Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
CONCEPT OF TORTS
No. Case Title Pages Page
1 Naguiat v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116123, March 13, 1997 14 2
2 Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993 14 16
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. v. First Farmers Milling Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-29041,
3 6 30
March 24, 1981
THIRD DIVISION
SYLLABUS
1.REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; WHEN A LABOR CASE MAY
REACH THE SUPREME COURT; GROUNDS THEREOF. — Firmly, we reiterate the rule that in a
petition for certiorari led pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is the only way a
labor case may reach the Supreme Court, the petitioner/s must clearly show that the NLRC
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
2.ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF AN ADMINISTRATE AGENCY OR A QUASI-
JUDICIAL BODY; BINDING UPON THE SUPREME COURT; EXCEPTION. — Long-standing
and well-settled in Philippine jurisprudence is the judicial dictum that ndings of facts of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is con ned to speci c matters, are generally accorded not only great
respect but even nality, and are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave
abuse of discretion, or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in
disregard of the evidence on record. Decisions, however concisely written, must distinctly
and clearly set forth the facts and law upon which they are based. This rule applies as well
to dispositions by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.
3.LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; RETRENCHMENT; WHEN A COMPANY
MAY BE EXEMPTED FROM PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE
AT BAR. — Well-settled is the rule that business losses or nancial reverses, in order to
sustain retrenchment of personnel or closure of business and warrant exemption from
payment of separation pay, must be proved with clear and satisfactory evidence. The
records, however, are devoid of such evidence. The labor arbiter, as af rmed by NLRC,
correctly found that petitioners stopped their taxi business within Clark Air Base because
of the phase-out of U.S. military presence thereat. It was not due to any great nancial loss
because petitioners' taxi business was earning pro tably at the time of its closure. With
respect to the amount of separation pay that should be granted, Article 283 of the Labor
Code provides: ". . . In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in case of closures or
cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business
losses or nancial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or
at least one-half (½) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of
at least six (6) months shall be-considered one (1) whole year."
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4.ID.; ID.; EMPLOYMENT; LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING AND INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTORS, DISTINGUISHED. — Labor-only contracting exists where: (1) the person
supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the
form of tools, equipment, machinery, and work premises, among others; and (2) the
workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly
related to the principal business of the employer. Independent contractors, meanwhile, are
those who exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according
to their own methods without being subject to control of their employer except as to the
result of their work.
5.COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATION; WHEN A STOCKHOLDER MAY BE HELD LIABLE
FOR CORPORATE TORT; CASE AT BAR. — Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the de nite
scope of "corporate tort." Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right given or the
omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty. Article
283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer to grant separation pay to employees in
case of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or nancial reverses, which is the condition obtaining at bar. CFTI
failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation. Consequently, its stockholder
who was actively engaged in the management or operation of the business should be held
personally liable. Furthermore, in MAM Realty Development vs. NLRC, 244 SCRA 797, June
2, 1995, the Court recognized that a director or of cer may still be held solidarily liable
with a corporation by speci c provision of law. thus: ". . . A corporation, being a juridical
entity, may act only through its directors, of cers and employees. Obligations incurred by
them, acting as such corporate agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the
corporation they represent. True, solidary liabilities may at times be incurred but only when
exceptional circumstances warrant such as, generally, in the following cases: . . . 4. When a
director, trustee or of cer is made, by speci c provision of law, personally liable for his
corporate action." As pointed out earlier, the fth paragraph of Section 100 of the
Corporation Code speci cally imposes personal liability upon the stockholder actively
managing or operating the business and affairs of the close corporation. The Court here
nds no application to the rule that a corporate of cer cannot be held solidarity liable with
a corporation in the absence of evidence that he had acted in bad faith or with malice. In
the present case, Sergio Naguiat is held solidarily liable for corporate tort because he had
actively engaged in the management and operation of CFTI, a close corporation.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN , J : p
Are private respondent-employees of petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Inc., who were separated
from service due to the closure of Clark Air Base, entitled to separation pay and, if so, in
what amount? Are of cers of corporations ipso facto liable jointly and severally with the
companies they represent for the payment of separation pay?
These questions are answered by the Court in resolving this petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolutions of the National Labor
Relations Commission (Third Division) 1 promulgated on February 28, 1994, 2 and May
31, 1994. 3 The February 28, 1994 Resolution af rmed with modi cations the decision 4
of Labor Arbiter Ariel C. Santos in NLRC Case No. RAB-III-12-2477-91. The second
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Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners.
The NLRC modi ed the decision of the labor arbiter by granting separation pay to
herein individual respondents in the increased amount of US$120.00 for every year of
service or its peso equivalent, and holding Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Sergio F.
Naguiat and Antolin T. Naguiat, jointly and severally liable with Clark Field Taxi, Inc.
("CFTI").
The Facts
The following facts are derived from the records of the case:
Petitioner CFTI held a concessionaire's contract with the Army Air Force Exchange
Services ("AAFES") for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio F.
Naguiat was CFTI's president, while Antolin T. Naguiat was its vice-president. Like Sergio
F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated ("Naguiat Enterprises"), a trading rm, it was a
family-owned corporation.
Individual respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxicab drivers.
During their employment, they were required to pay a daily "boundary fee" in the amount
of US$26.50 for those working from 1:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, and US$27.00 for those
working from 12:00 noon to 12:00 midnight. All incidental expenses for the maintenance
of the vehicles they were driving were accounted against them, including gasoline
expenses.
The drivers worked at least three to four times a week, depending on the
availability of taxicabs. They earned not less than US$15.00 daily. In excess of that
amount, however, they were required to make cash deposits to the company, which they
could later withdraw every fifteen days.
Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the Philippines, from which Clark
Air Base was not spared, the AAFES was dissolved, and the services of individual
respondents were officially terminated on November 26, 1991.
The AAFES Taxi Drivers Association ("drivers' union"), through its local president,
Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation bene ts that should
be awarded in favor of the drivers. They arrived at an agreement that the separated
drivers will be given P500.00 for every year of service as severance pay. Most of the
drivers accepted said amount in December 1991 and January 1992. However, individual
respondents herein refused to accept theirs.
Instead, after disaf liating themselves from the drivers' union, individual
respondents, through the National Organization of Workingmen ("NOWM"), a labor
organization which they subsequently joined, led a complaint 5 against "Sergio F.
Naguiat doing business under the name and style Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc.,
Army-Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES) with Mark Hooper as Area Service Manager,
Paci c Region, and AAFES Taxi Drivers Association with Eduardo Castillo as President,"
for payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-out. Said complaint was later
amended 6 to include additional taxi drivers who were similarly situated as complainants,
and CFTI with Antolin T. Naguiat as vice president and general manager, as party
respondent.
In their complaint, herein private respondents alleged that they were regular
employees of Naguiat Enterprises, although their individual applications for employment
were approved by CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after
having been hired by CFTI, and that the former thence managed, controlled and
supervised their employment. They averred further that they were entitled to separation
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pay based on their latest daily earnings of US$15.00 for working sixteen (16) days a
month.
In their position paper submitted to the labor arbiter, herein petitioners claimed
that the cessation of business of CFTI on November 26, 1991, was due to "great nancial
losses and lost business opportunity" resulting from the phase-out of Clark Air Base
brought about by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of the RP-US military
bases agreement. They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers' union, through its
President Eduardo Castillo who claimed to have had blanket authority to negotiate with
CFTI in behalf of union members, to grant its taxi driver-employees separation pay
equivalent to P500.00 for every year of service.
The labor arbiter, nding the individual complainants to be regular workers of CFTI,
ordered the latter to pay them P1,200.00 for every year of service "for humanitarian
consideration," setting aside the earlier agreement between CFTI and the drivers' union of
P500.00 for every year of service. The labor arbiter rejected the allegation of CFTI that it
was forced to close business due to "great nancial losses and lost business
opportunity" since, at the time it ceased operations, CFTI was pro tably earning and the
cessation of its business was due to the untimely closure of Clark Air Base. In not
awarding separation pay in accordance with the Labor Code, the labor-arbiter explained:
"To allow respondents exemption from its (sic) obligation to pay separation pay
would be inhuman to complainants but to impose a monetary obligation to an
employer whose pro table business was abruptly shot (sic) down by force
majeure would be unfair and unjust to say the least." 7
As mentioned earlier, the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners was denied by
the NLRC. Hence, this petition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order.
Upon posting by the petitioners of a surety bond, a temporary restraining order 9 was
issued by this Court enjoining execution of the assailed Resolutions.
The labor arbiter; as af rmed by NLRC, correctly found that petitioners stopped their taxi
business within Clark Air Base because of the phase-out of U.S. military presence thereat.
It was not due to any great nancial loss because petitioners' taxi business was earning
profitably at the time of its closure.
With respect to the amount of separation pay that should be granted, Article 283 of the
Labor Code provides:
". . . In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or
cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or nancial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to
one (1) month pay or at least one-half (½) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one
(1 ) whole year."
Is it not true that you applied not with Sergio F. Naguiat but with Clark Field Taxi?
Witness
I applied for (sic) Sergio F. Naguiat
Atty. Suarez
Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual or the corporation?
Witness
'Sergio F. Naguiat na tao.'
Atty. Suarez
Who is Sergio F. Naguiat?
Witness
He is the one managing the Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises and he is the one whom
we believe as our employer.
Atty. Suarez
What is exactly the position of Sergio F. Naguiat with the Sergio F. Naguiat
Enterprises?
Witness
He is the owner, sir.
Atty. Suarez
How about Mr. Antolin Naguiat what is his role in the taxi services, the operation
of the Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated?
Witness
And, although the witness insisted that Naguiat Enterprises was his employer, he could not
deny that he received his salary from the office of CFTI inside the base. 29
Another driver-claimant admitted, upon the prodding of counsel for the
corporations, that Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while CFTI was in taxi
services. 30
In addition, the Constitution 3 1 of CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association which,
admittedly, was the union of individual respondents while still working at Clark Air Base,
states that members thereof are the employees of CFTI and "(f)or collective bargaining
purposes, the definite employer is the Clark Field Taxi Inc."
From the foregoing, the ineludible conclusion is that CFTI was the actual and direct
employer of individual respondents, and that Naguiat Enterprises was neither their
indirect employer nor labor-only contractor. It was not involved at all in the taxi business.
CFTI president
solidarily liable
Petitioner-corporations would likewise want to avoid the solidary liability of their of cers.
To bolster their position, Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T. Naguiat speci cally aver that they
were denied due process since they were not parties to the complaint below. 3 2 In the
broader interest of justice, we, however, hold that Sergio F. Naguiat, in his capacity as
president of CFTI, cannot be exonerated from joint and several liability in the payment of
separation pay to individual respondents.
A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC 3 3 is the case in point. A.C. Ransom
Corporation was a family corporation, the stockholders of which were members of the
Hernandez family. In 1973, it led an application for clearance to close or cease
operations, which was duly granted by the Ministry of Labor and Employment, without
prejudice to the right of employees to seek redress of grievance, if any. Backwages of 22
employees, who engaged in a strike prior to the closure, were subsequently computed at
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P164,984.00. Up to September 1976, the union led about ten (10) motions for
execution against the corporation, but none could be implemented, presumably for
failure to nd leviable assets of said corporation. In its last motion for execution, the
union asked that of cers and agents of the company be held personally liable for
payment of the backwages. This was granted by the labor arbiter. In the corporation's
appeal to the NLRC, one of the issues raised was: "Is the judgment against a corporation
to reinstate its dismissed employees with backwages, enforceable against its of cer
and agents, in their individual, private and personal capacities, who were not parties in the
case where the judgment was rendered?" The NLRC answered in the negative, on the
ground that of cers of a corporation are not liable personally for of cial acts unless they
exceeded the scope of their authority.
O n certiorari, this Court reversed the NLRC and upheld the labor arbiter. In
imposing joint and several liability upon the company president, the Court, speaking
through Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, ratiocinated this wise:
"(b)How can the foregoing (Articles 265 and 273 of the Labor Code) provisions be
implemented when the employer is a corporation? The answer is found in Article
212(c) of the Labor Code which provides:
'(c)'Employer' includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its of cers
or agents except when acting as employer.'
The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602, the Minimum Wage Law.
Since RANSOM is an arti cial person, it must have an officer who can be
presumed to be the employer, being the 'person acting in the interest of (the)
employer' RANSOM. The corporation, only in the technical sense, is the employer.
The responsible of cer of an employer corporation can be held personally, not to
say even criminally, liable for nonpayment of back wages. That is the policy of
the law. . . .
(c)If the policy of the law were otherwise, the corporation employer can have
devious ways for evading payment of back wages. . . .
(d)The record does not clearly identify 'the of cer or of cers' of RANSOM directly
responsible for failure to pay the back wages of the 22 strikers. In the absence of
definite proof in that regard, we believe it should be presumed that the responsible
of cer is the President of the corporation who can be deemed the chief operation
of cer thereof . Thus, in RA 602, criminal responsibility is with the 'Manager or in
his default, the person acting as such.' In RANSOM, the President appears to be
the Manager." (Emphasis supplied.)
Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who actively managed the
business. Thus, applying the ruling in A. C. Ransom, he falls within the meaning of an
"employer" as contemplated by the Labor Code, who may be held jointly and severally liable
for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees.
Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were
"close family corporations" 3 4 owned by the Naguiat family. Section 100, paragraph 5,
(under Title XII on Close Corporations) of the Corporation Code, states:
"(5)To the extent that the stockholders are actively engage(d) in the management
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or operation of the business and affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders
shall be held to strict duciary duties to each other and among themselves. Said
stockholders shall be personally liable for corporate torts unless the corporation
has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance." (emphasis supplied)
Nothing in the records show whether CFTI obtained "reasonably adequate liability
insurance;" thus, what remains is to determine whether there was corporate tort.
Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the de nite scope of "corporate tort." Essentially, "tort"
consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. 3 5
Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty. 3 6 Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates
the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or nancial
reverses, which is the condition obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law-
imposed duty or obligation. Consequently, its stockholder who was actively engaged in the
management or operation of the business should be held personally liable.
Furthermore, in MAM Realty Development vs. NLRC, 3 7 the Court recognized that a
director or of cer may still be held solidarily liable with a corporation by speci c
provision of law. Thus:
". . . A corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors,
of cers and employees. Obligations incurred by them, acting as such corporate
agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the corporation they
represent. True, solidary liabilities may at times be incurred but only when
exceptional circumstances warrant such as, generally, in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
As pointed out earlier, the fth paragraph of Section 100 of the Corporation Code
specifically imposes personal liability upon the stockholder actively managing or operating
the business and affairs of the close corporation.
In fact, in posting the surety bond required by this Court for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order enjoining the execution of the assailed NLRC Resolutions,
only Sergio F. Naguiat, in his individual and personal capacity, principally bound himself to
comply with the obligation thereunder, i.e., "to guarantee the payment to private
respondents of any damages which they may incur by reason of the issuance of a
temporary restraining order sought, if it should be nally adjudged that said principals
were not entitled thereto." 38
The Court here nds no application to the rule that a corporate of cer cannot be
held solidarily liable with a corporation in the absence of evidence that he had acted in
bad faith or with malice. 3 9 In the present case, Sergio Naguiat is held solidarily liable for
corporate tort because he had actively engaged in the management and operation of
CFTI, a close corporation.
Antolin Naguiat not personally liable
Antolin T. Naguiat was the vice president of the CFTI. Although he carried the title of
"general manager" as well, it had not been shown that he had acted in such capacity.
Furthermore, no evidence on the extent of his participation in the management or
operation of the business was proffered. In this light, he cannot be held solidarily liable for
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the obligations of CFTI and Sergio Naguiat to the private respondents.
Fourth Issue: No Denial of Due Process
Lastly, in petitioners' Supplement to their original petition, they assail the NLRC Resolution
holding Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T. Naguiat jointly and severally liable with petitioner-
corporations in the payment of separation pay, averring denial of due process since the
individual Naguiats were not impleaded as parties to the complaint.
We advert to the case of A.C. Ransom once more. The of cers of the corporation
were not parties to the case when the judgment in favor of the employees was rendered.
The corporate of cers raised this issue when the labor arbiter granted the motion of the
employees to enforce the judgment against them. In spite of this, the Court held the
corporation president solidarily liable with the corporation.
Furthermore, Sergio and Antolin Naguiat voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when they, in their individual capacities, led a position
paper 40 together with CFTI, before the arbiter. They cannot now claim to have been
denied due process since they availed of the opportunity to present their positions.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The assailed February 28, 1994 Resolution of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED
as follows:
(1)Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated, and Sergio F. Naguiat, president and
co-owner thereof, are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, the individual respondents
their separation pay computed at US$120.00 for every year of service, or its peso
equivalent at the time of payment or satisfaction of the judgment; cdtai
Footnotes
1.Composed of Comm. Ireneo B. Bernardo, ponente, with Comms. Lourdes C. Javier (presiding
commissioner) and Joaquin A. Tanodra, concurring.
3.Ibid., p. 82.
4.Promulgated on June 4, 1993; Rollo, pp. 48-56.
7.Rollo, p. 56.
12.Bordeos, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos. 115314-23, September 26, 1996.
13.Maya Farms Employees Organization vs. NLRC, 239 SCRA 508, December 28, 1994.
14.See Revidad vs. NLRC, 245 SCRA 356, June 27, 1995; St. Gothard Disco Pub vs. NLRC, 218
SCRA 321, 334, February 1, 1993.
15.Mobil Employees Association vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 737, March 28, 1990; See Catatista vs.
NLRC, 247 SCRA 46, 1995; Shoppers Gain Supermart vs. NLRC G.R. No. 110731, July 26,
1996.
In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in
accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his
contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under
the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly
employed by him.
The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting out
of labor to protect the rights of workers established under this Code. In so prohibiting. or
restricting, he may make appropriate distinctions between labor-only contracting and job
contracting as well as differentiations within these types of contracting and determine
who among the parties involved shall be considered as the employer for the purposes of
this Code, to prevent any violation or circumvention of any. provision of this Code.
There is 'labor-only' contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not
have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such persons are
performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such
employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered as merely an
agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and
extent as if the latter were directly employed by him."
19."Art. 107. Indirect employer. — The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall
likewise apply to any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an
employer, contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work,
task, job or project."
20."Art. 109.Solidary liability . — The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding,
every employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or
subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For purposes of
determining the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they shall be considered
as direct employers."
26.Annex "C" to Respondent CFTI's (petitioner herein) Appearance and Omnibus Motion;
records, pp. 47-48.
27.Motion for Reconsideration, p. 6; Rollo, p. 79.
32.Rollo, p. 231.
33.142 SCRA 269, June 10, 1986.
39.See, Sunio vs. NLRC, 127 SCRA 390, January 31, 1984; and General Bank and Trust Co . vs.
Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 569, April 9, 1985.
40.Annex "C" to Petition; Rollo, pp. 31-36.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR. , J : p
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set
aside the Decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which
affirmed in toto the 16 October 1989 Decision or Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether
or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article
21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. cdphil
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code,
rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The
petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of three
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thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos
at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied." 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner
and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals
or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through
machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, (d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by
him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in
accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture
and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and
expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the
evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent
Court as follows:
"According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after
they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted
his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same
day he went with her to her hometown of Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he
wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their
intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings)
of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that
day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiff's parents and brothers and
sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987,
and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed
to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in
Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they
continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of
October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to
school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in
relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to
abort the foetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept
reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so
because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time
plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a
lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff,
her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod send by the barangay captain
went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant
insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that
defendant is still single.
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which
docketed the case as CA-G R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court
erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering
him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. Cdpr
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino
women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several
years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study
medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived
with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what
he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent,
trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her." 1 1
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and then concluded:
"In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on
the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise
these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage.
And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals,
good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and
insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been
enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to
study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the
moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered
him to do in its decision in this case." 1 2
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he
raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the
case at bar. 1 3
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed
any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not
professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never
maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions
and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with
such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the
subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem
upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take
four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he
does not possess good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law wife" is
now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian
Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims
that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed
his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not
be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. 1 4
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and
the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with. prLL
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support
of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility
of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not
disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment
and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or
value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 1 5
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Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had
overlooked any fact of substance or value which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower
court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio,
Jr., 1 6 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner has not endeavored to point out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts
must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 1 7
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that
would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
"The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is
not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 1 8
The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has
shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women
and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of
rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states
.." 1 9
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 2 0
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
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"'But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil
Code the following rule: LLpr
" . . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction,
not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that,
complainant 'surrendered herself' to petitioner because, 'overwhelmed by her love'
for him, she 'wanted to bind' him 'by having a fruit of their engagement even
before they had the benefit of clergy.'"
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 2 6 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if
there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not
convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and
conclusion were made in the said case:
"The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been
seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual
intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea
of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S.
vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
'To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise
or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the
intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent Dig. tit.
Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue
by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her
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ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer'
(27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 2 8 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently
retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been
carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
" . . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa
vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic);
Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other
words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal
knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence
recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be
no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . . ."
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
wedding preparations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471)." LLpr
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by wilfullness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to
deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would
deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced
woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting
injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the
criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal
case for that reason."
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that
granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the
latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence,
pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs.
Marcos, 3 2 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter
even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or
damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing," 3 3 for:
" . . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere
employee . . (Annex C ) or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance (TSN, pp. 51-53, May
18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may
have been offered by the petitioner." 3 4
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of
the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstanced
could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to
marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the
poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly
believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able
to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of
morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It
can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard
of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone
his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent
may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the
petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is
apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar
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offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 3 5 At most, it could be conceded that she is
merely in delicto. cdphil
"Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition or undue influence of the
party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud." 3 6
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said
that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the
petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their
marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and
infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. cdll
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J ., Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J ., is on terminal leave.
Footnotes
1. Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, 53-62. Per Associate Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, concurred
in by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Jaime M. Lantin.
7. Rollo, 31-33.
8. Rollo, 54-55.
9. Exhibit "E" of Petition; Rollo, 34-50.
17. Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil.
640 [1960].
18. 58 Phil. 866 [1933].
19. Congressional Record, vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, 14 May 1949, 2352.
20. Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978].
21. Report of the Code Commission, 39-40. This passage is quoted, except for the last
paragraph, in Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 18 SCRA 994, 996-997 [1966]; the Article 23
referred to is now Article 21.
28. Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, vol. I, Eleventh ed., (1984), 91-92.
29. Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed.,
76-77, omitting footnotes.
30. 7 Phil. 156 [1906].
SYNOPSIS
Plaintiff Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. Inc. filed an action for Injunction and prohibition with
Damages against defendants First Farmers Milling Co. and the adhering planters for the
alleged illegal transfer of the sugar quota of the latter from plaintiff to defendant sugar mill
and against the Sugar Quota Administrator for having approved said transfer. After the
defendants had filed their respective answers, plaintiff filed a Motion to Admit Amended
and Supplemental Complaint including PNB and NIDC as necessary parties, for having
allegedly assisted in the illegal creation and operation of defendant sugar mill. PNB and
NIDC, alleging that they have no participation whatsoever in the alleged illegal transfer,
filed a Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing their special and affirmative defenses which
were also grounds for dismissal. After a preliminary hearing, the Court of First Instance of
Rizal issued an Order dismissing the Amended and Supplemental Complaint against PNB
and NIDC for lack of cause of action and another Order denying the motion for
reconsideration of said Order.
On appeal by certiorari, the Supreme Court sustained the dismissal of the Amended and
Supplemental Complaint as its sufficiency was not supported by well-pleaded averments
of facts, which defect cannot be cured by the introduction of sufficient evidence against
the objection of defendants- appellees.
Orders appealed from, affirmed.
SYLLABUS
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA , J : p
This is an appeal taken by Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. from the Order dated November
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28, 1967 issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI (Pasig), in Civil Case No.
9185, as well as the Order dated March 5, 1968 denying the Motion for its reconsideration.
The Order had dismissed, after a preliminary hearing, on the ground of lack of cause of
action, the Amended and Supplemental Complaint against the defendants Philippine
National Bank (PNB) and National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC).
Plaintiff-appellant had commenced, on March 18, 1966, an action for Injunction and
Prohibition with Damages against defendants First Farmers Milling Co., Inc. (FFMC),
various named planters including those similarly situated, and Ramon Nolan in his capacity
as Administrator of the Sugar Quota Administration. It was alleged,
"9. That in the year 1964 the defendant First Farmers Milling Co., Inc.,
established and operated a sugar central known as the First Farmers Sugar
Central and for the crop years 1964-65 and 1965-66, the defendants transferred
their quota `A' allotments to their co-defendant First Farmers Milling Co., Inc., and
are actually milling their sugar with the said First Farmers Milling Co., Inc., which
illegal transfer has been made over the vigorous protest and objections of the
plaintiff, but with the unwarranted, unjustified and likewise illegal approval of
their co-defendant the Sugar Quota Administration;" 1
After the defendants FFMC, the adhering planters, and the Sugar Quota Administrator had
filed their respective Answers, plaintiff-appellant filed, on May 2, 1967, a Motion to admit
Amended and Supplemental Complaint. As amended, PNB and NIDC were included as new
defendants in view of the FFMC allegation in its Answer that the non-inclusion of PNB and
NIDC as party defendants, "who became creditors of defendant FFMC central prior to the
institution of the instant case, and who therefore are necessary parties, is fatal to the
complaint." It was alleged this time, LexLib
"20. That defendants NIDC and PNB have extended loans to defendant sugar
mill in the amount of P12,210,000.00 on June 18, 1965, and P4,000,000.00 on
Dec. 14, 1966, respectively, to assist in the illegal creation and operation of said
mill, hence, a joint tortfeasor in the trespass of plaintiff's rights, aggravated by the
fact that defendant mill has only a paid up capital stock of P500,000.00, hence,
said loans are far beyond the limits fixed by law;" 2
The defendants, except the Sugar Quota Administrator, filed their respective Answers to
the Amended and Supplemental Complaint. For their part, PNB and NIDC followed this with
a Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing their special and affirmative defenses, which were
also grounds for dismissal. Opposition, reply memoranda, rejoinder, and supplementary
reply memoranda on the Motion were submitted by the contending parties.
In their Answer, the PNB and NIDC had contended:
"xxx xxx xxx
"5. That both the defendants PNB and NIDC have no participation whatsoever
either directly or indirectly on the alleged illegal (transaction) transfer of the
defendant planters from the plaintiff to the defendant mill, and therefore, the
defendants PNB and NIDC could not be held liable for any damage that the
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plaintiffs alleged to have suffered from the said particular act complained of;
"6. That the granting of loans by the defendants PNB and NIDC in favor of the
defendant mill to finance the construction of a sugar central did not violate any
rights of the plaintiff in view of the fact that the said loans were extended in the
ordinary and usual course of business, as specifically authorized under the
respective Charter of the defendants PNB and NIDC, hence, the latter defendants
did not commit any tortious action against the plaintiffs and, consequently, the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against the defendants PNB and NIDC." 3
As stated at the outset, the trial Court dismissed the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint against the PNB and the NIDC after a preliminary hearing on the ground of lack
of cause of action. LexLib
The only issue then is whether or not the allegations of the Amended and Supplemental
Complaint constituted a sufficient cause of action against the PNB and NIDC.
A negative finding is called for.
It is basic that the Complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. "Ultimate facts" are the important and
substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the plaintiff's primary right and
duty, or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions by the defendant. 4
When the ground for dismissal is that the Complaint states no cause of action, the rule is
that its sufficiency can only be determined by considering the facts alleged in the
Complaint and no other. 5 The Court may not consider other matters outside of the
Complaint. 6 Defenses averred by the defendant are not to be taken into consideration in
ruling on the motion. 7 The allegations in the Complaint must be accepted as true and it is
not permissible to go beyond and outside of them for date or facts. 8 And the test of
sufficiency of the facts alleged is whether or not the Court could render a valid judgment
as prayed for, accepting as true the exclusive facts set forth in the Complaint. 9
The subject Amended and Supplemental Complaint fails to meet the test. It should be
noted that it charges PNB and NIDC with having assisted in the illegal creation and
operation of defendant sugar mill. Granting, for the sake of argument, that, indeed,
assistance in the "illegal" act was rendered, the same, however, is not supported by well-
pleaded averments of facts. Nowhere is it alleged that defendants-appellees had notice,
information or knowledge of any flaw, much less any illegality, in their co-defendants'
actuations, assuming that there was such a flaw or illegality. This absence is fatal and
buoys up instead the PNB-NIDC's position of lack of cause of action. cdrep
Although it is averred that the defendants' acts were done in bad faith, 1 0 the Complaint
does not contain any averment of facts showing that the acts were done in the manner
alleged. Such a bare statement neither establishes any right or cause of action on the part
of the plaintiff-appellant. It is a mere conclusion of law not sustained by declarations of
facts, much less admitted by defendants-appellees. It does not, therefore, aid in any wise
the complaint in setting forth a cause of action. 1 1 Defendants-appellees are not fairly
apprised of the act or acts complained of.
Besides, bad faith is never presumed (Civil Code, Art. 527). And, it has been held that "to
support a judgment for damages, facts which justify the inference of a lack or absence of
good faith must be alleged and proven". 1 2
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While it is a settled rule that a defective complaint may be cured by the introduction of
sufficient evidence so as to constitute the cause of action which the plaintiff intended to
set forth in the complaint, the same merits the Court's blessings only and unless there is
no objection or opposition from the side of the defendant. It is obvious that the
defendants-appellees, in the case at bar, were vigilant of their right and were on their guard
from the very initiation of the complaint against them.
Plaintiff-appellant's allegation "that defendants NIDC and PNB have extended loans to
defendant sugar mill . . ., to assist in the illegal creation and operation of said mill, hence, a
joint tortfeasor in the trespass of plaintiff's rights. . . ." is, therefore, a mere conclusion not
warranted by sufficient facts. What appears from the record is that PNB and NIDC came
into the picture in the ordinary and usual course of its business after the borrowing entity
had established itself as capable of being treated as a new milling district (FFMC is
officially designated as Mill District No. 49) because it could already operate and had its
array of adhering planters. "The doing of an act which is in itself perfectly lawful will not
render one liable as for a tort, simply because the unintended effect of such act is to
enable or assist another person to do or accomplish a wrong", 1 3 assuming, of course, that
there was such a wrong.
WHEREFORE, without resolving the issue in the main case regarding the alleged illegal
creation and operation of First Farmers Milling Co., Inc., there having been no presentation
of evidence as yet in the lower Court, the challenged Order dismissing the Amended and
Supplemental Complaint against defendants-appellees as well as the Order denying
reconsideration thereof, is hereby affirmed, and the appeal dismissed.
Costs against plaintiff-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
4. Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308 (1912); Remitere, et al. vs. Vda. de Yulo. et
al., 16 SCRA 251 (1966).
5. Acuña vs. Batac Producers Cooperative, 20 SCRA 526 (1967); Mindanao Realty Corp. vs.
Kintanar, et al. 6 SCRA 814 (1962).
9. La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory vs. Central Azucarera del Danao, 23 SCRA 686
(1968).
13. Konecny vs. Hohenschuh, 173 N.W. 901, 188 Iowa 1075; Noll v. Marian, 32 A. 2d 18,
347 Pa. 213 cited in Vol. 1, Cooley on Torts, p. 5; 86 CJS 933.