EP HSE SG 02 12 - EP HSE Technical Standard For HSE Case Rev 1

Exploration and Production TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 ii
EP HSE SG 02 12 FEBRUARY 2014
DISTRIBUTION LIST
Copy No. Title Location

1 PDP KL
2 P&E HSE KL
3 PM KL
4 PI KL
5 CHSE KL
6 ODO KL
7 ODT KL
8 BD SKO
9 PD PMO
10 SD SBO
11 MO (Country Manager) Myanmar
12 VO (Country Manager) Vietnam
13 TO (Country Manager) Turkmenistan
14 IO (Country Manager) Iraq
15 PSE PMO
16 PPD PMO
17 PRE PMO
18 PME PMO
19 PWE PMO
20 PSM PMO
21 BSE SKO
22 BPD SKO
23 BRE SKO
24 BME SKO
25 BWE SKO
26 BSM SKO
27 SSE SBO
28 SPD SBO
29 SRE SBO
30 SME SBO
31 SWE SBO
32 SSM SBO
NOTE: Copies are kept in each region’s online DARS and EDAS
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 iii
AMENDMENT SUMMARY
This sheet must be completed in detail at each revision once this document has
been approved. Details must include revision number, description and indication of
which pages and paragraphs have been revised, date of revision approval,
approvers title and signature.
Rev. Description Date Approver Title Name
0 Issue of Initial Draft Jan 13 Head of E&P HSE En. M Tarmizi B. Munir
Notes:
1) Document Custodian to update Amendment Record as and when

amendments/new revisions are received.
2) For description of amendment the Document Custodian should indicate
correction, modification, and update or delete issue.
3) Document Custodian to enter their company reference number, sign and date
the record of entry.
4) Where part amendments are issued, the relevant page(s) will be identified with a
lower case letter in the revision status line in the header
TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR
Exploration and Production
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD ........................................................................ I
DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................. II
AMENDMENT SUMMARY ..................................................... III
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................... 8
1.1 Purpose ............................................................................................. 8
1.2 Scope ............................................................................................... 8
1.3 General Definitions ................................................................................ 9
1.4 Requirement for HSE Case...................................................................... 9
1.5 Drilling Units........................................................................................ 9
1.6 Offshore and Onshore Production facilities ................................................... 9
1.6.1 Hazard and Effects Management Process (HEMP) ............................. 9
1.6.2 HSE Case Purpose ................................................................. 10
1.6.3 HSE Cases ........................................................................... 10
1.6.4 CIMAH and the HSE Case requirement ......................................... 11
1.6.5 PETRONAS HSE Case ............................................................ 12
1.6.6 PETRONAS HSE Cases and Third Party Operations ......................... 12
1.6.7 Temporary Changes / Mode of Operation ....................................... 12
1.6.8 HSE Case for HSE-Critical Operations .......................................... 13
2 HSE CASE AND TECHNICAL INTEGRITY PROCESS SAFETY
(TIPS) .............................................................................. 14
2.1 Major Accident Hazards ........................................................................ 15
2.2 Risk Acceptance Criteria ....................................................................... 17
2.2.1 Individual Risk ....................................................................... 18
2.2.2 Societal Risk ......................................................................... 19
2.3 Critical Drawings ................................................................................ 19
2.4 Independent Verification ....................................................................... 20
3 CONCEPT SELECT HSE CASE ........................................... 22
3.1 Roles and responsibilities ...................................................................... 22
3.1.1 Concept Select Phase HSE Case Custodian ................................... 22
3.1.2 HSE Case Reviewer ................................................................ 22
3.1.3 Concept Select Phase HSE Case Endorser .................................... 23
3.1.4 Project Manager ..................................................................... 23
4 DESIGN HSE CASE ......................................................... 24
4.1 Brownfield Projects ............................................................................. 26
4.2 Accelerated Projects ............................................................................ 26
4.3 Workforce Involvement ......................................................................... 27
4.4.1 Design Phase HSE Case Custodian ............................................. 27
4.4.3 HSE Case Endorser ................................................................ 28
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4.4.4 HSE Case Approver ................................................................ 28

4.4.5 Project Manager ..................................................................... 28
4.4.6 Technical Authorities ............................................................... 28
4.4.7 Maintenance Team ................................................................. 28
5 OPERATIONS HSE CASE .................................................. 30
5.1 Workforce Involvement ......................................................................... 32
5.2.1 Operation Phase HSE Case Custodian ......................................... 32
5.2.5 Project Manager ..................................................................... 34
5.2.7 Operations and Maintenance Team .............................................. 35
6 MOTHBALLING / DECOMMISSIONING / DISPOSAL HSE CASE .. 36
6.1.1 Decommissioning Phase HSE Case Custodian ................................ 36
6.1.5 Project Manager ..................................................................... 37
6.1.7 Operations and Maintenance Team .............................................. 37
7 DRILLING UNITS HSE CASE .............................................. 39
7.1 Drilling Roles and Responsibilities ........................................................... 41
7.1.1 Head of Drilling, E&P ............................................................... 41
7.1.2 Head of Drilling (Technology & Engineering), DRE ............................ 41
7.1.3 Head of Drilling (DRD, DRX or DRI) ............................................. 41
7.1.4 Head of Drilling Operations (DRO) ............................................... 41
8 HSE CASE STRUCTURE ................................................... 42
9 PART 1: OVERVIEW ........................................................ 43
9.1 Facilities Description ............................................................................ 43
9.1.1 Overview of the Installation ........................................................ 44
9.1.2 Facility and Process Description .................................................. 44
9.2 Remedial Action Plan (RAP) .................................................................. 45
9.3 Statement of Fitness ............................................................................ 45
10 PART 2: MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS .......................... 48
10.1 HEMP ............................................................................................. 48
10.2 Major Accident Hazards Identification ....................................................... 50
10.3 Hazard Inventory ................................................................................ 50
10.4 Facility Hazard and Effects Register ......................................................... 51
10.5 Safety Critical Elements ........................................................................ 51
10.6 Bowtie Assessment ............................................................................. 56
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10.6.1 Barrier and Control Effectiveness ................................................ 60

10.7 Performance Standards ........................................................................ 62
10.8 Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPMs) ............................... 63
10.9 Hazard Control Picture and Sheets .......................................................... 64
10.9.1 ALARP Demonstration ............................................................. 64
10.9.2 Hazard and Barrier Assessment .................................................. 67
10.10 Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) 69
10.10.1 Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) ....................................... 69
10.10.2 Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS)............................................. 69
10.10.3 MOPO and SIMOPS Workshops ................................................. 70
10.10.4 MOPO and SIMOPS template .................................................... 71
10.11 Operational Envelope........................................................................... 72
11 PART 3: CONTROL OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS ....... 74
11.1 Barriers and Safety Critical Elements ........................................................ 74
11.2 Identified facility SCEs.......................................................................... 76
11.3 Safety Critical Features ........................................................................ 77
11.4 Technical Integrity ............................................................................... 77
11.5 Safety Critical Element Register .............................................................. 78
12 PART 4: SYSTEMS .................................................... 79
12.1 HSE Critical Activities........................................................................... 79
12.2 Activity Sheets ................................................................................... 84
12.3 Competency to undertake activities for managing major hazards ....................... 84
12.4 Essential Procedures to Manage MAH ...................................................... 85
12.5 Critical Activity Matrix ........................................................................... 85
12.5.1 Function of SCE-Critical Activity Matrix .......................................... 86
12.5.2 Development of SCE-Critical Activity Matrix .................................... 86
13 MAIN SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FOR THE HSE CASE .... 87
13.1 Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) Requirements .......................................... 87
13.2 Scope of Assessment .......................................................................... 87
13.3 FSA Tools ........................................................................................ 88
14 HSE CASE REVIEW ................................................... 92
14.1 HSE Case Communication .................................................................... 92
14.2 Review Requirement ........................................................................... 92
14.3 Frequency of Review ........................................................................... 92
14.3.1 Major Modification to the facilities and operations ............................. 93
14.3.2 Findings from Other HSE Risk Assessments ................................... 93
14.3.3 Findings from Assurance Exercise ............................................... 93
14.3.4 Lesson Learnt........................................................................ 93
REFERENCES ................................................................... 94
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REVISION 1.0 4
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

The abbreviations and acronyms used in this document shall have the
following meaning:
AC .......................... Alternating Current
ACD ........................ Accelerated Competency Development
AIV ......................... Acoustic Induced Vibration
ALARP ..................... As Low As is Reasonably Practicable
BA .......................... Breathing Apparatus
BS .......................... British Standards
BTEX ....................... Benzene Toluene Ethylbenzene and Xylene
CFD......................... Computational Fluid Dynamics
CIMAH ..................... Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards
CO .......................... Carbon Monoxide
DCS ........................ Distributed Control System
DoE......................... Department of Environment
DOSH ...................... Department of Occupational Safety and Health
DOSO ...................... Demonstration of Safe Operation
DP .......................... Dynamic Positioning
DRD ........................ Drilling Development
DRE ........................ Drilling Exploration
DRI ......................... Drilling Intervention
DRO ........................ Drilling Operations
DRX ........................ Drilling Exploration
EDG ........................ Emergency Diesel Generator
EDP......................... Emergency Depressurisation
EERA ....................... Escape Evacuation and Rescue Analysis
EIA ......................... Environmental Impact Assessment
EEMUA .................... Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association
EN .......................... European Norm
EPS ......................... Early Production System
ERP ......................... Emergency Response Plan
ESD ........................ Emergency Shutdown
ESDV....................... Emergency Shutdown Valve
ESSA ....................... Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis
ETA ......................... Event Tree Analysis
FAT ......................... Factory Acceptance Test
FEED ....................... Front End Engineering Design
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FERA ....................... Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment

FPSO ....................... Floating Production Storage and Offloading
FRED ....................... Fire Radiation Explosion and Dispersion
FSA ......................... Formal Safety Assessment
FSO......................... Floating Storage and Offloading
FTA ......................... Fault Tree Analysis
FW .......................... Fire Water
GHSED .................... Group Health Safety and Environment Department
HAC ........................ Hazardous Area Classification
HAZID ..................... Hazard Identification
HAZOP..................... Hazard and Operability
HC .......................... Hydrocarbon
HCS ........................ Hazard Control Sheets
HCU ........................ Home Country Unit
HEMP ...................... Hazard Effect and Management Process
HIPPS ...................... High Integrity Pressure Protection System
HIV ......................... Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HRA ........................ Health Risk Assessment
HSE......................... Health Safety and Environment
HSEMS .................... Health Safety and Environment Management System
HVAC ...................... Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
IADC ....................... International Association of Drilling Contractors
ICB ......................... Independent Competent Body
IPF .......................... Instrumented Protective Function
IRPA........................ Individual Risk Per Annum
ISO ......................... International Organisation for Standardisation
ITPM ....................... Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance
JHA ......................... Job Hazard Analysis
JV ........................... Joint Venture
KPI ......................... Key Performance Indicators
LNG ........................ Liquefied Natural Gas
LOPA ....................... Layers of Protection Analysis
LPG ......................... Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MAE ........................ Major Accident Event
MAH ........................ Major Accident Hazard
MATTE ..................... Major Accident To The Environment
MEK ........................ Methyl Ethyl Ketone
HSE CASE
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MH .......................... Major Hazard

MODU...................... Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit
MOPO ...................... Manual of Permitted Operations
MS .......................... Management System
MSDS ...................... Material Safety Data Sheet
MTBE....................... Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether
NA .......................... Not Applicable
NDT ........................ Non Destructive Testing
NFHA....................... Non Flammable Hazard Assessment
NGL ........................ Natural Gas Liquids
OP .......................... Operating Procedures
OPU ........................ Overseas Production Unit
P&E HSE .................. Projects and Engineering HSE
PETRONAS ............... Petroliam Nasional Berhad
PFP ......................... Passive Fire Protection
PHA......................... Process Hazard Analysis
PHAST ..................... Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool
PLL ......................... Potential Loss of Life
POB ........................ Persons on Board
PS ........................... Protection Systems
PTS ......................... PETRONAS Technical Standard
PTW ........................ Permit To Work
QRA ........................ Quantitative Risk Assessment
RAM ........................ Risk Assessment Matrix
RAP ......................... Remedial Action Plan
SAT ......................... Site Acceptance Test
SCE......................... Safety Critical Element
SIL.......................... Safety Integrity Level
SIMOPS ................... Simultaneous Operations
SIPCON ................... Simultaneous Production and Construction
SIPCOM ................... Simultaneous Production and Commissioning
SIPROD ................... Simultaneous Production and Drilling
SISO ....................... Specific Instruction for Simultaneous Operations
SME ........................ Subject Matter Expert
SSIV ....................... Subsea Isolation Valve
TEMPSC ................... Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft
TIPS ........................ Technical Integrity Process Safety
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TR........................... Temporary Refuge

TRSIA...................... Temporary Refuge Smoke Ingress Assessment
UK .......................... United Kingdom
UPS......................... Uninterruptable Power Supply
HSE CASE
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REVISION 1.0 8
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
This document details the requirements for both the purpose and
contents of the HSE Case and provides guidance on its development.
The document aims to:
 Define the business accountability in delivering HSE case across the

asset lifecycle
 Define what the HSE case requirements are and how it is to be used
during each lifecycle phase of the asset
 Reference the relevant PETRONAS PTS documents associated with
the implementation of this standard
 Develop an understanding of how HSE case reports are to be
delivered.
The HSE Case shall be a demonstration that major accident hazard risks
associated with PETRONAS E&P operations are adequately managed
throughout the lifecycle of the asset, and do not pose harm to personnel
working at the facility, as well as to the nearby community, where
relevant.
The HSE Case shall serve as an official document that can be used to
demonstrate that the facility is designed, operated and maintained so
that the risk exposure to the personnel working at the facility, as well as
to the nearby community, is broadly acceptable or as low as reasonably
practicable (ALARP). The ALARP demonstration standard used for the
assessments shall be acceptable to PETRONAS E&P and in accordance
with best current industry practice.
The contents of the HSE Case shall be comprehensive, incorporating

descriptions of the facility, the potential hazards due to the facility’s
operations, as well as relevant risk assessments evaluating the
adequacy of control and mitigation for major accident hazards (MAH).
1.2 Scope
The requirements defined in this standard shall be applicable throughout
PETRONAS E&P global operations, including Company owned facilities
operated by the Contractors and Sub-contractors.
Additionally, the requirements specified in this technical standard shall

be complied with for facilities shared with other Operators (JV
operations). However, if the other Operator has equivalent HSE Case
requirements then these may be adopted provided:
 All the essential elements in minimizing the risks associated with the
facility have been addressed
 The requirements made under this standard are met or exceeded.
In these situations, this standard shall be the minimum acceptable

standard.
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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This standard specifically excludes the completion of an Environmental

Impact Assessment (EIA). This shall be the subject of a separate study
/ document. All facilities shall complete an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) in accordance with the requirements detailed in PTS
60.3206 Environmental Impact Assessment Guideline [7]. However, the
HSE Case shall also demonstrate adequate management of any Major
Accident To The Environment (MATTE) event that is identified and
appropriate to the facility operations.
In addition, occupational health risk assessments shall be identified

during consideration of the Health Hazards during the HAZID study (PTS
60.2004) [5] and further analysed in accordance with the PETRONAS
standard PTS 60.1400.01 Health Risk Assessment [6].
1.3 General Definitions

The intent of the following words are:
 Shall, Will, Must means that the action is mandatory across

PETRONAS facilities
 Should, Would, If possible means that an action is not mandatory
but is recommended
 May means that an action is optional and no recommendation is
made as to whether or not it should be implemented.
1.4 Requirement for HSE Case

The HSE Case document, including the associated safety studies, shall
be developed for the following facilities for all phases of the asset
lifecycle;
 Drilling Units in accordance with IADC Guidelines [10][11]

 Onshore and Offshore Production Facilities, including FSO, FPSO, Oil
and Gas Terminals, intra and inter-field pipelines, pipelines, block
valve stations, etc.
1.5 Drilling Units

The Drilling Contractor shall demonstrate to PETRONAS E&P that its
organization is committed to manage, control and mitigate all risks
inherent with drilling activities through development of HSE Case for the
drilling unit.
1.6 Offshore and Onshore Production facilities

1.6.1 Hazard and Effects Management Process (HEMP)
HEMP is a structured methodology for the identification of HSE hazards

and assessment of the associated risks, with the development of control
and recovery measures that reduce the HSE risks to ‘acceptable’ or As
Low As is Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) levels, see Figure 2-3. HEMP
must show that all HSE hazards have been systematically identified in
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 10
the Hazards & Effects Register, inclusive of relevant risk classification

(e.g. High, Medium and Low).
Guidelines for HEMP are provided in the PETRONAS Technical Standard

(PTS) PTS 60.0401 [3].
It should be noted that whilst HEMP may include consideration of

security risks, these are not required to form part of the HSE Case
submission.
1.6.2 HSE Case Purpose
The HSE Case must demonstrate in relation to the subject site or

facility:
 That all Major Accident Hazards (MAH) have been identified in the
Hazards and Effects Register and suitable control, mitigation and
recovery measures are provided/ implemented (for existing facilities
or operations). It must be demonstrated that operation can be
achieved within the PETRONAS quantitative criteria for risk
tolerability and that risk exposure has been reduced to ‘acceptable’
or ALARP levels.
 That all HSE risks - including those resulting from Medium and Low
Risk Hazards - will be managed and controlled via the PETRONAS or
project/ site/ operations specific HSE Management System.
 That Emergency Response Plans (on-site and off-site where
necessary) in relation to Major Accident Hazards have been prepared
based on credible emergency scenarios, with the necessary
stakeholder consultation.
All production facilities, including those operated by Contractors, shall

have an HSE Case prior to commencement of the operations. The HSE
Case shall, as a minimum, comply with:
 The regulatory requirement of the Country where the subject site or

facility operates
 The PETRONAS Company requirements as set out in this standard.
It is required that this Technical Standard shall be a minimum standard

or where there are local regulatory requirements, the more stringent
shall be adhered to.
In cases where the production operations’ facilities are operated by a

Contractor within a field e.g. FPSO, an HSE Case shall be required.
However, it shall be developed separately from the Company operated-
facilities. The HSE Case shall meet the minimum requirements stipulated
in this standard.
1.6.3 HSE Cases
An HSE Case is a living document that considers the full lifecycle of

project, facilities and operations. It must address the safety impacts in
each of the life cycle phases i.e. project conception, design, tender,
construction, commissioning, operation, decommissioning, abandonment
and site restoration of a project.
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 11
Figure 1-1 – Project Life Cycle and HSE Case Reports
1.6.4 CIMAH and the HSE Case requirement
The HSE Case required by this standard shall be considered to be in

addition to the requirements of the Malaysian DOSH or any other
national legislation that may be in-force at the facility location.
HSE Case
Onshore and offshore facilities are required by this standard to

demonstrate how safe operation of the facility is achieved. The
frequency of the HSE Case review cycle shall be no more than at an
interval of 5-years. However, a review and update of the facility HSE
Case will be required when any major modification to the facility occurs.
CIMAH Report
Malaysian onshore facilities are required by the Control of Industrial

Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) Regulation 1996 [16] and/or equivalent
Host Country requirement to complete a Control of Industrial Major
Accident Hazards (CIMAH) report that demonstrates the safe operation
of the facility. The frequency of the CIMAH report review and submission
is every three (3) years, with the exception for any major modification
to the facility which requires CIMAH Report to be updated. The HSE Case
requirements set out by this document shall be met by the incorporation
of an addendum to the CIMAH report that contains the additional
information required.
For onshore facilities in Malaysia that do not require submission of a

CIMAH report but require completion of a Demonstration of Safe
Operation (DOSO) may still be capable of posing a Major Accident
Hazard. Therefore, the requirements set out in this standard shall be
met either as an addendum to the DOSO report or as a separate HSE
Case.
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REVISION 1.0 12
1.6.5 PETRONAS HSE Case
Specifically for the preparation of the HSE Case, PETRONAS identifies

the following four stages as they relate to sequential time windows and
a HSE Case is required for each of these:
 Stage 1: Concept Select Phase

 Stage 2: Detailed Design.
 Stage 3: Operation.
 Stage 4: Mothballing / Decommissioning / Abandonment / Disposal.
1.6.6 PETRONAS HSE Cases and Third Party Operations
Table 1-1 details the requirements for compliance with this standard
when the asset is either not owned or operated by PETRONAS or is
linked in some way to a third party asset such as a Floating Storage Unit
(FSU) or pipeline, etc.
Table 1-1 – HSE Case requirements
PETRONAS Contractor HSE

HSE Case Case and HSE MS
(inc. FSA) and with Acceptance
HSE MS by PETRONAS
(inc. FSA)
PETRONAS owned and

Required
operated assets
PETRONAS owned asset

Required
operated by 3rd Party
PETRONAS operated asset

Required
owned by 3rd Party
3rd Party owned and

operated assets (e.g. FSU, Required
FSO, FPSO, pipeline, etc.)
In the situation where the PETRONAS asset is linked or connected to a

third party owned and operated facility, then the HSE Case Approver for
the PETRONAS facility shall as a minimum review and accept the
adequacy of the HSE Case developed by the third party that covers their
assets / facilities. In addition, the Formal Safety Assessment and HSE
MS must be reviewed and accepted by the HSE Case Approver as being
adequate.
1.6.7 Temporary Changes / Mode of Operation
In the situation where there are temporary changes to be made to an

existing facility and / or operation, the HSE Case shall be updated to
reflect the changes made to the facility or its altered mode of operation.
For example, if a normally producing well head platform is changed to a
water injection platform for later enhanced oil recovery then the HSE
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REVISION 1.0 13
Case shall be updated to reflect the temporary mode of operation /

configuration.
1.6.8 HSE Case for HSE-Critical Operations
For complete hazard management, consideration within the HSE Case

should be given for non-process related HSE-Critical Operations, such
as:
 Aviation Operations
 Road and Marine Operations
 Seismic Operations
As well as any other critical activities that may pose any major hazards
to the operations.
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REVISION 1.0 14
2 HSE CASE AND TECHNICAL INTEGRITY PROCESS

SAFETY (TIPS)
The aim of TIPS is to put into operation the PETRONAS Mandatory
Control Framework. This is achieved by focusing on defining and
confirming that assets are performing their required function effectively
and efficiently whilst safeguarding life, assets, environment and the
company reputation.
The TIPS process can be represented as a 5 stage TIPS flowchart, and is

shown in Figure 2-1 below.
Figure 2-1 – Technical Integrity Process Safety (TIPS) Flowchart
STAGE 5
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION
ACTIVITIES
STAGE 1
IDENTIFY MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS
MAH SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT
•Likelihood
•Consequence
•Risk
FORMAL SAFETY
DEMONSTRATION OF ASSESSMENT
MAH & SCE QRA, EERA, ESSA, NFHA, Dropped Object,
Ship Collision, TRSIA, F&G Mapping, HAC,
MANAGEMENT etc.
STAGE 2
IDENTIFY SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
SCE SUITABILITY ASSESSMENT
•Avoid
•Prevent
•Control / Mitigate
•Emergency Response
CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT REVIEW, SCHEDULED UPDATES,
AND CHANGE CONTROL PROCEDURES
FACILITY HSE CASE

VERIFICATION SCHEME
STAGE 3
DEFINE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF
•Functionality SUITABILITY AND EXECUTION
•Availability
•Reliability
•Survivability
•Interactions / Dependencies
STAGE 4
SAFETY CASE DEVELOP / REVIEW AND IMPLEMENT
ASSURANCE PROCESSES
IMPLEMENTATION INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF
•Test SUITABILITY AND EXECUTION
•Inspect
•Maintain
STAGE 5
MANAGE NON-CONFORMING SCEs
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF
•Identify SUITABILITY AND EXECUTION
•Manage Interim Risk Until Resolution
•Repair / Replace / Redesign / Rectify
The TIPS program has five main stages:
 Identification of Major Accident Hazards

 Identification of Safety Critical Elements, involved in the
management of Major Accident Hazards
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 Identification of Performance Standards for these Safety Critical

Elements
 Identification of the Assurance processes that maintain or ensure the
continued suitability of the Safety Critical Elements, and that these
are meeting the Performance Standards
 Verification that all steps have been undertaken, and this that Major
Accident Hazards are being controlled
The HSE Case and associated Performance Standards shall be in

accordance with the TIPS program and as a minimum shall describe the
MAH, SCEs and appropriate Performance Standards for each phase of
the project life cycle.
2.1 Major Accident Hazards

The HSE Case is the principal document that is used to identify the
Major Accident Hazards (MAH) and consequently identify and confirm
the barriers that are in place that prevent or mitigate the consequences
of the MAH.
A Major Accident Hazard is typically a low probability, high consequence

event, which requires a different approach to the occupational safety
management processes. Occupational safety management programmes
are associated with the higher frequency but lower consequence type of
events such as falls from height. The basic reason for this is that while
single failures can cause dangerous occurrences, Major Accidents do not
generally happen as a result of a failure of one piece of equipment or
one wrong action by an individual. Instead, they are epitomised by a
series of failures of plant, personnel functions, processes and
procedures. Following a major accident, it is not unusual for personnel
within a company to reflect that all the signs of the likelihood of the
eventual accident were evident. However, the operating company and
personnel had been unable to recognise this and make the necessary
changes to plant, people and processes, which become obvious and
natural to do, after such an accident.
The UK HSE Case Regulations [13] defines a MAH as an incident which

leads to extensive damage to an asset, major impact to company
reputation and / or severe or catastrophic consequences to people.
These include:
 Fire, explosion or other release of a dangerous substance involving

death or serious injury
 Any event involving major damage to the structure or loss of
stability
 Helicopter collision
 Failure of diver systems
 Any other work activity event involving death or serious injury to
more than one person
This definition does not deal with the protection of the marine and/or
onshore environment from the consequences of a major accident.
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However, safeguarding the integrity of installations and reducing the

risks to people from MAHs will also help to reduce threats to the marine
and onshore environment from the accidental release of hydrocarbons or
process fluids.
Therefore, in addition to the above definition, a Major Accident will be

considered to have occurred if it:
 Results from the uncontrolled developments at the facility / site

 Leads to serious danger to people or to the environment, both on
and off site
Uncontrolled developments may be due to on and off site factors that

are unable to be influenced or the opportunity to control or influence has
been lost. Offsite factors may be adverse weather conditions, sea state,
earthquakes, etc. Onsite factors are events that escalate so that they
are beyond the normal span of the operating envelope over which
control can be exercised.
A Major Accident must have the potential to cause serious danger but it
is not necessary for that danger to be realised. Serious danger to
people means a risk of death, serious physical injury or harm to health.
Serious danger to the environment should be considered as an accident
having the potential to result in:
 The death or adverse effects on local populations of species or

organisms
 Significant contamination of drinking water supplies, ground or
ground water
 Damage to designated areas, habitats or populations within the
areas
 Permanent or long term damage to widespread habitats
 Significant or long term damage to marine or aquatic environment
It is important to note that the HSE Case shall only consider Major
Accidents that have the potential to cause harm from the occurrence of
a single, unexpected and unplanned, acute exposure, release or event
(e.g. fire, explosion). This Technical Standard specifically excludes from
the HSE Case any occupational health hazards and environmental
discharges other than those that are considered to represent a MATTE
event. Typically, the Hazard Identification study (HAZID) shall identify
the occupational and environmental hazards using the guidewords listed
in Appendix 1 of the PTS 60.2004 Hazard Identification (HAZID)
Guideline [5] or the Generic Hazard List shown in Appendix 3. These
occupational and environmental hazards shall be the subject of separate
assessments in accordance with the relevant PETRONAS Technical
Standards. For example, PTS 60.3202 Environmental Aspects and
Impacts Assessment Guide [7], PTS 60.1400.01 Guideline Health Risk
Assessment [6], etc.
The classification of hazards as MAH is determined by risk ranking using

PETRONAS Risk Assessment Matrix. Major Accident Hazards are
represented by risks ranked as Red – VERY HIGH (E4, E5, D5), Orange –
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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HIGH (B5, C5, D4, E3) and Yellow (A5) as shown in the bounded region
of Figure 2-2 below.
Figure 2-2– PETRONAS E&P HSE Risk Matrix [12]
1 2 3 4 5
Severity
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
Minor Major Single Multiple

People Slight Injury
Injury Injury Fatality Fatalities
Slight Minor Local Major Extensive

Asset
IMPACT Damage Damage Damage Damage Damage
Slight Minor Localized Major Massive

Environment
Impact Impact Impact Impact Impact
Major Major Inter-

Slight Limited Considerable
Reputation National national
Impact Impact Impact
Impact Impact
Happens
E
several times
Almost
per year at
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5
Certain
location
Happens
D several times
Likely per year in
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
company
LIKELIHOOD
Incident has
C
Possible
occurred in our C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
company
Heard of
B
Unlikely
incident in B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
industry
A
Remotely Never heard of
likely to in industry
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
happen
2.2 Risk Acceptance Criteria

PETRONAS E&P has adopted risk acceptance criteria to assess the
acceptability of onsite and offsite risk level posed by PETRONAS E&P
facilities. These risk acceptance criteria are expressed in terms of
individual risk and societal risk.
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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2.2.1 Individual Risk
The HSE Case must be able to demonstrate via the Formal Safety
Assessment (typically the Quantitative Risk Assessment) that the facility
can be designed and operated so that it poses an acceptable risk to
workers and offsite population or members of the public. The
acceptable risk levels are often expressed as individual risk per annum
(IRPA) to worker groups or to the public. The acceptable limits for these
groups are shown in Figure 2-3 below. Risk figures between the
Unacceptable and Acceptable Regions require a demonstration that the
risk is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Risk reduction
measures may be recommended, and assessed for their practicability. If
none are identified or deemed practicable then the risk is deemed
acceptable.
The evaluation of the risk levels is typically completed as a Quantitative

Risk Assessment (QRA). The HSE Case need not contain the QRA, which
shall form part of the Formal Safety Assessment, but should make
reference to it as appropriate. The QRA shall be completed in
accordance with the PETRONAS E&P Technical Standard EP HSE SG 06
14 [9] and PTS 60.2210 [2].
Figure 2-3 – Individual risk acceptance criteria
For offshore installations the maximum tolerable limit of 10 -3 per year

shall include personal (occupational) and transport accidents. Where the
frequency is close to 10-3 per year acceptance that further risk reduction
measures are grossly disproportionate should be only on the basis of a
very rigorous demonstration.
In addition to the above risk acceptance criteria, onshore facilities in

Malaysia shall comply with the DoE risk acceptance criteria [20] that the
10-5 per year Location Specific Individual Risk contour must not extend
beyond the site boundary. For all onshore facilities the 10 -6 per year
LSIR contour shall not reach residential areas, or public buildings where
vulnerable populations will be located such as schools, hospitals etc.
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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2.2.2 Societal Risk
For PETRONAS E&P onshore facilities only it is proposed that the Hong
Kong Planning Department societal risk guidelines are used [17]. The
societal risk guidelines are shown in Figure 2-4. Two f-N risk lines are
used to determine what represents ‘acceptable’ or ‘unacceptable’
societal risks. It is considered unacceptable for any facility to be
capable of causing greater than 1000 fatalities due to single incident
irrespective of the likelihood of that particular event. An ALARP region is
also incorporated which is to ensure that all practicable and cost-
effective measures which can reduce risks will be considered.
PETRONAS E&P do not propose any group risk criteria for offshore
installations.
Figure 2-4 – Societal Risk Acceptance Criteria [17]
1.00E-02
1.00E-03
Frequency of N or more Fatalities (per year)
1.00E-04
Unacceptable
1.00E-05
1.00E-06 ALARP
1.00E-07
Acceptable
1.00E-08
1.00E-09
1 10 100 1000 10000
Number of Fatalities, N
2.3 Critical Drawings

Critical drawings are those drawings that are required to be maintained
to support implementation of any changes to the facility. They are
necessary to ensure that the risks associated with the major accident
hazards are adequately managed.
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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A list of critical drawings shall be for each facility. All critical drawings
shall be stored in an easily accessible database and they shall reflect the
current design and status of the facility appropriate to the lifecycle of
the asset. For example, during Operations Phase the drawings shall be
‘As Built’ versions. During Design phase the drawings shall be the latest
available revision.
The use of the easily accessible database is to ensure that personnel

have reliable and up to date information to allow accurate planning and
scoping of work operations and management of change.
The list of critical drawings shall include but not limited to the following:
 Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs)

 Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs)
 Cause and Effect Matrix
 Hazardous Area Classification
 Facility plot plans
 Site/ field layout
 Escape Routes
 Safety Equipment Layout
 Critical Valve List including all Locked Open and Locked Closed
valves
 Fire and Gas detector layouts
 Fixed Fire Fighting Equipment layouts
 Heat and Material Balance
 Fire water and deluge layout
2.4 Independent Verification

PETRONAS may appoint an Independent Verification Body (IVB) to
develop an effective verification scheme that ensures accurate
identification of the safety critical elements (SCEs) for the installation
and the adequacy of their association performance standards.
In order to ensure management of the MAHs is undertaken

comprehensively, it is necessary to have an integrated compliance
verification process. This is to be undertaken through a process of
independent verification by a defined Independent Competent Body
(ICB). This ICB will be responsible for:
 Challenging the identification of Major Accident Hazards

 Challenging and commenting on the SCEs
 Creating or being consulted in the creation of the Verification
Scheme and its periodic review
 Performing verification activities as defined by the Verification
Scheme
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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Essentially the ICB is providing an independent view of the initial and

on-going suitability of the SCEs to manage the risks through the means
defined in the HSE Case and translated through the Performance
Standards.
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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3 CONCEPT SELECT HSE CASE

The Concept Select HSE Case Report essentially demonstrates that the
HEMP process has been systematically applied during the concept phase
of the project for each of the options being considered. The purpose of
the Concept Select HSE Case is to demonstrate that the lowest risk
option considered during this phase has been selected. If the lowest risk
option has not been selected then the Concept Select HSE Case shall
demonstrate that the lowest risk concept was grossly disproportionate to
the level of benefit attained.
The Concept Select HSE Case shall include but not be limited to the
following:
 Reference to the descriptions of the options being considered

 An overview of anticipated hazards, their impact and associated risk
levels
 A summary of the key assumptions made in the Hazard Identification
and Risk Assessment
 Summaries of the philosophies and measures implemented during
this phase to reduce the residual risk level to ALARP
 Justification that the selected option represents the lowest overall
risk or that the lowest overall risk represents is grossly
disproportionate in relation to the level of benefit obtained
 Recommendations regarding HSE issues to be addressed in
subsequent phases of the project i.e. issues to be included in the
design phase (FEED) and studies/analysis that can only be
conducted meaningful during or after detailed design
3.1 Roles and responsibilities

The Concept Select Phase HSE Case is required prior to progression of
the selected option into Conceptual Engineering Phase and Front End
Engineering and Design (FEED).
3.1.1 Concept Select Phase HSE Case Custodian
He/ she is responsible for managing the relevant HEMP studies and
preparing the risk tolerability and ALARP assessments.
He/ she is responsible for preparing the content of the Concept Select
Phase HSE Case report. The Concept Select Phase HSE Case custodian
shall be the Project HSE engineer lead.
3.1.2 HSE Case Reviewer
HSE Case Reviewer is responsible for reviewing the accuracy and

adequacy of the HSE Case technical contents, including the relevant
HEMP studies.
An example of the HSE Case Reviewer is the HSE Senior

Manager/Manager.
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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3.1.3 Concept Select Phase HSE Case Endorser
The Concept Select Phase HSE Case Endorser is responsible for

reviewing and endorsing the HSE Case for all facilities operated by
PETRONAS E&P to ensure the adequacy of the Concept Select Phase HSE
Case contents in meeting PETRONAS E&P requirements. The HSE Case
endorser shall be the Head of HSE Division.
3.1.4 Project Manager
The Project Manager shall identify the requirement for the Concept
Select Phase HSE Case.
He/ she ensures that suitable and sufficient HSE resources are identified
and appointed, including the Concept Select HSE Case custodian.
The Project Manager is responsible for the approval of the Concept

Select Phase HSE Case including the conclusions, recommendations and
acceptance of the selected option.
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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4 DESIGN HSE CASE

The Design HSE Case Report should be completed at the end of the
FEED phase and updated as appropriate during the detailed design
phase to reflect any changes made.
The Design HSE Case is to demonstrate that the HEMP has been
systematically applied during the design phase of the project and that
risks have been actively reduced to ALARP. The design HSE Case shall
include but not be limited to the following aspects:
 The elements of the Hazards and Effects Register that are considered
to be Major Accident Hazards, which shall include an assessment of
the risks associated with each hazard including the key assumptions
 A summary of the HEMP studies completed including results
 That all HSE risks have been identified and that Medium and Low
risks that are not considered Major Accident Hazards are managed
and controlled by the PETRONAS or project/ site/ operations specific
HSE Management System.
 The representation of each major accident hazard using Bowties or
barrier analysis to enable identification of the Safety Critical
Elements (SCEs) and equipment. The bowtie analysis should also
identify the critical activities that ensure the identified SCE integrity.
 Description of the facilities and operations.
 Detailed Performance Standards covering the design, procurement,
fabrication, QA/QC, installation and commissioning phases for the
SCE identified sufficient for the development of Inspection Testing
and Preventive Maintenance (ITPMs)
 A summary of the philosophies and measures that have been
implemented during the FEED phase to reduce risks to ALARP
 An ALARP demonstration for considered risk reduction options and
reasons for acceptance or rejection
 A register of where, and providing justification as to why, the design
has deviated from the PETRONAS Technical Standards
 Details of how workforce involvement has been achieved in the
development of the Design HSE Case
The Design HSE Case shall also identify and detail those activities, with
cross reference to procedures where appropriate, that are critical for the
integrity of the identified SCEs. This is to ensure that all Safety Critical
Elements are designed, purchased, built, installed, operated, inspected
and maintained in a manner to guarantee their continued effectiveness.
The Performance Standards should detail those acceptance criteria,
assurance activities and verification tasks that are applicable and
appropriate to demonstrate that the facility is designed and built for HSE
integrity. For example, the SCE Performance Standards may require
welder’s certificates, material certificates to ensure that they are
fabricated by the vendor appropriately during the fabrication phase. It
may also be necessary to have Factory Acceptance Tests and Site
Acceptance Tests that provide assurance that the SCE is in accordance
with its Performance Standard.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 25
The Design HSE Case should be updated to address the major accident
hazards during the Construction Phase of the project. It is envisaged
that this will only be significant when there is likely to be simultaneous
production and construction / commissioning, for example for Brownfield
projects. This Design HSE Case update for construction phase should
involve the generation of an addendum that provides the following as a
minimum:
 Construction Phase HAZID which reviews the construction methods

to be used e.g. hot tapping / stoppling, heavy lifts, etc.
 Construction Phase MOPO, SIMOPS and /or SISO providing
information on the operation or activity operating envelope and safe
operating limits during the construction phase.
 For Brownfield projects only it may be beneficial to undertake a
Construction Phase Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) to
determine the most appropriate construction and commissioning
strategy e.g. facility shutdown against simultaneous construction,
commissioning and operation. It may also be of use to determine
the lowest risk strategy for the commissioning hazardous facilities.
The construction phase QRA will typically require the existing
platform risk profile and knowledge of the construction phase
manning levels. It should be noted that a construction phase HAZID
and SISO / SIMOPS / SIPCON / SIPCOM may be considered sufficient
as a construction phase risk assessment. The requirement for
conducting a construction phase QRA shall be determined by
PETRONAS Projects and Engineering (P&E) HSE to ensure that the
construction workers are not exposed to an unacceptable level of risk
during simultaneous production and construction / commissioning.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 26
Figure 4-1 – Asset Integrity Life Cycle – Design Stage Performance

Standards
4.1 Brownfield Projects

Brownfield project may be categorised as follows:
 Development of a new platform/ facilities that tie-in to existing

production facilities
 Modification of the existing facilities including infill drilling activities,
power upgrade, etc.
For Brownfield projects such as development of new facilities that are to

be implemented onto, or tie into, existing PETRONAS owned assets a
Design HSE Case is required to be completed for the additional new
project facilities. This Design HSE case shall then be incorporated into
the existing Operations HSE Case prior to commissioning of the
brownfield facilities by the Operations team.
For modifications such as infill drilling, it may just require the update of
the existing Operations HSE Case and associated FSA (e.g. QRA to
include the additional risk associated with the new wells and flowlines,
etc.)
4.2 Accelerated Projects

For accelerated programme projects, which may be either an
unconventional way of project completion or represented by a copy of an
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 27
already existing design e.g. incorporation of additional identical trains,

etc. A single HSE Case may be developed that covers both the design
and the operations phases of the asset. For example, the bowtie
diagrams shall detail the escalation factor controls and critical activities
that ensure that the facility is designed with HSE integrity. The HSE
Case shall be handed over to Operations during the commissioning
phase.
4.3 Workforce Involvement

For Design HSE Cases, workforce involvement can be demonstrated by
ensuring that the relevant staff representatives, including Operations
team representatives, have been involved in the design. This may be
done by ensuring they participate directly in the design activities such as
HAZIDs, HAZOPs, etc. and by participating in project assurance reviews
such as design reviews and audits.

The Design Phase HSE Case should be completed by the project team at
the end of the Front End Engineering phase.
4.4.1 Design Phase HSE Case Custodian
He/ she is responsible for identifying and managing the relevant HEMP
studies to assess the hazards and risks associated with the
development.
Identifies risk reduction strategies, Safety Critical Elements and defines

their Performance Standards in conjunction with the SCE Technical
Authorities.
Ensures that there is a suitable and robust ALARP demonstration in

place.
Reviews and approves all action items raised for correct detail, action
party and completion date.
He/ she is responsible for preparing the content of the Design Phase HSE
Case report. The Design HSE Case Custodian shall be the Lead Technical
Safety Engineer.

adequacy of the HSE Case technical contents, including the safety
studies and the recommended control and mitigation measures to
ensure the risks are ALARP.

Manager/Manager.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 28
4.4.3 HSE Case Endorser
HSE Case Endorser is responsible for reviewing and endorsing the HSE
Case for all facilities operated by PETRONAS E&P to ensure the adequacy
of the HSE Case contents in meeting PETRONAS E&P HSE Case
requirements. The HSE Case Endorser is the Head of HSE Division.
4.4.4 HSE Case Approver
HSE Case Approver is responsible for approving the HSE Case, including
the safety studies carried out and the recommended controls/remedial
action plans arising from those studies.
He/she shall also provide the required leadership and commitment in the
development of HSE Case as well as implementation of any
recommendations to ensure risk levels are ALARP.
The HSE Case approver shall also jointly approve together with the
Project Manager, the Design HSE Case.
The HSE Case Approver shall be the Asset Manager or the Head of
Country/Region e.g. Senior General Manager of Sarawak Operations.
Where there is an inter-connection of PETRONAS facilities with facilities

owned and operated by a third party, the third party facility HSE Case
and FSA shall be submitted to PETRONAS and accepted as being
adequate by the HSE Case Approver.
The Project Manager shall identify the requirement for the Design Phase
HSE Case. The Project Manager shall appoint the Design Phase HSE
Case Custodian and assigns responsibilities.
The Project Manager shall approve the recommendations or findings that

may result from the ALARP demonstration for incorporation into the
design.
He / she ensures that there has been sufficient consultation with

relevant parties through the Design HSE Case Development e.g.
Technical Authorities, Maintenance, etc.
The Project Manager shall develop the Statement of Fitness for the asset
and shall also jointly approve, together with the HSE Case Approver, the
Design HSE Case.
4.4.6 Technical Authorities
Technical authorities are responsible for approving the Safety Critical

Element listing and confirm the adequacy of the associated Performance
Standards.
4.4.7 Maintenance Team
The maintenance team for the facility are responsible for the
development and implementation of the Assurance plan and activities
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 29
for the identified Safety Critical Elements in accordance with their

Performance Standards. In addition the verification tasks should be
identified.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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5 OPERATIONS HSE CASE

The Operations HSE Case Report is to demonstrate that Major Accident
Hazards are managed during operations so that risks remain tolerable
and ALARP. The Operations HSE Case should describe the emergency
response systems provided and should review the emergency response
plan to confirm that the plan and systems provided adequately cover the
identified major accident hazards.
The Operations HSE Case shall describe the list of SCE Critical Tasks that
must be performed to ensure that the protection and mitigation
measures provided remain effective. The critical task list should also
define roles and responsibilities for performing the identified activity.
The Operations HSE Case is to be developed from and make reference to
the Design HSE Case. The Design HSE Case shall be updated during
detailed design to become the initial Operations HSE Case prior to
facility handover and shall be based on ‘As Built’ documentation where
necessary.
The Operations HSE Case shall include, but not be limited to the
following:
 An introduction, a description of the facilities and operations that are

covered by the HSE Case.
 A Matrix Of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous
Operations (SIMOPS) together with a description of how the relevant
management system is implemented. These shall be derived using
the templates provided in Appendix 11.
 Details of the hazards and their sources and controls associated with
the operation. This should reference the Design HSE Case, risk
reduction measures, the identified Safety Critical Elements and their
Performance Standards.
 Detailed Performance Standards covering the operational phase for
the identified SCEs sufficient for the inclusion into specific asset
maintenance and inspection plans / routines.
 Details of the SCE Critical Tasks that have to be performed to ensure
that the Performance Standards are met for the SCEs. This shall
include inspection, maintenance activities (e.g. preventative),
frequency of inspection, etc.
 Details of the emergency response systems provided and a review of
the facility emergency response plan.
 The Operations HSE Case Report must review the facility Emergency
Response Plan and facilities to ensure that all the identified Major
Accident Events are addressed and adequate provisions made for the
successful escape, evacuation and rescue of personnel.
 Details of how the workforce involvement has been achieved in the
development of the Operations HSE Case
The performance standards should consider the Functionality,

Availability, Reliability, Survivability and Inter-dependencies (FARSI) of
the SCE. They should detail the minimum acceptance criteria, assurance
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 31
activities and verification tasks that are applicable and appropriate under
FARSI to demonstrate that the facility can be operated for HSE integrity.
Figure 5-1 – Asset Integrity Life Cycle – Operations Stage Performance

Standards
The Operations HSE Case essentially should describe how to operate to

maintain HSE Integrity. The following requirements must be considered:
 The Operations HSE Case Report must address all HSE aspects of
routine and non-routine operations and must be based on finalised
construction, which may include modifications from earlier detailed
design and/or late changes in predicted impacts.
 The Operations HSE Case Report is essentially an update of the
earlier Design HSE Case Report.
 The Operations HSE Case Report must be reviewed and updated
every 5 years or when major equipment modifications significantly
alter the HSE impacts and/or hazards within the 5-year interval.
 The Operations HSE Case must be reviewed and updated when there
are significant changes to the process conditions e.g. if a new well /
reservoir is to be linked to an existing platform which has higher
pressures or sour service when previously sweet.
 The Operations HSE Case shall be reviewed and updated when it is
required to operate the asset beyond its design life. The Operations
HSE Case must clearly demonstrate on what basis continued safe
operation beyond the design life has been made.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 32
The Operations HSE Case shall include the production of a video, to be

used as a training video for operations staff on the facility that describes
as a minimum the following:
 What are the Major Accident Hazards for the facility

 How these hazards are being managed to ALARP levels or lower
 How the HSE Case is implemented by the facility.
As part of the HSE Case submission suitably sized posters (for example
A1 size) shall be provided for all the Bowties, and the MOPO / SIMOPS
for display at the facility control room.
For new assets the video shall be produced / commissioned by the

Operations team, once the facility has been handed over from projects.
5.1 Workforce Involvement

The HSE Case shall demonstrate that the workforce have been part of
the development and review of the HSE Case. Workforce in this context
is the front line operations and maintenance staff that are directly
involved in the day to day running of the facility.
The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that front line staff have:
 Knowledge of the major accident hazards that have been identified

for that particular facility
 Awareness of the controls and barriers that are in place to manage
these hazards, specifically SCEs, their performance standards, MOPO
etc.
 Knowledge of how these controls and barriers are managed i.e.
ITPMs
Operations HSE Cases shall be communicated to the operations and

maintenance teams on the site or platform. The focus shall be on what
the case means to them and what impact is it likely to have. In addition,
representatives from current operational, engineering and maintenance
teams shall be included in the regular reviews of the HSE Case.

During detailed design phase of the project the design team shall be
responsible for the initial completion of the Operations HSE Case, which
shall be handed over to Operations during the Commissioning phase.
Thereafter the Asset Manager shall be responsible for the subsequent
HSE Case revisions either due to facility modifications or in line with the
periodic revisions as set out by this standard.
5.2.1 Operation Phase HSE Case Custodian
The Operations Phase HSE Case custodian shall ensure that the
Operations HSE Cases are developed and maintained for the assets in
accordance with the latest requirements.
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 33
He/ she is responsible for validating the HEMP studies undertaken during
the previous phase to confirm that the studies remain relevant, and that
no additional studies are required.
The Operations HSE Case custodian shall ensure participation in

development, awareness and proper use of the HSE Case.
In conjunction with a multidisciplinary team to develop, review and

update the Safety Critical Elements listing.
He/she is responsible for the development and/or review of the

Performance Standards for the SCEs. The Performance Standards may
require updating following changes associated with the codes and
standards on which they were based, changes in operating parameters
e.g. more wells, higher POB, etc., or when significant changes are made
to the asset.
He/ She is responsible to confirm and monitor that the Inspection,

Testing and Preventive Maintenance (ITPM) are in line with the
Performance Standards and that inspection and maintenance is being
conducted as per the ITPM and at the required frequency and schedule.
He / She is responsible for the review of the emergency response plans

against the identified Major Accident Hazards.
The HSE Cases custodian is responsible for the maintenance and

accuracy of the Operations HSE Case, so that it continues to reflect the
management of Major Hazards on the facility. He / she is responsible
for preparing and maintaining the content of the Operations Phase HSE
Case report when there is major modification or as a minimum, once in
every five (5) years.
The Operations HSE Case custodian shall ensure that updates to the HSE
Case are communicated to all personnel when necessary.
The Operations HSE Case Custodian shall be the Offshore Installation

Manager (OIM) or equivalent for the onshore terminals. The OIM shall
also be heavily involved in the production of the facility video.


Manager/Manager.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 34
The HSE Case Endorser shall also review and approve the HSE Case
video content.
The asset manager shall be the Operations HSE Case approving

authority for the contents of the Operations Phase HSE Case including
the associated safety studies and the recommended controls / remedial
action plans arising.
He / she shall:
 Ensure the on-going compliance, implementation, periodic review

and update of the Operations HSE Case in accordance with these
guidelines.
 Develop the Statement of Fitness for the Asset.
 Approve the outcome of the HEMP Studies undertaken as part of the
HSE Case and Formal Safety Assessment.
 Ensure that the facility is operated according to the Operations HSE
Case.
 Be accountable to the PETRONAS leadership for ensuring that major
hazards management is in accordance with the measures described
in the HSE Case.
Where there is an inter-connection of PETRONAS facilities with facilities

owned and operated by a third party, the third party facility HSE Case
and FSA shall be submitted to PETRONAS and accepted as being
adequate by the HSE Case Approver.
The Project Manager initiates the development of the initial Operations

Phase HSE Case in accordance with this standard. For the initial
Operations HSE Case only the Project Manager shall appoint the
Operations Phase HSE Case Custodian and assigns responsibilities.
The Project Manager shall identify and liaise with the SCE Technical
Authorities.
He / she ensures that Design Phase HSE Case is maintained and

updated to reflect any changes made during detailed design.
The Project Manager shall also jointly approve together with the HSE
Case Approver, the initial Operations HSE Case, which is the HSE Case
completed as part of the project handover documentation to the
Operations team.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 35

Standards.
Technical authorities are responsible for managing the Safety Critical

Elements listing.
They are responsible for the development, review, update, and

implementation of strategies and Inspection, Testing and Preventive
Maintenance (ITPMs) through which the Performance Standards of the
SCEs will be maintained.
5.2.7 Operations and Maintenance Team
The operations and maintenance team for the facility are responsible for
the development, review and update of the Manual of Permitted
Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS).
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6 MOTHBALLING / DECOMMISSIONING / DISPOSAL

HSE CASE
The Mothballing / Decommissioning / Disposal HSE Case Report is to
demonstrate that major accident hazards are managed during
mothballing, decommissioning and disposal so that risks remain
tolerable and ALARP.
The Mothballing / Decommissioning / Disposal HSE Case shall describe

the list of SCE Critical Tasks that must be performed to ensure that the
required protection and mitigation measures provided remain effective
during and after shutdown of the facility. The critical task list should
also define roles and responsibilities for performing the identified
activity.
The Mothballing / Decommissioning / Disposal HSE Case shall include,

but not be limited to the following:
 A description of the facilities that are covered by the HSE Case.

 A description of how the relevant management system is
implemented to control risks.
 Details of the hazards, their sources and controls associated with the
decommissioning and disposal. This should reference any risk
reduction measures, the identified Safety Critical Elements and their
Performance Standards
 Details of the SCE Critical Tasks that have to be performed to ensure
that the Performance Standards are met for the SCEs.
The Mothballing / Decommissioning / Disposal HSE Case is to essentially

describe how HSE Integrity will be maintained during and after
shutdown of the facility. The report must include all HSE considerations
of shutdown, decommissioning, mothballing and/or removal or
discontinuation of an operation, including site restoration.
Equipment items that are to be decommissioned on an existing asset,

but the facility remains in production, shall be considered as a
modification, and the facility HSE Case shall be updated accordingly,
either as part of the modification or as part of the ongoing HSE Case
review cycle.

6.1.1 Decommissioning Phase HSE Case Custodian
He/ she is responsible for managing the relevant HEMP studies and
preparing the risk tolerability and ALARP assessments.
Identifies risk reduction strategies, any new or existing Safety Critical

Elements which may be required following decommissioning, and defines
their Performance Standards.
He/ she is responsible for preparing the content of the Mothballing /

Decommissioning Phase HSE Case report.
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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Manager/Manager.
HSE Case Approver is responsible for approving the HSE Case, including
the safety studies carried out and the recommended controls/remedial
action plans arising from those studies.
The HSE Case Approver is the Asset Manager or the Head of

Country/Region e.g. Senior General Manager of Sarawak Operations.
Project Manager shall initiate the Mothballing / Decommissioning Phase

HSE Case for the facility and ensure that it shall be developed in
accordance with this guideline prior decommissioning.

Standards for the mothballed / decommissioned facility.
Technical authorities are responsible for managing the Safety Critical

Elements listing.
They are responsible for the development, review, update, and

implementation of strategies and Inspection, Testing and Preventive
Maintenance (ITPMs) through which the Performance Standards of the
SCEs will be maintained.
6.1.7 Operations and Maintenance Team
The operations and maintenance team for the mothballed /

decommissioned facility are responsible for the review and update of the
Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and Simultaneous Operations
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(SIMOPS) and on-going inspection, maintenance and testing of the

SCEs.
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7 DRILLING UNITS HSE CASE

The Drilling Contractor engaged with the Company shall have in place an
HSE Case developed in accordance with the latest revision of the
International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) HSE Case
guidelines for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units (MODU) or Land Units
[10][11], whichever is applicable.
The HSE Case for the drilling unit shall:
 Demonstrate that there is an effective HSE management system in

place for managing major hazards, other workplace hazards and
environmental aspects
 Identify all potential hazards, including major accident hazards
 Identify, assess and manage the risks associated with these hazards
and demonstrate that residual risks have been reduced to tolerable
levels.
The drilling unit HSE Case shall contain the following as a minimum:
 Drilling contractor’s management system

 Drilling unit description and supporting information
 Risk management
 Emergency response
 Performance monitoring
As part of their HSE Case development, the Drilling Contractor shall

adhere to the regulatory requirement of the Country where it is intended
to be operated as well as the Company that it is engaged to, by
incorporating the relevant requirement in the HSE Case studies. The
Drilling Contractor shall declare if the HSE Case has been approved by
any external authority or party. The HSE Case for the drilling units shall
be submitted to PETRONAS E&P Drilling Division for review and check of
adequacy.
The Drilling Contractor shall ensure that the identified hazards, its
associated controls and mitigation measures are communicated to all
relevant parties.
If a formal HSE case that is fully compliant with the IADC HSE Case
guidelines is not available then formal written approval for dispensation
to engage that particular drilling contractor must be obtained from the
Head of Drilling.
The Drilling Contractor’s HSE Case shall be part of the documents to be

reviewed during Contractor selection process, which will depend on the
type of drilling which is undertaken. The type of drilling may be:
 Exploration, where there is typically no other installed facilities other

than the drilling unit itself
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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 Development, where the facility or platform is existing, and may be

producing where an Early Production System (EPS) has been
installed
 Production, where the facility or platform is existing and producing
For drilling activities the required documentation shall be required in

addition to the IADC HSE Case
Table 7-1 – Documentation requirements for Drilling types
Required Documentation /
Type of Drilling
Safety Studies
Exploration IADC HSE Case
Development without EPS IADC HSE Case
IADC HSE Case

Bridging Document
Development with EPS
SIPROD
SISO
IADC HSE Case

Bridging Document
Production
SIPROD
SISO
The bridging document shall be used to align the Drilling Unit HSE
management systems and that of PETRONAS E&P. The purpose of the
bridging document shall be to ensure that there is clear definition of how
all shared activities will be managed in a safe manner. It shall include
but not limited to the following:
 HSE Objectives
 Organisation chart together with roles and responsibilities
 Safety processes including communications, PTW, MOC, Inductions,
Shift Handovers, HSE meetings, etc.
 Emergency Response and Notification
 Manning levels and training requirements
 Worksite inspections
 Safety drills
 Health and hygiene
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7.1 Drilling Roles and Responsibilities

7.1.1 Head of Drilling, E&P
The Head of Drilling Division shall provide the required leadership and
commitment in ensuring the availability and adequacy of the HSE Case
by Drilling Contractors.
7.1.2 Head of Drilling (Technology & Engineering), DRE
The Head of Drilling (DRE) shall ensure that the Drilling Contractor’s HSE
Case is available and adequate, and if an HSE Case is not available shall
provide formal written dispensation for the engagement of that
particular drilling contractor. The dispensation shall provide justification
as to why the drilling contractor should be engaged and what measures,
systems, and barriers, etc., are in place in the absence of the HSE Case
to prevent major accidents hazards from being realised.
7.1.3 Head of Drilling (DRD, DRX or DRI)
Depending on the drilling type of project; either exploration,

development or intervention, the Head of Drilling (DRD, DRX or DRI) for
the respective drilling rig shall ensure development and review of HSE
Case in line with latest IADC requirements [10][11].
7.1.4 Head of Drilling Operations (DRO)
The Head of Drilling Operations for the respective drilling rig shall track
and monitor the implementation of recommendations / remedial action
plan by Drilling Contractors.
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8 HSE CASE STRUCTURE

The HSE Case shall be required for facilities that have the potential to
cause a Major Accident Event (MAE), e.g. drilling facility and production
facility.
Each HSE Case shall be specific to the facility and to the facility / project
phase (e.g. Concept, Design, Operations or Decommissioning /
Disposal), demonstrating that the risks associated with the particular
facility and phase are managed to ALARP.
The HSE Case may be developed for a Field. However, the detail
description, including the assessment of risks, MAHs, Bowties, SCEs and
Performance Standards shall be specific for each and every facility within
the Field e.g. Samarang HSE Case covers for all platforms within the
Samarang Field.
Drilling unit HSE Case development shall be the responsibility of the

drilling contractor, and the structure of the HSE Case shall follow the
requirements within the IADC guidelines [10][11].
The HSE Cases, irrespective of the asset lifecycle phase, shall be in line
with the following format.
 Book 1
o Part 1 – Overview
o Part 2 – Major Accident Hazards
o Part 3 – Control of Major Accident Hazards
o Part 4 – Systems
 Book 2
o Appendices
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9 PART 1: OVERVIEW
Part 1 of the HSE Case shall:
 Define the objectives of the HSE Case assessment

 Describe the contents of the HSE Case
 Describe the facility features that are relevant to HSE and the
emergency management of the facility
 Explain the key accountabilities for the HSE Case, i.e. the person
who is responsible for the implementation and management of the
HSE Case
 Explain the HSE Case change control i.e. when it is required to be
updated
 Highlight the number of remedial action plans according to the
category of findings e.g. Very High, High, Medium and Low
 Explain the management of tracking and monitoring of the remedial
action plans
 Conclude the statement of fitness for safe operation of the facility
based on the result/analysis from the risk assessments, or the
selected option for the concept phase HSE Case represents the
lowest risk concept, or that it has been demonstrated that the cost/
effort to adopt the lowest risk is grossly disproportionate to the
benefit gained
 For Contractor facilities, Part 1 of the HSE Case shall also include the
information below
o Explanation on the facilities operated;
o Key interfaces between the Contractor and PETRONAS E&P;
and
o Roles and responsibilities for each party involve in HSE Case
development
Part 1 shall also detail the HSE Case boundary limits and interfaces. For
example, it should detail what facilities, platforms, pipelines, etc., that
are included or excluded from the assessment.
The HSE Case should detail what operational modes are included within
the assessment e.g. Normal Operations, SIMOPS, Well Services (e.g.
workover, wire-lining, etc.), logistics operations (e.g. Helicopter take off
/ landing, marine operations within 500m of platform)
Some activities and their associated hazards are not entirely confined to
the facility and these interactions with other PETRONAS or Contractor
HSE Cases shall be identified.
9.1 Facilities Description

Part 1 shall describe accurately the essential features of the facility that
are relevant to the HSE and emergency management of the facility,
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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based on the level of detail/ knowledge at that particular phase of the

asset lifecycle.
When the scope of the HSE Case comprises several facilities in a field
e.g. main platform and satellite platforms, each facility shall be
described separately in detail.
The description of the facilities shall detail the equipment and operations
which are expected to be functioning during an emergency.
The facility description shall consist of two main sections:
 Overview of the installation

 Facility and process description.
9.1.1 Overview of the Installation
For offshore facilities the overview of the installation shall include:
 Field layout
 Exact location
 Facilities in the field.
For onshore facilities the overview shall include:
 Facility location
 Facility layout
 Description of the surrounding area, with respect to land use,
population, environmentally sensitive areas, etc.
9.1.2 Facility and Process Description
The facility description shall include a detailed description of the asset(s)

within the scope of the HSE Case. The level of detail shall be
commensurate with the phase of the asset lifecycle. The essential
elements that shall be described in this section include:
 Structural design of the facility

 Facility production capacity
 Main process equipment
 Facility operating parameters; this should include operational
envelopes which shall provide data on the structural limits for items
whose failure could lead directly to a major accident occurring.
Typically, this will include Sub-sea structure and topsides structures
which if they fail may lead directly to structural collapse.
 Process flow description, including Process Flow Diagrams (PFD)
 Meteorological conditions or Metocean data for offshore facilities
 Utilities system e.g. electrical, power, diesel, etc.
 Manning philosophy as per the design philosophy
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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9.2 Remedial Action Plan (RAP)

The Remedial Action Plan (RAP) is a compilation of recommendations
identified during HSE Case assessments which include:
 Recommendations on the inadequacy of facility HSEMS

 Recommendations from all associated safety studies for the facility
All recommendations shall be reviewed and accepted by the HSE Case

Custodian.
The recommendation shall be prioritized according to the risk level using

PETRONAS E&P Risk Assessment Matrix (Figure 2-2):
 Intolerable or High Risks represented by risks ranked as Red equate

to P1-Serious;
 Tolerable if ALARP Risks with a severity impact of 5 equates to P1-
High;
 Tolerable if ALARP or Medium Risks with a severity less than 5
equates to P2; and
 Broadly Acceptable or Low Risks represented by risks ranked as
Green equates to P3.
The requirements relating to timeline to close the recommendations are

as follows:
 P1-S shall be fully mitigated immediately and corrective action

completed within 6 to 12 months
 P1-H shall be closed within 6 months
 P2 shall be closed between 6 to 12 months
 P3 shall be closed within the revision cycle of the HSE Case.
Fully mitigated means that alternative measures shall be incorporated

immediately prior to continuing facility operation. The suitability and
effectiveness of the mitigation measures provided shall be based on
approval of the appropriate Technical Authority.
The HSE Case Custodian will appoint action parties and target
completion based on the prioritization.
In addition, the recommendations shall be tracked to closure via a

formal action tracking system (e.g. HSE Online, iHSE etc.) to ensure it is
properly monitored.
Sample template for Remedial Action Plan is shown in Appendix 8.
9.3 Statement of Fitness

A statement of fitness shall be developed for the assets prior to the pre-
start up audit for the project, before starting or commissioning a new
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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asset or a modification to an existing asset. The statement of fitness

represents the conclusion of
 The demonstration of the lowest risk option having been selected, or

that the cost/ effort required to adopt the lowest risk option
represents a grossly disproportionate investment to the level of risk
reduction achieved.
 The demonstration of safe operations for the facility
 The demonstration of safe abandonment of the facility
Typically, the statement should:
 Confirm compliance to PETRONAS E&P HSE Management System in

terms of hazard identification
 List the identified Major Accident Hazards (MAH), including
associated Major Accident Event (MAE) arising from Bowtie risk
assessment
 Summarise the risk contribution (in terms of %) from Quantitative
Risk Assessment, which can be typically represented in a pie chart
 Summarise the key Safety Critical Elements (SCE) in managing MAH,
including the management of SCE integrity and reliability
 Confirm that the risks associated with the facility and activities are
minimized to ALARP and the facility is safe to be operated
 Confirm that all recommendations included in the Remedial Action
Plan have been reviewed and accepted.
The Table 9-1 details the various elements that must be addressed in
the statement of fitness and how compliance is demonstrated.
Table 9-1 – Statement of Fitness
Requirement Demonstration
Process Safety Risks have been HSE Risk studies including HAZOP, HEMP, FERA,
identified, documented and are and bowties have been completed.
managed to ALARP
ALARP demonstration has been made for the
asset
SIMOPS and MOPO matrices have been
developed
Hazards and Effects Register
An Emergency Response Plan addressing each of
the identified Major Accident Hazards has been
developed and is routinely tested
Employees or Contractors Operator competence assurance plans with HSE

executing HSE Critical Activities Critical Roles identified in Job Descriptions
are competent and fit to work
Personnel in HSE Critical Roles are fit to work
TA approval framework is in place
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Requirement Demonstration
Safety Critical Equipment meets SCEs have been identified, documented and
its Technical Integrity included in the HSE Case
Requirements
Performance Standards have been developed for
all identified SCEs and approved by TAs
Design and Construction of new Compliance with all PTS requirements and a
assets and modifications to non-conformance register where requirements
existing assets meets design and cannot be satisfied
engineering requirements
Critical drawings and documents are prepared
and approved
Well handover document is completed
Procedures are in place to Operating procedures are in place

operate Safety Critical Elements
Integrity operating envelopes and alarm
within its operational limits
catalogues are completed
The asset register, Safety Critical
Elements (SCEs), SCE related Trip settings are in place, including wells
Performance Standards (PS)
Performance Standards and maintenance /
acceptance criteria and
inspection routines are current and uploaded
maintenance / inspection
into SAP
routines are identified and
loaded into the maintenance Asset Register is current and uploaded into SAP
management system (SAP)
Corrosion Management Plans are in place
Well integrity management is in place
Modifications are complete and Management of Change (MOC) process is

have been managed via the documented
Management of Change process
Staff in HSE Critical Positions are trained and a
log maintained
MOC procedures are in place and in use
A change register is maintained
HSE Audit and inspection Audits are scheduled and completed as per plan
programmes test compliance
Audit findings are internally communicated to all
with the inspection and
levels in the organisation and a RAP developed
maintenance regime and HSE
Case
The acceptance of the HSE Case by HSE Case Custodian, Endorser and
Approver shall be indicated on this page. A sample template for
statement of fitness is shown in Appendix 1.
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10 PART 2: MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS

During the Concept phase, Part 2 of the HSE Case shall describe the
following:
 The HEMP and how it has been applied for the assessment of Major
Accident Hazards in the HSE Case
 The process by which the Major Accident Hazards have been
identified and how these have been ranked on the PETRONAS Risk
Ranking Matrix
 The applicable Major Accident Hazards and their hazard identification
number obtained from the Generic Hazard List (see Appendix 3)
 The Hazard and Effects register sheets for all identified Major
Accident Hazards, and reference to all HSE hazards listed in the
Hazard and Effects Register developed as part of the HEMP
For all other phases of the Asset lifecycle Part 2 of the HSE Case shall
also include the following, in addition to the above:
 A review of the facility HSE Management System to ensure that the

non-MAHs are adequately controlled
 The application of Bowties to the identified Major Accident Hazards,
and the developed bowties for the facility
 Hazard and barrier assessment that should also make reference to,
confirm validity, and summarise the main findings of the group of
technical HSE studies specifically focused on Major Accident Hazards.
These technical HSE studies form part of the Formal Safety
Assessment and may include QRA, FERA, etc.
 An assessment of barrier and control effectiveness
 Operational Envelopes that include the Manual of Permitted
Operations (MOPO) and the safe limits, or operational envelope, for
systems where the failure of a single Safety Critical Element could
result in the Major Accident Event. For example, structural collapse
may occur in the event of subsea structure or topside structure
failure. Therefore, the HSE Case shall detail the safe working
envelope or limitations that prevent the failure of that particular
SCE. For structural limits that may include but not be limited to
platform deck loading, soft mooring pull from boats/ ships, helideck
loading, crane lifting capacity, environmental conditions (max wave
height, maximum wind speed, etc.)
10.1 HEMP
The completion of the HEMP shall be in accordance with the PETRONAS
Technical Standard PTS 60.0401 [3].
The Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP) is a structured

and systematic analysis methodology involving the identification,
assessment, and control of hazards and the recovery from the effects
caused by a release of the hazards. HEMP is an iterative process. The
four stages may partially overlap or may have to be carried out more
than once. HEMP is illustrated in Figure 10-1 below.
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DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
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Figure 10-1 – Hazard and effect management process
The principle of 'identify', 'assess', 'control' and ‘recover’ are the basis of
HEMP as below:
 Identify all hazards associated with the facility through a

comprehensive and structured process
 Assess the likelihood (how often the hazardous event could occur?),
the size of the consequences (e.g. how big is the fire?), and the
severity of the outcome (what sort of damage / harm could occur?)
 Determine what needs to be in place to remove the hazard from the
business, or reduce the likelihood of it occurring, or reduce the size
of the consequence and severity
 Provide measures that allow people to get away from the location of
the hazard (e.g. lifeboats to abandon a platform) or re-establish
normal operations after the incident.
To ensure that the four key elements of the HEMP process are applied
effectively in the management of Major Accidents Hazards a
comprehensive set of assessment activities shall be undertaken. These
activities shall include:
 Major Accident Hazards Identification

 Bowtie Assessment
 Hazard and Barrier Assessment and Risk Reduction Philosophies
 Barrier / Control Effectiveness
 ALARP Risk Management for Major Hazards
 Operational Envelope
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10.2 Major Accident Hazards Identification

The first step in Hazard and effect management process is identification
of hazards. A Hazard Identification study (HAZID) is the primary tool
used to identify and document hazards. The HAZID should be based on
a “Hazard Inventory”, which is a structured list of potential hazards and
covers hazards ranging from loss of hydrocarbon containment to general
slips, trips and falls. The HAZID shall be conducted in accordance with
the PETRONAS Technical Standard PTS 60.2004 [5].
The HAZID study shall be a multi-disciplinary team facilitated by an

experienced leader and the team shall identify those hazards that are
relevant to the specific facility or asset under consideration. Ideally the
team should comprise site / facility management, operations, HSE,
maintenance and engineering disciplines. The PETRONAS risk ranking
matrix Figure 2-2 shall be used to assess the hazards, their severity and
frequency of occurrence. Hazards that are assessed as having a
severity of 5 or high risk are then modelled further using bowtie
methodology to demonstrate how these hazards are managed and
controlled. For low and medium risk hazards the controls for these
hazards may be typically related to operating integrity i.e. Permit to
Work, Job Hazard Analysis, Operating Procedures and Process Safety
Information, Management of Change, etc.
All the major accident hazards are assessed for their overall risk levels
using a technical HSE study such as the Quantitative Risk Assessment,
which will form part of the facility Formal Safety Assessment.
Major Accident Hazards to the Environment and Occupational Health

risks shall also have been identified in the HAZID.
The impact of facility emissions/ discharges shall be the subject of the

facility Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), in accordance with the
requirements detailed in PTS 60.3206 Environmental, Social and Health
Impact Assessment [8] and PTS 60.3202 Environmental Aspects and
Impacts Assessment [7]. Control of the identified Major Accidents To
The Environment (MATTE) events shall be demonstrated via the HSE
Case. Other environmental hazards shall fall within the remit of the EIA.
In addition, the occupational risk assessment shall be completed in

accordance with the PETRONAS standard PTS 60.1400.01 Health Risk
Assessment (HRA) [6]. The control of Occupational Health Risks shall be
demonstrated in the HRA.
10.3 Hazard Inventory

Hazard inventory is a compilation of process and non-process hazards
developed specific for the facility prior further assessments on the
inherent risk for each of the hazard.
The hazard inventory may either be identified during HAZID exercise or

extracted from a generic list of hazards applicable for PETRONAS E&P
production facilities.
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The hazard inventory register shall include below information:
 Hazard category e.g. Hydrocarbons

 Hazard code number e.g. H01.01, etc.
 List of hazards by respective category e.g. Crude Oil under pressure,
etc..
The hazards identified from the studies undertaken (e.g. HAZID studies
during concept stage and detailed design stage, Health Risk Assessment,
Environmental Impact Assessment) shall be recorded in a Hazard and
Effects Register, which is a complete record of all hazards, their threats,
consequences, and risk ranking.
A generic “Hazard Inventory” list is as shown in Appendix 3.
10.4 Facility Hazard and Effects Register

The hazards and their potential effects on people, environment, assets
and PETRONAS’ reputation shall be identified and listed for the full asset
lifecycle from design to operations and eventually decommissioning.
The hazards are typically identified in a facility hazard identification
study (HAZID) which is subsequently used to develop the Hazards and
Effects Register (HER). The HER is a tabulation of information related to
each hazard. The information that shall be included in the hazard and
effects register are:
 Hazards and its code as per the hazard inventory

 Source of each hazard i.e. specific location where the hazard exists
 Threats that may cause the release of the hazard
 Top Event, which is the first event when the hazard is released
 Consequences to people, environment, asset and reputation as a
result due to the release of hazard
 Evaluation of inherent risk to people, environment, asset and
reputation based on PETRONAS Risk Assessment Matrix
 Identification of relevant documents in managing the hazards
 Determination of the hazard representing a MAH based on the MAH
criteria described in section 10.2.
An example of Hazard and Effects Register is as shown in Appendix 4.

The Hazards and Effect Register is a deliverable from HEMP [3], the HSE
Case shall reproduce the Hazard and Effects sheets that represent the
identified Major Accident Hazards.
10.5 Safety Critical Elements

Safety critical elements can be represented as barriers between the
hazard and the consequence following the release of the hazard. This is
illustrated in Figure 10-2 below. There are often holes present in the
barriers that may be permanent or temporary. For example, a design
error may lead to an area of poor fire and gas detection coverage, or a
maintenance activity may require the barrier to be partially isolated.
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These holes reflect a path or route through which the hazard is released
and the consequences of that released hazard are realised e.g. fire,
explosion leading to fatalities.
Figure 10-2 – Safety Critical Elements
The UK Offshore HSE Case Regulations 2005 [13] defines Safety Critical
Elements as any structure, plant, equipment, system (including
computer software) or component part whose failure could cause or
substantially contribute to a major accident, as are any which are
intended to prevent or limit the effect of a major accident.
Examples of SCEs and relevant associated equipment (sometimes

referred to as sub-elements) include but are not limited to:
Structural Integrity (SI)
 Critical structures whose failure could lead to a multiple fatality

accident, e.g. offshore jackets, accommodation unit topside support
structures
 Structures supporting equipment where loss of integrity could result
in an escape of hazardous material with the potential to cause
fatality and/or damage the environment
 Structures designed to protect other structures or equipment from
the full force of an impact which otherwise has the potential to cause
major accidents e.g. boat fenders / riser guards
 Lifting equipment and systems, jacking systems whose failure could
lead to or contribute to a major accident
Process Containment (PC)
 Equipment, piping and pipelines where loss of integrity could result

in an escape of fluid under pressure or hazardous material with the
potential to cause harm to people and /or the environment
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 Integrity protection systems such as relief valves, instrumented

protective systems, and bursting discs that protect the plant from
loss of containment as a result of exceeding design conditions.
Ignition Control (IC)
 Area classification systems and procedures designed to prevent

ignition in case of an escape of flammable material. This also
includes ventilation systems that may be necessary to maintain the
correct area classification.
 Miscellaneous ignition control components such as flame arrestors,
spark arrestors, etc.
Detection Systems (DS)
 Detection equipment and systems designed to alert the operators of

an escape of hazardous material and possibly to initiate various
control actions.
 Portable gas monitoring and gas testing equipment, used either to
supplement, or to complement fixed equipment and systems, or for
certifying safe conditions of work, e.g. prior to undertaking hot work
or confined space entry under Permit to Work (PTW).
Protection Systems (PS)
 Fire and explosion suppression equipment and systems where people

could otherwise be at risk
 Fire fighting equipment and systems
 Incident control equipment such as water sprays, foam systems
 Equipment and systems designed to mitigate the consequences of
fire and explosion such as fire walls, blast walls and passive fire
protection
 Other equipment and systems, which play a significant role in
preventing major accidents, such as navigational aids.
Shutdown Systems (SS)
 Release control equipment and systems such as emergency

shutdown, non-return valves, and blowdown, which are designed to
limit the quantity of hazardous material involved in an incident.
 Well isolation equipment such as the SCSSSV, SSV, etc.
 Drilling well control equipment such as Blowout Preventer, Mud
weight control, etc.
Emergency Response (ER)
 Emergency power equipment and systems (emergency generators,

switch gear, Uninterruptable Power Supplies (UPS), etc.
 Communications equipment and systems that alert people that an
incident has occurred and which can be used to provide instruction
as to further action
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 Equipment and systems that allow communication between

emergency response teams and the emergency control centre
 Equipment and systems that expedite the removal of people to a
place of safety such as emergency lighting, escape routes, offshore
platform evacuation systems and standby vessels.
 Equipment and systems that allow communication with external
agencies that can provide assistance in dealing with the incident.
 Secondary containment equipment and systems designed to restrict
hazardous materials spreading from a spillage location into other
areas.
 Weighing and measuring equipment and systems whose failure could
lead to or contribute to a major accident such as gas meters,
pressure/ temperature/level gauges, weighbridges.
Life Saving (LS)
 Personnel protective equipment for general use in an emergency

such as life jackets, breathing apparatus, and search and rescue
equipment, etc.
 Evacuation facilities such as life boats, TEMPSC, life rafts, knotted
ropes, scramble nets, boat landing etc.
The Safety Critical Element not only includes the specified equipment,
but also any other SCE required for the equipment to perform its
specified safety function, including electric and hydraulic power supplies
and connections. Figure 10-3 below shows a typical SCE barrier
diagram [18] and typical barrier sub groups.
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Figure 10-3 – Typical SCE Barriers diagram [18]
Structural
Integrity Process
Safe Operation Containment
Ignition
Control Detection
Systems
Protection
Systems Shutdown
Systems
Emergency
Response
Lifesaving
Escalating
Consequences
SI001 Structure (Jacket / PC001 Pressure Vessels IC001 Hazardous Area DS001 Fire and Gas PS001 Deluge Systems SD001 Emergency ER001 Temporary LS001 Personal Survival
Vessel Hull/ GBS / Ventilation Detection Shutdown Refuge (TR) / Equipment (PSE)
Foundation / PC002 Heat Exchangers PS002 Explosion Protection
IC002 Non-Hazardous (ESD) Control Primary Muster LS002 Rescue Facilities
Weathering Enclosure / PC003 Rotating Equipment DS002 Security including Blast Barriers
Area Ventilation System Areas (Incl. Standby
Piles etc.) Systems and Venting Provisions
PC004 Tanks (Incl. IBC's) ER002 Escape Routes Vessel / Man
IC003 Certified (Ex- DS003 Water in PS003 Helideck Fire Fighting SD002 Emergency
SI002 Topsides Primary Containing hazardous Overboard boat /
rated) Electrical Condensate / Systems Depressurisation ER003 Emergency /
Structure (Incl. Helidecks, (flammable, toxic etc.) Fast Rescue Craft
Equipment Gas (Blowdown) Escape Lighting
Crane Pedestals, Bridges, fluids PS004 Fire Water Pumps (Incl.
IC004 Cargo Tanks Inert SD003 High Integrity ER004 Internal, External LS003 TEMPSC /
Flare Tower etc.) PC005 Hydrocarbon Piping Caissons, Tank and
Gas System Pressure and Emergency Lifeboats
SI003 Heavy Lift Cranes and Supports)
PC006 Pipelines and Risers Protection Communication LS004 Alternate Means of
Mechanical Handling IC005 Electrical Earthing PS005 Fire Main and Other
PC007 Relief System (PRV, PSV Continuity (Earth Systems ER005 Uninterruptable Escape (Liferafts,
SI004 Stability systems(Incl. Distribution System
etc.) Bonding) (HIPPS) Power Supply Scramble Nets and
Ballast, Bilge, Cargo, PS006 Passive Fire Protection Ladders to Sea)
PC008 Wells' Hydrocarbon IC006 Fuel Gas Purge SD004 Well Isolation (UPS)
FPSO offloading, (Incl. Doors, Walls and
Containment System Penetrations) SD005 Pipeline ER006 Helicopter
Computer Management
systems) PC009 Fired Heaters IC007 Inert Gas Isolation Valve Facilities (Incl.
PS007 Gaseous Fire Protection
PC010 Gas Tight Floors and (Riser) Markings, Nets,
SI005 Road Vehicles IC008 Miscellaneous Systems
Walls SD006 Emergency Obstacle Marking
SI006 Mooring Systems Ignition Control PS008 Fine Water Spray / Lighting etc.)
PC011 Tanker Loading Systems Shutdown
SI007 Drilling Systems Components (hot Systems
Valves (ESDV) ER007 Emergency
PC012 Helicopter Refueling surface PS009 Sprinkler Systems
SI008 Bridge connections SD007 Subsea Power (Incl.
Equipment protection, inert
to support Vessel PS010 Power Management Isolation Valves Generation and
PC013 Well Intervention / Well gas)
SI009 Station Keeping / System (SSIV) System Distribution)
Control Equipment IC009 Flare Tip Ignition
Propulsion / Dynamic PS011 Fixed Foam Systems SD008 Drilling well ER008 Manual Fire
(Incl. BOP System / System
Positioning / PS012 Sand Filters Control Fighting
Connector / Diverter, Equipment
Thrusters Cement System, Ramrig, PS013 Chemical Injection Equipment
Drilling Instrumentation, Systems SD009 Utility Air ER009 Process Control
Well Control Equipment) and Alarms
PS014 Navigation Aids (Aircraft)
PC014 Moveable and ER010 Bunding and
PS015 Navigation Aids (Marine)
Temporary Equipment Drains
PS016 Metocean Data (Hazardous and
Gathering Systems Non-Hazardous)
ER011 Oil Spill
Contingency
(Oil Booms and
Dispersants)
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10.6 Bowtie Assessment

The bowtie is a model that represents how a hazard can be released i.e.
the threats, escalate to their associated consequences, and how they
are controlled.
The Hazards and Effects Register documents all hazards associated with
the facility and that control and mitigation measures have been
identified. Hazards that are assessed as having a severity level of 5 or
considered high risk shall be modelled using bowties. The purpose of
the bowtie analysis is to identify and ensure the adequacy of controls
and recovery barriers for the facility hazards.
The bowtie analysis shall allow for:
 Identification of the hazard release, escalation and consequence

scenarios
 Identification of controls e.g. barriers and escalation factor controls
required to manage the hazards
 Categorisation of controls into inherent safety, safety critical
element (hardware) or critical activity (procedures, processes,
operator action)
 A clear visual representation to facilitate the ALARP demonstration
 An aid to the incident review process if an occurrence of such a
major incident occurs
The bowties shall comply with the requirement of the PETRONAS Bowtie
Guidelines PTS 60.xxxx [4].
Figure 10-4 graphically presents the Bowtie analysis process.

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Figure 10-4 – Generic Bowtie Diagram format
Safety Critical Elements
HSE Critical Tasks

- Engineering (Design and Installed for HSE Integrity)
- Maintenance (Maintain for HSE Integrity)
- Operations (Operate for HSE Integrity)
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The following definitions shall apply to the bowtie analysis.
Hazard is something with the potential to cause harm, which may

include ill health or injury, damage to property, products, production
losses or increased liabilities. The concept is that the hazard has the
potential for something undesirable to happen rather than the actual
event itself.
Top Event or hazardous event occurs when the hazard is released. It

is important to realise that the top event is not the catastrophe yet, but
the dangerous characteristics of the hazard are now in the open. For
example oil or gas is outside of the pipeline (loss of containment).
Therefore it is not yet a disaster but if not mitigated correctly then it
can result in unwanted events i.e. consequences.
Figure 10-5 – Hazard & Top Event as typically shown on the bowtie
diagram
Threats are those factors that could cause the top event. Each threat
should be sufficient to cause the top event on its own. For example
corrosion of the pipeline can lead to loss of containment.
Figure 10-6 – Threat as typically shown on the bowtie diagram
Consequences are the potential events resulting from the release of

the hazard which results directly in loss or damage. Consequences
represent the unwanted events that PETRONAS wants to avoid by all
means.
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Figure 10-7 – Consequence as typically shown on the bowtie diagram
Barriers comprise proactive barriers and reactive barriers. Proactive

barriers are required to prevent a hazard being released and appear on
the left hand side of the bowtie diagram. Reactive barriers are
designed to prevent top event resulting in the unwanted events or
consequences being realised, and appear on the right hand side of the
bowtie diagram.
Figure 10-8 – Barriers as typically shown on the bowtie diagram
Escalation factors are conditions that make a particular barrier fail. It

is the condition that leads to increased risk by defeating or reducing the
effectiveness of a control. Escalation factors may also be termed as
defeating factors or barrier decay mechanism. In a similar way to
Threats, there may be controls in place that prevent the escalation
factor being realised. For example, if a barrier relates to protection from
overpressure by manual response to a high pressure alarm, an
escalation factor might be ‘operator not trained in correct response’,
‘control room unmanned’, etc. Each escalation factor requires to be
provided with a control mechanism in the same way as threats and
consequences.
Figure 10-9 – Escalation Factors as typically shown on the Bowtie

Diagram
Controls are the barriers in place that prevent the escalation factor
from arising. For example, the escalation factor for a shutdown valve
may be ‘fails to close’ and the control that helps prevent its failure to
close may be preventative maintenance system.
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The Bowtie analysis shall be completed using PETRONAS approved

software, such as BowTieXP.
The Facility Bowtie assessment shall contain the same threats, top
event and consequences as identified in the Hazard and Effects
Register. Subsequently, the required barriers and recovery barriers shall
then be identified in managing the hazards.
For facility risks, the barriers should contain Safety Critical Equipment
(hard barriers), while the escalation factor controls may be either soft
or hard barriers. Examples of hard barriers are pressure safety valve,
firewater pumps, pressure vessel, life boats, escape routes, etc.
Meanwhile examples of soft barriers are anchor pattern, first aid,
operating procedure, etc.
A bowtie workshop shall be held to ensure that the barriers, escalation

factors, controls, activities and roles have been correctly identified. The
escalation factors and the associated escalation controls for each of the
barriers and recovery barriers shall be identified to ensure the integrity
and reliability of the barrier.
Any recommendation arising from the Bowtie analysis and its associated
workshop, to further reduce the risk, shall be recorded in the Remedial
Action Plan.
A sample of Facility Bowtie is as shown in Appendix 5.
10.6.1 Barrier and Control Effectiveness
The Bowtie assessment identifies the required barriers and the Formal
Safety Assessment should confirm that any barrier has been designed
appropriately. However, the safety of personnel at the facility depends
on how successful the barriers are functioning in the operational phase
and this is directly related to the effectiveness of the escalation control
barrier. For example, a barrier to the Over-pressure threat may be a
Pressure Relief Device. This device has an escalation factor e.g. that it
fails to open, with the control barrier to that escalation factor being
preventative maintenance. This is illustrated in the figure below.
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Figure 10-10 – Barrier / Control Effectiveness Schematic
These controls are managed through systems and processes such as

inspection, competency assurance, etc.
Determining the effectiveness of the controls is important and relies on

the feedback from operations and maintenance personnel. This is best
achieved in a workshop environment taking informed opinion from
personnel, and any relevant audits or assessments available.
The Bowtie diagram shall also reflect the control effectiveness, with
identified escalation controls being colour coded as follows:
Effective – the control always works as intended
Partially Effective – the control works most of the time

but there are some weakness or performance issues
Ineffective – the control is not present or if present is
not suitable for the required function
If a control is ranked as partially effective or ineffective then there is a

risk that the barrier that it supports will fail leading to the potential for a
major accident (or the inability to recover from one). To correct for this
weakness a remedial action plan shall be raised that identifies the
necessary actions needed to be undertaken to reinstate that particular
control to full effectiveness.
The barrier effectiveness shall be summarised in the Hazard Control

Sheets (see Section 10.9).
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10.7 Performance Standards

Performance standards shall be prepared for all Safety Critical
Elements. The performance standards are the parameters that are
measured or assessed so that the suitability and effectiveness of each
SCE can be assured and verified. They are the essential requirements
that the SCE must maintain in order to fulfil its intended function.
Performance standards shall be produced for all equipment and systems

that:
 Protect people and the environment from a major hazard involving

fire, explosion and the release of flammable and /or toxic gases and
fumes
 Ensure effective escape form affected areas of the site, evacuation
of the site or transfer of people to a place of safety.
For a Performance Standard to be suitable it should satisfy all of the

following conditions:
 The goal or function of the SCE

 The functional performance requirement for the following criteria;
Functionality, Availability / Reliability and Survivability
 Any dependencies on other SCEs
 The pass or fail acceptance criteria by which performance of the SCE
will be measured and recorded
 The reference material from which the acceptance criteria should be
derived
 Any contingency actions that may be taken into consideration when
performance criteria are not met
During the operational phase of the installation, the Performance

Standard has to reflect how it shall be assured that the SCE is
maintained in the minimum acceptable condition, or minimum
acceptance criteria, and how it is being verified. This may not be the
same as the design criteria, for example an acceptable level of
degradation should be defined, if appropriate.
For static or passive systems such as structures, containment (vessels,

piping, pipelines), lifting equipment etc., measurable criteria for
operational suitability may be expressed as the maximum allowable
degradation that is acceptable. This may be derived from international
standards, industry guidelines or other best practice.
For active systems it is likely that performance can be clearly quantified

and confirmed by functional testing (e.g. active fire system discharge
rates, instrument alarm and trip set points, ESD valve closure time and
leakage rates, etc.,). Detailed functional analysis may be required to
determine the failure modes (including computer systems) which lead
to loss of critical functionality and the means of identifying them.
Equipment that is self-testing may make functional failure evident.
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For SCEs such as personal survival or escape equipment where

continual suitability is primarily achieved by original design
specification, it may be more practical to define periodic service or re-
certification intervals. Defining a fixed life for equipment replacement
may also be appropriate.
The following shall be observed in the setting of Performance

Standards:
 Each criteria, including minimum acceptance criteria shall be

justified
 It should be encouraged to use and reference design standards and
codes where this is relevant. For example, the Code used to design
the SCE, or that governs the testing frequency e.g. API RP 520 for
sizing of relief valves, EEMUA 188 for establishing operating periods
of relief valves. This may be relevant throughout the asset lifecycle.
 HSE Case supporting studies such as Fire and Explosion Risk
Assessment (FERA) and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) should
be reflected in the Performance Standard criteria, e.g. FERA shall
provide information for the required fire water demand in respect to
the largest potential scenario.
 Clearly measurable criteria, which can be confirmed during routine
operations, maintenance, testing or inspection is needed. Where
acceptance criteria are obscure or ambiguous they cannot
practicably be assured. This can lead to confusion and loss of
confidence in the SCE management process
 Lifecycle phases shall be separately considered, but shall be
combined into a single Performance Standard document this is to
provide traceability across the entire lifecycle of the SCE. However,
there shall be a single Performance Standard document for each
SCE that covers each lifecycle phase of the asset. The Performance
Standards should be updated to cover design, procurement,
commissioning, operation, and decommissioning for example as
appropriate. However, in the operations phase more concise,
specific and measurable criteria are required.
 It is required to ultimately align maintenance activities directly to
the performance standard criteria ensuring specific failure limits are
defined within the routines. These activities should be programmed
into the maintenance management system and their compliance
with the performance standard verified. Therefore, the means by
which the Performance Standard criteria are assured should be
identifiable from the Performance Standard.
10.8 Inspection, Testing and Preventive Maintenance

(ITPMs)
The assurance processes contained within the Performance Standard for
each SCE are to be incorporated into the Specific Equipment Reliability
Plan (ITPMs) process. The ITPMs must provide clear demonstration that
the SCE is meeting its respective Performance Standard. The
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implementation of the Performance Standard should be a goal setting

evidence based regime.
It should be noted that ITPMs are not part of the HSE Case, but shall be
linked to the HSE Case via the Safety Critical Elements and their
Performance Standards.
ITPMs are not necessarily required during the FEED stage of the project,
although ability to maintain may form part of the equipment selection.
However, they shall be developed towards the end of the detailed
design, or EPC, phase of the asset lifecycle. These developed ITPMs
shall be handed over to Operations team as a baseline ITPM document.
For Brownfield projects the baseline ITPM document will be limited to
the additional facilities. During the operational phase of the asset the
ITPMs shall be maintained and updated as necessary by the Operations
team. Additional equipment added during the facility operations phase
shall have ITPMs developed by either the brownfield project team or by
the Operations team.
10.9 Hazard Control Picture and Sheets

Part 2 of the HSE Case shall include the Hazard Control Picture and
Sheets that shall describe the hazard, the threats and their control
barriers, the possible consequences and their control barriers including
escalation likelihood and control, risk reduction measures and any
remedial action required. A typical Hazard Control Picture and Sheets
are shown in Appendix 2.
The Hazard Control Sheets shall contain the following information as a

minimum:
 Hazard type from the generic hazard list (Appendix 3) e.g. H-01
Hydrocarbons, H-01.01 Crude oil under pressure
 Description of the Top Event and its risk ranking according to
People, Assets, Environment and Reputation
 Description of the Hazard and location
 Assessment of the threats that may cause the hazardous top event,
and the measures in place to prevent it from being realised
 Assessment of the consequences that may occur if the top event
arises and the control and mitigation measures in place that
minimise its impact. This should include immediate consequences
and escalation likelihood and control
 ALARP demonstration and risk reduction measures considered,
including barrier effectiveness assessment. At the concept stage in
the asset lifecycle the barrier effectiveness assessment is not
required.
10.9.1 ALARP Demonstration
Risk assessment via the HAZID and associated risk assessment

techniques such as QRA determine whether risks are broadly
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acceptable, tolerable or intolerable by comparison with the PETRONAS

risk acceptance criteria and the PETRONAS Risk Ranking Matrix.
The demonstration of ALARP requires a judgement to be made that

determines whether or not risk levels are as low as is reasonably
practicable. ALARP is demonstrated when the level of effort or
complexity of any risk reduction measure, its cost and the time required
to implement it are disproportionate to the level of risk reduction that
may be achieved. To demonstrate ALARP it is necessary to identify all
risk reduction measures and assess whether or not a particular measure
represents a disproportionate level. Those identified risk reduction
measure that are considered as proportionate shall be included on the
remedial action plan for the facility. For information on the
determination
Typically the ALARP demonstration shall form part of the QRA study.
However, it is required to be summarised in the HSE Case.
All hazards shall be managed and controlled, and all hazard

management techniques shall be considered for each stage of the asset
lifecycle. The hazard management techniques to be considered shall
follow the principles of inherent safety.
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Figure 10-11 – Hazard Management Hierarchy
Hazard Management Control Examples
MOST Eliminate the

ELIMINATE
EFFECTIVE hazard
Substitute using - Aqueous based

processes or hydraulic fluids rather
materials with than oil based.
SUBSTITUTE
lower risk - Use of MEG instead of
impact Methanol for hydrate
formation prevention
Segregate Reduce hazardous

ISOLATE /
hazards and/or inventories and vessel
SEPARATE
targets sizes
Prevention – Design a
Prevention –
vessel to withstand the
design to
maximum upstream
prevent
pressure. Use of
unwanted event
corrosion resistant
ENGINEER Recovery –
materials e.g. SS rather
Design to
than CS
mitigate
Recovery – Provide a
harmful
relief device to mitigate
consequences
the flow from a high
pressure source.
Training,
ORGANISATION Competency,
Communication
Operating
procedures,
work
PROCEDURE instructions,
PTW, ERP,
Maintenance
Regimes
LEAST Protect the

PPE
EFFECTIVE person
The strategy that is selected for managing a hazard will differ

depending on the project phase, and this shall form part of the
evaluation when making an ALARP demonstration. Focus shall be on
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elimination or substitution of hazards during the early design phases

when the potential for making changes in the facility design is greatest.
Later in the project design there will be less opportunity to elimination
or substitution hazards and the focus should be more reflecting of the
isolate/ separate and engineer hazard management strategy. Once the
facility is operational the hazard management strategy will tend to be
largely organisational and procedural controls. PPE is to be regarded at
the last resort of hazard management and represents the least effective
strategy.
In most situations the decision as to whether HSE risks have been

reduced to ALARP involves a comparison between the control measures
a project is proposing and the measures PETRONAS would expect to see
in such circumstances i.e. compliance with the relevant PTS,
International Standards and Industry Recommended / Best Practices.
Compliance to the relevant PTS, International Standards and Industry
Recommended / Best Practices is considered to be an essential step in
demonstrating ALARP. ALARP demonstration shall be carried out for
each HSE Case as the asset lifecycle develops, with the exception of the
Concept Select Phase.
10.9.2 Hazard and Barrier Assessment
The hazard and barrier assessment shall essentially provide a summary

of the technical HSE studies that comprise the Formal Safety
Assessment (FSA) as part of the HEMP implementation. The FSA, and
the typical technical HSE studies that comprise the FSA, are discussed
in more detail in Section 13.
These technical HSE studies are conducted for one or more of the
following reasons:
 Assess in depth, the potential impacts from MAH on people,

environment and assets including determination of the magnitude of
consequences and frequency of occurrence
 Provide input into the design of the facility and selection of
equipment
 Confirm that the risk management approach through the design
complies with the philosophies e.g. HSE philosophy and strategies
such as Fire and Explosion strategy that are established at the start
of the project or development
 Confirm that the engineered barriers i.e. Safety Critical Elements,
have a level of functionality and reliability that reduces the risks
from the hazards down to ALARP.
Confirmation of the engineered barriers having the required level of

functionality and reliability shall be achieved by performing a qualitative
review of the Bowties developed for the Design, Operations and
Decommissioning HSE Case hazards. The review shall be led by an
experienced facilitator and the review team shall comprise experienced
staff from the following areas of expertise:
 Engineering
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 Process
 HSE
 Maintenance
 Operations
 Management
Each of the threat lines in the bowties shall be reviewed in turn and the
discussion should cover such questions as:
 Does the industry best practice state what should be done or make
recommendations?
 Can a benchmark exercise be undertaken against other operators
and similar controls implemented?
 Where are the gaps/ shortfalls and what action needs to be taken to
address these gaps/ shortfalls?
 Is there sufficient quantity and quality of barriers?
 Is there anything else that can be done to further reduce the risk?
Both barrier effectiveness and the number of barriers contribute to the

overall effectiveness of control, although in general the effectiveness of
individual barriers is more critical e.g. structural integrity.
The number, independence and reliability of the control and recovery

measures shall be appropriate with the level of risk.
By approaching the bowtie review in this systematic fashion, the

barriers can be challenged in terms of completeness, adequacy and
gaps identified and addressed so that the review team is satisfied that
the risks are reduced to ALARP. This process enables an ALARP
argument to be formulated although the number, quality, performance
and location of the barriers must be verified to complete the ALARP
demonstration. The verification of the safeguards shall be obtained via
the maintenance activities, audits, reliability assessment
In addition, the key assumptions on which the technical HSE studies

have been completed shall be detailed in the HSE Case. This should
include assumptions made on occupancy of the facility, modes of
transportation, process conditions, etc., that may alter the findings of
the FSA.
A summary of the QRA results shall be provided that identifies the

largest risk contributors and a comparison of the results with the
PETRONAS risk acceptance criteria, together with any recommendations
made.
A summary of the risk reduction measures that were identified by the

technical HSE studies and were implemented during the life cycle of the
project, together with a discussion on the implications of these risk
reduction measures duration the operational phase shall be made.
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It should be highlighted that the incorporation of any future

modification shall not compromise or exceed the safe limits of the risk
reduction measure provided. For example, future expansion and
associated construction activities must ensure that platform risers and
subsea pipelines are not exposed to unacceptable risk due to dropped
objects.
10.10 Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) and

Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS)
The MOPO and SIMOPS are tools designed to assist Supervisors and
Line Managers during the planning and co-ordination of operations and
activities by providing information on:
 The operation or activity operating envelope and safe operating

limits
 Actions to be taken if or when certain situations arise that could
compromise the safe operation of the asset
Both the MOPO and SIMOPS shall be readily available in a suitable

format i.e. poster size and laminated, and displayed in the facility
Control Room and any other operational and job planning or co-
ordination room. They shall be referred to during both routine work
planning and in determining the response to any unforeseen conditions.
The development of the SIMOPS matrix shall make reference to the

PETRONAS Carigali Guideline [19].
10.10.1 Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO)
Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) is a guide to define the limit of

safe operations or activities that are permitted if control and/or
mitigation measures are reduced and/or removed e.g. SCEs in terms of
threat controls, recovery preparedness and escalation factors are
partially present or not present.
10.10.2 Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS)
Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) is a guide to define the limit of safe

operations, both normal and abnormal operations that are permitted to
occur concurrently. Abnormal conditions include:
 Concurrent high-risk activities such as maintenance of equipment

located adjacent to live plant e.g. production sampling while
corrosion coupon removal, pigging while topping up chemical tanks,
etc.
 External influences such as extreme weather conditions (high wind,
sea swell, lightning, etc.), visibility, security issues and interfaces
with adjacent fields / platforms / facilities
 Organisational issues, such as absence or unavailability of key
personnel e.g. ER – first aider, ER – Fire Fighting Team, Radio
operator, etc.
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Concurrent activities or simultaneous activities (production/

construction/ maintenance), operations outside the design envelope,
severe weather, etc., are limited in accordance with the SIMOPS. Issue
of a permit to work (PTW) is a means of implementing the SIMOPS.
Variations of SIMOPS are:
 SIPCOM simultaneous production whilst commissioning activities are

undertaken
 SIPCON simultaneous production whilst construction activities are
being completed
 SIPROD simultaneous operation whilst drilling activities are being
completed.
10.10.3 MOPO and SIMOPS Workshops
Prior to conducting the MOPO and SIMOPS workshop(s) and agreed

Terms of Reference document shall be produced that details the
following:
 Introduction including facility description

 The MOPO and SIMOPS objectives and scope
 Proposed Agenda
 MOPO and SIMOPS workshop methodology
o List of Activities
o List of Influences
o List of SCE Impairment
o List of Critical Manpower Unavailability
o List of Assumptions to be confirmed during the workshop
 Documentation required for the workshop team members e.g. plot
plans, etc.
 Workshop participants
The team to develop or review the MOPO and SIMOPS shall comprise
personnel from the following areas who are familiar with the operation
of and required activities at the facility:
 Operations
 Maintenance
 HSE
 Management
The workshop shall be chaired by an experienced facilitator and shall:
 Confirm the list of operations and activities that could compromise

the safe operating limits
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 Develop the MOPO and SIMOPS utilising the matrices provided in

Appendix 7 as a guidance
 Identify those activities that are not permitted, and those that are
permitted and if so under what circumstances using a traffic light
system of red / amber / green
 Provide the supporting guidance notes for those activities identified
as being permitted with additional control requirements i.e. amber.
This is to assist the Supervisors if and when the situation arises
 Collectively review the matrices and ensure that they reflect the
current practise and give clear guidance for action to be taken under
specific circumstances
10.10.4 MOPO and SIMOPS template
A template MOPO and SIMOPS for both onshore and offshore facilities
are show in Appendix 7. These matrices shall be used as the basis for
the construction of the asset specific MOPO and SIMOPS or for the
review of the existing MOPO and SIMOPS if available. Where there are
deviations to the prohibited operations identified in the matrices, these
shall be fully justified in the facility HSE Case.
A number of assumptions have been made in developing this template

MOPO and SIMOPS, which are:
 The SIMOPS shall assume that two or more activities e.g.

production, well intervention are simultaneously being performed in
the same location or area.
 The MOPO shall assume that the operation or activity is in the
vicinity of, or within the area affected by the impaired SCE.
 The MOPO shall define the minimum level failure mode assessed as
having an impact on or more of the high level activities or
operations. If the failure mode is less than this shall be the subject
of a specific risk assessment and remedial action plan.
 When SCEs are in test mode, alternative controls shall be put in
place to ensure that their functionality is provided. Testing of these
systems is not generally considered to be impairment for MOPO
purposes.
 In cases where multiple barriers are unavailable or impaired then
the combined effect of the simultaneous failure on the activities
shall be the subject of a separate risk assessment.
 Where the field comprises multiple facilities covered by a single HSE
Case then it may be required to have several MOPO / SIMOPS
matrices to cover satellite and main platform facilities.
 Construction phase activities shall be subject to a separate MOPO
and SIMOPS study.
Additional controls required as indicated in the MOPO and SIMOPs

(coloured amber) shall be listed. All work shall only be carried out under
the formal control of the Permit to Work (PTW) system, including
component elements such as plant isolation certificates, vessel entry
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certificates, hot work permits, etc. All applicable procedures and work
instructions relating to the work to be undertaken shall be complied
with.
In certain cases, the specific operation is not directly impacted by the

barrier that is impaired, but consideration shall be given to proceeding
with non-essential work that could increase the risk.
Where necessary, the requirement for undertaking risk assessment

shall be noted. Measures shall be taken to maintain risks at ALARP and
the effectiveness of the measures shall be verified. All actions involving
bypassing the safeguarding systems shall be authorised by the
appropriate Technical Authority.
The notes within the MOPO are intended to support rather than
supersede any specific risk assessments that may be required. For a
MOPO to be effective it must provide clear concise information to the
Operator of immediate action to be taken under the specified
conditions, e.g. if working at height is on-going and wind speed
increases, he needs to be able to quickly see when to stop the activity
in question.
10.11 Operational Envelope

Facilities are generally designed to tolerate a degree of deviation from
normal operating conditions e.g. fluid composition, GOR, operating
pressure and temperature. The safe operation of the facility is
dependent on remaining within a defined operational envelope that is
assessed as providing a suitable level of control. For example, process
alarms, trips and pressure relief devices will define the safe process
operating pressure limits and ensure that these limits are not exceeded.
However, there will be circumstances where the operating envelope
must not be exceeded e.g. structural limitations.
Typically it will take a number of barriers or SCEs to fail before a major

accident occurs. However, the HSE Case shall detail the operational
limits that apply where the failure of a single barrier could lead directly
to a major accident occurring. For example, this applies to the
Structural Integrity barriers, Subsea structures, and Topside Structures,
or any onshore structure, which if it fails can lead directly to structural
collapse.
Typical operating envelope data for structural integrity barriers may

include but not be limited to the following:
 Deck loading restrictions e.g. allowable live loads for each deck,
laydown area, etc.
 Soft Mooring e.g. the maximum allowable soft mooring pull on each
jacket leg
 Helideck loading e.g. restrictions on the maximum allowable
helideck loading
 Crane capacity e.g. maximum allowable crane load
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 Environmental conditions e.g. maximum wave height, wind speed,

sea current, etc.
 Marine operations e.g. Maximum wave height for attendant boats,
maximum boat weight and approach speed.
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11 PART 3: CONTROL OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS

Part 3 of the HSE Case shall contain
 A register of Safety Critical Elements and their associated Major

Accident Hazard Bowtie
 A brief description of the identified barriers or Safety Critical
Elements
 A list of the safety critical features
 A description of how the technical integrity of the identified barriers
is to be maintained throughout the applicable project phase e.g.
design, operations, abandonment. This should include descriptions
of systems, procedures and responsibilities associated with the
process of ensuring barrier effectiveness.
 A review of the facility emergency response plan to ensure that it
adequately addresses the consequences of the identified major
accident hazards.
11.1 Barriers and Safety Critical Elements

The bowtie assessment required in Part 2 of the HSE Case will identify
the required barriers to prevent and recover from a Major Accident.
The barriers detailed in the bowties which are structure, plant or
equipment (hardware) are Safety Critical Elements (SCEs). In
PETRONAS there are 8 general barrier groups or categories as shown in
Figure 10-3. These barrier groups are either proactive or reactive.
Proactive barriers are those barriers designed to prevent the hazard
being released. Reactive barriers are those that are designed to control
the hazard, limit the size of the consequences that may arise and
enable personnel to escape.
The bowtie assessment can be used to broadly identify the applicable

SCE groups and sub-groups, see Figure 10-3. Whereas the flowchart
shown in Figure 11-1 below may be used to assist in the identification
of SCEs at the asset tag number level.
Each step in this flowchart (Figure 11-1) procedure is described in more

detail below.
Contains hydrocarbon or hazardous substance
 If the element in a system that contains flammable hydrocarbons or

other hazardous substance then there is the potential that failure
could result in a major accident or MATTE event. Therefore, these
items would be considered as an SCE. Typically these items would
include process pipework and vessels containing hydrocarbons, and
represent the process containment barrier grouping.
Part of a Control, Shutdown, Alarm or Mitigation System
 If the element is part of a control, shutdown, alarm or mitigation

system then there is the potential that its function is to provide
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protection against a major accident and their consequences. This

would be the case if it was designed to protect process equipment
from catastrophic failure. Typical examples are the facility
Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD) and Passive Fire Protection
(PFP). This identifies those SCEs that are part of the Detection,
Protection and Shutdown systems barrier grouping.
Can failure lead to Upstream or Downstream release?
 The failure of an element may result, for example, in upset

conditions that lead to over-pressurisation of pipework or vessels if
they are not designed to withstand the event. This would lead to a
major accident due to loss of containment in the upstream or
downstream systems. An example of this type of system is a High
Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS). This type of system
falls into the Shutdown Systems barrier grouping.
Can failure result in a major accident or inability to prevent, control or

mitigate?
 This would be a consideration for systems that are generally not

considered part of the process. For example, structural failure on a
mobile offshore facility may lead to loss of stability and a Major
Accident. In addition, systems such as the navigational aids help
prevent ship collision. Similarly cranes or lifting equipment may
cause a Major Accident in the event of their failure due to dropped
objects. This should identify the Structural Integrity barrier group
and also the Protection Systems grouping for elements such as
navigational aids, collision avoidance systems, etc.
Does the element prevent harm to people?
 This would include items that:

o Protect people and the environment from a major accident
hazard involving fire, explosion and the release of toxic gases
and fumes.
o Ensure effective escape from affected areas of the site,
evacuation of the site or transference of people to a place of
safety.
 This identifies SCEs that are part of the Emergency Response and
Life Saving barrier groupings
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Figure 11-1 – SCE identification Flowchart
11.2 Identified facility SCEs

The HSE Case shall include a description under each general barrier
group the applicable SCEs that have been identified within the facility
that are linked to a particular Major Accident. This section must
demonstrate the clear link between the facility MAH (and bowties) and
the hardware barrier that is considered to be an SCE for that facility. It
should be noted that equipment may fall into the barrier groups or
categories. However, it may not be classified as an SCE because there
is no Major Accident Hazard that requires its presence as a barrier.
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11.3 Safety Critical Features

Safety Critical Features are elements of the design and the facility that
inherently limit the risk although they are not linked with any of the
hardware barrier groups or categories. Typical examples of safety
critical features are:
 Plant layout to minimise explosion over-pressures due to level of

congestion, equipment orientation
 Boat landing located away from risers. Note that Riser Guards are
considered to be a Safety Critical Element. The orientation and
layout of the platform such that the risers are distant from the boat
landing is a Safety Critical Feature
 Normally unmanned operations
 HVAC intake location preventing smoke, flammable and/or toxic gas
ingress
 Refuge / muster points located upwind
 Minimisation of flanges and instrument connections to reduce leak
frequency
 Platform orientation with respect to prevailing wind direction, with
operator shelters located up wind
 Location of life rafts, life jackets, TEMPSC etc., at an easily
accessible position from the primary muster point.
 Minimisation of hydrocarbon inventory and vessel sizes
 Minimisation of ignition sources
 Safety design margins
11.4 Technical Integrity

It is only by ensuring the Technical Integrity of the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’
safety barriers that the safety of the facility can be maintained. The
HSE Case shall provide an overview of how the identified hardware
barriers or SCEs will be designed, procured, fabricated, installed,
commissioned, operated, inspected and maintained in a manner that
ensures its technical integrity during that particular phase of the asset
life cycle.
The TIPS process encompasses the HSE Case. However, the purpose of
the HSE Case is to identify the Major Accident Hazards and the Safety
Critical Elements required to control Major Hazards and to detail the
specific performance requirements. Therefore, Performance Standards
must be developed based on the HSE Case that are fully defined and
agreed by the appropriate Technical Authority, for each phase of the
project life cycle. These Performance Standards are not considered to
be part of the HSE Case but are to be developed based on the HSE Case
findings.
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The Performance Standards report for the SCEs will detail how they
have been developed and what critical assurance tasks are required to
ensure that technical integrity is maintained.
It is required that the identified SCEs are always able to perform to

100% of their required functionality. However, there will be times when
this is not possible due to breakdown or other causes. The Performance
Standards report shall detail the processes that are in place that
controls any deviations in SCE performance in a safe manner. This
represents essentially a management of change procedure. The
Performance Standards report shall also detail the process to be
followed in the event of modification to the SCEs. For example,
deviations in materials of construction during the fabrication phase of
the SCE, performance issues during operational phase, incorrect design
standard followed at the design stage, etc.
11.5 Safety Critical Element Register

For better management of the safety critical devices, each Safety
Critical Element shall be assigned a unique number as an SCE code
according to the category e.g. for fire fighting deluge system that falls
under the category of Protection System, the SCE number would be
PSXXX.
A record must be made of the SCEs identified; the record should state
why the element is considered safety critical and how it relates to
specific major hazards.
The register must demonstrate the clear link between the facility MAH
(and bowties) and the hardware barrier that is considered to be an SCE
for that facility.
The HSE Case shall contain a list of the SCEs identified in the bowtie
diagrams as per the example SCE register provided in Appendix 6. The
SCE Register must show each SCE against the MAH bowties where that
particular SCE appears as a hardware barrier.
The SCEs and their performance standards must be traceable in the

maintenance management system.
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12 PART 4: SYSTEMS
Part 4 of the HSE Case is to document those activities, people,
competencies and procedures that impact the barriers required to
manage the Major Accident Hazards.
Part 4 of the HSE Case shall contain
 HSE Critical Activities

 Activity Sheets
 Competency assessment description
 Essential procedures that manage Major Accident Hazards
 HSE Activity Matrix
12.1 HSE Critical Activities

Having identified the barriers required to manage Major Accident
Hazards Part 4 of the HSE Case (with the exception of the Concept
Select Phase), shall describe how during that particular phase of the
asset lifecycle e.g. Design, Operations, etc., their performance and
integrity will be assured and maintained.
This is to be achieved by identifying the SCE Critical Activities, which

are those activities that must be carried out to ensure that the SCE is
suitable, has the design integrity and will continue to perform its
intended function.
The SCE critical integrity activities shall be identified for all SCEs and for
the entire asset lifecycle, they may include:
 Critical design, construction, installation, commissioning,

maintenance, operation, modification and repair activities.
 Periodic testing of SCEs including testing of Instrumented Protected
Functions (IPFs) and systems
 Certification activities
 Independent inspection, examination and testing
 Administrative aspects such as training, auditing, etc..
Figure 12-1 shows the relation of Critical Activities to SCEs / barriers

and controls.
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Figure 12-1 – How activities relate to barriers
In order to assist in the identification of SCE critical integrity activities it

is recommended that asset groups are segregated along with the life
cycle processes for these assets, and upon which the SCE Critical
Integrity Activities should be identified. Figure 12-2 is a flowchart to
assist in the identification of SCE Critical Integrity Activities. This will
also assist in the identification of the organisational aspects to manage
the SCE Critical Integrity Activities during that particular phase of the
life cycle. It should be noted that SCE Critical Integrity Activities shall
also include SCE Integrity Audits that are carried out by the
Independent Competent Body and is used to confirm that all the SCE
Critical Integrity Activities have been identified and are performed.
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Figure 12-2 – Methodology for identifying SCE Critical Integrity Activities
SCE Critical Integrity Activities
PROCESSES ACTIVITIES ASSETS
DESIGN WELLS
PROCURE FLOWLINES & PIPELINES
BUILD STRUCTURES
QA/QC TESTING TANKS & VESSELS

PROCEDURES
RECORDS
INSTALL / COMMISSION PIPEWORK & VALVES
TRAINING
REPORTING
OPERATE AUDIT ROTATING EQT
ETC.
INSPECT BOILERS & HEATERS
CORROSION MGMT ELECTRICAL EQT
MAINTAIN INSTRUMENTS
REVIEW / IMPROVE HVAC & AC
CHANGE EMERGENCY & LIFE SAVING
DISPOSE
INTEGRITY ASSURANCE
OF SCEs
For example, SCE Critical Integrity Activities and assurances that are
identified during the design phase may include reviews that ensure that
the designer has taken account of:
 The expected working life of the asset

 The properties of the materials handled
 Corrosive environments
 Extreme operating conditions, including start-up, shutdown, and
reasonably foreseeable fault or emergency conditions
 The need for asset examination and testing to ensure continued
integrity throughout the design life
 Foreseeable changes to design conditions of equipment that may be
connected to the asset, including those operated by third parties
 Protection against system failure using suitable measuring, control
and protecting devices
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 Provision of door safety devices to prevent opening of equipment

whilst pressurised
 Interlocking devices to ensure availability of pressure relief devices
and emergency depressurising valves
 Suitable material for each component part compatible with service
and operating conditions
 External forces exerted on the asset including thermal, seismic,
wind, and wave loadings
 Safe access for operation, maintenance, and activities associated
with integrity assurance
 Indelibly marking of equipment with safe operating limits and other
safety information
This may simply be achieved by the normal project design procedures,

and assured via technical safety studies such as HAZOPs.
During the fabrication, construction, installation and commissioning

phase the HSE Case should identify the activities and assurances that
those doing the installation have the required training, skills, and
experience and that they:
 Provide adequate supervision, taking into account the complexity of

the system being installed. Critical stages of fabrication / installation
activities such as welding procedures, testing, material laboratory
analysis and NDT requirements should be witnessed.
 Prepare suitable foundations to support the equipment, taking into
account the nature of the ground, equipment weight, and other
internal loads and external forces
 Decide on the most suitable method of lifting and handling sizeable
loads to avoid harm to people and accidental damage.
 Check for signs of damage to equipment during transit and prior to
delivery to site for installation
 Protect the SCEs from the environment including adverse weather
before and during installation
 Ensure that hot work such as welding or cutting will not affect the
integrity of the SCE
 Ensure that protective devices are clear of obstruction, operate
correctly without hindrance or blockage and that the discharge is
routed to a safe place
 Ensure that access doors / hatches are clear of obstruction and
operate correctly
 Ensure that any labels or markings attached to the SCE are clearly
visible
 Provide adequate access for maintenance and examination purposes
 Provide suitable protection against mechanical damage such as
accidental impact by vehicles
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 Have the installation work checked and approved upon completion

by a suitably qualified and competent person
It is likely that these may all be achieved by the normal project

construction, installation, pre-commissioning and commissioning
procedures.
For the Operations Phase the HSE Case shall demonstrate how persons
operating the SCEs are provided with adequate instructions covering the
safe operation and actions to be taken in the event of an emergency,
and that the SCEs are operated in accordance with these instructions.
The operating instructions must contain all information needed for safe
operation of the SCEs including appropriate limits within which it is to
be operated and the environmental conditions in which it may safely
operate, see section 10.11. The instructions shall typically also include:
 Normal start-up and shutdown procedures

 Equipment preparation for maintenance and re-instatement
procedures
 Precautions for standby operation
 Function and effect of controls and protective devices
 Likely fluctuations expected in normal operations
 Requirements to ensure that the SCEs are adequately protected
against operating outside their design envelop at all times
 Maximum loads which may safely be imposed on parts of the
structure
 Procedures in the event of an emergency
 Reporting and recording of critical information which should include
equipment failure reports for root cause analysis.
The HSE Case shall identify those aspects of the operating manual that
are applicable to the management of SCEs, and their assurance
processes.
In addition during the Operational phase the SCEs must be maintained

and repaired so as to prevent danger or a major accident. The type and
frequency of the maintenance for the SCE must be assessed and the
suitable maintenance programme planned.
It is essential to maintain the desired functionality of the SCE during the

operation and maintenance phases, which are characterised by their
long term nature and where controls are difficult to maintain at the
same level. Processes that support these phases must be addressed, for
example:
 Monitoring SCEs against their Performance Standards

 Condition or reliability approach for maintenance
 Preventative maintenance approach
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 Use of appropriate support software

 Spare parts strategy
 Examining SCE failure modes and their consequences
12.2 Activity Sheets

With the exception of the Concept Phase, the HSE Case shall include the
activity sheets. The purpose of the activity sheet is to clearly
summarise the following:
 An overview of the activity which links the activity to how it ensures

that barriers are adequate and effective.
 Hazard management objectives of the activity which gives the
background as to how the activity either creates or maintains
adequate controls and barriers and how it manages hazards
 Description of tasks which is a list of the key sub tasks that form an
overall activity
 Accountable and responsible personnel / competency criteria – these
are the job positions accountable and / or responsible for the task
being done appropriately. An ‘accountable’ person is not necessarily
the person performing the task but is answerable for its adequacy
(generally supervisor / management level). The ‘responsible’ person
is the person that does the task.
 Company systems – these are the systems functioning within
PETRONAS that help in undertaking the task (either by planning it or
recording the results).
Verification of the satisfactory performance of the task will take place

either by internal audits or by use of an Independent Verification Body.
An example Activity Sheet is provided in Appendix 10.
12.3 Competency to undertake activities for managing

major hazards
An important factor in ensuring barrier effectiveness is the presence of
a person with the right competencies being available to undertake the
task specified in the activity sheets. In order to ensure the presence of
a person with the right competency it is necessary to:
 Identify each task or activity and match the task to a specific

position within the company and this position represents the
accountable and responsible persons for that particular task or
activity being done satisfactorily.
 The required competencies for a position are defined either in the
positions Job Competency Profile or in a detailed job description
 An assurance system is in place to demonstrate that the person who
is working in a position has the right competency, or has a plan in
place to close any competency gaps.
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The Operations HSE Case shall include a description of how competency

is assessed and maintained to ensure that the barriers identified remain
effective.
12.4 Essential Procedures to Manage MAH

A procedure is considered essential if any inadequacies in the procedure
or failure to follow it could lead directly to a barrier being ineffective or
a major accident hazard occurring. The Operational HSE Case shall
identify those essential or critical control procedures. The Operational
HSE Case shall include a training matrix for the critical control
procedures against job position or function, so that it can be ensured
that relevant people are adequately trained in these critical control
procedures.
Typical critical control procedures are:
 PTS 60.2001 Permit to work system – specifies the application of

Permit to Work within PETRONAS operations
 Emergency Response Procedure – provides the guidance for
emergency response for the facility
 Job Hazard Analysis – describes the requirements of the job hazard
analysis as a tool to manage hazards and risk analysis in the
execution of all work at the work place
 PTS 60.2201 Management of Change – provides guidelines for
managing proposed modifications to existing onshore and offshore
facilities and structures to ensure that the changes are practical with
added values and no additional risk whether or not it involves
change in the process
 PTS 60.2212 Bypassing of Safety Critical Equipment / Safety System
Isolation – Describes the requirements for defeat or override or
bypass of an automatic control or protection system when it is
required to be deliberately rendered inoperable for the purpose of
start-up, testing and maintenance
 Operating deviations – stipulates the hazard management
requirements for continuing operations when integrity assurance
activities or corrective maintenance cannot be executed
 MOPO/ SIMOPS procedure – Defines the standards to be applied to
safely manage multiple activities being performed simultaneously at
a location.
12.5 Critical Activity Matrix

The HSE Case shall present the organogram for the facility and the
manning levels in place with details of shift rotation. The job positions
identified shall be used to form the Critical Activity Matrix along with the
identified critical activities.
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12.5.1 Function of SCE-Critical Activity Matrix
The SCE-Critical Activity Matrix is a tabulation of critical activities and

its corresponding parties who are responsible and accountable to
perform the critical activities.
The SCE-Critical Activities are activities that shall be carried out to

ensure the effectiveness of the identified barrier (e.g. scheduled
maintenance to maintain the hard barriers). In general, the SCE-Critical
Activities are the escalation controls identified in the Bowtie
assessment.
The responsible parties for the respective SCE-Critical activities may

vary from the Management level to the Technician level at site.
However, the accountable parties should be limited to Management and
Supervisory level.
Note: A single party may be responsible or accountable for more than

one critical activity.
12.5.2 Development of SCE-Critical Activity Matrix
The SCE-Critical Activity Matrix shall be developed after completion of

Bowtie risk assessment where the hard barriers for both facility hazards
have been identified and confirmed.
The identification of SCE-Critical Activity and their corresponding

responsible and accountable parties should be developed by a team
comprising various disciplines as described below, but not limited to:
 Operations
 Maintenance
 HSE
 Integrity Engineering
 Well Engineering
 Project Management
 Leadership
 Pipeline Engineering.
As a minimum, the personnel involved in the development of the matrix

should be the Subject Matter Expert (SME) in the respective discipline.
Sample template for Critical Activity Matrix is as shown in Appendix 9.

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13 MAIN SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FOR THE HSE CASE
13.1 Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) Requirements

The HSE Case shall demonstrate that the risks associated with the
major accident hazards (MAH) are managed to ALARP.
Process facilities risks shall be evaluated via various techniques i.e.

quantitative risk assessments, semi-quantitative risk assessments and
qualitative risk assessments.
The scope for formal safety assessment during FEED and detailed
design phase are more detailed and comprehensive where the results
are used in finalizing the possible design options and the requirement
for and incorporation of risk reduction measures.
During the later phases of the Asset Lifecycle a revalidation of the

technical HSE studies as part of the HSE Case may be sufficient.
However, the FSA should be reviewed and updated as required in line
with the HSE Case report revision. All technical HSE studies shall be
completed in accordance with the appropriate PETRONAS Technical
Standards e.g. PTS 60.2210 for Quantitative Risk Assessment, PTS
60.2209 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), PTS 60.2204 Process
Hazard Analysis, etc.
As part of the assessments, the adequacy of the control and mitigation

measures shall be evaluated in minimizing the risks to ALARP.
Additionally, recommendations shall be made should these controls and
mitigation measures be found to be insufficient and shall be recorded in
the HSE Case Remedial Action Plan.
For Contractors facilities, the facilities shall also be subjected to the

comprehensive safety studies in demonstrating that the risks posed by
the facilities operations are at ALARP and the required controls and
mitigation measures are adequately identified and in placed. The
requirement to conduct comprehensive FSA shall be specified as part of
the contract provision.
The formal safety assessment shall be reviewed in cases of any major

modifications done on the facility which may impair the existing
controls, or if the reliability and integrity of the existing controls are in
doubt. Subsequently, the HSE Case shall also be updated for any
change in the safety studies to reflect the current risk exposure.
13.2 Scope of Assessment

The scope of the FSA in HSE Case shall include process hazards and
non-process hazards that may lead to Major Accident Event (MAE).
The Process Hazards shall include the assessment of potential leaks for
all process equipment, including flowlines and pipelines.
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Non-process Hazards shall include the assessment of transportation

hazards, lifting hazards, ship collision, occupational hazard and
structural failure.
The FSA shall cover all the facilities within the field, including all satellite
facilities.
The exposure of hazard shall take into account the maximum personnel
onboard the facility, including Contractors and visitors.
13.3 FSA Tools

The FSA tools in HSE Case shall consists of qualitative, semi-
quantitative and quantitative assessment as elaborated below:
 Qualitative Risk Assessment is a study/assessment which is based

on conservative assumptions particularly where uncertainties exist.
In this method, a single person or team can gather information and
brainstorm on the causes, control and consequence. Examples
include Hazard Identification (HAZID), Structured What-if
Techniques (SWIFT), Hazard Operability Study (HAZOP), etc.
 Semi-quantitative Risk Assessment is a more detailed
study/assessment to evaluate in detail on the key risk/issues
identified in a qualitative risk assessment. This method is useful
especially when quantification of risk is difficult and the qualitative
interpretation is too subjective. Examples include Layers of
Protection Analysis (LOPA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Instrumented
Protective Function (IPF) study, etc. and
 Quantitative Risk Assessment is a study/ assessment to numerically
determine the frequency of various adverse events and their
consequences to establish the risk to life that the particular facility
poses. The consequence modelling undertaken as part of the
Quantitative Risk Assessment shall utilize the relevant
programme/software e.g. FRED, PHAST, etc.
 Other similar studies include Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment
(FERA), Radiation, Dispersion and Plume Study, Non-Flammable
Hazard Analysis (NFHA), etc.
Below are typically the minimum safety studies required to evaluate

facility risks necessary to complete the HSE Case. These studies are
initially undertaken in detail during the design phase of the facility.
Therefore, during subsequent phases of the asset lifecycle i t may only
be necessary to revalidate the basis, assumptions, recommendations,
and to identify if any significant changes have been made from the
previous study. This may include, for example, that the muster point
location remains in the same location as originally intended, that
process conditions and materials remain the same as those used in the
consequence modelling, that the location and type of fire fighting
and/or EER facilities remain the same and in the same location as
detailed in the previous study, that all fire and gas detectors are located
as per the Fire and Gas Layout drawings, etc. Therefore, for the
Operations HSE Case it is expected that site visits shall be undertaken
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 89
to confirm the applicability and / or validate the assumptions and

findings of the previous FSA.
 Qualitative Risk Assessments may be required to assist in the

determining the credible scenario before proceeding with
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). Examples of the assessments
that may be conducted are Hazard Identification (HAZID), Hazards
and Operability Study (HAZOP), Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
assessment and verification, etc.
 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
o An assessment to identify and quantify the exposure to
process hydrocarbon fire and explosion hazards on the
facility. This study usually yields the quantification of fatality
risk to personnel working on the facility.
 Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a detailed hazard analysis where
the purpose is to identify the possible hazard scenarios of the
process, assess the existing safeguards and where necessary,
provide recommendations to ensure that the risk is managed to
ALARP level. The detailed analysis is divided into qualitative, semi -
qualitative and quantitative analysis depending on the aim of the
study. The most widely used technique is the Hazard and Operability
(HAZOP) study. Other detailed analysis techniques are Structure
What-If Technique (SWIFT), Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA),
etc. The analysis shall be in accordance with the PTS 60.2204
Process Hazard Analysis. However, it is envisaged that during the
design phase of the project that the Emergency Mitigation Facilities
Review (EMFR) checklist is completed. For subsequent phases only
a review of the EMFR Checklist is required as more detailed analysis
will be provided by associated studies such as EERA, ESSA, FRA,
QRA, etc.
 Fire Risk Assessment and Thermal Radiation:
o An assessment on fire risk and thermal radiation to establish
hazardous thermal radiation contours for the facility. The
purpose of the study is to assess the impact of thermal
radiation, on personnel, facility and operation.
 Gas Dispersion, Plume Study and Blast Study:
o An assessment on flammable gas dispersion and plume, to
establish safe cold vent locations, or flare stack height based
on flame out scenario. An assessment of delayed ignition of a
flammable vapour cloud causing an explosion and blast to
assess the maximum realistic overpressure levels at various
locations. This may require the use of CFD modelling,
particularly for offshore structures.
 Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA):
o An assessment on the emergency system with the objective
to identify and determine the availability of the critical
emergency system, assess the vulnerability to withstand
major accident emergency condition (e.g. fire and explosion),
as well as determining the survivability of the emergency
system.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 90
 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA):

o An assessment to ensure safe escape, evacuation and rescue
of personnel in the event of major accident. The intent of
EERA is to ensure the safety of personnel at all time while
retreating from the effect of hazardous situation with due
consideration of likely hazardous scenario, its duration, and
severity as well as the predicted responses of individual
under threat.
o It should be noted that the EERA study is an offshore
assessment which is not required for onshore facilities.
However, for onshore facilities a Safe Access and Layout
review study may be beneficial during the design phase. A
typical proposed methodology of this type of study is
illustrated in the Figure 13-1. However, the scope of the
review can be adjusted depending on the intended purpose
of the study. This type of study is envisaged to be only of
practical use during the design phase of the asset / facility.
Figure 13-1 – Safe Access and Layout Review
 Temporary Refuge Smoke Ingress Assessment (TRSIA):

o An assessment to identify the position of the Temporary
Refuge (TR), determine the integrity of the TR and the extent
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 91
of impairment and survivability of personnel in cases of any

major accident hazards.
 Hazardous Area Classification (HAC):
o An assessment to classify the areas around equipment
handling or storing flammable fluids. It provides a basis for
the correct selection of fixed electrical equipment and the
location of other fixed sources of ignition in those areas.
Hazardous area classification is essential for the control of
ignition sources, and hazardous area rated electrical
apparatus are considered as SCEs.
 Buildings Risk Assessment:
o For occupied buildings and/ or functionally significant
buildings, a buildings risk assessment may be required to
confirm that the building location or design does not place
the occupants at undue risk.
In cases where there are specific concerns on the adequacy of safety

systems on the facility, the suitable safety studies may also be
conducted on a case by case basis e.g.:
 Acoustically Induced Vibration (AIV) Study;

o An assessment of piping systems that may be at risk of
failure due to acoustic induced vibration caused by high
capacity gas let down facilities. This may apply to relief and
blow down systems.
 Fire and Gas Mapping;
o An assessment to identify location, number and type of
detector (including its voting strategy) to be used based on
potential source of gas release and fire. The output shall be
indicated on the master plan of a fire and gas safety system.
 SIL Assessment and Verification
o Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is defined as a relative level of
risk-reduction provided by a safety function, or to specify a
target level of risk reduction. SIL is a measurement of
performance required for a Safety Instrumented Function
(SIF). SIL Verification is the demonstration that the installed
SIF achieves it required performance.
The detail reports from all formal safety assessments shall be

referenced in the HSE Case.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 92
14 HSE CASE REVIEW
14.1 HSE Case Communication

The revised/new HSE Case shall be communicated to all relevant parties
working on the facilities and/or involved in the HSE-Critical activities.
During the communication session, it is essential to highlight:
 The fitness of the facility to be operated

 The risk exposure by personnel working on the facility
 Information with regards to MAH e.g. Facility Bowtie Risk
Assessment
 The SCE-Critical activities, including the accountable and responsible
parties, required in maintaining the effectiveness of hard barriers for
all MAH
 Information that is important as reference for the safe conduct of
HSE-Critical activities e.g. HSE-Critical Activity Bowtie Risk
Assessment.
14.2 Review Requirement

A HSE Case is intended to be a live document and shall always be kept
up to date to ensure that the information and the risks exposed to
personnel are current.
The review shall examine the basic assumptions made in HSE Case as
well as its entire content.
To ensure accuracy of the review, detail information with regards to the

facility and operations shall be made available to the appointed party in
charge for reviewing/developing the HSE Case. This is essential as the
facts and information given to be the basis of the studies will reflect the
results and findings of the HSE Case.
It is vital that before changes are made to the facility or the way it is
operated that the HSE Case is consulted as part of the change decision
making process.
14.3 Frequency of Review

A HSE Case shall be regularly reviewed and revised at least every five
(5) years, provided there is no change made to the facilities and/or
activities. However, where the review and revision frequency is
determined by local legislation e.g. Malaysian DOSH CIMAH report, then
the review and revision cycle shall be in accordance with the prevailing
local legal requirement.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 93
The following will require the HSE Case to be updated:
 Material changes to the facility, its organisation or mode of

operation
 Changes that affect the key assumptions used in the HEMP analysis
The review of HSE Case shall also be conducted to reflect:
 Major modification to the facilities and operations

 Findings from Other Risk Assessment
 Findings from Assurance Exercise
 Lesson Learnt.
14.3.1 Major Modification to the facilities and operations
For any major change in process facilities (e.g. installation of new

process equipment, pipeline tie-in, or change in operating conditions
(composition, pressure, temperature, etc.)), a thorough review and
update of the safety studies shall be conducted to evaluate the new
hazards and risks e.g. new source of leak, potential impact due to
fire/explosion from the new source of leak, dispersion of toxic gas, etc.
In addition, in cases where there is change to the manning philosophy,

the assumptions of the safety studies (e.g. QRA, EERA, ESSA, etc.) shall
be reviewed in determining the actual risk exposure to personnel.
14.3.2 Findings from Other HSE Risk Assessments
The HSE Case shall also be reviewed to reflect findings from other HSE
risk assessment exercise e.g. Process Hazard Analysis (PHA),
Facility/HSE-Critical Activity Risk Assessment, Fire and Gas Mapping,
etc., as and when required to ensure the completeness of the control
and/or recovery barriers identified in the safety studies.
14.3.3 Findings from Assurance Exercise
The HSE Case shall also be reviewed to reflect findings from HSE
assurance exercise as and when required. The new recommendation
and/or area for improvement with regards to HSE Case shall be
incorporated in the revised HSE Case with view to minimize the risk to
ALARP.
14.3.4 Lesson Learnt
The HSE Case shall also be reviewed to reflect lesson learnt from
incident investigation as and when required. The new recommendation
and/or area for improvement shall be incorporated in the revised HSE
Case with view to minimize the risk to ALARP. Any discrepancy to the
defective and/or missing barriers shall be re-assessed and to be
replaced with an effective barrier.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 94
REFERENCES
[1] PTS 60.0303 Documenting a HSEMS and HSE Case, Rev. 1, June 2006
[2] PTS 60.2210 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA), Rev 1, June 2006
[3] PTS 60.0401 Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP), Rev 2,
October 2012
[4] PTS 60.XXXX Draft Guideline for Bowtie
[5] PTS 60.2004 Guideline for Hazard Identification (HAZID), Rev 2, 2011
[6] PTS 60.1400.01, Guideline Health Risk Assessment, March 2012
[7] PTS 60.3202, Environmental Aspects and Impacts Assessment Guide,
Rev 0, June 2006
[8] PTS 60.3206, Environmental, Social and Health Impact Assessment,
Rev 2, September 2012
[9] PETRONAS E&P Technical Standard for Quantitative Risk Assessment
(QRA), EP HSE SG 06 14 February 2014
[10] International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) Health Safety
and Environmental Case Guidelines for Mobile Offshore Drilling Units
(MODU), Issue 3.3 1 Dec 2010
[11] International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) Health, Safety
and Environmental Case Guidelines for Land Drilling Units, Issue 1.0.1,
27 July 2009
[12] Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Offshore production
installations – Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard
identification and risk assessment, BS EN ISO 17776:2002
[13] L30 A Guide to the Offshore Installations (HSE Case) Regulations, 2005
[14] L111 A Guide to the Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations, 1999
[15] UKOOA Fire and Explosion Guidance, Issue 1, 2007
[16] P.U.(A) 39/96, Occupational Safety and Health (Control of Industrial
Major Accident Hazards) Regulations 1996
[17] Hong Kong Planning Department, Chapter 12 Miscellaneous Planning
Standards and Guidelines,
http://www.pland.gov.hk/pland_en/tech_doc/hkpsg/full/ch12/ch12_tex
t.htm
[18] EP OE MAN SCE Safety Critical Elements Manual, Rev 0, August 2013
[19] PETRONAS Carigali, Simultaneous Operations Guidelines, WW ALL O 05
001 Rev 1, 2013
[20] EG 1/04, Environmental Impact Assessment Guidelines for Risk
Assessment, Department of Environment (Malaysia), 2004
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 95
Appendix 1
-
Typical Statement of Fitness
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 96
Major Accident Hazards
Describe the Major Accident Hazards that have been identified for the facility. This
should be referenced against the generic hazard list. For example:
The Major Accident Hazards that have been identified for the facility are:
H01.01 Crude Oil under Pressure – leading to fire/ explosion due to loss of
containment of hydrocarbon
H01.02 Hydrocarbons in formation – leading to blowout and fire / explosion following
loss of containment of hydrocarbon
H01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas – leading to fire / explosion due to loss of containment of
hydrocarbon
H06.03 Overhead Equipment – leading to dropped object and subsequent fire /
explosion from loss of containment of hydrocarbon
H07.02 Objects under compression – leading to platform structural failure / collapse
H08.02 On Water Transport (boating) – leading to ship collision
H08.03 In air transport (flying) – leading to helicopter accidents
Technical HSE Assessment
This section shall illustrate that an assessment has been carried out to identify the
threats, their likelihood of occurrence, the possible consequences that may arise and
the provision of suitable and sufficient barriers and controls as part of the HSE Case.
Design Assessment – Describe the HSE studies that have been undertaken in relation
to the facility. Detail the continued validity of these studies and any salient findings.
Bowtie Analysis – Insert a paragraph related to the development of the Bowtie
diagram and any identified shortfall in barriers or controls.
SCEs – Insert a paragraph relating to the identification of SCEs and the assessment of
their effectiveness
Largest Risk Contributors – Insert a pie chart to show biggest risk contributor e.g.
see pie chart below.
1.00% 5.00%
5.00%
10.00%
6.00%
15.00%
48.00%
10.00%
HC under pressure - HC in formation HC under pressure - Risers and Pipelines

HC under pressure - Topsides piping and equipment Dropped Object
Occupational Helicopter Accidents
Platform Structural Failures Ship Collision
Risk levels – Insert a table detailing the PLL and IRPA values for the facility and that
they are within the PETRONAS risk acceptance criteria
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 97
Barriers and Control Effectiveness
A statement should be provided that describes how the effectiveness of the barriers
was ascertained. In addition, it should describe the identification of the escalation
factors and there controls in place that ensure the continued effectiveness of identified
SCEs. The statement should make due reference to the performance standards being
met and clear HSE Critical Roles and Responsibilities being identified.
ALARP Management of Risks
The key risk reduction measures identified and incorporated into the design should be
described. In addition a summary of the ALARP demonstration should be provided.
Remedial Actions
This section should summarise the remedial actions.
Signatures
As managers for the facility, we fully endorse the contents of this HSE Case. We are
committed to ensure that the integrity of the facility is maintained and that operation
described or referenced will be safe. We will address the shortfalls as documented in
the Remedial Action Plan and aim to deliver continuous improvement in HSE
Performance.
We have concluded that the xxxx facilities are safe to operate and Major Hazards can
be managed in accordance with the requirements set out in this HSE Case.
Title Signature
Reviewed by Regions Senior Manager, HSE
HSE Case Head of Production or Offshore

Custodian Installation Manager
Endorsed by General Manager, HSE Division
Asset Manager or Regions

Approved by
Head of Operations
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 98
Appendix 2
-
Typical Hazard Picture &
Control Sheet
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 99
HAZARD PICTURE HAZARD: Hydrocarbon under pressure in Topside Equipment HAZID REFERENCE: [H-01-03, H-01-05, H-01-06]
BOW-TIE
 01 Hydrocarbon under pressure in topside equipment
THREATS TOP EVENT IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES RECOVERY

 Overpressurisation of facilities / Equipment  Loss of Containment  Explosion  Escape
 Underpressure  Jet fire  Muster
 Temperature (high and low)  Pool fire  Evacuation by lifeboat/liferaft
 Deterioration of hoses (weather, mechanical, etc.)  Smoke
 Corrosion (internal and external)  Hydrocarbon spill
 Erosion (sand and debris management program) ESCALATED CONSEQUENCES
 Breaking into the process (opening pressurized equipment,  Damage to critical structure/platform collapse
launchers, receivers or piping)  Impairment of EER provisions
 Material deterioration / fatigue / equipment vibration, e.g.  Failure of riser and/or well flowline
pulsation dampeners, structural mounting, etc
 Seal failure / degradation
 External Impact e.g. Swinging load
 Internal explosion
PREVENTIVE CONTROL & MITIGATIVE BARRIERS  PS001 Deluge System EER MEASURES  LS001 Personal Survival
BARRIERS  IC008 Miscellaneous Ignition Control  IC001 Hazardous Area Ventilation  PS002 Fire & Explosion Protection  ER001 Temporary Refuge / Primary Equipment (PSE)
 SI003 Heavy Lift Cranes & Mech Components  IC002 Non-Hazardous Area Ventilation  PS003 Helideck Foam System Muster Area  LS002 Rescue Facilities – Standby
Handling Equipment  DS003 H2O in Condensate  IC003 Certified Electrical Equipment  PS004 Firewater Pump  ER002 Escape and Evacuation Routes Vessel
 PC001 Pressure Vessel  PS012 Sand Filters  IC005 Earth Bonding  PS005 Firewater Ringmain  ER003 Emergency / Escape Lighting  LS003 Lifeboats / TEMPSC
 PC002 Heat Exchanger  PS013 Chemical Injection System  IC008 Miscellaneous Ignition Control Components  PS007/8/9/11 Fire Protection Systems  ER004 Communication System  LS004 Alternative Means of
 PC003 Rotating Equipment  SD001 Emergency Shutdown System  SD001 Emergency Shutdown System (ESD)  PS010 Power Management System  ER005 Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) Escape
 PC004 Tanks (ESD)  SD002 Depressurisation System  SI001 Structures Subsea / Vessel / Hull /  ER006 Helicopter Facilities
 PC005 Piping System  SD006 Process Emergency Shutdown  SD004 Operational Well Isolation GBS / Foundation Structures  ER007 Emergency Power)
 PC007 Relief System Valves (ESDVs)  SD005 Pipeline Isolation Valve  SI002 Topside Structure  ER010 Open Haz./Non-Haz. Drains
 IC006 Fuel Gas Purge System  ER009 Process Control & Alarm  SD006 Process Emergency Shutdown Valves DETECTION
(ESDVs)  DS001 Fire and Gas Detection
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 100
Hazard H-01 Hydrocarbons TOP EVENT P E A R

Control
Sheet H-01.03 Crude Oil under Pressure Loss of Containment – C5 C5 C5 C5
Topsides
H-01.05 LPGs
H-01.06 Hydrocarbon Gas
A HAZARD DESCRIPTION
The Yetagun Complex produces export gas and condensate. It comprises of three platforms,
namely:
• Yetagun “A” Wellhead Platform, a four leg, 20 slot drilling platform which was installed
in March 1998;
• Yetagun “B” Production Platform, an eight leg production, compression and living
quarters platform which was installed in April 1999; and
• Yetagun “C” Booster Compressor Platform, a 4 leg, separation and 3 train booster
compression platform which was commissioned in April 2012.
Well fluids from Yetagun A production flow line are choked to 37 barg before routed to the
production header or the test header and then routed across the bridge to the Yetagun B
platform for three phase separation. The gas is routed to the booster compression facility at
Yetagun C where it is compressed to circa 70 barg and then it is routed to Yetagun B for water
and hydrocarbon dew point suppression and then the sales gas compressors to 160barg and
cooled to 63°C before export to shore.
Condensate routed to the condensate stabilization unit at Yetagun B where the condensate
needs to be stabilized to reduce the volatility of the condensate to 14.5 psia (1 bar) true vapor
pressure at 100°F (9.7 RVP predicted) before being sent to the FSO.
Releases of gas and condensate could potentially lead to fire and/or explosion causing
injuries/fatalities, and severe asset damage. Uncontrolled hydrocarbon releases within the
furnace can potentially cause fire/explosion of the furnace leading to similar scale of casualties
and losses. In addition, condensate release can also have environmental effect though it is not
as severe as crude oil releases due to the lighter components evaporating with less chance of
prolonged environmental impact.
Hazard locations:
The primary locations likely to give rise to this top event are:
Yetagun A
Cellar deck – wellheads and production manifold/headers
Main deck – gas pig launcher
Yetagun B
Cellar deck – production separator, condensate pumps and propane package
Main deck – sales gas compressors
Upper deck – separators, sales gas coolers & compressors and propane package
Yetagun C
Cellar deck – separator
Main deck – sales gas booster compressors
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 101

Control
Topsides
H-01.05 LPGs
B THREAT AND CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT
Consequence:
Threats/Causes:
Ignited release
 Overpressurisation of facilities /
Equipment • Immediate ignition leading to jet fire
 Underpressure • Explosion or flash fire from delayed ignition
 Temperature (high and low) of gas cloud
 Deterioration of hoses (weather, • Pool fire on the topsides or on sea-surface
mechanical, etc.) generating smoke
 Corrosion (internal and external) • Asphyxiation of personnel due to smoke
 Erosion (sand and debris management • Impairment of the escape and evacuation
program) systems
 Breaking into the process (opening • Damage to critical structural members
pressurized equipment, launchers, Unignited release
receivers or piping)
 Material deterioration / fatigue / • Asphyxiation of personnel due to gas cloud
equipment vibration, e.g. pulsation • Personnel injuries caused by escape and
dampeners, structural mounting, etc evacuation from incident site
 Seal failure / degradation • Environmental impact
 External Impact e.g. Swinging load These consequences from this Hazard are
 Internal explosion controlled through the following Bow-Tie:
The threats leading to this events are • All Hazards (excl air transportation) –
controlled through the following Bow-Tie: Consequence only
Hydrocarbon Under Pressure in Topside

Equipment
C THREAT AND CONSEQUENCE CONTROL
This hazard is assessed in the following technical studies, which is explained in Section xxx of
the HSE Case:
 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

 Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis (FERA)
 Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA)
 Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA)
 Emergency Response Plan (ERP)
The summary for each of these studies is within Section xxx Formal Safety Assessment of the
HSE Case and the recommendations/gaps for these studies are listed in the Remedial Action
Plan.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 102

Control
Topsides
H-01.05 LPGs
Immediate Consequences
The technical studies show those jet fire and vapour cloud explosions are the main threats for
Yetagun Complex from process topsides failure, with major accident consequences on people
and asset.
It is important to understand the following about jet fires:
 Fatalities to personnel in the event of immediate ignition occur before personnel have the
chance to make safety arrangements or escape from the affected area; and
 Detection and shutdown systems generally do not offer much protection to people for these
types of events; the most effective way to reduce the risks to personnel is to prevent/stop
the leak and minimize the ignition.
For Yetagun B topsides, the small, medium and large hydrocarbon releases from IP
Separator, Gas / Glycol Exchanger, Cold Gas / Gas Exchanger, Refrigeration Vessel Package
Skids (Propane Bullets), LP Compressors and Fuel Gas System on Upper Deck, Main Deck and
Cellar Deck could result in jet fire scenario with initial flame length longer than the critical
distances to the firewall separating the LQ and the process area. For HP Separators and Sales
Gas Compressors, only medium and large releases could result in similar jet fire scenario.
However, the length of the jet fire will decrease once isolation and blowdown starts and for
large and medium release, the duration of the jet fire is very short to cause impingement to
the nearest firewall.
The explosion dimensioning accidental load (DAL) side on pressure for the Yetagun B process
area is 0.15 barg for a fairly short duration of 121 milliseconds. The explosion DAL reflection
overpressure is 0.21 barg and this pressure is applicable to the interior of the process area,
such as the firewall. The explosion drag pressure for the modules is 0.08 barg and this
pressure is applicable to smaller piping inside the area and for the larger piping and
equipment the effect of both pressure and drag has to be combined. The main contributors to
this explosion DAL overpressure are release from HP Separators, Gas Exchangers and the LP
Compressors.
The following list the critical SCEs for controlling immediate consequences:
Barrier type Roles

Preventive Process Containment (PC001, PC002, PC003, PC004, PC005,
PC007) to minimize loss of containment through good
technical integrity management, and Protection System
(PS012, PS013) to protect against degradation
Detection Not effective for controlling immediate consequences
Control and Mitigative Ignition Control (IC006, IC008) to minimize ignition
probability
Escape, Evacuation and Not effective for controlling immediate consequences
Rescue
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 103

Control
Topsides
H-01.05 LPGs
Escalation Likelihood and Control
Upon occurrence of MAH, the management strategy for preventing escalation is to rely on
effective detection method to be followed by activation of shutdown/isolation and blowdown.
Barriers are put in place to prevents the following types of escalation consequences:
 Impairment of muster shelter and evacuation provisions that allows safe escape and
evacuation of personnel; and
 Escalation within the platform that pose a bigger consequence than the initial event.
The following list the critical SCEs for controlling escalation:
Barrier type Roles

Preventive Not effective for controlling escalation consequences
Detection Detection System (DS001) to provide quick alert to incident
Control and Mitigative Shutdown System (SD001, SD002, SD004, SD005, SD006) for
emergency shutdown and blowdown
Protective System (PS001, PS002, PS003, PS004, PS005,
PS007/8/8/11, PS010) to provide effective fire protection and
fire fighting
Escape, Evacuation and Emergency Response (ER001, ER002, ER003, ER004, ER005,
Rescue ER006, ER007) to provide provisions for safe access to muster
and evacuate via Life Saving (LS001, LS002, LS003, LS004)
D ALARP & RISK REDUCTION
The demonstrate ALARP, the Operational HSE Case maps out the barriers effectiveness in
controlling MAH during operations.
Barrier Effectiveness
In the SCE assessment done together with the operational personnel, the effectiveness level of
the SCE was determined accounting for the current operational state of the barrier. From the
Bow-Tie, the identified SCEs that do not have ‘Effective’ rating are summarized below:
THREAT BARRIER RATING REMEDIAL ACTION
SI002 – Topsides Structures Partially Confirm on the deck plate

Effective structural remaining
Discovery of pinhole corrosion on deck plate.
strength is within the
acceptable limits.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 104

Control
Topsides
H-01.05 LPGs
SI003 - Heavy Lift Cranes & Mechanical Partially Provide limit switches to
Handling Equipment Effective restrict crane travel
preventing possible
To maintain suitable integrity so that
dropped object on live
loads, or any lifting components, does
plant e.g. Production
not fail in a manner that could cause or
Cooler at Yetagun C.
contribute to a major accident.
PC001 - Pressure Vessel Partially Expedite recruitment of

Effective experienced and
To maintain integrity of the pressure
competent Inspection
containment system.
Engineer or utilize 3rd
party expertise for
inspection and
maintenance of pressure
vessel and heat
exchangers.
PC002 - Heat Exchangers Partially Expedite recruitment of

Effective experienced and
To maintain integrity of the pressure
competent Inspection
containment system.
Engineer or utilize 3rd
party expertise for
inspection and
maintenance of pressure
vessel and heat
exchangers.
PC003 - Rotating Equipment Partially Confirm CBM monitoring

Effective program complies with
To maintain leak tight integrity. To
CIMG requirement for all
ensure no catastrophic failure of
rotating equipment.
component parts that could result in a
major accident.
PC004 – Tanks Partially Identify a mechanism for

Effective ascertaining the internal
To maintain leak tight integrity.
condition of the diesel /
water storage legs and
establish the min.
acceptable wall thickness
PC005 – Piping System Partially Identify an inspection plan

Effective to cover pipework hot spot
To maintain the integrity of pipework.
locations that are
susceptible to corrosion.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 105

Control
Topsides
H-01.05 LPGs
PS001 - Deluge Systems Partially Confirm maintenance &

Effective inspection requirements
To mitigate the consequence of fire &
for FRP piping.
explosion.
PS004 - Firewater pumps Partially Ensure the auto start on

Effective firewater pump P-1301 A
To provide fire water on demand to
is rectified to provide
extinguish or limit the spread & effects
designed level of
of a fire.
reliability.
PS005 - Firewater Ring main & Other Partially Carry out hydraulic
Distribution Systems Effective analysis on FW ringmain to
prevent the observed
To distribute sufficient fire water to all
vibration with P-1302 in
fire water systems.
operation
ER004 - Communication Systems Partially Confirm the required

Effective frequency for PAGA
To ensure that all personnel on board or
system PMR.
at site at any location are made aware
of any need for mustering or
abandonment once the decision has
been made. To ensure that the
communication systems & information
required for emergency response
control, plant evacuation, & with all
external parties identified in the
emergency plan, are available.
ER005 - Uninterruptable Power Supply Partially Confirm the UPS system to

(UPS) Effective deliver emergency power
meets the designed
To provide uninterruptable power supply
performance
to the vital services during a major
requirements.
incident when normal power fails.
LS003 - Lifeboats / TEMPSC Partially Carry out overdue

Effective recertification of Yetagun A
To facilitate a secondary means of
lifeboats
evacuation of personnel, independent of
external resources, when the primary
means is unavailable.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 106
Appendix 3
-
Generic Hazard List
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 107
Hazard
Hazard Description Sources
Number
01 Hydrocarbons
01.01 Crude Oil under pressure Flowlines, pipelines, pressure vessels and
piping
01.02 Hydrocarbons in formation Oil wells especially during well drilling
and entry / workover operations
01.03 LPGs (e.g. Propane) Process fractionating equipment, storage
tanks
01.04 LNGs Cryogenic plants, tankers
01.05 Condensate, NGL Gas wells, gas pipelines, gas separation
vessels
01.06 Hydrocarbon gas Oil/ gas separators, gas processing
plants, compressors, gas pipelines
01.07 Crude Oil at low pressure Oil storage tanks
01.08 Wax Filter separators, well tubular, pipelines
01.09 Coal Fuel source, mining activities
02 Refined Hydrocarbons
02.01 Lube and seal oil Engines and rotating equipment
02.02 Hydraulic Oil Hydraulic pistons, hydraulic reservoirs
and pumps
02.03 Diesel fuel Engines, storage
02.04 Petroleum spirit / Gasoline Storage
03 Other Flammable Hazards
03.01 Cellulosic materials Packing materials, wood planks, paper
rubbish
03.02 Pyrophoric materials Metal scale from vessels in sour service,
scale on filters in sour service, iron
sponge sweetening units
04 Explosives
04.01 Detonators Seismic operations, pipeline construction
04.02 Conventional explosives Seismic operations, pipeline construction,
platform decommissioning
04.03 Perforating gun charges Well completion activities associated with
drilling rigs and workover operations
05 Pressure Hazards
05.01 Bottled gases under Welding and metal cutting, laboratory
pressure gas sources
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 108
Hazard
Number
05.02 Water under pressure Water disposal, water floods and
injection operations, strength testing of
pipeworks, well fracturing and
treatments
05.03 Non-hydrocarbon gas under Purging and leak testing of facilities
pressure in pipeworks
05.04 Air under high pressure Seismic air guns and related piping
05.05 Hyperbaric operations Undersea operations
(diving)
05.06 Decompression (diving) Undersea operations
05.07 Oil and Hydrocarbon gas
under pressure
06 Hazards associated with differences in height
06.01 Personnel at height >2m Work involving scaffolding, suspended
access, ladders, platforms, excavations,
towers, stacks, roofing, working
overboard, working on monkey board
06.02 Personnel at height <2m Slippery/ uneven surfaces, climbing /
descending stairs, obstructions, loose
gratings
06.03 Overhead equipment Objects falling while being lifted/ handled
or working at a height over people,
equipment or process systems, elevated
work platforms, slung loads
06.04 Personnel under water Objects falling onto divers from overhead
operations
07 Objects under induced stress
07.01 Objects under tension Guy and support cables, anchor chains,
tow and barge tie-off ropes, slings
07.02 Objects under compression Spring loaded devices, such as relief
valves and actuators, and hydraulically
operated devices
08 Dynamic situation hazards
08.01 On water transport (boating) Boat transport to and from locations and
camps, transporting materials, supplies
and products, marine seismic operations,
barges moving drilling rigs and work-
over rigs
08.02 In air transport (flying) Helicopter and fixed wing travel to and
from locations and camps, transporting
materials, supplies and products
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 109
Hazard
Number
08.03 Boat collision hazard to Shipping lane traffic, product transport
other vessels and offshore vessels, supply and maintenance barges
structures and boats, drifting boats
08.04 Equipment with moving / Engines, motors, compressors, drill
rotating parts stems, thrusters on DP ships
08.05 Use of hazardous hand tools Workshop, construction sites,
(grinding, sawing) maintenance sites, rotating equipment
08.06 Use of knives, machetes and Galley, seismic line clearing, grubbing
other sharp objects operations
08.07 Transfer from boat to Basket transfer, rope transfer
offshore platform
09 Physical Environment Hazards
09.01 Weather Winds, temperature extremes, rain, etc.,
09.02 Sea state / river currents Waves, tides or other sea states
09.03 Tectonic activity Earthquakes or other earth movement
activity
10 Hot surfaces
10.01 Process piping and Oil well piping, piping in fractionation
equipment 60 – 150°C systems, glycol regeneration
10.02 Process piping and Hot oil piping, piping associated with
equipment over 150°C stills and reboilers
10.03 Engine and turbine exhaust Power generation, gas compression,
systems refrigeration compression, engine driven
equipment such as forklifts
10.04 Steam piping Sulphur plants, power boilers, waste heat
recovery systems, heat tracing and
jackets
11 Hot fluids
11.01 Temperatures between 100 Glycol regeneration, low quality steam
and 150°C systems, cooling oils, galley
11.02 Temperatures greater than Power boilers, steam generators, sulphur
150°C plants, waste heat recovery units, hot oil
heating systems, regeneration gases
used with catalysts and desiccants
12 Cold surfaces
12.01 Process piping between -25 Cold ambient climate, Joule-Thomson
°C and -80°C expansions (process and leaks), propane
refrigeration systems, LPG gas plants
12.02 Process piping less than - Cryogenic plants, LNG plants, LNG
80°C storage vessels including tankers, vapour
lines off liquid nitrogen storage
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 110
Hazard
Number
13 Cold Fluids
13.01 Oceans, seas and lakes Northern and Southern oceans and lakes
<10°C
14 Open Flame
14.01 Heaters with fire tube Glycol reboilers, amine reboilers, salt
bath heaters, water bath heaters (line
heaters)
14.02 Direct fire furnaces Hot oil furnace, Claus plant reaction
furnace, catalyst and desiccant
regeneration gas heaters, incinerators,
power boilers
14.03 Flares Pressure relief and blowdown systems
15 Electricity
15.01 Voltage > 50V to 440 V in Power cables, temporary electrical lines
cables on construction sites
15.02 Voltage > 50 V to 440 V in Electric motors, electric switchgear,
equipment power generation, welding machines,
transformer secondary
15.03 Voltage > 440 V Power lines, power generation,
transformer primary, large electrical
motors
15.04 Lightning discharge Major lightning prone areas
15.05 Electrostatic energy Non-metallic storage vessels and piping,
product transfer hoses, wiping rags,
unearthed equipment, aluminium / steel,
high velocity gas discharges
16 Electromagnetic Radiation
16.01 Ultraviolet radiation Arc welding, sunshine
16.02 Infrared radiation Flares
16.03 Microwaves Galley
16.04 Lasers Instrumentation, surveying
16.05 E/M radiation: High voltage Transformers, power cables
AC cables
17 Ionizing Radiation – Open Source
17.01 Alpha, Beta – open source Well logging, radiography,
densitometers, interface instruments
17.02 Gamma rays – open source Well logging, radiography
17.03 Neutron – open source Well logging
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 111
Hazard
Number
17.04 Naturally occurring ionising Scales in tubulars, vessels and process
radiation plant fluids (especially in C3 reflux
streams)
18 Ionizing Radiation – Closed Source
18.01 Alpha, Beta – closed source Well logging, radiography,
densitometers, interface instruments
18.02 Gamma rays – closed source Well logging, radiography
18.03 Neutron – closed source Well logging
19 Asphyxiates
19.01 Insufficient Oxygen Confined spaces, tanks
atmospheres
19.02 Excessive CO2 Areas with CO2 fire fighting systems
such as turbine enclosures
19.03 Drowning Working overboard, marine seismic
operations, water transport
19.04 Excessive N2 N2 purged vessels
19.05 Halon Areas with halon fire fighting systems
such as turbine enclosures and electrical
switchgear and battery rooms
19.06 Smoke Welding / burning operations, fires
20 Toxic gases
20.01 H2S, Sour Gas Sour gas production, bacterial activity in
stagnant water, confined spaces in sour
operations
20.02 Exhaust fumes Enclosed spaces
20.03 SO2 Component of H2S flare and incinerator
flue gas
20.04 Benzene Component of crude oil, concentrated in
glycol vent emissions and Wemco units
20.05 Chlorine Water treatment facilities
20.06 Welding Fumes Construction and metal fabrication /
repair, welding toxic metals (galvanised
steel, cadmium coated steel), metal
cutting, grinding
20.07 Tobacco smoke Accommodation, office buildings, boats,
aircraft
20.08 CFCs Air Conditioning, refrigeration, aerosol
sprays
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 112
Hazard
Number
21 Toxic Liquid
21.01 Mercury Electrical switches, gas filters
21.02 PCBs Transformer cooling oils
21.03 Biocides (gluteraldehyde) Water treatment systems
21.04 Methanol Gas drying and hydrate control
21.05 Brines Hydrocarbon production, well kill fluid,
packer fluids
21.06 Glycols Gas drying and hydrate control
21.07 Degreasers (terpenes) Maintenance shops
21.08 Isocyanates Two-pack paint systems
21.09 Sulphanol Gas sweetening
21.10 Amines Gas sweetening
21.11 Corrosion Inhibitors Additive to pipelines and oil/gas wells,
chromates, phosphates
21.12 Scale inhibitors Cooling and injection water additive
21.13 Liquid Mud Additives Drilling fluid additive
21.14 Odorant additives Custody transfer facilities for gas, LPG
(mercaptans) and LNG
21.15 Alcoholic beverages
21.16 Non-prescribed drugs
21.17 Used engine oils (polycyclic Used engine oils
aromatic hydrocarbons)
21.18 Carbon tetrachloride Plant laboratory
21.19 Grey and / or black water Septic systems, camps, detergents
22 Toxic Solid
22.01 Asbestos Thermal insulation and construction
materials, old roofing (encountered
during removal)
22.02 Manmade mineral fibre Thermal insulation and construction
material
22.03 Cement dust Oil well and gas well cementing, civil
construction
22.04 Sodium hypochlorite Drilling fluid additive
22.05 Powdered mud additives Drilling fluid additive
22.06 Sulphur dust Sulphur recovery plants
22.07 Pig trash Pipeline cleaning operations
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 113
Hazard
Number
22.08 Oil based muds Oil and gas well drilling
22.09 Pseudo oil based muds Oil and gas well drilling
22.10 Water based muds Oil and gas well drilling
22.11 Cement slurries Oil and gas well drilling, plant
construction
22.12 Dusts Grit blasting, sand blasting, catalyst
(dumping, screening, removal,
drumming)
22.13 Cadmium compounds and Welding fumes, handling coated bolts
other heavy metals
22.14 Oil based sludges Oil storage tank cleaning
23 Corrosive Substances
23.01 Hydrofluoric acid Well stimulation
23.02 Hydrochloric acid Well stimulation
23.03 Sulphuric acid Wet batteries, regenerant for reverse
osmosis water makers
23.04 Caustic soda Drilling fluid additive
24 Biological Hazards
24.01 Food borne bacteria (e.g. E Contaminated food
Coli)
24.02 Water borne bacteria (e.g. Cooling systems, domestic water
Legionella) systems
24.03 Parasitic insects (pin worms, Improperly cleaned food, hands,
bed bugs, lice, fleas) clothing, living sites (pin worms, bed
bugs, lice, fleas)
24.04 Cold and flu virus Other people
24.05 Human Immune deficiency Contaminated blood, blood products and
Virus (HIV) other body fluids
24.06 Other communicable Other people
diseases
25 Ergonomic Hazards
25.01 Manual materials handling Pipe handling on drill floor, sack handling
in sack store, manoeuvring equipment in
awkward locations
25.02 Damaging noise Release from relief valves, pressure
control valves
25.03 Loud, steady noises >85 Engine rooms, compressor rooms, drilling
dB(A) brake, air tools
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 114
Hazard
Number
25.04 Heat stress (high ambient Near flare, on the monkey board under
temperatures) certain conditions, in open exposed areas
in certain regions of the world during
summer
25.05 Cold stress (low ambient Open areas in winter in cold climates,
temperatures) refrigerated storage areas
25.06 High humidity Climates where sweat evaporation rates
are too low to cool the human body,
personal protective clothing
25.07 Vibration Hand tool vibration, maintenance and
construction worker, boating
25.08 Work stations Poorly designed office furniture and
poorly laid out workstations
25.09 Lighting Work areas requiring intense light, glare,
lack of contrast, insufficient light
25.10 Incompatible hand controls Controls poorly positioned in workplace
requiring workers to exert excessive
force, lacking proper labels, hand-
operated control valves, for example in
driller house, heavy machinery, control
rooms
25.11 Awkward location of Machinery difficult to maintain regularly
workplaces and machinery due to their awkward positioning, for
example, valves in an unusually high or
low position
25.12 Mismatch of work to physical Requiring older workers to maintain a
abilities high level of physical activity over the
course of an 8/12 hour day, heavy
construction work performed by slight
individuals
25.13 Mismatch of work to Requiring individuals to monitor a
cognitive abilities process without trying to reduce their
boredom by giving them a higher task
load, asking a worker to supervise
something he/ she is not qualified to do
25.14 Long and irregular working Offshore locations utilising long shift
hours / shifts cycles, overtime, night shifts, rollover
shifts
25.15 Poor organisation and job Ambiguity of job requirements, unclear
design reporting relationships, over/under
supervision, poor operator / contractor
interfaces
25.16 Work planning issues Work overload, unrealistic targets, lack
of clear planning, poor communications
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 115
Hazard
Number
25.17 Indoor climate (too hot / Uncomfortable climate for permanently
cold / dry / humid, manned areas
draughty)
26 Psychological Hazards
26.01 Living on the job /away from Homesickness, missing family and social
family events, unable to be involved in
community, feeling of isolation and
missing part of life.
26.02 Working and living on live Awareness that mistakes can be
plant catastrophic, vulnerable to the mistakes
of others, responsible for the safety of
others. Awareness of difficulty of escape
in an emergency. Awareness of risks in
helicopter travel, adverse weather
26.03 Post traumatic stress Serious incidents, injuries to self and
others
26.04 Fatigue Physically demanding or arduous work,
long or excessive working hours
26.05 Shift work Construction, operations or drilling
activities involving 24 hour working,
saturation diving operations, changing
rest and sleep patterns associated with
activities
26.06 Peer pressure Pressure from others at the work location
to behave in a manner which may affect
well-being of the individual
27 Security Related Hazards
27.01 Piracy
27.02 Assault
27.03 Sabotage
27.04 Crisis (military action, civil
disturbances, terrorism)
27.05 Theft, pilferage
28 Use of natural resources
28.01 Water Cooling water
28.03 Air Turbines, combustion engines (pump and
compressor drivers)
29 Medical
29.01 Medical unfitness Medically unfit staff for the task
29.02 Motion sickness Crew change on water, marine
operations
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 116
Hazard
Number
30 Noise
30.01 High level noise Plant areas e.g. turbines, compressors,
generators, pumps, blowdown, etc.
30.02 Intrusive noise Intrusive noise in sleeping areas, offices
and recreational areas
31 Entrapment
31.01 Fire / explosion Blockage of routes to muster location or
contamination of muster area
31.02 Mechanical damage Objects blocking access / escape routes
31.03 Diving Snagging of lines / umbilicals
Considered to be a Major Hazard under ISO 17776. However, this may

not constitute a Major Accident Hazard that is the focus of the HSE
Case, e.g. falls from height, electrical voltage etc., are considered to be
health hazards and shall be the subject of a separate health risk
assessment.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 117
Appendix 4
-
Typical Hazards and Effects
Register
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 118
RISK RANKING ACCORDING TO RAM
L C R L C R L C R L C R
Barriers Remedial
Ref Hazard Barrier
Source Threats Top Event Consequence (HSE Risk Action to
No. Description Effectiveness
Controls) achieve ALARP
P A E R
H-01 Hydrocarbons (Unrefined)
Pressure,
Vacuum
Corrosion
Erosion
Temperature
Material Fatigue
Fire
Seal failure
Explosion
Overfilling
Flowlines Injury /
Environmental
Crude Oil Pipelines fatality
H- Loads Loss of Facility HSE M
under Pressure Severe C 5 C 5 C 5 C 5
01.01 jack ups / rigs / Containment Case H
Pressure Vessels environmenta
lift barges etc
Piping l impact
adjacent to the
Structural
platform
loss / damage
Structural
support
apparatus
failure
External impact
/ boat collision
Corrosion
Fire
Erosion
Explosion
Overpressure
Environmenta
Temperature
Pressure l impact
H- Condensate, Fatigue Loss of Facility HSE M
Vessels Injury C 5 C 5 C 1 C 4
01.05 NGL Seal / Containment Case H
Piping Structural
Connection
loss / damage
failure
Loss of
Maintenance
stability
External Impact
Corrosion
Erosion Fire
Overpressure Explosion
Vacuum Environmenta
Pipelines
Temperature l impact
H- Hydrocarbon Pressure Loss of Facility HSE M
Fatigue Injury C 5 C 5 C 1 C 4
01.06 Gas Vessels Containment Case H
Maintenance Structural
Piping
Seal & loss / damage
Connection Loss of
failure stability
External Impact
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 119
RISK RANKING ACCORDING TO RAM
L C R L C R L C R L C R
Barriers Remedial
Ref Hazard Barrier
Source Threats Top Event Consequence (HSE Risk Action to
No. Description Effectiveness
Controls) achieve ALARP
P A E R
H-02 Hydrocarbons (Refined)
Mishandling
Engines Inadequate
and packaging /
Irritation to
rotating container
skin / eyes
equipme Maintenance
H- Lube and Seal Irritation to Health Risk
nt (gas Corrosion Spill D 1 D 1 D 1 D 1
02.01 Oil respiratory Assessment
compress Gaskets / joints
tract
or, mechanical
Fire
pumps, failure
etc) Tank leak
Human error
Mishandling
External impact Fire
Corrosion Irritation to
Diesel Erosion skin / eyes
Storage Gasket / Irritation to
H- Engines mechanical Loss of respiratory Health Risk
Diesel fuel D 1 D 1 D 1 D 1
02.04 (EDG, failure Containment tract Assessment
FW Faulty Chronic
Pump) equipment health effect
Maintenance Environmenta
Level control l impact
failure
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 120
Appendix 5
-
Example Bowtie Analysis
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 121
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 122
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 123
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 124
Appendix 6
-
Example list of Safety Critical
Elements
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 125
MAH Bowties
Hydrocarbon in Formation (Platform wells)

H08.03 Loss of Control – Marine Collision
Hydrocarbon under pressure in Pipelines

Hydrocarbon under pressure in Topside
H07.02 Object Under Compression –
Topside, Jacket and Substructure
H01.01b Loss of Containment –

H01.01a Loss of Containment –
H01.02 Loss of Containment –
Present References e.g.

SCE PS
Safety Critical Elements on Operating
Group Code
Facility Manual
Consequence
equipment
and Risers
/ Impact
√ DS001 Fire and Gas Detection √

Detection DS002 Security Systems NA
Systems
Water in Condensate / Gas (Dewpoint)
DS003 NA
Measurement
Temporary Refuge / Primary Muster
√ ER001 √
Areas
√ Emergenc ER002 Escape and Evacuation Routes √
y
√ ER003 Emergency / Escape Lighting √
Response
√ ER004 Communication Systems √
√ ER005 Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) √
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 126
MAH Bowties



Present References e.g.

SCE PS
Safety Critical Elements on Operating
Group Code
Facility Manual
Consequence
equipment
and Risers
/ Impact
√ ER006 Helicopter Facilities √

ER007 Emergency Power NA
ER008 Manual Fire Fighting Equipment NA
ER009 Process Controls and Alarms NA
√ ER010 Open Hazardous Drains System √
√ ER011 Open Non-Hazardous Drains System √
Ignition IC001 Hazardous Area Ventilation NA
Control
√ IC002 Non-Hazardous Area Ventilation √
√ IC003 Certified Electrical Equipment √

/ Impact
REVISION 1.0

equipment
and Risers
Consequence
DOCUMENT NO :
EP HSE SG 02 12
SCE
Group
PS
Code
IC004
DATE:
FEBRUARY 2014
MAH Bowties
Safety Critical Elements
Cargo Tanks Inert Gas System

127
NA
on
Facility
Present
HSE CASE
Manual
Operating
References e.g.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 128
Appendix 7
-
Example Manual Of Permitted
Operations (MOPO) and
Simultaneous Operations
(SIMOPS)
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 129
SAFETY CRITCAL ELEMENTS
2ooN in voting system & 1ooN in non-

compromised (known leaks such that
Compromised (known leaks, reduced

compromised (known leaks in tanker
in impaired functionality e.g. 2ooN in
Earth Grounding and Bonding fails to
Helideck FW/Foam supply unavailble

Pig Launcher / Receiver Containment
ignition systems resulting in flare out

flow rateresulting in increased risk of
Loss of F&G (fire and flammable gas)
Loss or unavailability of Gaseous Fire

meet the PS requirement resulting in
equipment resulting in increased risk

Certified Electrical Equipment fails to
dew point measurement resulting in

Loss of bilge / ballast control leading
detection and end element resulting
Loss of Power Management System

resulting in increased risk of ignition
Loss of primary and secondary flare

handling system failure) resulting in
Inability to provide the required gas

loading system) - FPSO offtake unit
furnace tube wall thickness beyond
METOCEAN Data Gathering System

Loss of F&G detection - fusible plug
flow to the flare header resulting in
blast wall resulting in increased risk

Observed or detected defect in the

Total loss of F&G Detection system
increased corrosion rate, increased

Integrity - Compromised (pressure
damaged, plugged, or missing, hot
FW Delivery - local unavailability of

defect resulting in increased risk of
defect resulting in increased risk of
drilling systems structural integrity
unavailable - (damaged, removed,

element resulting in impaired local
detection end element resulting in
FW Supply unavailable - all pumps

Loss of Water in condensate / Gas
Rotating Equipment Containment
gas tight walls / floor fails to meet
meet PS requirements resulting in
loop unavailable leading to loss of
leading to increased risk of loss of

Inability to provide fuel gas purge
of failure in the event of an MAH.

risk of hydrate formation causing
chemical injection flow leading to

e.g. derrick, heave compensation
Observed or detected stuctural /
(<n+1) - (1 pump not available in

MAH, e.g. pipe / vessel supports,
unavailable resulting in increased

Integrity - Compromised (known
Loss of Gas (Toxic) detection end
Loss of access control to facilities

Ventilation impaired - loss of gas
functionality e.g. 2ooN in voting

wall thickness beyond allowable
wall thickness beyond allowable
FW Supply - Loss of redundancy

Observed or detected structural
Observed or detected structural
completion string, casing / liner,

Unavailability of Relief at design
Inability to provide the required

Total loss of gas blanket system
HVAC Shutdown - unavailable -
Observed or detected defect or
Flame / Spark Arrestor element

Observed or detected defect to
impaired local functionality e.g.
Fine Water Spray system - local

well intervention / Well control
ignition control equipment e.g.

to impaired vessel stability and
unavailable - (fans / dampers /
Passive Fire Protection - locally
Process Area FW/Foam supply

Unavailability of the BMS / IPS
Compromised (known leaks in
Loss of sprinkler system - local

(dampers / fan(s)) resulting in
not available, loss of FW tank,

mechanical defect resulting in
Navigational Aids unavailable

HVAC Shutdown - loss of gas
increased risk of MAH due to
Total loss of sprinkler system
Loss of sand filters leading to

mooring system (e.g. anchor
(dampers / detectors etc not

Hazardous Area Ventilation -
2x100% or 3x50% or 4x33%

Cargo tanks inert gas system
gauge / transmitter faulty or
Deluge system - Local (area)

HSE CASE
resulting in increased risk of
fire detction in specific area
Collision Avoidance System

detection and end element
equipment e.g. Rams, load
detectors etc not working)

MAH due to overpressure
blanket flow to individual
the FW distribution main

increased risk of ignition
increased risk of ignition
increased corrosion rate

Containment Integrity -
Containment integrity -
leaks, seal failure, etc.,)
increased erosion rates

MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS
increased risk of MAH
air ingress to the flare
Suppression System
SCE FAILURE MODE
SCE FAILURE MODE
SCE FAILURE MODE
SCE FAILURE MODE
SCE FAILURE MODE
main power supply

Activities and SCEs
risk of ignition
voting system
unavailability
unavailability
XXXX Operations
unavailabilty
unavailable
unavailable
unavailable
caisson etc
working)
MAH
etc)
doors, walls and penetrations)
Structures subsea / Vessel hull
Miscellaneous Ignition Control

PC008 Operational Well Containment
Explosion protection including

/ GBS / Foundation Structures
PS003 Helideck Fire Fighting Systems

IC004 Cargo Tanks Inert Gas System
IC003 Certified Electrical Equipment
DETECTION SYSTEMS (FIELD)
PS010 Power Management System

Caissons, Tank and support)
Caissons, Tank and support)

PC011 Floating Production Storage
Passive Fire Protection (incl.
METOCEAN Data Gathering

IC001 Hazardous Area Ventilation
IC001 Hazardous Area Ventilation
PS015 Collision Avoidance System

PS013 Chemical Injection Systems
Water in condensate / Gas
(dewpoint) measurement
Other distribution system
PS008 Fine Water Spray systems

PROCESS CONTAINMENT
Gaseous Fire Suppression

PS002 blast barriers and venting
Tanker Loading Systems -
Fire Water Ring Main and

IC007 Inert Gas Blanket System
IC007 Inert Gas Blanket System
Fixed Process Area Foam

STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
IC009 Flare Tip ignition System

Well Intervention / Well
PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Bilge, Ballast and Cargo
Fire Water Pumps (inc.

IC006 Fuel Gas Purge System
Management Systems
DS001 Fire and Gas Detection

PC010 Gas Tight Floor / Walls
Management System)
Heavy Lift Cranes and
Fired Heaters (Burner

PC001-6 Process Containment
PC001/6 Process Containment
PC003 Process Containment
Non Hazardous Area
Non Hazardous Area

SI003 Mechanical Handling
IGNITION CONTROL
Helicopter Refueling
Offtake (FPSO) unit
Control Equipment
SI002 Topside Structure
PS009 Sprinkler Systems

SI006 Mooring Systems
PS014 Navigational Aids

DS002 Security Systems
SI007 Drilling Systems
PS001 Deluge Systems

IC005 Earth Bonding
PC007 Relief System
PC009 Fired Heaters
Components
PS012 Sand Filters

Equipment
Equipment
Ventilation
Ventilation
provisions
System
System
System
PC009
PC012
PC013
DS003
PS004
PS004
PS005
PS006
PS007
PS011
PS016
SI001
SI004
IC002
IC002
IC008
DS
PC
PS
IC
SI
NORMAL ACTIVITIES
A1 Operate Specific Process Unit / Specific Process / Equipment P P A P P P N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N P P P P A P N P N N P P P P P P P A P P
A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process Equipment P P A P P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P N N P A P P P N P P P N P N A P P P A P N P P P P P P P P P P A P P
A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A4 Function Testing of ESD system A A A A A A P P P P A A A A P P A A A P P A A A N A A A A P P P P A A A A A A N A A A A A A P A A A A A A
A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations P P A P P P N N N N A N N N N N A N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N A P N P N P P P P P P P A A P P
A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations P P A P P P P P P N A P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P N P P P N N P N P P N P P P P P P A A P P
A7 Well production testing P P A P P P N N N N P A A A A A NA A A N N N A N N A N A A N N N N A A P A A A N A A A P P P A P P A A P P
A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) P P A P P P N N N N A A A A A A A A A N N N A N P A A A A P N P N A A P A A A N A A A P P P A P A A A A A
A9 Pigging Operations P P A P P P N N N N A A A A A A A A A N N N A N N N N P A P N P N A A P A A A N A P A P P P A P A A A P P
A10 Crane Operation / Lifting (sea lifts) P P N P N P N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A P P P
A11 Crane Operation / Lifting (inboard lifts) P P N P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N N A N A A A A A P P P P A A P A A A P A P A P P P A P A A P P P
A12 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) within 500m exclusion zone including mooring P P A P N P N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P
A13 Bunkering (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) P P P P P P N N N N A A A A A A A A A N N P A P A A A P A P P P P A A P A A A N A A A P P P A P A A P A P
A14 Bunkering (potable water) P P P P P P A A A NA A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P
A15 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) P P A P N P N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A P A A A A P A A A N A N A A A A A A A A A A N A P
A16 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) P P A P N P N N N P A A A A A N A A A P P N A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N A A A P P P A P A A N A A
A17 Boat transfer to/from platform (via swing rope, basket, etc) P P P P N P N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A P A P
A18 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV P P A P P P P P P N N A A A A A N A A N N A A A A A A A A P N P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A19 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) P P A P P P N N N P A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A A A P A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A20 Emergency Drill / Exercise A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A21 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A P P P P A A A A A N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A
A22 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) - Anchor handling outside 500m zone A A A NA A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P
A23 Functional Test of FW Pumps P P A P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A
A24 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N N A N P A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A25 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N N A N P A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A26 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A27 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc P P A P P P N N N N A A A A A A A A A P P P A P P P P A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A28 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops P P A P P P N N N N A A A A A A A A A P P P A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A29 Sump pump operations - emptying sump caisson P P A P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A P P P P P A A A P A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A30 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel P P A P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A P P P P P A A A P A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
OTHER ACTIVITIES (inc 3rd party)
B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) P P N P P P N N N N A A A A A A A A A N N N A N N N N P A P N P N A A P A A A N A P A P P P A P A A A A P
B2 NDT P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B3 Receipt (inc lifting) and storage of Radioactive Material (e.g. for radiography work) P P N P N P N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P
B4 Radiography work P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B5 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A P P N N A A A A A A A A P N P N A A P A A P N P P A P P P A P A A A A A
B7 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A P N P N A A P A A P N P P A P P P A P A A A A A
B8 Coldwork P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B9 Abseiling (working above open sea) P P A P N P N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P
B10 Erecting and removal of scaffold (including overside work) P P A P N P N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P
B11 Mooring of shuttle tanker to FSO/FPSO and SBM (export mooring) P P A P N P N N N A A A A A N A A A A N N A P A A A A P A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A P
B12 Diving operations in close proximity A A A A N A N N N A A A A A N A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P
B13 ROV A A A A N A N N N A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P
B14 Choke Valve bean up or down P P A P P P N N N N N A A A A A A A A N N N A N N A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B15 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) P P A P P P N N N A N A A A A A N A A N N N A N A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B16 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure P P A P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A P A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A P P P A P A A A A A
B17 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal P P A P P P N N N N N A A A A A N A A N N N A N P A A A A N N N N A A P A A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A
B18 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation P P A P P P N N N A N A A A A A N A A N N N A N P A A A A N N N N A A P A A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A
B19 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations P P A P P P N N N N N A A A A A N A A N N N A N P A A A A N N N N A A P A A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A
B20 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) P P A P P P N N N N N A A A A A N A A N N N A N P A A A A N N N N A A P A A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A A
B21 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B22 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B23 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A P P N N N P N N N N A A P P P P A A P A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A
B24 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) P P A P P P N N N N A A A A A A A A A N N A P A P P P A A P P P P A A P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A
B25 Other Maintenance (HVAC, relief valves, turbines) P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N P A P P A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B26 Hook up and commissioning P P A P P P N N N N A A A A A A A P P N N N N N N N N P P N N N N A P N P A P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A
B27 Manned presence on NUI P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N N A N A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B29 Working at Heights P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P
B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P
B31 TEMPSC / Life raft maintenance and testing (sea trial) P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P
B32 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain P P A P P P A A A P A A A A A A A A A N N N A N N N N P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B33 Topside Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B34 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B35 Stuck Pig Retrieval P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N N A N N N N P A P P P P A A P A A A A A A A P P P A P A A A A P
B36 Local Venting P P A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
B37 Black Start Up P P A P P P N N N P A A A A A A A P P N N N P N N P N P N P P P P A N N P A N N N N N N N N N N A A N P P
B38 Rig (e.g. Jack-up, tender assisted, etc.) move in / out P P P P N P N N N A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A P
B39 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NIGHT ACTIVITIES
C1 Night Time Working P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A P P P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
C2 Extended stay over night P P A P P P N N N A A A A A A A A A A P P P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
C3 Night Helicopter Operations P P A P N P N N N A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N A A A A A A A A A A N A N
C4 Night Marine Operations within 500m exclusion zone inc mooring N P A NA N P N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A P
C5 Night Heavy Lifting (sea lifts, inboard lifts etc) N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
LEGEND NOTES
A Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW
P Activity permitted subject to suitable risk assessment and OIM/ Plant Manager approval
N Activity not permitted in these circumstances
NA Not applicable
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 130
redundancy (<n+1) - (1 Generator not

meeting Performance Standard - (not
Basic Process Control system (BPCS) -

Local or partial loss of the ESD system
(structural damage, muster areas not
(structural damage, muster areas not

Performance Standard - (not closing,
BOP, insufficient mud weight, loss of
e.g. on-site burns treatment facilities

Shore Communications - unavailable
injection well or annulus resulting in
Temporary Refuge / Primary Muster
damaged (e.g. light not working etc)

meeting the performance standards
closing, not closing fast enough, not
provide emergency power supply to
TEMPSC - unavailable - (all units not

TEMPSC - loss of redundancy - (one
Life Jackets below minimum level or
unavailable markings, lighting, nets,
Tank bunding observed or detected

Loss of Drilling Well Control - loss of
not closing fast enough, not sealing
Total loss of Utility / Instrument Air
Area - unavailable / compromised -
PAGA system - Loss of redundancy
the 2x100% systems not available)
Life Buoys below minimum level or

SCSSV, SSV not closing, not closing
Alternate Means of Escape - locally

UPS - Loss of redundancy - (one of
standard - (not closing, not closing
Insufficient number or inadequate
Medical Response cannot be met -

defect resulting in loss or impaired
Emergency Power Supply - Loss of
Closed Drain System - Unavailable
Safety Shower / eyewash stations

Loss of operational well isolation -
(one of the systems not available)

fast enough, not sealing properly)
mud pump, incorrect mud weight

isolate steam / water / gas / WAG
Individual Process SIF unavailable
boat not available in a 2x100% or

Audio Visual Alarms - unavailable
Portable BA sets below minimum

Manual Fire Fighting Equipment -
fast enough, not sealing properly
Loss of well isolation - inability to
Spill Containment (e.g. booms) -

Escape route - locally unavailable
(Topsides / onshore) system not
Portable BA sets / Smoke Hoods

SSIV - not meeting performance
unavailable - liferafts / Scramble

available, loss of distribution etc
Aviation VHF radio - unavailable
Hose reels / monitors / portable

extinguishers locally unavailable
nets / Ladders / knotted ropes /

SDV (Topsides / Onshore) - not
Standby vessel (inc crew boat) -

detected damage / defective or
Helicopter facilities observed or
unavailable - all generators not
below minimum level or faulty
type of Chemical PPE available

HIPPS system not meeting the
performance standard (loss of
Evacuation route - unavailable
UPS - Unavailable - Inability to
available in 2x100% or 3x50%

Local or partial loss of the EDP
Local or partial loss of Utility /
Personal H2S monitors below

redundancy in SDV, Pressure
unavailable / compromised -
level (SCBA and Rescue Sets)
LS002 Vessel / Man Overboard boat / unavailable - (not present or

Bunding and Drains (Hazardous Closed Drain system - locally
Total loss of the EDP system
HSE CASE
Bunding and Drains (Hazardous Open Drain System - Totally

Bunding and Drains (Hazardous Open Drain System - locally
VHF Channels - unavailable
Emergency lighting - locally
PAGA system - unavailable
Marine Radio - unavailable
not available or inoperable

Total loss of HIPPS system
Emergency Power Supply

Alternate Muster Points -
e.g. low low level trip, etc
insufficent or unavailable
SDV (Riser) - not meeting
response time too slow)

Total loss of ESD system
secondary containment
minimum level or faulty

MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS
3x50% configuration)
SCE FAILURE MODE
SCE FAILURE MODE
SCE FAILURE MODE

Transmitters, etc)
essential systems
Activities and SCEs
sealing properly)
Instrument Air
(escape sets)
XXXX Operations
Unavailable
unavailable
unavailable
unavailable
unavailable
unavailable
clear, etc)
available)
damaged
clear etc)
etc.
Bunding and Drains (Hazardous
Bunding and Drains (Hazardous

ER005 Uninterruptable Power Supply
ER005 Uninterruptable Power Supply

SD007 Subsea Isolation Valves (SSIV)
EMERGENCY RESPONSE - EER

Emergency Shutdown Valves
Personal Survival Equipment
Rescue Facilities (in. Standby

Emergency Depressurisation
Emergency Depressurisation
LS004 (Liferafts, scramble nets and

ER003 Emergency / Escape Lighting
generation and distribution)
generation and distribution)

Emergency Shutdown (ESD)
Emergency Shutdown (ESD)
Emergency Communication
ER009 Process Control and Alarms
Alternate Means of Escape

Rescue Facilities (Medical /
SD004 Operational Well Isolation
SD004 Operational Well Isolation
Temporary Refuge (TR) /
Temporary Refuge (TR) /
ER006 markings, nets, obstacle

SD005 Pipeline Isolation Valves
Helicopter facilities (inc.

High Integrity Pressure

SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS
Emergency Power (inc

Primary Muster Areas
Primary Muster Areas
marking / lighting etc)

Internal, External and
and Non-hazardous)
and Non-hazardous)
and Non-hazardous)
and Non-hazardous)
and Non-hazardous)
Manual Fire Fighting
System (Blowdown)
System (Blowdown)
Drilling Well Control
LS003 TEMPSC / Lifeboats
LS003 TEMPSC / Lifeboats

Protection System
Protection System
Fast Rescue Craft)

ER011 Oil Spill Response
first aid facilities)

Control System
Control System
ladders to sea)
ER002 Escape Routes
ER002 Escape Routes
LIFE SAVING
Equipment
Equipment
SD009 Utility Air
SD009 Utility Air

(ESDVs)
(PSE)
(PSE)
(PSE)
(PSE)
(PSE)
(PSE)
(PSE)
SD001
SD001
SD002
SD002
SD003
SD003
SD006
SD008
ER001
ER001
ER004
ER004
ER004
ER004
ER004
ER004
ER007
ER007
ER008
ER010
ER010
ER010
ER010
ER010
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS002
SD
ER
LS
NORMAL ACTIVITIES
A1 Operate Specific Process Unit / Specific Process / Equipment P N N N N N N N N N P N P N P P N N P P P P P P P P P A P P P N N N P P P P P A N N N P P P P N N P N N
A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process Equipment P N P N N N P P N N P A P N P P N N P P P P P P P P P A P P P P N N P P P P P A P P P P P P A P P P P P
A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N P P N P N N A P P
A4 Function Testing of ESD system P N P N N N A A N N N A P N P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A N N N N N N P N N P N N
A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations N N N N N N A A N N N A P N P P N N P P P P P P P P N A P N P N N N N N P P P P N N N N N N P N N P N N
A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations P N P N N N A A P N P A P P P P N N P P P P P P P P N A P N P N N N N N P P P A N N N N N N P N N P N N
A7 Well production testing P N P N N N A P P N P A P N P P N P P P P P P P P P P A P P P P N N A A A A A A N N N N N N P N N P N N
A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) P N P N N N A A P N P A P N P P N N P P P P P P P A A A A A P P N N P P P P P A N N N N N N P N N P N N
A9 Pigging Operations P N P N N N A A P N P A P N P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A P P N N P P P P P A N N N N N N N N N P N N
A10 Crane Operation / Lifting (sea lifts) P N P N N N A A N N N A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N P N N
A11 Crane Operation / Lifting (inboard lifts) P N P N N N A A P N P A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P N N P N N
A12 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) within 500m exclusion zone including mooring A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P A A P P P P P
A13 Bunkering (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) P N P N N N A A A N A A P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A P A P P P P P P P A P P P P P P P N A A A A
A14 Bunkering (potable water) A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A
A15 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N P N N
A16 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N P N N
A17 Boat transfer to/from platform (via swing rope, basket, etc) A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P A A N N A N N
A18 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV P N P N N N N N N N N NA P N P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A N N N N N P P N N P N N
A19 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A A N P P P P
A20 Emergency Drill / Exercise A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N N P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A21 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A A A A A A A P P A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N N A N N
A22 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) - Anchor handling outside 500m zone A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A23 Functional Test of FW Pumps A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N A N N
A24 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) A P A P P P A A P P P A A A P P N N P P P P P P P A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N N N N P N N
A25 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) A P A P P P A A P P P A A A P P N N P P P P P P P A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N N N N P N N
A26 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) A P A P P P A A P P P A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N P N N
A27 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc P N P N N N A A N N N A A P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A P A P P A A A A A A N N N N N N N N N P N N
A28 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops A P A P P P A A P P P A A P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N N N N P N N
A29 Sump pump operations - emptying sump caisson A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P A P P
A30 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P A P P
B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) P N P N N N A A N N N A P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A P A N N P P P P P A N N N N N N N N N P N N
B2 NDT A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P N N P N N
B3 Receipt (inc lifting) and storage of Radioactive Material (e.g. for radiography work) A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N A N N
B4 Radiography work A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P N A N N P N N
B5 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) A P A P P P A A P P P A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N A N N A N N
B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) A P A P P P A A P P P A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N A N N P N N
B7 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N A N N P N N
B8 Coldwork A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N A N N P N N
B9 Abseiling (working above open sea) A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N A N N A N N
B10 Erecting and removal of scaffold (including overside work) P P P P P P A A P P P A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N A N N P N N
B11 Mooring of shuttle tanker to FSO/FPSO and SBM (export mooring) A P A P P P A A P P P A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N A A N N P N N
B12 Diving operations in close proximity A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P A A N A A A A
B13 ROV A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A
B14 Choke Valve bean up or down P P P P P P N N P P P A P N P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A N N N N N N A N N P N N
B15 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) A P A P P P N N P P P NA P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A N N N N N N A N N P N N
B16 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure A P A P P P A A P P P A A P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A P P P P P N A N N P N N
B17 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal N N P P P P N N P P P NA P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A N N N N N N P N N P N N
B18 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation N N P P P P N N P P P NA P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A N N N N N N P N N P N N
B19 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations N N P P P P N N P P P NA P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A N N N N N N P N N P N N
B20 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) N N P P P P N N P P P NA P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A N N N N N N P N N P N N
B21 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B22 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B23 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing A P A P P P A A P P P A P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N P N N P N N
B24 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) A P A P P P A A P P P A P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A N N N N N N A N N P N N
B25 Other Maintenance (HVAC, relief valves, turbines) A P A P P P A A P P P A P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N A N N P N N
B26 Hook up and commissioning N N N N N N A A N N N A N N P P N P P P P P P P P P N A P N P N N N P P P P P A N N N N N N P N N P N N
B27 Manned presence on NUI A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N A N N P N N
B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval A P A P P P A A P P P A P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N P N N P N N
B29 Working at Heights A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P N A N N P N N
B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P A N N A N N
B31 TEMPSC / Life raft maintenance and testing (sea trial) A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N
B32 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain A P A P P P A A P P P A P N P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P N P P P P
B33 Topside Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N A N N P N N
B34 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) A P A P P P A A P P P A P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N P N N P N N
B35 Stuck Pig Retrieval P P P P P P A A P P P A P P P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A N N P P P P P A N N N N N N P N N P N N
B36 Local Venting P P P P P P A A P P P A P P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A N N N N N N P N P P P P
B37 Black Start Up N N N N N N A A N N N A N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N P P N N N N N P P P P P A N N N N N N P N N N N N
B38 Rig (e.g. Jack-up, tender assisted, etc.) move in / out P P P P P P A A P P P A P P N P N N P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P N N P N N
B39 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NIGHT ACTIVITIES
C1 Night Time Working A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N N P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P N N A N N
C2 Extended stay over night A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N N P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N N N N A N N
C3 Night Helicopter Operations A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N P N N
C4 Night Marine Operations within 500m exclusion zone inc mooring P P P P P P A A P P P A A A P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N A N N
C5 Night Heavy Lifting (sea lifts, inboard lifts etc) N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
LEGEND
NA Not applicable
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 131
INFLUENCES ACTIVITIES
Other Platform / Operation Interfaces - Unplanned Shutdown on other facility affecting
Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger
Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) - Anchor handling outside
Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers,

Other Platform / Operation Interfaces - Emergency / incident on other facility affecting
PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch
M3 ER Team Members - Competent persons not available to fill ER team member position
3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter,
Other Platform / Operation Interfaces - Planned shutdown on other facility affecting
Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) within 500m exclusion
B22 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)
B3 Receipt (inc lifting) and storage of Radioactive Material (e.g. for radiography work)
Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc
B33 Topside Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out
Local Emergency Crisis Center LECC - Competent persons not available to fill LECC
M1 HSE Critical Position - Competent persons not available to fill HSE Critical Position
Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads (to be reviewed on an operation

A25 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc)
B7 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc)
A24 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc)
W5 High winds - Cease Operations / Abandon Platform Level (V < xx m/s)
W8 High swells - Cease Operations / Abandon Platform Level (h < xx m)
B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc)
B11 Mooring of shuttle tanker to FSO/FPSO and SBM (export mooring)
C4 Night Marine Operations within 500m exclusion zone inc mooring

W1 Adverse Weather (including monsoon (heavy rain), lightning, etc)
M2 ER Medic - Insufficient number of medics available on the facility
A28 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops
B18 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation

W10 Low Visibility - Severely Impaired Operations (xx m < l < xx m)
B17 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal
B21 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)

A1 Operate Specific Process Unit / Specific Process / Equipment
A17 Boat transfer to/from platform (via swing rope, basket, etc)
A30 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel
B10 Erecting and removal of scaffold (including overside work)
B19 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations

HSE CASE
B16 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure
B31 TEMPSC / Life raft maintenance and testing (sea trial)
B38 Rig (e.g. Jack-up, tender assisted, etc.) move in / out

W11 Low Visibility - Almost Zero Visibility Level (l < xx m)
B20 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc)
B25 Other Maintenance (HVAC, relief valves, turbines)

A19 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc)
A29 Sump pump operations - emptying sump caisson

W4 High winds - Warning Level (xx m/s < V < xx m/s)
SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS (SIMOPS)

W9 Low Visibility - Degraded Level (xx m < l < xx m)
A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations

W3 High winds - Alert Level (xx m/s < V < xx m/s)
C5 Night Heavy Lifting (sea lifts, inboard lifts etc)

A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection
W7 High swells - Warning Level (xx m < h < xx m)
A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations

Activities and Influences
B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing

A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process Equipment
B32 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain

W6 High swells - Alert Level (xx m < h < xx m)
A15 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off)
B24 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic)

XXXX Operations
A11 Crane Operation / Lifting (inboard lifts)
B5 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry)
B12 Diving operations in close proximity

W2 High Ambient Temperature (>50°C)
B9 Abseiling (working above open sea)

A18 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV
A21 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump)

A8 Sampling (No blowdown required)
A10 Crane Operation / Lifting (sea lifts)

CRITICAL MANPOWER UNAVAILABILITY
A16 Helicopter Operations (refuelling)

A4 Function Testing of ESD system
B1 Pigging operations (intelligent)

positions or LECC not available
B14 Choke Valve bean up or down

A23 Functional Test of FW Pumps
A13 Bunkering (Diesel, Jet A1 etc)
B26 Hook up and commissioning
C3 Night Helicopter Operations

B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval
A14 Bunkering (potable water)
B27 Manned presence on NUI

A20 Emergency Drill / Exercise
C2 Extended stay over night

A7 Well production testing
zone including mooring

P1 Intrusion (500m zone)
purging / gas freeing
C1 Night Time Working

B29 Working at Heights
A9 Pigging Operations
B4 Radiography work
B35 Stuck Pig Retrieval

NORMAL ACTIVITIES
B37 Black Start Up

metering, etc)
specific basis)
ADVERSE WEATHER
B36 Local Venting

FIELD INTERFACES
NIGHT ACTIVITIES
500m zone
operations
operations
operations
voids, etc)
B8 Coldwork
gear, etc)
B13 ROV
B2 NDT
etc
PUBLIC
A12
A22
A26
A27
B15
B23
B34
B39
M4
O1
O2
O3
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 NORMAL ACTIVITIES
P P A A P N A P N A P P P P P P N A P A1 Operate Specific Process Unit / Specific Process / Equipment
P P A A P N A P N A P P A A P P P A P A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process Equipment A
P P P A P N A P N A P P A A A A N A A A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A A
P P P P P N P P N A P P A A P N N P N A4 Function Testing of ESD system A A A
P P P P P N P P N A A A A A P N N P N A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A A A A
P P P P P N P P N A P P A A P N N P N A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A A A A A
P P P A P N A P N A P P A A P P N P P A7 Well production testing A A A N P P
P P P A P N A P N A P P A A A N N P N A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A A A N N A A
P P P P N N A P N A P P P P P P N P P A9 Pigging Operations P P A N N N A A
P N P P N N P N N A P N A A A N P P N A10 Crane Operation / Lifting (sea lifts) A A A A A A A A A
P N P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N A11 Crane Operation / Lifting (inboard lifts) P P A P P P P P P A
P P A P N N P N N P P N A A A P P P P A12 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) within 500m exclusion zone including mooring A A A P A A A A A A A
P N P P N N P N N A P N A A A N N P N A13 Bunkering (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A A A N A A A A A N P P
P P P P P N P N N A P N A A A P A P P A14 Bunkering (potable water) A A A A A A A A A N P P P
P P A P N N A P P P N N A A A P A P P A15 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A A A N P A A A A A A A A A
P N A P N N A P N P N N A A A P N P P A16 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A A A N P A A A A A A A N A N
P P A P P N P N N P P N A A A N A P N A17 Boat transfer to/from platform (via swing rope, basket, etc) A A A A A A A A A N A N N N N N
P P P P P N A P N A P P A A A N N P N A18 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A A A P P A A A A A P A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P N A A P A A A P N P P A19 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A A A A A A A A A P P A A A P P A A
P N P P N N A N N A P P A A N N A P N A20 Emergency Drill / Exercise A A A N N N A A A A A A A A A A A N A
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N A21 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A A A N N N A A A A P A A A A P A A A A
P P A P N N P P N A P P A A A P A P P A22 Marine Operations (Supply Boat, Standby Vessel, Barge, etc) - Anchor handling outside 500m zone A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N P P N A23 Functional Test of FW Pumps A A A N N N A A A A P A A A A P A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N A24 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) N P A N N P P A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N A25 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) N P A N N P A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N A26 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) N A A N N P A A A A P A A A P P A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A P N P P A27 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A A A P P A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N A28 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops P P A N N N P A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N P P N A P P A A A P N P P A29 Sump pump operations - emptying sump caisson A A A P P P A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N P N N A P P A A A P N P P A30 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel A A A P P P A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P N A P P P P P P N P P B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) P P A N N N A A A A P A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P P N A P N A P P A A A N P P N B2 NDT A A A N N N A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P N N N N N N A P N A A P N P P N B3 Receipt (inc lifting) and storage of Radioactive Material (e.g. for radiography work) A A A N N N A A A A A N N N N N N A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P N A P N A A P N P P N B4 Radiography work N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N N N N N N A N N N N N N N N N N N
P P P P P N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B5 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) N P A N N P A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) P P A N N P P N N A P A P P A A A N P A A A N N N A N N P P N A A N P
P P P P P N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B7 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) P P A N N P P P P A P A P P A A A N P A A A A P P A P P P P P A A N A A
P P P P P N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B8 Coldwork P P A N P P P A A A P A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A
P P P N N N P N N A P N A A A N P P N B9 Abseiling (working above open sea) A A A N N N A A A P A P P P A A P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A
P N P P N N P N N A P N A A A N P P N B10 Erecting and removal of scaffold (including overside work) A A A N N N A A A P P P P P A A P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A
P P A P N N P N N P N N A A A P P P P B11 Mooring of shuttle tanker to FSO/FPSO and SBM (export mooring) A A A N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A P P
P P A P N N P N N P P N A A A N P P N B12 Diving operations in close proximity A A A P P P A A A P A N N N A A N P A A P N P A A A A A P A A A A N A A A A P P P
P P A P N N P N N P P N A A A N A P N B13 ROV A A A P P P A A A P A N N N A A N P A A P N P A A A A A P A A A A N A A A A P P P N
P P P P P N A P N A P P A A A P N P P B14 Choke Valve bean up or down A A A N P P A A A A P A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P A A A A A A
P P P P P N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B15 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) A A A N P P A A A A P A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P A A A A A A P
P P P P P N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B16 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure A A A N P P A A A A P A A A P P A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P A A A A A A P A
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B17 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal N P A N P P P P A A P A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P A A A A A A N N N
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B18 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation N P A N P P P P A P P A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P A A A A A A N N N N
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B19 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations N P A N P P P P A A P A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P A A A A A A N N N N N
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B20 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) N P A N P P P P A A P A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P A A A A A A N N N N N N
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B21 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B22 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B23 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing N P A N P P A A A A P A P P A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A - -
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B24 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) N P P N P P P P P A P A P P P A A N P A P A P P P A P P P P P P P N P P P P A P A A A P P P P P P P - - P
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B25 Other Maintenance (HVAC, relief valves, turbines) N P P N P P A A A A P A P P A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P A A A A A P A A P P P P - - P P
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A P N N P N B26 Hook up and commissioning N P P N P P P P P A P A P P A A A N A A P A P P P A P P A A P P P N N P P P A P P A A P P P P P P P - - P P P
P P P P P N P P N P P P P P P P N P P B27 Manned presence on NUI P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P - - P P P P
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval A A A P P P A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A N A P P A A A A A A P A A A A A A - - P P P P P
P N P P N N A P N A P P A A A N P P N B29 Working at Heights A A A N P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A - - A P A A P A
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A A N P P N B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing P A A P P P A A A N P A P P N N N P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A - - A P A A P A A
P N P N N N P N N A P N A A A N N P N B31 TEMPSC / Life raft maintenance and testing (sea trial) A A A N A A A A A N P P P P P P P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A P N N A A A P P P P - - A P A P P A A A
P P P P P N A P N A P P A A A P N P P B32 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain A A A N A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N P P P A A A A A A P A P A A A A - - P P A P P A A A A
P P P P P N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B33 Topside Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out P P A N P P P P P P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A N A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A - - P P A N P A A A A P
P P P P P N A P N A P P A A A N N P N B34 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) P P A N P P P P P A P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A N A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A - - P P A P P A A A A P A
P P P P N N A P N A P P A A P N N P N B35 Stuck Pig Retrieval N P P N N N A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A N P P A A A A A A A A N A N N A A P A A A P A P A A A A - - P P P N P P A A A P P P
P N P P P N P P N P P P P P P P N P P B36 Local Venting P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P A P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P - - P P P P P P A P P P P P P
P P P P N N P N N A P N A A P N N P N B37 Black Start Up NA NA A N A A P A A A P A A A A A A N A N A A N P P A A A A A A A A N N N N A N A A N N P A N N N N N - - N N P P P N A P N P N N N P
P N A N N N N N N N N N A A A N N P N B38 Rig (e.g. Jack-up, tender assisted, etc.) move in / out N N A N N P N N N N A A N N A A N N A N A A A P P P A A A A N A A N N A A A N A P N N A A A N N N N - - A P A N P A A A N A N A N P N
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B39 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
NIGHT ACTIVITIES
P P A P P N A P N A P P A A A P P P P C1 Night Time Working A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N A A - - A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P N -
P P A P P N A P N A P P A A A P P P P C2 Extended stay over night A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A - - A A A A P A A A A A A A A P P P - A
P P A P N N A P N N N N A A A P P P P C3 Night Helicopter Operations A A A N P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A - - A A A A P A A A A A A A A P N A - A A
P P A P N N P N N N N N A A A P P P P C4 Night Marine Operations within 500m exclusion zone inc mooring A A A N P P A A A A A NA N N A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A N A A A A A A P N N A A A P P P P - - A A A A P A A A N A A A P P N N - A A A
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N C5 Night Heavy Lifting (sea lifts, inboard lifts etc) N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N - - N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N - N N N N
LEGEND
A Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW NOTES
NA Not applicable
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 132
available in 2x100% or 3x50% or 4x33% configuration)

without approved temporary repairs (wraps/ clamps))
Containment Integrity - compromised (known leaks in
Containment Integrity - compromised (known leaks in
FW Supply - Loss of redundancy (<n+1) - (1 pump not
mud weight, loss of mud pump, incorrect mud weight

in completion string, casing / liner, production packer,
increased risk of RTA or increased consequence if one
Observed or detetced structural defect to onsite road
HIPPS system not meeting the performance standard

increased risk of hydrate formation causing blockage,
Compromised (pressure gauge / transmitter faulty or
Total loss of gas blanket system resulting in increased

HVAC Shutdown - unavailable - (dampers / detectors
Loss of Gas (Toxic) detection end element resulting in
water / gas / WAG injection well or annulus resulting

BMS / IPS resulting in increased risk of Explosion e.g.
Loss of Drilling Well Control - loss of BOP, insufficient

Containment Integrity - Compromised (known leaks,
Containment Integrity - Compromised (known leaks,
SDV (Beach Valve, Block Valve Station) - not meeting

system not meeting the performance standards (not
Performance Standard - (not closing, not closing fast

2ooN in voting system & 1ooN in non-voting system
resulting in increased risk of failure in the event of an

Containment integrity - Compromised (known leaks,
element resulting in impaired functionality e.g. 2ooN
Loss of sand filters leading to increased erosion rates
closing, not closing fast enough, not sealing properly

Meteorological Data Gathering System is unavailable
leaks, Primary and Secondary seal failure on Floating
Unavailability of Relief at design flow rateresulting in
Loss of primary and secondary flare ignition systems
FW Supply unavailable - all pumps not available, loss

Loss of F&G detection - fusible plug loop unavailable
Observed or detected defect in the well intervention
Containment Integrity - Compromised (known leaks
Standard - (not closing, not closing fast enough, not

Observed or detected defect or Unavailability of the
Containment Integrity - compromised (known leaks

Tank containment integrity - Compromised (known
element resulting in impaired local functionality e.g.
Process SDV (Onshore) - not meeting Performance

impact barriers protecting process plant resulting in
Inability to provide the required gas blanket flow to

Ventilation impaired - loss of gas detection and end
Local or partial loss of the EDP (Topsides / onshore)

Loss of F&G (fire and flammable gas) detection end
measurement resulting in increased corrosion rate,

e.g. earthing cable missing or damaged, temporary
(loss of redundancy in SDV, Pressure Transmitters,

Observed or detected defect in the ignition control
such that gas tight walls / floor fails to meet the PS
Observed or detected structural defect resulting in
Observed or detected structural defect resulting in
damaged, plugged, or missing, hot surfaces or hot
Inability to provide the required chemical injection

Inability to provide fuel gas purge flow to the flare
requirements resulting in increased risk of ignition
Loss of operational well isolation - SCSSV, SSV not

Loss or unavailability of Gaseous Fire Suppression
individual equipment resulting in increased risk of
Hazardous Area Ventilation - unavailable - (fans /
Certified Electrical Equipment fails to meet the PS

requirement resulting in increased risk of ignition
measurement and increased risk of well release /
failure of BMS to carry out heater fire box purge,
element (dampers / fan(s)) resulting in impaired
Loss of well isolation - inability to isolate steam /

HVAC Shutdown - loss of gas detection and end
Observed or detected vehicle defect resulting in
MAH. Observed or detected defect in explosion

reduced wall thickness beyond allowable limits,
reduced wall thickness beyond allowable limits,

Observed or detected defect to drilling systems
functionality, inability to meet PS requirements

Pig Launcher / Receiver Containment Integrity -
equipment e.g. Flame / Spark Arrestor element
impaired local functionality e.g. 2ooN in voting
Loss of Power Management System leading to

were to occur e.g. brake failure / no ABS, tyres
Compromised (known leaks, seal failure, etc.,)
without approved temporary repairs (wraps /
Earth Grounding and Bonding fails to meet PS
Local or partial loss of Utility / Instrument Air

Fine Water Spray system - local unavailability
Observed or detected defect in the blast wall
leading to loss of fire detction in specific area
Loss of Water in condensate / Gas dew point

Roof Tanks, known pontoon leaks leading to
reduced furnace tube wall thickness beyond

Rotating Equipment Containment Integrity -
Loss of sprinkler system - local unavailability

Passive Fire Protection - locally unavailable -
unavailable, door leaking/ not sealing, etc.,)
increased risk of loss of main power supply

increased risk of MAH due to overpressure
Process Area FW/Foam supply unavailable

FW Delivery - local unavailability of the FW
Deluge system - Local (area) unavailabilty
/ Well control equipment e.g. Rams, load
header resulting in air ingress to the flare
opening, or insufficient blowdown rate)

flow leading to increased corrosion rate
Local or partial loss of the ESD system

dampers / detectors etc not working)
of FW tank, loss of supply source, etc

system & 1ooN in non-voting system
Helideck FW/Foam supply unavailble

HSE CASE
Total loss of Utility / Instrument Air

structural integrity e.g. derrick, etc.
Total loss of F&G Detection system
Loss of access control to facilities

ONSHORE MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS
enough, not sealing properly)

tanker loading system) - SBM
Navigational Aids unavailable

Total loss of sprinkler system
Total loss of the EDP system

pressure in the annulus etc)
in potential back flow of HC

Total loss of HIPPS system
(damaged, removed, etc)
Activities and SCEs
Total loss of ESD system

tanker loading system)

XXXX Operations
allowable limits, etc)
resulting in flare out

STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY SCE FAILURE MODE
SCE FAILURE MODE
SCE FAILURE MODE
SCE FAILURE MODE
PROTECTION SYSTEMS SCE FAILURE MODE
SCE FAILURE MODE

distribution main
sealing properly)
etc not working)
in voting system
risk of ignition
requirement
ignition
System
etc)
Tanker Loading Systems
Tanker Loading Systems

and venting provisions
SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS
IC006 Fuel Gas Purge System
PS002 including blast barriers
Passive Fire Protection


Miscellaneous Ignition
PS005 and Other distribution

PC010 Gas Tight Floor / Walls
Water in condensate /
Management System)
Emergency Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
Emergency Shutdown
PC011 -Road Tanker Loading
PS006 (incl. doors, walls and

PC011 -Single Buoy Mooring
Heavy Lift Cranes and
Fired Heaters (Burner
DETECTION SYSTEMS
Process Containment
Process Containment
(ESD) Control System
(ESD) Control System

Helideck Fire Fighting
Control Components
PS004 Tank, FW Supply and
Fire Water Ring Main

Earth Grounding and
PS004 Tank, FW supply and

Non Hazardous Area
Non Hazardous Area
Explosion protection
Power Management
System (Blowdown)
System (Blowdown)
IGNITION CONTROL
Meteorological Data
Suppression System
Helicopter Refueling
Drilling Well Control

Well Intervention /
Fixed Process Area

SI002 Structural Support
Chemical Injection
Protection System
Protection System
Mechanical Lifting
Certified Electrical
Gathering System
PS014 Navigational Aids

Inert Gas Blanket
Inert Gas Blanket
Fine Water Spray
Pipeline Isolation
DS002 Security Systems
SD002 Depressurisation
SD002 Depressurisation
Operational Well
Operational Well
Operational Well
(vessels, piping /
Flare Tip ignition

Civil Structures /
CONTAINMENT
Hazardous Area
Hazardous Area
SI007 Drilling Systems
PS001 Deluge Systems

DS003 Gas (dewpoint)
Valves (ESDVs)
measurement
SI006 Road Vehicles
SI006 Road Vehicles
penetrations)
Foam System
PC007 Relief System
Containment
PC009 Fired Heaters
Gaseous Fire
PC013 Well Control
PS012 Sand Filters

Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Equipment
Ventilation
Ventilation
Ventilation
Ventilation
Emergency
Emergency
SD009 Utility Air
SD009 Utility Air

PROCESS
support)
support)
Isolation
Isolation
Bonding
Systems
Systems
Systems
systems
systems
System
System
System
System
system
(FIELD)
Valves
PC001/
PC001-
PC008
PC009
PC012
SD001
SD001
SD003
SD003
SD004
SD004
SD005
SD006
SD008
PS003
PS007
PS008
PS010
PS011
PS013
PS016
IC001
IC001
IC002
IC002
IC003
IC005
IC007
IC007
IC008
IC009
SI003
SD
DS
PC
PS
IC
SI
NORMAL ACTIVITIES
A1 Operate Specific Process / Utility Unit / Specific Process or Utility / Equipment P A A A A N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N N P P P P A P N P N N P P P P P P P A P P N N N N N N N N P N P N
A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process and Utility Equipment P A A A A P P P P P P P P P P P A A P P N N P P P P N P P P N P N A P P P A P N P P P P P P P P P P A P P N P N N N P P N P A P N
A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A4 Function Testing of ESD system A A A A A P P P P P A A A A P P P A A A P P A A N A A A A P P P P A A A A A A N A A A A A A P A A A A A P N P N N N A A N P A P N
A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations P A A A A N N N N N A N N N N N N A N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N P N N N A P N P N P P P P P P P A A P N N N N N N A A N N A P N
A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations P A A A A P P P N N A P P P P P A A P P P P P P P P P P P P N P N P P P N N P N P P N P P P P P P A A P P N P N N N A A P P A P P
A7 Well production testing P A A A A N N N N N P A A A NA A A NA A A N N N N N A N A A N N N N A A P A A A N A A A P P P A P P A A P P N P N N N A P P P A P N
A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) P A A A A N N N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N N N P A A A A P N P N A A P A A A N A A A P P P A P A A A A P N P N N N A A P P A P N
A9 Pigging Operations P A A A A N N N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N N P A P N P N A A P A A A N A P A P P P A P A A A P P N P N N N A A P P A P N
A10 Crane Operation / Lifting P N A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A N N N P A A A A A P P P P A A P A A A P A P A P P P A P A A P P P N P N N N A A N P A A A
A11 Fork Lift Operations A A A A A N N N N N N A A A NA N N N A A P P P P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A P A A A A A A A A A A P N P N A A P N N P P A A
A12 Raw Materials Receipt (bunkering) (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) P A A A A N N N N N A A A A P P N A A A P P N N A A A N A P P P P A A P A A A N A A A P P P A P A A P A P N P N N N A A N P A P P
A13 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A A A A A A A A A A A A A A NA A P A A A N N A A A A A A P A A A A P A A A N A N A A A A A A A A A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A14 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A A A A A A A A A A A A A A NA A N A A A P P N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N A A A P P P A P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A P P
A15 Vehicle Movement on-plot A A P N A N N N N A N A A P NA N N N A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A P A P A A A A A A A A A A A P A P A A P N N A P A A
A16 Vehicle Movement off-plot A A A N A A A A A A A A A A NA A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N N A P A A
A17 Working outdoors (exposed to the elements i.e. heat stress, etc) A A A A A N N N N A N P N N N N P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A18 Working on Tall Structures P A A A P N N N N A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A19 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV P A A A P N N N A N N A A A A A A N A A N N A A A A A A A P N P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N P N N N N N N N NA P N
A20 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) P A A A A N N N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A P A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A21 Emergency Drill / Exercise A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A22 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) P A A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A P P P P A A A A A N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A23 Marine Operations - SBM A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P P P A A P A A A A
A24 Functional Test of FW Pumps P A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A25 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) P A A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N P A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A A A
A26 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) P A A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N P A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A A A
A27 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) P A A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A A A
A28 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc P A A A A N N N N N A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P N P N N N A A N N A A P
A29 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops P A A A A N N N N N A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A A P
A30 Sump pump operations - emptying sump tank P A A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A31 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel P A A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) P A A A A N N N N N A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N N P A P N P N A A P A A A N A P A P P P A P A A A A P N P N N N A A N N A P P
B2 NDT P A A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B3 Radiography work P A A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B4 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) P A A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A A A
B5 Boiler / furnace / HRSG entry P A A A A N N N N A A N N A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A A A
B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) P A A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A P P N N A A A A A A A P N P N A A P A A P N P P A P P P A P A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A A A
B7 Hot tapping / stoppling P A A A A N N N N P N A P N N N N N P P P P N N P A A A A P N P N A A P A A P N P P A P P P A P A A A A N N N N N N P N N N A P N
B8 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) P A A A A N N N N A N A A A N N N N P P P P A A A A A A A P N P N A A P A A P N P P A P P P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B9 Coldwork P A A A A N N N N A N A A A N N N N A A N N A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B10 Working at height (outside permanent structures) P A A A P N N N N A N P A A N N P N A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B11 Erecting and removal of scaffold P A A A A N N N N A N A A A N N N N A A N N A A A A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P A A P P A A A
B12 Chemical disposal by Vac Truck A A A A A N N N N A N A A A N N N N A A P P A A A A A A A A A P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B13 Road Maintenance / Grading A A A A A N N N N A N A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B14 Excavation activities / shoring A A A A A N N N N A N A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B15 Choke Valve bean up or down P A A A A N N N N N N A A A A A A A A A N N N N N A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P N N P P A P N
B16 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) P A A A A N N N N A N A A A A A A N A A N N N N A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P N N P P NA P P
B17 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure P A A A A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A P A P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A P P P A P A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A A P
B18 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal P A A A N P P P P N N A A A A A A N A A N N N N P A A A A N N N N A A P A A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A N N P P P P N N P P NA P P
B19 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation P A A A N P P P P N N A A A A A A N A A N N N N P A A A A N N N N A A P A A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A N N P P P P N N P P NA P P
B20 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations P A A A N P P P P N N A A A A A A N A A N N N N P A A A A N N N N A A P A A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A N N P P P P N N P P NA P P
B21 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) P A A A N P P P P N N A A A A A A N A A N N N N P A A A A N N N N A A P A A A N N P A A A A A A A A A A N N P P P P N N P P NA P P
B22 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B23 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B24 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing P A A A A N N N N A N A A A N N P P P P N N N N N N N A A P P P P A A P A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A P P
B25 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) P A A A A N N N N N N N A A N N N N A A N N A A P P P A A P P P P A A P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A P P
B26 Other Maintenance (HVAC, cranes, relief valves, turbines) P A A A A N N N N A N A A A N N N N A A N N P P P A A A A P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A P P
B27 Hook up and commissioning P A A A A N N N N P N N P P N N N N P P N N N N N N N P P N N N N A P N P A P N P P P P P P P P A A A A N N N N N N A A N N A N N
B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval P A A A A N N N N A N A A A N N P P A A N N N N A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A P P
B29 Grit blasting / Water Jetting P A A A A N N N N A N A A A N N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A P N P N A A P N N N P A A
B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing P A A A A N N N N A N P A A N N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B31 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A N N N N N N N P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A P N
B32 Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out P A A A A N N N N A N A A A N N N P A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
B33 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) P A A A A N N N N A N A A A N N N P A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A P P P A A P P A P P
B34 Stuck Pig Retrieval P A A A A N N N N A N A A A N N N P A A N N N N N N N P A P P P P A A P A A A A A A A P P P A P A A A P P P P P P P A A P P A P P
B35 Local Venting P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P
B36 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads A A A A A P P P P A P A A A P P N P P P N N P P P P P P P A P P N A A P A N P N P P P P P P P P A A N P N N N N A A N N N N N A A
NIGHT ACTIVITIES
C1 Night Time Working A A A A A N N N N A N P P P N N N P A A P P A A A A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
C2 Night time vehicular on plot movements A A P N A N N N N A N A A NA NA N N P A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
C3 Night time vehicular off plot movements A A A N A A A A A A N A A NA NA A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
C4 Night Helicopter Operations A A A A A P P P P A P A A NA NA P N A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A N P N P A A A A A A P A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
C5 Night Heavy Lifts N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
LEGEND NOTES
NA Not applicable
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 133
SAFETY CRITICAL ELEMENTS
Emergency Power Supply - Loss of redundancy (<n+1) -

Temporary Refuge (TR) Alternate Muster Points - unavailable / compromised -
Personal H2S monitors below minimum level or faulty

Emergency Power Supply unavailable - all generators
Medical Response cannot be met - e.g. on-site burns

Life Buoys below minimum level or damaged at jetty
defective or unavailable markings, lighting, nets, etc.
monitors / portable extinguishers locally unavailable
Tank secondary containment / bunding observed or
Insufficient number or inadequate type of Chemical
liferafts / Scramble nets / Ladders / knotted ropes /

Individual Process SIF unavailable e.g. low low level
Helicopter facilities observed or detected damage /
Life Jackets below minimum level or damaged (e.g.

Uninterruptable Power UPS - Unavailable - Inability to provide emergency
Safety Shower / eyewash stations not available or

Basic Process Control system (BPCS) - unavailable
Portable BA sets below minimum level (SCBA and

Portable BA sets / Smoke Hoods below minimum
unavailable / compromised - (structural damage,
Alternate Means of Escape - locally unavailable -

Shore / Offshore Communications - unavailable
/ Primary Muster Areas (structural damage, muster areas not clear, etc)
(1 Generator not available in 2x100% or 3x50%

Uninterruptable Power UPS - Loss of redundancy - (one of the 2x100%
Fire Fighting Response cannot be met - e.g. fire

PAGA system - Loss of redundancy (one of the
Manual Fire Fighting Equipment - Hose reels /
treatment facilities insufficent or unavailable,
fighter / brigade within specified time frame

detected defect resulting in loss or impaired
Temporary Refuge / Primary Muster Area -
Closed Drain system - locally unavailable
Open Drain System - Totally Unavailable

Open Drain System - locally unavailable
Emergency lighting - locally unavailable
HSE CASE
Hosiptal resonse time cannot be met

not available, loss of distribution etc
power supply to essential systems
Closed Drain System - Unavailable

Audio Visual Alarms - unavailable
Marine Radio - SBM - unavailable
Escape route - locally unavailable
Aviation VHF radio - unavailable
Spill Containment - unavailable

ONSHORE MATRIX OF PERMITTED OPERATIONS
Evacuation route - unavailable
light not working etc) at jetty

VHF Channels - unavailable
level or faulty (escape sets)

PAGA system - unavailable
muster areas not clear etc)
Activities and SCEs
secondary containment
systems not available)
systems not available)

XXXX Operations
SCE FAILURE MODE
SCE FAILURE MODE
Escape chutes etc

configuration)
PPE available
Rescue Sets)
inoperable
trip, etc
EMERGENCY RESPONSE -
/ Primary Muster Areas

Temporary Refuge (TR)

ER010 (Hazardous and Non-

Manual Fire Fighting
ER006 (inc. markings, nets,
Process Control and
Process Control and
Process Control and

Emergency / Escape
Bunding and Drains
Bunding and Drains
Bunding and Drains
Bunding and Drains
Bunding and Drains
Alternate Means of
Helicopter facilities
obstacle marking /
LS002 (Medical / first aid
scramble nets and

ER011 Oil Spill Response
Personal Survival
Personal Survival
Personal Survival
Personal Survival
Personal Survival
Personal Survival
Personal Survival
LS004 Escape (Liferafts,

Equipment (PSE)
Equipment (PSE)
Equipment (PSE)
Equipment (PSE)
Equipment (PSE)
Equipment (PSE)
Equipment (PSE)
Communication
Communication
Communication
Communication
Communication
Communication
Rescue Facilities
LS002 Rescue Facilities

ER007 generation and
ER007 generation and

ER002 Escape Routes
ER002 Escape Routes
LIFE SAVING
distribution)
distribution)
hazardous)
hazardous)
hazardous)
hazardous)
hazardous)
Equipment
ER004 Emergency
ER004 Emergency
ER004 Emergency
ER004 Emergency
ER004 Emergency
ER004 Emergency
facilities)
Lighting
Alarms
Alarms
Alarms
Supply
Supply
EER
ER001
ER001
ER003
ER005
ER005
ER008
ER009
ER009
ER009
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
LS001
ER
LS
NORMAL ACTIVITIES
A1 Operate Specific Process / Utility Unit / Specific Process or Utility / Equipment P P N P P P P P A A A P P A P P P N N N P P P P P A N P P P P P P N N P
A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process and Utility Equipment P P N P P P P P A A A P P A P P P P N N P P P P P A P P P P P P A P P P
A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
A4 Function Testing of ESD system P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations P P N P P P P P A A A P N A P N P N N N N N P P P P N P P P P N P N N P
A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations P P N P P P P P A A A P N A P N P N N N N N P P P A N P P P P N P N N P
A7 Well production testing P P N P P P P P A A A P P A P P P P N N A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P P N N P P P P P A N P P P P N P N N P
A9 Pigging Operations P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P P N N P P P P P A N P P P P N N N N P
A10 Crane Operation / Lifting P P N P P P P P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P N N P
A11 Fork Lift Operations A A N A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P P P N P P
A12 Raw Materials Receipt (bunkering) (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A P P P P P P P A P P P P P P P N A A
A13 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A A N A A A A A A A A A A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A
A14 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) P P N P P P P P P P P A A P A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N A
A15 Vehicle Movement on-plot A A N A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P P P A P P
A16 Vehicle Movement off-plot A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A17 Working outdoors (exposed to the elements i.e. heat stress, etc) P P N P P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
A18 Working on Tall Structures P P N P P A P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N A P N P
A19 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
A20 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A P P P P P A P A A A A A A N N A
A21 Emergency Drill / Exercise P P N N P P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
A22 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A A N P A A A A A A A P P A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N N P
A23 Marine Operations - SBM A A N P P A P P A P A A A A A A N P P N A A A A A P P A A N N N P N N P
A24 Functional Test of FW Pumps A A N P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A N N P
A25 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N N N P P N N N N P
A26 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N N N P P N N N N P
A27 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N N N N P
A28 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N N N P P N N N N P
A29 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N N N P P N N N N P
A30 Sump pump operations - emptying sump tank P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P
A31 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P N P P
B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A N N P P P P P A N P P P P N N N N P
B2 NDT P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P N N P
B3 Radiography work P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P N A N N P
B4 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N N N P P N A N N P
B5 Boiler / furnace / HRSG entry P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N N N P P N A N N P
B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B7 Hot tapping / stoppling P P N P P P P P A A A A P A A P N A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B8 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B9 Coldwork P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B10 Working at height (outside permanent structures) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N A N N P
B11 Erecting and removal of scaffold P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N A N N P
B12 Chemical disposal by Vac Truck P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N A A A A N A N N P
B13 Road Maintenance / Grading A A N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A N A N N P
B14 Excavation activities / shoring P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A N A N N P
B15 Choke Valve bean up or down P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B16 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B17 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B18 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B19 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B20 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B21 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B22 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B23 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B24 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B25 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P P P P A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B26 Other Maintenance (HVAC, cranes, relief valves, turbines) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B27 Hook up and commissioning P P N P P P P P A A A P N A P N P N N N P P P P P A N P P P P N P N N P
B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B29 Grit blasting / Water Jetting A A N P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A N A A P P N A N N P
B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing A A N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A P P N A N N P
B31 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B32 Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B33 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) P P N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P N P N N P
B34 Stuck Pig Retrieval P P N P P P P P P A A A A A A A A A N N P P P P P A N P P P P N P N N P
B35 Local Venting P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P
B36 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads P P N P N P N N A A N A A N A A P A A A A A A A A A P A A P P P P N N P
NIGHT ACTIVITIES
C1 Night Time Working P P N P N P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P P P P P N N P
C2 Night time vehicular on plot movements A A N A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P P P P N P P
C3 Night time vehicular off plot movements A A N A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
C4 Night Helicopter Operations A A N A N A A A A A N A A N A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
C5 Night Heavy Lifts N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
LEGEND
NA Not applicable
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 134
INFLUENCES ACTIVITIES
Other Offshore Platform / Onshore Plant / Operation Interfaces - Planned shutdown on
Other Offshore Platform / Onshore Plant / Operation Interfaces - Unplanned Shutdown
Other Offshore Platform / Onshore Plant / Operation Interfaces - Emergency / incident
Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers,

PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch
M3 ER Team Members - Competent persons not available to fill ER team member position
3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter,
B23 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)
Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc
Local Emergency Crisis Center LECC - Competent persons not available to fill LECC
M1 HSE Critical Position - Competent persons not available to fill HSE Critical Position
Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube
A26 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc)
A1 Operate Specific Process / Utility Unit / Specific Process or Utility / Equipment
B32 Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out

W4 High winds / Shamal (Dust Storm) - Warning Level (xx m/s < V < xx m/s)
B8 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc)
A25 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc)
B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc)

W1 Adverse Weather (including monsoon (heavy rain), lightning, etc)
M2 ER Medic - Insufficient number of medics available on the facility
A17 Working outdoors (exposed to the elements i.e. heat stress, etc)
A29 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops
B19 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation

W7 Low Visibility - Severely Impaired Operations (xx m < l < xx m)
B18 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal
B22 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis)

A31 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel
B26 Other Maintenance (HVAC, cranes, relief valves, turbines)

B20 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations
HSE CASE
A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process and Utility Equipment
A12 Raw Materials Receipt (bunkering) (Diesel, Jet A1 etc)
B17 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure

W8 Low Visibility - Almost Zero Visibility Level (l < xx m)
B21 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc)

B10 Working at height (outside permanent structures)
A20 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc)
W5 High winds - Cease Operations Level (V < xx m/s)
B36 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads

W6 Low Visibility - Degraded Level (xx m < l < xx m)
ONSHORE SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS (SIMOPS)
A30 Sump pump operations - emptying sump tank

A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations
W3 High winds - Alert Level (xx m/s < V < xx m/s)
A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection
A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations
B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing

Activities and Influences
B31 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain

A13 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off)
C3 Night time vehicular off plot movements

C2 Night time vehicular on plot movements
B25 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic)
XXXX Operations
on other facility affecting operations
on other facility affecting operations
B4 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry)

W2 High Ambient Temperature (>50°C)
A19 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV
A22 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump)

A8 Sampling (No blowdown required)
P1 Intrusion (within perimeter fence)
CRITICAL MANPOWER UNAVAILABILITY
A14 Helicopter Operations (refuelling)

other facility affecting operations
B11 Erecting and removal of scaffold

A4 Function Testing of ESD system
B12 Chemical disposal by Vac Truck

B1 Pigging operations (intelligent)
positions or LECC not available
B15 Choke Valve bean up or down

B14 Excavation activities / shoring
A24 Functional Test of FW Pumps
B13 Road Maintenance / Grading

B5 Boiler / furnace / HRSG entry
B27 Hook up and commissioning
C4 Night Helicopter Operations

B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval
B29 Grit blasting / Water Jetting

A16 Vehicle Movement off-plot
A15 Vehicle Movement on-plot

A18 Working on Tall Structures
A21 Emergency Drill / Exercise
A23 Marine Operations - SBM

A10 Crane Operation / Lifting
A7 Well production testing
B7 Hot tapping / stoppling
purging / gas freeing
C1 Night Time Working

A11 Fork Lift Operations
A9 Pigging Operations
B3 Radiography work
B34 Stuck Pig Retrieval

hanger voids, etc)
C5 Night Heavy Lifts

NORMAL ACTIVITIES
metering, etc)
ADVERSE WEATHER
B35 Local Venting

FIELD INTERFACES
NIGHT ACTIVITIES
B9 Coldwork
gear, etc)
B2 NDT
etc
PUBLIC
A27
A28
B16
B24
B33
M4
O1
O2
O3
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 NORMAL ACTIVITIES
P A A A P N A P P A A P P N A P A1 Operate Specific Process / Utility Unit / Specific Process or Utility / Equipment
P A A A P N A P P A A P P P A P A2 Operate Overall Plant / Process and Utility Equipment A
P P P A P N A P P A A A A N A A A3 Routine Visual Check / Equipment Inspection A A
P P P P P N A P P A A P N N P N A4 Function Testing of ESD system A A A
P P P P P N A A A A A P N N P N A5 Process Unit Startup / Shutdown operations A A A A
P P P P P N A A A A A P N N P N A6 Utility System Startup / Shutdown operations A A A A A
P P P A P N A P P A A A P N P P A7 Well production testing A A A N P P
P P P A P N A P P A A A N N P N A8 Sampling (No blowdown required) A A A N N A A
P P P P N N A P P P P P P N P P A9 Pigging Operations P P A N N N A A
P N P P N N A P N A A A N N P N A10 Crane Operation / Lifting N N A P N N N N N
P N P P N N A P N A A A P N P P A11 Fork Lift Operations P P A A P P P P P N
P P P P P N A P P A A A P N P P A12 Raw Materials Receipt (bunkering) (Diesel, Jet A1 etc) A A A A A A A A A P A
P P A P P N P N N A A A P A P P A13 Helicopter Operations (landing, take-off) A A A N P A A A A N N A
P N A P N N P N N A A A P N P P A14 Helicopter Operations (refuelling) A A A N P A A A A N N N N
P P A A P N A P N A A A A A A A A15 Vehicle Movement on-plot A A A A A A A P P P A A A A
P P A A P N P N N A A A A A A A A16 Vehicle Movement off-plot A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A
P P P P P N A P P A A A A N A A A17 Working outdoors (exposed to the elements i.e. heat stress, etc) A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A
P N P P P N A P N A A A A P A A A18 Working on Tall Structures A A A A P P A A A P A A P P A A A
P P P P P N A P P A A A N N P N A19 Function testing of SSV and SCSSSV A A A P P P A A A P P A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A A P A A A P N P P A20 Top up of Chemical Dosing Tanks (CI, Biocide, etc) A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P P A A N N A P N A21 Emergency Drill / Exercise A A A N N N A A A A A A A A A A A A N A
P P P P N N A P P A A A N N P N A22 Diesel Engine Test (EDG, FW Pump) A A A N N N A A A P A A A P A A A A A A A
P P A P N N P N N A A A P P P P A23 Marine Operations - SBM A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P P A A A N P P N A24 Functional Test of FW Pumps A A A N N N A A A P A A A P A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P P A A A N N P N A25 PPM of static process equipment (piping + valves, pipeline, vessels, etc) N P A N N P P A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P P A A A N N P N A26 PPM of rotating equipment (e.g. lube oil change for compressors, pumps, etc) N P A N N P A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P P A A A N N P N A27 PPM of electrical devices (Nav Aids, lighting, Battery Banks, UPS, transformers, switch gear, etc) N A A N N P A A A P A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P P A A A P N P P A28 Draining of condensate e.g. glycol contactor, instrument connections, comp scrubbers, etc A A A P P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P P A A A P N P P A29 PPM of instruments e.g. calibration, functional test of trip loops P P A N N N P A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P P A A A P N P P A30 Sump pump operations - emptying sump tank A A A P P P A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P P A A A P N P P A31 Open Drain System Operation - emptying open drain vessel A A A P P P A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P P P P P P N P P B1 Pigging operations (intelligent) P P A N N N A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P P N A P P A A A N P P N B2 NDT A A A N N N A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
P P P P N N A P N A A P N P P N B3 Radiography work N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
P P P P P N A P P A A A N N P N B4 Confined Space Entry (Vessel Entry) N P A N N P A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A N
P P P P P N A P P A A A N N P N B5 Boiler / furnace / HRSG entry N P A N N P A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A N A
P P P P N N A P P A A A N N N N B6 Hotwork (grinding, brazing, welding, oxy-cutting, naked flame, etc) P P A N N P P N N P A P A A A A A A N P A A A N N N A N N P P N A N P P
P P P P P N A P P A A A N N N N B7 Hot tapping / stoppling A P P N N P P N N N P P A A P P A A N P N P P N N N A N N P P N A N N N A
P P P P P N A P P A A A N N P N B8 Portable equipment use (e.g. air compressor in Zone 2, camera use, etc) P P A N N P P P P P A P A A A A A A N P A A A A P P A P P A A P A N A A A A
P P P P P N A P P A A A N N P N B9 Coldwork P P A N P P P A A P A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A
P P P P N N A P N A A A N P P N B10 Working at height (outside permanent structures) A A A P P P A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A N A A
P P P P N N A P N A A A N P P N B11 Erecting and removal of scaffold A A A N N P A A A A A P A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A N A A A
P N A A P N A P N A A A N N P N B12 Chemical disposal by Vac Truck A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A N A P A A A
P N P A P N A P N A A A P P P P B13 Road Maintenance / Grading A A A A P P A A A P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A P
P N P P P N A P N A A A N P P N B14 Excavation activities / shoring A A A A P P A A A P A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A P P
P P P P P N A P P A A A P N P P B15 Choke Valve bean up or down A A A N P P A A A P A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A A N A A A A A A A
P P P P P N A P P A A A N N P N B16 Wellhead PPM (grease/seal and test gate valves, press. test valves, casing / tube hanger voids, etc) A A A N P P A A A P A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A A P A A A A A A A P
P P P P P N A P P A A A N N P N B17 Bleed down of Wellhead Pressure / Annulus pressure A A A N P P A A A P A A P A A A A P N A A A A A A A P A A A A A A N P A A P A A A A A A A P A
P P P P N N A P P A A A N N P N B18 Well Intervention - well pumping / stimulation / scale removal N P A N P P P P A P A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A P P P A A A A A A N N N
P P P P N N A P P A A A N N P N B19 Well Intervention - Well additional perforation / re-perforation N P A N P P P P A P A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A P P P A A A A A A N N N N
P P P P N N A P P A A A N N P N B20 Well Intervention - Wireline (slickline or E-line) operations N P A N P P P P A P A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A P P P A A A A A A N N N N N
P P P P N N A P P A A A N N P N B21 Well Intervention (e.g. coiled tubing, snubbing, etc) N P A N P P P P A P A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P A P P P A A A A A A N N N N N N
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B22 Well workover (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B23 Drilling (new, deepening & sidetrack) (to be reviewed on an operation specific basis) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
P P P P N N A P P A A A N N P N B24 Isolation (including blind insertion / removal) and depressure of process equip. inc purging / gas freeing N P A N P P A A A P A P A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A - -
P P P P N N A P P A A A N N P N B25 Pressure testing (hydrotest, pneumatic) N P P N P P N N P P A P P A A A P N N P A P P P P P A P P P P P P N P P P N P P A P P A A P P P P P P P - - P
P P P P N N A P P A A A N N P N B26 Other Maintenance (HVAC, cranes, relief valves, turbines) N P P N P P A A A P A P A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N P P P N P P A A A A A P A A P P P P - - P P
P P P P N N A P P A A P N N P N B27 Hook up and commissioning N P P N P P P P P P P P A A A A A A N A N P P P P P P P P A A P P N N N P N P P A P A A A P P P P P P P - - P P P
P P P P N N A P P A A A N N P N B28 Corrosion Coupon Retrieval A A A P P P A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P P A A A A A A A N A A P P P A A A A A A P A A A A A A - - P P P P
N N P P N N N N N A A A N N P N B29 Grit blasting / Water Jetting P P N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N - - N N N N N
P P P P N N A P P A A A N P P N B30 Crane Inspection, maintenance and testing P A A P P P A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A - - A P A A A N
P P P P P N A P P A A A P N P P B31 Draining of Hydrocarbons to Closed Drain A A A P A A A A A P A A A A A A A P A A A A A A P P P A A A A A A N P A P P P A A A A A A P A P A A A A - - P P A P A N A
P P P P P N A P P A A A N P P N B32 Structural and Mechanical Maintenance including equipment change out P P A N P P P P P A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A - - P P A N A N A P
P P P P P N A P P A A A N N P N B33 3rd pty PPM for instrumented system (e.g. F&G, telecomms, multi-phase flowmeter, metering, etc) P P A N P P P P P P A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A - - P P A P A N A P A
P P P P N N A P P A A P N N P N B34 Stuck Pig Retrieval N P A N N P A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P A A A A A A A A N A A N N N A A P A A A P A P A A A A - - P P A N P N A P P P
P N P P P N P P P P P P P N P P B35 Local Venting P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P N P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P - - P P P P P N P P P P P
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N B36 Helicopter Lifting Operations - underslung loads N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N - - N N N N N N N N N N N N
NIGHT ACTIVITIES
P P A A P N A P P A A A P P P P C1 Night Time Working A A A A A A A A A N N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A N A N N N A A A N N A A - - A A A A A N A A A A A A N
P P A A P N A P P A A A P P P P C2 Night time vehicular on plot movements A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A - - A A A A A N A A A A A A N A
P P A A N N N N N A A A P P P P C3 Night time vehicular off plot movements A A A A A A A A A A A A A A P P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A - - A A A A A N A A A A A A N A A
P P A P N N N N N A A A P P P P C4 Night Helicopter Operations A A A P A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A A A A A A A A A A N A A A A - - A A A A A N A A A A A A N A A A
N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N C5 Night Heavy Lifts N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N - - N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N
LEGEND
A Combination allowable with normal procedures inc PTW NOTES
NA Not applicable
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 135
Appendix 8
-
Template for Remedial Action
Plan
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 136
Target
Description of Action Priority Action Party
N Completion
Remarks
o
(example) (example) (example)
(example)
Action
11 P1-S xIE dd/mm/yy
Action
22 P1-H xRM dd/mm/yy
Action
33 P2 xSE dd/mm/yy
Action
44 P3 xPD dd/mm/yy
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 137
Appendix 9
-
Example SCE Critical Activity
Matrix
2 OIM
Legend
41 Scheduler
A = Accountable
42 Site Analyst
REVISION 1.0
9 Asset Manager
13 Radio Operator
15 Crane Operator
22 Safety Manager
18 Helicopter Pilot
26 Project Manager
28 Project Engineer
8 Line HSE advisors
33 Works Supervisor
5 ER Team Member
6 Logistics Manager
EXECUTION PARTY
29 Project HSE Advisor

25 Metocean Engineer
14 Boat Landing Officer
1 Operations Manager
10 Audit Team Member
48 Technical Authority 2
47 Technical Authority 1
3 Country HSE manager
45 Head of Well Services

43 Chief of Well Services
34 Operations Technician
16 Marine Vessel Captain
7 Logistics Team Leaders
49 Well Services Engineer

21 HSE Contractor Advisor
44 Well Integrity Engineer

24 Metocean Team Leader
11 Head of Marine Services
23 Technical Safety Advisor

12 Head of Aviation Service
46 Well Services Supervisor

17 Helicopter Landing Officer
31 Construction Lead Engineer

20 HSE Capability Co-ordinator
27 Projects Technical Authority
32 Pipelines & Subsea Engineer

30 Commissioning Lead Engineer
R = Responsible
37 Maintenance Strategy Manager
40 Maintenance Execution Engineers

38 Maintenance Strategy Team Leaders
39 Maintenance Execution Team Leader
19 HSE Systems & Competency Manager
SAFETY CASE
35 Maintenance Engineering Discipline Manager

36 Maintenance Engineering Discipline Team Leaders
4 Corporate HSE Department - Oil Spill Response Co-ordinator
ACTIVITIES, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES MATRIX
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT - CONTINGENCY AND EMERGENCY PLANNING
A
R
Produce and maintain Emergency Response Plans (ERP)
A
R
Produce and maintain Oil Spill Response Plans (OSR)
Ensure ER preparedness including housekeeping carry out and assess the
A
R
effectiveness of ER drills and exercises
R
Carry out emergency reposne to health, safety and environmental events
A
R
Carry out emergency repsonse to oil spills at sea
Provide logistics emergency response coverage. Manage, administer ER
A
R
equipment and resources
Provision of HSE advice and services with respect to asset emergency
A
R
preparedness
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
The operation of the defined change management process (including the

A
R
assessment of risk) for both permenant and temporary changes, in people,

facility hardware and procedures
AUDIT AND REVIEW

A
R
Prepare and resource assurance plan

Perform audits and reviews including pre-start up audit to manage HSE risks to
A
R
ALARP
MANAGE LOGISTICS
DOCUMENT NO :
Co-ordinate marine operations both scehduled and unscheduled with due

A
R
EP HSE SG 02 12
regard to HSE
Co-ordinate aviation/ helicopter operations both scehduled and unscheduled
A
with due regard to HSE

Provide emergency response coverage. Manage, administer ER equipment and
A
R
resources
Review meteorological data and verify integrity of operations against adverse
A
weather policy
Carry out marine unloading of people and cargo (including crane lifts) with due
A
R
R
R
regard to HSE
A
R
R
Carry out helicopter unloading of people and cargo with due regard to HSE
A
Evaluate deck capacity versus demand during loading / unloading
PROVIDE HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUPPORT
Provide a full range of support in the areas of HSE global processes, and
A
contractor HSE management

Development and maintenance of HSE competence assessment, development,
A
R
and assurance
A
Provide support and advice on contractor engagement and HSE management

A
Provide advice and services for all aspects of HSE hazard and risk studies
A
Support and co-ordination of incident management and investigation
Provide technical safety advice in the development and maintenance of Safety

A
R
Cases and supporting technical studies

Provision of safety advice and services with respect to asset emergency
preparedness
Provision of advice and services with respect to oil spill emergency
preparedness
MANAGE METOCEAN DATA
A
R
Manage real time data acquisition and data archiving

A
R
Manage operational forecatsing

DATE:
A
R
Manage / update design and operational criteria
DESIGN, DRILL, SERVICE, AND ABANDON WELLS (excluding routine wireline

and stimulation operations)
Refer to Drilling HSE Case and supporting interface documentation
DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND MODIFICATION OF FACILITIES

FEBRUARY 2014
A
R
Define Performance Standards including Safety Critical Elements

A
Define the technical integrity management framework for facilities
Identify major HSE risks, prepare mitigation plans and demonstrate that HSE
A
risks are ALARP during design

Prepare specifications, plans and design complying with Petronas, legal and
A
R
industry regulations and codes

Prepare performance testing requirements and acceptance criteria for pre-
A
commissioning and commissioning activities

Construct and install jacket and topside facilities including all required hook up
A
R
R
and testing to manage HSE issues

Design and construct pipelines and subsea flowlines to meet required
A
standards for integrity and prevention of major accidents

PRODUCTION OPERATIONS (PRODUCE HYDROCARBONS)
Prepare the wells, topsides processing and utilities for production processing
A
(including purging operations if required)

Performing root cause identification and corrective action following
A
shutdowns
Carry out process monitoring and control to ensure the facilities are
A
R
maintained within the design operating envelope

Perform process intervention operations as required including sampling,
A
R
chemical injection, venting, isolation

Undertake corrective actions following defined HSE controls when wells,
R
A
topsides processing and utilities equipment does not perform to the defined
operational performance criteria
Carry out first line maintenance of production processing and utility systems
equipment
PLAN AND EXECUTE FACILITIES MAINTENANCE (STANDARD ROUTINES,
MAINTENANCE ENGINEERING ROUTINES)
Establish maintenance and integrity tasks to be performed based on defined
A
R
strategies and facility specific performance standards

Maintain maintenance planning system and activities defined in the SERP
A
R
guide including the adoption of key HSE MS processes and management of

operations personnel competence assurance
Monitor and control the execution of facilities maintenance including
A
R
implementation of safe systems of work raising required corrective actions

Ensure all deviations of safety critical elements are formally recorded and
A
R
138
authorised by the appropriate technical authority

PLAN AND EXECUTE FACILITIES MAINTENANCE (WELLHEAD ROUTINES)
Establish maintenance and integrity tasks to be performed based on defined

A
R
strategies and facility specific performance standards

Maintain maintenance planning system and activities defined in the SERP
A
guide including the adoption of key HSE MS processes and management of

operations personnel competence assurance
Monitor and control the execution of facilities maintenance including
A
R
implementation of safe systems of work raising required corrective actions

Ensure all deviations of safety critical elements are formally recorded and
A
authorised by the appropriate technical authority

PLAN AND EXECUTE PIPELINE MAINTENANCE
Refer to pipeline management group and supporting information
ASSURE SURFACE FACILITIES

A
Critical drawings and documentation shall be maintained AS BUILT

A
R
Examine SCEs status to comply with Performance Standards
ASSURE WELL INTEGRITY

HSE CASE
Critical drawings and documentation shall be maintained AS BUILT

A
R
Examine SCEs status to comply with Performance Standards
ASSURE PIPELINE INTEGRITY
Refer to Pipeline Safety case, pipeline management group and supporting

documentation
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 139
Appendix 10
-
Example Activity Sheet
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 140
ACTIVITY SHEET
PXX-XX-XXX DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND MODIFICATION OF FACILITIES
Overview of the Activity
The facility systems and structure must be capable of withstanding the design loads to
which they will be exposed to as a result of normal and anticipated upset conditions.
The correct design of the facility allows for these loads and the subsequent fabrication,
construction and / or installation of the facility in accordance with the design will result
in the potential for equipment or structural failure leading to a major accident hazard
being reduced.
This activity includes the modification, decommissioning and/or removal of existing
plant and any operations in which it is intended to operate plant outside its stated
design limits
Hazard Management Objectives of the Activity
To ensure the implementation of Design Integrity principles and risk management

strategies through all phases of the project to reduce risk levels to ALARP
HSE Tasks and Responsibilities
Execution Party (Competency Criteria) Guidelines,

PETRONAS Key
Processes and
Tasks
Accountable Responsible Documentation
Define
performance Project Technical
standards including Project Manager Authorities i.e.
Safety Critical discipline leads
Elements
Define the
technical integrity
management Project Manager Project Engineer Mandatory Control
requirements for Framework
facilities
PETRONAS
Technical
Identify major HSE
Standards
risks, prepare
mitigation plans Project Basis of
Project HSE
and demonstrate Project Manager Design
Advisor
that HSE risks are
ALARP during
design
Prepare
specifications, Project’s Technical
plans and design, Authorities i.e.
complying with Project Manager
discipline
PTS, legal and engineers
industry
regulations and
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 141
codes
Prepare
performance
testing
requirements and
Commissioning
acceptance criteria Project Manager
Lead Engineer
for pre-
commissioning and
commissioning
activities
Construct and
install jacket and
topsides facilities Commissioning
including all Lead Engineer
Project Manager
required hook up Construction Lead
and testing to Engineer
manage HSE
issues
Design and
construct pipelines
and subsea
flowlines to meet Pipelines and
Project Manager
required standards Subsea Engineer
for integrity and
prevention of
major accidents
Verification
As built drawings
Data sheets and specifications
Audits and reviews during design construction and installation
Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) or Site Acceptance Test (SAT)
PETRONAS Process Owner: Engineering Manager

HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 142
Appendix 11
-
Typical Information Required
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 143
Item Description
1.0 Section 1 – Hazardous Substances
1.01 Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for all raw materials and products
Complete list of hazardous substances inventory and data (location,
1.02
facilities, average storage capacity, maximum anticipated storage)
1.03 Type of leak detection system on-site i.e. fire and gas detection
Latest JKKP-5 form – Occupational Safety and Health Regulations (Control of
1.04 Industrial Major Accident Hazards) 1996 Notification of Industrial Activity
Form (Malaysia only)
2.0 Section 2 – Installation Information – “As Built” version
Map / Layout showing location and surrounding areas / facilities (for onshore
2.01
– updated version since last submission to DOSH)
Facilities layout (updated version), Overall Field Layout Drawing and Pipeline
2.02
routing layout
Site specific layout plans within each facilities (sub-unit) showing locations
2.03
and maximum inventory of hazardous substances (updated version)
2.04 Latest offsite population data (onshore only)
Latest manning levels for personnel on-site and their occupancy factors in
2.05 identified areas / facilities / platforms. For offshore, maximum and average
POB, manning levels on each deck / area
Total number of wells, number of operating wells including current closed in
2.06 tubing head pressure, flow rate, flowing temperature, etc) and number of
wells that are shut in.
Design life of each platform, date start of operation and asset integrity
2.07
assessment of the facility, Details of any asset life extension studies
2.08 Frequency of visit of operators to satellite platforms, duration of each visit
2.09 No. of dedicated supply vessels / standby vessel / FRC
2.10 Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) / Utility Flow Diagram (UFD)
2.11 Heat and Material Balance
2.12 Piping and Instrumentation Drawing (P&IDs)
2.13 Cause and Effect Matrix (Process) / API RP 14C SAFE Chart
2.14 Equipment Layout (Plan view and Elevation view)
2.15 Safety Equipment, fire fighting and escape route layouts
2.16 Hazardous Area Classification drawing
2.17 Functional shutdown logic block diagram
2.18 ESD kill knob loop schematic
2.19 Telecommunication system overall block diagram
2.20 PAGA system block diagram
2.21 Equipment list
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 144
2.22 Facility HAZID Report

2.23 Facility HAZOP Report
2.24 Latest revision of the facility HSE Case
2.25 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report
2.26 Heath Risk Assessment (HRA) Report
Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) / Simultaneous Operations, Hazards
2.27
and Effects Register (HER) and Critical Activities Catalogue (CAC)
Close out reports on recommendations raised in all HSE Studies /
2.28
Assessments / Reports
3.0 Section 3 – Actual Photographs of Facility
3.01 Photograph of helicopter operations
3.02 Photograph of crew transfer operation via boat
3.03 Photograph of lifting activities involving crane and supply boat
3.04 Aerial photographs of the various sides of the facility
Close up photographs of safety systems / safety critical elements on the
3.05 facility e.g. firewalls, gas detectors, fire detectors, firewater system and
pumps, lifeboats, life rafts, abseiling ropes, etc
3.06 Snap shots of the platform at various angles (elevation view, top, each deck)
4.0 Section 4 – Philosophies – “As Built” version
4.01 HSE / Safety Philosophy
4.02 Basis of Design
4.03 Operating and Maintenance Philosophy
4.04 Escape and Evacuation Philosophy
4.05 Relief, Vent and Blowdown Philosophy
4.06 Shutdown System Philosophy
4.07 Structural Design Basis
4.08 Firewater Protection Philosophy
4.09 Fire and Gas System Philosophy
4.10 Fire Fighting Philosophy
4.11 Process Control System Philosophy
4.12 Safety Instrumented System Philosophy
4.13 Operations Philosophy
5.0 Section 5 – Safety Management System
Organisation structure / chart at plant level including responsibilities and
5.01 accountabilities of the management and personnel as provided in the
organisation structure
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 145
HSE committee (as formal communication of HSE issues from the company
5.02 to other parties) details e.g. function, members, roles and responsibilities,
structure, operation, etc
5.03 HSE Plan
Emergency Response Manual / Arrangements including Platform Emergency
Response Plan, Oil Spill Response Plan, Typhoon / Cyclone Response Plan,
5.04
emergency response team, emergency drills and exercises conducted /
planned etc.
Training details including records (e.g. training needs, type of training
5.05
conducted, frequency, personnel competency, safety passports, etc)
Specific courses / permit / certificate for conducting HSE critical work
5.06
including records
Risk management documentation e.g. documentation on HSE hazards
5.07
identification, records, controls and management
5.08 Incident reporting and follow up procedures, records and communication
5.09 HSEMS Audit – HSE elements, frequency, personnel involved, function
HSE Management System Standard / Manual (not limited to key safety
responsibilities, design and operating standards, contractor management,
5.10
safety committee, training matrix and competence assurance, monitoring
and audit, health programmes, security programmes, etc)
5.11 Latest signed HSE Policies, drug and alcohol abuse policy, etc
6.0 Section 6 – Potential Major Accidents
6.01 Risk assessment report for plant modifications, HAZID study report
6.02 Safety and fire fighting equipment layout for all units
6.03 Layout drawing for all EER facilities
Temporary Refuge Impairment Assessment (TRIA) / Escape, Evacuation and
6.04
Rescue Analysis (EERA)
Evacuation information (muster time, time to prepare lifeboat) based on
6.05
emergency drill reports
6.06 Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA) report
6.07 Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis (ESSA)
6.08 Ship collision study
6.09 Fire and Gas Mapping Study
All calculation files for all the formal safety assessments e.g. spreadsheets,
6.10
consequence modelling files, etc
6.11 Fire rating and blast rating specification
6.12 Blast Protection Report
6.13 Flare Radiation and Dispersion Study
6.14 Fire and Gas Detection Study
6.15 Firewater and deluge layouts
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 146
6.16 Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

6.17 Dropped Object Study
6.18 Fire and Gas Detection System Layout
6.19 Safety Integrity Level (SIL) assessment and verification reports
6.20 Acoustic Induced Vibration (AIV) Report
7.0 Section 7 – Others
Complete list of plant / platform modifications since last HSE Case / CIMAH
7.01
submission
Comments / correspondence between PETRONAS and DOSH since last
7.02
CIMAH submission to DOSH (onshore only)
7.03 Performance Standards for Safety Critical Elements
7.04 Noise Study Report
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 147
Appendix 12
-
Verification Examination
Level
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 148
SCE Verification Examination Level

The SCE Register will include a “Verification Examination Level”, based on
the nature of the asset and the perceived consequence of failure. This
examination level will be categorized into three groups 1, 2 and 3, based
on the function of the SCE (i.e. inherent safety, prevention, control,
mitigation or emergency response), the propensity of failure to escalate
the incident, and the extent to which an alternative system can
compensate for the failed SCE.
The examination level is based on a scoring system with:
SCE Verification Examination Level = F x C x A
Function Score ‘F’
The distinction between each function is made on the basis that hazard
elimination or prevention is more effective than control, which in turn is
more effective than mitigation of effects or emergency response. On this
basis the following score set has been used:
Table A1– Function Score ‘F’
Function Description Score
Elimination and minimisation of hazards by

Inherent Safety 3
design
Reduction of likelihood of occurrence of

Prevention 3
accidents
Limitation of scale, intensity and duration of

Control 2
accidents
Mitigation Protection from effects 1
Emergency
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue 1
Response
Therefore, typically Structural Integrity and Process Containment barrier

groupings will represent examples of inherent safety barriers. Ignition
Control, SCEs such as Navigational Aids etc., may represent an example of
Prevention. Control and Mitigation functions are typically represented by
the Detection, Protection and Shutdown systems. For example, a fire
water system, PFP are considered to represent a mitigation function as
they offer protection from the effects. However, fire and gas detection,
ESD and blowdown systems are Control measures as they will limit the
scale and duration of the accident.
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 149
Consequence Score ‘C’
The potential for escalation of an incident due to failure of SCE is scored as

follows:
Table A2 – Consequence Score ‘C’
Function Description Score
Failure of the SCE function would not solely

Moderate contribute to an increase in severity of the 1
consequences.
Failure of the SCE function would or could lead to

escalation of the consequences, or
Significant Items whose failure could lead to major 2
hydrocarbon release and escalation affecting more
than one module or compartment.
Failure of the SCE function would or could lead to

major escalation of the consequences, or
Major Items whose failure would lead to direct 3

impairment of the TR or emergency escape and
rescue (EER) systems including associated support
structure.
Alternative Score ‘A’
The extent to which an alternative SCE can take over the function of the
failed SCE is scored as follows:
Table A3 – Alternative Score ‘A’
Alternative Description Score
There is no SCE that can reasonably duplicate the

No 2
function of the SCE subject to failure.
There is an alternative SCE that can carry out a

Yes 1
similar function to the SCE subject to failure.
Verification Examination Level
The verification examination level of each SCE is based on the ranges of

the examination level scores presented below:
HSE CASE
DOCUMENT NO : DATE:
REVISION 1.0 150
Table A4 – Verification Examination Levels
Level Score
1 12 to 18
2 6 to 11
3 1 to 5
The verification examination levels may be typically defined as follows:
 Examination Level 1 – High consequence of failure, and little or no level

of redundancy. Its failure during normal operation could immediately
result in a major incident i.e. single barrier to the Major Accident
Hazard
 Examination Level 2 – Significant consequence of failure, and at least
one level of redundancy but could not immediately result in a major
incident i.e. two or more barriers to the Major Accident Hazard
 Examination Level 3 – Minimal immediate consequences of an
individual failure, and having several levels of redundancy i.e. many
barriers to the Major Accident Hazard.
The verification examination level of the SCE may influence the frequency
of inspection, testing and verification, when considered in conjunction with
the likelihood of its failure and the required reliability or availability.
However, the verification examination level should be considered in the
development of a verification scheme. For example, a high examination
level item such as the jacket should attract more verification checks than a
less critical item for example a fire water pump. Hence, as the
examination levels will impact the verification scheme, it is essential that
the methodology adopted for the SCE verification examination levels are
agreed with the Independent Verification Body.
It should be noted that the Verification Examination Level does not reflect
the overall importance of the SCE or distinguish between the importance of
one SCE compared to another.

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Exploration and Production TECHNICAL STANDARD FOR

Copy No. Title Location

Rev. Description Date Approver Title Name

1) Document Custodian to update Amendment Record as and when

4.4.4 HSE Case Approver ................................................................ 28

10.6.1 Barrier and Control Effectiveness ................................................ 60

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

FERA ....................... Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment

MH .......................... Major Hazard

TR........................... Temporary Refuge

 Define the business accountability in delivering HSE case across the

The contents of the HSE Case shall be comprehensive, incorporating

Additionally, the requirements specified in this technical standard shall

In these situations, this standard shall be the minimum acceptable

This standard specifically excludes the completion of an Environmental

In addition, occupational health risk assessments shall be identified

1.3 General Definitions

 Shall, Will, Must means that the action is mandatory across

1.4 Requirement for HSE Case

 Drilling Units in accordance with IADC Guidelines [10][11]

1.5 Drilling Units

1.6 Offshore and Onshore Production facilities

HEMP is a structured methodology for the identification of HSE hazards

the Hazards & Effects Register, inclusive of relevant risk classification

Guidelines for HEMP are provided in the PETRONAS Technical Standard

It should be noted that whilst HEMP may include consideration of

1.6.2 HSE Case Purpose

The HSE Case must demonstrate in relation to the subject site or

All production facilities, including those operated by Contractors, shall

 The regulatory requirement of the Country where the subject site or

It is required that this Technical Standard shall be a minimum standard

In cases where the production operations’ facilities are operated by a

1.6.3 HSE Cases

An HSE Case is a living document that considers the full lifecycle of

Figure 1-1 – Project Life Cycle and HSE Case Reports

1.6.4 CIMAH and the HSE Case requirement

The HSE Case required by this standard shall be considered to be in

Onshore and offshore facilities are required by this standard to

Malaysian onshore facilities are required by the Control of Industrial

For onshore facilities in Malaysia that do not require submission of a

1.6.5 PETRONAS HSE Case

Specifically for the preparation of the HSE Case, PETRONAS identifies

 Stage 1: Concept Select Phase

Table 1-1 – HSE Case requirements

PETRONAS Contractor HSE

PETRONAS owned and

PETRONAS owned asset

PETRONAS operated asset

3rd Party owned and

In the situation where the PETRONAS asset is linked or connected to a

1.6.7 Temporary Changes / Mode of Operation

In the situation where there are temporary changes to be made to an

Case shall be updated to reflect the temporary mode of operation /

1.6.8 HSE Case for HSE-Critical Operations

For complete hazard management, consideration within the HSE Case

2 HSE CASE AND TECHNICAL INTEGRITY PROCESS

The TIPS process can be represented as a 5 stage TIPS flowchart, and is

Figure 2-1 – Technical Integrity Process Safety (TIPS) Flowchart

FACILITY HSE CASE

The TIPS program has five main stages:

 Identification of Major Accident Hazards

 Identification of Performance Standards for these Safety Critical