Recovery of Real Property: (Accion Interdictal) Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Forcible Entry
 An ejectment suit that may be instituted by "a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth".
 The possession is unlawful from the time of entry.

Unlawful Detainer
 An ejectment suit that may be instituted by "a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession".
 The possession is at first lawful and later becomes illegal.

Nature
They are summary in nature because they involve disturbance of social order, which must be
abated as promptly as possible.

Rationale
To provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession
of the property involved without delay in the determination thereof.

Jurisdiction
Municipal Trial Court/Metropolitan Trial Court

Issue
Mere physical or material possession (possession de facto); not juridical or civil possession,
which arises from ownership (possession de jure)

Prescription
Within 1 year from the date of actual entry (Forcible Entry) or from the date the last demand to
vacate (Unlawful Detainer)

Peralta-Labrador v. Bagarin (G.R. No. 165177, August 25, 2005)

It was clear that Peralta-Labrador's averment was a case for forcible entry because she alleged
prior physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by
Bulgarin. Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of respondent occurred 2
years prior to the filing of the complaint in 1996, the cause of action for forcible entry had
prescribed and the Metropolitan Trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

The complaint therefore should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court via an accion
publiciana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess, or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an
action to recover ownership as well as possession.

Nuñez v. SLTEAS (G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010)

If the unlawful entry was done through strategy or stealth, the 1-year prescriptive period
should be counted from the date of the discovery. The forcible entry requisite of prior
possession does not necessarily mean physical occupation of the property. It can mean doing
acts of possession (payment of real property tax).

Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006)

The ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the Tan Te
complaint, is an unlawful detainer case. A person who occupies the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between then, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment
is the proper remedy against them.

In such case, the unlawful possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate.
Since the last demand was sent on January 14, 1997 and the action was filed in September, 8,
1997, the action was instituted well within the 1 year period reckoned from the date when the
last demand was sent.

De La Paz v. Panis (G.R. No. L-57023, June 22, 1995)

The action was not for forcible entry; there was no allegation in the complaint that the
petitioners were denied possession of the land in question through any of the methods stated
in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, although private respondents prior possession was
clearly alleged.

Neither was the action one for unlawful detainer; it was noted earlier that there was no lease
contract between the parties, and the demand to vacate made upon the private respondents
did not make them tenants of the petitioners.

In order to gain possession of the land occupied by the private respondents, the proper remedy
adopted by the petitioners was the plenary action of recovery of possession before the then
Court of First Instance. Respondent judge, therefore, had jurisdiction over the case and should
not have dismissed it on the ground of lack thereof.

Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 116192, November 16, 1995)

This case involved a fence encroaching upon the parcel of land of a neighbor. It was not a
forcible entry case because there was no unlawful entry dispossessing the neighbor of the
property. It was also not for unlawful detainer because there was no contract or agreement
making the possession lawful at first and then it expired or was terminated making the
possession unlawful. It was for accion reivindicatoria since it was a recovery of ownership.

Ocampo v. Dionisio (G.R. No. 191101, October 1, 2014)

A judgment rendered in a forcible entry case will not bar an action between the same parties
respecting title or ownership because between a case for forcible entry and an accion
reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action.
A forcible entry case only involves the issue of possession over the subject property while the
recovery of possession case puts in issue the ownership of the subject property and the right to
possess the same.

The decision in the forcible entry case is conclusive only as to the MTC’s determination that the
petitioners are not liable for forcible entry since the respondents failed to prove their prior
physical possession; it is not conclusive as to the ownership of the parcel of land.

Suarez v. Emboy (G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014)

In ejectment cases, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show a statement of
facts to determine the class of case and remedies available to the parties. When the complaint
fails to state the facts constituting a forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not
state how entry was effected or how the dispossession started, the remedy should either be an
accion publiciana or accion reividicatoria.

In this case, the first requisite was absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how
Emboy entered the lot and constructed a house upon it. She was also silent about the details
on who specifically permitted Emboy to occupy the lot, and how and when such tolerance came
about.

Hence, the complaint should not have been for unlawful detainer and the CA did not commit an
error in dismissing Carmencita's complaint.

G.R. No. 169380 November 26, 2012

FIORELLO R. JOSE, Petitioner,

vs.
ROBERTO ALFUERTO, ERNESTO BACAY, ILUMINADO BACAY, MANUEL BANTACULO, LETTY
BARCELO, JING BERMEJO, MILNA BERMEJO, PABLO BERMEJO, JHONNY BORJA, BERNADETTE
BUENAFE, ALFREDO CALAGOS, ROSAURO CALAGOS, ALEX CHACON, AIDA CONSULTA,
CARMEN CORPUZ, RODOLFO DE VERA, ANA DELA ROSA, RUDY DING, JOSE ESCASINAS,
GORGONIO ESPADERO, DEMETRIO ESTRERA, ROGELIO ESTRERA, EDUARDO EVARDONE,
ANTONIO GABALEÑO, ARSENIA GARING, NARCING GUARDA, NILA LEBATO, ANDRADE
LIGAYA, HELEN LOPEZ, RAMON MACAIRAN, DOMINGO NOLASCO, JR., FLORANTE NOLASCO,
REGINA OPERARIO, CARDING ORCULLO, FELICISIMO PACATE, CONRADO P AMINDALAN, JUN
PARIL, RENE SANTOS, DOMINADOR SELVELYEJO, VILLAR, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE and Unknown
Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque
City, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
decision1 dated March 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80166. The Court of
Appeals’ decision reversed the decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City,
Branch 257, and of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 77, by
dismissing petitioner Fiorello R. Jose’s complaint for ejectment against Roberto Alfuerto,
Ernesto Bacay, Iluminado Bacay, Manuel Bantaculo, Letty Barcelo, Jing Bermejo, Milna Bermejo,
Pablo Bermejo, Jhonny Borja, Bernadette Buenafe, Alfredo Calagos, Rosauro Calagos, Alex
Chacon, Aida Consulta, Carmen Corpuz, Rodolfo De Vera, Ana Dela Rosa, Rudy Ding, Jose
Escasinas, Gorgonio Espadero, Demetrio Estrera, Rogelio Estrera, Eduardo Evardone, Antonio
Gabaleño, Arsenia Garing, Narcing Guarda, Nila Lebato, Andrade Ligaya, Helen Lopez, Ramon
Macairan, Domingo Nolasco, Jr., Florante Nolasco, Regina Operario, Carding Orcullo, Felicisimo
Pacate, Conrado Pamindalan, Jun Paril, Rene Santos, Dominador Selvelyejo, Rosario Ubaldo,
Sergio Villar, John Doe, Jane Doe and Unknown Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II,
Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City (respondents), on the ground that the petitioner’s cause
of action was not for unlawful detainer but for recovery of possession. The appellate court
affirmed this decision in its resolution of August 22, 2005.2

The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo Chua Sing under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52594,3 with an area of 1919 square meters, located in Barangay
San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Chua Sing purchased the land in 1991. On April 1, 1999, Chua Sing
leased the property to the petitioner. Their contract of lease was neither notarized nor
registered with the Parañaque City Registry of Deeds.4

The lease contract provided that:

That the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and renewable for the same period upon
mutual agreement of the parties to commence upon the total eviction of any occupant or
occupants. The LESSOR hereby transfers all its rights and prerogative to evict said occupants in
favor of the LESSEE which shall be responsible for all expenses that may be incurred without
reimbursement from the LESSOR. It is understood however that the LESSOR is hereby waiving,
in favor of the LESSEE any and all damages that may be recovered from the
occupants.5(Underscore ours)

Significantly, the respondents already occupied the property even before the lease contract
was executed.

On April 28, 1999, soon after Chua Sing and the petitioner signed the lease contract, the
petitioner demanded in writing that the respondents vacate the property within 30 days and
that they pay a monthly rental of P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the property. 6

The respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. On October 20, 1999, the petitioner filed an
ejectment case against the respondents before Branch 77 of the Parañaque City MeTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 11344.7
In this complaint, no mention was made of any proceedings before the barangay. Jose then
brought the dispute before the barangay for conciliation.8 The barangay issued a Certification to
File Action on March 1, 2000.9 Jose was then able to file an amended complaint, incorporating
the proceedings before the barangay before the summons and copies of the complaint were
served upon the named defendants.10

In the Amended Complaint11 dated March 17, 2000, the petitioner claimed that as lessee of the
subject property, he had the right to eject the respondents who unlawfully occupy the land. He
alleged that:

7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the subject lot, have
defiantly erected their houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever, much
less any building permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful and
registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor.12

The petitioner also stated that despite his written demand, the respondents failed to vacate the
property without legal justification. He prayed that the court order the respondents; (1) to
vacate the premises; (2) to pay him not less than P41,000.00 a month from May 30,1999 until
they vacate the premises; and (3) to pay him attorney’s fees of no less than P50,000.00, and the
costs of suit.13

In their Answer, the respondents likewise pointed out that they have been in possession of the
land long before Chua Sing acquired the property in 1991, and that the lease contract between
the petitioner and Chua Sing does not affect their right to possess the land. The respondents
also presented a Deed of Assignment,14 dated February 13, 2000, issued by David R. Dulfo in
their favor. They argued that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case as the issue deals with
ownership of the land, and sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action and
for lack of jurisdiction. They also filed a counterclaim for actual and moral damages for the filing
of a baseless and malicious suit.

After the required position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence were submitted, the
MeTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s favor. In its decision 15 of January 27, 2003, the MeTC
held that the respondents had no right to possess the land and that their occupation was
merely by the owner’s tolerance. It further noted that the respondents could no longer raise
the issue of ownership, as this issue had already been settled: the respondents previously filed
a case for the annulment/cancellation of Chua Sing’s title before the RTC, Branch 260, of
Parañaque City, which ruled that the registered owner’s title was genuine and valid. Moreover,
the MeTC held that it is not divested of jurisdiction over the case because of the respondents’
assertion of ownership of the property. On these premises, the MeTC ordered the respondents
to vacate the premises and to remove all structures introduced on the land; to each pay
P500.00 per month from the date of filing of this case until they vacate the premises; and to
pay Jose, jointly and severally, the costs of suit and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
On appeal before the RTC, the respondents raised the issue, among others, that no legal basis
exists for the petitioner’s claim that their occupation was by tolerance, "where the possession
of the defendants was illegal at the inception as alleged in the complaint, there can be no
tolerance."16

The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision of January 27, 2003. It issued its decision 17 on October 8,
2003, reiterating the MeTC’s ruling that a case for ejectment was proper. The petitioner, as
lessee, had the right to file the ejectment complaint; the respondents occupied the land by
mere tolerance and their possession became unlawful upon the petitioner’s demand to vacate
on April 28, 1999. The RTC, moreover, noted that the complaint for ejectment was filed on
October 20, 1999, or within one year after the unlawful deprivation took place. It cited
Pangilinan, et al. v. Hon. Aguilar, etc., et al.18 and Yu v. Lara, et al.19 to support its ruling that a
case for unlawful detainer was appropriate.

On March 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and MeTC decisions.20 It ruled that
the respondents’ possession of the land was not by the petitioner or his lessor’s tolerance. It
defined tolerance not merely as the silence or inaction of a lawful possessor when another
occupies his land; tolerance entailed permission from the owner by reason of familiarity or
neighborliness. The petitioner, however, alleged that the respondents unlawfully entered the
property; thus, tolerance (or authorized entry into the property) was not alleged and there
could be no case for unlawful detainer. The respondents’ allegation that they had been in
possession of the land before the petitioner’s lessor had acquired it in 1991 supports this
finding. Having been in possession of the land for more than a year, the respondents should not
be evicted through an ejectment case.

The Court of Appeals emphasized that ejectment cases are summary proceedings where the
only issue to be resolved is who has a better right to the physical possession of a property. The
petitioner’s claim, on the other hand, is based on an accion publiciana: he asserts his right as a
possessor by virtue of a contract of lease he contracted after the respondents had occupied the
land. The dispositive part of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October 8, 2003 of the RTC,
Branch 257, Parañaque City, in Civil Case No. 03-0127, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
amended complaint for ejectment is DISMISSED.21

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,22 which the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolution23 of August 22, 2005. In the present appeal, the petitioner raises before us the
following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF
THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT IS NOT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER BUT FOR RECOVERY OF
POSSESSION AND THEREFORE DISMISSIBLE
 II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE BASED ON
RESPONDENTS’ MATERIAL CHANGE OF THEORY WHICH IS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH
THEIR DEFENSES INVOKED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT

III

WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY DECIDE THIS CASE ON THE MERITS TO AVOID
CIRCUITOUS PROCEDURE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.24

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition unmeritorious.

Unlawful detainer is not the proper

remedy for the present case.

The key issue in this case is whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy.

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This
action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to
hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the
possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was permitted by the
plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them. However, the defendant’s
possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject
property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and
the defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted
one year from the unlawful withholding of possession.25

The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of
the court. The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the
absence of these allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy
and the municipal trial court or the MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the case. 26

In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the following allegations in support of his
unlawful detainer complaint:

3. On April 1, 1999, plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr. Rudy Chuasing, that parcel of lot owned and
registered in the lessor’s name, covering the area occupied by the defendants.

xxxx
6. Plaintiff’s lessor had acquired the subject property as early as 1991 through sale, thereafter
the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title was subsequently registered under his name.

7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the subject lot, have
defiantly erected their houses thereat without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever, much
less any building permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful and
registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor.

8. By reason of defendants’ continued unlawful occupancy of the subject premises, plaintiff

referred the matter to his lawyer who immediately sent a formal demand upon each of the
defendants to vacate the premises. Copies of the demand letter dated 28 April 1999 are xxx
hereto attached as annexes "C" to "QQ."

9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and refused and continues to fail and refuse to
vacate the premises without valid or legal justification.27 (emphasis ours)

The petitioner’s allegations in the amended complaint run counter to the requirements for
unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action, the possession of the defendant was
originally legal and his possession was permitted by the owner through an express or implied
contract.

In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the respondents’ occupancy was unlawful from the
start and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s
possession becomes illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the defendant to vacate the
property and the defendant’s subsequent refusal. In the present case, paragraph 8
characterizes the defendant’s occupancy as unlawful even before the formal demand letters
were written by the petitioner’s counsel. Under these allegations, the unlawful withholding of
possession should not be based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged
unlawful act had taken place at an earlier unspecified date.

The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly alleged that the respondents occupied the
premises by mere tolerance of the owner. No allegation in the complaint nor any supporting
evidence on record, however, shows when the respondents entered the property or who had
granted them permission to enter. Without these allegations and evidence, the bare claim
regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld.

In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,28 the Court cited Prof. Arturo M. Tolentino’s definition and
characterizes "tolerance" in the following manner:

Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are "those which by reason of
neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of property allows his neighbor or another person to do
on the property; they are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s property
can give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who permits them out of
friendship or courtesy." He adds that: "they are acts of little disturbances which a person, in the
interest of neighborliness or friendly relations, permits others to do on his property, such as
passing over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well." And, Tolentino
continues, even though "this is continued for a long time, no right will be acquired by
prescription." Further expounding on the concept, Tolentino writes: "There is tacit consent of
the possessor to the acts which are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and
silence on the part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of tolerance
that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts of possession are realized or
performed. The question reduces itself to the existence or non-existence of the permission.
[citations omitted; italics supplied]

The Court has consistently adopted this position: tolerance or permission must have been
present at the beginning of possession; if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action
for unlawful detainer would not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed. 29

It is not the first time that this Court adjudged contradictory statements in a complaint for
unlawful detainer as a basis for dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs of Urban,30 the claim that the
defendant’s possession was merely tolerated was contradicted by the complainant’s allegation
that the entry to the subject property was unlawful from the very beginning. The Court then
ruled that the unlawful detainer action should fail.

The contradictory statements in the complaint are further deemed suspicious when a
complaint is silent regarding the factual circumstances surrounding the alleged tolerance. In
Ten Forty Realty Corporation v. Cruz,31 the complaint simply stated that: "(1) defendant
immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by
the plaintiff; and (2) the respondent’s allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere
tolerance." The Court expressed its qualms over these averments of fact as they did not contain
anything substantiating the claim that the plaintiff tolerated or permitted the occupation of the
property by the defendant:

These allegations contradict, rather than support, plaintiff’s theory that its cause of action is for
unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the view that defendant’s occupation of the
property was unlawful at its inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in
unlawful detainer cases that plaintiff’s supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must be present
right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be recovered.

As the bare allegation of plaintiff’s tolerance of defendant’s occupation of the premises has not
been proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA
correctly ruled that the ejectment case should have been for forcible entry — an action that
had already prescribed, however, when the Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The
prescriptive period of one year for forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of defendant’s
actual entry into the land, which in this case was on April 24, 1998.32
Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court considered the owner’s lack of knowledge of
the defendant’s entry of the land to be inconsistent with the allegation that there had been
tolerance.

In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required allegations regarding the grant of
permission, but proof as well. It noted that the plaintiffs alleged the existence of tolerance, but
ordered the dismissal of the unlawful detainer case because the evidence was "totally wanting
as to when and under what circumstances xxx the alleged tolerance came about." It stated that:

Judging from the respondent’s Answer, the petitioners were never at all in physical possession
of the premises from the time he started occupying it and continuously up to the present. For
sure, the petitioners merely derived their alleged prior physical possession only on the basis of
their Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), arguing that the issuance of said title presupposes their
having been in possession of the property at one time or another.35

Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases cannot simply anchor their claims on the
validity of the owner’s title. Possession de facto must also be proved.

As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,36 we already ruled that a complaint
which fails to positively aver any overt act on the plaintiff’s part indicative of permission to
occupy the land, or any showing of such fact during the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful
detainer. As the Court then explained, a case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must
definitely establish its existence from the start of possession; otherwise, a case for forcible
entry can mask itself as an action for unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed beyond the
required one-year prescription period from the time of forcible entry:

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer — not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress — in the inferior court — provided for in
the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek
relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after
the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can
really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will
merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court — upon plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in — and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is
unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but
in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.37 (italics supplied)
Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for us to deprive the respondents of
possession over a property that they have held for at least eight years before the case was filed
in 1999, by means of a summary proceeding, simply because the petitioner used the word
"tolerance" without sufficient allegations or evidence to support it.

There was no change in the

respondents’ theory during
the appeal that would amount
to a deprivation of the petitioner’s
right to due process.

The petitioner alleges that the respondents had never questioned before the MeTC the fact
that their occupancy was by tolerance. The only issues the respondents allegedly raised were:
(1) the title to the property is spurious; (2) the petitioner’s predecessor is not the true owner of
the property in question; (3) the petitioner’s lease contract was not legally enforceable; (4) the
petitioner was not the real party-in-interest; (5) the petitioner’s predecessor never had prior
physical possession of the property; and (6) the respondents’ right of possession was based on
the "Deed of Assignment of Real Property" executed by Dulfo. The respondents raised the issue
of tolerance merely on appeal before the RTC. They argue that this constitutes a change of
theory, which is disallowed on appeal.38

It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on
appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower
court will not be considered by the reviewing court. The defenses not pleaded in the answer
cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. To do so would be
unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present evidence in connection with the
new theory; this would offend the basic rules of due process and fair play.39

While this Court has frowned upon changes of theory on appeal, this rule is not applicable to
the present case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the action due the petitioner’s failure to
allege and prove the essential requirements of an unlawful detainer case. In Serdoncillo v.
Spouses Benolirao,40 we held that:

In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant
on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts
as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy,
without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver
facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry
was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. (emphasis ours; italics supplied)

Regardless of the defenses raised by the respondents, the petitioner was required to properly
allege and prove when the respondents entered the property and that it was the petitioner or
his predecessors, not any other persons, who granted the respondents permission to enter and
occupy the property. Furthermore, it was not the respondents’ defense that proved fatal to the
case but the petitioner’s contradictory statements in his amended complaint which he even
reiterated in his other pleadings.41

Although the respondents did not use the word "tolerance" before the MeTC, they have always
questioned the existence of the petitioner’s tolerance. In their Answer to Amended Complaint,
the respondents negated the possibility of their possession of the property under the petitioner
and his lessor’s tolerance when the respondents alleged to have occupied the premises even
before the lessor acquired the property in 1991. They said as much in their Position Paper:

RODOLFO CHUA SING never had actual physical possession of his supposed property, as when
he became an owner of the 1,919 square meters property described in TCT No. 52594, the
property had already been occupied by herein DEFENDANTS since late 1970. Therefore,
DEFENDANTS were already occupants/possessors of the property from where they are being
ejected by FIORELLO JOSE, a supposed LESSEE of a property with a dubious title. The main thing
to be proven in the case at bar is prior possession and that the same was lost through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore possession
regardless of title or even ownership xxx. In the case at bar, neither RODOLFO CHUA SING nor
herein PLAINTIFF ever had any actual physical possession of the property where DEFENDANTS
have already possessed for more than ten (10) years in 1991 when RODOLFO CHUA SING got his
fake title to the property.42 (citation omitted)

In addition, whether or not it was credible, the respondent’s claim that their possession was
based on the Deed of Assignment executed by Dulfo, in behalf of the estate of Domingo de
Ocampo, shows that they considered the petitioner and his lessor as strangers to any of their
transactions on the property, and could not have stayed there upon the latter’s permission.

We note that even after the issue of tolerance had been directly raised by the respondents
before the RTC, the petitioner still failed to address it before the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and
the Supreme Court.43 At best, he belatedly states for the first time in his Memorandum44 before
this Court that his lessor had tolerated the respondents’ occupancy of the lot, without
addressing the respondents’ allegation that they had occupied the lot in 1970, before the
petitioner’s lessor became the owner of the property in 1991, and without providing any other
details. His pleadings continued to insist on the existence of tolerance without providing the
factual basis for this conclusion. Thus, we cannot declare that the Court of Appeals had in
anyway deprived the petitioner of due process or had unfairly treated him when it resolved the
case based on the issue of tolerance.

The Court cannot treat an ejectment

case as an accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria.
The petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed as an accion publiciana or
accion reivindicatoria, this Court should still resolve the case, as requiring him to properly refile
the case serves no other ends than to comply with technicalities.45

The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented before the MeTC in an ejectment case
and decide it as an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. These cases are not
interchangeable and their differences constitute far more than mere technicalities.

In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action for forcible entry cannot be treated as
an accion publiciana and summarized the reasons therefor. We find these same reasons also
applicable to an unlawful detainer case which bears the same relevant characteristics:

On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry can be treated as accion publiciana,
we rule in the negative. Forcible entry is distinct from accion publiciana. First, forcible entry
should be filed within one year from the unlawful dispossession of the real property, while
accion publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the real property. Second,
forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right to the physical possession of the real
property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better right to possession over
the real property. Third, an action for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial court and is a
summary action, while accion publiciana is a plenary action in the RTC. [italics supplied]

The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is brought before the proper inferior court to recover physical
possession only or possession de facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and forcible
entry cases are not processes to determine actual title to property. Any ruling by the MeTC on
the issue of ownership is made only to resolve the issue of possession, and is therefore
inconclusive.47 Because they only resolve issues of possession de facto, ejectment actions are
summary in nature, while accion publiciana (for the recovery of possession) and accion
reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are plenary actions.48 The purpose of allowing
actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be decided in summary proceedings is to
provide for a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor
of property from unjustly taking and continuing his possession during the long period it would
take to properly resolve the issue of possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the
maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of
possession might take the law in his hands and seize the property by force and violence.49 An
ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of determining
rights of possession or ownership. Citing Mediran v. Villanueva,50 the Court in Gonzaga v. Court
of Appeals51 describes in detail how these two remedies should be used:

In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to
protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it
requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke
the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously
just that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending the
decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the
possession of the property which is the subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly
dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social order.1âwphi1 Therefore, where a
person supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his
ownership against the party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an
action to this end in a court of competent jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by invading
the property and excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of
instituting an action to try the property right. [italics supplied]

Thus, if we allow parties to file ejectment cases and later consider them as an accion publiciana
or accion reivindicatoria, we would encourage parties to simply file ejectment cases instead of
plenary actions. Courts would then decide in summary proceedings cases which the rules
intend to be resolved through full-blown trials. Because these "summary" proceedings will have
to tackle complicated issues requiring extensive proof, they would no longer be expeditious and
would no longer serve the purpose for which they were created. Indeed, we cannot see how
the resulting congestion of cases, the hastily and incorrectly decided cases, and the utter lack of
system would assist the courts in protecting and preserving property rights.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals' decision dated March
14, 2005 and resolution dated August 22, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80116.

SPOUSES MANUEL AND G.R. No. 170575

FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO,
Petitioners,
Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
DEL CASTILLO, and
PEREZ, JJ.
GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION, INC.,
Promulgated:
Respondent. June 8, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants of the nature of
the action[1] and of which court has jurisdiction over the action.[2]
 This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the April 26, 2005 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 which dismissed the Petition for Review before it. Also assailed is the CA
Resolution[4] dated November 15, 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

The controversy between petitioners Manuel and Florentina Del Rosario

and respondent Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc. emanated from a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed by
the former against the latter, the surrounding circumstances relative thereto as summarized by the CA
in its assailed Decision are as follows:

The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of Lot 3-
A of Psd-301974 located in Roxas City which is described in and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-18397 of the Registry of Deeds for the City of Roxas.
Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took possession
and occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum of agreement entered into by
and between it and the City of Roxas. Its possession and occupancy of said land is in the
character of being lessee thereof.

In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the
respondent to vacate the premises of said land. The respondent did not heed such
notices because it still has the legal right to continue its possession and occupancy of
said land.[5]

On July 7, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint[6] for Unlawful Detainer against the respondent
before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City, docketed as Civil Case No. V-2391. Said
complaint contains, among others, the following significant allegations:

3. Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel of land,
situated at Dayao, Roxas City and covered by and described in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 18397 issued to the plaintiffs by the Register of Deeds for Roxas City as
evidenced by a xerox copy thereof which is hereto attached as Annex A.

4. Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the plaintiffs,

defendant took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same
and use[d] it for commercial purposes.

xxxx

7. Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the
land without any contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendants possession of the subject
property is only by tolerance.
 8. But [plaintiffs] patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in the last
quarter of 2002, plaintiffs made several demands upon said defendant to settle and/or
pay rentals for the use of the property.

xxxx

10. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed and

refused, as it continues to fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly rentals for the use
and occupancy of the land, and to vacate the subject premises despite the lapse of the
fifteen-day period specified in the said demand letters. Consequently, defendant is
unlawfully withholding possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are
the owners thereof.[7]

Upon service of summons, respondent filed its Answer[8] dated July 31, 2003 where it averred
that:

3. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of the

Complaint to the effect that the defendant took full control and possession of the
subject property, developed the same and has been using the premises in accordance
with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant
corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs
for over twenty-two long years; the defendant specifically DENIES the allegations
contained in the last part of this paragraph 4 of the Complaint that the defendant has
used the property leased for commercial purposes, the truth of the matter being that
the defendant has used and [is] still using the property only for civic non-profit
endeavors hewing closely to purposes of the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation
Inc., inter alia, devoted to general welfare, protection, and upliftment of the people of
Roxas City, Capiz, and in Panay Island, and elsewhere in the Philippines; that the
Foundation has spent out of its own funds for the compliance of its avowed aims and
purposes, up to the present, more than P25M, and that all the improvements, including
a beautiful auditorium built in the leased premises of the Foundation shall accrue to the
CITY (of Roxas), free from any compensation whatsoever, upon the expiration of this
Lease (Memorandum of Agreement, Annex 2 hereof), eighteen (18) years hence;

xxxx

5. The defendant specifically DENIES the allegations set forth in paragraph 7 of

the Complaint, the truth being that the defendant took possession of the subject
property by virtue of Memorandums of Agreement, photo-copies of which are hereto
attached as Annexes 1 and 2 and made integral parts hereof, entered into by defendant
and the City of Roxas, which is the true and lawful owner thereof; thus, the possession
of the subject property by the defendant foundation is lawful, being a lessee thereof;
 xxxx

8. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 10 of the

Complaint that defendant refused to pay monthly rental to the plaintiffs and to vacate
the premises, but specifically DENIES the rest of the allegations thereof, the truth being
that defendant has no obligation whatsoever, to the plaintiffs, as they are neither the
owners or lessors of the land occupied by defendant;

xxxx

As and by way of

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The defendant repleads the foregoing allegations, and avers further that:

12. The plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant.

The leased property does not belong to the plaintiffs. The property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397, [is] occupied by the [defendant] as [lessee] of
the City of Roxas since 1991, the latter having acquired it by purchase from the plaintiffs
way back on February 19, 1981, as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale which is
hereto attached as Annex 3 and made an integral part hereof. While, admittedly, the
said certificate of title is still in the name of the plaintiffs, nevertheless, the ownership of
the property covered therein has already transferred to the City of Roxas upon its
delivery to it. Article 1496 of the Civil Code provides that, ownership of the thing sold is
acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in any of the ways
specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that
the possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. It is also provided under
Article 1498 of the Civil Code that, when the sale is made through a public instrument,
the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, which is the object
of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred. Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex 3), the plaintiffs have
relinquished ownership of the property subject thereof in favor of the vendee, City
of Roxas. Necessarily, the possession of the property subject of the said Deed of
Absolute Sale now pertains to the City of Roxas and the plaintiffs have no more right,
whatsoever, to the possession of the same. It is defendant foundation by virtue of the
Memorandums of Agreement (Annexes 1 and 2 hereof), which has the legal right to
have possession of the subject property;[9]

After the MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary conference, respondent filed on
October 20, 2003 a Motion to Resolve its Defenses on Forum Shopping and Lack of Cause of
Action. Records show that before the instant case was filed, the City of Roxas had already filed a case
against petitioners for Surrender of Withheld Duplicate Certificate Under Section 107, [Presidential
Decree No.] 1529 docketed as Special Case No. SPL-020-03 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of RoxasCity. Subsequently, on October 27, 2003, petitioners filed their Opposition to the said Motion.

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

On November 24, 2003, the MTCC issued an Order[10] resolving the respondents Motion. In the
said Order, the MTCC held that:

The plaintiffs [have] no cause of action against herein defendant. The defendant
is the lessee of the City of Roxas of the parcel of land in question. There has been no
previous contractual relationship between the plaintiffs Del Rosarios and the defendant
Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. affecting the title of the land leased by the [Gerry] Roxas
Foundation. The Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. has not unlawfully withheld the
possession of the land it is leasing from its lessor. Its right to the physical possession of
the land leased by it from the City of Roxas subsists and continues to subsist until the
termination of the contract of lease according to its terms and pursuant to law.

The defendant had presented as its main defense that the property was already
sold by the plaintiffs to the present lessor of the property, the City of Roxas thru a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated February 19, 1981 executed by herein [plaintiff] spouses as
vendors.

Plaintiffs had not directly and specifically shown that the purported Deed of
Absolute Sale does not exist; rather, they contend that said document is merely
defective. They had not even denied the signatories to the said Contract of Sale;
specifically the authenticity of the spouses-plaintiffs signatures; all that plaintiffs did
merely referred to it as null and void and highly questionable without any specifications.

When the parties pleadings fail to tender any issue of fact, either because all the
factual allegations have been admitted expressly or impliedly; as when a denial is a
general denial; there is no need of conducting a trial, since there is no need of
presenting evidence anymore. The case is then ripe for judicial determination, either
through a judgment on the pleadings (Rules of Court, Rule 34) or by summary judgment
under Rule 35, Rules of Court.

In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that sometime in 1991, without the
consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the
subject property, developed the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes. x x x for so
many years, plaintiffs patiently waited for someone to make representation to them
regarding the use of the subject property, but the same never happened. Plaintiff[s]
have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any
 contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendants possession of the subject property is only
by tolerance.

xxxx

Defendant admits the allegations of the plaintiffs that the defendant took full
control and possession of the subject property, developed the same and has been using
the premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and the purposes
of the defendant corporation without any objection or opposition of any kind on the
part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long years.

That the defendants possession of the subject property is by virtue of a contract

of lease entered into by the defendant foundation with the City of Roxas which is the
true and lawful owner, the latter having acquired said property by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale as early as February 19, 1981, long before the defendant foundations
occupation of the property. In Alcos v. IAC 162 SCRA 823 (1988), Buyers immediate
possession and occupation of the property was deemed corroborative of the
truthfulness and authenticity of the deed of sale.

WHEREFORE, although this Court finds the defense on forum shopping

interposed by the defendant to be untenable and unmeritorious, and hence, denied;
this Court still finds the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs-spouses to be without a cause of
action and hence, dismisses this instant complaint. With cost against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On appeal, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 17 rendered a Decision[12] dated July 9, 2004 affirming the
MTCC Order.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Review. However, the CA, in a
Decision[13] dated April 26, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed Decision of the RTC.

Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14] which was, however, denied in a
Resolution[15] dated November 15, 2005.

Issues
 Still undaunted, petitioners now come to this Court on a Petition for Review on Certiorari raising
the following issues:

I. Whether x x x in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer, a court should

limit itself in interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the complaint; and,

II. Whether x x x there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.[16]

Our Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The allegations in petitioners Complaint constitute

judicial admissions.

Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC, among others, that: (1) sometime in
1991, without their consent and authority, respondent took full control and possession of the subject
property, developed the same and used it for commercial purposes; and (2) they allowed the
respondent for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual or legal basis. Petitioners
thus conclude that respondents possession of subject property is only by tolerance.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in

the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. x x x

A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense
with the introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice
necessary to be observed and complied with.[17]Correspondingly, facts alleged in the complaint are
deemed admissions of the plaintiff and binding upon him.[18] The allegations, statements or admissions
contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader.[19]

In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that respondents took control and possession of
subject property without their consent and authority and that respondents use of the land was without
any contractual or legal basis.
Nature of the action is determined by the judicial
admissions in the Complaint.

In Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo,[20] citing Caiza v. Court of Appeals,[21] this Court held
that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are
the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,[22] differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible
entry vis--vis unlawful detainer, to wit:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue
is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and
the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is
the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the
defendant's right to continue in possession.[23]

The words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth shall include every situation or
condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who
has had prior possession, therefrom.[24] The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion of
the original possessor by a person who has entered without right.[25]

The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily
implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is necessary.[26] The employment of
force, in this case, can be deduced from petitioners allegation that respondent took full control and
possession of the subject property without their consent and authority.

Stealth, on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and
to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission,[27] while strategy
connotes the employment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject property.[28] The
CA found that based on the petitioners allegations in their complaint, respondents entry on the land of
the petitioners was by stealth x x x.[29] However, stealth as defined requires a clandestine character
which is not availing in the instant case as the entry of the respondent into the property appears to be
with the knowledge of the petitioners as shown by petitioners allegation in their complaint that
[c]onsidering the personalities behind the defendant foundation and considering further that it is
plaintiffs nephew, then the vice-mayor, and now the Mayor of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del
Rosario, although without any legal or contractual right, who transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs
did not interfere with the activities of the foundation using their property.[30] To this Courts mind, this
allegation if true, also illustrates strategy.

Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the Complaint

establish a cause of action for forcible entry, and not for
unlawful detainer.

In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by means of
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.[31] [W]here the defendants possession of the property is
illegal ab initio, the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover
possession.[32]

In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control of
the subject property without any contractual or legal basis.[33] Assuming that these allegations are true,
it hence follows that respondents possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, the
foundation of petitioners complaint is one for forcible entry that is the forcible exclusion of the original
possessor by a person who has entered without right.[34] Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there
can be no tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondents possession was illegal at the inception.[35]

Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in

petitioners Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this Court finds that
the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entry and not the instant suit
for unlawful detainer.

Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for Forcible

Entry within the reglementary one-year period from the
time of dispossession.

Petitioners likewise alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and occupancy
of subject property in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one year
from the time of dispossession,[36] the action for forcible entry has already prescribed when petitioners
filed their Complaint in 2003. As a consequence, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action
against the respondent.

In fine, the MTCC properly dismissed the Complaint, and the RTC and the CA correctly affirmed
said order of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2005 and the Resolution
dated November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

LOURDES DELA CRUZ, G.R. No. 139442

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS Promulgated:

and MELBA TAN TE,
Respondents. December 6, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have
abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that
which he hath.

Holy Bible, Matthew 25:29

The Case
This petition for review seeks to nullify the April 30, 1999 Decision and the July 16, 1999
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49097, which reversed the Decision of the
Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 98-89174, and reinstated the
Decision of the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 20, which ordered petitioner
Dela Cruz to vacate the subject lot in favor of respondent Tan Te.[1]
The Facts

The Reyes family, represented by Mr. Lino Reyes, owned the lot located at No. 1332
Lacson Street (formerly Gov. Forbes Street), Sampaloc, Manila. Petitioner Lourdes Dela Cruz
was one of their lessees, and she religiously paid rent over a portion of the lot for well over 40
years. Sometime in 1989, a fire struck the premises and destroyed, among others, petitioners
dwelling. After the fire, petitioner and some tenants returned to the said lot and rebuilt their
respective houses; simultaneously, the Reyes family made several verbal demands on the
remaining lessees, including petitioner, to vacate the lot but the latter did not
comply. On February 21, 1994, petitioner was served a written demand to vacate said lot but
refused to leave. Despite the setback, the Reyes family did not initiate court proceedings
against any of the lessees.

On November 26, 1996, the disputed lot was sold by the Reyeses to respondent Melba Tan Te
by virtue of the November 26, 1996 Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent bought the lot in
question for residential purposes. Despite the sale, petitioner Dela Cruz did not give up the lot.

On January 14, 1997, petitioner was sent a written demand to relinquish the premises which
she ignored, prompting respondent Tan Te to initiate conciliation proceedings at the barangay
level. While respondent attempted to settle the dispute by offering financial assistance,
petitioner countered by asking PhP 500,000.00 for her house. Respondent rejected the counter
offer which she considered unconscionable. As a result, a certificate to file action was issued to
Tan Te.

On September 8, 1997, respondent Tan Te filed an ejectment complaint with damages before
the Manila MeTC, entitled Melba Tan Te v. Lourdes Dela Cruz and docketed as Civil Case No.
156730-CV. The complaint averred that: (1) the previous owners, the Reyeses were in
possession and control of the contested lot; (2) on November 26, 1996, the lot was sold to Tan
Te; (3) prior to the sale, Dela Cruz forcibly entered the property with strategy and/or stealth; (4)
the petitioner unlawfully deprived the respondent of physical possession of the property and
continues to do so; and, (5) the respondent sent several written demands to petitioner to
vacate the premises but refused to do so.
On October 24, 1997, petitioner filed her answer and alleged that: (1) the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC as more than one
year had elapsed from petitioners forcible entry; (2) she was a rent-paying tenant protected by
PD 20;[2] (3) her lease constituted a legal encumbrance upon the property; and (4) the lot was
subject of expropriation.

The Ruling of the Manila MeTC

On April 3, 1998, the MeTC decided as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff as

follows:

1. Ordering the defendant and all persons claiming right under her to
vacate the premises situated at 1332 Lacson Street (formerly Gov. Forbes
Street), Sampaloc, Manila and peacefully return possession thereof to
plaintiff;

2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P360.00 a

month from December 1996 to November 1997; P432.00 a month from
December 1997 to November 1998, plus 20% for each subsequent year
until the premises shall have been vacated and turned over to the plaintiff;

3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as

attorneys fees; and, the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[3]

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Unconvinced, petitioner Dela Cruz appealed the Decision of the MeTC in the Manila RTC
and the appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-89174. On September 1, 1998, the RTC
rendered its judgment setting aside the April 3, 1998 Decision of the Manila MeTC and dismissed
respondent Tan Tes Complaint on the ground that it was the RTC and not the MeTC which had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The RTC believed that since Tan Tes
predecessor-in-interest learned of petitioners intrusion into the lot as early as February 21,
1994, the ejectment suit should have been filed within the one-year prescriptive period which
expired on February 21, 1995. Since the Reyes did notfile the ejectment suit and respondent Tan
Te filed the action only on September 8, 1997, then the suit had become an accion
publiciana cognizable by the RTC.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Disappointed at the turn of events, respondent Tan Te appealed the adverse Decision to
the Court of Appeals (CA) which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49097. This time, the CA
rendered a Decision in favor of respondent Tan Te reversing the Manila RTC September 1, 1998
Decision and reinstated the Manila MeTC April 3, 1998 Decision.

Petitioner tried to have the CA reconsider its Decision but was rebutted in its July 16,
1999 Resolution.

Unyielding to the CA Decision and the denial of her request for reconsideration, petitioner Dela
Cruz now seeks legal remedy through the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari before the
Court.

The Issues

Petitioner Dela Cruz claims two (2) reversible errors on the part of the appellate court,
to wit:

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, WENT BEYOND THE
ISSUES OF THE CASE AND CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN REVERSING

THE DECISION OF THE RTC AND IN EFFECT, REINSTATING THE DECISION OF
THE [MeTC] WHICH IS CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.[4]

The Courts Ruling

Discussion on Rule 45

Before we dwell on the principal issues, a few procedural matters must first be resolved.
Petitioner Dela Cruz asks the Court to review the findings of facts of the CA, a course of action
proscribed by Section 1, Rule 45. Firm is the rule that findings of fact of the CA are final and
conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court provided they are supported by
evidence on record or substantial evidence. Fortunately for petitioner, we will be liberal with
her petition considering that the CAs factual findings contradict those of the RTC, and there was
an asseveration that the court a quo went beyond the issues of the case. Indeed, these grounds
were considered exceptions to the factual issue bar rule.

Secondly, the petition unnecessarily impleaded the CA in violation of Section 4, Rule 45. We will
let this breach pass only because there is a need to entertain the petition due to the conflicting
rulings between the lower courts; however, a repetition may result to sanctions.

The actual threshold issue is which court, the Manila RTC or the Manila MeTC, has jurisdiction
over the Tan Te ejectment suit. Once the jurisdictional issue is settled, the heart of the dispute
is whether or not respondent is entitled to the ejectment of petitioner Dela Cruz from the
premises.

However, the petition is bereft of merit.

On the Issue of Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain,
hear and determine certain controversies.[5] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by
law.

Section 33 of Chapter III -- on Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts of B. P. No. 129[6] provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
 Thus exclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings (accion interdictal) is
lodged with the first level courts. This is clarified in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure that embraces an action for forcible entry (detentacion), where one is deprived of
physical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. In actions for forcible entry, three (3) requisites have to be met for the municipal trial
court to acquire jurisdiction. First, the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of
the property. Second, they must also assert that they were deprived of possession either by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must be filed within one (1)
year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of physical
possession of the land or building.

The other kind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer (desahucio), where one
unlawfully withholds possession of the subject property after the expiration or termination of
the right to possess. Here, the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive; for in such action,
the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the
termination of the defendants right to continue in possession.[7] The essential requisites of
unlawful detainer are: (1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract express or implied; (2) the
expiration or termination of the possessors right to hold possession; (3) withholding by the
lessee of the possession of the land or building after expiration or termination of the right to
possession; (4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the
lease and vacate the premises; and (5) the action must be filed within one (1) year from date of
last demand received by the defendant.

A person who wants to recover physical possession of his real property will prefer an
ejectment suit because it is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure which allows
immediate execution of the judgment under Section 19, Rule 70 unless the defendant perfects
an appeal in the RTC and complies with the requirements to stay execution; all of which are
nevertheless beneficial to the interests of the lot owner or the holder of the right of possession.

On the other hand, Section 19, of Chapter II of B.P. No. 129 on Regional Trial Courts
provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise

exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxxx

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
 conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Two (2) kinds of action to recover possession of real property which fall under the
jurisdiction of the RTC are: (1) the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession
(accion publiciana) when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year or when the
action was filed more than one (1) year from date of the last demand received by the lessee or
defendant; and (2) an action for the recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria) which
includes the recovery of possession.

These actions are governed by the regular rules of procedure and adjudication takes a
longer period than the summary ejectment suit.

To determine whether a complaint for recovery of possession falls under the jurisdiction
of the MeTC (first level court) or the RTC (second level court), we are compelled to go over the
allegations of the complaint. The general rule is that what determines the nature of the action
and the court that has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. These
cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the
defendant.[8]

This general rule however admits exceptions. In Ignacio v. CFI of Bulacan, it was held
that while the allegations in the complaint make out a case for forcible entry, where tenancy is
averred by way of defense and is proved to be the real issue, the case should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction as the case should properly be filed with the then Court of Agrarian
Relations.[9]

The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint states,
but what the allegations in the body of the complaint define and describe. The designation or
caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is
not even an indispensable part of the complaint.[10]

Let us refer to the allegations of the complaint filed in the Manila MeTC in Civil Case No.
98-89174, which we quote verbatim:

3. That plaintiff is the absolute and registered owner of a parcel of land

located at No. 1332, Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila now being occupied
by defendant;
 4. That plaintiff purchased the above-said parcel of land together with its
improvements from the legal heirs of the late EMERLINDA DIMAYUGA
REYES on November 26, 1996, under and by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale x x x;
5. That pursuant to the said deed of sale, the title to the land and all its
improvements was transferred in plaintiffs name as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 233273 issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila on
April 22, 1997 x x x;

6. That prior to said sale, the previous owners, represented by Mr. Lino
Reyes, husband of the said deceased Emerlinda D. Reyes and the
administrator of her estate, was in possession and control of the property
subject of this complaint;
7. That also prior to said sale, defendant, without the knowledge and
consent of Mr. Lino Reyes, surreptitiously and by means of stealth and
strategy entered, used and occupied the said premises thus depriving the
former of rightful possession thereof;
8. That on February 21, 1994, Mr. Lino Reyes, through Atty. Alejo Sedico,
his lawyer, furnished the defendants a letter formally demanding that
defendant vacate the premises x x x;

9. That, however, defendant failed and refused to vacate despite just and
legal demand by Mr. Lino Reyes;

10. That after the sale to plaintiff of said premises, plaintiff has several
times demanded of defendants to vacate the premises, the last demand
having been made on them personally and in writing on January 14, 1997 x
x x;

11. That defendant failed and refused and still fails and refuses to vacate
the premises without legal cause or justifiable reason whatsoever;[11]

The answer of petitioner averred:

4. The Court has no jurisdiction over the case, having been filed by plaintiff
more than the reglementary one year period to commence forcible entry
case, which is reckoned from the date of the alleged unlawful entry of
defendant by the use of stealth and strategy into the premises;

5. For more than four decades now, defendant has been and still is a rent-
paying tenant of the subject land occupied by their residential house,
dating back to the original owner-lessor, the Dimayuga family. Her lease
with no definite duration, commenced with a rent at P60.00 per month
 until it was gradually increased in the ensuing years. As of November 1996,
it stood at P300.00 a month;

6. In this circumstances [sic], defendant enjoys the protective mantle of

P.D. 20 and the subsequent rental control status against dispossession. She
cannot be ejected other than for causes prescribed under B.P. Blg.
25. Further, in case of sale of the land, she has the right of first refusal
under the express provision of P.D. 1571;

7. Throughout the years of her tenancy, defendant has been updated in

her rental payment until the collector of the original owner-lessor no
longer came around as she has done theretofore;

7.1. As a result, she was compelled to file a petition for

consignation of rent before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila;

8. A bona fide tenant within the ambit if [sic] P.D. 20 and the subsequent
rental control status, including B.P. Blg. 25, under its terms, cannot be
ousted on a plea of expiration of her monthly lease;

9. Her lease constitutes a legal encumbrance upon the property of the

lessor/owner and binds the latters successor-in-interest who is under
obligation to respect it;

10. The land at bench is the subject of a pending expropriation

proceedings;

11. Plaintiff being a married woman cannot sue or be sued without being
joined by her husband;[12]

Undeniably, the aforequoted allegations of the complaint are vague and iffy in revealing
the nature of the action for ejectment.

The allegations in the complaint show that prior to the sale by Lino Reyes, representing
the estate of his wife Emerlinda Reyes, he was in possession and control of the subject lot but
were deprived of said possession when petitioner, by means of stealth and strategy, entered
and occupied the same lot. These circumstances imply that he had prior physical possession of
the subject lot and can make up a forcible entry complaint.
On the other hand, the allegation that petitioner Dela Cruz was served several demands
to leave the premises but refused to do so would seem to indicate an action for unlawful
detainer since a written demand is not necessary in an action for forcible entry. It is a fact that
the MeTC complaint was filed on September 8, 1997 within one (1) year from the date of the
last written demand upon petitioner Dela Cruz on January 14, 1997.

As previously discussed, the settled rule is jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the
initiatory pleading and the defenses in the answer are deemed irrelevant and immaterial in its
determination. However, we relax the rule and consider the complaint at bar as an exception in
view of the special and unique circumstances present. First, as in Ignacio v. CFI of
Bulacan,[13] the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised in the answer wherein there was an
admission that petitioner Dela Cruz was a lessee of the former owners of the lot, the Reyeses,
prior to the sale to respondent Tan Te. The fact that petitioner was a tenant of the
predecessors-in-interest of respondent Tan Te is material to the determination of
jurisdiction. Since this is a judicial admission against the interest of petitioner, such admission
can be considered in determining jurisdiction. Second, the ejectment suit was filed with the
Manila MeTC on September 8, 1997 or more than nine (9) years ago. To dismiss the complaint
would be a serious blow to the effective dispensation of justice as the parties will start anew
and incur additional legal expenses after having litigated for a long time.Equitable justice
dictates that allegations in the answer should be considered to aid in arriving at the real nature
of the action. Lastly, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court clearly empowers the Court to
construe Rule 70 and other pertinent procedural issuances in a liberal manner to promote just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

Based on the complaint and the answer, it is apparent that the Tan Te ejectment
complaint is after all a complaint for unlawful detainer. It was admitted that petitioner Dela
Cruz was a lessee of the Reyeses for around four (4) decades. Thus, initially petitioner as lessee
is the legal possessor of the subject lot by virtue of a contract of lease. When fire destroyed her
house, the Reyeses considered the lease terminated; but petitioner Dela Cruz persisted in
returning to the lot and occupied it by strategy and stealth without the consent of the
owners. The Reyeses however tolerated the continued occupancy of the lot by petitioner. Thus,
when the lot was sold to respondent Tan Te, the rights of the Reyeses, with respect to the lot,
were transferred to their subrogee, respondent Tan Te, who for a time also tolerated the stay
of petitioner until she decided to eject the latter by sending several demands, the last being the
January 14, 1997 letter of demand. Since the action was filed with the MeTC on September 8,
1997, the action was instituted well within the one (1) year period reckoned from January 14,
1997. Hence, the nature of the complaint is one of unlawful detainer and the Manila MeTC had
jurisdiction over the complaint.

Thus, an ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the
Tan Te complaint, is a specie of unlawful detainer cases.
 As early as 1913, case law introduced the concept of possession by tolerance in
ejectment cases as follows:
It is true that the landlord might, upon the failure of the tenant to pay the
stipulated rents, consider the contract broken and demand immediate
possession of the rented property, thus converting a legal possession into
illegal possession. Upon the other hand, however, the landlord might
conclude to give the tenant credit for the payment of the rents and allow
him to continue indefinitely in the possession of the property. In other
words, the landlord might choose to give the tenant credit from month to
month or from year to year for the payment of their rent, relying upon his
honesty of his financial ability to pay the same. During such period the
tenant would not be in illegal possession of the property and the landlord
could not maintain an action of desahucio until after he had taken steps to
convert the legal possession into illegal possession. A mere failure to pay
the rent in accordance with the contract would justify the landlord, after
the legal notice, in bringing an action of desahucio. The landlord might,
however, elect to recognize the contract as still in force and sue for the
sums due under it. It would seem to be clear that the landlord might sue
for the rents due and [unpaid, without electing to terminate the contract
of tenancy;] [w]hether he can declare the contract of tenancy broken and
sue in an action desahucio for the possession of the property and in a
separate actions for the rents due and damages, etc.[14]
The concept of possession by tolerance in unlawful detainer cases was further refined
and applied in pertinent cases submitted for decision by 1966. The rule was articulated as
follows:

Where despite the lessees failure to pay rent after the first demand, the
lessor did not choose to bring an action in court but suffered the lessee to
continue occupying the land for nearly two years, after which the lessor
made a second demand, the one-year period for bringing the detainer case
in the justice of the peace court should be counted not from the day the
lessee refused the first demand for payment of rent but from the time the
second demand for rents and surrender of possession was not complied
with.[15]
In Calubayan v. Pascual, a case usually cited in subsequent decisions on ejectment, the
concept of possession by tolerance was further elucidated as follows:

In allowing several years to pass without requiring the occupant to vacate

the premises nor filing an action to eject him, plaintiffs have acquiesced to
defendants possession and use of the premises. It has been held that a
person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by
 an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.The
status of the defendant is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose
term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of
the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to
vacate.[16] (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing jurisprudence, it is unequivocal that petitioners possession after she
intruded into the lot after the firewas by tolerance or leniency of the Reyeses and hence, the
action is properly an unlawful detainer case falling under the jurisdiction of the Manila MeTC.

Even if we concede that it is the RTC and not the MeTC that has jurisdiction over the Tan
Te complaint, following the reasoning that neither respondent nor her predecessor-in-interest
filed an ejectment suit within one (1) year from February 21, 1994 when the Reyeses knew of
the unlawful entry of petitioner, and hence, the complaint is transformed into an accion
publiciana, the Court deems it fair and just to suspend its rules in order to render efficient,
effective, and expeditious justice considering the nine (9) year pendency of the ejectment
suit. More importantly, if there was uncertainty on the issue of jurisdiction that arose from the
averments of the complaint, the same cannot be attributed to respondent Tan Te but to
her counsel who could have been confused as to the actual nature of the ejectment suit. The
lawyers apparent imprecise language used in the preparation of the complaint without any
participation on the part of Tan Te is sufficient special or compelling reason for the grant of
relief.

The case of Barnes v. Padilla[17] elucidates the rationale behind the exercise by this Court
of the power to relax, or even suspend, the application of the rules of procedure:

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere

tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even
the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that
which this Court itself has already declared to be final x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party
litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this
Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not
to override substantial justice.[18]
 Moreover, Section 8, Rule 40 authorizes the RTCin case of affirmance of an order of the
municipal trial court dismissing a case without trial on the merits and the ground of dismissal is
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matterto try the case on the merits as if the case was
originally filed with it if the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. In the same vein, this Court, in
the exercise of its rule-making power, can suspend its rules with respect to this particular case
(pro hac vice), even if initially, the MeTC did not have jurisdiction over the ejectment suit, and
decide to assume jurisdiction over it in order to promptly resolve the dispute.

The issue of jurisdiction settled, we now scrutinize the main issue.

At the heart of every ejectment suit is the issue of who is entitled to physical possession
of the lot or possession de facto.

We rule in favor of respondent Tan Te for the following reasons:

1. Petitioner admitted in her Answer that she was a rent-paying tenant of the Reyeses,
predecessors-in-interest of respondent Tan Te. As such, she recognized the ownership of the lot
by respondent, which includes the right of possession.

2. After the fire raged over the structures on the subject lot in late 1989 the contracts of
lease expired, as a result of which Lino Reyes demanded that all occupants, including petitioner,
vacate the lot but the latter refused to abandon the premises. During the duration of the lease,
petitioners possession was legal but it became unlawful after the fire when the lease contracts
were deemed terminated and demands were made for the tenants to return possession of the
lot.

3. Petitioners possession is one by the Reyeses tolerance and generosity and later by
respondent Tan Tes.

Petitioner fully knows that her stay in the subject lot is at the leniency and magnanimity
of Mr. Lino Reyes and later of respondent Tan Te; and her acquiescence to such use of the lot
carries with it an implicit and assumed commitment that she would leave the premises the
moment it is needed by the owner. When respondent Tan Te made a last, written demand
on January 14, 1997 and petitioner breached her promise to leave upon demand, she lost her
right to the physical possession of the lot. Thus, respondent Tan Te should now be allowed to
occupy her lot for residential purposes, a dream that will finally be realized after nine (9) years
of litigation.
 Petitioner raises the ancillary issue that on March 15, 1998, the Manila City Council
passed and approved Ordinance No. 7951:
[a]uthorizing the Manila City Mayor to acquire either by negotiation or
expropriation certain parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 233273, 175106 and 140471, containing an area of One
Thousand Four Hundred Twenty Five (1,425) square meters, located at
Maria Clara and Governor Forbes Streets, Sta. Cruz, Manila, for low cost
housing and award to actual bonafide residents thereat and further
authorizing the City Mayor to avail for that purpose any available funds of
the city and other existing funding facilities from other government
agencies x x x.[19]

It readily appears that this issue was not presented before the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 49097 despite the fact that the respondents petition was filed on September 25,
1998, six months after the ordinance was passed.Thus, this issue is proscribed as are all issues
raised for the first time before the Court are proscribed.

Even granting for the sake of argument that we entertain the issue, we rule that the
intended expropriation of respondents lot (TCT No. 233273) by the city government
of Manila will not affect the resolution of this petition. For one thing, the issue can be raised by
petitioner in the appropriate legal proceeding. Secondly, the intended expropriation might not
even be implemented since it is clear from the ordinance that the City Mayor will still locate
available funds for project, meaning the said expense is not a regular item in the budget.

WHEREFORE, this petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The April 30, 1999 Decision of the
Court of Appeals reinstating the April 3, 1998 MeTC Decision in Civil Case No. 156730-CV and
the July 16, 1999 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 49097 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 202354 September 24, 2014

AMADA C. ZACARIAS, Petitioner,

vs.
VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY, CYNTHIAANACAYGUISIC, ANGELITO ANACAY, JERMIL
ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY ISRAEL and all other persons claiming authority under
them, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision 1 dated June 20, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 which reversed the Decision2 dated August 22,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay City and affirmed the
Decision3 dated October 8, 2010 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Amadeo-Silang,
Cavite, Branch 17 in Civil Case No. 862.

The present controversy stemmed from a complaint4 for Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful
Detainer filed on December 24, 2008 by petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-
in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, against the above-named respondents, Victoria Anacay and members
of her household. Said respondents are the occupants of a parcel of land with an area of seven
hundred sixty-nine (769) square meters, situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the name of petitioner and issuedby Municipal
Assessor Reynaldo L. Bayot on August 31, 2007.

The parties were ordered to proceed to the Philippine Mediation Center pursuant to Section
2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Mediation was unsuccessful and
thus the case was returned to the court.5

After due proceedings, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is, hereby, rendered in favor of defendants

Victoria Anacay, Edna Anacay, Santiago Amerna, Raymond and Cynthia Guisic, Angelito Anacay
and Myrlinda Yalo, and all persons acting under them, and against plaintiff Amada C. Zacarias,
represented by her attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, the instant Complaint for ejectment with
damages, Unlawful Detainer is, hereby, DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.6

The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the essential elements of an
action for unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioner had permitted or tolerated
respondents’ occupation of the subject property was unsubstantiated. It noted that the
averments in the demand letter sent by petitioner’s counsel that respondents entered the
property through stealth and strategy, and in petitioner’s own "Sinumpaang Salaysay", are
more consistent withan action for forcible entry which should have been filed within one year
from the discovery of the alleged entry. Since petitioner was deprived of the physical
possession of her property through illegal means and the complaint was filed after the lapse of
one year from her discovery thereof, the MCTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case.

On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that unlawful detainer was the proper remedy
considering that she merely tolerated respondents’ stay in the premises after demand to vacate
was made upon them, and they had in fact entered into an agreement and she was only forced
to take legal action when respondents reneged on their promise to vacate the property after
the lapse of the period agreed upon.

In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner did not state that
respondents entered her property through stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in
lawful possession and acceded to the request of respondents to stay in the premises until May
2008 but respondents’ reneged on their promise to vacate the property by that time. It held
that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because the respondents unlawfully withheld the
property from petitioner after she allowed them to stay there for one year.

With the subsequent oral agreement between the parties, the RTC ruled that respondents’
occupation ofthe property without petitioner’s consent can be converted to a contract, such
agreement not being prohibited by law nor contrary to morals or good customs. Having
satisfied the requisites for an unlawful detainer action, the RTC found that petitioner’s
complaint was filed within the prescribed one-year period counted from the time the final
demand to vacate was received by the respondents on July 24, 2008.

The falloof the Decision of the RTC states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-
Amadeo dated October 8, 2010 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and a new one is entered
ordering the defendants and all claiming under their rights to: (1) vacate the subject property
and surrender possession and control over the same to the plaintiff; Pay the sum of Two
Thousand (₱2,000.00) Pesos each as rentals or compensation for the use thereof starting from
July 2008 until the same is paid in full, with interests thereon at twelve (12%) percent per
annum; (2) pay the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos, as moral damages; (3) pay the
sum of Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) Pesos, as exemplary damages; and (4) pay the sum of
Twenty Thousand (₱20,000.00) Pesos, as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.7

With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period, the
above decision became final and executory.8

On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. At the
hearing heldon January 4, 2012,respondents were given a period of ten days within which to
file their comment. At the next scheduled hearing on February 6, 2012,respondents’ counsel
appeared and submitted a Formal Entry of Appearancewith Manifestation informing the court
that on the same day they had filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction before
the CA, copies ofwhich were served to petitioner thru her counsel and to the RTC. Nonetheless,
in its Order dated February 6, 2012, the RTC stated that said manifestation was "tantamount to
[a] comment to the pending motion" and thus gave petitioner’s counsel a period of ten (10)
days within which to fileher Reply and thereafter the incident will be submitted for resolution.9

On June 20, 2012, the CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Order dated August 22, 2011
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, 4th Judicial Region, Branch 18, Tagaytay City is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 8, 2010 rendered by the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, Branch 17 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.10

The CA held that the MCTC clearlyhad no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not
satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer. Since the
prescriptive period for filing an action for forcible entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert
her action into one for unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-year period to file her action from
the time of her demand for respondents to vacate the property.

Further, the CA said that while petitioner has shown that she is the lawful possessor of the
subject property,she availed of the wrong remedy to recover possession but nevertheless may
still file an accion publicianaor accion reivindicatoria with the proper regional trial court.

Petitioner contends that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in nullifying the judgment of the RTC which has long become
final and executory. She argues that the suspension of the strictadherence to procedural rules
cannot be justified by unsupported allegationsof the respondents as to supposed non-receipt of
documents concerning this case.

On their part, respondents maintain that they were not aware of the proceedings before the
RTC and were not furnished a copy of the said court’s adverse decision. They also stress that
resort to certiorari was proper and the suspension of procedural rules was justified by
compelling circumstances such as the imminentdestruction of the only property possessed by
respondents who are indigent, respondents’ lack of awareness of unfavorable judgment
rendered on appeal by the RTC, substantive merits of the case insofar as the jurisdictional
requirements in a suit for unlawful detainer, lack of showing that resortto certiorari petition
was frivolous and dilatory, and there being no prejudice caused to the other party.

After a thorough review of the records and the parties’ submissions, we find neither reversible
error nor grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA.
The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which
has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint.11 In ejectment cases, the
complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class
of cases for which Section 112 of Rule 70 provides a summary remedy, and must show enough
on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.13 Such remedy is
either forcibleentry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical
possession of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In
illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied.14

The MCTC and CA both ruled thatthe allegations in petitioner’s complaint make out a case for
forcible entry but not for unlawful detainer.

In Cabrera v. Getaruela,15 the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action
for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by toleranceof the
plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination ofthe latter’s right of possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.16

In this case, the Complaint alleged the following:

3. Plaintiff is the owner of that parcel of land situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite with
an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SIXTY NINE (769) SQUARE METERS, and covered by Tax Declaration
No. 18-026-01182 issued by the Municipal Assessor of Silang, Cavite. Copy of said tax
declaration is hereto attached as Annex "B";

4. Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the subject property. She had it planted to
Bananas and other fruit bearing trees. However, sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that
the defendants have entered the subject property and occupied the same;

5. Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises. The defendants requested
for time toleave and she acceded to said request. The defendants committed to vacate the
subject property by the end of May, 2008;
6. Inspite of several repeateddemands, defendants unjustifiably refused to vacate the subject
premises prompting the Plaintiff to seek the assistance of a lawyer who wrote them a FORMAL
and FINAL DEMAND to vacate the premises and to pay reasonable compensation for their
illegal use and occupancy of the subject property. A copy of the DEMAND LETTER is hereto
attached as Annex "C";

7. Plaintiff also referred this matter to the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Barangay Lalaan 1st for
possible conciliation but to no avail as the defendants still refused to vacate the subject
property. Thus, the said Barangay issued a CERTIFICATION TOFILE ACTION, as evidenced by a
copy thereto attached as Annex "D";

x x x x17

The above complaint failed to allegea cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does not
describe possession by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and
which became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of suchlawful possession. Petitioner’s
insistence that she actually tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after her discovery of
their entry into the subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered
respondents’occupation in May 2007. Such possession could not have been legal from the start
as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less was it based on any contract, express or
implied. We stress that the possession ofthe defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal
but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.18

In Valdez v. Court of Appeals,19 the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had
no jurisdiction over the case. Thus:

To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to
be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction
should be made.

If right at the incipiencydefendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt
that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under
Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.

xxxx

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word "tolerance" confirms our view
heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of
forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two
reasons:First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge tothe right of the possessor.
Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court - provided for in the
rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy
ceases to bespeedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the
inferior court. Second,if a forcible entry action in the inferior courtis allowed after the lapse of a
number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really
prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely
make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is
unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry
and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Italics and underscoring supplied)

It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action,
whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which
may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the
possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that
the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the
class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction without resort to
parol testimony.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how
entry was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an
accion publicianaor an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court. Thus, in Go, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging that
they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which was occupied by
respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased mother. Resolving the
issue on whether or not petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court ruled:

Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property registered under TCT No.
C-32110 from their parents; that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of
their mother, and after her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written
demand on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x

It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant illegally occupying
the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of this
kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of
the possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners’ cause of action
fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged
tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x

The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the inception and not
merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the
subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners
and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected
clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized as
possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz
vs. Court of Appeals[224 SCRA 216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer
not of forcible entry x x x.

xxxx

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that
would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that "respondents
without any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in
the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof." Nothing has been said on
how respondents’ entry was effected or how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no
express contract existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court
had no jurisdiction over the case.It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals
correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the complaint. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege how and when entry was
effected. The bare allegation of petitioner that "sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that
the defendants have enterep the subject property and occupied the same", as correctly found
by the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built their houses
thereon clandestinely and without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible
entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and the
RTC clearly erred in reversing the lower court's ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner.

Lastly, petitioner's argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying a final and executory
judgment of the RTC deserves scant consideration.

It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very
authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. 20 Indeed, a
void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right
nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of execution based
on it is void.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated June 20, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 123195 is hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.