20 November 83; 2-300 attendees.
VFW Southern Conference
-- Tampa, Florida, 13-15 January 84; 2-300 attendees.
American Security Council
-- National Security Leadership Seminar, Boston, VA.,
9-11 November 83, approximately 75 attendees.
VFW Auxiliary
Can disseminate DoD position to membership via
its house organ to 685,000 members.
American Legion Auxiliary
Can disseminate DoD position to membership via its
house organ to 100,00Q members and can also use its
National Security Committee as additional centers
of influence.

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SPEAKER EMPLOYMENT
(applies to list attached)

High Level Speakers Category I

-Apprise them immediately that they may be called on to
appear on TV or at major forums to address DoD nuclear
issue position, e.g., "Meet the Press," "60 Minutes,"
"Crossfire," various foreign or economic affairs councils.

High Level Speakers Category II

-Use at local and mid-winter meetings of military orier.ted
orge.nizations, e ;g., VFW, American Legion and their respective
ladies auxiliaries.
-Use women spokespersons at womens meetings.
-Supplement Category I as necessary.

Mid-Level Speakers Category III

-Supplement Category II and "Other Speak~rs."

Other Speakers within ISP

-Use in high schools and universities;
use mainly with young people.

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 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPEAKERS LIST
FOR NUCLEAR ISSUES
2 2 SEP 1903
High Level Speakers - Category l
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
*Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer
Under Secretary of Defense Fred C. Ikle
· Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering,
Richard D. DeLauer
Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and
Resources, USD(P), Dov S. Zakheim
Secretary of the Navy John Lehman
High Level Speakers - Category II
*Brigadier · General John R. Lasater, USAF, Advisor of NATO
Affairs & Principal Deputy, European & NATO Policy
Ronald S. Lauder, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for European & NATO Policy
Richard Wagner, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for
Atomic Energy
James Wade, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering
Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
national Security Policy ·
William Hoehn, Principal -Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Secuity Policy
*Ronald Lehman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces Policy
Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces Policy
Amoretta Hoeber, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Research and Engineering
Kathleen ·Troia, The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
i•iid~Level Speakers - Category III
Frank Miller; Director Strategic Forces Policy
(OASD/ISP/S&THFP)
Stephen Hanmer, Director, ?heater Huclear Policy, OASD/ISP
(S&TNFP)
Abram Shulsky, Director, Arms Control Policy
Sheila Buckley, Director Multilateral Negotiatons
*Colonel Hugh Hinds, Strategic Forces Policy
Sally Horn, Director, Verification Policy
Otr.er Speakers ~ithin ISP - Category IV
Strategic Arms Control Policy
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*Mr. Lee Minichiello

*Colonel Ed·..;ard Nawrocki, US/ ,
Dr. Kent Stansberry
Lt. Col. Samuel Boykin, USAF
Verification Policy
Colonel Edward Nawrocki, USAF
*Mrs. Victoria Price
~Mr. William Bode
Strategic Forces Policy
Mr. -Drni try Ponomareff
*Mrs. Diane Dornan
Hr. William Furniss
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Theater Nuclear Forces Policy
Mr. John Woodworth
Colonel· Merrill Walters, USAF
Colonel Christopher Thudium, USA
Mr. William Heiser
·Ms. Elaine Bunn
Mr. Richard Peyer
Mrs. Susan Burk
Colonel Malcom Morrison, USAF
Multilateral . Negotiations
Mr. Michael MacDonald
Lt. Col. Daniel Gallington, USAF
*Major Jeffrey Trenton USA
*Mrs. Susan Burk

(*-Departed) .

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS SCHEDULE
SECEDF
DEPSECDEF

(to be prepared for final draft)