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G. E. M. Anscombe
The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 173, Special Issue: Philosophers and Philosophies.
(Oct., 1993), pp. 500-504.
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Fri May 18 08:17:16 2007
The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 43, No. 173
ISSN 0031-8094
RUSSELM O R ANSELM?
BY G. E. M. ANSCOMBE
1. I did not argue that Anselm's argument could be 'saved by deletion ofa comma',
only that it could so be saved from the stupidity of an Ontological Argument. Note
that commas in editing Anselm are merely editorial judgement, there being no
commas in the mediaeval MSS.
2. I wanted to show what Anselm's argument was. I did not claim that it was a valid
proof. I could not determine whether it was a valid argument.
3. I showed that ifit was a valid argument ofthe 'Ontological' class, it has a missing,
i.e., unstated, premise: 'What exists in reality is greater than if it exists only in the
mind'. (This missing premise is supplied by Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part I,
Q. I1 art. 1 ii, who discusses an argument, obviously current in his time and deriving
from Anselm's, though he does not attribute it to Anselm. All the same, he thinks it
wrong.)
4. Williams does not notice the need of this extra premise, saying directly (or
perhaps taking me as saying) that the premise, which (with the editorial comma
put into the text before 'quod maius est') says that existing in reality is greater than
existing only in a mind, 'seems to involve the fallacy of treating being as a real
predicate'. I t does not: the extra premise is requisite.
5. Williams does not notice that Proslogion 3 is an argument assuming the conclusion
reached in Proslogion 2. The latter has supposedly proved the existence of that 'quo
maius cogitarinequit' ('than which nothing greater can be thought of'). Henceforth I
shall abbreviate this as qmcn, and 'quo maius cogitaripotest', 'than which a greater can
be thought of', as qmcp.
Given that qmcn does exist in re (in reality), Anselm argues further that it cannot
not exist. This impossibility must be an impossibility of its ceasing to exist. Hence
Williains' accusation that I equate 'It can be the case that that than which nothing
greater can be conceived is not-existent' with 'That than which nothing greater
can be conceived can be non-existent' is wrong. Given that idqmcn has been proved
0T h e editor3 or The Philorophirnl Qwrlerly, 1993
RUSSELM OR ANSELM? 50 1
to exist, it can further be shown that it cannot be not-existent, i.e., cannot become
non-existent, i.e., cease to exist. The argument from non-conceivability applies:
namely, that qmcn, if existent, cannot be thought of as ceasing to exist. For one can
conceive something - call it id qmcn - to be capable of ceasing to exist. But then it is
not qmcn, for one would be thinking of something greater if one thought of
something qmcn which was incapable of ceasing to exist.
It is a mistake to treat Proslogion 3 as a new and independent argument for there
being such a thing as something qmcn, i.e., for 'id qmcn' being a non-empty concept.
This shows that Williams' arguments against Proslogion 3 are misconceived. He says
that Anselm attempts a reductio ad absurdum proof of the proposition 'That than
which nothing greater can be conceived cannot be conceived not to exist'. But, to
repeat, Anselm's reasoning in Proslogion 3 assumes that that qmcn (that than which
nothing greater can be conceived) has already been proved to exist, and he is
arguing something further. Here he does rely on what Williams calls a premise for a
further proof of the existence of id qmcn, namely that if you conceive of something as
existing and capable of not existing, your conception is a conception of something
inferior to what you conceive if you conceive of it as incapable of not existing.
6. It is a mistake to say that 'That than which nothing greater can be conceived' is a
'definite description' in the sense that Russell gave to that term. Anselm's first and
repeated expression in Proslogion 2 is 'aliquid qmcn', i.e., 'something qmcn'. I n the
same - short - chapter he later speaks of id qmcn, which we can render 'that than
which . . .'. There is no reason to think he has switched to a Russellian definite
description, which would have in strictness to be rendered 'that which alone is qmcn'.
It is worth observing that Russell in 'On Denoting' has a footnote: 'The
argument [namely "the most perfect Being has all perfections; existence is a
perfection; therefore the most perfect Being exists"] can be made to prove validly
that all members of the class of most perfect Beings exist. . . '. I do not complete this
interesting footnote, but quote its beginning to show that Williams' assumption
that 'id qmcn' is a definite description d la Russell wants grounds. Reading Anselm's
argument, I might say (to Anselm): 'You've proved the existence ofsome qmcn, but
so far as that goes it leaves open the question "How many things fall under that
description?" '. In Proslogion 2 Anselm speaks of 'such a nature' ('talis natura'). It
may be that there is only one 'such nature', but more than one thing that has it.
7. Here I will give briefly what ought to be the received version of Anselm's
argument in Proslogion 2, accepting the editorial comma before 'quod maius est'. ( I
put in square brackets the extra premise which that version needs, and which is not
in Anselm.) '
If qmcn exists only in a mind, still it can be conceived to exist in reality as well.
Now, for any object, to exist in reality as well as in a mind is greater than for it to
exist only in the mind. [And therefore it too is greater than if it exists only in the
mind.] Hence conceiving it to exist in reality as well as in a mind is conceiving it as
greater than one is conceiving it as if one thinks it exists only in a mind. Therefore
one cannot conceive qmcn to exist only in a mind. For if qmcn is only in a mind, this
0The editors af T h e Philorophirnl Quarlerb, 1993.
502 G . E. M. ANSCOMBE
qmcn is also qmcp - but that is a contradiction. But it certainly does exist in a mind -
namely in that of the fool, who says there is no such thing in reality. Therefore qmcn
exists in reality as well as in the mind.
This argument can be blamed like the Ontological Argument, since it derives a
thing's being greater from its existence in reality's being greater than existence only in
the mind.