>>>MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO (G.R. NO.

149036 )<<<
Facts:

Herein petitioner Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as �Acting Director
IV� of the EID and was reappointed twice for the same position in a temporary
capacity. Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad interim, of herein
respondents Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners,
respectively. Their appointments were renewed thrice by PGMA, the last one during
the pendency of the case, all due to the failure of the Commission of Appointments
to act upon the confirmation of their appointments.

Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, issued a

memorandum removing petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Law
Department. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but was denied. Thus,
petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to
remain in office of herein respondents, claiming that their ad interim appointments
violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well
as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman
and members.

Issue:

(1) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were prohibited under the
Constitution

(2) Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA were temporary in character

Ruling: NO.

(1) While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC �shall be independent�, this
provision should be harmonized with the President�s power to extend ad interim
appointments. To hold that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission
on Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can
assume office will negate the President�s power to make ad interim appointments.
This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect
to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the
framers of the Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution � on the nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments � did not provide for ad interim appointments. The
original intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away with ad
interim appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in session
throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess. However, because
of the need to avoid disruptions in essential government services, the framers of
the Constitution thought it wise to reinstate the provisions of the 1935
Constitution on ad interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in the present
Constitution of the ad interim appointing power of the President was for the
purpose of avoiding interruptions in vital government services that otherwise would
result from prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three
constitutional commissions.

Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her constitutional
power to make ad interim appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil
sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution. This power to make ad interim appointments is lodged in the President
to be exercised by her in her sound judgment. Under the second paragraph of Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes
in appointing officials who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. First, while Congress is in session, the President may nominate the
prospective appointee, and pending consent of the Commission on Appointments, the
nominee cannot qualify and assume office. Second, during the recess of Congress,
the President may extend an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee to
immediately qualify and assume office. Whether the President chooses to nominate
the prospective appointee or extend an ad interim appointment is a matter within
the prerogative of the President because the Constitution grants her that power.
This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the President in
the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not been shown
in the instant case.

In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the President to

Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, respectively, do
not constitute temporary or acting appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.

(2) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect

immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution
itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it
effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
Constitution provides as follows:

�The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.�

Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President.

While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by

law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be
withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting
appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the
kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to
the three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.

In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to
fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments
during the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary
or acting capacity. The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are
expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President, during the
recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect immediately.

>>>LAGMAN v MEDIALDEA<<<
FACTS:
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President Rodrigo
Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
In accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President, on
May 25, 2017, submitted to Congress a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216.
The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion
and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
On May 23, 2017, as the President stated in his Report, the Maute terrorist group
took over a hospital in Marawi City; established several checkpoints within the
city; burned down certain government and private facilities and inflicted
casualties on the part of Government forces; and started flying the flag of the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby indicating a
removal of allegiance from the Philippine Government and their capability to
deprive the duly constituted authorities � the President, foremost � of their
powers and prerogatives.
The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City; the role it
plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole; and the possible tragic
repercussions once it falls under the control of the lawless groups.
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate declared that it
found �no compelling reason to revoke Proclamation 216.
The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned the Supreme
Court, questioning the factual basis of President Duterte�s Proclamation of martial
law.
ISSUES:
[1] W/N the petitions are the �appropriate proceeding� covered by paragraph 3,
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review
required by the Court;
[2] A. Is the President required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in
his appreciation of facts? B. Is the President required to obtain the favorable
recommendation thereon bf the Secretary of National Defense? C. Is the President is
required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation,
even if subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported?
[3] Is the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress
jointly or separately;
[4] W/N there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; A. What are the
parameters for review? B. Who has the burden of proof? C. What is the threshold of
evidence?
[5] Whether the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the
calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief?
[6] W/N Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and thus null
and void: a. with its inclusion of �other rebel groups;� or b. since it has no
guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao
region;
[7] W/N the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the Report
of the President to Congress are sufficient bases: a. for the existence of actual
rebellion; or b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region;
[8] W/N terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual
rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law
or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
[9] W/N nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 will: A. have the effect of
recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or B. also nullify the acts of the President
in calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts
of the Mindanao region.

RULING:
1. The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph
of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and
5 of Article VIII. The phrase �in an appropriate proceeding� appearing on the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen
for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise
of the Chief Executive�s emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be
denominated as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
2. a.) In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration
and/or the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality
of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court
expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the
written Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and
veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To
require him otherwise would impede the process of his decision-making.
b.) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that
the President�s power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except
for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety
requires it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the
President is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Only on
the President can exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
c.) As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial
law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the
revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of these
powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court as to
whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be based
only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the time he
made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found in the
proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress. These may
be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was made or past
events. As to how far the past events should be from the present depends on the
President.
3. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is independent
of the actions taken by Congress.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On
the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. The power to review by the
Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but
likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation.
4. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows:
l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two
requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to
believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in
determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring
martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and
most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or
non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension
of the writ. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict
the exercise of his emergency powers.
5. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does
not extend to the calibration of the President�s decision of which among his
graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation. To do so would be
tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an
infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the
President.
6. a.) Inclusion of �other rebel groups � does not make Proclamation No. 216 vague.
The term �other rebel groups� in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague when
viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of
Proclamation No. 216 refers to �other rebel groups� found in Proclamation No. 55,
which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
b.) Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make Proclamation No. 216
vague. Operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the implementation
of the proclamation.
There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the
implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and other
orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Any act
committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws
should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the
Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere
that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
7. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. By a review of the facts available to him
that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to
remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory
and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his power and prerogatives, leading
the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion
was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable
cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
8. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Rebellion may be subsumed under
the crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope covering a wide range of
predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by which
terrorism can be committed.
Meanwhile, public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. For a
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus to be valid, there must be concurrence of 1.) actual rebellion or invasion
and 2.) the public safety requirement.
In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG
and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or
establishment but likewise against civilians and their properties. There were bomb
threats, road blockades, burning of schools and churches, hostages and killings of
civilians, forced entry of young male Muslims to the group, there were hampering of
medical services and delivery of basic services, reinforcement of government
troops, among others. These particular scenarios convinced the President that the
atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus
impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
9. a.) The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare
martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55.
The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces independently of
the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to declare
martial law. Even so, the Court�s review of the President�s declaration of martial
law and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily entails separate proceedings
instituted for that particular purpose.
b.) Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the
nullification of the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the
operative fact doctrine,� the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an
�operative fact� before it is declared unconstitutional.
***
Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
region. The Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of Proclamation
No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions
are hereby DISMISSED.

>>> Risos-Vidal v COMELEC<<<

Facts:

In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the
crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former
President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and
political rights.

In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President.

None of the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second
in the results.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a
Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the
Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before

the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because
of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40
of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC).

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President
Estrada�s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon
vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered
the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor
of Manila.

Issue:

May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been
convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?

Held:

Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective
office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that
the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and

accepted by former President Estrada does not actually specify which political
right is restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not
deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada�s rights of suffrage and to
hold public office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot be upheld
based on the pardon�s text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of

Article IX-C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to
grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of the Congress.

x x x x

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of

election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances
in which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment
cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases
involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that
any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power
of the President.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that �(h)e is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights,� expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in

relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is
worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the
prohibition � a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision
allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction
by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for
and hold any public office, whether local or national position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal�s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon,

i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek
any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor
militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada�s rights to suffrage
and to seek public elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition
or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political
rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an
essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that
explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas."
Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are
not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause
at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does
not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its
effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to
limit the scope of the pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an

introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and
obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble
can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on

Respondent�s promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have
explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President
Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission
is constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a
condition to the pardon extended to former President Estrada.