1. CARGANILLO VS.
PEOPLE receives the money, or goods or other personal
FACTS:
Prosecution:
 Teresita Lazaro, a rice trader in Rizal, Nueva
Ecija, gave the petitioner the amount
of P132,000.00 for the purpose of buying palay.
 The petitioner, who was alleged to be an "ahente"
or agent in the buy-and-sell of palay, agreed to
deliver the palay to the Lazaro Palay Buying
Station on or before November 28, 1998.
 According to the "Kasunduan" signed by the
petitioner, the parties agreed that for every kilo of
palaybought the petitioner shall earn a
commission of twenty centavos (P0.20). But if no
palayis purchased and delivered on November
28, the petitioner must return the P132,000.00 to
Teresita within one (1) week after November 28.
 After failing to receive any palayor
the P132,000.00 on November 28 and one (1)
week thereafter, respectively, Teresita made oral
and written demands to the petitioner for the
return of the P132,000.00 but her demands were
simply ignored.
 She thus filed a complaint for estafa against the
petitioner.
Defense:
 The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime and
denied that she entered into a "principal-agent"
agreement with, and received the P132,000.00
from, Teresita.
 She alleged that she owed Teresita a balance
of P13,704.32 for the fertilizers and rice that she
purchased from the latter in 1995 and 1996, and
that, in November 1996, she was made to sign a
blank "Kasunduan" that reflected no written date
and amount. She likewise denied personally
receiving any written demand letter from
Teresita.
CRIME CHARGED: Estafa
RTC: Convicted as charged
CA: Affirmed
 She (Petitioner) argues that the prosecution failed
to establish all the elements of estafa because she
never received the P132,000.00 from Teresita;
that an element of the crime is that "the offender
property in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligations
involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the
same."
RULING:
Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, the offense of estafa committed with
abuse of confidence requires the following elements:
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial on his part
of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is
to the prejudice of another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.
All the elements of estafa are present in this case: that the
petitioner received in trust the amount of P132,000.00
from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay and
misappropriated it when she failed to return the said
amount to Teresita upon demand.
As the CA and the RTC did, we find worthy of credit and
belief the "Kasunduan" presented in evidence by the
prosecution that was admittedly signed by the petitioner
and which contained the terms of agreement between her
and Teresita. This document clearly stated that the
petitioner received in trust the amount of P132,000.00
from Teresita for the purpose of buying palay with the
corresponding obligations to (1) deliver the palay to the
Lazaro Palay Buying Station on or before November 28,
1998, and (2) return the P132,000.00 to Teresita one week
after November 28 in the event that the petitioner failed
to make palay purchases.
It is settled that the agreement or contract between the
parties is the formal expression of the parties’ rights,
duties, and obligations and is the best evidence of the
parties’ intention. Thus, when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced into writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.
1
2. CORPUZ VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and
petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990.
 Private complainant was then engaged in the
business of lending money to casino players and,
upon hearing that the former had some pieces of
jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on
May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell
the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
 Private complainant agreed, and as a
consequence, he turned over to petitioner the
following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a
woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and
another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value
of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even
date.
 They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the
proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return
the same items, within a period of 60 days.
 The period expired without petitioner remitting
the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of
jewelry.
 When private complainant was able to meet
petitioner, the latter promised the former that he
will pay the value of the said items entrusted to
him, but to no avail.
CRIME CHARGED: Estafa
RTC: Convicted as charged
CA: Affirmed
ISSUE: The honorable court of appeals erred in affirming
the lower court's finding that the criminal information for
estafa was not fatally defective although the same did not
charge the offense under article 315 (1) (b) of the revised
penal code in that -
1. The information did not fix a period within which the
subject [pieces of] jewelry should be returned, if unsold,
or the money to be remitted, if sold;
2. The date of the occurrence of the crime alleged in the
information as of 05 july 1991 was materially different
from the one testified to by the private complainant which
was 02 may 1991;
RULING:
The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is
the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from
the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an
essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure
of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not
render the Information ipso facto defective.
It must be remembered that petitioner was
convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who
shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence
ELEMENTS: (Estafa with abuse of confidence)
(a) that money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial on his part
of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is
to the prejudice of another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender.
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is,
that there is a demand by the offended party on the
offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his
testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able
to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the
time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner
about the same items with the latter promising to pay
them.
No specific type of proof is required to show that
there was demand. Demand need not even be formal; it
may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not
even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon
the person charged, since even a mere query as to the
whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would
be tantamount to a demand. Thus, the failure of the
prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not
fatal.
2
 In view of the foregoing and based on the records,
the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the
elements of the crime.
Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of
jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the
receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or
return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There
was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the
proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took
place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within
or after the agreed period despite demand from the private
complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.

3
3. SULIMAN VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 Vilma Suliman along with Luz Garcia were
charged with 6 crimes: 2 counts of illegal
recruitment penalized under RA 8042 and 4
counts of Estafa (2)(a) of Art. 315
 Only petitioner was brought to trial as her co-
accused, Garcia, eluded arrest and remained at-
large despite the issuance of a warrant for her
arrest.
 RTC’s decision: The six cases were consolidated
and, after trial, the RTC of Manila, Branch 21,
rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
illegal recruitment and three (3) counts of estafa.
 Her MR to RTC was denied by RTC for lack of
merit
 CA’s decision: Affirmed the decision of RTC
convicting her guilty for the crime of estafa and
illegal recruitment
 Petitioner did not file an MR with the
reglementary period prompting her to file a
motion to admit attached motion for
reconsideration however it was denied
CRIME CHARGED:
Herein petitioner and certain Luz P. Garcia were charged
with the following crimes:
(2) counts of illegal recruitment under Section 6,
paragraphs (a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042,
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995
(4) counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code
(Note: Garcia remained at large)
RTC: Convicted
Two (2) counts of illegal recruitment and three (3) counts
of estafa
CA: Affirmed
RULING:
(Note: Ruling on Illegal Recruitment, se full case)
As to the charge of estafa, the act complained of in the
instant case is penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)
of the RPC, wherein estafa is committed by any person
who shall defraud another by false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud. It is committed by using
fictitious name, or by pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other
similar deceits. The elements of estafaby means of deceit
are the following, viz.:
(a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent
representation as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions;
(b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation
was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud;
(c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to
part with his money or property; and
(d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.
In the instant case, all the foregoing elements are
present. It was proven beyond reasonable doubt, as found
by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, that petitioner and
her co-accused misrepresented and falsely pretended that
they had the capacity to deploy the private complainants
for employment either in South Korea, Saudi Arabia and
Canada.
The misrepresentation was made prior to private
complainants' payment of placement fees. It was the
misrepresentation and false pretenses made by petitioner
and her co-accused that induced the private complainants
to part with their money.
As a result of such false pretenses and
misrepresentations, the private complainants suffered
damages as the promised employment abroad never
materialized and the various amounts of money they paid
were never recovered.
Petitioner argues that she could not be held liable
because she was not privy nor was she aware of the
recruitment activities done by her coaccused. Petitioner
avers that when her co-accused received several amounts
of money from the private complainants, she acted in her
personal capacity and for her own benefit without the
knowledge and consent of petitioner.
4
 The Court is not persuaded. As owner and general
manager, petitioner was at the forefront of the recruitment
activities of Suliman International. Undoubtedly, she has
control, manage mentor direction of the business of the
said company.
Petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak
defense, especially in the face of positive assertions made
by the private complainants who had no ill motive to
falsely testify against her.
In any case, petitioner cannot deny participation
in the recruitment of the private complainants because the
prosecution has established that petitioner was the one
who offered the private complainants an alleged
alternative employment in Ireland when their original
deployment did not materialize.

5
4. PEOPLE VS. TIBAYAN
FACTS:
Prosecution:
 Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc.
(TGICI) is an open-end investment company
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on September 21, 2001.
 Sometime in 2002, the SEC conducted an
investigation on TGICI and its subsidiaries.
 In the course thereof, it discovered that TGICI
was selling securities to the public without a
registration statement in violation of Republic
Act No. 8799, otherwise known as “The
Securities Regulation Code,” and that TGICI
submitted a fraudulent Treasurer’s Affidavit
before the SEC.
 Resultantly, on October 21, 2003, the SEC
revoked TGICI’s corporate registration for being
fraudulently procured.
 The foregoing led to the filing of multiple
criminal cases for Syndicated Estafa against the
incorporators and directors of TGICI, namely,
Jesus Tibayan, Ezekiel D. Martinez, Liborio E.
Elacio, Jimmy C. Catigan, Nelda B. Baran, and
herein accused-appellants.
 Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued
against all of them; however, only accused-
appellants were arrested, while the others
remained at large.
 According to the prosecution, the private
complainants were enticed to invest in TGICI due
to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the
assurance that they will recover their
investments.
 After giving their money to TGICI, private
complainants received a Certificate of Share and
post-dated checks, representing the amount of the
principal investment and the monthly interest
earnings, respectively.
 Upon encashment, the checks were dishonored,
as the account was already closed, prompting
private complainants to bring the bounced checks
to the TGICI office to demand payment.
 At the office, the TGICI employees took the said
checks, gave private complainants
acknowledgement receipts, and reassured that
their investments, as well as the interests, would
be paid.
 However, the TGICI office closed down without
private complainants having been paid and, thus,
they were constrained to file criminal complaints
against the incorporators and directors of TGICI.
Defense:
 Accused-appellants denied having conspired with
the other TGICI incorporators to defraud private
complainants.
 Particularly, Puerto claimed that his signature in
the Articles of Incorporation of TGICI was
forged and that since January 2002, he was no
longer a director of TGICI.
 For her part, Tibayan also claimed that her
signature in the TGICI’s Articles of Incorporation
was a forgery, as she was neither an incorporator
nor a director of TGICI.
CRIME CHARGED:
Crime of Syndicated Estafa, defined and penalized under
Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) in relation to Presidential Decree No. (PD)
1689.
RTC:
The RTC issued six (6) separate decisions convicting
Tibayan of 13 counts and Puerto of 11 counts
of Estafa under Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the
RPC in relation to PD 1689
The RTC found that accused-appellants conspired with
the other directors/incorporators of TGICI in
misrepresenting the company as a legitimate corporation
duly registered to operate as a mutual fund, to the
detriment of the private complainants.
However, the RTC convicted accused-appellants of
simple Estafa only, as the prosecution failed to allege in
the informations that accused-appellants and the other
directors/ incorporators formed a syndicate with the
intention of defrauding the public, or it failed to adduce
documentary evidence substantiating its claims that the
accused-appellants committed Syndicated Estafa.
CA:
The CA modified accused-appellants’ conviction
to that of Syndicated Estafa, and accordingly, increased
their respective penalties to life imprisonment for each
count.
6
 The CA concluded that as incorporators/directors
of TGICI, accused-appellants and their cohorts conspired
in making TGICI a vehicle for the perpetuation of fraud
against the unsuspecting public.
As such, they cannot hide behind the corporate
veil and must be personally and criminally liable for their
acts. The CA then concluded that since the TGICI
incorporators/directors comprised more than five (5)
persons, accused-appellants’ criminal liability should be
upgraded to that of Syndicated Estafa, and their
respective penalties increased accordingly.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of
Syndicated Estafa defined and penalized under Item 2 (a),
Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC in relation to PD
1689
RULING:
The Court sustains the convictions of accused-appellants.
Item 2 (a), Paragraph 4, Article 315 of the RPC provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall
defraud another by any means mentioned herein below
shall be punished by:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses
or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business,
or imaginary transactions; or by means of other
similar deceits.
The elements of Estafa by means of deceit under this
provision are the following:
(a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent
representation as to his power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions;
(b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation
was made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud;
(c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to
part with his money or property; and
(d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.
Section 1 of PD 1689 defines Syndicated Estafa as
follows:
Section 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa
or other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and
316 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall be
punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or
more persons formed with the intention of carrying out
the unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or
scheme, and the defraudation results in the
misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders,
or members of rural banks, cooperatives, “samahang
nayon(s),” or farmers’ associations, or funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
Thus, the elements of Syndicated Estafa are:
(a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in
Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC,, is committed;
(b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of
five (5) or more persons; and
(c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperative, “samahang nayon(s),” or farmers’
associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
In this case, a judicious review of the records
reveals TGICI’s modus operandi of inducing the public to
invest in it on the undertaking that their investment would
be returned with a very high monthly interest rate ranging
from three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%).
Under such lucrative promise, the investing
public are enticed to infuse funds into TGICI.
However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI
knew from the start that TGICI is operating without any
paid-up capital and has no clear trade by which it can pay
the assured profits to its investors, they cannot comply
with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their
investors’ money.
Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-
appellants, along with the other accused who are still at
7
large, used TGICI to engage in a Ponzi scheme, resulting
in the defraudation of the TGICI investors.
A Ponzi scheme is a type of investment fraud that
involves the payment of purported returns to existing
investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its
organizers often solicit new investors by promising to
invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high
returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the
perpetrators focus on attracting new money to make
promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the
false appearance that investors are profiting from a
legitimate business. It is not an investment strategy but a
gullibility scheme, which works only as long as there is
an ever-increasing number of new investors joining the
scheme.
All the elements of Syndicated Estafa, committed
through a Ponzi scheme,are present in this case,
considering that:
(a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more
than five (5) people, including herein accused-appellants,
made false pretenses and representations to the investing
public – in this case,the private complainants – regarding
a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with TGICI
in order to solicit money from them;
(b) the said false pretenses and representations were made
prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud;
(c) relying on the same, private complainants invested
their hard-earned money into TGICI; and
(d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI ended up running
away with the private complainants’ investments,
obviously to the latter’s prejudice.

8
5. HAO VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 Private complainant Manuel Dy y Awiten (Dy)
filed a criminal complaint against the petitioners
and Victor Ngo (Ngo) for
syndicated estafa penalized under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, in relation with Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1689.
 Dy alleged that he was a long-time client of
Asiatrust Bank, Binondo Branch where Ngo was
the manager.
 Because of their good business relationship, Dy
took Ngo’s advice to deposit his money in an
investment house that will give a higher rate of
return.
 Ngo then introduced him to Ma. Gracia Hao
(Gracia), also known as Mina Tan Hao, who
presented herself as an officer of various
reputable companies and an incorporator of State
Resources Development Corporation (State
Resources), the recommended company that can
give Dy his higher investment return.
 Relying on Ngo and Gracia’s assurances, Dy
initially invested in State Resources the
approximate amount of Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00).
 This initial investment earned the promised
interests, leading Dy, at the urging of Gracia, to
increase his investment to almost One Hundred
Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00).
 Dy increased his investments through several
checks he issued in the name of State
Resources. In return, Gracia also issued several
checks to Dy representing his earnings for his
investment.
 Gracia issued checks in the total amount
of (P114,286,086.14). All these checks were
subsequently dishonored when Dy deposited
them.
 Dy sought the assistance of Ngo for the recovery
of the amount of the dishonored checks. Ngo
promised assistance, but after a few months, Dy
found out that Ngo already resigned from
Asiatrust Bank and could no longer be located.
 Hence, he confronted Gracia regarding the
dishonored checks. He eventually learned that
Gracia invested his money in the construction and
realty business of Gracia’s husband, Danny Hao
(Danny). Despite their promises to pay, the
petitioners never returned Dy’s money.
 Dy filed a supplemental affidavit to include in the
criminal complaint Chester De Joya, Allan
Roxas, Samantha Roxas, Geraldine Chiong, and
Lyn Ansuas – all incorporators and/or directors of
State Resources.
 On the basis of Dy’s complaint and supplemental
affidavit, the public prosecutor filed an
information14 for syndicated estafa against the
petitioners and their six co-accused.
 Judge Placido Marquez issued warrants of arrest
against the petitioners and the other accused.
Consequently, petitioners immediately filed a
motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift
warrant of arrest. In their twin motions, they
invoked the absence of probable cause against
them and the pendency of their petition for review
with the Department of Justice (DOJ).
 The trial court denied the petitioners’ twin
motions.
CRIME CHARGED:
Syndicated estafa penalized under Article 315(2)(a) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation
with Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1689.
RTC: Convicted as charged
CA:
The CA affirmed the denial of the petitioners’
motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of
arrest.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest, a judge is mandated to personally
evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence.17 The CA noted that Judge Marquez
only issued the warrants of arrest after his personal
examination of the facts and circumstances of the case.
Since the judge complied with the Rules, the CA
concluded that no grave abuse of discretion could be
attributed to him.
The CA opined that the evidence on record and
the assertions in Dy’s affidavits only show probable cause
for the crime of simple estafa, not syndicated estafa.
Under PD No. 1689, in order for
syndicated estafa to exist, the swindling must have been
committed by five or more persons, and the fraud must be
9
against the general public or at least a group of persons.
In his complaint-affidavit, Dy merely stated that he relied
on the petitioners’ false representations and was
defrauded into parting with his money, causing him
damage.
Since there was no evidence that State Resources
was formed to defraud the public in general or that it was
used to solicit money from other persons aside from Dy,
then the offense charged should only be for simple estafa.
RULING:
In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is
determined at two stages. The first is at the executive
level, where determination is made by the prosecutor
during the preliminary investigation, before the filing of
the criminal information. The second is at the judicial
level, undertaken by the judge before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest.
In the case at hand, the question before us relates
to the judicial determination of probable cause. In order
to properly resolve if the CA erred in affirming the trial
court’s issuance of the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners, it is necessary to scrutinize the crime
of estafa, whether committed as a simple offense or
through a syndicate.
One of the modes of estafa is by means of deceit.
Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC defines how this particular
crime is perpetrated:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of other similar deceits.
Estafa has the following elements:
1) the existence of a false pretense, fraudulent act
or fraudulent means;
2) the execution of the false pretense, fraudulent
act or fraudulent means prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud;
3) the reliance by the offended party on the false
pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, which
induced him to part with his money or property; and
4) as a result, the offended party suffered damage
The cited factual circumstances show the
elements of estafa by means of deceit. The petitioners
induced Dy to invest in State Resources promising higher
returns. But unknown to Dy, what occurred was merely a
ruse to secure his money to be used in Danny’s
construction and realty business.
The petitioners’ deceit became more blatant when
they admitted in their petition that as early as August
1995, State Resources had already been dissolved.37 This
admission strengthens the conclusion that the petitioners
misrepresented facts regarding themselves and State
Resources in order to persuade Dy to part with his money
for investment with an inexistent corporation.
These circumstances all serve as indicators of the
petitioners’ deceit. “Deceit is the false representation of a
matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or
misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which
should have been disclosed, which deceives or is intended
to deceive another, so that he shall act upon it to his legal
injury.”
Thus, had it not been for the petitioners’ false
representations and promises, Dy would not have placed
his money in State Resources, to his damage. These
allegations cannot but lead us to the conclusion that
probable cause existed as basis to arrest the petitioners for
the crime of estafa by means of deceit.
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689,39 there is
syndicated estafa if the following elements are present:
1) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined
in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was committed;
2) the estafa or swindling was committed by a
syndicate of five or more persons; and
3) the fraud resulted in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural
banks, cooperatives, “samahang nayon[s],” or farmers
associations or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
The factual circumstances of the present case
show that the first and second elements of
syndicated estafa are present; there is probable cause for
violation of Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC against the
petitioners. Moreover, in Dy’s supplemental complaint-
affidavit, he alleged that the fraud perpetrated against him
was committed, not only by Ngo and the petitioners, but
10
also by the other officers and directors of State Resources.
The number of the accused who allegedly participated in
defrauding Dy exceeded five, thus satisfying the
requirement for the existence of a syndicate.
However, the third element of the crime is
patently lacking. The funds fraudulently solicited by the
corporation must come from the general public. In the
present case, no evidence was presented to show that
aside from Dy, the petitioners, through State Resources,
also sought investments from other people. Dy had no co-
complainants alleging that they were also deceived to
entrust their money to State Resources. The general
public element was not complied with. Thus, no
syndicated estafa allegedly took place, only
simple estafa by means of deceit.
Despite this conclusion, we still hold that the CA
did not err in affirming the trial court’s denial of the
petitioners’ motion to lift warrant of arrest.
A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge
after personal evaluation of the facts and circumstances is
convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was
committed.
Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to
believe that an offense was committed by the person
sought to be arrested.
This must be distinguished from the prosecutor’s
finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the
proper criminal information. Probable cause for warrant
of arrest is determined to address the necessity of placing
the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice.
With our conclusion that probable cause existed
for the crime of simple estafa and that the petitioners have
probably committed it, it follows that the issuance of the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners remains to be
valid and proper.

11
6. CAPILI VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City.
 Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending
civil case for declaration of nullity of the second
marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed
by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that
the marriage is declared null and void, it would
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3)
the pendency of the civil case for the declaration
of nullity of the second marriage serves as a
prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
 In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered
a decision declaring the voidness or incipient
invalidity of the second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent on the ground
that a subsequent marriage contracted by the
husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is
void from the beginning.
 The petitioner accused filed his Manifestation
and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal
of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him
on the ground that the second marriage between
him and private respondent had already been
declared void by the RTC.
 The RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
CRIME CHARGED: Bigamy
RTC: Granted the petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
CA: Reversed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: whether or not the subsequent declaration of
nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of
the criminal case for bigamy
RULING:
NO.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and
penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be
imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
In the present case, it appears that all the elements
of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information
was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent was contracted on
December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili
contracted on September 3, 1999.
Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared
the bigamous nature of the second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent
judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of
petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
The accused may still be charged with the crime
of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first
marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage
was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People, it wa ruled that:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the
nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had
already been consummated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted.
12
 Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which
is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if
petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first
marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and
the second marriage were subsisting before the first
marriage was annulled.

13
7. LASANAS VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 On February 16, 1968, Judge Carlos B. Salazar of
the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Iloilo
solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas
and Socorro Patingo without the benefit of a
marriage license.
 The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had
not executed any affidavit of cohabitation to
excuse the lack of the marriage license.
 Lasanas and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage
vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo
Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo City.
They submitted no marriage license or affidavit
of cohabitation for that purpose.
 Both ceremonies were evidenced by the
corresponding marriage certificates. In 1982,
Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because
of irreconcilable differences.
 On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted
marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a religious
ceremony solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at
the Sta. Maria Church in Iloilo City. Their
marriage certificate reflected the civil status of
the accused as single.
 The accused filed a complaint for annulment of
marriage and damages against Socorro in the
RTC in Iloilo City.
 The complaint alleged that Socorro had employed
deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing
his consent to their marriage; and that subsequent
marital breaches, psychological incompatibilities
and her infidelity had caused him to suffer mental
anguish, sleepless nights and social humiliation
warranting the award of damages.
 Socorro charged the accused with bigamy in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City.
CRIME CHARGED: Bigamy
RTC: Convicted as charged
CA: Affirmed
 The accused contended that because he had not
been legally married to Socorro, the first element
of bigamy was not established; that his good faith
and the absence of criminal intent were
absolutory in his favor; and that he had been of
the honest belief that there was no need for a
judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage before he could contract a subsequent
marriage
RULING:
The appeal lacks merit.
Article 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor
shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he or she contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
The marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas
and private complainant Patingo was void because of the
absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of
cohabitation. The ratificatory religious wedding
ceremony could not have validated the void marriage.
Neither can the church wedding be treated as a marriage
in itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites
of a valid marriage should be present.
One of these requisites is a valid marriage license
except in those instances when this requirement may be
excused. There having been no marriage license nor
affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who
presided over the religious rites, the religious wedding
cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say,
petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration
of the nullity of his void marriage to private complainant
Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did
just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban.
Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
The first and second elements of bigamy were
present in view of the absence of a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The
14
requirement of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage is
found in Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently
held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before
a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.
The crime of bigamy was consummated from the
moment he contracted the second marriage without his
marriage to Socorro being first judicially declared null
and void, because at the time of the celebration of the
second marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still
deemed valid and subsisting due to such marriage not
being yet declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction.

15
8. BUATIS VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Prosecution:
 On August 18, 1995, the wife of private-
complainant Atty. Jose J. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz),
retrieved a letter from their mailbox addressed to
her husband.
 The letter was open, not contained in an envelope,
and Atty. Pieraz’ wife put it on her husband’s
desk.
 On that same day, Atty. Pieraz came upon the
letter and made out its content.
 Reacting to the insulting words used by Buatis,
Jr., particularly: "Satan, senile, stupid, [E]nglish
carabao," Atty. Pieraz filed a complaint for libel
against accused-appellant.
 Subject letter and its contents came to the
knowledge not only of his wife but of his children
as well and they all chided him telling him:
"Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."
 Aside from the monetary expenses he incurred as
a result of the filing of the instant case, Atty
Pieraz’ frail health was likewise affected and
aggravated by the letter of accused-appellant.
Defense:
 The defense forwarded by accused-appellant
Buatis, Jr. was denial.
 According to him, it was at the behest of the
president of the organization "Nagkakaisang
Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan"
or NASATAMA, and of a member, Teresita
Quingco, that he had dictated to one of his
secretaries, a comment to the letter of private-
complainant in the second week of August 1995.
 Initially during his testimony, Buatis, Jr. could
not recall whether he had signed that letter-
comment or if it was even addressed to Atty.
Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had made
and sent another letter, this time dated August 24,
1995, to Atty. Pieraz.
 Confronted in court with the counter-affidavit
which he filed before the Pasig City Prosecutor’s
Office, however, Buatis, Jr. could not deny its
contents, among which was his admission that
indeed, he had sent subject letter of August 18
and the letter dated August 24, 1995 to Atty.
Pieraz.
CRIME CHARGED: Libel
RTC: Convicted as charged
CA: Affirmed
- The CA found that the words used in the letter are
uncalled for and defamatory in character as they
impeached the good reputation of respondent as a lawyer
and that it is malicious. It rejected petitioner’s claim that
the letter is a privileged communication which would
exculpate him from liability since he failed to come up
with a valid explanation as to why he had to resort to name
calling and downgrading a lawyer to the extent of
ridiculing him when he could have discharged his so
called "duty" in a more toned down fashion. It found also
that there was publication of the letter, thus, it cannot be
classified as privileged.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.
-Petitioner claims that: the CA failed to apply the ruling
in People v. Velasco that "if the act/matter charged as
libelous is only an incident in [an] act which has another
objective, the crime is not libel;" when he made his reply
to respondent’s letter to Mrs. Quingco making a demand
for her to vacate the premises, his objective was to inform
respondent that Mrs. Quingco is one of the recognized
tenants of the Rodriguez estate which is claiming
ownership over the area of Brgy. Manggahan, Pasig City,
and petitioner is the attorney-in-fact of the administrator
of the Rodriquez estate; communication in whatever
language, either verbal or written of a lawyer under
obligation to defend a client’s cause is but a privileged
communication;
RULING:
The Petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a
public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites
must concur:
(a) it must be defamatory;
(b) it must be malicious;
(c) it must be given publicity; and
16
(d) the victim must be identifiable
The last two elements have been duly established
by the prosecution. There is publication in this case. In
libel, publication means making the defamatory matter,
after it is written, known to someone other than the person
against whom it has been written.
Petitioner’s subject letter-reply itself states that
the same was copy furnished to all concerned. Also,
petitioner had dictated the letter to his secretary. It is
enough that the author of the libel complained of has
communicated it to a third person. Furthermore, the letter,
when found in the mailbox, was open, not contained in an
envelope thus, open to public.
In determining whether a statement
is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood
by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were
used and understood in another sense.
In determining whether the specified matter is
libelous per se, two rules of construction are
conspicuously applicable: (1) That construction must be
adopted which will give to the matter such a meaning as
is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in
which the public would naturally understand what was
uttered. (2) The published matter alleged to be libelous
must be construed as a whole.
In using words such as "lousy", "inutile",
"carabao English", "stupidity", and "satan", the letter, as
it was written, casts aspersion on the character, integrity
and reputation of respondent as a lawyer which exposed
him to ridicule.
As the CA said, these very words of petitioner
have caused respondent to public ridicule as even his own
family have told him: "Ginagawa ka lang gago dito."
Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is
defamatory; and, under the general rule laid down in
Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown. Thus, when the
imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not prove
malice on the part of petitioner (malice in fact), for the
law already presumes that petitioner’s imputation is
malicious (malice in law).
Petitioner, however, insists that his letter was a
private communication made in the performance of his
moral and social duty as the attorney-in-fact of the
administrator of the Rodriguez estate where Mrs. Quingco
is a recognized tenant and to whom respondent had
written the demand letter to vacate, thus in the nature of a
privileged communication and not libelous.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the
purview of a qualified privileged communication under
Article 354, No. 1, as claimed by petitioner, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) the person who made the communication had
a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication,
or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may
either be his own or of the one to whom it is made;
(2) the communication is addressed to an officer
or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the
matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection
sought; and
(3) the statements in the communication are made
in good faith and without malice.
While it would appear that the letter was written
by petitioner out of his social duty to a member of the
association which he heads, and was written to respondent
as a reply to the latter’s demand letter sent to a member,
however, a reading of the subject letter-reply addressed to
respondent does not show any explanation concerning the
status of Mrs. Quingco and why she is entitled to the
premises as against the claim of respondent’s client.
The letter merely contained insulting words, i.e,
"lousy" and "inutile letter using carabao English",
"stupidity", and "satan", which are totally irrelevant to his
defense of Mrs. Quingco’s right over the premises. The
words as written had only the effect of maligning
respondent’s integrity as a lawyer.
Moreover, the law requires that for a defamatory
imputation made out of a legal, moral or social duty to be
privileged, such statement must be communicated only to
the person or persons who have some interest or duty in
the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the
protection sought by the author of the statement.A written
letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as
privileged when it is published and circulated among the
public.
In this case, petitioner admitted that he dictated
the letter to one of her secretaries who typed the same and
made a print out of the computer. While petitioner
addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same letter
17
showed that it was copy furnished to all concerned. His
lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and is anathema
to his claim of privileged communication. Such
publication had already created upon the minds of the
readers a circumstance which brought discredit and
shame to respondent’s reputation.
Since the letter is not a privileged
communication, malice is presumed under Article 354 of
the Revised Penal Code. The presumption was not
successfully rebutted by petitioner as discussed above.

18
9. MARIANO VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 Ferdinand de Leon was driving his owner type
jeep along Barangay Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan.
 With him were his wife, Urbanita, and their two-
year old son, as they just came from a baptismal
party.
 Luis de Leon, an uncle of Ferdinand, also came
from the baptismal party and was driving his
owner type jeep.
 Accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano was
driving his red Toyota pick-up with his wife,
Rebecca, and their helper, Rowena Años, as
passengers. They had just attended a worship
service in Barangay Engkanto.
 The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of
Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it.
 Ferdinand got mad, overtook the pick-up and
blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano stopped the
pick-up behind the jeep.
 Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached
Reynaldo. Ferdinand claimed that he and
Reynaldo had an altercation. However, Reynaldo
insisted that he just stayed inside the pick-up and
kept quiet while Ferdinand hurled invectives at
him.
 Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought the
assistance of Luis de Leon. Luis intervened and
told Ferdinand and Reynaldo “magpasensiyahan
na lamang kayo at pagpasensiyahan mo si
Ferdinand.” Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the
advice of Luis and they went their separate ways.
 Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray,
Ferdinand decided to drop by his mother’s house
in San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He
parked his jeep in front of the house of his mother
and alighted therefrom.
 However, he was bumped by a moving vehicle,
thrown four (4) meters away and lost
consciousness. Urbanita shouted, “Mommy,
Mommy, nasagasaan si Ferdie.” She identified
the fast-moving vehicle that bumped Ferdinand
as the same red Toyota pick-up driven by
Reynaldo.
 On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife,
Rebecca, tried to show that the jeep of Ferdinand
stopped on the road in front of the house of the
latter’s mother about five (5) to six (6) meters
away from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the
pick-up as he saw an oncoming vehicle, which he
allowed to pass.
 Thereafter, Reynaldo made a signal and overtook
the jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand
suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost his balance
and was sideswiped by the overtaking pick-up.
 Reynaldo did not stop his pick-up and he
proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders
might harm him and his companions.
 After bringing his companions to their house,
Reynaldo proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in
Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the
incident.
 Ferdinand was brought to the hospital and
incurred hospital expenses. They received
financial assistance from Mariano.
CRIME CHARGED: Frustrated Murder
RTC: Frustrated Homicide
CA: Reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries
- The petitioner argues that his guilt for any crime was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt, and claims that
Ferdinand’s injuries were the result of a mere accident.
He insists that he lacked criminal intent; that he was not
negligent in driving his pick-up truck; and that the CA
should have appreciated voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance in his favor.
RULING:
The petitioner is convicted of Reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries.
Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his pick-
up five (5) to six (6) meters behind the jeep of Ferdinand,
as he allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he
overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. However, the fact that
Ferdinand’s body was thrown four (4) meters away from
his jeep showed that Reynaldo was driving his pick-up at
a fast speed when he overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. It is
worthy to note that Reynaldo admitted that he has known
Ferdinand and the latter’s family since 1980 because they
have a store where he used to buy things.
As aptly observed by the OSG, Reynaldo should
have foreseen the possibility that Ferdinand would alight
from his jeep and go inside the house of his mother where
the store is also located. As aptly observed by the court a
quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond the normal rate
19
of speed and within the control of the driver’s hands could mathematical formula provided for in Article 64 of the
have caused Ferdinand’s injuries. Revised Penal Code.
The very fact of speeding is indicative of On the basis of this particular provision, the trial
imprudent behavior, as a motorist must exercise ordinary court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of Article 64 in
care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate the instant case even if appellant had two mitigating
with the conditions encountered, which will enable him or circumstances in his favor with no aggravating
her to keep the vehicle under control and avoid injury to circumstance to offset them.” Conformably with Article
others using the highway. Reckless imprudence consists 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is
of involuntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which
an act from which material damage results by reason of ranges from one to four months. As earlier mentioned, the
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person rules in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code are not
performing of failing to perform such act, taking into applicable in reckless imprudence, and considering
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of further that the maximum term of imprisonment would
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances not exceed one year, rendering the Indeterminate
regarding persons, time and place. Sentence Law inapplicable, the Court holds that the
straight penalty of two months of arresto mayor was the
“Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but
correct penalty for the petitioner.
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing of failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.”
To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the
act must be something more than a mere negligence in the
operation of the motor vehicle, a willful and wanton
disregard of the consequences is required. The
Prosecution must further show the direct causal
connection between the negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of.
Contrary to the petitioner’s insistence, the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be
appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365,
Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the
imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
"The rationale of the law," according to People vs.
Medroso, Jr.: “can be found in the fact that in quasi-
offenses penalized under Article 365, the carelessness,
imprudence or negligence which characterizes the
wrongful act may vary from one situation to another, in
nature, extent, and resulting consequences, and in order
that there may be a fair and just application of the penalty,
the courts must have ample discretion in its imposition,
without being bound by what We may call the

20
10. SENIT VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
 Private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. was
driving north along Aglayan from the direction of
Valencia on board his Toyota pick-up with his
wife Rosalinda Toor, their three-year-old son
Mohinder Toor, Jr., and househelper Mezelle
Jane Silayan.
 He turned left and was coming to the center of
Aglayan when a speeding Super 5 bus driven by
petitioner and coming from Malaybalay headed
south towards Valencia, suddenly overtook a big
truck from the right side.
 Petitioner tried to avoid the accident by swerving
to the right towards the shoulder of the road and
applying the brakes, but he was moving too fast
and could not avoid a collision with the pick-up.
The bus crashed into the right side of private
complainant’s pick-up at a right angle.
 All passengers of the pick-up were injured and
immediately brought to the hospital. The damage
sustained by the pick-up reached P106,155.00.
 Defense’s version: The trial ensued in absentia
because after the initial presentation of evidence
for the petitioner, he resigned from his
employment and transferred residence. His
whereabouts allegedly became unknown so he
was not presented as a witness by his new
counsel. (kineclaim niya na dapat di siya
maconvict kasi di siya nakapagpresent ng
evidence)
CRIME CHARGED: Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property
RTC: Convicted as charged
CA: Affirmed
RULING:
The RTC did not err in convicting the petitioner.
The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 365 of the
RPC, which provides that:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. –
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing
to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
The elements of reckless imprudence are:
(1) that the offender does or fails to do an act;
(2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
(3) that it be without malice;
(4) that material damage results from the reckless
imprudence; and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part
of the offender, taking into consideration his employment
or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition,
and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and
place.
All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have
been established in the present case.
The petitioner questions the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and claims that their testimonies
are biased. He also claims that Toor, Sr. is the real culprit
when he turned left without looking for an incoming
vehicle, thus violating traffic rules resulting to the mishap.
Taken all together, the testimonies of the
witnesses conclusively suggest that: (1) the Super 5 bus
was moving fast; (2) the bus overtook a big truck which
was moving slowly from the right side; and (3) when the
petitioner saw the pick-up truck turning left, he applied
the brakes but because he was moving fast, the collision
became inevitable.
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the
Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner recklessly drove on
the right shoulder of the road and overtook another south-
bound ten-wheeler truck that slowed at the intersection,
obviously to give way to another vehicle about to enter
the intersection. It was impossible for him not to notice
that the ten-wheeler truck in front and traveling in the
same direction had already slowed down to allow passage
of the pick-up, which was then negotiating a left turn to
Aglayan public market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow
down, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to reduce his
speed or apply on the brakes of the bus in order to allow
the pick-up to safely make a left turn. Instead, he drove at
a speed too fast for safety, then chose to swerve to the
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right shoulder of the road and overtake the truck, entering
the intersection and directly smashing into the pick-up. In
flagrantly failing to observe the necessary precautions to
avoid inflicting injury or damage to other persons and
things, the petitioner was recklessly imprudent in
operating the Super 5 bus.
Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended,
mandates all motorists to drive and operate vehicles on
the right side of the road or highway. When overtaking
another, it should be made only if the highway is clearly
visible and is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking
while approaching a curve in the highway, where the
driver's view is obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily,
drivers of automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle,
are charged with a high degree of care and diligence to
avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it
that vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not
taken unaware by his presence on the side of the road
upon which they have the right to pass.
Thus, the petitioner cannot blame Toor, Sr. for
not noticing a fast-approaching bus, as the cited law
provides that the one overtaking on the road has the
obligation to let other cars in the opposite direction know
his presence and not the other way around as the petitioner
suggests.

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