21. OCA vs.

CA
G.R. No. 144817
March 7, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Oca and Isabelo Oca are the co-owners of a fishpond known in the locality as
the "Purong" property situated in Bolosan, Dagupan City. The four petitioners are the civil law lessees of
another called the "Salayog" property. Petitioner Jose Oca is also the sole and exclusive owner of two
fishponds commonly called the "Perew" and the "Fabian" properties. Respondent Sergio O. Abalos claims
to be the "share tenant-caretaker" of the above fishponds, asserting that he had been in peaceful
possession, cultivation and care of the aforesaid fishponds from the time he received the same from the
petitioners Oca brothers until the first week of May 1992 when he requested from them the share of the
harvest and instead of acceding, petitioners demanded that he vacate the lands.

A complaint for Peaceful Possession, Leasehold and Damages with Motion for the Issuance of Interlocutory
Order was filed by the respondent against the petitioner with the PARAD. Petitioners in their answer denied
that the respondent is a caretaker/tenant of the land. They acknowledged that the respondent is merely an
industrial partner who had waived his right as such, in consideration of the amount of P140,000.00. After
due proceedings, the PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent declaring him as a bona fide
tenant of the subject fishponds.

The above Decision was appealed by the petitioners to the DARAB but the Board affirmed in toto the
Decision of the PARAD. Petitioners sought relief with the Court of Appeals and filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari. The Appellate Court modified the Decision ruling that the private respondent cannot be a
tenant of the "Salayog" property, he having sold his share and interest and had consequently, waived any
interests he had thereon. Hence, the instant petition, raising as a new argument the supposed lack of
jurisdiction of the PARAD over the subject fishponds.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners be permitted to impugn for the first time the jurisdiction of the Provincial
Adjudicator at this stage of the case?

HELD:
The well-entrenched rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined exclusively by the
Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot
be acquired through, or waived or enlarged or diminished by, their act or omission; neither is it conferred by
acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or
disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character.

An error in jurisdiction over the subject matter can be objected to at any instance, as the lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the action. This kind of defense can be invoked even
for the first time on appeal or after final judgment. Such is understandable as this kind of jurisdiction, to
stress, is statutorily determined.This rule on timing, however, is not absolute. In highly meritorious and
exceptional circumstances, estoppel or waiver may operate as a shield to prevent a party from belatedly
resorting to this form of defense. Thus, we have held in the leading case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy that a
party may be barred by estoppel by laches from invoking this plea for the first time on appeal for the
purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active participation of said party invoking the
plea. We defined laches as "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to assert
it has abandoned it or has declined to assert it." In the case at bar, we find the petitioners guilty of estoppel
by laches. In the first place, they never disputed the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator at any stage of
the proceeding: whether in the Provincial Office level, the DARAB, or the Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding
the presence of numerous opportunities in the various stages of this case to contest the adjudicator's
exercise of jurisdiction, not once did they register a hint of protest. Neither can they claim that they were
prevented from contesting its jurisdiction during the eight years this case was under litigation.

The ends of justice and equity require that petitioners should not be allowed to defeat the tenant's right by
belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction. Permitting petitioners to assail the jurisdiction of the Provincial
Adjudicator at this late stage of the case would mean rendering useless all the proceedings held below. A
great deal of time, effort and resources would be put to waste both on the part of the litigants and of the
State. This is especially oppressive for the respondent, a tenant who cannot afford the discomforts of a
protracted litigation.

22. Tijam v. Sibonghanoy

FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00,
exclusive of interest filed by SerafinTijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy
and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month
prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of
First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than
P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which
jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court
along with the records of the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus
we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission
to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
(Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was
further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or
of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because
the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a
practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs.
Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127,
35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who
has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the Court of
Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26,
1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc.
vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p.
277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could
have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance
of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was
within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to
obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an
adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment
creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but
revolting.
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, We have become persuaded
that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of
Appeals x xx granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety x xx

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

23. REMIGIO ISIDRO vs CA

G.R. No. 105586
December 15, 1993

FACTS:
Private respondent Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4.5 hectares located
in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In 1985, Aniceta Garcia, sister of private respondent and also the
overseer of the latter, allowed petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy portion of the
abovementioned land, consisting of one (1) hectare, in order to augment his (petitioner's) income to meet
his family's needs. The occupancy of a portion of said land was subject to the condition that petitioner
would vacate the land upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying any rental and converted
the same into a fishpond.

In 1990, private respondent through her overseer demanded from petitioner the return of the land, but the
latter refused to vacate and return possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort and invested
capital in converting the same into a fishpond.

Based on an ocular inspection of the subject land, the trial court found that the land in question is a
fishpond and, thus, in a decision dated 30 May 1991, the said trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that
the land is agricultural and therefore the dispute over it is agrarian which is under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian relations as provided in Sec. 12(a) of Republic Act No. 946 (now
embodied in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land involved in this case is an agricultural land.

Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
As to the first issue, the answer is yes. As to the second issue, the answer is no.

The MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint primarily on the ground that the subject land is
agricultural and therefore the question at issue is agrarian. In this

connection, it is well to recall that Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of Procedure, provides that the
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive
Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential
Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating
to compensation of lands acquired under Republic Act No. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer
of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor
and lessee.

It is irrefutable in the case at bar that the subject land which used to be an idle, swampy land was
converted by the petitioner into a fishpond. And it is settled that a fishpond is an agricultural land. An
agricultural land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in Republic Act No. 6657 and not
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Republic Act No. 6657 defines
agricultural activity as the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock,
poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices
performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or
juridical.

But a case involving an agricultural land does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute upon
which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso facto make the
possessor an agricultural lessee or tenant. The law provides for conditions or requisites before he can
qualify as one and the land being agricultural is only one of them. The law states that an agrarian dispute
must be a controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over lands devoted to agriculture . And as
previously mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold, tenancy or stewardship.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant: (2)
the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5)
there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of harvests between the parties . All
these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of
one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de
jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the government under existing tenancy laws.

Furthermore, an agricultural lessee as defined in Sec. 116(2) of Republic Act No. 3844, is a person who, by
himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging
to, or possessed by, another with the latter's consent for purposes of production, for a price certain in
money or in produce or both . An agricultural lessor, on the other hand, is a natural or juridical person who,
either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants to another the cultivation
and use of his land for a price certain.

Based on the statutory definitions of a tenant or a lessee, it is clear that there is no tenancy or
agricultural/leasehold relationship existing between the petitioner and the private respondent. There was no
contract or agreement entered into by the petitioner with the private respondent nor with the overseer of the
private respondent, for petitioner to cultivate the land for a price certain or to share his harvests . Petitioner
has failed to substantiate his claim that he was paying rent for the use of the land.

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29. ONQUIT vs. BINAMIRA-PARCIA (MONZON)

A.M. MTJ-96-1085
October 8, 1998

FACTS:
The charge against respondent Judge stems from a forcible entry case with prayer for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction with damages. Said case was assigned to her
sala. The complainant and her two brothers were therein co-defendants. Complainant raised the issue of
jurisdiction stating that said case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) because it involves tenancy over an agricultural land. Thereafter, complainant and
her co-defendants filed with respondent Judge, an Ex-Parte Motion for Disqualification, Request for
Disqualification and Request for Resolution. Basically, these motions were founded on the trial court’s
alleged lack of jurisdiction. In a single Order, respondent Judge denied all three motions ruling that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint and not those raised by defendants. Moreover,
according to respondent Judge , the claim regarding the nature of the case at bar would not automatically
divest the court of its jurisdiction.
Subsequently, plaintiff in the lower court filed an injunction bond which was approved by respondent Judge
and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued against the defendants, including herein complainant. A
seizure order followed which directed respondent Sheriff to seize the palay from the land in question.

ISSUES:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction over the case.

WON that the plaintiff’s injunction bond was approved by respondent Judge without first serving a copy to
the complainant and the motion of issuance of seizure order was not served resulting in a violation of due
process.

WON the complainants were ordered to leave the land because they will certainly lose the case

WON the sheriff seized all the palay harvested without issuing a receipt, despite demand therefor, and
delivered the palay to the plaintiff.

HELD:
The case was dismissed. The court held that it is a basic rule that the material averments in the complaint,
which in this case is for ejectment, determine the jurisdiction of the court. And, jurisprudence dictates that
the court does not lose its jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as
a defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the parties.” It is the duty of the
court to receive evidence to determine the veracity of allegations of tenancy. In an Order of respondent
Judge dated 09 February 1996, it was ruled that, considering the evidence presented, the land in question
is an irrigated riceland, but not tenanted.

The records belie the claim of complainant that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was not served to the
defendants. Records show that said writ was served to the defendants on February 16, 1996 at their
residence but all refused to acknowledge receipt therefore, nevertheless the executing Sheriff left each a
copy to the defendants.

As to the allegation that the judge was persuaded with money and told the complainants to leave the land
were not supported by evidence apart from the self-serving statements made by complainant. The court is
not persuaded by said accusations hurled by complainant simply because there is no evidence thereon to
implicate the respondent Judge.

Neither are we convinced that respondent Sheriff was remiss in his duty to issue a receipt for the palay he
seized. Admittedly, he did not issue the receipt on the spot, but we accept the reason stated earlier for
issuing it when the palay was already cleaned and measured, next day. From the record, complainant
made no averment that respondent Sheriff derived pecuniary benefit in not immediately giving complainant
a receipt. It was reasonable to briefly wait until measurement could be made as to the volume of the palay
after being cleaned and threshed before issuance of the receipt. In the absence of contrary evidence, the
presumption prevails that the sheriff has regularly performed his official duty.

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