Republic vs Remman Enterprises (Civil Law)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO

G.R. No. 199310; February 19, 2014; REYES, J.

FACTS:
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises filed an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two
parcels of land situated in Taguig, Metro Manila, identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre,
with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.

The RTC found the application for registration sufficient in form and substance and set it for initial hearing on May 30,
2002. The Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette and was likewise posted in a conspicuous places.

On the day of the hearing, only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC
issued an order of general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to the
respondent’s application for registration. Sometime after, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) likewise filed its
Opposition, alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

During the trial, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945.
The respondent purchased Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador and Bella Mijares, respectively, in 1989. The
subject properties were originally owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime, who cultivated and planted different kinds of
crops in the said lots, through her caretaker and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said parcels
of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in
1989. The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, as evidenced by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 28, 1989 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent; (2) survey plans of the subject
properties; (3) technical descriptions of the subject properties; (4) Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate; (5) tax declarations of
Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; and (6) certifications dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno, Senior
Forest Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain

For its part, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application for registration should be denied since the subject parcels
of land are not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that pursuant to Section
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50
meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA,
claimed that, upon preliminary evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of Taguig, which was
prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the then Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966,
he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the
subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties range
from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.

On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed that, based on the actual topographic survey of the
subject properties he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the subject properties, contrary to
LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m. Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation ranging from
12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077 ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. The RTC pointed out that LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the subject properties
is below 12.50 m is hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic map that was prepared using an aerial
survey on March 2, 1966; that nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed conducted on March 2,
1966 for purposes of gathering data for the preparation of the topographic map.

Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not always remain the same; that the elevations of the
subject properties may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial survey, from which the topographic
map used by LLDA was based, was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by Engr. Magalonga in
measuring the elevations of the subject properties.

Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that the same
could not be considered part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850,
Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that can be covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum
lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of
Laguna Lake form part of its bed and not those that are already far from it, which could not be reached by the lake water.
The RTC pointed out that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from the shoreline of Laguna Lake; that
they are dry and waterless even when the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise found that the
respondent was able to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.

The CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE:
Is respondent entitled to the registration of title to the subject properties?
HELD: NO
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower
courts, which this Court, generally may not disregard. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual
findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for doing so. That the subject properties are not part of
the bed of Laguna Lake, however, does not necessarily mean that they already form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. It is still incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh incontrovertible evidence,
that the subject properties are indeed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

While deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that the elevations of the subject properties are above the reglementary
level of 12.50 m and, hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake, the Court nevertheless finds that the respondent
failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to the subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, xxxx all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted
right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or
alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming
the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable."

The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject properties under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Under said Section, applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish:
1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the same; and
3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the subject property forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, the respondent presented two certifications issued by Calamno, attesting that Lot
Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain "under Project No. 27-B of
Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on January 3, 1968."

However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject properties are
alienable and disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Court clarified that, in addition to
the 1) certification issued by the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and disposable, applicants for
land registration must 2) prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of
public domain as alienable and disposable. They must 3) present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and 4) certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records.

In Republic v. Roche, the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the ruling in T.A.N. Properties. Here, Roche did not
present evidence that the land she applied for has been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain. She
submitted only the survey map and technical description of the land which bears no information regarding the land’s
classification. She did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification from the appropriate government
agency. Thus, it cannot be said that she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section 14(1) of P.D.
1529.
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in support of its application for registration are thus not
sufficient to prove that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable. It
is still imperative for the respondent to present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary,
which must be certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting the
application for registration in spite of the failure of the respondent to prove by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that
the subject properties are alienable and disposable.

Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N. Properties, which was promulgated on June 26, 2008,
must be applied prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law of the land and, pursuant to
Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its application for
registration of title was filed and was granted by the RTC prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N.
Properties.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was filed and granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling
in T.A.N. Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the present case; it is not antithetical to the rule
of non-retroactivity of laws pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the interpretation of a law by this
Court constitutes part of that law from the date it was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect. "Such judicial doctrine does not amount
to the passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one."
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove
that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject properties since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the subject properties since
1943, the respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena which are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of
the possession and occupation of the subject properties by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not
constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the subject properties required by
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed, other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present any other
evidence to prove the character of the possession and occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject
properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be
presented to substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
subject of the application. Applicants for land registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions
of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over
it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property.

Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have indeed planted crops on
the subject properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties have been possessed and occupied by them
in the manner contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject properties may only have amounted to
mere casual cultivation, which is not the possession and occupation required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim of ownership.
For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The possession
of public land, however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because
the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years."
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject properties presented by the respondent were only for
2002. The respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the subject properties as early as 1989, and
that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943, it was only in 2002 that it
started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
they constitute proof of claim of ownership." That the subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002
gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or possession of the subject properties starting that
year.
WHEREFORE, respondent's application for registration is denied.
Secretary of DENR vs Yap
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws: Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008

FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition
for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the
survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island
as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from
filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in
Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition
countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed part
of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not available for disposition
pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.

ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural
land, therefore making these lands alienable.
HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must
be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either
by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

ANGELITA BUENAVENTURA VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

(GR. NO. 166865, March 2, 2007)

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree enumerates the persons who may apply for
registration of land: (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) those who
have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. Because
of Section 14 (2) of the said decree, those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and
whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may
have the right to register their title to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land
commenced only after 12 June 1945.
Spouses Amado and Irene Buenaventura acquired a parcel of land, located at San Dionisio
Parañaque, from the Heirs of Lazaro de Leon even before the World War II. However, it was only on 30
January 1948 that a Deed of Sale was executed in favor of the spouses. This land was transferred,
subsequently, to their heirs, including petitioners Angelita and Preciosa Buenaventura (Buenaventuras).
A new tax declaration was issued in their name.
On 05 June 2000, the Buenaventura filed with the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque an
Application for the Registration of Title of the land. When the case was set for hearing no formal
opposition had been filed. The Buenaventuras, then, proceeded to present evidence and witnesses to
prove that they have acquired vested rights over the land thru open, continuous, and exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over 50 years completely unmolested by any
adverse claim as required by law and that the land is alienable and disposable.
Subsequently, the trial court granted the application, ordering the registration of the parcel of land in favor
of the Buenaventuras.
Respondent Republic appealed the trial court's order with the Court of Appeals, who ruled in
favor of the Republic, declaring that the land was public. Moreover, the appellate court while recognizing
that the Buenaventuras and their predecessors'-in-interest had acquired possession of the land since
1948, it ruled that they failed to show possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
12 June 1945 or earlier as required by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject property is an alienable and disposable land of public domain,
hence susceptible of application for registration under the Property Registration Decree
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the decision of the trial court
confirming petitioners' title over the subject property for not being allegedly supported by
substantial evidence as required by law

HELD:
The petition is GRANTED.
The subject property is an alienable and disposable land of public domain since 3 January 1968
as certified by the DENR.
Section 14 of the Property Registration enumerates the persons who may apply for registration of
land: (1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) those who
have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws. Under the
first classification, three requisites must be complied with for the filing of an application for registration of
title, to wit: (a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of public domain; (b) that the
applicants themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation; (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945. The second classification relates to prescription.
In this case the Court disagreed with the Republic's claim that the land in questioned is not
alienable and disposable, invoking Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution and the Regalian Doctrine,
which states that all lands of the public domain belong to the State and all lands not otherwise appearing
within private ownership are presumed to belong the State. Such presumption, however, is not
conclusive. It can be rebutted by the applicant's presentation of incontrovertible evidence showing that the
land subject of application for registration is alienable and disposable. Petitioners presented a certification
issued by the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources showing that the land is an alienable
and disposable land of public domain since 3 January 1968. Such certification is sufficient to establish the
true nature or character of the subject property. The certification enjoys the presumption of regularity in
the absence of contradictory evidence. Therefore, the alienable and disposable character of the
questioned parcel of land has been clearly established by the evidence of the Buenaventuras, by 3
January 1968, at the latest.
As to the requisites of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, the Court agreed with the findings of
the Court of Appeals that the evidence presented by petitioners was not enough to prove that their
possession of the subject property started since 12 June 1945 or earlier because the evidence
established that the questioned parcel of land was acquired by spouses Buenaventura only on 30
January 1948, the date of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale by its previous owners. Moreover,
petitioners' possession of the subject property could only ripen into ownership on 3 January 1968, when
the same became alienable and disposable. In Republic v. Herbieto (G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005,
459 SCR\ 183, 201-202), the Court ruled that "any period of possession prior to the date when the subject
property was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the
land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not
apply thereto."
Even if the possession of alienable lands of the public domain commenced only after 12
June 1945, application for registration of the said property is still possible by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which speaks of prescription.
The fact that they failed to prove possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required
by Section 14 (1) will not be an insurmountable bar to the petitioners to have title to the subject property
registered in their names.

The Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 144057, 17 January 2005, 448 SCR\ 442,
451-452) declared that the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. 1073, both providing 12 June 1945 or earlier as the reckoning period of possession necessary to
vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain, did not preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of public domain, possession over which
commenced only after 12 June 1945, considering Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration
Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
It becomes crystal clear from the aforesaid ruling of the Court that even if the possession of
alienable lands of the public domain commenced only after 12 June 1945, application for registration of
the said property is still possible by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree which
speaks of prescription.
Under the Civil Code, prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership. Article 1137 of the
Code states that "ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years without need of title or of good faith."
It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land may be converted into
private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years. Such
property now falls within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14 (2), over which title by
prescription can be acquired. Hence, because of Section 14 (2) of Presidential Decree 1529, those who
are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and whose possession has been characterized as
open, continuous and exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to register their title to such land
despite the fact that their possession of the land commenced only after 12 June 1945.
The aforesaid jurisprudential rule truly demonstrates that, in the present case, while petitioners'
possession over the subject property can be reckoned on 3 January 1968, the date when according to
evidence, the subject property became alienable and disposable, they can still have the subject property
registered in their names by virtue of Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The records, indeed, reveal that petitioners were in possession of the subject property for more
than 30 years, 32 years to be exact, reckoned from the year 1968, when the subject property was finally
declared alienable and disposable by the DENR to the time they filed an application for registration of title
over the subject property on 5 June 2000. Petitioners' possession of the subject property since 1968 has
been characterized as open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner. By this, the subject alienable and disposable public land had been effectively
converted into private property over which petitioners have acquired ownership through prescription to
which they are entitled to have title through registration proceedings.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS CANDY MAKER, INC.

(GR.NO. 163766, June. 22, 2006)

Facts:
On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc. for a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation of
12.50m, about 900 meters away the Laguna de Bay.Candy Maker, Inc. as applicant, filed an application
with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for registration of its alleged title over the lot.
 The CENRO of Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the alienable and disposable zone. On
the other hand, the Land Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot no. 3138-B on the ground
that it is a legal easement and intended for public use, hence, inalienable and indisposable. On July 2001,
the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed its opposition which alleged that the lot subject of the
application for registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake
Bed, a public land within, its jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable property of the State,
and if so, whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of evidence to prove its ownership over the
property?

Held:
The property subject of this application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land.
However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses registrable title over the property. The statute of
limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not operate against the statute unless the occupant
proves possession and occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the required number of years
to constitute a grant from the State. A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does
not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership, such possession is not exclusive and notorious as
to give rise to presumptive grant from the state. In light of the foregoing, the petition of the Republic of the
Philippines is granted.

Republic vs. unoz

Lee hong hok vs. David
FACTS:

 Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application in accordance with
which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent (*similar to public auction) was made by the
Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892.

 On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT
No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City on October 21, 1959.

 Land in question is not a private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources have always sustained the public character for having been formed by reclamation (as
opposed to peittioners contention that it is accretion)

 The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud - But there was no fraud in this case

ISSUES:
1. W/N Lee Hong Kok can question the grant. - NO

2. W/N David has original acquisition of title. - YES

HELD: Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal justification for nullifying the right of David to the disputed lot
arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials)
 Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent. The
legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the government. Private parties like the
plaintiffs cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved are void since they are not the
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga
Cadastre after claiming it as their private property.

 Well-settled Rule : no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government

 Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an
owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in
addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a period
of 5 years.

 Imperium v. Dominium

1. Imperium - government authority possessed by the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept
of sovereignty

2. Dominium - capacity to own or acquire property. The use of this term is appropriate with reference to
lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation
and use of lands and other natural resources, including their disposition, except as limited by the
Constitution.