THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF CLAUSEWITZ:

Illustrated Yesterday and Today with Application to the

1991 Persian Gulf War

OUTLINE

Thesis statement. The theories of Carl von Clausewitz can be applied

to all wars, Napoleonic through the recently concluded Persian Gulf

War.

I. Nature of the War

A. The Idea of Clausewitz

1. Understand Objectives of the Enemy as well as Our Own

2. Understand the Means that must be Expended

B. Historical Examples

1. Peninsula War, 1808-1813

2. Vietnam War, 1954-1972

C. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

1. U.N. Objectives

2. U.S. Objectives

3. Iraq's Understanding of the Nature of the War

II. Political

A. The Idea of Clausewitz

1. Relationship Between Politics and War

2. National Political Aims are Paramount

B. Historical Examples

1. Korean War, 1950

2. Vietnam War

C. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

1. Political Factors Influencing President Bush

2. Political Factors Influencing President Hussein

III. Fog and Friction

A. The Idea of Clausewitz

1. Definition

2. Causes

B. Historical Examples

1. Utah Beach, D-Day, 6 June 1944

2. Omaha Beach, D-Day, 6 June 1944

C. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

1. Effects of Fog on U.S.

2. Effects of Fog on Iraq

D. Friction

1. Definition

2. Causes

E. Historical Examples

1. Utah Beach, D-Day, 6 June 1944 (continued)

2. Omaha Beach, D-Day, 6 June 1944 (continued)

F. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

1. Effects of Friction on U.S.

2. Effects of Friction on Iraq

IV. Centers of Gravity

A. The Idea of Clausewitz

1. Definition
 2. The Importance of Understanding

B. Historical Examples

1. Vietnam War - U.S. did not define properly

2. Vietnam War - North Vietnam did define properly

C. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

1. U.S. Clearly Identified Center of Gravity

2. Iraq Clearly Identified Center of Gravity

V. Culminating Point of Attack/Victory

A. The Idea of Clausewitz

1. Definition

2. Causes

B. Historical Examples

1. World War II, 1941

2. World War II, 1944

C. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

1. Bombing Missions out of England and Spain

2. Quick U.S. Attack

D. Culminating Point of Victory

1. Definition

2. Causes

E. Historical Examples

1. Peninsular War, 1808-1813

2. Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945

F. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

1. Quick Victory Prevented Culminating Point

2. Problems for U.S. if Iraq Held Out

VI. Diversions

A. The Idea of Clausewitz

1. Definition

2. Proper Timing

B. Historical Examples

1. WWII, 1942

2. WWII, 1944

C. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

1. U.S. Diversions

2. Iraq Diversions

VII. Moral Elements

A. The Idea of Clausewitz

1. Definition

2. Why are they Important

B. Historical Examples (High Moral)

1. French Revolution, 1789

2. WWII, Pacific Theatre

C. Historical Examples (Low Moral)

1. Battle of France, 1940

2. WWII, Italy

D. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

1. American Moral Element

2. Iraq Moral Element

VIII. Civilized Warfare

 A. The Idea of Clausewitz

1. Clausewitzian View

2. Governental Restraints

B. Historical Examples (POW Treatment)

1. WWII, 1942

2. WWII, 1943

C. Historical Examples (Leveling Cities)

1. China, 1937

2. Battle of Britain, 1940-1941

D. Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

1. U.S. Conducted a High Technology War

2. Iraq made Three Fundamental Mistakes

THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF CLAUSEWITZ:

Illustrated Yesterday and Today with Application to the

1991 Persian Guf War

Introduction

The writings of Karl von Clausewitz continue to generate a great

deal of discussion both within the military community as well as the

civilian sector. He is often quoted to prove a point or to explain an

event or situation. How can this be, when Clausewitz wrote about

Napoleonic warfare, which occurred almost two centuries ago? In his day

there were no airplanes, no laser guided bombs, no tanks, no

submarines. Soldiers rode horses and fired individual weapons with very

limited ranges. Moreover, his writings on the theory of war were found

and published by his widow after his sudden death.(9:27) Von Kriege (On

War), the title of this work, consisted of eight books, of which

Clausewitz considered only the first chapter of the first book

complete.(9:20) Considering all this, how can Clausewitz be relevant

today?

The theories of Clausewitz are timeless because he did not analyze

war from the mechanical aspects of how battles were fought between

opposing generals. Instead, he analyzed warfare from the social,

political, moral, and emotional perspectives as well as the tactical and

strategic levels. This paper addresses eight prominent Clausewitzian

ideas. Each idea will be explained and illustrated by historical

examples of two types. The first set of examples are drawn from two

centuries of war from the Napoleonic era to 1990. The second set of

examples are drawn from the recently concluded 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The Nature of War

The Idea of Clausewitz

One of the most improtant and lasting contributions of Clausewitz is

his insistence that before any conflict begins, civilian-and military

leaders and strategists must understand the kind of war upon which they

are embarking.

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the
 statesman and commander have to make is to establish. . .the kind of war

on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to

turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.(9:88)

Coming to grips with the nature of the war is the first, and most

comprehensive, question that must be answered. A mistake in identifying

the nature of the conflict can lead to defeat on the battlefield. The

folowing must be carefully considered in this identification:

1) The political objectives of the enemy as well as our own.

2) The power and condition of the enemy's state as well as our own.

3) The character and capacity of the enemy's government and of his

people as well as our own.

4) The political connections of other states and the effect which

war will produce on these states.(9:585-586)

Clausewitz said the "means" (capabilities) must be addressed when

considering war.(9:90) The enemy's means are of primary concern,

Questions that must be asked include:

1) Will he fight conventionally or unconventionally? Air, land or

sea?

2) Will he likely give in easily? How much punishment can he take?

3) Will he fight according to the Geneva Conventions?

4) What will it take to be successful against him?

Historical Examples

1) From 1808 to 1813, France was involved in the Peninsular War with

Spain. The Spanish military forces were defeated and Napolean put his

brother on the throne. French revolutionary reforms were institutes in

the government and in the church. The Spanish people rejected these

reforms, refused to be defeated, and 100,000 Frenchmen a year were

killed in Spain during the ensuing harshly fought partisan war.

Napoleon's military lost many fine troops that he could have used

elsewhere. Because Napoleon failed to understand the motivations of the

Spanish people, he could not possibly comprehend the nature of the war

in Spain.

2) From 1954 to 1972, America was bogged down in a war in Vietnam

with an elusive enemy and no clear objectives. America's high

technology weapons were not suited to a jungle, guerilla type war.

There was confusion regarding the enemy center of gravity. As the war

dragged on and casualties mounted, American public support waned. The

United States then accepted a political settlement designed to save

face; many believed that thereafter a communist takeover was

inevitable. Was it a civil war? A revolutionary war? A conventional

war? A case of overt aggression from North Vietnam? American civilian

and military leaders could not agree on answers to these

questions--questions critical to identifying the nature of the conflict

in Vietnam.

Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

The United Nations during the later half of 1990 established clear

objectives for the conflict in Southwest Asia:

1) Iraq must leave Kuwait unconditionally.

2) The legitimate government of Kuwait must be restored.

3) Iraq must pay reparations for damages inflicted as a result of

its aggression.

These objectives were clear, and in line with guidance provided by

Clausewitz. "No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought

to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to

achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it." (9:579)

During late 1990 and early 1991, the United States embraced the

United Nations Security Council resolutions and established the

following additonal objectives:

1) Restore some semblance of stability and ensure free movement of

oil out of the Gulf Region.

2) Restore the international status quo and show would-be

aggressors that aggression does not pay.

3) Destroy Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities.

4) Weaken Iraq's military and destroy Saddam hussein's ability to

wage offensive war.

5) Remove Saddam from power (not officially stated).

The Bush administration was careful to establish very specific

objective early in the campaign. The administration did not want to be

accused of not clearly establishing policy. Thus the administration

produced a comprehensive stategy that proved to be a major asset for

the Allied powers. American officials understood the kind of war that

occurred in Southwest Asia. The SCUD firings at Saudi Arabia and Israel

were anticipated. The SCUD firings at Israel were an attempt to get the

Jewish state involved in the war and divide the coalition. These SCUD

lauchings were Iraq's primary offensive thrust. It is reasonable to

state that the Bush administration was fairly accurate in predicting the

kind of war that evolved.

On the other hand, it appears that Saddam did not understand the

nature of the war upon which he embarked. Initially, he may not have

understood that the invasion of Kuwait would mean opposing over half a

million American and Allied troops with modern equipment. Nor did he

choose to pull back in the face of this build-up.

While Saddam continued to improve defensive positoins inside

Kuwait, the first phase of the U.S. and coalition build-up began. This

phase involved a near total embargo on imports to Iraq and the

introduction of 250,000 U.S. troops into the theater. Phase II of the

build-up included more than 200,000 additonal American troops and a

stiffer embargo. The United Nations meanwhile, passed numerous

resolutions denouncing the Iraqi invasion and demanding a withdrawal of

Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Still Saddam indicated no real intention of

leaving Kuwait. Instead, he spoke of drowning the American forces in

their own blood in the 'mother of all battles'. It is logical to

conclude that he did not understand the kind of war that evolved.

Political

The Idea of Clausewitz

One of Clausewitz's most lasting contributions is his pronouncement

of the proper relationship between politics and war. He stresses that

politics and political interactions between countries continue even

after the outbreak of hostilities. Clausewitz is clear on this

point:
 We maintain,. . .that war is simply a continuation of political

intercourse, with the addition of other means. We deliberately use

the phrase "with the addition of other means" because we also want to

make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political

intercourse or change it into something entirely different.(9:605)

It is readily apparent that war is tightly intertwined with politics.

"War for Clausewitz is an inescapable part of political life."(7:64)

War and politics cannot exist independently. War is so permeated by

politics that to plan a war without political guidance is useless.

Wars are fought for political reasons, not military reasons.(9:87)

National political aims should always be center stage when

contemplating going to war. The prime reason for the existence and

continuation of a war is to achieve clearly defined political

objectives. The military, therefore, must adapt itself to and work

toward these objectives. Policy must provide the framework for

appropriate military strategy. The role of the military in this

political framework is to conduct operations according to guidance and

direction from the National Command Authority. Attempts by military

leaders to ignore, negate, or circumvent political guidance, can lead to

disaster. It can be no other way according to Clausewitz. Military

leaders must resign themselves to military strategies which are in

harmony with political goals.

Historical Examples

1) After communist China became involved in the Korean War in

November 1950, General Douglas MacArthur wanted to expand the Korean War

by blockading the Chinese coast, bombing air and logistical bases in

Manchuria as well as Chinese cities. He also implied that he favored

assisting General Chiang Kai-shek's forces in reentering mainland China

to overthrow the communist Chinese government. This approach, however,

was strongly rejected by President Truman and the Joint Chief of Staff

because it threatened and challenged the administration's policy

designed to keep Korea from turning into World War III. The

administration's policy was based largely on the theory of containment

of Soviet expansion advocated by George Kennan in his famous "Mr. X"

article. President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that

the primary Soviet threat was in Europe, not the Far East. In fact,

during the Korean War more American troops were sent to Europe than to

Korea. Policy and politics dictated that the Korean War be limited in

scope and intensity because the political goal was one of moderation--a

show of force to prevent further Soviet military adventures.

2) A variation of this theme was repeated during the Vietnam War.

Generally, American military leaders advocated, over the course of time,

such things as invading Laos to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail, blockading

Haiphong harbor, bombing Hanoi and the Red River Delta dikes, and later

invading Cambodia. All of these suggestions made sense from a purely

military perspective. However, as in the Korean War, policy dictated

different action. The Johnson administration had its allies, American

public opinion, and potential reaction of the Soviet Union and China

to consider. Again, South Vietnam was not worth World War III. One may

disagree with the policy but we must understand that policy governs
strategy.

Historical Applicaiton to the Persian Gulf War

Tactics and the manner on which high technology weapons were

employed had significant political ramifications. For example, the

Patriot missile system became a political weapon because it rendered the

SCUDs ineffective and therefore kept Israel out of the war. The Allied

air strikes into Iraq were politically sensitive. Smart weapaons enabled

the U.S. to conduct a surgical air campaign aimed at keeping the

coalition together. It destroyed Iraq's infrastructure with minimum

Iraqi ciivian casualties. The air campaign successfully appeased the

Arab/Moslem community and the United Nations, and sat well with the

American public--diverse political groups which would have reacted

negatively to heavy civilian casualties.

President Bush and other coalition leaders clearly set the tone for

the war. The military leaders, including General Colin Powel, Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander

of Coalition Forces, understood that it was President Bush's decision to

begin the air war and his decision to commence the ground war. The hub

of power and decision making lay in the White House, not in the hands of

the military. President Bush cited the lessons of the Vietnam War when

he announced that the hands of the military would not be tied with

restrictions making prosecution of the war overly difficult. This

attitude showed the close cooperation between the White House and the

military leadership.

The political leaders of the U.S. and Iraq had to deal with

internal factors that influenced them. President Bush had to be aware

of public opinion and the attitude of Congress. A key question was:

Would public opinion and Congress turn away from President Bush in the

face of an intensive ground war involving high American casualties?

What if Kuwait were liberated but Saddam refused to surrender and the

ground war continued in an effort to eliminate him? What if Israel

entered the war and the coalition fell apart?

Saddam also had to deal with internal factors. The religious

leaders in Iraq were extremely powerful and could sway public opinion.

The loyalty of the military, particularly Saddam's closest military

advisors, was essential to avoid a coup. Additionally, the loyalty of

the Republican Guard was essential in maintaining his political

leverage in Iraq as well as his hold on military power. Being a

dictator, he had to firmly control the political and military dealings

in his country very closely.

Fog and Friction

Fog

The Idea of Clausewitz

Two words that are frequently used to explain events relating to

war are fog and friction. These terms are often used interchangeably,

but are clearly different words used to explain different events.

The fog of war focuses on uncertainty as explained by Clausewitz:

War is the realm of uncertainty; three-fourths of the factors on

which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser

uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a

 skilled intelligence to scent out the truth. (9:101)

The primary cause of fog is that the true picture of the enemy is

unclear. What has happened, what is happening, and what will likely

happen is unclear under the best of conditions. The picture gets

particularly muddy and confused when intelligence cannot provide

accurate information, and command and control functions are degraded.

Between combating nations there rarely exist a complete screen or

fog. The fog of war varies in time and place. Sometimes it is

impenetrable; at other times it permits glimpses; at other times it

lifts altogether and events become clear. It is most common for each

nation to have some idea of enemy intentions. How much of an idea

largely depends on reconnaissance measures and security precautions

taken by the combatants.(5:46)

Historical Examples

1) When American paratroopers landed off target behind Utah Beach,

on D-Day, 6 June 1944, the troops and their commanders did not know

where they were. Even the higher level commanders, such as Montgomery

and Eisenhower, did not know where many paratroopers had landed. There

was uncertainty and confusion concerning the friendly situation. In

this case, the uncertainty of where the paratroopers were related to the

fog of war.

2) On D-Day, 6 June 1944, the 716th German Coastal Defense Division

was defending Omaha Beach right up until the time of the Allied

amphibious assault. Just prior to the assault, this division was moved

to a position away from Omaha Beach and was replaced by the 352nd

Assault Infantry Division, which had been defending well behind Omaha

Beach. The 352nd Division was more capable and certainly inflicted more

punishment on the Americans than would have 716th. Allied

intelligence did not find out about this change until it was too late.

The American troops hitting the beach had an inaccurate picture of who

the defenders were.

Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

Before G-Day, 16 February 1991, the effects of the fog of war had a

limited impact on Allied forces. The U.S. had tremendous intelligence

assets at work, from spy satellites high above the earth to human

intelligence spying on the ground. The U.S. knew where the Iraqi units

were and could very capably track the movement of units. More

importantly, the U.S. had a very effective command and control system

which fed information up and down the chain of command keeping leaders

informed and the fog or uncertainty of war greatly diminished but not

totally eliminated.

The effects of fog on Iraq were magnified because the command and

control facilities had been substantially reduced by Allied bombing.

Futhermore, Iraq's intelligence gathering assets were inadequate, even

at the beginning of the air war. Iraq had a poor picture of the

location of Allied forces and the ground order of battle. There were

three major questions that the Iraqis could not answer and which

contributed to the Iraqi fog of war:

1) Will the U.S. conduct an amphibious assault?

2) How long will the air campaign continue and when will the ground
campaign begin?

3) How will the Allied Forces prosecute the ground campaign?

Without an accurate picture of the enemy, the Iraqi military was

confused as to enemy intentions. Without the "eyes and ears" needed to

gather intelligence, Iraq was limited to reacting, and to delayed

reaction at that. Uncertainty regarding the Allied ground forces and

capabilities contributed greatly to the swiftness and totality of Iraq's

defeat.

Friction

The Idea of Clausewitz

Friction is a related but different idea. "Friction...is the force

that makes the apparently easy so difficult."(9:121) Friction and

chance are closely connected. Examples of friction include: a tank not

starting when it should, a messenger being delayed due to getting lost,

elements of an amphibious assault attacking the wrong beach, or sand

clogging up a rifle and causing it to misfire at a critical point.

Friction can be reduced but not totally eliminated. Training is an

important element in reducing friction. The old axiom, "The more we

sweat in peacetime, the less we bleed in war," certainly applies. There

is no substitute for hard, realistic training to prepare combat forces

for the rigors and uncertainty of combat. Sharpening individual combat

skills and carefully preparing equipment will reduce friction to a more

manageable and therefore less crucial level.

Experience in combat not only reduces friction but prepares

soldiers to cope with and to overcome its effects. Recognizing the

effects of friction, and good leader rehearses whenever possible, allows

ample time for preparation, and permits subordinate leaders freedom of

action in making decisions that were not previously covered by

guidance. Clausewitz believes the best general is not the one who is

most familiar with the idea of friction, but the one who does not expect

a standard of achievement in his operations which friction makes

impossible.(9:120) By understanding and accepting friction and its

constraints, leaders are better able to master the effects of

friction.(13:95)

Historical Examples (continuation of Utah and Omaha Beach examples)

1) On D-Day, during the Normandy invasion, the American 82nd and

101st Divisions planned to land in drop zones behind Utah Beach. The

first waves of paratroopers landed on target, but successive waves badly

missed assigned drop zones due to poor visibility, antiaircraft fire,

and less qualified pilots who were flying in the follow-up waves. It is

estimated that more than one-half of both divisions failed to land in

proper drop zones. This landing plan looked good on paper, but was very

difficult to execute due to friction.

2) On D-Day, during the invasion of Omaha Beach, infantry and tanks

(that could "swim") were to make a coordinated assault on the beach.

The tanks, however, got caught in rough seas and sank or landed late.

The initial infantry assaults went in without armor support. This

landing also looked good when planned, but friction (rough water)

jeopardized success on Omaha Beach.

Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

 Friciton was not a big factor in the Allied coalition's air

campaign. Highly trained air crews, with higly technical equipment,

took the fight ot the enemy in the air over Iraq and Kuwait. Although

friction certainly exists in an air campaign, it is usually less

pronounced that in a ground campaign.

Friction was certainly evident in the coalition ground effort. On

at least two occasions, Allied planes bombed freindly positions, causing

numerous casualties each time. Allied planes which had been sent to

destroy Iraqi targets ended up destroying American and British personnel

and equipment. This can easily happen unless very precise precautions

are taken by air crews, especially in a fast paced, fluid battlefield.

These crews must have detailed knowledge of enemy and friendly

equipment. This knowledge is gained by training. Additioanlly, air

crews must know where freindly as well as enemy locations are. This is

gained by keeping up-to-date on the current situation and applying that

knowledge, not on paper where friction is absent, but on the modern

battlefield.

Iraq, on the other hand, suffered greatly from the effects of

friciton, mainly due to the destruction of much of their command and

control system. The Iraqi high command was blind--virtually unable to

obtain accurate and timely information on the enemy, or even the

friendly, situation. The result was confusion and loss of cohesion.

The Allied strategy from the beginning was to introduce as much

friction into the Iraqi command and control system as possible. This

was accomplished by Allied air strikes continually pounding critical

centers of communication inside Iraq and Kuwait. By cutting off command

and control, front line Iraqi commanders were often isolated from higher

headquarters. Without this higher headquarters link, valuable enemy

intelligence information was not received quickly enough to respond in a

fluid, fast moving situation. Additionally, information from

subordinate commanders to Iraqi higher headquarters could not be

processed smoothly. This lack of coordination between higher

headquarters and subordinate units led to a lack of unity of effort

among Iraqi commanders. Thus, the Allied strategy designed to induce

friction into the Iraqi military machine was successful.

Centers of Gravity

The Idea of Clausewitz

Clausewitz explains center of gravity as being the hub of all power

and movement, on which everything depends. The center of gravity is the

point against which all energies should be directed. It is essential in

war to understand the enemy's center of gravity and then to focus your

efforts against it. Clausewitz wrote:

. . .two basic principles that underlie all strategic planning and

serve to guide all other considertions.... The first task, then, in

planning for war is to identify the enemy's centers of gravity, and

if posssible trace them back to a single one.

The second task is to ensure that the forces to be used against

that point are concentrted for a main offensive.(9:617-619)

The idea is clean and clear cut. If possible, the enemy's critical

vulnerability must be identified early, ideally before the war begins.

Once identified, the task of the strategist is to strike repeated blows

against this critical spot. Once this center of gravity has been

identified and attacked, and the enemy thrown for a loss, he must be

struck repeatedly and not given time to recover.

Historical Examples

1) During the Vietnam War, the U.S. did not properly identify the

enemy's center of gravity. By simple comparison of military power, the

United States should have won and won quickly in Vietnam. Some believed

the center of gravity was the Viet Cong, others believed the extended

lines of communication between military supplies in the North and the

military fighting in the South were the center of gravity. Even today,

nearly 20 years after the American pullout, debate and controversy still

rage. Not properly identifying the enemy center of gravity led to the

confused execution of the war.

2) During the Vietnam War, the North Vietnamese, on the other hand,

clearly recognized the most vulnerable center of gravity in the United

States, that is, the American people. Perhaps at the begining of the

war, North Vietnam did not understand this. But clearly, as time

passed, and dissent in America grew (especially after the Tet offensive

in 1968), it was obvious that public support for the war was

diminishing. All North Vietnam had to do was hold out and continue to

inflict losses on American soldiers. The loss of American support

caused immense political pressure for the U.S. to bring the war to a

close as quickly as possible.

Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

President Bush clearly identified the correct center of gravity in

Iraq as Saddam. This man was definitely the hub of all power and

controlled everything of significance in Iraq. President Bush

repeatedly said that the U.S. did not have a quarrel with the people of

Iraq. The U.S. had, according to the President, a quarrel with Saddam

Hussein. Although the President publicly said that it was not targeting

Saddam Hussein, he repeatedly called for the Iraqi people and/or the

Iraqi military to rise up and overthrow Saddam. The Bush Administration

believed this would bring a quick end to the war, particularly if the

war-weary military engineered a coup.

Although clearly Saddam was the main center of gravity in Iraq,

other less important centers of gravity existed such as the extended

lines of communicaiton from Baghdad to the Iraqi troops in Kuwait. The

bombing of logistics and supply convoys heading south had a telling

effect. Captured enemy prisoners of war told of limited water supplies,

sparse food rations, and unsanitary health conditions. These conditions

contributed significantly to the mass surrenders and diminished fighting

spirit among the Iraqi troops seen during the brief ground war.

Other Iraqi centers of gravity included:

1) The Republican Guard.

2) The loyalty of military commanders who were cut off from

higher headquarters.

3) The security apparatus that surrounded Saddam Hussein.

4) The people of Iraq, military and civilian, who had endured a

longer war with Iran from 1980 to 1988.

 Saddam Hussein seemingly understood that the American center of

gravity was American public opinion. If Saddam could have undermined

American support for the war effort, his country, like North Vietnam,

needed only to hold out to win. Parading American prisoners of war on

television was an attempt by Saddam Hussein to undermine public

support. Iraq fought a media war, using claims of large numbers of

civilian casualties in an attempt to influence the American people that

the war was unjust and fought unfairly by the U.S. and Allied countries.

Saddam also realized that the coalition was a major center of

gravity. His repeated calls for the Arab community to drive the

infidels out of the Holy Land was an attempt to hammer a wedge into the

coalition. Saddam Hussein also said, or at least implied, that Allied

forces (particularly western forces) wished to destroy the Iraqi

infrastructure in an effort to totally destroy the nation. These claims

were made in the hope of destroying the coalition.

Culminating Point of Attack/Victory

Culminating Point of Attack

The Idea of Clausewitz

These two points need to be differentiated so that the real meaning

of Clausewitz's writing can be understood. Both refer to reaching the

highest level or zenith of a particular event.

The culminating point of the attack is that point when the

attacker's strength is sapped and his superiority is exhausted.

Clausewitz stated:

The attacker is purchasing advantages that may become valuable at

the peace table, but he may pay for them on the spot with his

fighting forces. If the superior strength of the attack--which

diminishes day by day--leads to peace, the object will have been

attained. There are strategic attacks that have led directly to

peace, but these are the minority. Most of them only lead up to the

point where their remaining strength is just enough to maintain a

defense and wait for peace. Beyond that point the scale turns....This

is what we mean by the culminating point of the attack.(9:528)

It is critical for the commander to identify properly this

culminating point or his attack will be continued until he stretches his

lines of communication to the breaking point. His exhausted forces are

then vulnerable to enemy counterattack. A wise commander will realize

when this culminating point is approaching and will take up temporary

defensive positions until his lines of communication are restored and

his forces rested.

When the attack is continued beyond the culminating point, a

situation of diminishing returns may develop. The attack may become

less effective as the defender becomes relatively stronger. The

defender is very likely falling back on friendly territory where: lines

of communication are shortened, local population is supportive,

reinforcement of personnel is easier, and the defense becomes more

solidified. The object then is for the commander to use judgement and

experience to avoid going past this point and overextending his forces.

Historical Examples

1) In June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. At the end of

three weeks, the spectacular attack had carried German armored

spearheads up to 400 miles inside the Soviet Union. At this point,

however, they were out of fuel and very low on ammunition, thereby

forced to halt their offensive for four to six weeks while logistics

support caught up with the spearheads. The attack had clearly reached

its culminating point.

2) In 1944, Allied forces, racing across France, ran out of fuel as

they approached the German border. Patton's 3rd Army was halted for

some time while gasoline and other supplies went to Montgomery's

forces. The entire Allied logistic situation was aggravated by

Montgomery's failure to secure the approaches to the port of Antwerp.

(He instead opted for the dramatic lunge toward the Rhine in operation

Market Garden in which two depleted SS Panzer Divisions badly mauled the

British 1st Airborne Division.) Due to unresolved logistical

difficulties, the Allied offensive had temporarily reached its

culminating point.

Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

During the air campaign, it appeared that the only chance of the

culminating point of attack being reached was if Allied air forces ran

out of ammunition. To lessen the chance of this happening, B52s flew

missions directly out of Fairfield in the United Kingdom and bases in

Spain where there were huge munitions depots.

During the 100 hour ground campaign of the Persian Gulf war, the

Allied campaign plan was one sweeping maneuver designed to cut off and

destroy all Iraqi divisions in the Kuwaiti theater of operations. The

101st Air Assault Division was used to establish forward petroleum, oil

and lubricant (POL) bases. Allied forces moved 60 days of supplies to

the area immediately behind the line of departure for the 7th Corps'

advance. These supplies turned out to be vastly more than what was

needed to prevent a culminating point from being reached.

Iraq never reached the culminating point of the attack. After the

2 August 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Iraq maintained a virtually passive

form of defense, except for improving already established defensive

positions. Iraq consciously chose the military option of defense over

offense and therefore never reached a culminating point of the attack.

Culminating Point of Victory

The Idea of Clausewitz

The culminating point of victory is more difficult to understand.

In certain cases it is not possible for one country to defeat totally

another, unless that country virtually collapses. It is vital to

understand the will of the people you wish to conquer and the limit of

your resources before you embark on the road to war. Simply put, the

country you are fighting may be too powerful or too difficult to defeat

and/or conquer.

Clausewitz wrote: "It is not possible in every war for the victor

to overthrow his enemy completely. Often even victory has a culminating

point. This has been amply demonstrated by experience."(9:566) As a

war progresses the attacker may become relatively weaker because of his

own successes. This may seem to be a contradiction but it is not.

Because of one nations success in a war, other states may join in the
war to prevent the utter destruction of the defeated nation. In

addition, a whole nation may rise up in extremity to save itself by a

people's war.(12:41) "It is necessary to know how far (our

preponderance) will reach, in order not to go beyond that point and,

instead of fresh advantage, reap disaster."(12:41)

Historical Examples

1) During the Peninsular War between France and Spain, 1808 to

1813, the Spanish people resisted by waging guerrilla and partisan

warfare against the French, even after Napoleon had defeated the regular

Spanish Army and put his brother on the Spanish throne. Each year,

100,000 French soldiers died in a war Napoleon did not understand and

the French could not win--a classic example of the culminating point of

victory being exceeded, despite the defeat of the Spanish Army, and a

French garrison of over 250,000 troops.

2) During the Sino-Japanese War, 1937 to 1945, Japan's Army had

defeated major Chinese armies and occupied huge portions of Eastern

China. Nevertheless, Japan was effectively stalemated by 1941, despite

having committed 2,000,000 troops to the war. The Japanese were hard

pressed to make futher gains; indeed, they had difficulty securing

territory already won. Chiang Kai-shek had withdrawn his government to

Chunking and refused to negotiate. The Japanese were overextened and

overcommitted in China. In many ways it was their "Vietnam." Japan had

reached the culminating point of victory in her war against China, and

sought a way out of that impasse by widening the war to include the

Dutch, British, and the United States, which she did in December 1941.

Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

A culminating point of victory might have been reached if Iraqi

forces in Kuwait had the capability and will to fight effectively to the

last man. Instead, their front line forces suffered from lack of

supplies and replenishment which caused low morale and diminished

fighting spirit. The Republican Guard, while giving more resistance

than front line forces, did not live up to its reputation of a highly

trained, vastly equipped, and spirited fighting force. Without

continued and strenuous fighting from the enemy, no culminating point of

victory was reached by Allied military forces.

Another opportunity for reaching the culminating point of victory

might have arisen if after the liberation of Kuwait, President Bush had

felt compelled to drive to Baghdad and beyond to secure Saddam's removal

from political power in Iraq. This could have occured if the Iraqi

forces had withdrawn from Kuwait but Saddam had refused to accept all of

the provisions of the United Nations resolutions and the Iraqi people

and the Republican Guard had continued to firmly support him and his

policies.

Diversions

The Idea of Clausewitz

The term diversion, according to Clausewitz, means an attack on

enemy territory that draws enemy forces away from the main

objective.(9:562) There are two instances when diversions are useful:

1) When the enemy diverts relatively more forces from the point or

area of the intended main attack than you have used in creating your
 diversion.(9:562-564)

2) If the enemy does not detect or react to the diversion, your

diversion forces may gain an important secondary objective; such as

something of value to the enemy or key terrain.(9:562-564)

Clausewitz warns that creating diversions can be dangerous and

should be done with utmost caution.

It is dangerous, in fact, to use substantial forces over any length of

time merely to create and illusion; there is always the risk that

nothing will be gained and that the troops deployed will not be

available when they are really needed.(9:203)

In the latter case, the resources committed to a diversion may be better

used in the main atttack. Successful diversions do not happen very

frequently. They are extremely difficult to plan and can be risky if

not successful.

Historical Examples

1) The Japanese attempted what proved to be an unsuccessful

diversion during the Battle of Midway in June 1942. The Japanese sent

four large carriers against Midway Island. In an effort to create a

diversion, two additional carriers were sent to the Aleutian Islands,

specifically to attack the American base at Dutch Harbor. Although

privy to parts of the Japanese plan through code breaking and other

intelligence activities, Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific

Fleet, diverted only a few cruisers and destroyers to counter the

Japanese carriers moving to the Aleutians. Nimitz concentrated all

three of his available carriers against the four Japanese carriers which

struck Midway. The result was the dramatic American victory on 4 June

1942 in which all four Japanese carriers were sunk. Unfortunately, for

the Japanese, the two carriers which might have altered the outcome of

The Battle of Midway, were involved in and unsuccessful diverison a

thousand miles from the main engagement.

2) During World War II, American deception plan in 1944 for

Operation Overlord was particularly successful. The objective of the

diverison was to freeze the German 15th Army in the Pas de Calais. This

was accomplished primarily through the creation of a bogus army centered

around General George S. Patton. Dummy equipment, such as inflatable

rubber landing craft and tanks were used, along with fake radio

traffic. Real units were also used--units which were scheduled to be

moved to Normandy weeks after the D-Day assault. This deception took

nothing away from the D-Day assault in Normandy and it kept the German

15th Army sitting in the Pas de Calais wondering when Patton's invasion

was coming.

Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

In a recent news conference, General Schwarzkopf said that the

Persian Gulf War will be studied for a long time to come. When asked to

elaborate, he said the deception aspects of the campaign were especially

noteworthy.

The United States used the amphibious forces in the Persian Gulf to

create a large scale diversion, forcing Iraq to commit up to six

divisions to defend the coastline when they could have been used

elsewhere inland. This diversion was enhanced by the use of heavy naval
gunfire shelling the Kuwaiti coastline, which was a normal precedent to

and opposed amphibious landing. This deception took very little away

from the Allied ground campaign.

Iraq was forced to keep approximately 120,000 third-rate troops

positioned along the border with Turkey. If Turkey could have been

persuaded to posture more aggressively, by moving more troops to the

Iraq border threatening a second front, this passive diversion could

have been made even more effective. This action might have forced Iraq

to divert front line forces to the Turkish border. Turkey need not have

intended to use these troops. The only requirement was to keep the

Iraqi military guessing.

The 7th Army Corps was involved in a massive deception plan that

included the largest movement of tanks since World War II. This

deception concentrated the initial tank build-up and subsequent probing

attacks along the Saudi border with Kuwait. This plan tricked the

Iraqis into retaining large mobile reserves, including the Republican

Guard, behind the Kuwaiti-Saudi border--more than 100 miles east from

where the main attack actually occurred. This deception worked so well

that the attacking force had to move its plan ahead 10 hours to take

advantage of very light enemy resistance.

On the Iraqi side, the SCUDS were an effective diversion.

Thousands of Allied sorties were diverted to find and destroy the SCUD

launchers even though the Patriot weapons system was available to

counter them. These sorties were diverted from the Baghdad area, the

Republican Guard, and other military targets to go after a militarily

insignificant target. This was sound military strategy on the part of

Saddam, although it may have backfired politically.

Moral Elements

The Idea of Clausewitz

Moral factors are extremely important in the view of Clausewitz.

Moral factors include not only believing in what you are fighting for

but fighting hard for what you believe in. Simply believing in a cause

is not enought. The soldier must go one step further. The soldier must

have a strong fighting spirit and professional pride. This feeling of

professional pride is not new. Clausewitz wrote:

No matter how much one may be inclined to take the most sophisticated

view of war, it would be a serious mistake to underrate professional

pride (esprit de corps) as something that may and must be present in

an army to greater or lesser degree.(9:187)

It is important to differentiate between moral an morale. Simply

put, moral is believing and fighting for a cause. That cause may be a

democracy, nation, or a way of life. Moral runs deep and is not

easily changed or swayed. Morale, on the other hand, is transitory and

is usually based on more shallow factors, such as the quality or

temperature of the chow, timeliness of mail, or frequency of showers.

An army which has esprit de corps will not lose cohesion under fire

and will not run when rumors and fear spread. A unit with high moral

qualities will not lose respect and trust for its officers even in

defeat. A unit which understands what training and harship means to

victory is a unit filled with military virture and efficiency. This

esprit cannot be underestimated by the enemy or overestimated by the

friendly govenment. In either case, disaster could be the

result.(9:187) Clausewitz believed that:

...moral elements are among the most important in war. They

constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole, and at an early

stage they establish a close affinity with the will that moves and

leads the whole mass of force, partically merging with it, since the

will is itself a moral quanity...

The spirit and other moral qualities of an army, a general or a

government, the temper of the population of the theatre of war, the

moral effects of victory or defeat--all vary greatly. They can

moreover influence our objective and situation in very different

ways.(9:184)

Historical Examples (High Moral)

1) In the aftermath of athe Frence Revolution in 1789, Napoleon had

the advantage of having troops who had something to fight for. Among

other causes, the Frenchmen of this time were fighting for ideals of the

French Revolution and Nationalism. The French also had the advantge of

fighting against mercenaries whose interests were largely monetary.

French armies could sustain tremendous casualties and still maintain a

strong fighting force in the field. An example is the Battle of

Borodino in Napoleon's 1812 Russian campaign. This battle represented

the last chance for Russia to keep France away from Moscow. The size of

the armies was relatively equal, about 100,000 plus. However, unlike

many previous campaigns and battles, the Russian army, too, possessed

strong moral fiber. Both armies suffered extremely heavy casuslties and

both stayed on the field until finally the Russian commander withdrew

his army in relatively good order. The result was a tactical victory,

but a strategic defeat for Napoleon. The Battle of Borodino

demonstrated the superior moral qualities inherent in both armies.

2) In World War II the Japanese armed forces demonstrated unusually

strong moral fiber. Japanese soldiers, sailors, and airmen fought for

their Emperor, national and family honor, and their personal destiny in

the hereafter. Kamikaze pilots and banzai charges characterized the

Pacific War. From one island to antoher, from Guadalcanal to Okinawa,

most Japanese fought until the last man. American planners for the

final invasion of the Home Islands in 1945 and 1946 had to assume that

many Japanese men, women, and children would fight to the death. Only

the atomic bomb and Russian entry into the war against them (both in

early August 1945) compelled the Japanese to surrender before the

planned invasion.

Historical Examples (Low Moral)

The lack of moral elements can lead to defeat and humiliation.

Once defeatism spreads through an army and a nation, the affects can be

very damaging.

1) Both before and during the Battle of France in 1940, the French

army suffered from poor moral qualities. During the 1930's. French

domestic politics saw bitter struggles between French political parties

ranging from the far right to the far left. Indeed, many French

rightists preferred Nazi domination and conquest of France to being

governed by left wing parties, specifically the Popular Front Party.

Additionally, France as a nation still suffered from the terrible ordeal

of trench warfare in World War I which affected the smaller and older

French population more heavily than it did the larger and younger German

population. Finally, the French people and soldiers placed great faith

in the vaunted Maginot Line--a system of fortifications on the

Franco-German border. Therefore, when the Germans avoided the Maginot

Line by suddenly striking through the Ardennes Forest and across the

Meuse River and racing to the English Channel, thereby cutting off

significant allied armies, France's moral cohesion collapsed.

2) Italy in World War II suffered from bad equipment as well as

poor military and political leadership. Additonally, they fought the

wrong enemy. Italy had traditionally been friendly with the United

States and Great Britain and did not identify with Germany. But

Mussolini's primary goal was to build a new Roman Empire and he believed

it was in Italy's best interest to fight on the side of Germany. The

result was a poor showing for Italy. The hearts of the Italian people

were not in the war. The best example was when General Wavell routed

and captured over 100,000 Italian troops with only two small British

Imperial Divisions in Egypt and Libya in 1940-41.

Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

Americn troops had high esprit. Traditioanlly, American troops

believe in their cause and transfer that strong belief into a firm

fighting spirit. The Americn people remained united behind the policy

in Southwest Asia, keeping moral elements at elevated levels. It is

important to note, however, that hardships in Southwest Asia were not

burdensome for a prolonged time. American and Allied ground forces did

not have to undergo the hardships of prolonged, intense combat, which

would have been a truer test of esprit and moral mettle.

The Iraqi troops suffered from the effects of poor moral elements.

Frequent defections and the surrender of battalion-sized units occured

even before S-Day. On and after G-Day, Iraqi POWs presented a more

serious problem to the Allied advance than did Iraqi resistance. In all

fairness, many of these early POWs were second line fighters drafted off

the steets of Baghdad who did not match up to the "elite" Republican

Guard, which offered more resistance.

General Schwarzkopf remarked that the Iraqi troops were tired after

eight years of war with Iran and their "heart was not in it." Many of

the Iraqi troops were battle hardened and certainly well acquainted with

the horrors and rigors of combat. However, many ran when Allied troops

approached. The poor showing by these forces, including the

Republican Guard, is explained by a combination of other factors

relating to fog, friction, training, equipment, and operational art, as

well as low moral fiber.

Finally, what exactly were the Iraqi troops fighting for? Saddam

Hussein is a brutal dictator who used chemical agents on the Kurds in

Northern Iraq. He also gave up gains which had been hard won in the war

with Iran. Then, just days before G-Day, Saddam agreed to a

"conditional" withdrawl from Kuwait--the so-called "nineteenth province

of Iraq." What was left to fight for?

 Civilized Warfare

The Idea of Clausewitz

Clausewitz believed that war is a serious undertaking that should

not be taken lightly. Joseph Greene wrote in The Living Thought of

Clausewitz:

...he was the first man to express clearly the idea of war as a

national affair....he was one of the first to write extensively about

opening wars with a sudden stroke at the enemy with all the armed

force a commander can bring to bear.(8:6)

In fact, some historians insist that Clausewitz is the intellectual

father of total war.(8:6)

Clausewitz knew first hand that war is a tough business and it

takes hard fighting to win. To introduce moderation into the philosophy

of war would be absurd according to Clausewtiz. He believed that war is

such a bloody spectical that it should be given due respect and entered

into only after reason has been applied.(9:642) How then does civilized

warfare fit into his writing? Even in war, Clausewitz believed there

were restraints that governmental leaders must impose on the military

and civilian populations in connection with the prosecution of war.

Specifically, these restraints are directed against nonmilitary

targets.

If, then, civilized nations do not put their prisoners to death or

devastate cities and countries, it is because intelligence plays a

larger part in their methods of warfare and has taught them more

effective ways of using force than the crude expression of

insticts.(9:76)

Clausewitz clearly said that combatants should not mistreat POWs,

level cities, or destroy the environment during the prosecution of a

war. Yet throughout history, countries have crossed over the line that

not only Clausewitz but many others have drawn.

Historical Examples

1) During the Bataan death march in April-May 1942, the Japanese

forced 70,000 American and Filipino prisoners to march 70 miles to

relocation camps. Malnourished and suffering from disease, many died

during the march. Upon reaching their new camps, many more were

tortured and deprived of proper medical care. Poor Japanese treatment

of POWs is explained in part by the Bushido Code which stated that death

was preferable to surrender. If the Japanese had no respect for their

own soldiers who surrendered, why should they treat enemy POWs with

respects? An answer is that as military strategists they should have

been concerned about the American reaction to this practice and its

impact on the American national will to fight for total defeat of

Japan.

2) The Germans during World War II in North Africa and on the

Western Front were generally recognized to have given adequate care to

POWs. The war on the Eastern Front between the Germans and the Russians

was totally different.

a) From June through December 1941, approximately 3.5 million

Russians were captured by the Germans. Treatment of these POWs was

shocking. They were put in cattle yards and not given adequate food,
shelter, or medical attention. Seventy-five percent of these POWs died

within one year of capture. Part of the reason Germans treated Russian

POWs so poorly was that Hiltler wanted Libensraum (living room). He

needed room to spread out so that the German nation might grow.

Additionally, Hitler believed in Untermenschen (under-people or

sub-humans). He believed that the people he was killing really did not

matter anyway.

b) German POWs were also treated badly by the Russians.

Specifically, during February 1943, 90,000 Germans surrendered at

Stalingrad. These troops had been on low rations and were being

provided poor health care even before their capture. After

surrendering, they were forced to march long distances before they were

put on trains bound for relocation camps in Siberia. Less than 4,000 of

these 90,000 German POWs lived to return to Germany after the war. It

should be noted, however, that the Russians did not have food, clothing,

or medicine to spare for the POWs.

As noted earlier, Clausewitz warns against the indiscriminate

leveling of cities and their inhabitants. He realized that the practice

of leveling cities can backfire and result in galvanizing public

opinion. The following examples apply:

1) Late in 1937, the Japanese seized Nanking, the capital of

Nationalist China, and sacked the city. Within seven weeks 200,000

Chinese were brutally massacred inwhat historians have called "the Rape

of Naking". Eye witnesses reported that the Japanese threw babies into

the air and caught them on bayonets. The rape of Nanking infuriated the

Chinese Nationalists. On 26 December 1937, Chiang Kai-shek publicly

stated, in great detail, that he rejected any possibility of a

negotiated settlement with Japan, in part, because Japan had violated

the customs of civilized warfare.

2) In the Battle of Britain, 1940 to 1941, Hitler directed the

Luftwaffe to bomb London and other British cities in an effort to

destroy the will of the British people. The bombing of Coventry is

probably the best known example of this terror bombing campaign. The

American news reporter, Edward R. Murrow, broadcast to the world daily

("This is London calling") describing the Luftwaffe attacks and the

heroic reaction of the stout-hearted Londoners, who slept in the

subways, sent their children off to the countryside, and carried on as

best they could. The bombing served only to unite the British people

with no appreciable damage to the British war effort. This attempt at

uncivilized warfare backfired on Hitler and provided the background for

Winston Churchill's inspiring leadership against the Nazis.

Historical Application to the Persian Gulf War

The United States conducted a high technology war based on surgical

precision rather than a meat cleaver approach. Targets were carefully

selected to avoid civilian casualties and extremely accurate "smart"

weapons employed to limit collateral damage and friendly casualties.

Iraq charged (unsuccessfully) that the U.S. and the Allies targeted

population centers, as well as religious and culatural artifacts. Iraq

further charged (again unsuccessfully) that Allied forces attempted to

destroy the infrastructure of Iraq through the bombing campaign.

 In the Persian Gulf War, the United States organized a coalition of

western and eastern nations with diversified cultural, religious, and

economic backgrounds. Members of the coalition had to be aware of

differences in the way each intended to fight the war. If certain

coalition partners had believed that the coalition air campaign had

targeted Iraqi civilians or was designed to destroy the Iraqi culture,

the coalition might have fallen apart quickly. The United States, even

if otherwise inclined, had to avoid acting out of instinct as Clausewitz

warned, and instead, use reason and caution in the prosecution of the

war.

Iraq, on the other hand, made three fundamental errors regarding

the concept of civilized warfare:

1) Iraq failed to guage the reaction of the United States and the

world when they placed Allied pilots on Iraqi television. These pilots

appeared to have been beaten and perhaps drugged in an attempt to get

"confessions" which may have been coerced. The intent, of course, was

to show the Iraqi people that Allied pilots had been shot down and that

these pilots did not support the war. This parading of POWs was staged

to benefit internal Iraqi relations but backfired elsewhere because

mistreatment of POWs goes beyond civilized warfare.

2) The launchings of SCUD missiles at Israel and Saudi Arabia had

little effect militarily, except--as pointed out earlier--to divert

Allied sorties away from other targets. Whe indiscriminate launchings

of these missiles were designed purely to inflict fear and terror into

the civilian sector. Additionally, SCUD missiles are not precision

weapons. These missiles are area weapons which can do enormous damage

to targets such as cities. These missile attacks had little positive

effect for Iraq, but united the coalition and increased international

support.

3) We now know that Iraq attempted the virtual complete destruction

of Kuwait (atrocities, killings, rape, torture, over 30,000 Kuwaiti

citizens sent to Iraq, etc.). Over 800 oil wells were set on fire and

the supporting oil industry devastated. Kuwait City was completely

stripped, valuables taken to Iraq, and buildings destroyed. Kuwait is

now faced with a monumental rebuilding effort. This destruction is

tantamount to a scorched early policy.

Conclusion

Clausewitz expressed the modest hope that his writings on war

"would not be forgotten quickly, and might be picked up more than once

by those interested in the subject."(9:58) As a theorist of war,

Clausewitz has come to mean more to this century than he did to his

own.(10:39) That American civilian and military officials frequently

explained policies and actions in the Persian Gulf War in Clausewitzian

terms is a testament ot his still powerful contemporary influence.

Terms such as fog, friction, and center of gravity are common military

phraseology used to discuss and explain military events from the distant

past to the recent conflict with Iraq. All indications suggest that

Clausewitz's legacy and import will only continue to grow.

The words of Michael Howard written 25 years ago (A Short Guide to

Clausewitz On War) still apply today:

 For all serious students of the problems of war and peace,

Clausewitz's great study On War is likely to remain a basic text for

many years....the profundity and originality of his writings brought

the study of war to an entirely new level: and his views on the

relationship between war and policy, on the part played by `friction'

in war, on the importance of morale, and on strategy in general remain

the starting point for almost all later thinking on the

subject.(11:ix)

The modest hope put forth by Clausewitz, over 150 years ago, was

certainly fulfilled as noted by Edward M. Collins in War, Politics and

Power: "The reason for reading Clausewitz today is quite simple: he has

something to say which is important, timely, and relevent to our

situation."(3:1)