Sie sind auf Seite 1von 13

Maternity Children’s Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor G.R. No. 78909June 30, 1989EN BANC: MEDIALDEA, J.

Facts:
Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the Cagayan deOro Women's Club and
Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the
club itself as well as from paying patients,averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity
SweepstakesOffice and the Cagayan De Oro City government.Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from salary
and living allowances, theemployees are given food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from their
respectivesalariesOn May 23, 1986, ten (10) employees of the petitioner employed in different capacities/positionsfiled a
complaint with the Office of the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region X,for underpayment of their
salaries and ECOLAS, which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-86.On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director
directed two of his Labor Standard and WelfareOfficers to inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of
the allegations in thecomplaints. Based on their inspection report and recommendation, the Regional Director issuedan
Order dated August 4, 1986, directing the payment of P723,888.58, representingunderpayment of wages and ECOLAs to
all the petitioner's employees.Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment, Hon.
Augusto S.Sanchez, who rendered a Decision on September 24, 1986, modifying the said Order in thatdeficiency wages
and ECOLAs should be computed only from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986,On October 24, 1986, the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied by theSecretary of Labor in his Order dated May 13, 1987, for lack of
merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case and if so, the extent of coverage of any award that
should be forthcoming, arising from his visitorial and enforcementpowers under Article 128 of the Labor Code.
Held:
This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128-b of the Labor Code, as amendedby E.O. No. 111. Under the
present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial andenforcement power over labor standards cases, and is
therefore empowered to adjudicatemoney claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee relationship, and the
findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned.
Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, andregulations relating to wages,
hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary andwelfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and
health standards (Section 7, Rule I, Ruleson the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated
September 16,1987).
Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, this petition should be dismissed, as it is hereby DISMISSED, as regards allpersons still employed in
the Hospital at the time of the filing of the complaint, but GRANTED asregards those employees no longer employed at
that time. SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes,Griño-Aquino and
Regalado, JJ., concur
Philippine Association of Service Expporters, Inc. vs. DrilonG.R. No. 81958June 30, 1988EN BANC,
SARMIENTO, J:

Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm"engaged principally in the recruitment
of Filipino workers for overseas placement," challengesthe Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of
1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARYSUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS,"and
specifically assailed for "discrimination against males or females;" that it "does not applyto all Filipino workers but only
to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it isviolative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be
an invalid exercise of the lawmakingpower, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.On May 25,
1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Commentinforming the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent
Labor Secretary lifted thedeployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States,
Italy,Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," theSolicitor General
invokes the police power of the Philippine State.
Issue:
Whether the challenged Department Order is a valid regulation in the nature of a police power measure under the
Constitution.
Held:
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the"state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order topromote the general welfare."
As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint uponliberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It
is not capable of an exact definitionbut has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace.Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the futurewhere it could be
done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response toconditions and circumstances thus assuring the
greatest benefits.It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to theCharter.
Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a
fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it toperform the most vital functions of governance. The police
power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection. It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in
theState which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.As a general rule,
official acts enjoy a presumed validity.
In the absence of clear andconvincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified.There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that"equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect
Identity of rightsamong all men and women."Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone.
What concerns theConstitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, andhumane.
Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toilingexpatriates have adequate protection,
personally and economically, while away from home. Inthis case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the
petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely
ordered anindefinite ban on deployment.This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the
business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business
firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the
State is to provide a decent living to its citizens.
Decision:
The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find theimpugned Order to be
tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,Bidin, Cortes and Griño-
Aquino, JJ., concur.Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.
Calalang vs. Williams G.R. No. 478002 December 1940FIRST DIVISION, LAUREL (J): 4 CONCUR

Facts:
A resolution by the National Traffice Commission that animal drawn vehicles be prohibited frompassing along Rosario
Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street,from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m.
to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extendingfrom the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7
a.m. to 11 p.m., for aperiod of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic was approvedand
adopted by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications upon indorsement by theDirector of Public Works
pursuant to Commonwealth Act 548 with modifications that RosarioStreet and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of
animal-drawn vehicles, between the points andduring the hours as indicated.The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief
of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to beenforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in
his capacity as a privatecitizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme Court the petition for a writ of
prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; VicenteFragante, as Director of
Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works andCommunications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of
the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, asActing Chief of Police of Manila.
Issue:
Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe uponthe constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being andeconomic security of all the people.
Held:
The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards anygiven group.Social justice
is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but thehumanization of laws and the equalization of
social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of themembers of the community, constitutionally, through
the adoption of measures legally justifiable,or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of allgovernments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.Social justice, therefore, must
be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that shouldbe equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economiclife,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to thegreatest number."
Decision:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Writ of Prohibition Prayed for is hereby denied, with costsagainst the petitioner.
So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO SANTOS, JR., HOUDIEL MAGADIA, GILBERT ANTONIO, REGINO DURAN, PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, and THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
respondents.

G.R. No. 77875 February 4, 1993


Facts: This was an instant petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of NLRC setting aside the suspension of the
complaints and directing Philippine Airline to pay complainants their salaries.
Individual respondents were port stewards of catering sub-department on the passenger services department of petitioner.
Their salaries were deducted due to the mishandling of company’s properties which the respondents resented. On August
27, 1984, represented by the union, individual respondents made a formal notice regarding the deductions thru Mr. Abad,
Manager for care taking who was on vacation leave but no action was taken. They then filed a formal grievance pursuant
to the collective bargaining agreement.
On his return, Mr. Abad on December 7, 1984, he informed the grievants and scheduled meeting. Thereafter, the
individual respondents refused to do ramp inventory thinking that since there was no action taken by Mr. Abad five days
after they filed the petition, it shall be resolved in their favor. But Mr. Abad denied the petition and suspended individual
respondents. He also pointed out that it was only proper that employees were charged for the mishandling of company’s
property.
Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal suspension to the labor arbiter. The decision was ruled in favor of the
petitioner and the complaint was set aside. The labor arbiter’s decision was appealed to the respondent commission who
rendered decision setting aside the labor arbiter’s order of dismissal. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issue: Whether public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on
resolving in favor of individual respondents who believed that inaction on the petition they filed for grievance would be
resolved in their favor in accordance to their collective bargaining agreement ?
Held: The petition hinges on the interpretation of Sec. 2, Art. IV of the PAL-PALEA Collective Bargaining Agreement
about the processing of grievances. Petitioner submits that since the grievance machinery was made for both labor and
management, employees are duty-bound to thresh out first all the remedies before the management and give them
opportunity to act on it. But due to the absence of Mr. Abad the grievance was not acted upon.
The court held that the employees should not bear the dire effects of Mr. Abad’s absence. The management should had
someone else to look after the grievance during his absence. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over
backward to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privileges in
life should have more privileges in law.
Ruling: Petition was denied and the assailed decision of NLRC was affirmed.
DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION VS. ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU)

G.R. No. 85073. August 24, 1993


FACTS:
Respondent Associated Labor Unions filed a complaint before the Ministry of Labor and Employment, Regional
Arbitration Branch XI, Davao City, against petitioner, for "Payment of the Thirteenth-Month Pay Differentials."
Respondent ALU sought to recover from petitioner the thirteenth month pay differential for 1982 of its rank-and-file
employees, equivalent to their sick, vacation and maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days and special
holidays, and pay for regular holidays which petitioner, allegedly in disregard of company practice since 1975, excluded
from the computation of the thirteenth month pay for 1982. In its answer, petitioner claimed that it erroneously included
items subject of the complaint in the computation of the thirteenth month pay for the years prior to 1982, upon a doubtful
and difficult question of law. Subsequently, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favour of respondent ALU, ordering
herein petitioner to pay the 1982 13th month pay differential to all its rank-and-file workers/employees. Consequently,
petitioner appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, which affirmed the decision and accordingly
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. Hence, the case at bar.
ISSUE:
whether or not in the computation of the thirteenth month pay given by employers to their employees under P.D.851,
payments for sick, vacation and maternity leaves, premiums for work done on rest days and special holidays, and pay for
regular holidays may be excluded in the computation and payment thereof, regardless of long-standing company
practice.
RULING:
Presidential Decree No. 851, promulgated on December 16, 1975, mandates all employers to pay their employees a
thirteenth month pay. How this pay shall be computed is set forth in Section 2 of the "Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851," thus: SECTION 2. (a) "Thirteenth month pay" shall mean one twelfth (1/12)
of the basic salary of an employee within a calendar year. (b) "Basic Salary" shall include all renumerations or earnings
paid by an employer to an employee for services rendered but may not include cost of living allowances granted pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 525 or Letter of Instructions No. 174, profit-sharing payments, and all allowances and
monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular or basic salary of the employee at the time
of the promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975.
The Department of Labor and Employment issued on January 16, 1976 the "Supplementary Rules and Regulations
Implementing P.D. No. 851" which in paragraph 4 thereof further defines the term "basic salary," thus: 4. Overtime pay,
earnings and other renumerations which are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the computation of the
13th month pay.
Clearly, the term "basic salary" includes renumerations or earnings paid by the employer to employee, but excludes cost-
of-living allowances, profit-sharing payments, and all allowances and monetary benefits which have not been considered
as part of the basic salary of the employee as of December 16, 1975. The exclusion of cost-of-living allowances and
profit sharing payments shows the intention to strip "basic salary" of payments which are otherwise considered as
"fringe" benefits. This intention is emphasized in the catch all phrase "all allowances and monetary benefits which are
not considered or integrated as part of the basic salary." Basic salary, therefore does not merely exclude the benefits
expressly mentioned but all payments which may be in the form of "fringe" benefits or allowances. In fact, the
Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851 are very emphatic in declaring that overtime pay,
earnings and other renumerations shall be excluded in computing the thirteenth month pay.
In other words, whatever compensation an employee receives for an eight-hour work daily or the daily wage rate in the
basic salary. Any compensation or remuneration other than the daily wage rate is excluded. It follows therefore, that
payments for sick, vacation and maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days special holidays, as well as pay
for regular holidays, are likewise excluded in computing the basic salary for the purpose of determining the thirteen
month pay.
From 1975 to 1981, petitioner had freely, voluntarily and continuously included in the computation of its employees'
thirteenth month pay, the payments for sick, vacation and maternity leaves, premiums for work done on rest days and
special holidays, and pay for regular holidays. The considerable length of time the questioned items had been included
by petitioner indicates a unilateral and voluntary act on its part, sufficient in itself to negate any claim of mistake.
A company practice favorable to the employees had indeed been established and the payments made pursuant thereto,
ripened into benefits enjoyed by them. And any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot be
reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer, by virtue of Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing P.D. No. 851, and Article 100 of the labor of the Philippines, which prohibit the diminution or elimination
by the employer of the employees' existing benefits.
Petitioner cannot invoke the principle of solutio indebiti which as a civil law concept that is not applicable in Labor Law.
Besides, in solutio indebiti, the obligee is required to return to the obligor whatever he received from the latter (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Arts. 2154 and 2155). Petitioner in the instant case, does not demand the return of what it paid
respondent ALU from 1975 until 1981; it merely wants to "rectify" the error it made over these years by excluding
unilaterally from the thirteenth month pay in 1982 the items subject of litigation. Solutio indebiti, therefore, is not
applicable to the instant case.
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC, the petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned decision
of respondent NLRC is AFFIRMED accordingly.
ANTONIO M. SERRANO
VS.
GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC.

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,
under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of
US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.

On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract upon the assurance
and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.

Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two months and
7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.

Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in
the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;

2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and
Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

HELD:

On the first issue.

The answer is in the negative. Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his
contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.

The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the
law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly
the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being
of OFWs wherever they may be employed.

On the second issue.

The answer is in the affirmative. To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity. Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies
to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an
invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or
more;

Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and
other OFWs to equal protection.

The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 174585 October 19, 2007

FEDERICO M. LEDESMA, JR., Petitioner,


vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC-SECOND DIVISION) HONS. RAUL T. AQUINO,
VICTORIANO R. CALAYCAY and ANGELITA A. GACUTAN ARE THE COMMISSIONERS, PHILIPPINE
NAUTICAL TRAINING INC., ATTY. HERNANI FABIA, RICKY TY, PABLO MANOLO, C. DE LEON and
TREENA CUEVA, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Federico
Ledesma, Jr., seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision,1 dated 28 May 2005, and the Resolution,2 dated 7 September
2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79724. The appellate court, in its assailed Decision and Resolution,
affirmed the Decision dated 15 April 2003, and Resolution dated 9 June 2003, of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), dismissing petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal and ordering the private respondent
Philippine National Training Institute (PNTI) to reinstate petitioner to his former position without loss of seniority rights.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:

On 4 December 1998, petitioner was employed as a bus/service driver by the private respondent on probationary basis,
as evidenced by his appointment.3 As such, he was required to report at private respondent’s training site in Dasmariñas,
Cavite, under the direct supervision of its site administrator, Pablo Manolo de Leon (de Leon).4

On 11 November 2000, petitioner filed a complaint against de Leon for allegedly abusing his authority as site
administrator by using the private respondent’s vehicles and other facilities for personal ends. In the same complaint,
petitioner also accused de Leon of immoral conduct allegedly carried out within the private respondent’s premises. A
copy of the complaint was duly received by private respondent’s Chief Accountant, Nita Azarcon (Azarcon).5

On 27 November 2000, de Leon filed a written report against the petitioner addressed to private respondent’s Vice-
President for Administration, Ricky Ty (Ty), citing his suspected drug use.

In view of de Leon’s report, private respondent’s Human Resource Manager, Trina Cueva (HR Manager Cueva), on 29
November 2000, served a copy of a Notice to petitioner requiring him to explain within 24 hours why no disciplinary
action should be imposed on him for allegedly violating Section 14, Article IV of the private respondent’s Code of
Conduct.6

On 3 December 2000, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent before the Labor
Arbiter.

In his Position Paper,7 petitioner averred that in view of the complaint he filed against de Leon for his abusive conduct as
site administrator, the latter retaliated by falsely accusing petitioner as a drug user. VP for Administration Ty, however,
instead of verifying the veracity of de Leon’s report, readily believed his allegations and together with HR Manager
Cueva, verbally dismissed petitioner from service on 29 November 2000.

Petitioner alleged that he was asked to report at private respondent’s main office in España, Manila, on 29 November
2000. There, petitioner was served by HR Manager Cueva a copy of the Notice to Explain together with the copy of de
Leon’s report citing his suspected drug use. After he was made to receive the copies of the said notice and report, HR
Manager Cueva went inside the office of VP for Administration Ty. After a while, HR Manager Cueva came out of the
office with VP for Administration Ty. To petitioner’s surprise, HR Manager Cueva took back the earlier Notice to
Explain given to him and flatly declared that there was no more need for the petitioner to explain since his drug test
result revealed that he was positive for drugs. When petitioner, however, asked for a copy of the said drug test result, HR
Manager Cueva told him that it was with the company’s president, but she would also later claim that the drug test result
was already with the proper authorities at Camp Crame.8

Petitioner was then asked by HR Manager Cueva to sign a resignation letter and also remarked that whether or not
petitioner would resign willingly, he was no longer considered an employee of private respondent. All these events
transpired in the presence of VP for Administration Ty, who even convinced petitioner to just voluntarily resign with the
assurance that he would still be given separation pay. Petitioner did not yet sign the resignation letter replying that he
needed time to think over the offers. When petitioner went back to private respondent’s training site in Dasmariñas,
Cavite, to get his bicycle, he was no longer allowed by the guard to enter the premises.9

On the following day, petitioner immediately went to St. Dominic Medical Center for a drug test and he was found
negative for any drug substance. With his drug result on hand, petitioner went back to private respondent’s main office in
Manila to talk to VP for Administration Ty and HR Manager Cueva and to show to them his drug test result. Petitioner
then told VP for Administration Ty and HR Manager Cueva that since his drug test proved that he was not guilty of the
drug use charge against him, he decided to continue to work for the private respondent.10

On 2 December 2000, petitioner reported for work but he was no longer allowed to enter the training site for he was
allegedly banned therefrom according to the guard on duty. This incident prompted the petitioner to file the complaint for
illegal dismissal against the private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.

For its part, private respondent countered that petitioner was never dismissed from employment but merely served a
Notice to Explain why no disciplinary action should be filed against him in view of his superior’s report that he was
suspected of using illegal drugs. Instead of filing an answer to the said notice, however, petitioner prematurely lodged a
complaint for illegal dismissal against private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.11

Private respondent likewise denied petitioner’s allegations that it banned the latter from entering private respondent’s
premises. Rather, it was petitioner who failed or refused to report to work after he was made to explain his alleged drug
use. Indeed, on 3 December 2000, petitioner was able to claim at the training site his salary for the period of 16-30
November 2000, as evidenced by a copy of the pay voucher bearing petitioner’s signature. Petitioner’s accusation that he
was no longer allowed to enter the training site was further belied by the fact that he was able to claim his 13th month
pay thereat on 9 December 2000, supported by a copy of the pay voucher signed by petitioner.12

On 26 July 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision,13 in favor of the petitioner declaring illegal his separation from
employment. The Labor Arbiter, however, did not order petitioner’s reinstatement for the same was no longer practical,
and only directed private respondent to pay petitioner backwages. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the dismissal of the [petitioner] is herein declared to be illegal. [Private
respondent] is directed to pay the complainant backwages and separation pay in the total amount of One Hundred Eighty
Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty One Pesos and Fifty Three Centavos (₱184, 861.53).14

Both parties questioned the Labor Arbiter’s Decision before the NLRC. Petitioner assailed the portion of the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision denying his prayer for reinstatement, and arguing that the doctrine of strained relations is applied only
to confidential employees and his position as a driver was not covered by such prohibition.15 On the other hand, private
respondent controverted the Labor Arbiter’s finding that petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment, and
insisted that petitioner was never dismissed from his job but failed to report to work after he was asked to explain
regarding his suspected drug use.161âwphi1

On 15 April 2003, the NLRC granted the appeal raised by both parties and reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision.17The
NLRC declared that petitioner failed to establish the fact of dismissal for his claim that he was banned from entering the
training site was rendered impossible by the fact that he was able to subsequently claim his salary and 13th month pay.
Petitioner’s claim for reinstatement was, however, granted by the NLRC. The decretal part of the NLRC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision under review is, hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another
entered, DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.

[Petitioner] is however, ordered REINSTATED to his former position without loss of seniority rights, but WITHOUT
BACKWAGES.18

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was likewise denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 29 August
2003.19

The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, and
affirmed the NLRC Decision giving more credence to private respondent’s stance that petitioner was not dismissed from
employment, as it is more in accord with the evidence on record and the attendant circumstances of the instant
case.20 Similarly ill-fated was petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution issued on 7 September 2006. 21

Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari22 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner
assailing the foregoing Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:

I.

WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, AND


THE ASSAILED DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. PETITIONER’S
DISMISSAL WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCES ON RECORD, WHICH
WERE MISAPPRECIATED BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC, AND HAD THESE BEEN CONSIDERED
THE INEVITABLE CONCLUSION WOULD BE THE AFFIRMATION OF THE LABOR ARBITER’S
DECISION FINDING ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

II.

WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SUBVERTED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT DID NOT
CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD SHOWING THAT THERE WAS NO JUST CAUSE FOR
DISMISSAL AS PETITIONER IS NOT A DRUG USER AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THIS GROUND FOR DISMISSAL.

III.

WHETHER, THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN NOT
FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS SUBVERTED PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF THE
LAW.23

Before we delve into the merits of this case, it is best to stress that the issues raised by petitioner in this instant petition
are factual in nature which is not within the office of a Petition for Review.24 The raison d’etre for this rule is that, this
Court is not a trier of facts and does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties for the factual findings of the labor officials who have acquired expertise in their own fields are
accorded not only respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court.25

However, when the findings of the Labor Arbiter contradict those of the NLRC, departure from the general rule is
warranted, and this Court must of necessity make an infinitesimal scrunity and examine the records all over again
including the evidence presented by the opposing parties to determine which findings should be preferred as more
conformable with evidentiary facts.26

The primordial issue in the petition at bar is whether the petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment.
The Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment warranting the payment of his
backwages. The NLRC and the Court of Appeals found otherwise.

In reversing the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, the NLRC underscored the settled evidentiary rule that before the burden of
proof shifts to the employer to prove the validity of the employee’s dismissal, the employee must first sufficiently
establish that he was indeed dismissed from employment. The petitioner, in the present case, failed to establish the fact
of his dismissal. The NLRC did not give credence to petitioner’s allegation that he was banned by the private respondent
from entering the workplace, opining that had it been true that petitioner was no longer allowed to enter the training site
when he reported for work thereat on 2 December 2000, it is quite a wonder he was able to do so the very next day, on 3
December 2000, to claim his salary.27

The Court of Appeals validated the above conclusion reached by the NLRC and further rationated that petitioner’s
positive allegations that he was dismissed from service was negated by substantial evidence to the contrary. Petitioner’s
averments of what transpired inside private respondent’s main office on 29 November 2000, when he was allegedly
already dismissed from service, and his claim that he was effectively banned from private respondent’s premises are
belied by the fact that he was able to claim his salary for the period of 16-30 November 2000 at private respondent’s
training site.

Petitioner, therefore, is now before this Court assailing the Decisions handed down by the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals, and insisting that he was illegally dismissed from his employment. Petitioner argues that his receipt of his
earned salary for the period of 16-30 November 2000, and his 13th month pay, is neither inconsistent with nor a negation
of his allegation of illegal dismissal. Petitioner maintains that he received his salary and benefit only from the
guardhouse, for he was already banned from the work premises.

We are not persuaded.

Well-entrenched is the principle that in order to establish a case before judicial and quasi-administrative bodies, it is
necessary that allegations must be supported by substantial evidence.28 Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla.
It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.29

In the present case, there is hardly any evidence on record so as to meet the quantum of evidence required, i.e.,
substantial evidence. Petitioner’s claim of illegal dismissal is supported by no other than his own bare, uncorroborated
and, thus, self-serving allegations, which are also incoherent, inconsistent and contradictory.

Petitioner himself narrated that when his presence was requested on 29 November 2000 at the private respondent’s main
office where he was served with the Notice to Explain his superior’s report on his suspected drug use, VP for
Administration Ty offered him separation pay if he will just voluntarily resign from employment. While we do not
condone such an offer, neither can we construe that petitioner was dismissed at that instance. Petitioner was only being
given the option to either resign and receive his separation pay or not to resign but face the possible disciplinary charges
against him. The final decision, therefore, whether to voluntarily resign or to continue working still, ultimately rests with
the petitioner. In fact, by petitoner’s own admission, he requested from VP for Administration Ty more time to think
over the offer.

Moreover, the petitioner alleged that he was not allowed to enter the training site by the guard on duty who told him that
he was already banned from the premises. Subsequently, however, petitioner admitted in his Supplemental Affidavit that
he was able to return to the said site on 3 December 2000, to claim his 16-30 November 2000 salary, and again on 9
December 2000, to receive his 13th month pay. The fact alone that he was able to return to the training site to claim his
salary and benefits raises doubt as to his purported ban from the premises.

Finally, petitioner’s stance that he was dismissed by private respondent was further weakened with the presentation of
private respondent’s payroll bearing petitioner’s name proving that petitioner remained as private respondent’s employee
up to December 2000. Again, petitioner’s assertion that the payroll was merely fabricated for the purpose of supporting
private respondent’s case before the NLRC cannot be given credence. Entries in the payroll, being entries in the course
of business, enjoy the presumption of regularity under Rule 130, Section 43 of the Rules of Court. It is therefore
incumbent upon the petitioner to adduce clear and convincing evidence in support of his claim of fabrication and to
overcome such presumption of regularity.30 Unfortunately, petitioner again failed in such endeavor.

On these scores, there is a dearth of evidence to establish the fact of petitioner’s dismissal. We have scrupulously
examined the records and we found no evidence presented by petitioner, other than his own contentions that he was
indeed dismissed by private respondent.

While this Court is not unmindful of the rule that in cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proof to
prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause in the case at bar, however, the facts and the evidence did
not establish a prima facie case that the petitioner was dismissed from employment.31 Before the private respondent must
bear the burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, petitioner must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of
his dismissal from service. Logically, if there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or illegality
thereof.

In Machica v. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc.,32 we had underscored that the burden of proving the allegations rest upon
the party alleging, to wit:

The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their
allegation that respondents dismissed them from their employment. It must be stressed that the evidence to prove this
fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal
cases finds no application here because the respondents deny having dismissed the petitioners.33

In Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain,34 this Court took the occasion to emphasize:

It is a basic rule in evidence, however, that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who makes the allegations – ei
incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat. If he claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by
competent evidence, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his
opponent.35

It is true that the Constitution affords full protection to labor, and that in light of this Constitutional mandate, we must be
vigilant in striking down any attempt of the management to exploit or oppress the working class. However, it does not
mean that we are bound to uphold the working class in every labor dispute brought before this Court for our resolution.

The law in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. It
should be made clear that when the law tilts the scales of justice in favor of labor, it is in recognition of the inherent
economic inequality between labor and management. The intent is to balance the scales of justice; to put the two parties
on relatively equal positions. There may be cases where the circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interests of
management but never should the scale be so tilted if the result is an injustice to the employer. Justitia nemini neganda
est -- justice is to be denied to none.36

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 28 May 2005
and its Resolution dated 7 September 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79724 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen