Police power; Due process; Presumption as to constitutionality of ordinance; Ordinance
regulating hotels, motels, etc.; Judicial inquiry
G.R. No. L-24693 July 31, 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC.
and GO CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
This is an appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition whether
Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.
FACTS
The Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760 on June 13, 1963
approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time
acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers
of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on
the ground:
 that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is
made to motels;
 that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being
unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00
fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
 that the provision in the same section which would require to refrain from
entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other
quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a
lobby open to public view at all times;
 that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be
open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly
authorized representatives;
 that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and
requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities;
 that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibits a person less
than 18 years old from being accepted; and
 that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance
for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license
of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of
its investments.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process
clause.
ACTIONS of the COURT
LOWER COURT: The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and,
therefore, null and void."
SUPREME COURT RULING: Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the
injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging-houses is a police
power measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As such, it is immune from any
imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance.
To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which
has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs".
An ordinance, having been enacted by councilors, must be presumed to be valid and should
not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise
of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the necessity for
evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. Where there was no factual foundation laid for
overthrowing an ordinance which is not void on its face, the presumption of constitutionality
must prevail.
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rests the
exercise of the police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the
requirements of certain constitutional guarantees, the exercise of such police power,
however, insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person, is subject to
judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious,
whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guarantee may call for correction by the courts.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard
to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or
property, in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process which must exist
both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity, is responsiveness to
the supremacy of reason. obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront to
reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking
body considers an evil of rather serious pro portions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of
authority. What should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication
of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of
public morals.