CASE DIGESTS:
create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the
# 1: G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP.
SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has
all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have
subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less
order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from
such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the
PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority
of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to
“Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested
the “Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and
argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the
President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include the
inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds
because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of
the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a
quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the
latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question
E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for
public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be
an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as
a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus,
they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their
mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger
of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” In private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in
interest” rule. It provides that “every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action,
does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is
entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in
the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or
“taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain
direct injury as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s
assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues
in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific
powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to
specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The
amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing
auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will
complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable
cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to
be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited
to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause
enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in
a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class
are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate
and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
#2: Facts:
On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into
law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005. RA No. 9335 was
enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law
intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees
of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status. Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and
guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2)
set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate
personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe
a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the
issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.
Petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) directly filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the SC to declare R.A. No. 9335
and its IRR unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that R.A. No. 9335 is a bill
of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a particular group or class of
officials and employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that the law
confers upon the Board the power to impose the penalty of removal upon
employees who do not meet their revenue targets; that the same is without the
benefit of hearing; and that the removal from service is immediately executory.
Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act
which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group
without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of
certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment,
penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not
seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays
down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and
provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are
still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are
amply protected.
#3: 95 SCRA 392 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – “Equal Protection” –
Eligibility to Office after Being 65
Judicial Review; Requisites thereof
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already
retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees
from public office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed
the law averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general,
Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These
two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more
of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term
of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision
which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office as well
as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them
after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case
should have never been merged. Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot’s. They
have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so
that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be
followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the
existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by
the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes
may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and
after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null
and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws
is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable
and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently
from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age,
have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees
attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger
ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that
candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume
office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable
classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of
the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political
elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65
years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable
disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be
retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be
reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a
good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired
from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from
running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision.
#4: Quinto vs. Comelec
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC). They contend that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that the
advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the
purpose of early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time
limitations. Such advance filing does not automatically make the person who
filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. Petitioners further posit that
the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon the
filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause
in the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Are appointed officials considered resigned upon filing of their certificates of
candidacy? Is Section 13 of RA 9369 violative of the equal protection clause?

RULING:
No to the first question and yes to the second. “ANY PERSON WHO FILES
HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY
BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN
PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC.” The said proviso seems to
mitigate the situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by
considering persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of
the campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding
appointive positions will only be considered as resigned at the start of the
campaign period when they are already treated by law as candidates.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned
from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned
all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial
distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying
elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the
differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to
those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. There
is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the
elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be
germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the
second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in
Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
#5: G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Facts:
Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization
composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on
moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec
alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.
Issue:
Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.
Ruling:
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted.
Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s
application was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in Article
3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts against
morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or
sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather than out
of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their allegation that
allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.
The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its constitutionally
vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized
and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual orientation is
not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international laws to which we
adhere.
#6: Trillanes vs. Pimentel (G.R. No. 179817)
FACTS:
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etat in relation to the “Oakwood
Incident.” In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year
term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the Court
that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate, alleging mainly
that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending
resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and Jalosjos exists
RULING:
The petition is bereft of merit.
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos,
petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) was
already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a
motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a
mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and
political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving
moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of
lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is regarded as a
"political offense."
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in
expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized
practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.
xxx
A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.
confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies equally
to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like
Jalosjos.
xxx
Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial,
he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities
and such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel
outside his place of detention.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement
in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody
for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution
provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
(Underscoring supplied)
Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders
augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail
for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue
certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila Pen
Incident," proves that petitioner's argument bites the dust. The risk that he
would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for
foreboding became real.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a
factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a
discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is
controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once
it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right
nor of discretion

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal action.

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases, both
being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of
offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly
no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in
the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and
for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence
of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or
imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of
an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This
accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is
"regardless of the stage of the criminal action." Such justification for