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Middle Eastern Studies
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Dispensing with Tradition?
Turkish Politics and International Society
during the Ozal Decade, 1983-93
BERDAL ARAL
Turgut Ozal played a leading role in Turkish politics first as prime minister
(1983-89), then as president (1989-93). At first sight, he comes across as
a man of apparent paradoxes. He was part of a political tradition that
represented the revolt of Anatolia (the Asian portion of Turkey) against an
elitist, Westward-looking establishment which tended to despise the values
and traditions of Anatolia (which in fact derived its vitality from Islam);
and yet, it was the same Ozal who enjoyed the unequivocal support of the
USA and international financial institutions on account of his espousal of
free-market economy and support for US policies in the Middle East,
Caucasia and Central Asia. Ozal was also the man who most deepened and
widened Turkey's links with the Islamic world, to the extent that he was
often blamed by some secularists for harbouring 'fundamentalist'
ambitions; and yet it was under Ozal's premiership that Turkey applied f
membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) in April 1987
as the ultimate step in Turkey's search for 'recognition' as part of the
'European family'.
To make sense of this apparent paradox, one has to locate its
background in the specific political culture that has evolved since the
establishment of a secular, Westward-looking and nationalistic Turkish
republic in the mid-1920s. Today these core values of Kemalism, the
doctrinal foundation of Turkish nationalism named after the founder of
the Turkish Republic, appear to have been internalized, owing either to
state coercion or to conviction, on the part of all the political groupings,
with the marked exception of Islamists. In the post-Second World War
era, Turkey's political rulers decided to change the course of Turkish
foreign policy from neutrality to military and economic alliance with the
Western world on the pretext of Stalin's territorial ambitions over parts of
Turkish territory as contained in the Soviet memorandum of 1946.' This
new strategy was widely supported by mainstream political parties,
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TURKISH POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, 1983-93 73
The first thing to observe about Ozal was his ability to reconcile
contradictory elements and establish harmony between them. That his
Motherland Party consisted of four different political wings (Liberals,
Conservatives, Social Democrats, Extreme Nationalists) is a testimony to
Ozal's appetite for accommodation. Close to his death (1993) Ozal was
planning to overcome the polarization between secularists and anti-
secularists by overseeing a 'reform' in Islam that, in his view, would have
been accordant with 'modem conditions'. As he saw it, this reform would
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74 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
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TURKISH POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, 1983-93 75
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76 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
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TURKISH POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, 1983-93 77
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78 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
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TURKISH POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, 1983-93 79
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80 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
military bases in Turkey; third, Turkey deployed nearly 100,000 troops near
the Iraqi border, which forced Iraq to move a substantial portion of its troops
to the north; last, but not least, Turkey permitted the US to launch air strikes
in northern and central Iraq from NATO air bases in Turkey.'
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the resulting crisis
gave Ozal a unique opportunity to 'prove' Turkey's continuing worth to the
Western world. The logistical and political support given by Turkey to the
US-led coalition against Iraq was primarily planned by Ozal. By adopting a
staunchly pro-American line throughout the crisis, Ozal wanted to
demonstrate that Turkey was an indispensable part of Western security and
strategic interests at a time when its worth was not sufficiently appreciated
by the US and Europe.45 Ozal was convinced that a deteriorating Turkish
role would harm Turkish interests. He believed that, in such an eventuality,
the US administration could easily be manipulated by Greek and Armenian
lobbies.46 Indeed soon after the US President had declared the dawn of a
'New World Order', the US Senate voted a draft bill on the 'Armenian
genocide' allegedly perpetrated by Ottoman Turks during the First World
War. At almost the same time, the US administration accepted the Greek
demand for an addendum to the US-Greek defence treaty on guaranteeing
Greek security in case of an armed attack from outside (presumably from
Turkey).47
As Turkey played a crucial role in the Allied victory against Iraq, Ozal
was certain that the US would be more supportive of Turkey in the future.
Indeed, before the war, in return for Turkish support, Ozal had been
promised by the US that Turkey would have received substantial
economic aid and extensive military equipment, while enjoying greater
access to the US market for textile products.48 This promise was partially
fulfilled. In appreciation of the Turkish support during the Gulf war, the
US increased the security assistance and trade benefits enjoyed by Turkey,
doubled the quotas for Turkish textile exports, and intervened with third
countries to (partially) compensate for the economic and financial losses
suffered by Turkey as a result of the events leading to the Gulf war.49 As
far as Europe was concerned, Ozal wrote a letter to the EEC member
states in March 1991 reminding them of Turkey's active contribution
during the Gulf war. Ozal argued that Turkey deserved a 'fairer treatment'
from its European partners.5" However European support was never as
firm as that of the US.
Ozal deemed that the termination of the Cold War and, connected with this,
the dismantling of the Soviet bloc in the beginning of the 1990s turned
Turkey into a model and centre of attraction in a vast geographical space
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TURKISH POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, 1983-93 81
from the Adriatic to Central Asia. Indeed it was widely expected that
Turkey would lead these countries towards the market economy and
multiparty democracy. However the economic problems faced by these
republics were too serious for Turkey to solve alone. Ozal knew well that
Turkey did not possess the necessary resources, such as capital, expertise
and technology, to satisfy their foreign investment needs. Therefore he
presented Turkey as a channel for Western and Japanese investments in the
exploration, production and distribution of oil, gas and mineral riches of
these republics. Accordingly, Turkish businessmen tried to take part in
projects for which they had been short of capital and technology.5 Within
the confines of its economic resources, Turkey managed to allocate some
one billion dollars of aid and trade credits for these republics in 1992.52
Apparently, in spite of his genuine endeavours, Turkey failed to provide
significant economic assistance to the Turkic republics during Ozal's
presidency.53
To compensate for Turkey's lack of material resources, Ozal focused
his attention on international economic co-operation. Indeed Ozal played
a key role in the revitalization of the Economic Co-operation
Organization (ECO), originally set up between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan,
by extending its membership to five of the Turkic republics, namely
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (note that the dominant language,
Tajiki, is a Persian dialect) Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, in February
1992. The ECO, which now embraces some 300 million people, was
designed to harmonize transport and communications, relax customs
tariffs, and establish a joint investment and development bank among
member states.54The Western world tended to encourage the tightening of
Turkey's relations with the Turkic republics in preference to Iranian
influence."
Under Ozal's presidency, Turkey also played an active role in the
establishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone in December
1990. Founded among the littoral states, namely Turkey, Russia, Bulgaria,
Romania, Georgia and Ukraine, along with Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Greece and Moldova, this trade pact was intended to encourage economic
co-operation and greater freedom of trade among member states. Ozal was
all too aware that, for the first time in 200 years, Turkey was 'free of
Russian pressures', a situation he wanted to exploit to the full.56
However, Turkey's involvement with the Turkic republics generally
produced less fruitful results than originally expected.57 This was partly due
to the fact that, despite Ozal's enthusiasm, Turkey still lacked a 'practical
strategy' and the 'political will or diplomatic clout' to implement its plans
vis-a-vis the Turkic republics.58 Also noteworthy is the fact that Ozal had
unrealistic expectations of these republics. To put it bluntly, Ozal was over-
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82 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
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TURKISH POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, 1983-93 83
From one angle, Ozal seems to represent a radical breakthrough from the
conventions of Turkish politics. His peculiar approach to Turkish politics
and foreign policy differed from those of his predecessors with its
dynamism, boldness, unorthodox style, and adaptability to changes in the
international environment.70 Undoubtedly, Ozal was an intelligent, clever
and ambitious leader who sought to exploit external circumstances to
enhance Turkey's international stature and national interests. He was also
a leader who rarely hesitated to take initiatives and calculated risks
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84 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
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TURKISH POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, 1983-93 85
From another angle, however, Ozal appears not to have broken with the
fundamentals of Turkish politics, particularly in the area of foreign policy.
Like those of his predecessors, his external policies prioritized the West. His
concern with Third World countries and initiatives was negligible. However
Ozal sought to establish constructive bilateral and multilateral relations with
other Islamic countries and the Turkic republics, especially through
economic devices. Given the extent and depth of his commitment in this
regard, he was undeniably unique in the history of republican Turkey.
However, not unlike his predecessors, he never attempted to question
Turkey's military, political and economic alliance with the Western world.
On the contrary, his was the most comprehensive partnership with the US
since the Menderes government in the 1950s. What however distinguished
Ozal was his visionary zeal to use the US as a leverage to turn Turkey into
a prominent regional power. He said: 'If we do not make major mistakes,
the next century will be the century of the Turks' .76 Only time will tell if this
prophecy comes true.
NOTES
1. Mehmet Gonlubol and Haluk Ulman, Olaylarla Turk Diz Politikasi, 8th edi
Siyasal Kitabevi, 1993), pp. 191-209.
2. At the time, pro-Islamic parties were banned in Turkey.
3. Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: The Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1991), pp.24-279.
4. Soon after his deposition, he was hanged, alongside his Minister of Finance and Minister of
Foreign Affairs, for, inter alia, giving too much concessions to the (Islamic) 'reactionary
elements'.
5. Yavuz Gokmen, Ozal Yayasaydi (Had Ozal lived) (Ankara: Verso Yayincilik, 1994),
pp.300-1.
6. Ozal became president in 1989 upon his election by the parliament for a seven-year term.
7. Ahmet Altan, in Osman Ozsoy, Unliilerin Turgut Ozal'la Hatiralari (Recollections of the
Famous with Turgut Ozal) (Istanbul: Tiirdav, 1994), p.144. On this rather paradoxical
position, see the interview with Cengiz (andar, a well-known Turkish journalist and an
unofficial adviser to Ozal, conducted soon after Ozal's death, in Metin Sever and Cem Dizdar
(interviewers), Ikinci Cumhuriyet Tartiqmalari (The Discussions on the Second Republic)
(Ankara: Ba$ak Yayinlari, 1993), pp.91-114.
8. Abdurrahman Dilipak, in Ozsoy, ibid., p.207.
9. See for instance his speech during the Third Economic Congress of Izmir on 4 June 1992, in
Ikinci Cumhuriyet Tartimalarl, 15-31.
10. Ramazan Gozen, 'Turgut Ozal and Turkish Foreign Policy: Style and Vision', Foreign
Policy, Vol.20, Nos.3-4 (1996), pp.69-101, 73. Especially during his presidency, in the
course of his active involvement in foreign policy, Ozal tended to bypass the division of
power as envisioned under the Turkish Constitution. He similarly disregarded the
bureaucratic mechanisms which he saw as a stumbling bloc in decision-making. However his
attitude frequently caused strains in the government. His exaggerated statements about
Turkey's readiness to accept some one million Turks fleeing from Bulgaria in 1989 on
account of the Bulgarian policy of forcible assimilation allegedly resulted in the resignation
of the Foreign Minister in protest. (Ibid, pp.71-2).
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86 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
11. Part of his speech in the Third Economic Congress of Izmir, in 2. Cumhuriyet Tartlimalarl,
pp.28-9.
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TURKISH POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, 1983-93 87
40. Ibid., p.100. It must be noted that, at the time, the SC resolution which authorized the use of
force against Iraq had not yet been adopted. Throughout the crisis, Ozal was continuously
blamed by the opposition for harbouring unrealistic ambitions and for his willingness to join
the war on the side of the US (Cevizoglu, p.39). However, after the war, Ozal opposed the
possibility of the disintegration of Iraq as he came to realize that Turkey would not be among
the beneficiaries of such an eventuality. Indeed he became aware that the emergence of a
Kurdish state in the north of Iraq would only exacerbate Turkey's own Kurdish problem.
(Sayari, 'Turkey', p.14).
41. Andrew Mango, Turkey, the Challenges of a New Role (London: Praeger, 1994), p.111.
42. Sayari, 'Turkey', p.16.
43. Cevizoglu, p.86.
44. Bruce R. Kuniholm, 'Turkey and the West', Foreign Affairs, Vol.70, No.2 (Spring 1991),
pp.36-7.
45. Kutlay Dogan, Turgut Ozal Belgeseli (The Turgut Ozal File) (Ankara: Turk Haberler Ajansi,
1994), pp.318-19.
46. In Turkish foreign policy discourse, Greeks and Armenians are portrayed as the 'ardent
enemies' of Turkey.
47. Guldemir, Texas-Malatya, pp.95-6.
48. Kuniholm, 'Turkey and the West', pp.34-8.
49. Sayari, 'Turkey', p.19.
50. Newspot, 7 March 1991.
51. George J. Church, 'Across the Great Divide', Time, Vol.140, No.16, 19 Oct. 1992, p.35.
52. The Economist, 25 Dec.-8 Jan.1993, p.82.
53. Robins, 'Between Sentiment', p.593.
54. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1992, p.38792. At least initially, Iran was inclined to see
the ECO as an incipient model of an Islamic common market, while Turkey laid emphasis
on its economic side.
55. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Reference Supplement, 1992, p.R.128.
56. The Washington Post, 24 Feb. 1993.
57. Suat Bilge, 'Bagimsiz Devletler Toplulugu ve Tiirkiye' (The Commonwealth of Independent
States and Turkey), Avrasya Etudleri, Vol. 1, No.4 (Winter 1995), p.91.
58. Robins, 'Between Sentiment', 1993, p.609.
59. Part of his speech can be found in Bilge, 'Bagimsiz Devletler', p.89. 'BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts', Middle East, 2 Nov. 1992.
60. Ibid., p.90.
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88 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
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