An Ecological Perspective on the Origins of Industrialization

Author(s): Theodore L. Steinberg

Source: Environmental Review: ER, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter, 1986), pp. 261-276
Published by: Forest History Society and American Society for Environmental History
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3984350
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 A n EcologicalPerspective
on the Origins
of Industrialization
Theodore L. Steinberg

It is more than one hundred years since Arnold Toynbee first

deliveredhis famous lectureson the industrialrevolution.' Ever since,
historianshave been hard at work studyingthe dynamicsof industrial
change.And they havemuchto show for theirefforts. Economichistori-
ans have sketchedan accuratepicture of the tremendoussurge in the
growth of industry.Historiansof technologyhave remindedus of the
importantrole played by innovations and their diffusion. Social and
laborhistorianshave focusedon the consequencesof industrialdevelop-
ment-the changeswroughtby industrialization,the transformationsof
family life, religious beliefs, ethnic customs, working-classtraditions,
social mobility,and the very natureof work itself.2One almost gets the
feelingthereis little left to study, that nothinghas been overlooked,that
everythingsignificanthas beenuncovered.
Despite all the scholarly attention, there is a dimension that has
escaped notice. The transformationof the environment,perhaps the
most visible manifestationof industrialchange, has not been a focal
point for historicalresearch.3The industrialrevolution reworkedthe
earth'slandscape,alteringthe foundationsof a societybasedon agricul-
ture and placing it on the road to modern economic development.
Humankind'srelationshipwiththe naturalworldwas profoundlyaffected.
New sourcesof energyand technologyweredeveloped,differentways of
farmingand feedingthe populationemerged-all that accompaniedthe
shift to the industrialmode of production.The industrialrevolutionwas
part of a tremendousecological restructuring,a new and significant
chapterin the earth'senvironmentalhistory.
To unravela processas complexas the industrialrevolution,histori-
ans have borrowedfrom economicsand demography;they have applied
sophisticatedstatisticaltechniquesto the problemof industrialchange
and have successfullydocumentedthe complicatedpatternof economic
growth.Still, the questionpersists:Whatcausedan industrialrevolution?
The answerrequiresthat we complementour analysiswith an ecological
approach. Because industrialization involved a significant shift in
humankind'srelationshipwith nature, an ecological perspectivemay

261
262 REVIEW
ENVIRONMENTAL WINTER

help us discoverthe roots of that change.This meansventuringfar from

the historian'straditionalterrain.We need to chartthe distantwatersof
prehistorywith ecologicalanthropologistsas our guides and embracea
differentset of assumptionsabout history.
Two majorquestionsare connectedwiththe originsof the industrial
revolution.First, what werethe actualmechanicsof industrializationas
it began in the Westernworld? Some have exploredthe discoveryand
diffusion of new technologicaladvancesin different countries;others
havetakena narrowerfocus by lookingat how industrialchangeemerged
in particularlocalities.The studiesgenerallycover short periodsof time
with the nation-stateor region as the geographic focus. The second
questioncasts a much wider net, asking why the industrialrevolution
began in Europe as opposed to Asia, once an area of substantialeco-
nomic development.Historiansconsideringthis issue have assumed a
much broaderspatial and temporalframework;they tend to be inter-
estedin economicdevelopmentas it occurredin differentcontinentsover
the courseof severalcenturies.
For those addressingthe first issue, technologicalchange is often
describedas the driving force behind the industrialrevolution. That
technologyplayeda vital partis undisputed.AlthoughA. E. Mussonand
Eric Robinson, two prominenthistoriansof the subject, are careful to
note that technologicalfactors alone do not account for the industrial
revolution,the importanceof technologyclearlyinspirestheir work. In
Musson'swords, "the modernworld undoubtedlyowes a great debt to
Britishpioneersof the eighteenthand nineteenthcenturies," to those
great inventorswho come so quickly to our lips-Newcomen, Darby,
Arkwright,and Crompton. David S. Landes shares a similar faith in
technologyand arguesthat the industrialrevolutioncenterson a vast
complexof technicalchanges-a steadystreamof innovationsramifying
throughoutthe economy.4The connectionbetweentechnologicalchange
andthe industrialrevolutionhas had powerfulappeal.But that attention
has comeperhapsat the expenseof otherlinesof inquiry.
Because many important technical advances were developed in
England, that country has attractedmuch attention. Until recently, a
powerfulassumptiondominatedresearchin this area-that the industrial
revolution began in England and gradually spread over the rest of
Europe.' But some scholarshave challengedthat assumption,question-
ing England'ssupremacyand refutingits designationas the birthplaceof
industrialization.In N. F. R. Crafts'sview, a strongelementof random-
ness lies behindEngland'sindustrialsuccess. The reason why England
industrializedaheadof Franceis largelyinexplicablesince entrepreneurs
in both countrieswereexperimentingwith the decisiveinventions.It was
equallyprobable,in his opinion, for Franceto have beenthe first nation
to industrialize.Othershave challengedwhetherEnglandindustrialized
ahead of Europe. Comparingthe levels of industrialproductivityin
1986 THEODORE L. STEINBERG 263

Englandand France,PatrickO'Brienand CaglarKeyderuncoveredsome

surprisingresults. Their data show that the productivityof workersin
Franceexceededthat of their Britishcounterpartsthroughoutthe nine-
teenth century. They declare emphatically, "Primafacie, our figures
seemto threatenthe whole paradigmof a first IndustrialRevolutionand
its diffusionto backward'followercountries'on theEuropeanmainland."6
As suchtraditionalassumptionshave faded, historianshave reexam-
ined their approach to industrial change. Many have put aside the
nation-state,focusinginsteadon specificregionsfor signs of industriali-
zation. In particular,they have concentratedon the originsof industrial
developmentin the countryside.Ruralindustryis not new to historians;
as earlyas 1882,W. Cunninghamnoted manyexamplesof ruralindustry
existingbeforethe eighteenthcenturyin England.I Morerecently,Frank-
lin Mendelshas made rural industrythe cornerstoneof a new theory
about the origins of industrialization-proto-industrialization-aterm
that specificallyrefersto productsmanufacturedin the countrysideand
sold outside of the region producingthem, sometimesin international
markets.Cottageindustryeasily conformedto the needs of an agricul-
tural society with its periods of underemployment.In their spare time
cottage workersproducedmanufacturedarticles while still cultivating
their lands and tendingtheir livestock. Accordingto Mendels, cottage
industry was a necessary precondition for the industrial revolution.
Proto-industrialization, as Mendelshas put it, "precededand prepared
modernindustrialization proper."8
In Mendels'sopinion, severalreasonsaccount for the transforma-
tion from a proto-industrialto an industrialeconomy. As ruralindustry
attractedan increasingnumberof peasantlaborers,the productivityand
profits accruingto agriculturerose. Becauseit now cost more to attract
rural workers, employerscentralizedthe methods of production and
therebyraisedthe productivityof labor whilecuttingdown on expenses.
Proto-industrialization also helpedmerchantentrepreneursraisemoney
to meet the high capital costs of industrialization.In addition, the
machine builders provided a supply of technical knowledge for the
transitionto the industrialrevolution. Finally, the market for agricul-
tural productsexpandedas a largerproportionof the populationcould
no longermeetits subsistencerequirements.9
Although attractiveto Marxisthistoriansbecause it helps explain
the transitionfrom feudalismto capitalism,proto-industrialization has
not escapedcriticism.D. C. Colemaninsiststhat the theorydoes not help
us understandhow the industrialrevolutionunfolded in England.The
concept, he points out, does not account for those regions in England
that slid back fromproto-industryand failedto take the industrialroute.
Rab Houston and K. D. M. Snell follow suit, challengingwhetherit
explainshow future industrialistsaccumulatedcapital. The sources of
capital,they claim, were far more diversethan the theoryindicates,and
the laborsupplyfor industrializationcame from occupationsotherthan
264 ENVIRONMENTAL
REVIEW WINTER

rural industry.To L. A. Clarkson, the most serious weaknessof the

argumentlies in the restrictedscope of the industriesit encompasses.The
textile trades provide almost all the examples of the proto-industrial
economy to the neglect of other forms of industrialactivity. Clarkson
believesthe theory is of value only in explainingindustrializationas it
occurredin textiles, and even thereit does not accountfor those proto-
industrialregionsthat failedto industrialize.'0
Such deficienciesmust be acknowledged.Although proto-industri-
alizationis an ambitious, sophisticatedtheory exploringthe origins of
industry,it stumblesagainstthe rich detailsof the historicalrecord.It is
too specificallyfocusedto accountfor the wide rangeof factorsbehind
industrialchange.And the conditionsit seizesupon do not alwaysseem
to be the critical ones. The question remainshow a society based on
agricultureembarkedon the pathof modernindustrialdevelopment.
A secondthemeconnectedto the originsissueexploresthe precondi-
tions for long-termeconomicdevelopment.In his classicbook, The Un-
bound Prometheus,David Landes briefly considerswhy the industrial
system first emergedin Europe. Two features stand out: the security
providedby the systemof privateenterpriseand "the high value placed
on the rationalmanipulationof the humanand materialenvironment.""
In his opinion, an economicsystemfoundedon privatepropertyand an
ethos emphasizingincreasedcontrolover the environment(apparent,for
instance, in the low birth rates of preindustrialEurope), impelledthe
region toward economic development.Capitalismand an instrumental
ideology combined, in short, to bring on an industrial revolution.
ImmanuelWallersteingoes beyond Landesand has tried to unravelthe
mysterybehindEurope'seconomicedge on Asia, especiallyChina. The
disintegrationof the ancientempiresof Romeand China,in his view, led
to the emergenceof differentsocial systems-feudalism in Europeand
imperialbureaucracyin China. On this point Wallersteinseemsreason-
ably close to Landes.But he arguesfurtherthat this developmentinter-
sected with different systems of food production:Europe supported
itself on cattleand wheat,whileChinareliedon the morelabor-intensive
cultivationof rice. Europeansneeded more land to prosper(a factor
behind the European"discovery"of the Americas);China demanded
morelabor.Colonizationof the Americas,in turn, startedEuropeon the
pathof economicgrowth-a routeChinadid not take untilmuchlater'2
E. L. Jones in TheEuropeanMiraclethoughtfullypursuesWaller-
stein's argument.He agreeswith Wallersteinand Landesthat Europe's
decentralizedsystemof nation-statesencouragedeconomicdevelopment.
The rushto innovate,to discoverthe world, could be stymiedor delayed
in Europe but never totally annihilatedas in Asia. Jones points out:
"Columbus did eventually find a sponsor." Although his argument
seemsto emphasizegeopoliticalfeatures,Jonesalso suggestsenvironmental
1986 THEODOREL. STEINBERG 265

and social factors. Favorable epidemiological circumstances and a

diminishingthreatfrom naturalcatastrophesproduceda stableenviron-
mentin Europeencouragingfewerbirthsand higherper-capitaincomes.
In Asia, meanwhile,threatsto capital investmentsabounded.'3Jones's
book explainswhy Europeheld a comparativeadvantageover Asia; it
does not explainwhat sent Europeon the industrialpath. Landesand
Wallerstein,althoughtheyoffera usefulbackdropfor discoveringEurope's
long-termeconomic development,do not explain why Europe took to
the industrialmode. The factorsthey focus on providenecessarybut not
sufficientreasonsfor the launchingof industrialgrowth.
Neitherof the two main approachesto the originsof industrializa-
tion explainssatisfactorilywhy it occurred.Proto-industrialization,
if it
succeedsat all, illuminateshow ruralindustrymay have helpedspurthe
industrialrevolution.But what forces were operatingto inspirea shift
from an agriculturalto an industrialmode of productionin the first
place? Proto-industrializationfails to account for such matters. The
second approach-comparingthe vital forces in the economic develop-
ment of Europe and Asia-explains why industrializationemergedin
Europebefore Asia. Combiningthe two approachesstill does not fully
accountfor the factorscompellingEuropeansto industrialize.Adopting
an ecologicalapproachoffers a new perspectiveon the industrialrevolu-
tion anda betterchanceof figuringout the impetusbehindit.
A considerationof prehistory,althoughnot a subjectwell suitedfor
the tools of the historian, is a useful place to begin. Large-scale
transformation-on a par with the industrialrevolution-occurred be-
fore recordedtime. The enduringstruggleto makea livingfromthe land,
for one, has alwaysbeen partof humanhistory.Whathas changedis the
method of production. Although historiansspend most of their time
studyingagricultureand industry,huntingand gatheringhas been the
dominantmode of production.14Agricultureand industryoccupyonly a
fractionof the past. The importantquestion then is how people, until
recenttimes, managedto keep themselvesalive. The significantpoint of
concernshouldbe with the transitionsbetweenthe modesof production.
Whathappenedto causeone mode to give way to another?What factors
compelledthose shifts?
The transitionfrom huntingand gatheringto agricultureis a subject
ecologicalanthropologistshave spent a greatdeal of time investigating.
Mark Cohen poses two crucial questions: "why human populations
chose agricultureas a strategyover huntingand gatheringand why so
manyof the world'speople chose it duringone brief time span." In his
opinion, an increase in the population preceded the developmentof
agriculture.Becausehuntingand gatheringis suitedonly to maintaining
subsistencefor small groups, the population rise compelled people to
searchfor a new way to meet their needs. Huntersand gatherersslowly
266 ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW WINTER

evolvedtowardagricultureas they realizedits capacityto supportgreater

numbersof people. Morepeople pressingagainsta limitedresourcebase
inspiredthe shift to the agriculturalmode.'5
Cohen's theory is similarto that of Ester Boserup,an economist,
who argues that agriculturerequiresincreasedamounts of labor and
developed only when the population could meet those requirements.
Malthus,she seemsto say, had it all wrong. He assumeda fixed amount
of land when, in fact, the existenceof large stretchesof fallow area left
room for agriculturalimprovement.By makingbetteruse of fallow land,
technicallycalled the intensificationof agriculture,a largerpopulation
would be less likely to outdistancethe availableresources.Boserupand
Cohen have turnedMalthusiantheory on its head. Populationgrowth,
farfromleadingto civilization'sdecline,propelseconomicdevelopment. 16
BennetBronson, an anthropologist,believesthe originsof agricul-
ture are far more complicated.Population growth, he concedes, may
havebeen important,but by itself is not sufficientto explainthe shift to
agriculture.The availableresourcesin a localityand people'sperception
of those resourcesare equally significant considerations.The role of
marketforcesand governmentalcontrolsalso shouldnot be overlooked.
Populationpressure,Bronsonacknowledges,might have caused a shift
in subsistencepatterns, but he shows that short-run fluctuations in
population densities did not always lead to the cultivation of crops.
Populationpressurealone,he concludes,is not a sufficientexplanation.'7
An alternativetheory, accordingto Kent Flannery, looks to the
interchangeof resourcesamong groups of people exploiting different
environments.Agricultureevolvedwith the transferof speciesfrom one
ecological niche to another. Where abundant resourcesexisted, food
collectorscould have persistedfor long periodsof time. But eventually,
an excess number of people would have to move to less generous
environments,thus bringingwith them plantsand techniquesfrom their
formerlocale.Transplanting groupsof speciesacrossregions,in Flannery's
view, interferedwith the processof naturalselectionand eventuallyled
to geneticchanges-a processfavoringthe developmentof agriculture.A
new ecologicalpatternemergedleadingto the evolutionof food produc-
tion. To Flannery,agriculturewas the long-termoutcomeof the chang-
ing relationshipbetweenpeopleandthe naturalworldthey exploited.'8
This small sampleof anthropologicalperpectiveson the originsof
agriculturedoes not touch some of the otherissuesinvolved-the impact
of rising sea levels on the concentrationof peoples, the formidable
populationincreaseaccompanyingvillagelife, and the domesticationof
animals.'9Althoughdebaterageson, the workof ecologicalanthropolo-
gists remindsus that human beings are organismsmaking a complex
seriesof demandson the environment.20 And that relationshipmay well
explainthe process of change. Although the origins of agricultureare
still obscure, it is clear that the domesticationof plants and animals
involvedan entirelynew strategyfor sustaininglife.
1986 THEODOREL. STEINBERG 267

Occasionally,historianshavecomparedthisso-calledNeolithicrevolu-
tion with the industrialrevolution, but at the same time making clear
their reluctanceto seriously consider the events of prehistory.Carlo
Cipolla invokesthe analogy but misses the point when he characterizes
hunters and gatherersas "savage bands." He sees the transition to
agricultureand eventuallyto industrializationas one long marchonward
and upward.2'But huntersand gathererswere neithersavage, nor as he
seems to imply, stupid. Ethnographicevidence points to the sophisti-
catedmethodshuntersand gatherersusedto exploitthe naturalworld.In
all probability,the transitionfrom huntingand gatheringto agriculture
was not made by accident or through ignorance but for compelling
reasonsthat anthropologists arejust beginningto uncover.22The compari-
son betweenthe originsof agricultureand industrializationis useful only
if the assumptionsof anthropologistsbecome part of the historian's
ecologicalframework.
One major assumptionhas continuitythroughouthuman history:
Humankindcan neverescape from the biologicalneed to sustainitself.
Roy Rappaport,an anthropologistknownfor his workon the Tsembaga
of New Guinea, remindsus "that man is an animal, that he survives
biologicallyor not at all."23In that sense, all epochs share a common
biologicalthread.Fromthe PleistoceneAge to industrialsociety,human-
kind has engaged in a long-standingstrugglewith the natural world,
constantlymanipulating andexploitingit for the sakeof humanexistence.
Anthropologistscall this process human energyrelations. Like all
animals,humanbeingshave to expenda certainamountof energyto be
able to consumeenoughenergyto maintainthemselves.That is a fact of
life. Whatchangesis the way differentculturesgo about maintainingthe
process. For huntersand gatherers,the exchangeis a relativelysimple
one: food is consumedby the same people who have gatheredit. Over
time the process has become increasinglyintricatewith infinitelymore
exchangesto consider. Today, most of us are employed in jobs far
removed from the task of securing food. The division of labor has
intercededand redistributedthe task of food production,allowingthe
luxuryof engagingin activitiesunrelatedto the necessityof producing
food. Still, humanexistencehas alwaysdependedon a caloricminimum,
and in that sense there is a solid link betweenindustrialsociety and the
worldof huntersandgatherers.24
The biologicalneed to reproducecomplicatesthe unendingcycle of
expending,producing,and consumingenergy.Existenceis an elaborate
balancingact, a precarioustry at jugglingthe productionand consump-
tion of energywith reproduction.For the anthropologistMarvinHarris,
the relationshipbetweena subsistencestrategyand reproductionis the
key to all human cultures. His theory of cultural materialismgives
strategicpriorityto that relationship.His argumentis simple: focus on
those aspects of human existence that cannot be changed. Although
268 ENVIRONMENTAL
REVIEW WINTER

reproductioncan be limited, its relationshipto the need to produce

energy to sustain life can never be swept away. Like a good gambler
Harrishedgeshis bet. Becausepeople must feed themselves,they come
straightup against the ecological constraintsimposed by reproduction
and the exploitationof the environmentfor energy. His argumentpro-
videsa good wayto understandwhy one culturegaveway to another.25
Harriscan be criticized,particularlyfor downplayingthe role ideas
have in the evolutionof cultures.As his colleaguesRoy Rappaportand
RobertNettinghave shown, ideas often play an importantpart in help-
ing peoplesurvivein theirenvironment.26 Rituals,sacredfeasts,taboos-
all are often found at the heartof subsistencestrategies.Whatgoes on in
people's minds is important, a point Harris is apt to slight. But his
explanationdoes argue that the relationshipbetweenreproductionand
the meansof subsistenceis an importantone.
This leads to anotherassumptionabout the historicalprocess. In-
stead of seeing history as a collection of stable cultures,each shocked
into changingby someoutsideforce(technologicalinventionfor example),
a more dynamicview of human culturesis needed. If the relationship
betweenreproductivegrowth and food productionis at best unstable,
then perhapsculturesare inherentlysubjectto change.Insteadof a series
of exogenousshocks boosting historyforeveronward,endogenousfac-
tors should be weighed more carefully. Human cultures are forever
changing.At some point, a thresholdis reached-enough changeshave
accumulatedto call it a transformation.Althoughit lacksthe highdrama
of great discoveriesand technicaladvances,change often takes place a
lot morequietlythanwe think.27
A discussionof the origins of agriculturehelps to illustratethat
assumption.To manyecologicalanthropologists,technologicaladvance
does not explainthe beginningsof agriculture.Thetechniquesfor domesti-
catingplantlife wereknownbeforethe periodwhen farmingbecamethe
subsistencestrategyof the majorityof the world's population.Because
huntingand gatheringsocietieswere not ignorantof farming,the devel-
opmentof agriculturecannotbe attributedto technicalgenius.Its origins,
say many anthropologists,were founded on need, not knowledge.28
Insteadof a revolutionin the meansof subsistence,the shift to agricul-
ture involveda powerfulbut slow processof evolutionarychange. The
crucialquestion, however, is what happenedto force the adoption of
agricultureif the techniqueswere known all along? One strategywould
explore whetherthe former method of subsistence-food collectingin
this case-became untenableand therefore unable to provide for the
population.
How then can these assumptionsbe used to interpretindustrial
development?From an ecologicalperspective,the industrialrevolution
involves new approaches to subsistence, a new way of feeding the
population. It rests on an entirely different ecological base than the
1986 THEODORE L. STEINBERG 269

agriculturalmode of production.Fewer people produce food for their

own consumption.Instead, vast armiesof humansare fed throughthe
efforts of a smallernumberof individuals.Exploringthe roots of that
new mode of subsistenceoffers some suggestionsfor betterunderstand-
ing industrialization.Technicalachievements,although not to be dis-
counted, are not at the heart of industrialchange. No one disputesthe
importanceof certain inventions, of the powerful impact of creative
genius. But why did a society founded on agricultureadopt the new
technology?An ecologicalapproachexamineswhy a particularstrategy
of subsistenceproved compellingat different points in time. Did the
agriculturalmode of production-precedingthe industrial-became eco-
logicallyunstable?
The decline of feudalism provides a good point of departure.29
David Herlihy has explored the precariousbalance between climate,
population,and subsistencedominatingthe MiddleAges. Sincethe end
of the RomanEmpire,he points out, Europewas locked in a struggleto
balance populationincreasewith environmentaldeterioration.30From
the elevenththroughthe early fourteenthcenturiesEuropeexperienced
substantialdemographicgrowth. Of special importanceis the relation-
shipbetweenthe increasein populationand the availableresources.How
did Europecontinueto nourishthat growingpopulation?One possibility
lies in the developmentof common-fieldagriculture.RichardHoffman
sees the rise and diffusion of the common-fieldsystemas a responseto
ecologicalpressures.As a growingnumberof people pushed against a
fixed baseof resources,the populationmovedtowardcommunalregula-
tion of open fields. The commonfields, accordingto Hoffman, emerged
''as a conservativeand equilibrium-maintaining response,"an answerto
ecologicalneed, muchas some anthropologists view the originsof agricul-
turetakingplacethousandsof yearsearlier."3
The spread of common-field agriculturedid not save feudalism
from decline. Followingthe demographicdevastationof the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries,feudalismgave way to the ascendingforce of
capitalism.Thereare many ways to study the originsof capitalism,but
one overlookedpossibilityis to view it as an elaborateholdingaction, a
way to keep afloat a population'ssubsistencebase. The increasedinflu-
ence of marketsand the divisionof labor, so centralto capitalism,may
haveoffereda newwayof wrestinga livingfromthe land-an innovative
responseto ecologicalpressures.MarvinHarrisarguesthat the intensifi-
cationof the feudalmodeof production
reachedits ecologicallimits and that the crisis precedingthe emergenceof the
new mode of productionwhich we call capitalismwas at bottom similarto the
crisesprecedingthe neolithic'revolution'and the riseof pristinestates.32
Population growth-which may have fueled the collapse of feudal-
ism-was closely connected to the enormous geographic expansion of
270 ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW WINTER

the sixteenthcentury.The increasein availableresourcesaccompanying

the colonizationof the Americas-an "ecologicalwindfall"accordingto
E. L. Jones-laid the underpinningfor the growthin Europeanpopula-
tion.33WilliamMcNeillnotes a less obvious but paralleldevelopment
the homogenizationof infectiousdiseasesthat took placeafterEuropean
contactwiththe New World.In a cruelandtragicway, New Worldlosses
wereOld Worldgains. The decimationof the native Americanpopula-
tion in the wake of contact proved an epidemiologicalgodsend for
Europe. By about 1700, lethal epidemicsgave way to a new patternof
less virulentinfections;a microparasiticboon set the stage for a more
stableand persistentincreasein population.34
Still, sustaineddemographicgrowthdid not occurin the seventeenth
and early eighteenthcenturies;indeed, the populationof Europe stag-
natedduringthis period. But a remarkableredistributionof population
did take place. In the first half of the seventeenthcenturythe numberof
peoplein the northernand westernregionsof Europegrewmuch faster
than in the Mediterranean,the formerseat of economicdevelopment.35
At the same time, a period of cold and unstableclimaticconditions, a
"little ice age," may have interferedwith Europe'scapacityto feed its
shifting population. Although the influence of climate on historical
changeis disputed,one factorremainsclear:weatherplayeda majorrole
in determiningthe prospectsfor a successfulharvest.36AndrewAppleby
takes this one step furtherand suggeststhat poor harvestsand famine,
althoughlinkedto climaticvariation,may havereflectedsocial,economic,
and governmentalshortcomings.Famine, in his opinion, reflectedhu-
man failures,such as insufficientlypreparedgovernments,and the lack
of agriculturaladvancement.37But shortfalls of food, whatever the
reasons, highlight the perennial problem of how to feed a growing
population.
The rise of rural industry may have been one response to the
dilemma.Joan Thirskhas found a relationshipbetweenthe development
of ruralindustryand the cheap labor often found in regionsof pastoral
farmingor infertilesoil.38E. L. Jones also sees an importanttie between
a region'ssoil, the type of farming,and the appearanceof ruralindustry.
Mixed agriculturein England developed successfullyin the south and
east where the land was well suited for this innovation-areas where
ruralindustrywas apparentlyabsent. But in the northernregions,where
mixedfarmingfailedto takeroot, cottageindustryexpanded.39 If capitalists
exploitedcottageworkers,as some believe,the delicateecology of seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-centuryagriculturepreparedthe way. Scholars
might find it worthwhileto explore the forces pushing and pulling
farmerstowardruralindustry,particularlywhetherecologicalconstraints
forcedthemto broadentheiroccupationalhorizons.
1986 THEODORE L. STEINBERG 271

Agriculturalinnovationprovidedanothersolutionto the problemof

makinga living from the land. The term agriculturalrevolution,used to
describetechnical improvementsin the seventeenthcentury, seems a
misnomerwhencomparedto the vast changesof prehistory.Still, signifi-
cant improvementstook place in the 1600s. As a consequenceof the
European"discovery"of the Americas,farmershad at their disposala
greatervariety of crops. Beans, maize, and potatoes-all New World
crops-inspired improvementsin Europeanagriculture.40 The potato, in
particular,playeda vital role; capableof being grown on small patches
of mediocresoil, it expandedthe food supply in ways that wheat and
other grains had never done.4"More important, new fodder crops-
especiallyclover and turnips-provided greateramountsof winterfeed
for livestock. As the numberof farm animalsincreased,more manure
was available-a developmentsignificantto soil fertilityin an age before
artificialfertilizers.42
Most historiansaccept those facts. But the role of agriculturein
industrializationis still open to question. Its potential for fostering
economic developmentis vast; it can provide raw materialsand food,
labor and capital, as well as serve as a market for the products of
industry.E. L. Jones and S. J. Woolf emphasizethe positivecontribu-
tions of agricultureto industrialchange.To them, it is at the forefrontof
economic development,providingbetter suppliesof food and creating
amplemarketsfor manufacturedgoods. Combinedwith the decreasing
population pressure precedingindustrialization,they argue, industry
movedforward.43 Others,notablyPatrickO'Brien,areless certainof the
place of agriculturein industrialchange. In his view, agriculturepro-
videdlaborand capital,but its role in industrialdevelopmentdid not go
muchfurther.Agricultural improvement,he pointsout, was a "protracted
process," and althoughit helped spur industrialization,it did not grow
at the paceof industry.44
Whateverthe verdicton agriculture,its relationshipto population
change cannot be ignored. How best to go about providing for the
subsistenceneeds of the population-here is the nub of historyfrom an
ecologicalperspective.Some of the best evidence,particularlythe work
of EmmanuelLe Roy Ladurieand RogerSchofield,underscoresthe link
between population and food production. Ironically, when Malthus
arguedfor his famedtheory, the world, in fact, was movingaway from
the pressureshe spoke of.45Is it possible, therefore,that the industrial
revolutionsaveda Europeteeteringon the ecologicaledge? Perhapsthe
industrialrevolution evolved as a means of overcominga crumbling
subsistencebase, a world that had become ecologicallyuntenable.Or
perhapsa lull in populationpressurecombinedwith rising agricultural
incomes to propel industrialization?46 Nearly thirty years ago, H. J.
Habakkukposed the compellingquestionswe still have not answered:
272 ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW WINTER

did the industrialrevolutioncreateits own laborforce, or was it the other

way around?47
Although the perspectivesof ecology and technology may appear
far removedfrom each other, this need not be the case. But a different
orderof questionhas to be asked about technologicalchange. A classic
essay by E. A. Wrigley suggests a useful direction for analysis. The
supplyof rawmaterialsmay be the distinguishingfactor in the industrial
revolution.In his opinion, a "technicallyperfectcapitalism"could have
existed before industrialization,but the difficulties of expandingthe
supply of raw materialsstill limited production. When inorganic re-
sourcesweresubstitutedfor organicones, the ceilingon productionwas
lifted and sustainedeconomicgrowthbecamepossible. Moreimportant,
Wrigleyalso hinted that some technologicalinnovations reflectedthe
scarcityof organicresources.48 FrancoisCrouzetused that argumentto
explainthe differentratesof technologicaladvancein GreatBritainand
France. In Great Britain, where wood was in short supply, technical
achievementsassociatedwith the productionand use of coal developed,
while in France-graced with large expansesof woodland-innovation
was slowed. AlthoughCrouzetfocuses on other sourcesof change, the
scarcityof naturalresourcesoffers a compellingreasonfor technological
development.49 Boserupalso sees Europe'sshortageof fuel as a boost to
technologicalchange.50
RichardWilkinson'sPovertyand Progressexpressesa moreexplicit
statementaboutthe relationshipbetweenpopulationandnaturalresources.
In his view, the developmentof industrialtechnologywas an elaborate
attemptto regainequilibriumin the face of the scarcityof resources.The
majortechnologicaldiscoveries,the shift to coal and the developmentof
steampower,Wilkinsonargues,are not to "be regardedas the fruitsof a
society'ssearchfor progress,but as the outcomeof a valiantstruggleof a
society with its back to the ecologicalwall." Societiesdid not resortto
economicdevelopmentand technologicalachievementwith progressin
mind. Instead,Westernculturewas drivento exploit naturein new and
innovativeways as subsistenceproblemsoutgrewthe abilityof the eco-
nomic systemto resolvethem. Wilkinson'sskepticismis clear:Progress
is the resultof poverty,not plenty.5'
The searchfor new sourcesof fuel-new forms of energy-was the
inspirationbehind much technological achievement. Industrialization
broughta great surge in the productionof energy, a developmentthat
has released many people from having to secure food directly from
nature.For those reasons,the study of the relationshipbetweenenergy
and industrialchangeis significant.LeslieWhitehas madean important
observationabout energyand the evolutionof culture.He beginswith a
simplepremise:for humansto exist as organisms,they mustcaptureand
make use of energy.Culturesthereforeexist to harnessenergy,to make
the arrangementsfor the energytransformations.FromWhite'sperspec-
tive, the evolution of human culture rests on the exploitationof ever
1986 THEODORE L. STEINBERG 273

greaterquantitiesof energy.Progressis easily chartedby measuringthe

levelsof energyproduction. 52
That scenario,althougha bit too teleological,focuses on the trans-
formationof energy as a useful way to understandindustrialchange.
Just as the developmentof agricultureentaileda new way to profit from
the energy of the sun, industrializationmade its contributionto the
historyof energyrelations.The industrialrevolution,in essence, meant
energyproductionfar in excessof biologicalneed. That fact accountsfor
the exponentialrise in the humanpopulationthat has occurredin a very
shortspanof time.
Historianshavenot completelyoverlookedthe placeof energyin the
industrialrevolution.Coal and steam engineshave been populartopics
for studentsof industrialchange. But it is now clearthat steam did not
play the pivotal role in the early developmentof industry. Rather,
renewableenergysources, especiallywaterpower,appearto have been
far moreimportant.In GreatBritain,whichhad passedthroughseveral
decadesof industrializationby 1800,the majorityof manufacturingwas
still carried on without the aid of steam; where mechanizationhad
occurred,waterpowerwas used.53
Dolores Greenberghas noted that animatesources of energy sup-
pliedmorethanhalf of America'shorsepowerneedsuntil 1880.54 Rivers,
not steamengines,shouldbe the focus for studyingearlyindustrialization.
A new technologyand materialcultureevolved to more efficiently ex-
ploit river resources.The legal system also changed, encouragingthe
manipulationof water for greaterenergyand profits.55Those develop-
mentswereall part of the long processwherebynaturewas increasingly
conceivedas discretebundlesof commodities-of wood, land, and water.
The industrialrevolutionhad redefinedthe environment;it was now a
vast "naturalresource."
The anthropologistJohn Bennettcalls this processthe "ecological
transition," or, "the developmentof an anthropocentricorientation
towardthe naturalworld." In his view, naturewas evermore definedin
terms of human wants and needs. Although the transitionwas a long
time in the making,it gainedits greatestmomentumduringthe industrial
revolution.Moreimportant,Bennettpoints out that the restructuringof
humankind'srelationshipwith nature-so centralto industrialization-
was not withoutits ecologicalconsequences.56 But this essay has focused
more on the causesthan consequencesof industrialchange.An ecologi-
cal perspectiveon industrializationdoes not reveal everythingscholars
wantto know. But it providesa freshapproachto the subject,offeringa
way to rethinkassumptionsabout population, technology, agriculture
and their places in the process of industrialization.Beginningwith the
basic stuff of life, the nitty-grittyof biological existence,an ecological
perspectiveon the industrialrevolutionis an appropriaterouteto under-
standingits origins.
274 ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW WINTER

Notes

'ArnoldToynbee, The IndustrialRevolution (1884; reprint, Boston, 1956). 1 use

thetermsindustrialrevolutionandindustrialization interchangeably.Theindustrialrevolu-
tion was revolutionaryin termsof its consequences,but I do not mean to imply that it
remadetheworldin a shortperiodof time.SeeRondoCameron,"TheIndustrialRevolution:
A Misnomer,"HistoryTeacher15(May1982),377-84.
2Theliteratureon the new social and economichistory is vast. See especiallyJoel
Mokyr,"TheIndustrialRevolutionandthe New EconomicHistory,"in TheEconomicsof
the IndustrialRevolution,ed. Joel Mokyr(Totowa,NJ, 1985),1-51.Examplesof the new
social historyincludethe work of E. P. Thompson,Eric Hobsbawm,Joan Scott, and
GarethStedman-Jones.
'EricJones,whoseworkhasexploreda varietyof environmental themes,is one partial
exception.See Eric L. Jones, The EuropeanMiracle:Environments,Economies, and
Geopoliticsin theHistoryof EuropeandAsia (Cambridge,1981).
4A. E. Mussonand Eric Robinson,Scienceand Technologyin the IndustrialRevolu-
tion (Manchester,1969),60; andDavidS. Landes,TheUnboundPrometheus:Technologi-
cal Changeand IndustrialDevelopmentin WesternEuropefrom 1750 to the Present
(Cambridge,1969),2. For a sophisticateddiscussionof technologicaldiffusion,see David
J. Jeremy, TransatlanticIndustrialRevolution: The Diffusion of Textile Technologies
BetweenBritainandAmerica,1790-1830(Cambridge,1981).
5Landesmakesthe assumptionthat the industrialrevolutionfirstoccurredin England
and then spreadto the "follower" nations. Other historiansshare a similarview. See
Landes,UnboundPrometheus,PhyllisDeane, TheFirstIndustrialRevolution(Cambridge,
1965);and Peter Mathias, TheFirst IndustrialNation: An EconomicHistory of Britain
1700-1914(London,1969).
IN. F. R. Crafts, "IndustrialRevolutionin Englandand France:Some Thoughtson
the Question'Why Was EnglandFirst?"' in Mokyr, The Economicsof the Industrial
Revolution.See WalterW. Rostow'srebuttal,"No RandomWalk:A Commenton 'Why
Was EnglandFirst?"'in the same volume. See also PatrickO'Brienand CaglarKeyder,
EconomicGrowthin BritainandFrance1780-1914(London,1978),146.
'W. Cunningham,The Growthof EnglishIndustryand Commerce(1882; reprint,
Cambridge,1925).
'FranklinF. Mendels,"Proto-industrialization: The FirstPhase of the Industrializa-
tion Process,"Journalof EconomicHistory32 (March1972),241.
9Ibid, 242-257; see also Franklin F.ture and
IndustryDuringthe Processof Industrialization," in RegionandIndustrialization: Studies
on the Role of the Regionin the EconomicHistoryof the Last Two Centuries,ed. Sidney
Pollard(Gottingen,1980),177-95.
"D. C. Coleman,"Proto-Industrialization: A ConceptToo Many," EconomicHis-
tory Review 36 (August 1983), 435-48; Rab Houston and K. D. M. Snell, "Proto-
Industrialization?CottageIndustry,SocialChange,andtheIndustrial Revolution,"Historical
Journal27 (June 1984),488-91;L. A. Clarkson,Proto-Industrialization: TheFirstPhase
of Industrialization?(London,1985),54-57;GayL. Gullickson,"AgricultureandCottage
Industry:Redefiningthe Causesof Proto-Industrialization," Journalof EconomicHistory
43 (December1983),831-50;and the essaysin M. Berg,P. Hudson,and M. Sonenscher,
Manufacturein TownandCountrybeforetheFactory(Cambridge,1983).
"Landes,UnboundPrometheus,15, 12-39.
'2Immanuel Wallerstein,TheModernWorld-System I: CapitalistAgricultureand the
Originsof the EuropeanWorld-Economy in the SixteenthCentury(Orlando,FL, 1974),
52-63.
'3Jones,TheEuropeanMiracle,67, andchaps. 1-4, 12.
'4Richard B. Lee and IrvenDeVore,"Introduction:Problemsin the Studyof Hunters
andGatherers,"in LeeandDeVore,eds., MantheHunter(Chicago,1968),3.
1986 THEODOREL. STEINBERG 275

"'MarkN. Cohen, TheFood Crisisin Prehistory:Overpopulationand the Originsof

Agriculture (New Haven, 1977), 5, 14-17.
'6EsterBoserup,TheConditionsof AgriculturalGrowth:TheEconomicsof Agrarian
Change under Population Pressure (New York, 1965), chaps. 3, 4, 14. Also see her more
recent book, Population and Technological Change (Chicago, 1981), chaps. 4, 5. For
criticism of her theory see the contributions to Peasant Studies Newsletter 1 (1972), 34-59,
especially the article by Brian Spooner and Robert Netting.
'7Bennet Bronson, "The Earliest Farming: Demography as Cause and Consequence,"
in Origins of Agriculture, ed. Charles A. Reed (The Hague, 1977), 23-48. Also see his
"Farm Labor and the Evolution of Food Production," in Population Growth: Anthropo-
logical Implications, ed. Brian Spooner (Cambridge, 1972), 190-218.
"Kent V. Flannery, "The Ecology of Early Food Production in Mesopotamia," in
Environmentand CulturalBehavior:Ecological Studies in CulturalAnthropology,ed.
Andrew P. Vayda (Garden City, 1969), 283-307.
"See Reed, Origins of Agriculture for an extensive sample of the literature.
2'Andrew P. Vayda and Roy A. Rappaport, "Ecology, Cultural and Noncultural," in
Introduction to Cultural Anthropology, ed. James A. Clifton (Boston, 1968), 488-489.
2C. M. Cipolla, "Introduction" in The Industrial Revolution 1700-1914, ed. C. M.
Cipolla (Sussex, 1976), 7. Harold Perkin compares the industrial revolution to the Neolithic
Revolution in a less offensive but still largely uninformed manner. See Perkin, The Origins
of ModernEnglishSociety,1780-1880(London,1969),3-5.
"On hunting and gathering see Richard B. Lee, "!Kung Bushman Subsistence: An
Input-Output Analysis," in Vayda, Environment and Cultural Behavior, 47-79, and Lee's
two essays in Spooner, Population Growth.
"Roy A. Rappaport, "The Flow of Energy in an Agricultural Society," in Energy and
Power, ed. Dennis Flanagan et al. (San Francisco, 1971), 80.
"For a discussion of human energy relations see Lee, "!Kung Bushman Subsistence,"
48-50. On human energy relations and the market economy see Karl Polanyi, The Great
ThePoliticaland EconomicOriginsof Our Time(1944;reprint,Boston,
Transformation:
1957), chaps. 4, 5, 6.
"MarvinHarris,CulturalMaterialism:The Strugglefor a Scienceof Culture(New
York, 1979), 56-58.
"Roy Rappaport,Pigs for the Ancestors:Ritual in the Ecology of a New Guinea
People (1968; reprint, New Haven, 1984); Robert McC. Netting, "Sacred Power and
Centralization:Aspects of Political Adaptation in Africa," in Spooner, Population Growth,
219-44.
"For more on the issue see Cohen, Food Crisis in Prehistory, 285.
"Ibid., chap. 1; Marvin Harris, Cannibals and Kings: The Origins of Cultures (New
York, 1978), chap. 3; Brian Spooner and Robert Netting, "Humanized Economics,"
PeasantStudiesNewsletter1 (1972),54-59.
"My debt is to Donald Worster, "History as Natural History: An Essay on Theory
and Method," Pacific Historical Review 53 (February 1984), 17.
"David Herlihy, "Ecological Conditions and Demographic Change," in One Thou-
sand Years: WesternEurope in the Middle Ages, ed. Richard L. DeMolen (Boston, 1974),
3-43; also see H. C. Darby, "The Clearing of the Woodland in Europe," in Man's Role in
Changing the Face of the Earth, ed. William L. Thomas, Jr. (Chicago, 1956), 190-204.
"Richard C. Hoffman, "Medieval Origins of the Common Fields," in European
Peasants and Their Markets, ed. William N. Parker and Eric L. Jones (Princeton, 1975),
63.
"Harris,CannibalsandKings,259.
33Jones,TheEuropeanMiracle,84.
"4William H. McNeil, Plagues and Peoples (Garden City, NY, 1976), chap. 5.
"Jan de Vries, Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600-1750 (Cambridge, 1976),
6. For the Mediterranean, see Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean
World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (New York, 1966).
276 REVIEW
ENVIRONMENTAL WINTER

36Forthe role of climate in history, see Robert 1. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds.,
Climate and History: Studies in Interdisciplinary History (Princeton, 1981).
"Andrew B. Appleby, "Epidemics and Famine in the Little Ice Age," in Rotberg and
Rabb, Climnateand History, 63-83.
"Joan Thirsk, "Industries in the Countryside," in Essays in the Economic and Social
History of Tudor and Stuart England, ed. F. J. Fisher (Cambridge, 1961), 70-88.
39E.L. Jones, "Environment, Agriculture,and Industrializationin Europe," Agricultural
History 51 (July 1977), 491-502.
40AlfredW. Crosby, Jr., The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Conse-
quences of 1492 (Westport, CT, 1972), 177-78.
4'William L. Langer, "Europe's Initial Population Explosion," American Historical
Review 69 (October 1963), 1-17.
42E. L. Jones, "Agriculture and Economic Growth in England, 1660-1750: Agricul-
tural Change," in Agriculture and Economic Growth in England 1650-1815, ed. E. L.
Jones (London, 1967), 155-56, and Jones, Agriculture and the Industrial Revolution (New
York, 1974), chap. 5.
43E. L. Jones and S. J. Woolf, eds., Agrarian Change and Economic Development
(London, 1969), 5-15.
44P. K. O'Brien, "Agriculture and the Industrial Revolution," Economic History
Review 30 (1977), 173.
45EmmanuelLe Roy Ladurie, The Peasants of Languedoc, trans. John Day, (1966;
reprint, Urbana, 1974), 311; Roger Schofield, "The Impact of Scarcity and Plenty on
Population Change in England, 1541-1871," in Hunger and History: The Impact of
Changing Food Production and Consumption Patterns on Society, ed. Robert 1. Rotberg
and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge, 1983), 67-93.
16Boserup directly challenges this view. See Population and Technological Change,
chap. 10.
4"H.J. Habakkuk, "The Economic History of Modern Britain," Journal of Economic
History 18 (December 1958), 500.
48E. A. Wrigley, "The Supply of Raw Materials in the Industrial Revolution,"
Economic History Review 15 (August 1962), 1-16.
49F.Crouzet, "England and France in the Eighteenth Century: A Comparative Analy-
sis of Two Economic Growths," in The Causes of the Industrial Revolution in England, ed.
R. M. Hartwell (London, 1967), 168-71.
5"Boserup,Population and Technological Change, 107.
"Richard G. Wilkinson, Poverty and Progress: An Ecological Perspective on Eco-
nomic Development (New York, 1973), 126.
"Leslie A. White, The Evolution of Culture: The Development of Civilization to the
Fall of Rome (New York, 1959), 33-57.
"A. E. Musson, "IndustrialMotive Power in the United Kingdom, 1800-70," Economic
History Review 29 (August 1976), 416-17.
"Dolores Greenberg, "Reassessing the Power Patterns of the Industrial Revolution:
An Anglo-American Comparison," American Historical Review 87 (December 1982),
1241.
"Theodore L. Steinberg, "Factory Waters: Industrialization and the Charles River,"
in Waltham:A Social History, ed. David H. Fischer (forthcoming).
"John W. Bennett, The Ecological Transition: Cultural Anthropology and Human
Adaptation (New York, 1976), 4-6.