Cases Public Corporation

List of Cases
CASE TITLE PAGE

NO.
1 THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE v. CITY OF 3
ZAMBOANGA
2 CITY OF MANILA v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 12
3 METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. BEL- 19
AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.
4 SALAS v. JARENCIO 34
5 LIMBONA v. MANGELIN 45
6 ORDILLO v. COMELEC 56
7 DIMASANGCOP v. DPWH 60
8 CHIONGBIAN v. ORBOS 83
9 JAVIER v. CA 91
10 MONTEJO v. COMELEC 96
11 UMALI v. COMELEC 109
12 MACASIANO v. DIOKNO 128
13 LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC. 133
14 BATANGAS CATV, INC. v. CA 143
15 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY OFFICERS v. LIM 154
16 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COLLADO 217
17 ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. FEATI BANK AND 230
TRUST CO.
18 METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GARIN 245
19 SEMA v. COMELEC 252
20 ACEBEDO OPTICAL v. CA 278
21 PIMENTEL v. AGUIRRE 286
22 LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENR 303
23 MASIKIP v. THE CITY OF PASIG 330
24 MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE v. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION 341
25 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIM 348
26 MONDANO v. SILVOSA 358
27 ANDAYA v. RTC 361
28 JALOSJOS v. COMELEC 365
29 TORAYNO v. COMELEC 420
30 COQUILLA v. COMELEC 428
31 RODRIGUEZ v. COMELEC 436
32 FRANCIA v. MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN 445
33 CITY OF CEBU v. DEDAMO 450
34 PALAFOX v. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE 455
35 MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI v. FONTANILLA 465
36 MAQUILING v. COMELEC 475
37 PAPANDAYAN v. COMELEC 516
38 ABUNDO v. COMELEC 525
Public Corporation Cases Compilation_1

39 MALONZO v. ZAMORA 551
40 OMBUDSMAN v. BINAY 562
41 ALEJANDRO v. OMBUDSMAN 612
42 OMBUDSMAN v. RODRIGUEZ 621
43 ANGOBUNG v. COMELEC 631
44 CLAUDIO v. COMELEC 638

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968
THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE,defendants-appellants.
Fortugaleza, Lood, Sarmiento, M. T. Yap & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for defendants-appellants.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be the
provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39
was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act
also provided that —
Buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the
capital to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to
be fixed by the Auditor General.
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed
thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in
the name of Zamboanga Province. As far as can be gleaned from the records, 1 said properties were
being utilized as follows —
No. of Lots Use

1 ................................................ Capitol Site
3 ................................................ School Site
3 ................................................ Hospital Site
3 ................................................ Leprosarium
1 ................................................ Curuan School
1 ................................................ Trade School
2 ................................................ Burleigh School
2 ................................................ High School Playground
9 ................................................ Burleighs
1 ................................................ Hydro-Electric Site (Magay)
1 ................................................ San Roque
23 ................................................ vacant

It appears that in 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred to
Dipolog. 2 Subsequently, or on June 16, 1948, Republic Act 286 was approved creating the
municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga Province.
On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act 39, fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question left by Zamboanga
Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00. 3
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into
two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations of the
old province were to be divided between the two new ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided:
Upon the approval of this Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the
obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably between the Province of
Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the
Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.
Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955, apportioned the assets and
obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and
45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of
P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and buildings in question, or P704,220.05 payable by
Zamboanga City.
On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a
ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-
indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price
thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13,
1951 conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as
of 1945, when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.
The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an
amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the
quarter ending March 31, 1960, then for the quarter ending June 30, 1960, and again for the first
quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46, was credited to
the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the P764,220.05 due it.
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that —
All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga
and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of
the said City of Zamboanga. (Stressed for emphasis).
Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12, 1961, ordered the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to
Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of
Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since the enactment of Republic Act 3039,
P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has already been returned to it.
This constrained plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint
entitled "Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Norte against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and

the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It was prayed that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be declared
unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and just
compensation; (b) Plaintiff's rights and obligations under said law be declared; (c) The Secretary of
Finance and the Internal Revenue Commissioner be enjoined from reimbursing the sum of
P57,373.46 to defendant City; and (d) The latter be ordered to continue paying the balance of
P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue allotments.
On June 4, 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of preliminary injunction as prayed for.
After defendants filed their respective answers, trial was held. On August 12, 1963, judgment was
rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Republic Act No. 3039

unconstitutional insofar as it deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties,
consisting of 50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon under certificates of title
(Exhibits "A" to "A-49") in the name of the defunct province of Zamboanga; ordering
defendant City of Zamboanga to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P704,220.05 payment thereof
to be deducted from its regular quarterly internal revenue allotment equivalent to 25% thereof
every quarter until said amount shall have been fully paid; ordering defendant Secretary of
Finance to direct defendant Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct 25% from the
regular quarterly internal revenue allotment for defendant City of Zamboanga and to remit
the same to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte until said sum of P704,220.05 shall have been
fully paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte to execute through its proper officials the
corresponding public instrument deeding to defendant City of Zamboanga the 50 parcels of
land and the improvements thereon under the certificates of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") upon
payment by the latter of the aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full; dismissing the
counterclaim of defendant City of Zamboanga; and declaring permanent the preliminary
mandatory injunction issued on June 8, 1962, pursuant to the order of the Court dated June
4, 1962. No costs are assessed against the defendants.
It is SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, but prior to the perfection of defendants' appeal, plaintiff province filed a motion
to reconsider praying that Zamboanga City be ordered instead to pay the P704,220.05 in lump
sum with 6% interest per annum. Over defendants' opposition, the lower court granted plaintiff
province's motion.
The defendants then brought the case before Us on appeal.
Brushing aside the procedural point concerning the property of declaratory relief filed in the
lower court on the assertion that the law had already been violated and that plaintiff sought to give it
coercive effect, since assuming the same to be true, the Rules anyway authorize the conversion of
the proceedings to an ordinary action, 5 We proceed to the more important and principal question of
the validity of Republic Act 3039.
The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings thereon in
question. For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over the properties of a
municipal corporation, of which a province is one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is
owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity,
the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its
private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The
municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. 6

The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the use to which it is
intended and devoted. Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under
the law of Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the properties in question?
The Civil Code classification is embodied in its Arts. 423 and 424 which provide: 1äw phï1.ñët
ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property
for public use and patrimonial property.
ART. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists
of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or
municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this
Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. (Stressed for emphasis).
Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as
High School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga
province. Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be
considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the phrase "public works
for public service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must
be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated properties in the
first paragraph of Art 424. 7 The playgrounds, however, would fit into this category.
This was the norm applied by the lower court. And it cannot be said that its actuation was
without jurisprudential precedent for in Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of Lands, 8 and
in Municipality of Tacloban v. Director of Lands, 9 it was held that the capitol site and the school sites
in municipalities constitute their patrimonial properties. This result is understandable because, unlike
in the classification regarding State properties, properties for public service in the municipalities are
not classified as public. Assuming then the Civil Code classification to be the chosen norm, the lower
court must be affirmed except with regard to the two (2) lots used as playgrounds.
On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of
Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service
are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is
enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration,
public education, public health, etc. 10
Supporting jurisprudence are found in the following cases: (1) HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, 11where it was stated that "... where the municipality has occupied lands distinctly for
public purposes, such as for the municipal court house, the public school, the public market, or other
necessary municipal building, we will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, presume a grant from
the States in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that rule may be invoked only
as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes...." (2) VIUDA DE TANTOCO V.
MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO 12 held that municipal properties necessary for governmental
purposes are public in nature. Thus, the auto trucks used by the municipality for street sprinkling, the
police patrol automobile, police stations and concrete structures with the corresponding lots used as
markets were declared exempt from execution and attachment since they were not patrimonial
properties. (3) MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. CANTOS 13 held squarely that a municipal lot
which had always been devoted to school purposes is one dedicated to public use and is not
patrimonial property of a municipality.

Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as
capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school
playground sites — a total of 24 lots — since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in
its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of Congress. Said lots
considered as public property are the following:
TCT
Lot Number Use
Number
2200 ...................................... 4-B ...................................... Capitol Site
2816 ...................................... 149 ...................................... School Site
3281 ...................................... 1224 ...................................... Hospital Site
3282 ...................................... 1226 ...................................... Hospital Site
3283 ...................................... 1225 ...................................... Hospital Site
3748 ...................................... 434-A-1 ...................................... School Site
5406 ...................................... 171 ...................................... School Site
High School Play-
5564 ...................................... 168 ......................................
ground
157 &
5567 ...................................... ...................................... Trade School
158
High School Play-
5583 ...................................... 167 ......................................
ground
6181 ...................................... (O.C.T.) ...................................... Curuan School
11942 ...................................... 926 ...................................... Leprosarium
11943 ...................................... 927 ...................................... Leprosarium
11944 ...................................... 925 ...................................... Leprosarium
5557 ...................................... 170 ...................................... Burleigh School
5562 ...................................... 180 ...................................... Burleigh School
5565 ...................................... 172-B ...................................... Burleigh
5570 ...................................... 171-A ...................................... Burleigh
5571 ...................................... 172-C ...................................... Burleigh
5572 ...................................... 174 ...................................... Burleigh
5573 ...................................... 178 ...................................... Burleigh
5585 ...................................... 171-B ...................................... Burleigh
5586 ...................................... 173 ...................................... Burleigh
5587 ...................................... 172-A ...................................... Burleigh
We noticed that the eight Burleigh lots above described are adjoining each other and in turn
are between the two lots wherein the Burleigh schools are built, as per records appearing herein and
in the Bureau of Lands. Hence, there is sufficient basis for holding that said eight lots constitute the
appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh schools, and partake of the nature of the same.
Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned, the records do not
disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga.
Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when
Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to
authorize construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own expense, 14 it can be

assumed that said buildings were erected by the National Government, using national funds. Hence,
Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in
question.
But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere
accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of said lands,
i.e., public. Moreover, said buildings, though located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and
benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by the provincial residents. The province
then — and its successors-in-interest — are not really deprived of the benefits thereof.
But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the
value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are not being
utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes. Said lots are:
TCT Number Lot Number Use

5577 ...................................... 177 ...................................... Mydro, Magay
13198 ...................................... 127-0 ...................................... San Roque
5569 ...................................... 169 ...................................... Burleigh 15
5558 ...................................... 175 ...................................... Vacant
5559 ...................................... 188 ...................................... "
5560 ...................................... 183 ...................................... "
5561 ...................................... 186 ...................................... "
5563 ...................................... 191 ...................................... "
5566 ...................................... 176 ...................................... "
5568 ...................................... 179 ...................................... "
5574 ...................................... 196 ...................................... "
5575 ...................................... 181-A ...................................... "
5576 ...................................... 181-B ...................................... "
5578 ...................................... 182 ...................................... "
5579 ...................................... 197 ...................................... "
5580 ...................................... 195 ...................................... "
5581 ...................................... 159-B ...................................... "
5582 ...................................... 194 ...................................... "
5584 ...................................... 190 ...................................... "
5588 ...................................... 184 ...................................... "
5589 ...................................... 187 ...................................... "
5590 ...................................... 189 ...................................... "
5591 ...................................... 192 ...................................... "
5592 ...................................... 193 ...................................... "
5593 ...................................... 185 ...................................... "
7379 ...................................... 4147 ...................................... "
Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are
truly private in nature. On the other hand, that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also
registered is of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private. 16

We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The controversy here is more along the
domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations — State vs. Province — than along that of Civil Law.
Moreover, this Court is not inclined to hold that municipal property held and devoted to public service
is in the same category as ordinary private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary private
properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can even be acquired thru adverse
possession — all these to the detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification of
properties other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of the
Civil Code — is "... without prejudice to the provisions of special laws." For purpose of this article, the
principles, obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special laws".
Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as
public should prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.
Defendants' claim that plaintiff and its predecessor-in-interest are "guilty of laches is without
merit. Under Commonwealth Act 39, Sec. 50, the cause of action in favor of the defunct Zamboanga
Province arose only in 1949 after the Auditor General fixed the value of the properties in question.
While in 1951, the Cabinet resolved transfer said properties practically for free to Zamboanga City, a
reconsideration thereof was seasonably sought. In 1952, the old province was dissolved. As
successor-in-interest to more than half of the properties involved, Zamboanga del Norte was able to
get a reconsideration of the Cabinet Resolution in 1959. In fact, partial payments were effected
subsequently and it was only after the passage of Republic Act 3039 in 1961 that the present
controversy arose. Plaintiff brought suit in 1962. All the foregoing, negative laches.
It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City of Zamboanga
the former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in nature, said share to
computed on the basis of the valuation of said 26 properties as contained in Resolution No. 7, dated
March 26, 1949, of the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General.
Plaintiff's share, however, cannot be paid in lump sum, except as to the P43,030.11 already
returned to defendant City. The return of said amount to defendant was without legal basis. Republic
Act 3039 took effect only on June 17, 1961 after a partial payment of P57,373.46 had already been
made. Since the law did not provide for retroactivity, it could not have validly affected a completed
act. Hence, the amount of P43,030.11 should be immediately returned by defendant City to plaintiff
province. The remaining balance, if any, in the amount of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 lots
should then be paid by defendant City in the same manner originally adopted by the Secretary of
Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and not in lump sum. Plaintiff's prayer,
particularly pars. 5 and 6, read together with pars. 10 and 11 of the first cause of action recited in the
complaint 17clearly shows that the relief sought was merely the continuance of the quarterly
payments from the internal revenue allotments of defendant City. Art. 1169 of the Civil Code on
reciprocal obligations invoked by plaintiff to justify lump sum payment is inapplicable since there has
been so far in legal contemplation no complete delivery of the lots in question. The titles to the
registered lots are not yet in the name of defendant Zamboanga City.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and another judgment is
hereby entered as follows:.
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in
lump sum the amount of P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of the sum of
P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter; and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor of plaintiff of whatever balance
remains of plaintiff's 54.39% share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting therefrom the
sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal

Committee formed by the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments from the allotments of
defendant City, in the manner originally adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 See Record on Appeal, pp. 4-6.
2 See Exhibit C.
3 The Committee report itself was not submitted as evidence
4 Exhibit C.
5 Rule 64, Sec. 6, Rules of Court.
62 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd ed., 191-196; Martin Public Corporation, 5th ed.,
31-32; Gonzales, Law on Public Corporations, 1962 ed., 29-30; Municipality of Naguilian v.
NWSA, L-18452, Nov. 29, 1963.
7 Cebu City v. NWSA, L-12892, Apr. 30, 1962.
8 17 Phil. 216.
9 17 Phil. 426.
10 Martin, op. cit., supra.; Gonzales, op cit., supra.; 62 C.J. 8. 437-439.
11 24 Phil. 124.
12 49 Phil. 52.
13 91 Phil. 514.
It was only in Republic Act 2264, Sec. 3, last paragraph, that provinces, cities and
14
municipalities were "... authorized to undertake and carry out any public works
projects, financed by the provincial city and municipalfunds or any other fund borrowed from
or advanced by private third parties .. without the intervention of the Department of Public
Works and Communications." (Stressed for emphasis) This law was approved and took
effect on June 19, 1959.
15This could not be considered as forming part of the appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh
school sites since the records here and in the Bureau of Lands show that this lot is set apart
from the other Burleigh lots.

Republic v. Sioson, L-13687, Nov. 29, 1963; Hodges V. City of Iloilo, L-17573, June 30,
16
1962.
17 Record on Appeal, pp. 8-9, 13.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989
CITY OF MANILA, and EVANGELINE SUVA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, IRENE STO. DOMINGO and for and in behalf of
her minor children, VIVENCIO, JR., IRIS, VERGEL and IMELDA, all surnamed STO.
DOMINGO, respondents.
The City Legal Officer for petitioners.
Jose M. Castillo for respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside: (a) the Decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court now Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on May 31, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV
No. 00613-R entitled Irene Sto. Domingo et al., v. City Court of Manila et al., modifying the decision
of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII 2 in Civil Case No. 121921 ordering the
defendants (herein petitioners,) to give plaintiffs (herein private respondents) the right to use a burial
lot in the North Cemetery corresponding to the unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued upon, to
search the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. and to bury the same in a substitute lot to
be chosen by the plaintiffs; and (b) the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 1985
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
As found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, the undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Brought on February 22, 1979 by the widow and children of the late Vivencio Sto.
Domingo, Sr. was this action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline
Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North
Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-in-charge of the
said burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of Manila.
Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. deceased husband of plaintiff Irene Sto. Domingo and
father of the litigating minors, died on June 4,1971 and buried on June 6,1971 in Lot
No. 159, Block No. 194 of the North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to
Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 per Official
Receipt No. 61307 dated June 6, 1971 (see Exh. A) with an expiry date of June 6,
2021 (see Exh. A-1). Full payment of the rental therefor of P50.00 is evidenced by
the said receipt which appears to be regular on its face. Apart from the
aforementioned receipt, no other document was executed to embody such lease
over the burial lot in question. In fact, the burial record for Block No. 194 of Manila
North Cemetery (see Exh. 2) in which subject Lot No. 159 is situated does not reflect
the term of duration of the lease thereover in favor of the Sto. Domingos.

Believing in good faith that, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, Series of
1975, dated March 6, 1975, of the City Mayor of Manila (See Exh. 1) prescribing
uniform procedure and guidelines in the processing of documents pertaining to and
for the use and disposition of burial lots and plots within the North Cemetery, etc.,
subject Lot No. 159 of Block 194 in which the mortal remains of the late Vivencio Sto.
Domingo were laid to rest, was leased to the bereaved family for five (5) years only,
subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation.
On the basis of such certification, the authorities of the North Cemetery then headed
by defendant Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal from subject
burial lot the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., placed the bones and
skull in a bag or sack and kept the same in the depository or bodega of the cemetery
y Subsequently, the same lot in question was rented out to another lessee so that
when the plaintiffs herein went to said lot on All Souls Day in their shock,
consternation and dismay, that the resting place of their dear departed did not
anymore bear the stone marker which they lovingly placed on the tomb. Indignant
and disgusted over such a sorrowful finding, Irene Sto. Domingo lost no time in
inquiring from the officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery, defendant Sergio Mallari,
and was told that the remains of her late husband had been taken from the burial lot
in question which was given to another lessee.
Irene Sto. Domingo was also informed that she can look for the bones of her
deceased husband in the warehouse of the cemetery where the exhumed remains
from the different burial lots of the North Cemetery are being kept until they are
retrieved by interested parties. But to the bereaved widow, what she was advised to
do was simply unacceptable. According to her, it was just impossible to locate the
remains of her late husband in a depository containing thousands upon thousands of
sacks of human bones. She did not want to run the risk of claiming for the wrong set
of bones. She was even offered another lot but was never appeased. She was too
aggrieved that she came to court for relief even before she could formally present her
claims and demands to the city government and to the other defendants named in
the present complaint. (Decision, Court of Appeals, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 34-55)
The trial court, on August 4, 1981, rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendants to give

plaintiffs the right to make use of another single lot within the North Cemetery for a
period of forty-three (43) years four (4) months and eleven (11) days, corresponding
to the unexpired term of the fully paid lease sued upon; and to search without let up
and with the use of all means humanly possible, for the remains of the late Vivencio
Sto. Domingo, Sr. and thereafter, to bury the same in the substitute lot to be chosen
by the plaintiffs pursuant to this decision.
For want of merit, defendant's counterclaim is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)
The decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which on May 31, 1984 rendered a decision
(Rollo, pp. 33-40) modifying the decision appealed from, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED (is hereby modified) and another one is hereby entered:
1. Requiring in full force the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of
the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr., and to bury the same in the substitute lot
adjudged in favor of plaintiffs hereunder;
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally P10,000.00

for breach of contract;
3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P20,000.00

for moral damages;
4. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally, P20,000.00

for exemplary damages;
5. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P10,000.00

as and for attorney's fees;
6. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, on the

foregoing amounts legal rate of interest computed from filing hereof until fully paid;
and
7. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, the cost of

suit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 40)
The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, this instant petition (Rollo, pp. 7-27) filed on July 27, 1985.
The grounds relied upon for this petition are as follows:
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING

DAMAGES AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR
GOOD FAITH AND THEIR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OR CONSENT TO THE
REMOVAL OF THE SKELETAL REMAINS OF THE LATE VIVENCIO STO.
DOMINGO, SR. FROM THE SUBJECT BURIAL LOT.
II
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING

PETITIONERS HEREIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ALLEGED TORTS OF THEIR
SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, INSPITE OF THE PROVISIONS
OF SECTION 4 OF THE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 409 (REVISED CHARTER OF
MANILA) AND OTHER APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SUBJECT
EXEMPTING THE PETITIONERS FROM DAMAGES FROM THE MALFEASANCE

OR MISFEASANCE OF THEIR OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, IF THERE BE ANY
IN THIS CASE. (Brief for Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 93-94)
In the resolution dated November 13, 1985 (,Rollo, p. 84), the petition was given due course.
The pivotal issue of this case is whether or not the operations and functions of a public cemetery are
a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila. The resolution of this
issue is essential to the determination of the liability for damages of the petitioner city.
Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or
purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They
conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function,
it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate employees.
Further Section 4, Article I of the Revised Charter of Manila exempts the city from liability for
damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board,
or any other city officer, to enforce the provision of its charter or any other laws, or ordinance, or
from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board or any other officers while enforcing or attempting to
enforce said provisions. They allege that the Revised Charter of Manila being a special law cannot
be defeated by the Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code being a general law.
Private respondents on the other hand maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of
lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with private respondent Irene Sto. Domingo.
The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease.
Private respondents' contention is well-taken.
Under Philippine laws, the City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the
faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity
with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted
with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and
corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in
administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the
legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the
special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and
corporate. In McQuillin on Municipal Corporation, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation
proper has ... a public character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government,
and private (so called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own
community (Torio v. Fontanilla, 85 SCRA 599 [1978]). In connection with the powers of a municipal
corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary
capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial
properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads, city
streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for
public service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws (Article 424; Province of Zamboanga del Norte v.
City of Zamboanga, et al., 22 SCRA 1334 [1968]).
Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra, the Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the
settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex
contractu (Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, et al., 21 Phil. 184 (1912) or ex delicto (Mendoza v.
de Leon, 33 Phil. 508 (1916).
The Court further stressed:

Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort....
xxx xxx xxx
The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for
the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or line of his
employment, by which another who is free from contributory fault, is injured.
Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within tile operation of
this rule of law, and are liable accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the
requisite elements of liability co-exist. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The Court added:
... while the following are corporate or proprietary in character, viz: municipal
waterworks, slaughter houses, markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves,
ferries and fisheries. Maintenance of parks, golf courses, cemeteries and airports
among others, are also recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary
character. (Dept. of Treasury v. City of Evansvulle, Sup. Ct. of Indiana, 60 N.E. 2nd
952, 954 cited in Torio v. Fontanilla, supra) (Emphasis supplied)
Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a
patrimonial property of the City of Manila which was created by resolution of the Municipal Board of
August 27, 1903 and January 7, 1904 (Petition, Rollo pp. 20-21 Compilation of the Ordinances of the
City of Manila). The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer
(Ibid., Sec. 3189), the order and police of the cemetery (Ibid., See. 319), the opening of graves,
niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same (Ibid., Sec. 327) are
under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. The City of Manila
furthermore prescribes the procedure and guidelines for the use and dispositions of burial lots and
plots within the North Cemetery through Administrative Order No. 5, s. 1975 (Rollo, p. 44). With the
acts of dominion, there is, therefore no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property
which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute
that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from
contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by
the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. (Henson v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
148 SCRA 11 [1 987]). Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to
damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract. (Boysaw v. Interphil
Promotions, Inc., 148 SCRA 635 [1987]).
Noteworthy are the findings of the Court of Appeals as to the harrowing experience of private
respondents and their wounded feelings upon discovery that the remains of their loved one were
exhumed without their knowledge and consent, as said Court declared:
It has been fully established that the appellants, in spite or perhaps because, of their
lowly station in life have found great consolation in their bereavement from the loss of
their family head, by visiting his grave on special or even ordinary occasions, but
particularly on All Saints Day, in keeping with the deep, beautiful and Catholic Filipino
tradition of revering the memory of their dead. It would have been but fair and
equitable that they were notified of the intention of the city government to transfer the
skeletal remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo to give them an opportunity to
demand the faithful fulfillment of their contract, or at least to prepare and make
provisions for said transfer in order that they would not lose track of the remains of
their beloved dead, as what has actually happened on this case. We understand fully

what the family of the deceased must have felt when on All Saints Day of 1978, they
found a new marker on the grave they were to visit, only to be told to locate their
beloved dead among thousands of skeletal remains which to them was desecration
and an impossible task. Even the lower court recognized this when it stated in its
decision thus:
All things considered, even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs

for the unfortunate happening complained of and untimely
desecration of the resting place and remains of their deceased dearly
beloved, it finds the reliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and
factual basis. Under the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the
most that plaintiffs ran ask for is the replacement of subject lot with
another lot of equal size and similar location in the North Cemetery
which substitute lot plaintiffs can make use of without paying any
rental to the city government for a period of forty-three (43) years,
four (4) months and eleven (11) days corresponding to the unexpired
portion of the term of the lease sued upon as of January 25, 1978
when the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. were
prematurely removed from the disputed lot; and to require the
defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the late
Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in the substitute lot
adjudged in favor of plaintiffs hereunder. (Decision, Intermediate
Appellate Court, p. 7, Rollo, p. 39)
As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 of the
North Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as clearly stated in the
receipt duly signed by the deputy treasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by the city government,
there is nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both the trial court and the
Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that the receipt is in itself a contract of lease. (Decision,
Intermediate Appellate Court, p. 3, Rollo, pp. 5-6).
Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla, supra), petitioner City of Manila is
liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the
contract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative
Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only
beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases.
When subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for
fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), J., is on leave.
Footnotes

1 Penned by Justice Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa, concurred in by Justices Ramon G.
Gaviola, Jr. and Eduardo P. Caguioa.
2 Presided by Judge Fidel P. Purisima.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE

ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Not infrequently, the government is tempted to take legal shortcuts to solve urgent problems of the
people. But even when government is armed with the best of intention, we cannot allow it to run
roughshod over the rule of law. Again, we let the hammer fall and fall hard on the illegal attempt of the
MMDA to open for public use a private road in a private subdivision. While we hold that the general
welfare should be promoted, we stress that it should not be achieved at the expense of the rule of law. h Y
Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
Respondent Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose
members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is
the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated
December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting
January 2, 1996. The notice reads: Court
"SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic
"Dear President Lindo,
"Please be informed that pursuant to the mandate of the MMDA law or Republic Act No.
7924 which requires the Authority to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for
the safe and convenient movement of persons, Neptune Street shall be opened to
vehicular traffic effective January 2, 1996.
"In view whereof, the undersigned requests you to voluntarily open the points of entry
and exit on said street.
"Thank you for your cooperation and whatever assistance that may be extended by your
association to the MMDA personnel who will be directing traffic in the area.
"Finally, we are furnishing you with a copy of the handwritten instruction of the President
on the matter.
"Very truly yours,
PROSPERO I. ORETA
Chairman" [1]
On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the
adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Sppedsc

On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136,
Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the following day.
On January 23, 1996, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary
injunction. Respondent questioned the denial before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39549. The
[2]
appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street and on February 13, 1996, it issued a
[3]
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDAs proposed action. [4]
On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the
MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the
demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by
ordinance. The decision disposed of as follows: Jurissc
"WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the challenged Order dated January 23, 1995,
in Civil Case No. 96-001, is SET ASIDE and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on
February 13, 1996 is hereby made permanent.
"For want of sustainable substantiation, the Motion to Cite Roberto L. del Rosario in
contempt is denied. [5]
"No pronouncement as to costs.
"SO ORDERED." [6]
The Motion for Reconsideration of the decision was denied on September 28, 1998. Hence, this
recourse. Jksm
Petitioner MMDA raises the following questions:
"I
HAS THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA) THE

MANDATE TO OPEN NEPTUNE STREET TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC PURSUANT TO ITS
REGULATORY AND POLICE POWERS?
II
IS THE PASSAGE OF AN ORDINANCE A CONDITION PRECEDENT BEFORE THE

MMDA MAY ORDER THE OPENING OF SUBDIVISION ROADS TO PUBLIC TRAFFIC?
III
IS RESPONDENT BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. ESTOPPED FROM

DENYING OR ASSAILING THE AUTHORITY OF THE MMDA TO OPEN THE SUBJECT
STREET? Jlexj

WAS RESPONDENT DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS DESPITE THE SEVERAL
MEETINGS HELD BETWEEN MMDA AND THE AFFECTED BEL-AIR RESIDENTS AND
BAVA OFFICERS?
HAS RESPONDENT COME TO COURT WITH UNCLEAN HANDS?" [7]
Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a private
residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial district of Makati City. It runs parallel to
Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete
perimeter wall approximately fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor
Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its eastern end
intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates. Edp mis
Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an
agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of
these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to
insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of
MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate
Court. From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of
[8]
Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. [9]
Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the
Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The [10]
power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health,
public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. [11]
It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised
[12]
by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however,
[13]
may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of
municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
[14]
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. [15]
A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has
substantial control of local affairs." The Local Government Code of 1991 defines a local government unit
[16]
as a "body politic and corporate" -- one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National
[17]
Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. Local government
[18]
units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. They are also the territorial and political
[19]
subdivisions of the state.[20]
Our Congress delegated police power to the local government units in the Local Government
Code of 1991. This delegation is found in Section 16 of the same Code, known as the general welfare
clause, viz: Chief
"Sec. 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of
the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of

appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of
their inhabitants."
[21]
Local government units exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The
legislative body of the provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city
government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang
bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The Local Government Code of 1991
empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city
or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code x x
x." The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may be
[22]
necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the
general welfare of the inhabitants thereon."[23]
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units - i.e., twelve
(12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati,
Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the
municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic
Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
[24]
administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region
placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. [25]
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political
boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by
the individual local government units comprising Metro Manila." There are seven (7) basic metro-wide
[26]
services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and
traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage
management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; (6) health and
sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety. The basic service of transport and
traffic management includes the following: Lexjuris
"(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination,
and monitoring of policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the
existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of
thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and
goods; provision for the mass transport system and the institution of a system to
regulate road users; administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including
the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;" [27]
In the delivery of the seven (7) basic services, the MMDA has the following powers and
functions: Esm
"Sec. 5. Functions and powers of the Metro Manila Development Authority.The MMDA
shall:
(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term
plans and programs for the delivery of metro-wide services, land use and physical
development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent with national development objectives
and priorities;

(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment
programs for metro-wide services which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for
priority programs and projects, and which shall include the packaging of projects and
presentation to funding institutions; Esmsc
(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the delivery
of specific services under its jurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this
purpose, MMDA can create appropriate project management offices;
(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects in
Metro Manila; identify bottlenecks and adopt solutions to problems of implementation;
(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall
coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects
concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement,
engineering and education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and
cooperation, including but not limited to, assignment of personnel, by all other
government agencies and offices concerned;
(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines
and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules and regulations, whether
moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers
licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of
RA 4136 and PD 1605 to the contrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the
Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its
traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of
local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members of non-
governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject
to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; and
(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA,
including the undertaking of delivery of basic services to the local government units,
when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination with and consent of the local
government unit concerned." Jurismis
The implementation of the MMDAs plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local government
units, national government agencies, accredited peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations,
and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter
into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other cooperative arrangements with these bodies for the
delivery of the required services within Metro Manila.[28]
The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is composed of the
mayors of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors
League and the president of the Metro Manila Councilors League. The Council is headed by a Chairman
[29]
who is appointed by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policy-making
body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs and projects, and
issues the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of said plans; it approves the annual
budget of the MMDA and promulgates the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services,
collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. These functions are particularly enumerated
as follows: LEX
"Sec. 6. Functions of the Metro Manila Council. -
(a) The Council shall be the policy-making body of the MMDA;

(b) It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and projects and issue rules and
regulations deemed necessary by the MMDA to carry out the purposes of this Act;
(c) It may increase the rate of allowances and per diems of the members of the Council to
be effective during the term of the succeeding Council. It shall fix the compensation of the
officers and personnel of the MMDA, and approve the annual budget thereof for
submission to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM);
(d) It shall promulgate rules and regulations and set policies and standards for metro-
wide application governing the delivery of basic services, prescribe and collect service
and regulatory fees, and impose and collect fines and penalties." Jj sc
Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of
these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies,
standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the
use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass
transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic
enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the
institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA
is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the
implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a
single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. Ca-lrsc
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination,
regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a
system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police
power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any
legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A.
No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in
the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
[30]
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are
actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the
process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide
services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government
units concerning purely local matters." [31]
Petitioner cannot seek refuge in the cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court where we
[32]
upheld a zoning ordinance issued by the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), the predecessor of the
MMDA, as an exercise of police power. The first Sangalang decision was on the merits of the
petition, while the second decision denied reconsideration of the first case and in addition discussed the
[33]
case of Yabut v. Court of Appeals. [34]
Sangalang v. IAC involved five (5) consolidated petitions filed by respondent BAVA and three residents
of Bel-Air Village against other residents of the Village and the Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati
Development Corporation, as the developer of the subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain
restrictive easements in the deeds of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the
prohibition on the setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and the condition that the

lots be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners alleged that respondents, who were residents along
Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their residences into commercial establishments in violation of
the "deed restrictions," and that respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the full commercialization" of
Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that separated the commercial from the residential
section of the village. [35]
The petitions were dismissed based on Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of Makati and
Ordinance No. 81-01 of the Metro Manila Commission (MMC). Municipal Ordinance No. 81 classified Bel-
Air Village as a Class A Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the center line of
Jupiter Street. The Municipal Ordinance was adopted by the MMC under the Comprehensive Zoning
Ordinance for the National Capital Region and promulgated as MMC Ordinance No. 81-01. Bel-Air Village
was indicated therein as bounded by Jupiter Street and the block adjacent thereto was classified as a
High Intensity Commercial Zone. [36]
We ruled that since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary between Bel-Air Village
and the commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. We also
held that the perimeter wall on said street was constructed not to separate the residential from the
commercial blocks but simply for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation
did not violate the "deed restrictions" in the deeds of sale. Scc-alr
We upheld the ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, as a legitimate exercise of police
power. The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the
[37]
general welfare prevailed over the "deed restrictions".
In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision, we held that the opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by
the demands of the common good in terms of "traffic decongestion and public convenience." Jupiter was
opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to the
Village. The same reason was given for the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a road
[38]
inside the same village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also made under the police power
of the municipal government. The gate, like the perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public nuisance
because it hindered and impaired the use of property, hence, its summary abatement by the mayor was
proper and legal.[39]
Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly,
both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant
case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22,
1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any
ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal
basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its
charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of
persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of
transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as
an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Misjuris
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the
forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter
of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the
present MMDA. Jjlex
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 824. It comprised the
Greater Manila Area composed of the contiguous four (4) cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloocan,
and the thirteen (13) municipalities of Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Las Pinas, Malabon, Navotas,
Pasig, Pateros, Paranaque, Marikina, Muntinlupa and Taguig in the province of Rizal, and Valenzuela in
the province of Bulacan. Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding that the rapid
[40]

growth of population and the increase of social and economic requirements in these areas demand a call
for simultaneous and unified development; that the public services rendered by the respective local
governments could be administered more efficiently and economically if integrated under a system of
central planning; and this coordination, "especially in the maintenance of peace and order and the
eradication of social and economic ills that fanned the flames of rebellion and discontent [were] part of
reform measures under Martial Law essential to the safety and security of the State." [41]
Metropolitan Manila was established as a "public corporation" with the following powers: Calrs-pped
"Section 1. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila.There is hereby created a public

corporation, to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and
attributes of a corporation including the power to make contracts, sue and be
sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of property and
such other powers as are necessary to carry out its purposes. The Corporation shall
be administered by a Commission created under this Decree." [42]
The administration of Metropolitan Manila was placed under the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) vested
with the following powers:
"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions of the Commission. - The Commission shall have the
following powers and functions:
1. To act as a central government to establish and administer programs and

provide services common to the area;
2. To levy and collect taxes and special assessments, borrow and expend money and
issue bonds, revenue certificates, and other obligations of indebtedness. Existing tax
measures should, however, continue to be operative until otherwise modified or repealed
by the Commission;
3. To charge and collect fees for the use of public service facilities;
4. To appropriate money for the operation of the metropolitan government and review
appropriations for the city and municipal units within its jurisdiction with authority to
disapprove the same if found to be not in accordance with the established policies of the
Commission, without prejudice to any contractual obligation of the local government units
involved existing at the time of approval of this Decree;
5. To review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of cities
and municipalities within Metropolitan Manila;
6. To enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and to fix penalties for any violation
thereof which shall not exceed a fine of P10,000.00 or imprisonment of six years or
both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense;
7. To perform general administrative, executive and policy-making functions;
8. To establish a fire control operation center, which shall direct the fire services of the
city and municipal governments in the metropolitan area;
9. To establish a garbage disposal operation center, which shall direct garbage collection
and disposal in the metropolitan area;

10. To establish and operate a transport and traffic center, which shall direct traffic
activities; Jjjuris
11. To coordinate and monitor governmental and private activities pertaining to essential
services such as transportation, flood control and drainage, water supply and sewerage,
social, health and environmental services, housing, park development, and others;
12. To insure and monitor the undertaking of a comprehensive social, economic and
physical planning and development of the area;
13. To study the feasibility of increasing barangay participation in the affairs of their
respective local governments and to propose to the President of the Philippines definite
programs and policies for implementation;
14. To submit within thirty (30) days after the close of each fiscal year an annual report to
the President of the Philippines and to submit a periodic report whenever deemed
necessary; and
15. To perform such other tasks as may be assigned or directed by the President of the
Philippines." Sc jj
The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and
administering programs providing services common to the area. As a "central government" it had the
power to levy and collect taxes and special assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power
to appropriate money for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city and
municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances,
resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and resolutions. It also had the power to
review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and
thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
P. D. No. 824 further provided:
"Sec. 9. Until otherwise provided, the governments of the four cities and thirteen
municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila shall continue to exist in their present form
except as may be inconsistent with this Decree. The members of the existing city and
municipal councils in Metropolitan Manila shall, upon promulgation of this Decree,
and until December 31, 1975, become members of the Sangguniang Bayan which
is hereby created for every city and municipality of Metropolitan Manila.
In addition, the Sangguniang Bayan shall be composed of as many barangay captains as

may be determined and chosen by the Commission, and such number of representatives
from other sectors of the society as may be appointed by the President upon
recommendation of the Commission.
x x x.
The Sangguniang Bayan may recommend to the Commission ordinances,

resolutions or such measures as it may adopt; Provided, that no such ordinance,
resolution or measure shall become effective, until after its approval by the
Commission; and Provided further, that the power to impose taxes and other
levies, the power to appropriate money and the power to pass ordinances or
resolutions with penal sanctions shall be vested exclusively in the Commission."

The creation of the MMC also carried with it the creation of the Sangguniang Bayan. This was
composed of the members of the component city and municipal councils, barangay captains chosen by
the MMC and sectoral representatives appointed by the President. The Sangguniang Bayan had the
power to recommend to the MMC the adoption of ordinances, resolutions or measures. It was the MMC
itself, however, that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and measures
recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMCs approval. Moreover, the power to
impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the power to pass ordinances or
resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC. Sce-dp
Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully possessed
legislative and police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and
municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMC.
After President Corazon Aquino assumed power, there was a clamor to restore the autonomy of the
local government units in Metro Manila. Hence, Sections 1 and 2 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution
provided: Sj cj
"Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are
the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as herein provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy."
The Constitution, however, recognized the necessity of creating metropolitan regions not only in the
existing National Capital Region but also in potential equivalents in the Visayas and Mindanao. Section
[43]
11 of the same Article X thus provided:
"Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions,
subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and
municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local
executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that
will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination."
The Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special metropolitan political
subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services
requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic
autonomy and their own local executive and legislative assemblies. Pending enactment of this law, the
[44]
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution gave the President of the Philippines the power to constitute the
Metropolitan Authority, viz:
"Section 8. Until otherwise provided by Congress, the President may constitute the
Metropolitan Authority to be composed of the heads of all local government units
comprising the Metropolitan Manila area." [45]
In 1990, President Aquino issued Executive Order (E. O.) No. 392 and constituted the Metropolitan
Manila Authority (MMA). The powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the MMA. It [46]
ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers and functions of the MMC were passed to the
MMA. The MMAs power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban services requiring coordination
in Metropolitan Manila." The MMAs governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council, although
[47]
composed of the mayors of the component cities and municipalities, was merely given the power
of: (1) formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination and
consolidation; and (2) promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval of a code of
basic services and the exercise of its rule-making power. [48]

Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units became primarily responsible for the
governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMAs jurisdiction was limited to addressing
common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative
power. Its power was merely to provide the local government units technical assistance in the
preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a
"review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local
governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local
governments accordingly." [49]
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and
administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were
"without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units." The character of the
MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.
R. A. No. 7924 originated as House Bill No. 14170/ 11116 and was introduced by several legislators led
by Dante Tinga, Roilo Golez and Feliciano Belmonte. It was presented to the House of Representatives
by the Committee on Local Governments chaired by Congressman Ciriaco R. Alfelor. The bill was a
product of Committee consultations with the local government units in the National Capital Region (NCR),
with former Chairmen of the MMC and MMA, and career officials of said agencies. When the bill was
[50]
first taken up by the Committee on Local Governments, the following debate took place:
"THE CHAIRMAN [Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor]: Okay, Let me explain. This has been debated a
long time ago, you know. Its a special we can create a special metropolitan political
subdivision. Supreme
Actually, there are only six (6) political subdivisions provided for in the Constitution:
barangay, municipality, city, province, and we have the Autonomous Region of Mindanao
and we have the Cordillera. So we have 6. Now.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman. In the case of the Autonomous
Region, that is also specifically mandated by the Constitution.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thats correct. But it is considered to be a political subdivision. What is

the meaning of a political subdivision? Meaning to say, that it has its own
government, it has its own political personality, it has the power to tax, and all
governmental powers: police power and everything. All right. Authority is different;
because it does not have its own government. It is only a council, it is an
organization of political subdivision, powers, no, which is not imbued with any
political power. Esmmis
If you go over Section 6, where the powers and functions of the Metro Manila
Development Authority, it is purely coordinative. And it provides here that the
council is policy-making. All right.
Under the Constitution is a Metropolitan Authority with coordinative power. Meaning to

say, it coordinates all of the different basic services which have to be delivered to the
constituency. All right.
There is now a problem. Each local government unit is given its respective as a political subdivision.
Kalookan has its powers, as provided for and protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. All right, the
exercise. However, in the exercise of that power, it might be deleterious and disadvantageous to other
local government units. So, we are forming an authority where all of these will be members and then set
up a policy in order that the basic services can be effectively coordinated. All right. justice

Of course, we cannot deny that the MMDA has to survive. We have to provide
some funds, resources. But it does not possess any political power. We do not
elect the Governor. We do not have the power to tax. As a matter of fact, I was trying
to intimate to the author that it must have the power to sue and be sued because it
coordinates. All right. It coordinates practically all these basic services so that the flow
and the distribution of the basic services will be continuous. Like traffic, we cannot deny
that. Its before our eyes. Sewerage, flood control, water system, peace and order, we
cannot deny these. Its right on our face. We have to look for a solution. What would be
the right solution? All right, we envision that there should be a coordinating agency and it
is called an authority. All right, if you do not want to call it an authority, its alright. We may
call it a council or maybe a management agency.
x x x."
[51]
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that
given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the
implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. This was explicitly stated in
the last Committee deliberations prior to the bills presentation to Congress. Thus: Ed-p
"THE CHAIRMAN: Yeah, but we have to go over the suggested revision. I think this was
already approved before, but it was reconsidered in view of the proposals, set-up, to
make the MMDA stronger. Okay, so if there is no objection to paragraph "f" And then next
is paragraph "b," under Section 6. "It shall approve metro-wide plans, programs and
projects and issue ordinances or resolutions deemed necessary by the MMDA to
carry out the purposes of this Act." Do you have the powers? Does the MMDA
because that takes the form of a local government unit, a political subdivision.
HON. [Feliciano] BELMONTE: Yes, I believe so, your Honor. When we say that it has the
policies, its very clear that those policies must be followed. Otherwise, whats the use of
empowering it to come out with policies. Now, the policies may be in the form of a
resolution or it may be in the form of a ordinance. The term "ordinance" in this case really
gives it more teeth, your honor. Otherwise, we are going to see a situation where you
have the power to adopt the policy but you cannot really make it stick as in the case now,
and I think here is Chairman Bunye. I think he will agree that that is the case now. Youve
got the power to set a policy, the body wants to follow your policy, then we say lets call it
an ordinance and see if they will not follow it.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thats very nice. I like that. However, there is a constitutional
impediment. You are making this MMDA a political subdivision. The creation of the
MMDA would be subject to a plebiscite. That is what Im trying to avoid. Ive been
trying to avoid this kind of predicament. Under the Constitution it states: if it is a
political subdivision, once it is created it has to be subject to a plebiscite. Im trying
to make this as administrative. Thats why we place the Chairman as a cabinet rank.
HON. BELMONTE: All right, Mr. Chairman, okay, what you are saying there is .
THE CHAIRMAN: In setting up ordinances, it is a political exercise. Believe me.
HON. [Elias] LOPEZ: Mr. Chairman, it can be changed into issuances of rules and
regulations. That would be it shall also be enforced. Jksm
HON. BELMONTE: Okay, I will .

HON. LOPEZ: And you can also say that violation of such rule, you impose a
sanction. But you know, ordinance has a different legal connotation.
HON. BELMONTE: All right. I defer to that opinion, your Honor. sc
THE CHAIRMAN: So instead of ordinances, say rules and regulations.
HON. BELMONTE: Or resolutions. Actually, they are actually considering

resolutions now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Rules and resolutions.
HON. BELMONTE: Rules, regulations and resolutions." [52]
The draft of H. B. No. 14170/ 11116 was presented by the Committee to the House of Representatives.
The explanatory note to the bill stated that the proposed MMDA is a "development authority" which is a
"national agency, not a political government unit." The explanatory note was adopted as the sponsorship
[53]
speech of the Committee on Local Governments. No interpellations or debates were made on the floor
and no amendments introduced. The bill was approved on second reading on the same day it was
presented. [54]
When the bill was forwarded to the Senate, several amendments were made. These amendments,
however, did not affect the nature of the MMDA as originally conceived in the House of Representatives. [55]
It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political
subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The
[56]
Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the
rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as
may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government units, the President merely
[57]
exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. Newmiso
Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No.
7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati
City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed
opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling. We
desist from ruling on the other issues as they are unnecessary. Esmso
We stress that this decision does not make light of the MMDAs noble efforts to solve the chaotic traffic
condition in Metro Manila. Everyday, traffic jams and traffic bottlenecks plague the metropolis. Even our
once sprawling boulevards and avenues are now crammed with cars while city streets are clogged with
motorists and pedestrians. Traffic has become a social malaise affecting our peoples productivity and the
efficient delivery of goods and services in the country. The MMDA was created to put some order in the
metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted by its charter are limited. Its
good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision without
any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of
law. Sdjad

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 39549 are affirmed. Sppedsc
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1]
Annex "D" to the CA petition, Court of Appeals (CA) Rollo, p. 27.
[2]
Annex "J" to Petition, Rollo, pp. 76-78.
[3]
Minutes of the Ocular Inspection, Court of Appeals Rollo, pp. 193-194.
[4]
CA Rollo, p. 332.
[5]
Roberto L. del Rosario is a resident of Neptune Street who allegedly spearheaded a campaign to open Neptune Street to the
public-- Motion to Cite in Contempt, CA Rollo, pp. 412-415.
[6]
CA decision, p. 10, Rollo, p. 61.
[7]
Petition, p. 15, Rollo, p. 24.
[8]
168 SCRA 634 (1988).
[9]
Petition, p. 24, Rollo, p. 33.
[10]
United States v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, 253-254 [1915]; Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580, 603 [1915]; People v. Pomar, 46 Phil.
440, 447 [1924].
[11]
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, pp. 95-98 [1996].
[12]
Cruz, Constitutional Law, p. 44 [1995].
[13]
Id., see also 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 177 [1956 ed.].
[14]
Cruz, supra, at 44; Binay v. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508, 513-514 [1991].
[15]
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, 234 SCRA 255, 272 [1994].
[16]
Bernas, supra, at 959, citing UP Law Center Revision Project, Part II, 712 [1970] citing Sady, "Improvement of Local Government
Administration for Development Purpose," Journal of Local Administration Overseas 135 [July 1962].
[17]
Section 15, Book I, Local Government Code of 1991
[18]
Id.
[19]
Titles I, II, III, IV, Book III, Local Government Code of 1991.
[20]
Section 1, Article X, 1987 Constitution.
[21]
Section 16, Book I, Local Government Code of 1991; also cited in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc. supra, at 264-265.
[22]
Sections 468 (a), 458 (a), and 447 (a), Book III, Local Government Code of 1991.
[23]
Section 391 (a), Book III, Local Government Code of 1991.
[24]
Entitled "An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes."
[25]
Section 1, R.A. 7924.
[26]
Section 3, par. 1, R. A. 7924.
[27]
Section 3 (b), supra; emphasis supplied.
[28]
Section 9, paragraph 5, supra.
[29]
Section 4, supra. Non-voting members of the Council are the heads of the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Department of Tourism (DOT), Department of Budget and
Management (DBM), Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Committee (HUDCC), and the Philippine National Police (PNP)
or their duly authorized representatives.
[30]
Section 1, R.A. 7924.
[31]
Section 2, supra.
[32]
Op cit.
[33]
168 SCRA 634 [1988].
[34]
176 SCRA 719 [1989].
[35]
168 SCRA 634, 654-655.
[36]
Id. at 643.
[37]
Id, at 730.
[38]
Id. at 723.
[39]
Like the perimeter wall along Jupiter StreetId. at 734.
[40]
Section 2, P.D. 824.
[41]
Whereas Clauses, P.D. 824.
[42]
Section 1, P.D. 824; emphasis supplied.
[43]
Speech of then Constitutional Commissioner Blas Ople, see Bernas, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, pp. 706-707
[1995].
[44]
Section 11, Article X, 1987 Constitution.
[45]
Section 8, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution.
[46]
Section 3, E.O. 392.
[47]
Section 1, supra.
[48]
Section 2, supra.

[49]
Section 6, supra.
[50]
Chairmen Ismael Mathay, Jr. and Ignacio Bunye.
[51]
Deliberations of the Committee on Local Government, House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, November 10,
1993, pp. 46-48.
[52]
Deliberations of the Committee on Local Governments, House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, November 9,
1994, pp. 68-70.
[53]
Explanatory Note to H. B. 11116, p. 3.
[54]
H.B. 14170/ 11116, Sponsorship and Debates, December 20, 1994.
[55]
Compare H.B. 14170/ 11116 with R. A. 7924; see Senate Amendments, February 21, 1995.
[56]
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
[57]
Section 7 (g), R.A. 7924.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29788 August 30, 1972
RAFAEL S. SALAS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, in his

capacity as Governor of the Land Authority; and LORENZO GELLA, in his capacity as
Register of Deeds of Manila, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO, as Presiding Judge of Branch XXIII, Court of First Instance of
Manila; ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila; and the CITY
OF MANILA, respondents-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor-General Antonio A. Torres,
Solicitor Raul I. Goco and Magno B. Pablo & Cipriano A. Tan, Legal Staff, Land Authority for
petitioners-appellants.
Gregorio A. Ejercito and Felix C. Chavez for respondents-appellees.
ESGUERRA, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII, in Civil Case No. 67946, dated September
23, 1968, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment declaring Republic Act No. 4118
unconstitutional and invalid in that it deprived the City of Manila of its property without
due process and payment of just compensation. Respondent Executive Secretary
and Governor of the Land Authority are hereby restrained and enjoined from
implementing the provisions of said law. Respondent Register of Deeds of the City of
Manila is ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876 which he had
issued in the name of the Land Tenure Administration and reinstate Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 22547 in the name of the City of Manila which he cancelled, if
that is feasible, or issue a new certificate of title for the same parcel of land in the
name of the City of Manila.1
The facts necessary for a clear understanding of this case are as follows:
On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a land
registration court, rendered judgment in Case No. 18, G.L.R.O. Record No. 111, declaring the City of
Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the Cadastral
Survey of the City of Mani1a, containing an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less. Pursuant to
said judgment the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 21, 1920, issued in favor of the City of
Manila, Original Certificate of Title No. 4329 covering the aforementioned parcel of land. On various
dates in 1924, the City of Manila sold portions of the aforementioned parcel of land in favor of Pura
Villanueva. As a consequence of the transactions Original Certificate of Title No. 4329 was cancelled

and transfer certificates of title were issued in favor of Pura Villanueva for the portions purchased by
her. When the last sale to Pura Villanueva was effected on August 22, 1924, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 21974 in the name of the City of Manila was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22547 covering the residue thereof known as Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557,
with an area of 7,490.10 square meters, was issued in the name of the City of Manila.
On September 21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antono J.
Villegas, adopted a resolution requesting His Excellency, the President of the Philippines to consider
the feasibility of declaring the City property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska Streets,
under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 22547, containing a total area of 7,450 square
meters as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the
actual occupants thereof.2
The said resolution of the Municipil Board of the City of Manila was officially transmitted to the
President of the Philippines by then Vice-Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on September 21, 1960, with the
information that the same resolution was, on the same date, transmitted to the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines.3
During the First Session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines, House Bill No. 191 was filed in the
House of Representatives by then Congressman Bartolome Cabangbang seeking to declare the
property in question as patrimonial property of the City of Manila, and for other purposes. The
explanatory note of the Bill gave the grounds for its enactment, to wit:
In the particular case of the property subject of this bill, the City of Manila does not
seem to have use thereof as a public communal property. As a matter of fact, a
resolution was adopted by the Municipal Board of Manila at its regular session held
on September 21, 1960, to request the feasibility of declaring the city property
bounded by Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets as a patrimonial property of
the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants
thereof. Therefore, it will be to the best interest of society that the said property be
used in one way or another. Since this property has been occupied for a long time by
the present occupants thereof and since said occupants have expressed their
willingness to buy the said property, it is but proper that the same be sold to them.4
Subsequently, a revised version of the Bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by
Congressmen Manuel Cases, Antonio Raquiza and Nicanor Yñiguez as House Bill No. 1453, with
the following explanatory note:
The accompanying bill seeks to convert one (1) parcel of land in the district of
Malate, which is reserved as communal property into a disposable or alienable
property of the State and to provide its subdivision and sale to bona fide occupants
or tenants.
This parcel of land in question was originally an aggregate part of a piece of land with
an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less. ... On September 21, 1960, the
Municipal Board of Manila in its regular session unanimously adopted a resolution
requesting the President of the Philippines and Congress of the Philippines the
feasibility of declaring this property into disposable or alienable property of the State.
There is therefore a precedent that this parcel of land could be subdivided and sold
to bona fide occupants. This parcel of land will not serve any useful public project
because it is bounded on all sides by private properties which were formerly parts of
this lot in question.

Approval of this bill will implement the policy of the Administration of land for the
landless and the Fifth Declaration of Principles of the Constitution, which states that
the promotion of Social Justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
people should be the concern of the State. We are ready and willing to enact
legislation promoting the social and economic well-being of the people whenever an
opportunity for enacting such kind of legislation arises.
In view of the foregoing consideration and to insure fairness and justice to the present bona fide
occupants thereof, approval of this Bill is strongly urged.5
The Bill having been passed by the House of Representatives, the same was thereafter sent to the
Senate where it was thoroughly discussed, as evidenced by the Congressional Records for May 20,
1964, pertinent portion of which is as follows:
SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr. President, it will be re called that when the late Mayor
Lacson was still alive, we approved a similar bill. But afterwards, the late Mayor
Lacson came here and protested against the approval, and the approval was
reconsidered. May I know whether the defect in the bill which we approved, has
already been eliminated in this present bill?
SENATOR TOLENTINO: I understand Mr. President, that that has already been
eliminated and that is why the City of Manila has no more objection to this bill.
SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr. President, in view of that manifestation and

considering that Mayor Villegas and Congressman Albert of the Fourth District of
Manila are in favor of the bill. I would not want to pretend to know more what is good
for the City of Manila.
SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there being no objection, I move that we

approve this bill on second reading.
PRESIDENT PRO-TEMPORE: The biII is approved on second reading after several

Senetors said aye and nobody said nay.
The bill was passed by the Senate, approved by the President on June 20, 1964, and became
Republic Act No. 4118. It reads as follows:
Lot I-B-2-B of Block 557 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila, situated in the
District of Malate, City of Manila, which is reserved as communal property, is hereby
converted into disposal or alienable land of the State, to be placed under the disposal
of the Land Tenure Administration. The Land Tenure Administration shall subdivide
the property into small lots, none of which shall exceed one hundred and twenty
square meters in area and sell the same on installment basis to the tenants or bona
fide occupants thereof and to individuals, in the order mentioned: Provided, That no
down payment shall be required of tenants or bona fide occupants who cannot afford
to pay such down payment: Provided, further, That no person can purchase more
than one lot: Provided, furthermore, That if the tenant or bona fide occupant of any
given lot is not able to purchase the same, he shall be given a lease from month to
month until such time that he is able to purchase the lot: Provided, still further, That
in the event of lease the rentals which may be charged shall not exceed eight per
cent per annum of the assessed value of the property leased: And provided, finally,

That in fixing the price of each lot, which shall not exceed twenty pesos per square
meter, the cost of subdivision and survey shall not be included.
Sec. 2. Upon approval of this Act no ejectment proceedings against any tenant or
bona fide occupant of the above lots shall be instituted and any ejectment
proceedings pending in court against any such tenant or bona fide occupant shall be
dismissed upon motion of the defendant: Provided, That any demolition order
directed against any tenant or bona fide occupant shall be lifted.
Sec. 3. Upon approval of this Act, if the tenant or bona fide occupant is in arrears in
the payment of any rentals, the amount legally due shall be liquidated and shall be
payable in twenty-four equal monthly installments from the date of liquidation.
Sec. 4. No property acquired by virtue of this Act shall be transferred, sold,

mortgaged, or otherwise disposed of within a period of five years from the date full
ownership thereof has been vested in the purchaser without the consent of the Land
Tenure Administration.
Sec. 5. In the event of the death of the purchaser prior to the complete payment of
the price of the lot purchased by him, his widow and children shall succeed in all his
rights and obligations with respect to his lot.
Sec. 6. The Chairman of the Land Tenure Administration shall implement and issue
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act.
Sec. 7. The sum of one hundred fifty thousand pesos is appropriated out of any
funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes
of this Act.
Sec. 8. All laws or parts of laws inconsistent with this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.
Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 20, 1964.
To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, and pursuant to the request of the occupants
of the property involved, then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap of the Land Authority (which succeeded
the Land Tenure Administration) addressed a letter, dated February 18, 1965, to Mayor Antonio
Villegas, furnishing him with a copy of the proposed subdivision plan of said lot as prepared for the
Republic of the Philippines for resale of the subdivision lots by the Land Authority to bona fide
applicants.6
On March 2, 1965, the City Mayor of Manila, through his Executive and Technical Adviser,
acknowledged receipt of the proposed subdivision plan of the property in question and informed the
Land Authority that his office would interpose no objection to the implementation of said law,
provided that its provisions be strictly complied with.7
With the above-mentioned written conformity of the City of Manila for the implementation of Republic
Act No. 4118, the Land Authority, thru then Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap, requested the City

Treasurer of Manila, thru the City Mayor, for the surrender and delivery to the former of the owner's
duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547 in order to obtain title thereto in the name of the
Land Authority. The request was duly granted with the knowledge and consent of the Office of the
City Mayor.8
With the presentation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547, which had been yielded as above
stated by the, City authorities to the Land Authority, Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T. No. 22547)
was cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Manila and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.
80876 was issued in the name of the Land Tenure Administration (now Land Authority) pursuant to
the provisions of Republic Act No.
4118.9
But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the City of Manila made a complete turn-
about, for on December 20, 1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in his capacity as the City Mayor of Manila
and the City of Manila as a duly organized public corporation, brought an action for injunction and/or
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the herein appellants,
particularly the Governor of the Land Authority and the Register of Deeds of Manila, from further
implementing Republic Act No. 4118, and praying for the declaration of Republic Act No. 4118 as
unconstitutional.
With the foregoing antecedent facts, which are all contained in the partial stipulation of facts
submitted to the trial court and approved by respondent Judge, the parties waived the presentation
of further evidence and submitted the case for decision. On September 23, 1968, judgment was
rendered by the trial court declaring Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional and invalid on the
ground that it deprived the City of Manila of its property without due process of law and payment of
just compensation. The respondents were ordered to undo all that had been done to carry out the
provisions of said Act and were restrained from further implementing the same.
Two issues are presented for determination, on the resolution of which the decision in this case
hinges, to wit:
I. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila?
II. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution?
I.
As regards the first issue, appellants maintain that the land involved is a communal land or "legua
comunal" which is a portion of the public domain owned by the State; that it came into existence as
such when the City of Manila, or any pueblo or town in the Philippines for that matter, was founded
under the laws of Spain, the former sovereign; that upon the establishment of a pueblo, the
administrative authority was required to allot and set aside portions of the public domain for a public
plaza, a church site, a site for public buildings, lands to serve as common pastures and for streets
and roads; that in assigning these lands some lots were earmarked for strictly public purposes, and
ownership of these lots (for public purposes) immediately passed to the new municipality; that in the
case of common lands or "legua comunal", there was no such immediate acquisition of ownership by
the pueblo, and the land though administered thereby, did not automatically become its property in
the absence of an express grant from the Central Government, and that the reason for this
arrangement is that this class of land was not absolutely needed for the discharge of the
municipality's governmental functions.

It is argued that the parcel of land involved herein has not been used by the City of Manila for any
public purpose and had not been officially earmarked as a site for the erection of some public
buildings; that this circumstance confirms the fact that it was originally "communal" land alloted to the
City of Manila by the Central Government not because it was needed in connection with its
organization as a municipality but simply for the common use of its inhabitants; that the present City
of Manila as successor of the Ayuntamiento de Manila under the former Spanish sovereign merely
enjoys the usufruct over said land, and its exercise of acts of ownership by selling parts thereof did
not necessarily convert the land into a patrimonial property of the City of Manila nor divest the State
of its paramount title.
Appellants further argue that a municipal corporation, like a city is a governmental agent of the State
with authority to govern a limited portion of its territory or to administer purely local affairs in a given
political subdivision, and the extent of its authority is strictly delimited by the grant of power conferred
by the State; that Congress has the exclusive power to create, change or destroy municipal
corporations; that even if We admit that legislative control over municipal corporations is not
absolute and even if it is true that the City of Manila has a registered title over the property in
question, the mere transfer of such land by an act of the legislature from one class of public land to
another, without compensation, does not invade the vested rights of the City.
Appellants finally argue that Republic Act No. 4118 has treated the land involved as one reserved for
communal use, and this classification is conclusive upon the courts; that if the City of Manila feels
that this is wrong and its interests have been thereby prejudiced, the matter should be brought to the
attention of Congress for correction; and that since Congress, in the exercise of its wide
discretionary powers has seen fit to classify the land in question as communal, the Courts certainly
owe it to a coordinate branch of the Government to respect such determination and should not
interfere with the enforcement of the law.
Upon the other hand, appellees argue by simply quoting portions of the appealed decision of the trial
court, which read thus:
The respondents (petitioners-appellants herein) contend, among other defenses, that

the property in question is communal property. This contention is, however,
disproved by Original Certificate of Title No. 4329 issued on August 21, 1920 in favor
of the City of Manila after the land in question was registered in the City's favor. The
Torrens Title expressly states that the City of Manila was the owner in 'fee simple' of
the said land. Under Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act, as amended, the decree of
confirmation and registration in favor of the City of Manila ... shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons including the Insular Government and all the branches there
... There is nothing in the said certificate of title indicating that the land was
'communal' land as contended by the respondents. The erroneous assumption by the
Municipal Board of Manila that the land in question was communal land did not make
it so. The Municipal Board had no authority to do that.
The respondents, however, contend that Congress had the power and authority to
declare that the land in question was 'communal' land and the courts have no power
or authority to make a contrary finding. This contention is not entirely correct or
accurate. Congress has the power to classify 'land of the public domain', transfer
them from one classification to another and declare them disposable or not. Such
power does not, however, extend to properties which are owned by cities, provinces
and municipalities in their 'patrimonial' capacity.

Art. 324 of the Civil Code provides that properties of provinces, cities and
municipalities are divided into properties for public use and patrimonial property. Art.
424 of the same code provides that properties for public use consist of provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades and public works for public service paid for by said province, cities or
municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial. Tested by
this criterion the Court finds and holds that the land in question is patrimonial
property of the City of Manila.
Respondents contend that Congress has declared the land in question to be

'communal' and, therefore, such designation is conclusive upon the courts. The
Courts holds otherwise. When a statute is assailed as unconstitutional the Courts
have the power and authority to inquire into the question and pass upon it. This has
long ago been settled in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60, when the United States
Supreme Court speaking thru Chief Justice Marshall held:
... If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void,

does it, notwithstanding its validity, bind the courts, and oblige them
to give effect? It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is ... So if a law be in opposition to
the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a
particular case, so that the court must either decide that case
conformable to the constitution, disregarding the law, the court must
determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of
the very essence of unconstitutional judicial duty.
Appellees finally concluded that when the courts declare a law unconstitutional it does not mean that
the judicial power is superior to the legislative power. It simply means that the power of the people is
superior to both and that when the will of the legislature, declared in statutes, stands in opposition to
that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the Constitution
rather than by the statutes.
There is one outstanding factor that should be borne in mind in resolving the character of the land
involved, and it is that the City of Manila, although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee
simple, has not shown by any shred of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private
or patrimonial property. It is true that the City of Manila as well as its predecessor, the Ayuntamiento
de Manila, could validly acquire property in its corporate or private capacity, following the accepted
doctrine on the dual character — public and private — of a municipal corporation. And when it
acquires property in its private capacity, it acts like an ordinary person capable of entering into
contracts or making transactions for the transmission of title or other real rights. When it comes to
acquisition of land, it must have done so under any of the modes established by law for the
acquisition of ownership and other real rights. In the absence of a title deed to any land claimed by
the City of Manila as its own, showing that it was acquired with its private or corporate funds, the
presumption is that such land came from the State upon the creation of the municipality (Unson vs.
Lacson, et al., 100 Phil. 695). Originally the municipality owned no patrimonial property except those
that were granted by the State not for its public but for private use. Other properties it owns are
acquired in the course of the exercise of its corporate powers as a juridical entity to which category a
municipal corporation pertains.
Communal lands or "legua comunal" came into existence when a town or pueblo was established in
this country under the laws of Spain (Law VII, Title III, Book VI, Recopilacion de las Leyes de Indios).
The municipalities of the Philippines were not entitled, as a matter of right, to any part of the public

domain for use as communal lands. The Spanish law provided that the usufruct of a portion of the
public domain adjoining municipal territory might be granted by the Government for communal
purposes, upon proper petition, but, until granted, no rights therein passed to the municipalities, and,
in any event, the ultimate title remained in the sovereign (City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10
Phil. 327).
For the establishment, then, of new pueblos the administrative authority of the
province, in representation of the Governor General, designated the territory for their
location and extension and the metes and bounds of the same; and before alloting
the lands among the new settlers, a special demarcation was made of the places
which were to serve as the public square of the pueblo, for the erection of the church,
and as sites for the public buildings, among others, the municipal building or the casa
real, as well as of the lands whick were to constitute the common pastures, and
propios of the municipality and the streets and roads which were to intersect the new
town were laid out, ... . (Municipality of Catbalogan vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil.
216, 220) (Emphasis supplied)
It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source or classification of land
in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its private or
corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants,
whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount
power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for
the performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or
instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the
same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different use (2 McQuilin,Municipal
Corporations, 3rd Ed., p. 197, citing Monagham vs. Armatage, 218 Minn. 27, 15 N. W. 2nd 241).
True it is that the legislative control over a municipal corporation is not absolute even when it comes
to its property devoted to public use, for such control must not be exercised to the extent of depriving
persons of their property or rights without due process of law, or in a manner impairing the
obligations of contracts. Nevertheless, when it comes to property of the municipality which it did not
acquire in its private or corporate capacity with its own funds, the legislature can transfer its
administration and disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of according
to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the constitutional mandate of promoting social justice
to insure the well-being and economic security of the people.
It has been held that a statute authorizing the transfer of a Municipal airport to an Airport
Commission created by the legislature, even without compensation to the city, was not violative of
the due process clause of the American Federal Constitution. The Supreme Court of Minnessota
in Monagham vs. Armatage, supra, said:
... The case is controlled by the further rule that the legislature, having plenary
control of the local municipality, of its creation and of all its affairs, has the right to
authorize or direct the expenditures of money in its treasury, though raised, for a
particular purpose, for any legitimate municipal purpose, or to order and direct a
distribution thereof upon a division of the territory into separate municipalities ... . The
local municipality has no such vested right in or to its public funds, like that which the
Constitution protects in the individual as precludes legislative interferences. People
vs. Power, 25 Ill. 187; State Board (of Education) vs. City, 56 Miss. 518. As remarked
by the supreme court of Maryland in Mayor vs. Sehner, 37 Md. 180: "It is of the
essence of such a corporation, that the government has the sole right as trustee of

the public interest, at its own good will and pleasure, to inspect, regulate, control, and
direct the corporation, its funds, and franchises."
We therefore hold that c.500, in authorizing the transfer of the use and possession of
the municipal airport to the commission without compensation to the city or to the
park board, does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
The Congress has dealt with the land involved as one reserved for communal use (terreno
comunal). The act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative
power and it should not be interfered with by the courts.
This brings Us to the second question as regards the validity of Republic Act No. 4118, viewed in the
light of Article III, Sections 1, subsection (1) and (2) of the Constitution which ordain that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law and that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.
II .
The trial court declared Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional for allegedly depriving the City of
Manila of its property without due process of law and without payment of just compensation. It is now
well established that the presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a law (U S. vs. Ten
Yu, 24 Phil. 1; Go Ching, et al. vs. Dinglasan, et al., 45 O.G. No. 2, pp. 703, 705). To declare a law
unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for
even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no infringement of constitutional rights
is allowed. To strike down a law there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law
condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done (Morfe vs. Mutuc, et al., G.R. No. L-20387,
Jan. 31, 1968; 22 SCRA 424). That situation does not obtain in this case as the law assailed does
not in any manner trench upon the constitution as will hereafter be shown. Republic Act No. 4118
was intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the Government program
of "Land for the Landless". The explanatory note of House Bill No. 1453 which became Republic Act
No. 4118, reads in part as follows:
Approval of this bill will implement the policy of the administration of "land for the
landless" and the Fifth Declaration of Principles of the Constitution which states that
"the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
people should be the concern of the State." We are ready and willing to enact
legislation promoting the social and economic well-being of the people whenever an
opportunity for enacting such kind of legislation arises.
The respondent Court held that Republic Act No. 4118, "by converting the land in question — which
is the patrimonial property of the City of Manila into disposable alienable land of the State and
placing it under the disposal of the Land Tenure Administration — violates the provisions of Article III
(Secs. 1 and 2) of the Constitution which ordain that "private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation, and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law". In support thereof reliance is placed on the ruling in Province of
Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of Zamboanga, G.R. No. 2440, March 28, 1968; 22 SCRA 1334,
which holds that Congress cannot deprive a municipality of its private or patrimonial property without
due process of law and without payment of just compensation since it has no absolute control
thereof. There is no quarrel over this rule if it is undisputed that the property sought to be taken is in
reality a private or patrimonial property of the municipality or city. But it would be simply begging the
question to classify the land in question as such. The property, as has been previously shown, was

not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has
in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for
the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila granted by the
sovereign upon its creation. That the National Government, through the Director of Lands,
represented by the Solicitor General, in the cadastral proceedings did not contest the claim of the
City of Manila that the land is its property, does not detract from its character as State property and
in no way divests the legislature of its power to deal with it as such, the state not being bound by the
mistakes and/or negligence of its officers.
One decisive fact that should be noted is that the City of Manila expressly recognized the paramount
title of the State over said land when by its resolution of September 20, 1960, the Municipal Board,
presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio Villegas, requested "His Excellency the President of the
Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the city property bounded by Florida, San Andres
and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 25547, containing an area
of 7,450 square meters, as patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of reselling
these lots to the actual occupants thereof." (See Annex E, Partial Stipulation of Facts, Civil Case No.
67945, CFI, Manila, p. 121, Record of the Case) [Emphasis Supplied]
The alleged patrimonial character of the land under the ownership of the City of Manila is totally
belied by the City's own official act, which is fatal to its claim since the Congress did not do as
bidden. If it were its patrimonial property why should the City of Manila be requesting the President
to make representation to the legislature to declare it as such so it can be disposed of in favor of the
actual occupants? There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land belongs to
the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of Manila for municipal purposes. But since
the City did not actually use said land for any recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain idle
and unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no presumption of State grant of
ownership in favor of the City of Manila may be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own
private or patrimonial property (Municipality of Tigbauan vs. Director of Lands, 35 Phil. 798; City of
Manila vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 327; Municipality of Luzuriaga vs. Director of Lands, 24 Phil.
193). The conclusion of the respondent court that Republic Act No. 4118 converted a patrimonial
property of the City of Manila into a parcel of disposable land of the State and took it away from the
City without compensation is, therefore, unfounded. In the last analysis the land in question pertains
to the State and the City of Manila merely acted as trustee for the benefit of the people therein for
whom the State can legislate in the exercise of its legitimate powers.
Republic Act No. 4118 was never intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm
its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National
Government: And this was done at the instance or upon the request of the City of Manila itself. The
subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by
Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain
without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, but
simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property.
It should be emphasized that the law assailed was enacted upon formal written petition of the
Municipal Board of Manila in the form of a legally approved resolution. The certificate of title over the
property in the name of the City of Manila was accordingly cancelled and another issued to the Land
Tenure Administration after the voluntary surrender of the City's duplicate certificate of title by the
City Treasurer with the knowledge and consent of the City Mayor. To implement the provisions of
Republic Act No. 4118, the then Deputy Governor of the Land Authority sent a letter, dated February
18, 1965, to the City Mayor furnishing him with a copy of the "proposed subdivision plan of the said
lot as prepared for the Republic of the Philippines for subdivision and resale by the Land Authority to
bona fide applicants." On March 2, 1965, the Mayor of Manila, through his Executive and Technical
Adviser, acknowledged receipt of the subdivision plan and informed the Land Authority that his

Office "will interpose no objection to the implementation of said law provided that its provisions are
strictly complied with." The foregoing sequence of events, clearly indicate a pattern of regularity and
observance of due process in the reversion of the property to the National Government. All such acts
were done in recognition by the City of Manila of the right and power of the Congress to dispose of
the land involved.
Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns, either under the due process
clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to get from the
Congress the concession it sought of having the land involved given to it as its patrimonial property,
the Courts possess no power to grant that relief. Republic Act No. 4118 does not, therefore, suffer
from any constitutional infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and petitioners shall proceed with the free
and untrammeled implementation of Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from the
respondents. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Antonio, JJ., concur.
Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Pages 79-80, Rollo.
2 Annex "E" to the Partial Stipulation of Facts, page 121, Records.
3 Annex "E-1" to the Partial Stipulation of Facts, page 122, Records.
4 Annex "F" to the Partial Stipulation of Facts, page l23, Records.
5 Annex "F-1", page 128, Records.
6 Annex "J", page 142, Records.
7 Annex "K", page 145, Records.
8 Annexes "L" and "L-1", pages 145-147, Records.
9 Annexes "A" and "N", pages 148-150, Records.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner,

vs.
CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS,
GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL
DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner.
Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent
facts are as follows:
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a

member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region
XII, representing Lanao del Sur.
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity).
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members,

respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the
Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11,
1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew
from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as members
of the Assembly.
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the

Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier
Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his
capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads:
The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and

dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious organizations
and traditional leaders on the recent and present political
developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.
The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would

hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as

envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the
Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission.
You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook

Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987,
with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence,
unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary
Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no
session in November as "our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress
take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ... ."
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary

Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram:
TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE

TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE
CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST
SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED
AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL
ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN
NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY
PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM
FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's

advice, with the following assemblymen present:
1. Sali, Salic
2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
3. Dagalangit, Rakil
4. Dela Fuente, Antonio
5. Mangelen, Conte
6. Ortiz, Jesus
7. Palomares, Diego
8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
9. Tomawis, Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry

After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized
to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all
Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said
seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly
resumed with the following Assemblymen present:
1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer
2. Ali Salic
3. Ali Salindatu
4. Aratuc, Malik
5. Cajelo, Rene
6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
7. Dagalangit, Rakil
8. Dela Fuente, Antonio
9. Ortiz, Jesus
10 Palomares, Diego
11. Quijano, Jesus
12. Sinsuat, Bimbo
13. Tomawis, Acmad
14. Tomawis, Jerry
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:
HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the
presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to
call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the
previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I
move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding Officer
and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2,
1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented?

Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ...

Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker
vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1
Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that-
(a) This Petition be given due course;
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued

enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5,
1987, and on any day thereafter;
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by

respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or

Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and
(e) Making the injunction permanent.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. 2
Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the
Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE
SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things,
that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and
emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy
for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in
the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . .
." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without
authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the
petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting
to the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed
a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should
have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," 7 for which the respondents now submit
that the petition had become "moot and academic". 8
The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has
made the case moot and academic.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the
expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this
petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in
question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had
conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense,
assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other
hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that
"since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang

Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory
gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so that their differences could be
threshed out and settled." 11Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no
matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by
law.
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely
require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear
herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of
graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any
opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere
accusations that cannot warrant expulsion.
In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other
Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the
part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner]
before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within the confines of
the Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity
and character as representative of the people" 13 an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access
to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and, unless the recourse amounts to
malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed
warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper
proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is
within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts
are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is
exercised with grave abuse.
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the
courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come,
therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are
now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent
of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential
Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established
"internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," 17 with legislative and
executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities 18specified therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for
the respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence
of the National Government," 20 "which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;

(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and
external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural

resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing. 21
In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..." 22
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments "more responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
judgments with his own. 27
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is
free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in
that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency. 28
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a
question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted
prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy
now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the
proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X,
sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class
is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and
the Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is
autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps
the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our
jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our
jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments
of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense,
that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No.
1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision
and control over Autonomous Regions."33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their
legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall

exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of national
development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the

Autonomous Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social
services, programs and facilities;

(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture
indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of

such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people in the Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that
enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap
ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and
programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the
Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of
the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the
Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective
nevertheless for lack of quorum.
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true
that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or
adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides likewise that "the
Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of course, there is
disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner
effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner
says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment
and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so
that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and
disunity. 37 The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of
"short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a
recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the
same Rules. 38 Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session.
But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in
question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or
not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs
of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly,
assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his
attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind
his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this
reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order
to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings
before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it.
In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent,
since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened.

In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the
future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to
its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner
should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies
to thwart them. 39
In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook,

Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook,
Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, 115-120; emphasis in the original.
2 Id., 6-7.
3 Id., 134-135.
4 Id., 134.
5 Id.
6 Id., 135.
7 Id.
8 Id., 142.
9 Id., 141.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 81805, May 31, 1988.
13 Id., 135.

14 See CONST. (1987), art. III, sec. 11.
15 IMPLEMENTING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK

AND THE LUPONG TAGAPAGPAGANAP NG POOK IN REGION IX AND REGION
XII AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
16 Pres. Decree No. 1618, sec. 3.
17 Supra.
18 Supra.
19 Supra, sec. 4.
20 Supra.
21 Supra.
22 Supra, sec. 35(a).
23 CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 1; also CONST. (1987), supra, art. sec. 3.
24 Batas Blg. 337, sec 2.
25 CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 4; Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec. 14.
26 Batas Blg. 337, supra; Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958).
27 Hebron v. Reyes, supra.
28 Bernas, Joaquin, "Brewing storm over autonomy," The Manila Chronicle, pp. 4-5.
29 CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 1.
30 Supra, sec. 2.
31 Supra, sec. 15.
32 Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec. 14.
33 Pres. Decree No. 1618, supra, sec. 35 (b). Whether or not it is constitutional for
the President to exercise control over the Sanggunians is another question.
34 Supra, sec. 7.
35 Rollo, Id., 122.
36 Id.
37 Id., 145-146.

38 Id., 121.
39 See Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 93054 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 100
Cordillera Regional Assembly Member ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, (Banaue), Ifugao Provincial Board
Member CORAZON MONTINIG, (Mayoyao), Former Vice-Mayor MARTIN UDAN (Banaue), Municipal
Councilors MARTIN GANO, (Lagawe), and TEODORO HEWE, (Hingyon), Barangay Councilman
PEDRO W. DULAG (Lamut); Aguinaldo residents SANDY B. CHANGIWAN, and DONATO TIMAGO;
Lamut resident REY ANTONIO; Kiangan residents ORLANDO PUGUON, and REYNAND DULDULAO;
Lagawe residents TOMAS KIMAYONG, GREGORIO DANGO, GEORGE B. BAYWONG, and VICENTE
LUNAG; Hingyon residents PABLO M. DULNUAN and CONSTANCIO GANO; Mayoyao residents
PEDRO M. BAOANG, LEONARDO IGADNA, and MAXIMO IGADNA; and Banaue residents PUMA-A
CULHI, LATAYON BUTTIG, MIGUEL PUMELBAN, ANDRES ORDILLO, FEDERICO MARIANO, SANDY
BINOMNGA, GABRIEL LIMMANG, ROMEO TONGALI, RUBEN BAHATAN, MHOMDY GABRIEL, and
NADRES GHAMANG, Petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; The Honorable
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Secretary of Justice; Hon. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary; The
Cabinet Officer for Regional Development; Hon. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and
Management; and Hon. ROSALINA S. CAJUCOM, OIC, National Treasurer, Respondents.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which
voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly
constitute such Region.
The antecedent facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows:
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled
"An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the
Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly
rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic
Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of
Ifugao. On the same date, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the
COMELEC resolution and provided:
". . . [A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be
included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably — then, alone,
legally and validly constitutes the CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)
As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the elections in the
Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991. : nad
Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary on February 5, 1990 issued
a Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera
Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220.
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic
Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said petition.

On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the
Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices created under Executive
Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act. - nad
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as
the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.
The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void COMELEC resolution No. 2259, the
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative
Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing
the same and spending public funds for the purpose and (2) declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting
the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force
and effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted by Congress and
the same is duly ratified by the voters in the constituent units. We treat the Comments of the respondents
as an answer and decide the case.
This petition is meritorious.
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis Supplied)
The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be
made up of more than one constituent unit. The term "region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more
provinces. This is supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided
for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces. (Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972),
which was made as part of the law of the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself.
To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It
joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this
case.- nad
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as
possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional
provisions are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then,
be applied in this case. (See Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770, [1988]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413, 422-423 [1970]).
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the
petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province.
Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be
administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government
units. It further provides that:
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the
proper governance and development of all provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay or ili
within the Autonomous Region . . ."
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute
the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of
officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and
legislative powers over exactly the same small area.

Article V, Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the Cordillera Assembly whose
members shall be elected from regional assembly districts apportioned among provinces and the cities
composing the Autonomous Region. chanr obles vir tual l aw libr ar y
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly shall then be elected only
from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward predicament of having two legislative bodies — the
Cordillera Assembly and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan — exercising their legislative powers over the
province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise, it
would have too many government officials for so few people. :-cr alaw
Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development Board composed of the
Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city mayors or their representatives, two members of
the Cordillera Assembly, and members representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the
provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The Board's functions (Article
XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the Provincial Coordinator's
(Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 — Local Government Code).
If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on the other hand it takes
an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in the regional level, it could only mean that a larger area
must be covered at the regional level. The respondent's theory of the Autonomous Region being made up
of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to the
Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements cannot be construed as funding only a lone
and small province.
These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera Autonomous Region was
never contemplated by the law creating it.
The province of Ifugao makes up only 11% of the total population of the areas enumerated in Article I,
Section 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao
and Baguio City. It has the second smallest number of inhabitants from among the provinces and city above
mentioned. The Cordillera population is distributed in round figures as follows: Abra, 185,000; Benguet,
486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga-Apayao, 214,000; Mountain Province, 116,000; and Baguio City,
183,000; Total population of these five provinces and one city; 1,332,000 according to the 1990 Census
(Manila Standard, September 30, 1990, p. 14).
There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or which cannot be complied
with. Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as
Chairman and are (6) members coming from different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the
respondents' view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one member. It would never have a
quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as practicable, to come from various
provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various
indigenous cultural communities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a
common regional language based upon the various languages and dialects in the region which regional
language in turn is expected to enrich the national language.
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions
which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region. :-cr alaw
To contemplate the situation envisioned by the respondent would not only violate the letter and intent of the
Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would also be impractical and illogical.
Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC, (G.R. No. 89651, November 10, 1969), is not applicable in the
case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary of Justice.
The Abbas case laid down the rate on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by majority of the votes cast
by the constituent units called for the purpose" found in the Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated:
x x x

". . . [I]t is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple majority of votes approving
the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent
units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units."
This was the pronouncement applied by the Secretary of Justice in arriving at his conclusion stated in his
Memorandum for the President that:
x x x
". . . [i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) as mandated by
R.A. No. 6766 became effective upon its approval by the majority of the votes cast in the province
of Ifugao. And considering the proviso in Section 13 (a) that only the provinces and city voting
favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted
favorably — can, alone, legally and validly constitute the CAR." (Rollo. p. 40).
The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 for the Cordillera and Republic
Act No. 6734 for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao determine — (1) whether there shall be an
autonomous region in the Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among
those enumerated in the two Republic Acts, shall comprise said Autonomous Regions. (See III, Record of
the Constitutional Commission, 487-492 [1986]).
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities shall comprise the autonomous
region in Muslim Mindanao which is, consequently, the same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous
region in the Cordillera. However, there is nothing in the Abbas decision which deals with the issue on
whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or Cordillera could exist despite the fact that
only one province or one city is to constitute it.
chanrobles virtual l aw libr ar y
Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of Ifugao can validly and legally
constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The issue is not whether the province of Ifugao is to be
included in the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections,
insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the
Secretary of Justice, the February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order
No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order No. 220 is declared
to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 149848. November 25, 2004]
ARSADI M. DISOMANGCOP and RAMIR M. DIMALOTANG, petitioners, vs. THE

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS SIMEON
A. DATUMANONG and THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT EMILIA
T. BONCODIN, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
At stake in the present case is the fate of regional autonomy for Muslim Mindanao which is the epoch-
making, Constitution-based project for achieving national unity in diversity.
Challenged in the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (Petition) are the constitutionality and validity of
[1]
Republic Act No. 8999 (R.A. 8999), entitled An Act Establishing An Engineering District in the First District
[2]
of the Province of Lanao del Sur and Appropriating Funds Therefor, and Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) Department Order No. 119 (D.O. 119) on the subject, Creation of Marawi Sub-District
[3]
Engineering Office.
The Background
The uncontested legal and factual antecedents of the case follow.
For the first time in its history after three Constitutions, the Philippines ordained the establishment of
regional autonomy with the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. Sections 1 and 15, Article X mandate the
[4]
creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. Section 15 specifically provides
that [t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines. To effectuate this mandate, the Charter devotes a number of provisions under Article X. [5]
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734), entitled An Act Providing
for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, was enacted and signed into law on 1
August 1989. The law called for the holding of a plebiscite in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del
Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-
Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General
Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on 19
[6]
November 1989, only four (4) provinces voted for the creation of an autonomous region, namely: Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). The law contains elaborate provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and
[7]
the areas of jurisdiction which are reserved for the National Government. [8]
In accordance with R.A. 6734, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on 12 October 1990,
Executive Order No. 426 (E.O. 426), entitled Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the
Department of Public Works and Highways within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao under the
Autonomous Regional Government, and for other purposes. Sections 1 to 3 of the Executive Order are its
[9]
operative provisions.

ARMM was formally organized on 6 November 1990. President Corazon C. Aquino flew to Cotabato,
the seat of the Regional Government, for the inauguration. At that point, she had already signed seven (7)
Executive Orders devolving to ARMM the powers of seven (7) cabinet departments, namely: (1) local
government; (2) labor and employment; (3) science and technology; (4) public works and highways; (5)
social welfare and development; (6) tourism; and (7) environment and national resources. [10]
Nearly nine (9) years later, on 20 May 1999, then Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar issued D.O. 119 which reads, thus:
Subject: Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
Pursuant to Sections 6 and 25 of Executive Order No. 124 dated 30 January 1987, there is
hereby created a DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have
jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within
Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur. The headquarters of the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office shall be at the former quarters of the Marawi City Engineering Office.
Personnel of the above-mentioned Sub-District Engineering Office shall be made up of

employees of the National Government Section of the former Marawi City Engineering Office
who are now assigned with the Iligan City Sub-District Engineering Office as may be determined
by the DPWH Region XII Regional Director. (Emphasis supplied)
Almost two (2) years later, on 17 January 2001, then President Joseph E. Estrada approved and
signed into law R.A. 8999. The text of the law reads:
AN ACT ESTABLISHING AN ENGINEERING DISTRICT IN THE FIRST DISTRICT OF THE

PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:
SECTION 1. The City of Marawi and the municipalities comprising the First District of the
Province of Lanao del Sur are hereby constituted into an engineering district to be known as the
First Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur.
SEC. 2. The office of the engineering district hereby created shall be established in Marawi City,
Province of Lanao del Sur.
SEC. 3. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in
the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law. Thereafter,
such sums as may be necessary for the maintenance and continued operation of the
engineering district office shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. (Emphasis supplied)
Congress later passed Republic Act No. 9054 (R.A. 9054), entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand
the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act
No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended. Like its
forerunner, R.A. 9054 contains detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and the
retained areas of governance of the National Government. [11]

R.A. 9054 lapsed into law on 31 March 2001. It was ratified in a plebiscite held on 14 August 2001.
[12]
The province of Basilan and the City of Marawi also voted to join ARMM on the same date. R.A. 6734 and
R.A. 9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts.
On 23 July 2001, petitioners Arsadi M. Disomangcop (Disomangcop) and Ramir M. Dimalotang
(Dimalotang) addressed a petition to then DPWH Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong, seeking the revocation
of D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A. 8999. No action, however, was taken on the petition. [13]
Consequently, petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang filed the instant petition, in their capacity as
Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II, respectively, of the First Engineering District of the
Department of Public Works and Highways, Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (DPWH-ARMM) in
Lanao del Sur.
Petitioners seek the following principal reliefs: (1) to annul and set aside D.O. 119; (2) to prohibit
respondent DPWH Secretary from implementing D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999 and releasing funds for public
works projects intended for Lanao del Sur and Marawi City to the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
and other administrative regions of DPWH; and (3) to compel the Secretary of the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) to release all funds for public works projects intended for Marawi City and the First
District of Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur only; and to compel
respondent DPWH Secretary to let the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur implement
all public works projects within its jurisdictional area. [14]
The petition includes an urgent application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and, after hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin respondent DBM Secretary from releasing funds
for public works projects in Lanao del Sur to entities other than the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District
in Lanao del Sur, and also to restrain the DPWH Secretary from allowing others besides the DPWH-ARMM
First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur to implement public works projects in Lanao del Sur. [15]
To support their petition, petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion
and that it violates the constitutional autonomy of the ARMM. They point out that the challenged Department
Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office with functions that have already been
devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. [16]
Petitioners also contend that R.A. 8999 is a piece of legislation that was not intelligently and thoroughly
studied, and that the explanatory note to House Bill No. 995 (H.B. 995) from which the law originated is
questionable. Petitioners assert as well that prior to the sponsorship of the law, no public hearing nor
consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was made. The House Committee on Public Works and Highways
(Committee) failed to invite a single official from the affected agency. Finally, petitioners argue that the law
was skillfully timed for signature by former President Joseph E. Estrada during the pendency of the
impeachment proceedings. [17]
In its resolution of 8 October 2001, the Court required respondents to file their comment. In [18]
compliance, respondents DPWH Secretary and DBM Secretary, through the Solicitor General, filed on 7
January 2002, their Comment.
In their Comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintain the validity of
[19]
D.O. 119, arguing that it was issued in accordance with Executive Order No. 124 (E.O. 124). In defense
[20]
of the constitutionality of R.A. 8999, they submit that the powers of the autonomous regions did not diminish
the legislative power of Congress. Respondents also contend that the petitioners have no locus standi or
[21]
legal standing to assail the constitutionality of the law and the department order. They note that petitioners
have no personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. [22]
Asserting their locus standi, petitioners in their Memorandum point out that they will suffer actual
[23]
injury as a result of the enactments complained of. [24]
Jurisdictional Considerations
First, the jurisdictional predicates.

The 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. It establishes the authority of
the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of acts of the political departments. It speaks of
judicial prerogative in terms of duty.
[25]
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of judicial power: First, there must
be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before
the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity of the act must have
standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
opportunity. Fifth, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
[26]
In seeking to nullify acts of the legislature and the executive department on the ground that they
contravene the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. As held in Taada v.
Angara, where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
[27]
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. But in deciding to take
jurisdiction over this petition questioning acts of the political departments of government, the Court will not
review the wisdom, merits, or propriety thereof, but will strike them down only on either of two grounds: (1)
unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
[28]
For an abuse to be grave, the power must be exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.
There is grave abuse of discretion when respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in the exercise
of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
[29]
The challenge to the legal standing of petitioners cannot succeed. Legal standing or locus standi is
defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term interest means a material
interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from a mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. [30]
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show not only that the law is
invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. He must
show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or
that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. [31]
But following the new trend, this Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it does not
satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interests are involved. In several cases, the Court
has adopted a liberal stance on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue
of transcendental significance to the people. [32]
In the instant case, petitioner Disomangcop holds the position of Engineer IV. When he filed this
petition, he was the Officer-in-Charge, Office of the District Engineer of the First Engineering District of
DPWH-ARMM, Lanao del Sur. On the other hand, petitioner Dimalotang is an Engineer II and President of
the rank and file employees also of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur. Both
are charged with the duty and responsibility of supervising and implementing all public works projects to be
undertaken and being undertaken in Lanao del Sur which is the area of their jurisdiction. [33]
It is thus not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office under D.O. 119
and the creation of and appropriation of funds to the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed
under R.A. 8999 will affect the powers, functions and responsibilities of the petitioners and the DPWH-
ARMM. As the two offices have apparently been endowed with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-
ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are in imminent danger of being
eased out of their duties and, not remotely, even their jobs. Their material and substantial interests will
definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct and immediate.
Thus, they can legitimately challenge the validity of the enactments subject of the instant case.
Points of Contention

In the petition before us, petitioners contend that R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 are unconstitutional and
were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
We agree in part.
Republic Act No. 8999
At the outset, let it be made clear that it is not necessary to declare R.A. No. 8999 unconstitutional for
the adjudication of this case. The accepted rule is that the Court will not resolve a constitutional question
unless it is the lis mota of the case, or if the case can be disposed of or settled on other grounds.[34]
The plain truth is the challenged law never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a
subsequent enactment.
The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy scheme. While they are
classified as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation by
a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999
[35]
in this case. The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.

We quote excerpts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
FR. BERNAS. Yes, that is the reason I am bringing this up. This thing involves some rather far-
reaching consequences also in relation to the issue raised by Commissioner Romulo with
respect to federalism. Are we, in effect, creating new categories of laws? Generally, we have
statutes and constitutional provisions. Is this organic act equivalent to a constitutional provision?
If it is going to be equivalent to a constitutional provision, it would seem to me that the
formulation of the provisions of the organic act will have to be done by the legislature, acting as
a constituent assembly, and therefore, subject to the provisions of the Article on Amendments.
That is the point that I am trying to bring up. In effect, if we opt for federalism, it would really
involve an act of the National Assembly or Congress acting as a constituent assembly and
present amendments to this Constitution, and the end product itself would be a constitutional
provision which would only be amendable according to the processes indicated in the
Constitution.
MR. OPLE. Madam President, may I express my personal opinion in this respect.
I think to require Congress to act as a constituent body before enacting an organic act would be
to raise an autonomous region to the same level as the sovereign people of the whole country.
And I think the powers of the Congress should be quite sufficient in enacting a law, even if it is
now exalted to the level of an organic act for the purpose of providing a basic law for an
autonomous region without having to transform itself into a constituent assembly. We are
dealing still with one subordinate subdivision of the State even if it is now vested with certain
autonomous powers on which its own legislature can pass laws.
FR. BERNAS. So the questions I have raised so far with respect to this organic act are: What
segment of the population will participate in the plebiscite? In what capacity would the
legislature be acting when it passes this? Will it be a constituent assembly or merely a
legislative body? What is the nature, therefore, of this organic act in relation to ordinary statutes
and the Constitution? Finally, if we are going to amend this organic act, what process will be
followed?
MR. NOLLEDO. May I answer that, please, in the light of what is now appearing in our report.

First, only the people who are residing in the units composing the regions should be allowed to
participate in the plebiscite. Second, the organic act has the character of a charter passed by
the Congress, not as a constituent assembly, but as an ordinary legislature and, therefore, the
organic act will still be subject to amendments in the ordinary legislative process as now
constituted, unless the Gentlemen has another purpose.
FR. BERNAS. But with plebiscite again.
MR. NOLLEDO. Those who will participate in the plebiscite are those who are directly affected,
the inhabitants of the units constitutive of the region. (Emphasis supplied) [36]
Although R.A. 9054 was enacted later, it reaffirmed the imperativeness of the plebiscite
requirement. In fact, R.A. 9054 itself, being the second or later ARMM Organic Act, was subjected to and
[37]
ratified in a plebiscite.
The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074, as implemented by E.O. 426, devolved the functions of the
DPWH in the ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur (minus Marawi City at the time) to the Regional
[38]
Government. By creating an office with previously devolved functions, R.A. 8999, in essence, sought to
amend R.A. 6074. The amendatory law should therefore first obtain the approval of the people of the ARMM
before it could validly take effect. Absent compliance with this requirement, R.A. 8999 has not even become
operative.
From another perspective, R.A. 8999 was repealed and superseded by R.A. 9054. Where a statute of
later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject,
that intention must be given effect.
Of course, the intention to repeal must be clear and manifest. Implied repeal by irreconcilable
[39]
inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are clearly
inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both
cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other. [40]
The Court has also held that statutes should be construed in light of the objective to be achieved and
the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the
object, suppress the mischief and secure the benefits intended. [41]
R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the constitutional grant of autonomy by
detailing the powers of the ARG covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, one of which is
its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999, however, ventures to reestablish the
National Governments jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently
inconsistent with R.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter laws objective.
Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic Acts, R.A.
6734 and R.A. 9054. The kernel of the antagonism and disharmony lies in the regional autonomy which the
ARMM Organic Acts ordain pursuant to the Constitution. On the other hand, R.A. 8999 contravenes true
decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy.
Regional Autonomy Under
R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054
The 1987 Constitution mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and unequivocal answer to the cry
for a meaningful, effective and forceful autonomy. According to Commissioner Jose Nolledo, Chairman of
[42]
the Committee which drafted the provisions, it is an indictment against the status quo of a unitary system
that, to my mind, has ineluctably tied the hands of progress in our country . . . our varying regional
characteristics are factors to capitalize on to attain national strength through decentralization. [43]
The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate
development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. These cultures, as a matter of right, must
[44]
be allowed to flourish.
[45]

Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine society in its
ethnolinguistic, cultural, and even religious diversities. It strives to free Philippine society of the strain and
wastage caused by the assimilationist approach. Policies emanating from the legislature are invariably
[46]
assimilationist in character despite channels being open for minority representation. As a result, democracy
becomes an irony to the minority group. [47]
Several commissioners echoed the pervasive sentiment in the plenary sessions in their own inimitable
way. Thus, Commissioner Blas Ople referred to the recognition that the Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras do not belong to the dominant national community as the justification for conferring on them a
measure of legal self-sufficiency, meaning self-government, so that they will flourish politically, economically
and culturally, with the hope that after achieving parity with the rest of the country they would give up their
own autonomous region in favor of joining the national mainstream. For his part, the Muslim delegate,
[48]
Commissioner Ahmad Alonto, spoke of the diversity of cultures as the framework for nation-
building. Finally, excerpts of the poignant plea of Commissioner Ponciano Bennagen deserve to be quoted
[49]
verbatim:
. . . They see regional autonomy as the answer to their centuries of struggle against oppression
and exploitation. For so long, their names and identities have been debased. Their ancestral
lands have been ransacked for their treasures, for their wealth. Their cultures have been defiled,
their very lives threatened, and worse, extinguished, all in the name of national development; all
in the name of public interest; all in the name of common good; all in the name of the right to
property; all in the name of Regalian Doctrine; all in the name of national security. These
phrases have meant nothing to our indigenous communities, except for the violation of their
human rights.
...
Honorable Commissioners, we wish to impress upon you the gravity of the decision to be made
by every single one of us in this Commission. We have the overwhelming support of the Bangsa
Moro and the Cordillera Constitution. By this we mean meaningful and authentic regional
autonomy. We propose that we have a separate Article on the autonomous regions for the
Bangsa Moro and Cordillera people clearly spelled out in this Constitution, instead of prolonging
the agony of their vigil and their struggle. This, too is a plea for national peace. Let us not pass
the buck to the Congress to decide on this. Let us not wash our hands of our responsibility to
attain national unity and peace and to settle this problem and rectify past injustices, once and
for all.
[50]
The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the case of the Filipino Muslims and the Cordillera
people who have been fighting for it. Their political struggle highlights their unique cultures and the
unresponsiveness of the unitary system to their aspirations. The Moros struggle for self-determination
[51]
dates as far back as the Spanish conquest in the Philippines. Even at present, the struggle goes on. [52]
Perforce, regional autonomy is also a means towards solving existing serious peace and order
problems and secessionist movements. Parenthetically, autonomy, decentralization and regionalization, in
international law, have become politically acceptable answers to intractable problems of nationalism,
separatism, ethnic conflict and threat of secession. [53]
However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of a sovereignty
distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. [54]
Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination exercised by the local government unit vis--vis
the central government.

In international law, the right to self-determination need not be understood as a right to political
separation, but rather as a complex net of legal-political relations between a certain people and the state
authorities. It ensures the right of peoples to the necessary level of autonomy that would guarantee the
support of their own cultural identity, the establishment of priorities by the communitys internal decision-
making processes and the management of collective matters by themselves. [55]
If self-determination is viewed as an end in itself reflecting a preference for homogeneous, independent

nation-states, it is incapable of universal application without massive disruption. However, if self-
determination is viewed as a means to an endthat end being a democratic, participatory political and
economic system in which the rights of individuals and the identity of minority communities are protectedits
continuing validity is more easily perceived. [56]
Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal government powers to the people of a
particular area or region with least control and supervision from the central government. [57]
The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with a common tradition and
shared social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways of life and heritage, exercise their rights,
and be in charge of their own business. This is achieved through the establishment of a special governance
regime for certain member communities who choose their own authorities from within the community and
exercise the jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide internal community affairs. [58]
In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the cultivation of more positive means for national
integration. It would remove the wariness among the Muslims, increase their trust in the government and
pave the way for the unhampered implementation of the development programs in the region. Again, even
[59]
a glimpse of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission could lend a sense of the urgency and the
inexorable appeal of true decentralization:
MR. OPLE. . . . We are writing a Constitution, of course, for generations to come, not only for
the present but for our posterity. There is no harm in recognizing certain vital pragmatic needs
for national peace and solidarity, and the writing of this Constitution just happens at a time when
it is possible for this Commission to help the cause of peace and reconciliation in Mindanao and
the Cordilleras, by taking advantage of a heaven-sent opportunity. . . . [60]
...
MR. ABUBAKAR. . . . So in order to foreclose and convince the rest of the of the Philippines that
Mindanao autonomy will be granted to them as soon as possible, more or less, to dissuade
these armed men from going outside while Mindanao will be under the control of the national
government, let us establish an autonomous Mindanao within our effort and capacity to do so
within the shortest possible time. This will be an answer to the Misuari clamor, not only for
autonomy but for independence. [61]
...
MR. OPLE. . . . The reason for this abbreviation of the period for the consideration of the
Congress of the organic acts and their passage is that we live in abnormal times. In the case of
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, we know that we deal with questions of war and peace.
These are momentous issues in which the territorial integrity and the solidarity of this country
are being put at stake, in a manner of speaking.
We are writing a peace Constitution. We hope that the Article on Social Justice can contribute to
a climate of peace so that any civil strife in the countryside can be more quickly and more justly
resolved. We are providing for autonomous regions so that we give constitutional permanence
to the just demands and grievances of our own fellow countrymen in the Cordilleras and in

Mindanao. One hundred thousand lives were lost in that struggle in Mindanao, and to this day,
the Cordilleras is being shaken by an armed struggle as well as a peaceful and militant struggle.
...
Rather than give opportunity to foreign bodies, no matter how sympathetic to the Philippines, to
contribute to the settlement of this issue, I think the Constitutional Commission ought not to
forego the opportunity to put the stamp of this Commission through definitive action on the
settlement of the problems that have nagged us and our forefathers for so long. [62]
A necessary prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization. [63]
Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates, whether

geographically or functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by
subnational units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger government chooses to delegate certain
authority to more local governments. Federalism implies some measure of decentralization, but unitary
systems may also decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units
that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not possess any claim of right against the central
government. [64]
Decentralization comes in two formsdeconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration is administrative

in nature; it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from the
national office to the regional and local offices. This mode of decentralization is also referred to as
administrative decentralization. [65]
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of powers,
responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the central government to local
government units. This is a more liberal form of decentralization since there is an actual transfer of powers
[66]
and responsibilities. It aims to grant greater autonomy to local government units in cognizance of their
[67]
right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and technical
capabilities.
[68]
This Court elucidated the concept of autonomy in Limbona v. Mangelin, thus: [69]
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers
to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments more responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit
of national development and social progress. At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that he
can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to
self-immolation, since in that event the autonomous government becomes accountable not to
the central authorities but to its constituency.
In the case, the Court reviewed the expulsion of a member from the Sangguniang Pampook,
Autonomous Region. It held that the Court may assume jurisdiction as the local government unit, organized

before 1987, enjoys autonomy of the former category. It refused, though, to resolve whether the grant of
autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power
rather than mere administration. [70]
A year later, in Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit, the Court, with the same
[71]
composition, ruled without any dissent that the creation of autonomous regions contemplates the grant of
political autonomyan autonomy which is greater than the administrative autonomy granted to local
government units. It held that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution (Art. X, Sec.
2) refers to administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the
grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. [72]
And by regional autonomy, the framers intended it to mean meaningful and authentic regional
autonomy. As articulated by a Muslim author, substantial and meaningful autonomy is the kind of local
[73]
self-government which allows the people of the region or area the power to determine what is best for their
growth and development without undue interference or dictation from the central government. [74]
To this end, Section 16, Article X limits the power of the President over autonomous regions. In
[75] [76]
essence, the provision also curtails the power of Congress over autonomous regions. Consequently,
[77]
Congress will have to re-examine national laws and make sure that they reflect the Constitutions adherence
to local autonomy. And in case of conflicts, the underlying spirit which should guide its resolution is the
Constitutions desire for genuine local autonomy. [78]
The diminution of Congress powers over autonomous regions was confirmed in Ganzon v. Court of
Appeals, wherein this Court held that the omission (of as may be provided by law) signifies nothing more
[79]
than to underscore local governments autonomy from Congress and to break Congress control over local
government affairs.
This is true to subjects over which autonomous regions have powers, as specified in Sections 18 and
20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Expressly not included therein are powers over certain areas. Worthy
of note is that the area of public works is not excluded and neither is it reserved for the National
Government. The key provisions read, thus:
SEC. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region
consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise
provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with the
provisions of the Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the autonomous region.
SEC. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of general
welfare of the people of the region. (Emphasis supplied)
E.O. 426 officially devolved the powers and functions of the DPWH in ARMM to the Autonomous
Regional Government (ARG). Sections 1 and 2 of E.O. 426 provide:
SECTION 1. Transfer of Control and Supervision. The offices of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) including their functions, powers and responsibilities, personnel, equipment,
properties, budgets and liabilities are hereby placed under the control and supervision of
the Autonomous Regional Government.
In particular, these offices are identified as the four (4) District Engineering Offices (DEO)
in each of the four provinces respectively and the three (3) Area Equipment Services
(AES) located in Tawi-Tawi, Sulu and Maguindanao (Municipality of Sultan Kudarat).
SEC. 2. Functions Transferred. The Autonomous Regional Government shall be responsible for
highways, flood control and water resource development systems, and other public works within
the ARMM and shall exercise the following functions:
1. Undertake and evaluate the planning, design, construction and works supervision for
the infrastructure projects whose location and impact are confined within the ARMM;
2. Undertake the maintenance of infrastructure facilities within the ARMM and

supervise the maintenance of such local roads and other infrastructure facilities
receiving financial assistance from the National Government;
3. Ensure the implementation of laws, policies, programs, rules and regulations

regarding infrastructure projects as well as all public and private physical structures
within the ARMM;
4. Provide technical assistance related to their functions to other agencies within the
ARMM, especially the local government units;
5. Coordinate with other national and regional government departments, agencies,

institutions and organizations, especially the local government units within the ARMM
in the planning and implementation of infrastructure projects;

6. Conduct continuing consultations with the local communities, take appropriate
measures to make the services of the Autonomous Regional Government responsive
to the needs of the general public and recommend such appropriate actions as may
be necessary; and
7. Perform such other related duties and responsibilities within the ARMM as may be
assigned or delegated by the Regional Governor or as may be provided by law.
(Emphasis supplied)
More importantly, Congress itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and devolved the administrative and
fiscal management of public works and funds for public works to the ARG. Section 20, Article VI of R.A.
9054 provides:
ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
SEC. 20. Annual Budget and Infrastructure Funds. The annual budget of the Regional
Government shall be enacted by Regional Assembly. Funds for infrastructure in the
autonomous region allocated by the central government or national government shall be
appropriated through a Regional Assembly Public Works Act.
Unless approved by the Regional Assembly, no public works funds allocated by the central
government or national government for the Regional Government or allocated by the Regional
Government from its own revenues may be disbursed, distributed, realigned, or used in any
manner.
The aim of the Constitution is to extend to the autonomous peoples, the people of Muslim Mindanao
in this case, the right to self-determinationa right to choose their own path of development; the right to
determine the political, cultural and economic content of their development path within the framework of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic. Self-determination refers to the need for a
[80]
political structure that will respect the autonomous peoples uniqueness and grant them sufficient room for
self-expression and self-construction. [81]
In treading their chosen path of development, the Muslims in Mindanao are to be given freedom and
independence with minimum interference from the National Government. This necessarily includes the
freedom to decide on, build, supervise and maintain the public works and infrastructure projects within the
autonomous region. The devolution of the powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM and transfer of
the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds to the ARG are meant to be true,
meaningful and unfettered. This unassailable conclusion is grounded on a clear consensus, reached at the
Constitutional Commission and ratified by the entire Filipino electorate, on the centrality of decentralization
of power as the appropriate vessel of deliverance for Muslim Filipinos and the ultimate unity of Muslims and
Christians in this country.
With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and the National Government takes control
again. The hands, once more, of the autonomous peoples are reined in and tied up.
The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have
been previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
E.O. 426 clearly ordains the transfer of the control and supervision of the offices of the DPWH within
the ARMM, including their functions, powers and responsibilities, personnel, equipment, properties, and
budgets to the ARG. Among its other functions, the DPWH-ARMM, under the control of the Regional
Government shall be responsible for highways, flood control and water resource development systems,

and other public works within the ARMM. Its scope of power includes the planning, design, construction
and supervision of public works. According to R.A. 9054, the reach of the Regional Government enables it
to appropriate, manage and disburse all public work funds allocated for the region by the central
government.
The use of the word powers in E.O. 426 manifests an unmistakable case of devolution.
In this regard, it is not amiss to cite Opinion No. 120, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice on whether
[82]
the national departments or their counterpart departments in the ARG are responsible for implementation
of roads, rural water supply, health, education, women in development, agricultural extension and
watershed management. Referring to Section 2, Article V of R.A. 6734 which enumerates the powers of
the ARG, he states:
It is clear from the foregoing provision of law that except for the areas of executive power
mentioned therein, all other such areas shall be exercised by the Autonomous Regional
Government (ARG) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. It is noted that programs
relative to infrastructure facilities, health, education, women in development, agricultural
extension and watershed management do not fall under any of the exempted areas listed in the
abovequoted provision of law. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that all these spheres of
executive responsibility have been transferred to the ARG.
Reinforcing the aboveview (sic) are the various executive orders issued by the President
providing for the devolution of the powers and functions of specified executive departments of
the National Government to the ARG. These are E.O. Nos. 425 (Department of Labor and
Employment, Local Government, Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources, Social Welfare
and Development and Science and Technology), 426 (Department of Public Works and
Highways), 459 (Department of Education, Culture and Sports) and 460 (Department of
Agriculture). The execution of projects on infrastructure, education, women, agricultural
extension and watershed management within the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
normally fall within the responsibility of one of the aforementioned executive departments of the
National Government, but by virtue of the aforestated EOs, such responsibility has been
transferred to the ARG.
E.O. 426 was issued to implement the provisions of the first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6734the validity
of which this Court upheld in the case of Abbas v. Commission on Elections. In Section 4, Article XVIII of
[83]
said Act, central government or national government offices and agencies in the autonomous region which
are not excluded under Section 3, Article IV of this Organic Act, shall be placed under the control and
[84]
supervision of the Regional Government pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the oversight committee.
Evidently, the intention is to cede some, if not most, of the powers of the national government to the
autonomous government in order to effectuate a veritable autonomy. The continued enforcement of R.A.
8999, therefore, runs afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts and results in the recall of powers which have
previously been handed over. This should not be sanctioned, elsewise the Organic Acts desire for greater
autonomy for the ARMM in accordance with the Constitution would be quelled. It bears stressing that
national laws are subject to the Constitution one of whose state policies is to ensure the autonomy of
autonomous regions. Section 25, Article II of the 1987 Constitution states:
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
R.A. 8999 has made the DPWH-ARMM effete and rendered regional autonomy illusory with respect
to infrastructure projects. The Congressional Record shows, on the other hand, that the lack of an
implementing and monitoring body within the area has hindered the speedy implementation, of
infrastructure projects. Apparently, in the legislatures estimation, the existing DPWH-ARMM engineering
[85]
districts failed to measure up to the task. But if it was indeed the case, the problem could not be solved

through the simple legislative creation of an incongruous engineering district for the central government in
the ARMM. As it was, House Bill No. 995 which ultimately became R.A. 8999 was passed in record time
on second reading (not more than 10 minutes), absolutely without the usual sponsorship speech and
debates. The precipitate speed which characterized the passage of R.A. 8999 is difficult to comprehend
[86]
since R.A. 8999 could have resulted in the amendment of the first ARMM Organic Act and, therefore, could
not take effect without first being ratified in a plebiscite. What is more baffling is that in March 2001, or
barely two (2) months after it enacted R.A. 8999 in January 2001, Congress passed R.A. 9054, the second
ARMM Organic Act, where it reaffirmed the devolution of the DPWH in ARMM, including Lanao del Sur and
Marawi City, to the Regional Government and effectively repealed R.A. 8999.
DPWH Department Order No. 119
Now, the question directly related to D.O. 119.
D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure
projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of E.O. 426. The Executive
Order was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734which initiated the creation of the constitutionally-mandated
autonomous region and which defined the basic structure of the autonomous government. E.O. 426
[87] [88]
sought to implement the transfer of the control and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to the
Autonomous Regional Government. In particular, it identified four (4) District Engineering Offices in each
of the four (4) provinces, namely: Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Accordingly, the
[89]
First Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over the public works within
the province.
The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication of the DPWH-
ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department
order, in effect, takes back powers which have been previously devolved under the said executive order.
D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWHs order, like spring water, cannot rise higher
than its source of powerthe Executive.
The fact that the department order was issued pursuant to E.O. 124signed and approved by President
Aquino in her residual legislative powersis of no moment. It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory
construction that a special provision or law prevails over a general one. Lex specialis derogant
[90]
generali. As this Court expressed in the case of Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, another basic
[91]
principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special legislation on
the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions
are not applicable, that specific statute prevails over a general statute and that where two statutes are of
equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail.
E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works
and Highways while E.O. 426 is a special law transferring the control and supervision of the DPWH offices
within ARMM to the Autonomous Regional Government. The latter statute specifically applies to DPWH-
ARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to E.O. 426 in the instant case.
In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in effect superseded E.O.
124. In case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails
because it is the later legislative will.
[92]
Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations,
and other issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly. With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows
[93]
that D.O. 119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
Grave abuse of discretion
Without doubt, respondents committed grave abuse of discretion. They implemented R.A. 8999
despite its inoperativeness and repeal. They also put in place and maintained the DPWH Marawi Sub-
District Engineering Office in accordance with D.O. 119 which has been rendered functus officio by the
ARMM Organic Acts.

Still, on the issue of grave abuse of discretion, this Court, however, cannot uphold petitioners argument
that R.A. 8999 was signed into law under suspicious circumstances to support the assertion that there was
a capricious and whimsical exercise of legislative authority. Once more, this Court cannot inquire into the
wisdom, merits, propriety or expediency of the acts of the legislative branch.
Likewise, the alleged lack of consultation or public hearing with the affected agency during the
inception of the law does not render the law infirm. This Court holds that the Congress did not transgress
the Constitution nor any statute or House Rule in failing to invite a resource person from the DPWH-ARMM
during the Committee meeting. Section 27, Rule VII of the Rules of the House only requires that a written
[94]
notice be given to all the members of a Committee seven (7) calendar days before a regularly scheduled
meeting, specifying the subject matter of the meeting and the names of the invited resource persons. And
it must be emphasized that the questions of who to invite and whether there is a need to invite resource
persons during Committee meetings should be addressed solely to Congress in its plenary legislative
powers. [95]
Conclusion
The repeal of R.A. 8999 and the functus officio state of D.O. 119 provide the necessary basis for the
grant of the writs of certiorari and prohibition sought by the petitioners. However, there is no similar basis
for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondent DBM Secretary to release funds appropriated
for public works projects in Marawi City and Lanao del Sur to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District
in Lanao del Sur and to compel respondent DPWH Secretary to allow the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering
District in Lanao del Sur to implement all public works projects within its jurisdictional area. Section 20,
Article VI of R.A. 9054 clearly provides that (f)unds for infrastructure in the autonomous region allocated by
the central government or national government shall only be appropriated through a Regional Assembly
Public Works Act passed by the Regional Assembly. There is no showing that such Regional Assembly
Public Works Act has been enacted.
WHEREFORE, considering that Republic Act No. 9054 repealed Republic Act No. 8999 and rendered
DPWH Department Order No. 119 functus officio, the petition insofar as it seeks the writs of certiorari and
prohibition is GRANTED. Accordingly, let a writ of prohibition ISSUE commanding respondents to desist
from implementing R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119, and maintaining the DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering
Office and the First Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur comprising the City of Marawi and
the municipalities within the First District of Lanao del Sur. However, the petition insofar as it seeks a writ
of mandamus against respondents is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Acting C.J.), Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.
Corona, J., on leave.
[1]
Dated 25 September 2001; Rollo, pp. 3-30, with annexes.
[2]
Approved on 17 January 2001.
[3]
Dated 20 May 1999.
[4]
SEC. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. (Art. X,
1987 CONST.)
[5]
SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
SEC. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous
regions shall be vested in the National Government.

SEC.18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of
nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region consisting
of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be elective and representative of the constituent
political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction
consistent with the provisions of the Constitution and national laws.
The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting
favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
SEC. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of
organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
SEC. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the
organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of general welfare of the people of the
region.
SEC. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police
agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The defense
and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National Government.
[6]
Par. (2), Sec. 1, R.A. 6734.
[7]
Chiongbian v. Orbos, 315 Phil. 251, 257 (1995).
[8]
ARTICLE V
POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
SECTION 1. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions necessary for the proper governance
and development of all the constituent units within the Autonomous Region consistent with the constitutional policy on
regional and local autonomy and decentralization: Provided, That nothing herein shall authorize the diminution of the powers
and functions already enjoyed by local government units.
SEC. 2. The Autonomous Region is a corporate entity with jurisdiction in all matters devolved to it by the
Constitution and this Organic Act as herein enumerated:
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage;
(9) Powers, functions and responsibilities now being exercised by the departments of the National Government
except;
(a) Foreign affairs;

(b) National defense and security;
(c) Postal service;
(d) Coinage, and fiscal and monetary policies;
(e) Administration of justice;
(f) Quarantine;
(g) Customs and tariff;
(h) Citizenship;
(i) Naturalization, immigration and deportation;
(j) General auditing, civil service and elections;
(k) Foreign trade;
(l) Maritime, land and air transportation and communications that affect areas outside the Autonomous
Region; and
(m) Patents, trademarks, tradenames, and copyrights; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized
by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the Region.
ARTICLE XII
URBAN AND RURAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
SECTION 1. The Regional Government shall promote and formulate comprehensive and integrated regional
urban and rural development policies, plans, programs and projects responsive to the needs, aspirations and values of the
people within the Region.
ARTICLE XIX
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
SEC. 4. Upon the organization of the Autonomous Region, the line agencies and offices of the National
Government dealing with local government, social services, science and technology, labor, natural resources, and tourism,
including their personnel, equipment, properties and budgets, shall be immediately placed under the control and supervision
of the Regional Government.
Other National Government offices and agencies in the Autonomous Region which are not excluded under
paragraph (9), Section 2, Article V of this Organic Act, together with their personnel, equipment, properties and budgets,
shall be placed under the control and supervision of the Regional Government pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the
Oversight Committee mentioned in Section 3, Article XIX of this Organic Act: Provided, however, That the transfer of these
offices and agencies and their personnel, equipment, properties and budgets shall be accomplished within six (6) years
from the organization of the Regional Government.
The National Government shall continue such levels of expenditures as may be necessary to carry out the
functions devolved under this Act: Provided, however, That the annual budgetary support shall, as soon as practicable,
terminate as to the line agencies or offices devolved to the Regional Government.
SEC. 10. The National Government shall, in addition to its regular annual allotment to the Autonomous Region,
provide the Regional Government Two billion pesos (P2,000,000,000.00) as annual assistance for five (5) years, to fund
infrastructure projects duly identified, endorsed and approved by the Regional Planning and Development Board herein
created: Provided, however, That the annual assistance herein mentioned shall be appropriated and disbursed through a
Public Works Act duly enacted by the Regional Assembly: Provided, further, That this annual assistance may be adjusted
proportionately in accordance with the number of provinces and cities joining the Autonomous Region: and Provided,
finally, That the national programs and projects in the Autonomous Region shall continue to be financed out of national
funds.
[9]
SEC. 1. Transfer of Control and Supervision. The offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) within the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) including their functions, powers and responsibilities, personnel,
equipment, properties, budgets and liabilities are hereby placed under the control and supervision of the Autonomous
Regional Government.
In particular, these offices are identified as the four (4) District Engineering Offices (DEO) in each of the four
provinces respectively and the three (3) Area Equipment Services (AES) located in Tawi-Tawi, Sulu and Maguindanao
(Municipality of Sultan Kudarat).

SEC 2. Functions Transferred. The Autonomous Regional Government shall be responsible for highways, flood
control and water resource development systems, and other public works within the ARMM and shall exercise the following
functions:
1. Undertake and evaluate the planning, design, construction and works supervision for the infrastructure projects
whose location and impact are confined within the ARMM;
2. Undertake the maintenance of infrastructure facilities within the ARMM and supervise the maintenance of such
local roads and other infrastructure facilities receiving financial assistance from the National Government;
3. Ensure the implementation of laws, policies, programs, rules and regulations regarding infrastructure projects
as well as all public and private physical structures within the ARMM;
4. Provide technical assistance related to their functions to other agencies within the ARMM, especially the local
government units;
5. Coordinate with other national and regional government departments, agencies, institutions and organizations,
especially the local government units within the ARMM in the planning and implementation of infrastructure projects;
6. Conduct continuing consultations with the local communities, take appropriate measures to make the services
of the Autonomous Regional Government responsive to the needs of the general public and recommend such appropriate
actions as may be necessary; and
7. Perform such other related duties and responsibilities within the ARMM as may be assigned or delegated by
the Regional Governor or as may be provided by law.
SEC. 3. Functions Retained by the National Government. Functions not specified herein shall be retained by the
DPWH. These include, among others, the reserved powers of the National Government in accordance with Article V, Section
2, as well as those subject to specific provisions, of Republic Act No. 6734; Provided, That, the DPWH and the Autonomous
Regional Government may enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with reference to operationalizing these functions within
the ARMM subject to the approval of the Office of the President; Provided, however, That the operations of the National
Government are not prejudiced.
[10]
M. Tiquia, AUTONOMY: A HISTORICAL EXPERIMENT, Congressional Research and Training Service 15 (1991).
[11]
ARTICLE IV
POWERS OF GOVERNMENT
SEC. 1. Powers and Functions. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Regional Government shall
exercise those powers and functions expressly granted to it in this Organic Act, or necessary for or incidental to the proper
governance and development of all the constituent units within the autonomous region consistent with the policy on regional
and local autonomy and decentralization.
The Regional Government may enact its own regional administrative code and regional local government code
consistent with the Constitution. The powers and functions already vested upon and the shares of the national taxes
provided by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, to provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangay
in the autonomous region shall not be reduced.
SEC. 2. Corporate Entity. The autonomous region is a corporate entity with jurisdiction over all matters devolved
to it by the Constitution and this Organic Act.
SEC. 3. Scope of Regional Assembly Legislative Power; Exceptions. The Regional Assembly may exercise
legislative power in the autonomous region for the benefit of the people and for the development of the region except on
the following matters:
(c) Postal service;
(d) Coinage and fiscal and monetary policies;
(e) Administration of justice; It may, however, legislate on matters covered by the Shariah. The Shariah shall
apply only to Muslims. Its application shall be limited by pertinent constitutional provisions, particularly by the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment and by pertinent national legislation that promotes human rights and the universally
accepted legal principles and precepts;
(f) Quarantine;
(g) Customs and tariff;
(h) Citizenship;

(i) Naturalization, immigration and deportation;
(j) General auditing;
(k) National Elections;
(l) Maritime, land, air transportation, and communications; The autonomous government shall, however, have the
power to grant franchises, licenses and permits to land, sea and air transportation plying routes in the provinces or cities
within the region, and communications facilities where frequencies are confined to and whose main offices are located within
the autonomous region;
(m) Patents, trademarks, trade names, and copyrights, and
(n) Foreign trade.
ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
SEC. 20. Annual Budget and Infrastructure Funds. The annual budget of the Regional Government shall be
enacted by Regional Assembly. Funds for infrastructure in the autonomous region allocated by the central government or
national government shall be appropriated through a Regional Assembly Public Works Act.
Unless approved by the Regional Assembly, no public works funds allocated by the central government or national
government for the Regional Government or allocated by the Regional Government from its own revenues may be
disbursed, distributed, realigned, or used in any manner.
ARTICLE XI
URBAN AND RURAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
SECTION 1. Urban and Rural Development. The Regional Government shall promote and formulate
comprehensive and integrated regional urban and rural development policies, plans, programs, and projects responsive to
the needs, aspirations, and values of the people in the autonomous region.
ARTICLE XVIII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
SEC. 11. Annual Assistance.- In addition to the regular annual allotment to fund the regular operations of the
Regional Government, such amounts as may be needed to fund the infrastructure projects duly identified, endorsed, and
approved by the Regional Economic and Development Planning Board as created herein shall be provided by the central
government or national government as annual assistance for six (6) years after the approval of this Organic Act, and shall
be included in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA). The annual assistance herein mentioned shall be appropriated
and disturbed through a Public Works Act duly enacted by the Regional Assembly. The national programs and projects in
the autonomous region shall continue to be financed by the central government or national government funds.
[12]
See Sec. 27 (1), Art. VI, 1987 CONST.
[13]
Rollo, p. 9.
[14]
Id. at 5 and 10.
[15]
Id. at 19.
[16]
Id. at 14.
[17]
Id. at 17-18.
[18]
Id. at 31.
[19]
Dated 7 January 2002; Rollo pp. 36-49.
[20]
Entitled Reorganizing The Ministry Of Public Works and Highways, Redefining Its Powers And Functions, And For Other Purposes;
Approved on 30 January 1987.
D.O. 119 was issued pursuant to Sections 6 and 25 of E.O. 124:
SEC. 6. Minister of Public Works and Highways. The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate
of the Ministry and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Minister of Public Works and Highways,
hereinafter referred to as the Minister, who shall have supervision and control over the Ministry and shall be appointed by
the President for such purposes, the Minister shall:
(a) Advise the President on the promulgation of executive or administrative orders, regulations, proclamations
and other issuances relative to matters under the jurisdiction of the Ministry;

(b) Establish the policies and standards for the operation of the Ministry pursuant to the Presidents guidelines;
(c) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out Ministry objectives, policies, and functions;
(d) Exercise supervision and control over all Bureaus and Offices under the Ministry;
(e) Supervise all attached agencies and corporations in accordance with law;
(f) As deemed appropriate by the Minister, delegate authority for the performance of any power or function, as
defined herein or as delegated by the President of the Philippines, to officers and employees under his direction;
(g) Perform such other authorities and responsibilities as may be provided by law.
SEC. 25. District Office. There shall be a District Office in each of the provinces and cities throughout the country
to be headed by a District Engineer appointed by the Minister. A province or city may, however, be divided into two (2) or
more engineering districts, upon determination and issuance of an administrative order by the Minister. The District Office
shall be responsible for all highways, flood control and water resource development system, and other public works within
the district, except those defined under Section 5 (d) hereof. For this purpose, it shall have the following duties and
responsibilities:
(a) Undertake and evaluate the planning, design, construction and works supervision functions of the Ministry for
the abovementioned infrastructure in the district;
(b) Undertake the maintenance of the abovementioned infrastructure within the district and supervise the
maintenance of such local roads and other infrastructure receiving national government financial assistance as the Minister
may determine;
(c) Coordinate with other Ministries, agencies, institutions, and organizations, especially local government units
within the district in the planning and implementation of infrastructure projects;
(d) Provide technical assistance to other agencies at the local level on public works planning, design, construction,
maintenance, and other engineering matters including securing assistance from the Regional Office or, through the same
office, assistance from the Ministry proper or Bureaus;
(e) Conduct continuing consultations with the local communities, take appropriate measures to make the services
of the Ministry responsive to the needs of the general public, compile and submit such information to the Regional Office,
and recommend such appropriate actions may be necessary;
(f) Perform such other related duties and responsibilities as may be assigned or delegated by the Minister or as
may be required by law.
SEC. 5. Powers and Functions. The Ministry, in order to carry out its mandate shall have the following powers
and functions;
(d) Identify, plan, secure funding for program, design, construct or undertake prequalification, bidding, and award
of contracts of public works projects with the exception only of specialized projects undertaken by Government corporate
entities with established technical capability and as directed by the President of the Philippines or as provided by law;
[21]
Rollo, p. 47.
[22]
Id. at 43-45.
[23]
Id. at 27-48.
[24]
Id. at 44-45.
[25]
Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276, 293 (1998). Par. 2, Sec. 1, Article VIII of the 1987 CONST., provides:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[26]
Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128448, 1 February 2001, 351 SCRA 44, 53-54 citing Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA
88, 103 (1996); See also Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766, 19 August
1994, 235 SCRA 506, 518 [citing Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51, (1990);
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980); People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56 (1937)]; Mariano, Jr. vs. Comelec, 312 Phil. 259, 270
(1995); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. 44007, 20 March 1991, 195 SCRA 444, 452;
Fernandez v. Torres, G.R. No. 102940, 6 November 1992, 215 SCRA 489, 493; Macasiano v. National Housing Authority,
G.R. No. 107921, 1 July 1993, 224 SCRA 236, 242; Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 632, (2000),
Citations omitted.
[27]
338 Phil. 546, 574 (1997).
[28]
Supra note 25 at 294.

[29]
Microsoft Corporation v. Best Deal Computer Center Corporation, 438 Phil. 408, 414 (2002), citations omitted; J. L. Bernardo
Construction v. Court of Appeals, 381 Phil. 25, 36 (2000), Citation omitted; Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v.
Zamora, G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572, 138587, 138680, 138698, 10 October 2000, 342 SCRA 449, 494. See also Estate of
Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone, G.R. No. 137285, 16 January 2001, 349 SCRA 240, 252-253; Toh v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140274, 15 November 2000, 344 SCRA 831, 836-837 citing Solvic Industrial Corporation v.
NLRC, 296 SCRA 432, 441 (1998).
[30]
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 632-633 (2000), citations omitted.
[31]
Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572, 138587, 138680, 138698, 10 October 2000, 342
SCRA 449, 478, citing Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, (res.) G.R. No. 78716, 22 September
1987. See also Bugnay Const. and Dev. Corp. v. Laron, G.R. 79983, 10 August 1989, 176 SCRA 240, 251-252; Tatad v.
Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 114222, 6 April 1995, 243 SCRA 436, 474.
[32]
[33]
Memorandum for the Petitioners, Rollo pp. 44-45.
[34]
Separate Opinion of J. Panganiban in Sanlakas and Partido and Manggagawa v. Executive Secretary Angelo Reyes, Gen. Narciso
Abaya, Dir. Gen. Hermogenes Ebdane, G.R. No. 159085, 3 February 2004.
[35]
J. BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY 1103 (2003).
[36]
III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (III RECORD) 182-183; 11 August 1986.
[37]
Sec. 3, Art. XVII of R.A. 9054 provides:
Any amendment to or revision of this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a majority of the
vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90)
days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
[38]
Marawi City joined ARMM after voting affirmatively at the plebiscite for the ratification of R.A. 9054 on 14 August 2001.
[39]
Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, 11 December 1992 216 SCRA 505-506, Citations omitted.
[40]
Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, 11 December 1992 216 SCRA 505-506, citations omitted; See also Berces, Sr.
v. Guingona, Jr., 311 Phil. 614, 620 (1995); Republic v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 108208, 11 March 1994, 231 SCRA 211, 230;
Hon. Hagad v. Hon. Gozodadole, 321 Phil. 604, 613-614 (1995), citations omitted; Manzano v. Hon. Valera, 354 Phil. 66,
76 (1998), citations omitted.
[41]
Intia, Jr. v. COA, 366 Phil. 273, 291 (1999) citing Paat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111107, 10 January 1997, 266 SCRA 167.
[42]
[43]
Ibid.
[44]
S. Rood, Intergovernmental Relations in a Cordillera Autonomous Region, VOL. XXXIII No. 4 PHIL. J. PUB. ADM 379, 391 (1989).
[45]
[46]
S. Tanggol, Regional Autonomy and Social Development, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES: A BOOK OF
READINGS, VOL. II, CURRENT ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE 631, 651 (1998).
[47]
S. TANGGOL, MUSLIM AUTONOMY IN THE PHILIPPINES: RHETORIC AND REALITY 12 (1993).
[48]
III RECORD 570; 21 August 1986.
[49]
Supra note 36 at 170; SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF COMMISSIONER ALONTO.
[50]
Id. at 171-172.
[51]
S. TANGGOL, op. cit. supra note 47.
[52]
Id. at 13.
[53]
N. Roht-Arriaza, The Committee on the Regions and the Role of Regional Governments in the European Union, 20 Hastings Intl.
& Comp. L. Rev. 413, 417 (1997).
[54]
Sec. 15, Art. X, 1987 CONST.
See also III RECORD 235, 12 August 1986:
MR. NOLLEDO. As I already stated, these autonomous regions are established within the framework of our national
sovereignty. And in answer to the question of Commissioner Bengzon this morning that should there be rebels against the
government, whether this will prevent the President from sending armed forces to suppress the rebellion, I said, No, because
of the expression within the framework of national sovereignty. We are not granting sovereignty to the autonomous region.

That is why the term power of autonomous region was appropriately used because as an accepted principle in constitutional
law, sovereignty is indivisible. That is why we also maintain the provision in both Committee Report Nos. 21 and 25 that the
President of the Philippines has supervisory power over autonomous regions to see to it that laws are faithfully executed.
So, I find no inconsistency between the powers to be granted to autonomous regions and the sovereignty of the Republic
of the Philippines.
[55]
H. Rojas, Stop Cultural Exclusions (In Chile!): Reflections on the Principle of Multiculturalism, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 121, 149 (2003).
[56]
H. Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 Va. J. Intl. L. 1, 66 (1993).
[57]
A. Brillantes and J. Cuaresma, Jr., Local Governments, Local Autonomy and Decentralization 29 (1990).
[58]
H. Rojas, op. cit. supra note 55 at 140.
[59]
S. Tanggol, op. cit. supra note 46.
[60]
[61]
Id. at 536; 20 August 1986.
[62]
Ibid.
[63]
P. Tapales, The Nature and State of Local Government, in LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES: A BOOK OF
READINGS, VOL. I, LOCAL GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 5, 12-13 (1998).
[64]
F. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1, 19, 28 (2002).
[65]
R. Guzman, and M. Reforma, Decentralization Towards Democratization and the Development in the Asian Pacific Region,
in LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES: A BOOK OF READINGS, VOL. I, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ADMINISTRATION, 21, 24 (1998); A. Brillantes and J. Cuaresma, Jr., op. cit. supra note 57 at 28.
[66]
P. Tapales, op. cit. supra note 63; Id. at 23-24.
[67]
A. Brillantes and J. Cuaresma, Jr., op. cit. supra note 57.
[68]
R. Guzman, and M. Reforma, op. cit. supra note 65 at 23-24.
[69]
G.R. No. 80391, 28 February 1989, 170 SCRA 786, 794-795, citations omitted.
[70]
Ibid.
[71]
G.R. Nos. 79956 and 82217, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 495, 506.
[72]
Ibid; emphasis supplied.
[73]
Supra note 36 at 172; SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF BENNAGEN.
[74]
M. TAMANO, AUTONOMY: TO KEEP THIS NATION INTACT 131 (1986).
[75]
Sec. 16, Art. X, 1987 CONST.: The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed.
[76]
Fr. Bernas stressed this point:
FR. BERNAS. I think what we were saying is that when we speak of autonomy, we are speaking of autonomy not
just vis--vis the President but also vis--vis the Legislature. So that while we are curtailing the power of the President, we are
also curtailing the power of the Legislature. (III RECORD 515; 19 August 1986).
[77]
J. Bernas, op. cit. supra note 35 at 1100, citing III RECORD 514-516.
[78]
Id. at 1107.
[79]
G.R. Nos. 93252, 93746, 95245, 5 August 1991, 200 SCRA 271, 281.
[80]
[81]
S. Tanggol, op. cit. supra note 46 at 159.
[82]
Dated 20 August 1991.
[83]
G.R. Nos. 89651, 89965, 10 November 1989, 179 SCRA 287.
[84]
SEC. 3. Scope of Regional Assembly Legislative Power; Exceptions.- The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power in
the autonomous region for the benefit of the people and for the development of the region except on the following matters:

(c) Postal service;
(d) Coinage and fiscal and monetary policies;
(e) Administration of justice; It may, however, legislate on matters covered by the Shariah. The Shariah shall apply only to
Muslims. Its application shall be limited and permits to land, sea and air transportation plying routes in the provinces or cities
within the region, and communications facilities where frequencies are confined to and whose main offices are located within
the autonomous region.
(m) Patents, trademarks, trade names, and copyrights; and
(n) Foreign trade.

[85]
The Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 995, the source of R.A. 8999, was adopted as its sponsorship speech. It reads:
EXPLANATORY NOTE
This bill aims to establish an engineering district in the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur. It seeks to respond to the urgent
need to accelerate the completion of the infrastructural foundation that will bring about the timely fulfillment Lanao del Surs
economic and social objectives in consonance with the national goals.
Lanao del Sur teems with natural riches including a highly trainable human resource. But despite such abundance, the province is
immersed in destitution. There are concerted efforts to improve the plight of the inhabitants but these are being hampered
by an acute infrastructural deficiency. Projects are being earmarked for the province but the lack of an implementing
and monitoring body within the area hinders their speedy implementation. This snag can, however, be eradicated if
an engineering district is established in the province, particularly in the First District where the seat of the provincial
government is located.
With an engineering district in the vicinity, all the infrastructural programs envisioned for Lanao del Sur can be realized and once the
physical requirements for progress are effectively laid down, the province can then hasten its development.
Early approval of this bill is therefore earnestly sought. (Emphasis supplied)

[86]
Transcript of Session, 3 February 1999, pp. 108-110.
[87]
[88]
Sec. 18, Art. X, 1987 CONST.
[89]
Sec. 1, E.O. 426.
[90]
Bayan (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. 138570, 138572, 138587, 138680, 138698, 10 October 2000, 342
SCRA 483-484.
[91]
No. L-66614, 25 January 1988, 157 SCRA 282, 294, citations omitted.
[92]
David v. Comelec, 337 Phil. 535, 547 (1997), citation omitted.
[93]
Sec. 18, R.A. 9054.
[94]
SEC. 27. Place and Time of Meetings.- Committee and subcommittee meetings, conferences or hearings shall be held in the House
building or whenever necessary in any government office during periods of session or during recess. They may, however,
be held in any other place when so authorized by the Speaker.
Except the Committee on Rules, no committee may meet while the House is sitting in plenary session without special permission from
the Committee on Rules.
All standing committees and subcommittees shall meet at the hour and place provided by schedule, unless otherwise ordered by the
House.
Seven (7) calendar days before a regularly scheduled committee meeting, written notice thereof shall be given to all Members,
specifying therein the subject matter and the names of the resource persons invited to said meeting.
No bill, resolution or petition shall be set for hearing unless it has been officially referred to an appropriate committee or subcommittee,
provided that, no initial hearing on any bill, resolution or petition shall be conducted unless written notice thereof has been
issued to members of the concerned committee or subcommittee at least seven (7) calendar days before such hearing.
The committees and/or subcommittees shall, as far as practicable, schedule bills, resolutions or petitions of similar or related subject
matter for the same hearing.
[95]
Sec. 1, Art. VI, 1987 CONST.: The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 96754 June 22, 1995
CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN (Third District, South Cotobato) ADELBERT W.

ANTONINO (First District, South Cotobato), WILFREDO G. CAINGLET (Third District,
Zamboanga del Norte), HILARION RAMIRO, JR. (Second Division, Misamis Occidental),
ERNESTO S. AMATONG (Second District, Zamboanga del Norte), ALVIN G. DANS (Lone
District, Basilan), ABDULLAH M. DIMAPORO (Second District, Lanao del Norte), and
CONGRESSWOMAN MARIA CLARA A. LOBREGAT (Lone District, Zamboanga
City) petitioners,
vs.
HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS, Executive Secretary; COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SEC. FIDEL V.
RAMOS, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS X AND XII,
CHAIRMAN OF THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL FOR REGION X, CHAIRMAN
JESUS V. AYALA, CABINET OFFICERS FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR REGIONS XI
and XII, DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY SECRETARIAT, PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT STAFF, HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT;
and HON. ROSALINA S. CAJUCUM, OIC National Treasurer, respondents.
IMMANUEL JALDON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR M. ORBOS, HON. FIDEL RAMOS, HON. SECRETARY
LUIS SANTOS, AND HON. NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALINA CAJUCOM, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
These suits challenge the validity of a provision of the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (R.A. No. 6734), authorizing the President of the Philippines to "merge" by
administrative determination the regions remaining after the establishment of the Autonomous
Region, and the Executive Order issued by the President pursuant to such authority, "Providing for
the Reorganization of Administrative Regions in Mindanao." A temporary restraining order prayed for
by the petitioners was issued by this Court on January 29, 1991, enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the Executive Order and statute in question.
The facts are as follows:
Pursuant to Art. X, §18 of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6734, the Organic Act
for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, calling for a plebiscite to be held in the provinces of
Basilan, Cotobato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the
cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and
Zamboanga. In the ensuing plebiscite held on November 16, 1989, four provinces voted in favor of

creating an autonomous region. These are the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and
Tawi-Tawi. In accordance with the constitutional provision, these provinces became the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao.
On the other hand, with respect to provinces and cities not voting in favor of the Autonomous
Region, Art. XIX, § 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides,
That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscites shall be
included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities
which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall
remain in the existing administrative regions. Provided, however, that the President
may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
Pursuant to the authority granted by this provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on
October 12, 1990 Executive Order No. 429, "providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative
Regions in Mindanao." Under this Order, as amended by E.O. No. 439 —
(1) Misamis Occidental, at present part of Region X, will become part of Region IX.
(2) Oroquieta City, Tangub City and Ozamiz City, at present parts of Region X will
become parts of Region IX.
(3) South Cotobato, at present a part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(4) General Santos City, at present part of Region XI, will become part of Region XII.
(5) Lanao del Norte, at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
(6) Iligan City and Marawi City, at present part of Region XII, will become part of
Region IX.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 96754 are, or at least at the time of the filing of their petition, members of
Congress representing various legislative districts in South Cotobato, Zamboanga del Norte,
Basilan, Lanao del Norte and Zamboanga City. On November 12, 1990, they wrote then President
Aquino protesting E.O. No. 429. They contended that
There is no law which authorizes the President to pick certain provinces and cities
within the existing regions — some of which did not even take part in the plebiscite
as in the case of the province of Misamis Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta,
Tangub and Ozamiz — and restructure them to new administrative regions. On the
other hand, the law (Sec. 13, Art. XIX, R.A. 6734) is specific to the point, that is, that
"the provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions."
The transfer of the provinces of Misamis Occidental from Region X to Region IX;
Lanao del Norte from Region XII to Region IX, and South Cotobato from Region XI to
Region XII are alterations of the existing structures of governmental units, in other
words, reorganization. This can be gleaned from Executive Order No. 429, thus
Whereas, there is an urgent need to reorganize the administrative

regions in Mindanao to guarantee the effective delivery of field

services of government agencies taking into consideration the
formation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
With due respect to Her Excellency, we submit that while the authority necessarily
includes the authority to merge, the authority to merge does not include the authority
to reorganize. Therefore, the President's authority under RA 6734 to "merge existing
regions" cannot be construed to include the authority to reorganize them. To do so
will violate the rules of statutory construction.
The transfer of regional centers under Executive Order 429 is actually a restructuring
(reorganization) of administrative regions. While this reorganization, as in Executive
Order 429, does not affect the apportionment of congressional representatives, the
same is not valid under the penultimate paragraph of Sec. 13, Art. XIX of R.A. 6734
and Ordinance appended to the 1986 Constitution apportioning the seats of the
House of Representatives of Congress of the Philippines to the different legislative
districts in provinces and cities.1
As their protest went unheeded, while Inauguration Ceremonies of the New Administrative Region IX
were scheduled on January 26, 1991, petitioners brought this suit for certiorari and prohibition.
On the other hand, the petitioner in G.R. No. 96673, Immanuel Jaldon, is a resident of Zamboanga
City, who is suing in the capacity of taxpayer and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines.
Petitioners in both cases contend that Art. XIX, §13 of R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because (1)
it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by administrative
determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for the exercise of the power
delegated and (2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
In addition, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673 challenges the validity of E.O. No. 429 on the ground that
the power granted by Art. XIX, §13 to the President is only to "merge regions IX and XII" but not to
reorganize the entire administrative regions in Mindanao and certainly not to transfer the regional
center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
The Solicitor General defends the reorganization of regions in Mindanao by E.O. No. 429 as merely
the exercise of a power "traditionally lodged in the President," as held in Abbas v. Comelec,2 and as
a mere incident of his power of general supervision over local governments and control of executive
departments, bureaus and offices under Art. X, §16 and Art. VII, §17, respectively, of the
Constitution.
He contends that there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only a grant of the power to
"fill up" or provide the details of legislation because Congress did not have the facility to provide for
them. He cites by analogy the case of Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan,3 in
which the power of the Governor-General to fix municipal boundaries was sustained on the ground
that —
[such power] is simply a transference of certain details with respect to provinces,

municipalities, and townships, many of them newly created, and all of them subject to
a more or less rapid change both in development and centers of population, the
proper regulation of which might require not only prompt action but action of such a
detailed character as not to permit the legislative body, as such, to take it efficiently.

The Solicitor General justifies the grant to the President of the power "to merge the existing regions"
as something fairly embraced in the title of R.A. No. 6734, to wit, "An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," because it is germane to it.
He argues that the power is not limited to the merger of those regions in which the provinces and
cities which took part in the plebiscite are located but that it extends to all regions in Mindanao as
necessitated by the establishment of the autonomous region.
Finally, he invokes P.D. No. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772 which provides:
1. The President of the Philippines shall have the continuing authority to reorganize
the National Government. In exercising this authority, the President shall be guided
by generally acceptable principles of good government and responsive national
government, including but not limited to the following guidelines for a more efficient,
effective, economical and development-oriented governmental framework:
(a) More effective planning implementation, and review functions;
(b) Greater decentralization and responsiveness in decision-making

process;
(c) Further minimization, if not, elimination, of duplication or

overlapping of purposes, functions, activities, and programs;
(d) Further development of as standardized as possible ministerial,

sub-ministerial and corporate organizational structures;
(e) Further development of the regionalization process; and
(f) Further rationalization of the functions of and administrative

relationships among government entities.
For purposes of this Decree, the coverage of the continuing authority

of the President to reorganize shall be interpreted to encompass all
agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units of the National
Government, including all government owned or controlled
corporations as well as the entire range of the powers, functions,
authorities, administrative relationships, acid related aspects
pertaining to these agencies, entities, instrumentalities, and units.
2. [T]he President may, at his discretion, take the following actions:
xxx xxx xxx
f. Create, abolish, group, consolidate, merge, or integrate entities,

agencies, instrumentalities, and units of the National Government, as
well as expand, amend, change, or otherwise modify their powers,
functions and authorities, including, with respect to government-
owned or controlled corporations, their corporate life, capitalization,
and other relevant aspects of their charters.

g. Take such other related actions as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes and objectives of this Decree.
Considering the arguments of the parties, the issues are:
(1) whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative in character, as petitioners
contend, or whether it is executive in character, as respondents claim it is, and, in any event,
whether Art. XIX, §13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President's discretion;
(2) whether the power given is fairly expressed in the title of the statute; and
(3) whether the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities
in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not
vote in favor of it; and
(4) whether the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of
Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City.
It will be useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their
creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was passed "authorizing the President of the
Philippines, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different executive
departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government, including banking
or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it." The purpose was to promote
"simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government."4 The Commission on Reorganization created
under the law was required to submit an integrated reorganization plan not later than December 31,
1969 to the President who was in turn required to submit the plan to Congress within forty days after
the opening of its next regular session. The law provided that any reorganization plan submitted
would become effective only upon the approval of Congress.5
Accordingly, the Reorganization Commission prepared an Integrated Reorganization Plan which

divided the country into eleven administrative regions. 6 By P.D. No. 1, the Plan was approved and
made part of the law of the land on September 24, 1972. P.D. No. 1 was twice amended in 1975,
first by P.D. No. 742 which "restructur[ed] the regional organization of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and
Tawi-Tawi" and later by P.D. No. 773 which further "restructur[ed] the regional organization of
Mindanao and divid[ed] Region IX into two sub-regions." In 1978, P.D. No. 1555 transferred the
regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City.
Thus the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the
President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power "to
merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the
President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to
facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires should have regional offices. As this Court observed in Abbas,
"while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it
is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the
power of general supervision over local governments [seeArt. X, §4 of the Constitution]." The regions
themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes."7 The
power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries8 which has
been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General9 or as "administrative in nature."

There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President
the power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has provided a
sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and
whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in the title of the
law.
First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be
gathered or implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in
other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. 11
With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the
same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the
Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to
enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic
development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business."12 Indeed, as the
original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this policy, it is logical to
suppose that in authorizing the President to "merge [by administrative determination] the existing
regions" in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the provinces now constituting the
Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute the original basis for the
organization of administrative regions.
Nor is Art. XIX, §13 susceptible to charge that its subject is not embraced in the title of R.A. No.
6734. The constitutional requirement that "every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof" 13 has always been given a practical rather than
a technical construction. The title is not required to be an index of the content of the bill. It is a
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement if the title expresses the general subject and
all provisions of the statute are germane to that subject. 14 Certainly the reorganization of the
remaining administrative regions is germane to the general subject of R.A. No. 6734, which is the
establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
Finally, it is contended that the power granted to the President is limited to the reorganization of
administrative regions in which some of the provinces and cities which voted in favor of regional
autonomy are found, because Art. XIX, §13 provides that those which did not vote for autonomy
"shall remain in the existing administrative regions." More specifically, petitioner in G.R. No. 96673
claims:
The questioned Executive Order No. 429 distorted and, in fact, contravened the clear
intent of this provision by moving out or transferring certain political subdivisions
(provinces/cities) out of their legally designated regions. Aggravating this
unacceptable or untenable situation is EO No. 429's effecting certain movements on
areas which did not even participate in the November 19, 1989 plebiscite. The
unauthorized action of the President, as effected by and under the questioned EO
No. 429, is shown by the following dispositions: (1) Misamis Occidental, formerly of
Region X and which did not even participate in the plebiscite, was moved from said
Region X to Region IX; (2) the cities of Ozamis, Oroquieta, and Tangub, all formerly
belonging to Region X, which likewise did not participate in the said plebiscite, were
transferred to Region IX; (3) South Cotobato, from Region XI to Region XII; (4)
General Santos City: from Region XI to Region XII; (5) Lanao del Norte, from Region
XII to Region IX; and (6) the cities of Marawi and Iligan from Region XII to Region IX.
All of the said provinces and cities voted "NO", and thereby rejected their entry into
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as provided under RA No. 6734. 15

The contention has no merit. While Art. XIX, §13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do
not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions,"
this provision is subject to the qualification that "the President may by administrative determination
merge the existing regions." This means that while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain
in the regions as designated upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless
be regrouped with contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may
require.
The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the
lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of
local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services.
There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus
be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will
become part of Region IX.
The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division or
merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people residing in
those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that administrative
regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political
representation.
Petitioners nonetheless insist that only those regions, in which the provinces and cities which voted
for inclusion in the Autonomous Region are located, can be "merged" by the President.
To be fundamental reason Art. XIX, §13 is not so limited. But the more fundamental reason is that
the President's power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration. It is
noteworthy that the petitioners do not claim that the reorganization of the regions in E.O. No. 429 is
irrational. The fact is that, as they themselves admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in
E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (2)
transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and
population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic
development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.
What has been said above applies to the change of the regional center from Zamboanga City to
Pagadian City. Petitioners contend that the determination of provincial capitals has always been by
act of Congress. But as, this Court said in Abbas, 16 administrative regions are mere "groupings of
contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, . . . [They] are not territorial and political
subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays." There is, therefore, no basis for
contending that only Congress can change or determine regional centers. To the contrary, the
examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize administrative
regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center.
It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City
may entail the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of buildings and other
infrastructure to house regional offices. That contention is addressed to the wisdom of the transfer
rather than to its legality and it is settled that courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or expediency
of legislation. In any event this is a question that we will consider only if fully briefed and upon a
more adequate record than that presented by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 23-24, Petition (G.R. No. 96754).
2 179 SCRA 287 (1989).
3 36 Phil. 549 (1917).
4 R.A. No. 5435, § 1.
5 §4.
6 INTEGRATED REORGANIZATION PLAN, Ch. II, Art. I, §1.
7 Supra note 2 at 300-01. Abbas in fact sustained the constitutionality of Art. XIX,
§13 of R.A, No. 6734 against claims that it contravened Art. X, §10 of the
Constitution which requires approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite of the
merger of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
8 Act No. 1748.
9 122 Phil. 965, 973-4 (1965). See also Government of the Philippine Islands v.
Municipality of Binangonan, 34 Phil. 518 (1916); Municipality of Cardona v.
Municipality of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 (1917).
10 Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970).
11 See Rabor v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 111812, May 31,1995.
12 R.A. No. 5435, §1.
13 Art. VI, §26(1).
14 Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288 (1941); Association of Small Landowners in

the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 365 (1992).
15 Petitioner's Memorandum, G.R. No. 96673, pp. 5-6.
16 Supra note 2 at 300.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 49065 June 1, 1994
EVELIO B. JAVIER, RIZAL G. PAGTANAC, JOVITO C. PLAMERAS, JR., SILVESTRE E.

UNTARAN, JR. and ALFONSO V. COMBONG, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MAXIMIANO SENTINA, JUANITO BULAC, FRED PALLON,
AMADO YANGSON, ANGEL MARTINEZ, DIONISIO NOMBREHERMOSO, MANUEL RIVERO,
JR., FEDERICO RUIZ, JR., MELQUIADES GALIDO, AGUSTIN ALMOROS, GENEROSO
BARSUBIA, FELOMINO CABREJAS, FORTUNATO CADIAO, FERNANDO CONDES,
MARCELINO DE LA CRUZ, PELAGIO JUADA, FRANCISCO JUBILAN, RODOLFO SIASOL, EPE
MACABANTI, ERNESTO GRASPARIL, EUSTAQUIO MENA, DIONISIO JAVIER, PETRONILO
BERGANTINOS, FRANCISCO ABANTO, FELIMON ABLE, CORAZON HABLADO, JOSE ADUG,
SILVESTRE ELLO, ESTEBAN MANINGO, ELEUTERIO PLAMERAS, FELIPE DE LOS REYES,
GONZALO VELASCO, TEODULFO NARANJO, ALFREDO BACAWAG, JOSE CEPE, ENRIQUE
JOSILVA, PEDRO QUANICO, PELAGIO ESPARAR, CRISANTO GELLA, RODULFO GUMANAO
and CRISANTO MEJUGE, respondents, ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, intervenor.
Silvestre E. Untaran for himself and for petitioners.
Alfonso V. Combong, Jr. for petitioners.
Florentini M. Pesayco for private respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The issues raised in this petition for review on certiorari revolve around the validity of Resolution No.
206 of the Provincial Board of Antique abolishing the Office of the Provincial Engineer.
On 19 April 1974, Provincial Engineer Maximiano Sentina and forty (40) officials and employees of
the Office of the Provincial Engineer filed a petition for mandamus and damages against the entire
Provincial Board of Antique. The petition was anchored on the hypothesis that the abolition of the
Office of the Provincial Engineer was a circumvention of the constitutional mandate on security of
tenure and intended only to weed out provincial officials and employees who opposed the Provincial
Board’s candidacy in the 08th November 1971 elections.
Respondents, denying petitioners’ ascriptions, insisted that the abolition of the Office of the
Provincial Engineer was motivated instead by a provision of Presidential Decree No. 17, which
lowered the internal revenue allotment to the road and bridge fund of the province from 50% to
17.5% thereby leaving an inadequate allotment for materials, salaries and operating expenses of the
Office of the Provincial Engineer. Respondents averred that the power of the provincial board to
create an office carried with it the power to abolish it; that administrative remedies had not been

exhausted by petitioners; and that mandamus was an improper remedy inasmuch as the power to
appropriate funds for the Office was not ministerial but within the sound judgment of respondents.
In due course, the lower court 1 rendered a decision. Finding for respondents, the court held that the
"drastic decrease in the amount available for appropriation" was the principal consideration that
impelled the Provincial Board to abolish the Office. The court a quo also took note of the resolutions
of several municipal councils in Antique calling the attention of the Provincial Board to the neglect in
the maintenance of provincial roads. The lower court decreed:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds and so holds that Resolution No. 206,
Series of 1973, was validly enacted by the herein respondents, composing the
Provincial Board of Antique, and consequently dismisses the herein petition.
Likewise, the counterclaim is dismissed. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for the reconsideration of the decision of the lower court having been denied, petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 15 February 1977, the appellate court, reversing the court a quo, held that "the passage of
Resolution No. 206 was prompted in the main by reasons other than those stated therein," and that
the evidence on record "adequately justifie(d) the charge that personal and political animosities on
the part of petitioner Sentina, on (the) one hand, and respondents, on the other, (had) caused the
respondent Provincial Board to enact said resolution." 2 The appellate court rendered
judgment, 3 thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside. In lieu
thereof, another one is rendered (a) declaring Resolution No. 206, Series of 1973 of
the Provincial Board of Antique, to be null and void; (b) granting the writ
of mandamus, and ordering the respondents, or their successors as members of the
Provincial Board of Antique, to reinstate the petitioners to the positions they held in
the Office of the Provincial Engineer as of June 30, 1973; and to appropriate the
necessary amounts for the maintenance of said office and the payment of the back
salaries of the petitioners from July 1, 1973 until the date of their reinstatement,
minus the sums any of the petitioners may have received from other employments in
the meantime; (c) ordering the respondents, jointly and severally, to pay each of the
petitioners the amount of P3,000.00, P2,000.00 and P500.00 for moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, respectively; (d) ordering the lower court to
conduct further proceedings to determine the amount allowable as back salaries to
each of the petitioners in accordance with the guidelines stated above; and (e)
ordering the respondents-appellees to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
On 14 September 1978, the Court of Appeals denied, for lack of merit, the motion for
reconsideration.
The Provincial Board thereupon instituted the instant petition for review on certiorari.
On 18 August 1982, during the pendency of this appeal, Enrique A. Zaldivar, then incumbent
governor of Antique, filed a motion for leave to intervene, 4 which the Court granted. 5 Governor
Zaldivar contended, in his memorandum in intervention, that should the displaced officials and

employees of the Office be reinstated and paid their back salaries from 01 July 1973, it would be to
the great sacrifice of Antique’s development programs. 6
Critical in the instant petition are two basic questions: whether or not the provincial board had the
authority under the then existing laws to enact the questioned resolution, and, in the affirmative,
whether or not that authority was legitimately exercised.
Private respondents claim that the abolition of the Office of the Provincial Engineer is not only
constitutionally infirm but also violative of General Order No. 3 issued shortly after the proclamation
of martial law in 1972. Private respondents explain that Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973
Constitution —
Sec. 9. All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic of the
Philippines shall continue in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the
incumbent President of the Philippines, but all officials whose appointments are by
this Constitution vested in the Prime Minister shall vacate their respective offices
upon the appointment and qualification of their successors. —
has been so framed as to allow the policy and purpose behind General Order No. 3 to continue, i.e.,
to consolidate in the hands of the President, the power to appoint, dismiss and control all officials of
the government, both national and local, in line with the nature and spirit of martial
law. 7 Respondents quote a portion of the Journal of the Constitutional Convention during its 287th
plenary session of 25 November 1972, where their counsel, Arturo Pacificador, a constitutional
convention delegate, stated on the floor during the discussions on Section 9, Article XVII, of the
1973 Constitution, that ". . . the local government unit who may believe that an office they (have)
created is no longer necessary may petition the President to issue a decree abolishing the same, but
it will be beyond their power to abolish by themselves said office in view of the clear mandate of the
provision of the Constitution." 8
Undoubtedly, Section 9, Article XVII, of the 1973 Constitution did convey an authority to carry out a
valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the Government, 9 recalling to mind General Order
No. 3 issued on 22 September 1972, but this general provision could not have meant or envisioned
an absolute proscription on local governments, if and when minded, from themselves creating or
abolishing positions, an authority that they theretofore had under the then existing laws. One such
law was Section 18 of Republic Act No. 5185 (Local Autonomy Act), then still in force, which
empowered provincial governments to create, among other positions, the office of a provincial
engineer. While the law did not expressly vest on provincial governments the power to abolish that
office, absent, however, any contrary provision, that authority should be deemed embraced by
implication from the power to create it. Section 23 of the Act, in fact, expressed that an "implied
power of a province . . . (should) be liberally construed in its favor" and "(a)ny fair and reasonable
doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of local government and it
(should) be presumed to exist."
We must rule then that the power of the province of Antique to abolish the office in question did exist
at the time.
The real debatable issue focuses on the real reasons behind the questioned action of the provincial
board. An abolition of office is not per se objectionable but this rule carries a caveat that the act is
done in good faith.
We have scrutinized closely the records, most especially in this case, in view of the disagreement
between the trial court and the appellate court on their factual findings; the result of our examination

is that there, indeed, appears to be evidence to support their own respective findings. On the one
hand, valid reasons have been shown that tend to substantiate the need at the time for the abolition
of the office in question by the Provincial Board. Upon the other hand, it cannot be discounted that
personal and political motives did contribute in no small measure in that final decision of the board.
In sum, we see a situation where the abolition of the office could have well been justified except for
the convexity of circumstances attendant to the decision process that clearly appear to have greatly
influenced the final action taken by the board. We are not prepared, however, to conclude a clear
case of bad faith on the part of respondents.
Given the peculiar factual settings heretofore expressed, we would have, under ordinary
circumstances, simply issued an order of reinstatement. The Court cannot, however, close its eyes
to the multifarious and significant events that have since taken place on, among other things, the
national and local government structures, as well as their offices and incumbents; the law itself, both
constitutional and statutory; as well as the personal and other circumstances of concerned parties,
including no less than petitioners and private respondents themselves. It is our considered view that
in lieu of an order for reinstatement of private respondents, an award for backwages, equivalent to
five (5) years without qualification or deduction, should be paid to said respondents.
The above holding is not without precedent. The Court had an opportunity to adjudicate similarly
in Rubio, et al., vs. People’s Homesite & Housing Corporation, et al. 10 There, the petitioners, who
were issued original and permanent appointments by the PHHC in the Multi-Storey Tenement
Projects, occupying regular and permanent positions, were improperly separated from service in
1966 due to an alleged abolition of positions. In awarding back salaries, in lieu of reinstatement, this
Court, speaking through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, said:
The Court therefore also declares that the Trial Court was correct in directing
reinstatement of the petitioners-employees to their former positions, and the payment
to them of back salaries and other benefits they would otherwise have earned.
This is however no longer an easy matter. In the first place, it is doubtful if

reinstatement as a remedy would be feasible in view of the fact that more than
twenty-three (23) years have already elapsed since the petitioners-employees’
positions were abolished. Many of them will have found employment elsewhere.
Some may have passed away. Many others will have reached retirement age or will
no longer be employable on account of age or inadequacy of qualifications, by this
time. In the second place, as the PHHC and the other respondents allege, it would
be unfair to "permit a dismissed laborer to earn back wages for all time, or for a very
long period of time," without allowing the employer to prove the salaries the laborer
had earned during the period of his separation, or what efforts he had exerted to find
gainful employment; . . .
In Antiporda vs. Ticao (160 SCRA 4C), the Court, citing previous cases, held that since the
reinstatement of an employee unjustly terminated was no longer feasible, the latter should instead
be awarded "backwages equivalent to five (5) years without qualification or deduction."
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, JUDGMENT is
hereby rendered ORDERING petitioners, or their incumbent successors in the Provincial
Government of Antique, to cause to be paid to private respondents back salaries, computed as of
the date of their removal, equivalent to five (5) years without qualification or deduction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
#Footnotes
1 Presided by Judge Celso L. Magsino.
2 Rollo, p. 94.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez and concurred in by Associate

Justices Delfin Fl. Batacan and Jose B. Jimenez.
4 Rollo, p. 433.
5 Resolution of September 29, 1982; Rollo, p. 437.
6 Rollo, p. 442.
7 Private Respondents’ Comment on the Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 258.
8 Rollo, pp. 262-263. The existence of this portion of the Journal of the Constitutional
Convention was belied by petitioners’ counsel, former Associate Justice of this Court,
Calixto O. Zaldivar, who appended to petitioners’ reply brief, the letter of 1971
Constitutional Convention President Diosdado Macapagal stating that the 287th
plenary session of the Convention was held on November 26, 1972, not on
November 25, 1972, that the purported interpellation or speech of Arturo Pacificador
during said plenary session did not occur at all and that there were indeed reports
about fabricated speeches inserted in the Constitutional Convention Journal (Rollo,
p. 343).
9 National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration v. Civil Service

Commission, 221 SCRA 145.
10 185 SCRA 656, 22 May 1990.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 118702 March 16, 1995
CIRILO ROY G. MONTEJO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
SERGIO A.F. APOSTOL, intervenor.
PUNO, J.:
More than political fortunes are at stake in the case at bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736
of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the
principle of equality of representation. To remedy the alleged inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer
the municipality of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the province. Intervenor Sergio
A.F. Apostol, representing the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion of Tolosa in his
district. We gave due course to the petition considering that, at bottom, it involves the validity of the
unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative
districts.1
The first district2 covers Tacloban City and the municipalities of Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo, San
Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.
The second district3 is composed of the municipalities of Barugo, Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara,
Dagami, Dulag, Jaro, Julita, La Pat, Mayorga, MacArthur, Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Tunga.
The third district4 is composed of the municipalities of Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango, and Villaba.
The fourth district5 is composed of Ormoc City and the municipalities of Albuera, Isabel, Kananga,
Matagob, Merida, and Palompon.
The fifth district6 is composed of the municipalities of Abuyog, Bate, Baybay, Hilongos, Hindang,
Inopacan, Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom.
Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made its sub-province by virtue of Republic Act No.
2141 Section 1 of the law spelled out enacted on April 8, 1959.7

Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities comprising the sub-province, viz.: "Almeria, Biliran,
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised
therein."
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the sub-
province of Biliran became a regular province. It provides:
Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into regular provinces

upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held
in the sub-provinces and the original provinces directly affected. The
plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously with
the national elections following the effectivity of this code. The new
legislative districts created as a result of such conversion shall
continue to be represented in Congress by the duly-elected
representatives of the original districts out of which said new
provinces or districts were created until their own representatives
shall have been elected in the next regular congressional elections
and qualified.
The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. As a consequence of the conversion, eight (8) municipalities of the
Third District composed the new province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A further consequence was to reduce the Third District to
five (5) municipalities with a total population of 145,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the
province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation meetings with the incumbent
representatives of the province and other interested parties. On December 29, 1994, it promulgated
Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the Second
District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte. The
composition of the First District which includes the municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the
Fifth District were not disturbed. After the movement of municipalities, the composition of the five (5)
legislative districts appeared as follows:
First District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Tacloban City, 137,190 81,679

2. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543
3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,929
4. Palo, 38,100 20,816
5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167
6. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497
7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,357
8. Tolosa; 13,299 7,700
———— ————
TOTAL 303,349 178,688
Second District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)

1. Barugo, 23,817 13,237
2. Barauen, 46,029 23,307
3. Carigara 38,863 22,036
4. Dagami, 25,606 16,519
5. Dulag, 33,020 19,375
6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139
7. Julita, 9,944 6,196
8. La Paz, 14,311 9,003
9. Mayorga, 10,530 5,868
10. Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,628
11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348
12. Tabontabon, and 7,183 4,419
13. Tunga; 5,413 3,387
———— ————
TOTAL 272,167 156,462
Third District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649

2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415
3. San Isidro, 24,442 14,916
4. Tabango, 29,743 15,48
5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227
6. Capoocan, and 23,687 13,595
7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474
———— ————
TOTAL 214,499 125,763
Fourth District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,140

2. Albuera, 32,395 17,493
3. Isabel, 33,389 21,889
4. Kananga, 36,288 19,873
5. Matagob, 15,474 9,407
6. Merida, and 22,345 12,474
———— ————
TOTAL 269,347 155,995
Fifth District: Population Registered

Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,682

2. Bato, 28,197 116,13
3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923
4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871
5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659

6. Inopacan, 16,894 10,401
7. Javier, 18,658 11,713
8. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,616
9. Matalom 28,291 16,247
———— ————
TOTAL 309,148 181,242
Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for reconsideration calling the attention of respondent COMELEC,
among others, to the inequitable distribution of inhabitants and voters between the First and Second
Districts. He alleged that the First District has 178,688 registered voters while the Second District
has 156,462 registered voters or a difference of 22,226 registered voters. To diminish the difference,
he proposed that the municipality of Tolosa with 7,7000 registered voters be transferred from the
First to the Second District. The motion was opposed by intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol.
Respondent Commission denied the motion ruling that: (1) its adjustment of municipalities involved
the least disruption of the territorial composition of each district; and (2) said adjustment complied
with the constitutional requirement that each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of
equality of representation ordained in the Constitution. Citing Wesberry v. Sanders,8 he argues that
respondent COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as much as practicable one man's
vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." The Solicitor General, in his
Comment, concurred with the views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however, opposed the petition
on two (2) grounds: (1) COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736; and (2)
assuming it has jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the Constitution. Respondent
COMELEC filed its own Comment alleging that it acted within the parameters of the Constitution.
We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
While the petition at bench presents a significant issue, our first inquiry will relate to the constitutional
power of the respondent COMELEC9 to transfer municipalities from one legislative district to another
legislative district in the province of Leyte. The basic powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer
and administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in black and white in section 2(c), Article IX of
the Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC does not invoke this provision but relies on the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is
traditionally regarded as part of the power to make laws. The Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the
Seats of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines to the Different Legislative
Districts in Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila Area." Its substantive sections state:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of

the First Congress of the Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the 1986
Constitutional Commission and subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided
by law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor

adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population
may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in

the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of
Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and
according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is
geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on
Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days
before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
The Ordinance was made necessary because Proclamation No. 3 10 of President Corazon C. Aquino,
ordaining the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, abolished the Batasang
Pambansa. 11 She then exercised legislative powers under the Provisional Constitution.12
The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., 13 now a
distinguished member of this Court. The records reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to
resolve several prejudicial issues before authorizing the first congressional elections under the 1987
Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether the members of the House of Representatives
would be elected by district or by province; who shall undertake the apportionment of the legislative
districts; and, how the apportionment should be made.14Commissioner Davide, Jr. offered three (3)
options for the Commission to consider: (1) allow President Aquino to do the apportionment by law;
(2) empower the COMELEC to make the apportionment; or (3) let the Commission exercise the
power by way of an Ordinance appended to the Constitution. 15 The different dimensions of the
options were discussed by Commissioners Davide, Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F. Ople. We quote
the debates in extenso, viz.:16
xxx xxx xxx
MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very simple motion by way of amendment by
substitution and this was, I believe, a prior or a proposed amendment. Also, the
chairman of the Committee on the Legislative said that he was proposing a vote first
by the Chamber on the concept of whether the election is by province and cities on
the one hand, or by legislative districts on the other. So I propose this simple
formulation which reads: "FOR THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION THE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS SHALL BE APPORTIONED BY
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS." I hope the chairman will accept the proposed
amendment.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or less, the same insofar as the apportionment is
concerned, but the Bernas-Sarmiento et al. proposal would also provide for a
mandate for the apportionment later, meaning after the first election, which will in
effect embody what the Commission had approved, reading as follows: "Within three
years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section."

So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request for a suspension of the session, so that all
the proponents can work together.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is suspended.
It was 3:33 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is resumed.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a compromise, I wonder if the Commission

will allow this. We will just delete the proposed subparagraph (4) and all the
capitalized words in paragraph (5). So that in paragraph (5), what would be left would
only be the following: "Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section."
But we shall have an ordinance appended to the new Constitution indicating

specifically the following: "FOR PURPOSES OF THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1986 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION
AND SUBSEQUENT ELECTIONS AND UNTIL OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY LAW,
THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ELECTED
FROM LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG THE PROVINCES,
CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA AS FOLLOWS."
And what will follow will be the allocation of seats to Metropolitan Manila Area, to the
provinces and to the cities, without indicating the municipalities comprising each of
the districts. Then, under Section 2, we will mandate the COMELEC to make the
actual apportionment on the basis of the number of seats provided for and allocated
to each province by us.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the provision which will give mandate to COMELEC
to do the redistricting. Redistricting is vitally linked to the baneful practices of cutting
up areas or spheres of influence; in other words, gerrymandering. This Commission,
being a nonpartisan, a nonpolitical deliberative body, is in the best possible situation
under the circumstances to undertake that responsibility. We are not wanting in
expertise and in time because in the first place, the Committee on the Legislative has
prepared the report on the basis of the recommendation of the COMELEC.
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Ople is recognized.
MR. OPLE. I would like to support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino in this
respect. We know that the reapportionment of provinces and cities for the purpose of
redistricting is generally inherent in the constituent power or in the legislative power.
And I would feel very uncertain about delegating this to a quasi-judicial body even if it
is one of the constitutional offices created under this Constitution. We have the
assurance of Commissioner Davide, as chairman of the Committee on the
Legislative, that even given the very short time remaining in the life of this
Commission, there is no reason why we cannot complete the work of
reapportionment on the basis of the COMELEC plan which the committee has
already thoroughly studied and which remains available to the Constitutional
Commission.
So, I support the position taken by Commissioner Aquino, Mr. Presiding Officer. I
think, it is the safest, the most reasonable, and the most workable approach that is
available to this Commission.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Davide say:
MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether this body will make the apportionment itself
or whether we will leave it to the COMELEC. So, there arises, therefore, a prejudicial
question for the body to decide. I would propose that the Commission should now
decide what body should make the apportionment. Should it be the Commission or
should it be the COMELEC? And the Committee on the Legislative will act
accordingly on the basis of the decision.
MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Bengzon is recognized.
MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I would like to inform the body that I believe the
Committee on the Legislative has precisely worked on this matter and they are ready
with a list of apportionment. They have, in fact, apportioned the whole country into
various districts based on the recommendation of the COMELEC. So they are ready
with the list and if this body would wish to apportion the whole country by district
itself, then I believe we have the time to do it because the Committee on the
Legislative is ready with that particular report which need only to be appended to the
Constitution. So if this body is ready to accept the work of the Committee on the
Legislative we would have no problem. I just would like to give that information so
that the people here would be guided accordingly when they vote.
MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask Commissioner Davide some questions.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide may yield if he so

desires.

MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.
MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment which we are considering apply only to the
first election after the enactment of the Constitution?
MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the Padilla proposal, it will be for the first election; on
the basis of the Sarmiento proposal, it will only apply to the first election.
MR. RODRIGO. And after that, Congress will have the power to reapportion.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to the Constitution — the reapportionment

based on the COMELEC study and between the approval of the Constitution and the
first election — the COMELEC no longer has the power to change that even a bit.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. May I address a clarificatory question to Commissioner Davide?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Gentleman will please proceed.
MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the Commissioner's proposed apportionment and

considering the fact that there will be a corresponding reduction to 183 seats, would
there be instances representation of under non-representation?
MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding Officer. I can assure the Commission that
there will be no case of inequitable distribution. It will come out to be one for every
350 to 400,000 inhabitants.
MR. REGALADO. And that would be within the standard that we refer.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. REGALADO. Thank you.
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation is that there was a motion by Commissioner
Sarmiento to mandate COMELEC to do the redistricting. This was also almost the
same motion by Commissioner Padilla and I think we have had some kind of meeting
of minds. On the other hand, there seems to be a prejudicial question, an
amendment to the amendment as suggested by Commissioner Aquino, that instead
of the COMELEC, it should be this Commission that shall make the redistricting. So
may I ask Commissioner Aquino, if she insists on that idea, to please formulate it into
a motion so we can vote on that first as an amendment to the amendment.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS . AQUINO. The motion is for this Commission to undertake the apportionment of

the legislative districts instead of the proposal that COMELEC be given the mandate
to undertake the responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified, Mr. Presiding Officer. Is it the motion or the
proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The proposed amendment.
MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the approval of this proposed amendment
which we substitute for paragraphs 4 and 5.
MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it should be treated merely as a motion to be

followed by a deletion of paragraph 4 because that should not really appear as a
paragraph in Section 5; otherwise, it will appear very ugly in the Constitution where
we mandate a Commission that will become functus officio to have the authority. As
a matter of fact, we cannot exercise that authority until after the ratification of the new
Constitution.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does Commissioner Sarmiento say?
MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer. So, may I move for the
approval of this proposed amendment.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-thirds vote or a simple plurality to adopt that
motion?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). That will require a two-thirds vote.
MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the motion, Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) The Gentleman may proceed.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this Commission do the reapportionment

legislative districts.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What is the pleasure of Commissioner

Aquino?

MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again on the motion. Is Commissioner Sarmiento,
therefore, adopting my motion? Would it not be right for him to move that the
COMELEC be mandated?
MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the amendment. It is already the Commission

that will be mandated.
MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentlemen has accepted the amendment the amendment.
Thank you.
MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this Commission do the reapportionment.
VOTING
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Let us proceed to vote.
As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their
hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 30 votes in favor and none against; the motion is approved.
Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission denied to the COMELEC the major power of legislative
apportionment as it itself exercised the power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered the
COMELEC "to make minoradjustments of the reapportionment herein made." The meaning of the
phrase "minor adjustments was again clarified in the debates 17 of the Commission, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. This is just clarificatory, Mr. Presiding Officer. In Section 2, the
Commission on Elections is empowered to make minor adjustments on the
apportionment made here.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any time limit for this.
MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit unless during the period of amendments
a proposal is made. The authority conferred would be on minor corrections or
amendments, meaning to say, for instance, that we may have forgotten an
intervening municipality in the enumeration, which ought to be included in one
district. That we shall consider a minor amendment.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner de Castro is recognized.

MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
I was about to ask the committee the meaning of minor adjustment. Can it be
possible that one municipality in a district be transferred to another district and call it
a minor adjustment?
MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding Officer. Minor, meaning, that there
should be no change in the allocations per district. However, it may happen that we
have forgotten a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned
district, or there may be an error in the correct name of a particular
municipality because of changes made by the interim Batasang Pambansa and the
Regular Batasang Pambansa. There were many batas pambansa enacted by both
the interim and the Regular Batasang Pambansa changing the names of
municipalities.
MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be made only if one of the
municipalities is not mentioned in the ordinance appended to, and it will be up for the
COMELEC now to adjust or to put such municipality to a certain district.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance, we may not have the data
regarding a division of a municipality by the interim Batasang Pambansa or the
Regular Batasang Pambansa into two municipalities, meaning, a mother municipality
and the new municipality, but still actually these are within the geographical district
area.
MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the COMELEC cannot do is that,
if, for example, my municipality is in the First District of Laguna, they cannot put that
in any other district.
MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is a substantive one.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
Consistent with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance did not
also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative
district to another district. The power granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is
to adjust the number of members (not municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of which such
new province was created. . . ."
Prescinding from these premises, we hold that respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736
transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of
the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
It may well be that the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a regular province brought about
an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5) legislative districts of the
province of Leyte. This imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a citizen's vote in
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not proper at this
time for petitioner to raise this issue using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue involves
a problem of reapportionment of legislative districts and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress.
Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution categorically gives Congress the power to reapportion,
thus: "Within three (3) years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a

reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section." In Macias
v. COMELEC, 18 we ruled that the validity of a legislative apportionment is a justiciable question. But
while this Court can strike down an unconstitutional reapportionment, it cannot itself make the
reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do by directing respondent COMELEC to transfer the
municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the
transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of
Leyte. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Ordinance Appended to the Constitution.
2 Represented by Congressman Cirilo Roy G. Montejo.
3 Represented by Congressman Sergio A.F. Apostol.
4 Represented by Congressman Alberto S. Veloso.
5 Represented by Congressman Carmelo J. Locsin.
6 Represented by Congressman Eriberto V. Loreto.
7 Section 9, Article XVIII of the Constitution provides:
"A sub-province shall continue to exist and operate until it is converted into a regular
province or until its component municipalities are reverted to the mother province."
8 376 US 1. See also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 US 533; WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377
US 633, Maryland Commission For Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 US 656, etc.
9 The power of the respondent COMELEC to redistrict does not appear to have been
disputed by the parties in the proceedings below.
10 Promulgated March 26, 1986 and otherwise known as Freedom Constitution.
11 See Article I, Section 3 of Proclamation No. 3.
12 See Section 1, Article II of Provisional Constitution.

13 He was the Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative. The other co-sponsors
of the Ordinance, introduced in the Commission as Resolution No. 551, were
Commissioners Azcuna, Sumulong, Calderon, Alonto, Jamir, Lerum, Guingona,
Abubakar, Rodrigo, Aquino, Concepcion, de los Reyes, Jr., Garcia and Treñas.
14 Record of Constitutional Commission, October 9, 1986 session, p. 686.
15 Ibid, p. 687.
16 Ibid, pp. 692-694, 700.
17 Records of Constitution Commission, Session of October 13, 1986, pp. 950-951.
18 No. L-18684, September 14, 1961, 3 SCRA 1.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 203974 April 22, 2014
AURELIO M. UMALI, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT
OF CABANATUAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204371
J.V. BAUTISTA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before the Court is the consolidated case for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief, docket as G.R. No. 203974, assailing Minute Resolution No. 12-07971 and Minute
Resolution No. 12-09252 dated September 11, 2012 and October 16, 2012, respectively, both
promulgated by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and Petition for
Mandamus, docketed G.R. No. 204371, seeking to compel public respondent to implement the
same.
The Facts
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-
2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city
of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the
President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of
Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as
provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991."
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-
0797 which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that for purposes of the
plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only
those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.
The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC),
citing conversion cases involving Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte,

and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where only the residents of the city proposed to be converted were
allowed to vote in the corresponding plebiscite.
In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly
affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should
be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the
conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city,
the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the local government unit (LGU)
directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be
interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just
those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by
enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause
material change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of
the province as a whole.
To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, city mayor of
Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to
conversions, which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC,
Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite.
Lastly, private respondent pointed out that when Santiago City was converted in 1994 from a
municipality to an independent component city pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the
plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.
Following a hearing conducted on October 4, 2012,3 the COMELEC En Banc on October 16, 2012,
in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote of 5-24 ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the
assailed Minute Resolution 12-0925. The dispositive portion reads:
The Commission, taking into consideration the arguments of counsels including the Reply-
memorandum of Oppositor, after due deliberation, RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:
1) To DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor Governor Aurelio M. Umali; and
2) To SCHEDULE the conduct of Plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from
component city into highly-urbanized city with registered residents only of Cabanatuan City
to participate in said plebiscite.
Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, on
substantially the same arguments earlier taken by petitioner Umali before the poll body. On the other
hand, public respondent COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintained in its
Comment that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted from a component city into an HUC and
that the political unit directly affected by the conversion will only be the city itself. It argues that in this
instance, no political unit will be created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU,
and that no boundaries will be altered. The conversion would merely reinforce the powers and
prerogatives already being exercised by the city, with the political unit’s probable elevation to that of
an HUC as demanded by its compliance with the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the
participation of the voters of the entire province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.

Private respondent will later manifest that it is adopting the Comment of the COMELEC.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 2012, respondent COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9543, which
adopted a calendar of activities and periods of prohibited acts in connection with the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC. The Resolution set the conduct of the plebiscite on December 1,
2012. Thereafter, a certain Dr. Rodolfo B. Punzalan filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief which was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 in Palayan City. In the said case, Punzalan
prayed that Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 be declared unconstitutional, that the trial court decree
that all qualified voters of the province of Nueva Ecija be included in the plebiscite, and that a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining public respondent from implementing the
questioned resolution. On October 19, 2012, the RTC granted the prayer for a TRO.
On November 6, 2012, public respondent through Minute Resolution No. 12-0989 suspended the
preparations for the event in view of the TRO issued by the RTC. On November 27, 2012, the
plebiscite was once again rescheduled to give way to the May 13, 2013 national, local and ARMM
regional elections as per Resolution No. 9563.
After this development, petitioner J.V. Bautista, on December 3, 2012, filed a case before this Court
for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 204371, praying that public respondent be ordered to
schedule the plebiscite either on December 15 or 22, 2012. Petitioner Bautista argued that since the
TRO issued by the RTC has already expired, the duty of the public respondent to hold the plebiscite
has become mandatory and ministerial. Petitioner Bautista also alleged that the delay in holding the
plebiscite is inexcusable given the requirement that it should be held within a period of 120 days
form the date of the President’s declaration.
In its Comment to the Bautista petition, public respondent justified its position by arguing that
mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute. With all the legal conflicts
surrounding the case, it cannot be said that there is a clear showing of petitioner Bautista’s
entitlement to the relief sought. Respondent COMELEC likewise relied on Sec. 5 of the Omnibus
Election Code to justify the postponements, citing incidents of violence that ensued in the locality
during the plebiscite period.
After the conclusion of the 2013 elections, public respondent issued Resolution No. 1353 scheduling
the plebiscite to January 25, 2014. However, a TRO was issued by this Court on January 15, 2014 in
G.R. No. 203974 to suspend the conduct of the plebiscite for Cabanatuan City’s conversion. Given
the intertwining factual milieu of the two petitions before the Court, both cases were consolidated on
March 18, 2014.
The Issue
The bone of contention in the present controversy boils down to whether the qualified registered
voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the
plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.
Resolving the Petition for Certiorari either way will necessarily render the Petition for Mandamus
moot and academic for ultimately, the public respondent will be ordered to hold the plebiscite. The
only variation will be as regards its participants.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition for Certiorari is meritorious.

Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for
determining the qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec. 10,
Art. X reads:
Section 10, Article X. – No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily encompasses
not only Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in
the province are qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed conversion of Cabanatuan
City.
On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their claim that only the City
of Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the voting. Sec. 453 states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the President to
declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum
requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. (emphasis supplied)
Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as referring only to the
registered voters in the city being converted, excluding in the process the voters in the remaining
towns and cities of Nueva Ecija.
Before proceeding to unravel the seeming conflict between the two provisions, it is but proper that
we ascertain first the relationship between Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the
LGC.
First of all, we have to restate the general principle that legislative power cannot be delegated.
Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation is subject to certain exceptions allowed in the
Constitution, namely:
(1) Delegation by Congress to the President of the power to fix "tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government" under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution; and
(2) Delegation of emergency powers by Congress to the President "to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy" in times of war and other
national emergency under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, which is pertinent in the case at bar, is essentially legislative in
nature.5 The framers of the Constitution have, however, allowed for the delegation of such power in
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the
creation, division, merger, abolition or the substantial alteration of the boundaries is subject to the
approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.

True enough, Congress delegated such power to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang
Panlungsod to create barangays pursuant to Sec. 6 of the LGC, which provides:
Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by
Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision, or by
ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the
case of a barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and
requirements prescribed in this Code." (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines for the exercise of this authority have sufficiently been outlined by the various LGC
provisions detailing the requirements for the creation of barangays6, municipalities7, cities8, and
provinces9. Moreover, compliance with the plebiscite requirement under the Constitution has also
been directed by the LGC under its Sec. 10, which reads:
Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. – No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial

alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected."
(emphasis supplied)
With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied, the delegation to LGUs of the power to
create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries has become a recognized exception
to the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative powers.
Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453 of the LGC quoted
earlier, which states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the duty of the President to
declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum
requirements prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein.
In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on whether or
not the requirements under Sec. 45210 of the LGC are complied with. The provision makes it
ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare a component city as highly
urbanized once the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable indices
under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language "shall" used in the provision leaves the
President with no room for discretion.
In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for purposes of
conversions once the requirements are met. No further legislation is necessary before the city
proposed to be converted becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification, as the basis for
the delegation of the legislative authority is the very LGC.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the source of the delegation of
power to the LGUs under Sec. 6 of the LGC and to the President under Sec. 453 of the same code
is none other than Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Respondents, however, posit that Sec. 453 of the LGC is actually outside the ambit of Sec. 10, Art.
X of the Constitution, considering that the conversion of a component city to an HUC is not "creation,
division, merge, abolition or substantial alternation of boundaries" encompassed by the said
constitutional provision.

This proposition is bereft of merit.
First, the Court’s pronouncement in Miranda vs. Aguirre11 is apropos and may be applied by analogy.
While Miranda involves the downgrading, instead of upgrading, as here, of an independent
component city into a component city, its application to the case at bar is nonetheless material in
ascertaining the proper treatment of conversions. In that seminal case, the Court held that the
downgrading of an independent component city into a component city comes within the purview of
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
In Miranda, the rationale behind the afore-quoted constitutional provision and its application to cases
of conversion were discussed thusly:
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common
denominator - - - material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units
directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution
requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to
appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of
our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of
the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable
practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on
the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the
people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism
to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries
of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a
matter that affects them - - - direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people’s
representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution
granting more autonomy to local government units.12
It was determined in the case that the changes that will result from the conversion are too substantial
that there is a necessity for the plurality of those that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the
enumerated acts in the constitutional provision, conversions were found to result in material changes
in the economic and political rights of the people and LGUs affected. Given the far-reaching
ramifications of converting the status of a city, we held that the plebiscite requirement under the
constitutional provision should equally apply to conversions as well. Thus, RA 852813 was declared
unconstitutional in Miranda on the ground that the law downgraded Santiago City in Isabela without
submitting it for ratification in a plebiscite, in contravention of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
we nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial
alteration of boundaries.
As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and necessarily entails a
change in the geographical configuration of a local government unit or units. However, the phrase
"boundaries" should not be limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of
the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines
between political subdivisions, where the LGU’s exercise of corporate power ends and that of the
other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be "substantial" for it to be within the ambit of the
constitutional provision.
Pertinent is Art. 12(c) of the LGC’s Implementing Rules and Regulations, which reads:

Art. 12. Conversion of a Component City into a Highly Urbanized City. –
xxxx
(c) Effect of Conversion – The conversion of a component city into a highly-urbanized city shall make
it independent of the province where it is geographically located. (emphasis added)
Verily, the upward conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will
come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably
suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of
independence. With the city’s newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the
province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What once formed part of
Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva
Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s severance
from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq.
km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be "substantial."
Needless to stress, the alteration of boundaries would necessarily follow Cabanatuan City’s
conversion in the same way that creations, divisions, mergers, and abolitions generally cannot take
place without entailing the alteration. The enumerated acts, after all, are not mutually exclusive, and
more often than not, a combination of these acts attends the reconfiguration of LGUs.
In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an HUC is substantial
alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and resultantly, said provision applies, governs
and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC.
Moreover, the rules of statutory construction dictate that a particular provision should be interpreted
with the other relevant provisions in the law The Court finds that it is actually Sec. 10 of the LGC
which is undeniably the applicable provision on the conduct of plebiscites. The title of the provision
itself, "Plebiscite Requirement", makes this obvious. It requires a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. On the other hand, Sec.
453 of the LGC, entitled "Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status", is only on the duty to declare a
city as highly urbanized. It mandates the Office of the President to make the declaration after the city
has met the requirements under Sec. 452, and upon proper application and ratification in a
plebiscite. The conduct of a plebiscite is then a requirement before a declaration can be made. Thus,
the Court finds that Sec. 10 of the LGC prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC on the plebiscite
requirement.
We now take the bull by the horns and resolve the issue whether Sec. 453 of the LGC trenches on
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Hornbook doctrine is that neither the legislative, the executive, nor the judiciary has the power to act
beyond the Constitution’s mandate. The Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power beyond
what is circumscribed by the Constitution is ultra vires and a nullity. As elucidated by former Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando in Fernandez v. Cuerva:14
Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to the
Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern." Administrative
or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution. The above provision of the civil Code reflects the orthodox view that an

unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no
duties, and affords no protection. x x x
Applying this orthodox view, a law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the
Constitution.15 In a long line of cases, the cardinal principle of construction established is that a
statute should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any
constitutional command or prescription.16 If there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the
legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or
more constitution, that interpretation which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality will be adopted,
even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or apparent import of
the language used.17
Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 should
be construed in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. If one takes the plain meaning
of the phrase in relation to the declaration by the President that a city is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of
the LGC will clash with the explicit provision under Sec. 10, Art. X that the voters in the "political
units directly affected" shall participate in the plebiscite. Such construction should be avoided in view
of the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters
therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be converted to an
HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in order to
harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
The Court finds that respondents are mistaken in construing Sec. 453 in a vacuum. Their
interpretation of Sec. 453 of the LGC runs afoul of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which explicitly
requires that all residents in the "political units directly affected" should be made to vote.
Respondents make much of the plebiscites conducted in connection with the conversion of Puerto
Princesa City, Tacloban City and Lapu-Lapu City where the ratification was made by the registered
voters in said cities alone. It is clear, however, that the issue of who are entitled to vote in said
plebiscites was not properly raised or brought up in an actual controversy. The issue on who will
vote in a plebiscite involving a conversion into an HUC is a novel issue, and this is the first time that
the Court is asked to resolve the question. As such, the past plebiscites in the aforementioned cities
have no materiality or relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to say that conversion of said cities
prior to this judicial declaration will not be affected or prejudiced in any manner following the
operative fact doctrine―that “the actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.”18
The entire province of Nueva Ecija will be directly

affected by Cabanatuan City’s conversion
After the Court has resolved the seeming irreconcilability of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and
Sec. 453 of the LGC, it is now time to elucidate the meaning of the phrase "political units directly
affected" under Sec. 10, Art. X.
a. "Political units directly affected" defined
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should
primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate will be "directly
affected" by the change. To interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC19 and Padilla v. COMELEC20 are
worth revisiting.

We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered and whose
economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the plebiscite. As held:
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be
first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected"
whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the
boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros
Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in
order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple
logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected.
The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be
substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted
from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.21
xxxx
To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will
be subtracted from the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of
approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing province whose
boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent
effects of the division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people living in the
separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The economy
of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for the
better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of these political groups will be affected
and they are, therefore, the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which
must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.22 (emphasis added)
Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution, as invoked in Tan, states:
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or
units affected. (emphasis added)
Despite the change in phraseology compared to what is now Sec. 10, Art. X, we affirmed our ruling
in Tan in the latter case of Padilla. As held, the removal of the phrase "unit or" only served to sustain
the earlier finding that what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected" is the
plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. As reflected in the journal of the
Constitutional Commission:23
Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform the
Committee that under the formulation in the present Local Government Code, the words used are
actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the implication of the use of these words.
Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about this.
Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no objection on the part
of the two Gentlemen from the floor?

Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or" because in the
plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay
plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory. (emphasis added)
The same sentiment was shared by the Senate during its deliberations on Senate Bill No. 155––the
predecessor of the LGC––thus:
Senator Guingona. Can we make that clearer by example? Let us assume that a province has
municipalities and there is a merger of two municipalities. Would this therefore mean that the
plebiscite will be conducted within the two merged municipalities and not in the eight other
municipalities?
Senator Pimentel. The whole province, Mr. President, will be affected, and that is the reason we
probably have to involve the entire province.
Senator Guingona. So the plebiscite will not be held only in the two municipalities which are being
merged, but the entire province will now have to undergo.
Senator Pimentel. I suppose that was the ruling in the Negros del Norte case.
Senator Guingona. Supposing it refers to barangays, will the entire municipality have to vote? There
are two barangays being merged, say, out of 100 barangays. Would the entire municipality have to
participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President, because the municipality is affected directly by the merger of
two of its barangay.
Senator Guingona. And, if, out of 100 barangay, 51 are being merged, abolished, whatever, would
the rest of the municipality not participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Do all the 51 barangay that the Gentleman mentioned, Mr. President, belong to
one municipality?
Senator Guingona. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. Then it will only involve the municipality where the 51 barangays belong.
Senator Guingona. Yes. So, the entire municipality will now have to undergo a plebiscite.
Senator Pimentel. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. In the earlier example, if it is only a merger of two municipalities, let us say, in a
province with 10 municipalities – the entire province – will the other municipalities although not
affected also have to participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Yes. The reason is that the municipalities are within the territorial boundaries of
the province itself, it will have to be altered as a result of the two municipalities that the Gentleman
mentioned.24
In the more recent case of Miranda, the interpretation in Tan and Padilla was modified to include not
only changes in economic but also political rights in the criteria for determining whether or not an

LGU shall be considered "directly affected." Nevertheless, the requirement that the plebiscite be
participated in by the plurality of political units directly affected remained.
b. Impact on Economic Rights
To recall, it was held in Miranda that the changes that will result in the downgrading of an LGU from
an independent component city to a component city cannot be categorized as insubstantial, thereby
necessitating the conduct of a plebiscite for its ratification. In a similar fashion, herein petitioner
Umali itemized the adverse effects of Cabanatuan City’s conversion to the province of Nueva Ecija
to justify the province’s participation in the plebiscite to be conducted.
Often raised is that Cabanatuan City’s conversion into an HUC and its severance from Nueva Ecija
will result in the reduction of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the province based on Sec. 285
of the LGC. The law states:
Section 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. - The share of local government units in the
internal revenue allotment shall be collected in the following manner:
(a) Provinces - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(b) Cities - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities - Thirty-four percent (34%); and
(d) Barangays - Twenty percent (20%)
Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on
the basis of the following formula:
(a) Population - Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%); and
(c) Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)
In our earlier disquisitions, we have explained that the conversion into an HUC carries the accessory
of substantial alteration of boundaries and that the province of Nueva Ecija will, without a doubt,
suffer a reduction in territory because of the severance of Cabanatuan City. The residents of the city
will cease to be political constituencies of the province, effectively reducing the latter’s population.
Taking this decrease in territory and population in connection with the above formula, it is conceded
that Nueva Ecija will indeed suffer a reduction in IRA given the decrease of its multipliers’ values. As
assessed by the Regional Director of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for Region
III:25
Basis for IRA Province of Cabanatuan Province of

Computation Nueva Ecija City Nueva Ecija Net
of Cabanatuan
City

No. of Population 1,843,853 259,267 259,267
CY 2007 Census
Land Area 5,751.33 282.75 5,468.58
(sq. km.)
IRA Share of Actual IRA Estimated IRA Reduction

Nueva Ecija Share share excluding
Cabanatuan
City
Based on ₱800,772,618.45 ₱688,174,751.66 ₱112,597,866.79

Population
Based on Land ₱263,470,472.62 ₱250,517,594.56 P 12,952,878.06

Area
Total ₱125,550,744.85
Clear as crystal is that the province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a substantial reduction of its share in
IRA once Cabanatuan City attains autonomy. In view of the economic impact of Cabanatuan City’s
conversion, petitioner Umali’s contention, that its effect on the province is not only direct but also
adverse, deserves merit.
Moreover, his claim that the province will lose shares in provincial taxes imposed in Cabanatuan City
is well-founded. This is based on Sec. 151 of the LGC, which states:
SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. – Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may
levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided,
however, That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and
independent component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions
of this Code. (emphasis added)
Once converted, the taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself. Prior to this, the province enjoys
the prerogative to impose and collect taxes such as those on sand, gravel and other quarry
resources,26 professional taxes,27 and amusement taxes28 over the component city. While, it may be
argued that this is not a derogation of the province’s taxing power because it is in no way deprived of
its right to collect the mentioned taxes from the rest of its territory, the conversion will still reduce the
province’s taxing jurisdiction, and corollary to this, it will experience a corresponding decrease in
shares in local tax collections. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction and shares poses a material
and substantial change to the province’s economic rights, warranting its participation in the
plebiscite.
To further exemplify the impact of these changes, a perusal of Secs. 452(a) and 461(a) of the LGC
is in order, viz:
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities.

(a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office, and within the latest annual income of at least Fifty
Million Pesos (₱50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the city
treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.
Section 461. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
A component city’s conversion into an HUC and its resultant autonomy from the province is a threat
to the latter’s economic viability. Noteworthy is that the income criterion for a component city to be
converted into an HUC is higher than the income requirement for the creation of a province. The
ensuing reduction in income upon separation would clearly leave a crippling effect on the province’s
operations as there would be less funding to finance infrastructure projects and to defray overhead
costs. Moreover, the quality of services being offered by the province may suffer because of looming
austerity measures. These are but a few of the social costs of the decline in the province’s economic
performance, which Nueva Ecija is bound to experience once its most progressive city of
Cabanatuan attains independence.
c. Impact on Political Rights
Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political rights of Nueva Ecija and those of its
residents will also be affected by Cabanatuan’s conversion into an HUC. Notably, the administrative
supervision of the province over the city will effectively be revoked upon conversion. Secs. 4 and 12,
Art. X of the Constitution read:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments.
Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Sec 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province.
The voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition, shall
not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to Cabanatuan City if it is
converted into an HUC. This includes the right to be outside the general supervision of the province
and be under the direct supervision of the President. An HUC is not subject to provincial oversight

because the complex and varied problems in an HUC due to a bigger population and greater
economic activity require greater autonomy.29 The provincial government stands to lose the power to
ensure that the local government officials of Cabanatuan City act within the scope of its prescribed
powers and functions,30 to review executive orders issued by the city mayor, and to approve
resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council.31 The province will also be divested of
jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning the elected city officials of the new HUC, and the
appeal process for administrative case decisions against barangay officials of the city will also be
modified accordingly.32 Likewise, the registered voters of the city will no longer be entitled to vote for
and be voted upon as provincial officials.33
In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City and the province of Nueva Ecija, the city will
be separated from the territorial jurisdiction of the province, as earlier explained. The provincial
government will no longer be responsible for delivering basic services for the city residents’ benefit.
Ordinances and resolutions passed by the provincial council will no longer cover the city. Projects
queued by the provincial government to be executed in the city will also be suspended if not
scrapped to prevent the LGU from performing functions outside the bounds of its territorial
jurisdiction, and from expending its limited resources for ventures that do not cater to its
constituents.1âwphi1
In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the province of Nueva Ecija and its
residents, the entire province certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC. Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered
voters of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.
Respondents’ apprehension that requiring the entire province to participate in the plebiscite will set a
dangerous precedent leading to the failure of cities to convert is unfounded. Their fear that provinces
will always be expected to oppose the conversion in order to retain the city’s dependence is
speculative at best. In any event, any vote of disapproval cast by those directly affected by the
conversion is a valid exercise of their right to suffrage, and our democratic processes are designed
to uphold the decision of the majority, regardless of the motive behind the vote. It is unfathomable
how the province can be deprived of the opportunity to exercise the right of suffrage in a matter that
is potentially deleterious to its economic viability and could diminish the rights of its constituents. To
limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is
as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they
demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.34
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 203974, is
hereby GRANTED. COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 dated September 11, 2012 and
Minute Resolution No. 12-0925 dated October 16, 2012 are hereby declared NULL and VOID. Public
respondent COMELEC is hereby enjoined from implementing the said Resolutions. Additionally,
COMELEC is hereby ordered to conduct a plebiscite for the purpose of converting Cabanatuan City
into a Highly Urbanized City to be participated in by the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecij a
within 120 days from the finality of this Decision. The Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No.
204371, is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

I join Dissent of J. Leonen
MA. LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Took no part. I join the Dissent of J. Leonen

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
I join the dissent of J. Leonen

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

I dissent. See Separate Opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
MA. LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

ENRIQUE ESGUERRA-VIDAL
Clerk of Court
OCC-En Banc
Supreme Court

Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 113-115.
2
Id. at 64-65.
3
Id. at 143-146.
4
COMELEC Chairperson Sixto Brillantes and Commissioner Armando Velasco cast the
dissenting votes.
5
Mendenilla v. Onandia, 115 Phil. 534 (1962).
6
RA 7160, Sec. 385-386
7
Id., Sec. 441-442
8
Id., Sec. 449-450
9
Id., Sec. 460-461
10
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities.
(a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand (200,000) inhabitants
as certified by the National Statistics Office, and within the latest annual income of at
least Fifty Million Pesos (₱50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as
certified by the city treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.
(b) Cities which do not meet above requirements shall be considered component
cities of the province in which they are geographically located. If a component city is
located within the boundaries of two (2) or more provinces, such city shall be
considered a component of the province of which it used to be a municipality.
(c) Qualified voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain excluded from voting for
elective provincial officials.
Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution or this Code, qualified voters of

independent component cities shall be governed by their respective charters, as
amended, on the participation of voters in provincial elections.
Qualified voters of cities who acquired the right to vote for elective provincial officials
prior to the classification of said cities as highly-urbanized after the ratification of the
Constitution and before the effectivity of this Code, shall continue to exercise such
right.
11
G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999, 314 SCRA 603.

12
Id. at 610.
13
An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act Numbered 7720 – An Act Converting
the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to Be Known as the City of
Santiago.
14
No. L-21114, November 28, 1967, 21 SCRA 1095, 1106.
15
Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 111230, September 30, 1994, 237 SCRA 279, 291
16
Mutuc v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 32717, Nov. 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 228.
17
Garcia v. COMELEC, supra note 15.
18
Fernandez v. Cuerva, supra note 14.
19
No. L-73155, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 727.
20
G.R. No. 103328, October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 735.
21
Tan v. COMELEC, supra note 19, at 742-743.
22
Id. at 745-746.
23
III RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 486.
Senate Bill No. 155, II RECORDS OF THE SENATE 121, 4th Regular Session (July 26,
24
1990).
25
Rollo, p. 89.
26
RA 7160, Sec. 138.
27
Id., Sec. 139.
28
Id., Sec. 140.
De Leon, Hector S. & De Leon, Hector Jr., TEXTBOOK ON THE PHILIPPINE

29
CONSTITUTION (2011).
30
LGC, Section 29. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and Municipalities. - The
province, through the governor, shall ensure that every component city and municipality
within its territorial jurisdiction acts within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions.
Highly urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be independent of the
province.
Id., Section 465. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions, and
Compensation.
xxxx

(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the province and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code, the provincial governor shall:
xxxx
(2) Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the province and
the exercise of the appropriate corporate powers provided for under Section 22 of
this Code, implement all approved policies, programs, projects, services and
activities of the province and, in addition to the foregoing, shall:
(i) Ensure that the acts of the component cities and municipalities of the province and
of its officials and employees are within the scope of their prescribed powers, duties
and functions.
31
Id., Section 30. Review of Executive Orders. -
(a) Except as otherwise provided under the Constitution and special statutes, the
governor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the component city or
municipal mayor within his jurisdiction. The city or municipal mayor shall review all
executive orders promulgated by the punong barangay within his jurisdiction. Copies
of such orders shall be forwarded to the governor or the city or municipal mayor, as
the case may be, within three (3) days from their issuance. In all instances of review,
the local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such executive orders are
within the powers granted by law and in conformity with provincial, city, or municipal
ordinances.
(b) If the governor or the city or municipal mayor fails to act on said executive orders
within thirty (30) days after their submission, the same shall be deemed consistent
with law and therefore valid.
xxxx
Id., Section 455. Chief Executive; Powers, Duties and Compensation.
xxxx
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
city mayor shall:
(1) Exercise general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services,
and activities of the city government. and in this connection, shall:
xxxx
(xii) Furnish copies of executive orders issued by him, to the provincial governor in
the case of component city mayors, to the Office of the President in the case of
highly-urbanized city mayors and to their respective metropolitan council chairmen in
the case of mayors of cities in the Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan
political subdivisions, within seventy-two (72) hours after their issuances;

xxxx
(xx) Submit to the provincial governor, in case of component cities; to the Office of
the President, in the case of highly-urbanized cities; to their respective metropolitan
authority council chairmen and to the Office of the President, in case of cities of the
Metropolitan Manila Area and other metropolitan political subdivisions, the following
reports: an annual report containing a summary of all matters pertinent to the
management, administration and development of the city and all information and
data relative to its political, social and economic conditions; and supplemental reports
when unexpected events and situations arise at any time during the year, particularly
when man-made or natural disasters or calamities affect the general welfare of the
city, province, region or country.
32
Id., Section 67. Administrative Appeals. - Decisions in administrative cases may, within
thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:
(a) The sangguniang panlalawigan, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang

panlungsod of component cities and the sangguniang bayan; and
(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities.
Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and executory.
33
Id., Secs. 451-452(c).
34
Tan v. COMELEC, supra note 19, at 747, Concurring Opinion, Teehankee, C.J.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992
LEVY D. MACASIANO, Brigadier General/PNP Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic

Command, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Branch 62, Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila, MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE, METRO MANILA, PALANYAG
KILUSANG BAYAN FOR SERVICE, respondents.
Ceferino, Padua Law Office for Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for service.
Manuel de Guia for Municipality of Parañaque.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the annulment of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, which granted the writ of preliminary
injunction applied for by respondents Municipality of Parañaque and Palanyag Kilusang Bayan for
Service (Palanyag for brevity) against petitioner herein.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which
authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets
located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. The
said ordinance was approved by the municipal council pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1979, authorizing and regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open
spaces within Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms
and conditions.
On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86, s. 1990 of the
municipal council of respondent municipality subject to the following conditions:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority
of the residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending areas
thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be
marked distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by
pedestrians;

3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly
designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the
reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority.
On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque
Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service cooperative for the establishment,
operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative,

entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in
the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal
government of Parañaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the
said streets.
On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan
Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel
St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondent Palanyag.
On October 16, 1990, petitioner Brig. General Macasiano wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag
giving the latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be
dismantled.
Hence, on October 23, 1990, respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint
petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which
the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 24, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin petitioner from
enforcing his letter-order of October 16, 1990 pending the hearing on the motion for writ of
preliminary injunction.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 s.
1990 of the Municipality' of Parañaque and enjoining petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from enforcing
his letter-order against respondent Palanyag.
Hence, this petition was filed by the petitioner thru the Office of the Solicitor General alleging grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial judge in issuing
the assailed order.
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the
municipal council of Parañaque authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as
sites for flea markets is valid.
The Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner, contends that municipal roads are used for public
service and are therefore public properties; that as such, they cannot be subject to private
appropriation or private contract by any person, even by the respondent Municipality of Parañaque.
Petitioner submits that a property already dedicated to public use cannot be used for another public
purpose and that absent a clear showing that the Municipality of Parañaque has been granted by the
legislature specific authority to convert a property already in public use to another public use,
respondent municipality is, therefore, bereft of any authority to close municipal roads for the

establishment of a flea market. Petitioner also submits that assuming that the respondent
municipality is authorized to close streets, it failed to comply with the conditions set forth by the
Metropolitan Manila Authority for the approval of the ordinance providing for the establishment of flea
markets on public streets. Lastly, petitioner contends that by allowing the municipal streets to be
used by market vendors the municipal council of respondent municipality violated its duty under the
Local Government Code to promote the general welfare of the residents of the municipality.
In upholding the legality of the disputed ordinance, the trial court ruled:
. . . that Chanter II Section 10 of the Local Government Code is a statutory grant of

power given to local government units, the Municipality of Parañaque as such, is
empowered under that law to close its roads, streets or alley subject to limitations
stated therein (i.e., that it is in accordance with existing laws and the provisions of
this code).
xxx xxx xxx
The actuation of the respondent Brig. Gen. Levi Macasiano, though apparently within
its power is in fact an encroachment of power legally vested to the municipality,
precisely because when the municipality enacted the ordinance in question — the
authority of the respondent as Police Superintendent ceases to be operative on the
ground that the streets covered by the ordinance ceases to be a public thoroughfare.
(pp. 33-34, Rollo)
We find the petition meritorious. In resolving the question of whether the disputed municipal
ordinance authorizing the flea market on the public streets is valid, it is necessary to examine the
laws in force during the time the said ordinance was enacted, namely, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,
otherwise known as Local Government Code, in connection with established principles embodied in
the Civil Code an property and settled jurisprudence on the matter.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property for public use, Article 424
of Civil Code states:
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists
of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or
municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by
this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets
are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent
municipality. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed
public and are under the absolute control of Congress (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of
Zamboanga, L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334). Hence, local governments have no
authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is
vested upon them by Congress. One such example of this authority given by Congress to the local
governments is the power to close roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the Local
Government Code, which states:

Sec. 10. Closure of roads. — A local government unit may likewise, through its head
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with existing
law and the provisions of this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or provincial
road, street, alley, park or square. No such way or place or any part of thereof shall
be close without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. A property thus
withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other
real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or
conveyed. (Emphasis ours).
However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local government units to close
roads and other similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic
principles already established by law. These basic principles have the effect of limiting such authority
of the province, city or municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil
Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and
made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of
or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due
process which should be complied with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be
for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when
circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public
service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial
property of the local government unit concerned (Article 422, Civil Code; Cebu Oxygen, etc. et al. v.
Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). It is only then that the
respondent municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in accordance with the last
sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local Government Code. In one case, the
City Council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared the terminal road of M. Borces Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan.
Thereafter, the City Council passes another resolution authorizing the sale of the said abandoned
road through public bidding. We held therein that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city
street and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use. Such withdrawn portion becomes
patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene
Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No.
L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). However, those roads and streets which are available to
the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property
devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power to use it for another purpose
or to dispose of or lease it to private persons. This limitation on the authority of the local government
over public properties has been discussed and settled by this Court en banc in "Francisco V.
Dacanay, petitioner v. Mayor Macaria Asistio, Jr., et al., respondents, G.R. No. 93654, May 6, 1992."
This Court ruled:
There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents' market
stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil
Case No. C-12921. A public street is property for public use hence outside the
commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man,
it may not be the subject of lease or others contract (Villanueva, et al. v. Castañeda
and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142 citing the Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602;
Espiritu v. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869; And Muyot v. De la
Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860).
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of
the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of
the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to
law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through

contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater
number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general
welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect.
The Executive Order issued by acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes
del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the
city government contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for
public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of
the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as
arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians.
Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has the authority to pass the
disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly implemented because it cannot be considered
approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance by respondent municipality of
the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of the ordinance, to wit:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the majority
of the residents do(es) not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending
areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be
marked distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by
pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly
designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once the
reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority. (p.
38, Rollo)
Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with the foregoing
conditions precedent to the approval of the ordinance. The allegations of respondent municipality
that the closed streets were not used for vehicular traffic and that the majority of the residents do not
oppose the establishment of a flea market on said streets are unsupported by any evidence that will
show that this first condition has been met. Likewise, the designation by respondents of a time
schedule during which the flea market shall operate is absent.
Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people, houses
and traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow
the establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and
Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving the problem of congestion. We take note of the
other observations of the Solicitor General when he said:
. . . There have been many instances of emergencies and fires where ambulances
and fire engines, instead of using the roads for a more direct access to the fire area,
have to maneuver and look for other streets which are not occupied by stalls and
vendors thereby losing valuable time which could, otherwise, have been spent in
saving properties and lives.
Along G.G. Cruz Street is a hospital, the St. Rita Hospital. However, its ambulances
and the people rushing their patients to the hospital cannot pass through G.G. Cruz

because of the stalls and the vendors. One can only imagine the tragedy of losing a
life just because of a few seconds delay brought about by the inaccessibility of the
streets leading to the hospital.
The children, too, suffer. In view of the occupancy of the roads by stalls and vendors,
normal transportation flow is disrupted and school children have to get off at a
distance still far from their schools and walk, rain or shine.
Indeed one can only imagine the garbage and litter left by vendors on the streets at
the end of the day. Needless to say, these cause further pollution, sickness and
deterioration of health of the residents therein. (pp. 21-22, Rollo)
Respondents do not refute the truth of the foregoing findings and observations of petitioners.
Instead, respondents want this Court to focus its attention solely on the argument that the use of
public spaces for the establishment of a flea market is well within the powers granted by law to a
local government which should not be interfered with by the courts.
Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limitations laid
down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such
powers should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members
of the community. Every local government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will
enhance the public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the
general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective, the local government
should refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare.
As what we have said in the Dacanay case, the general public have a legal right to demand the
demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials of respondent
municipality have the corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and
restore them to their specific public purpose.
The instant case as well as the Dacanay case, involves an ordinance which is void and illegal for
lack of basis and authority in laws applicable during its time. However, at this point, We find it worthy
to note that Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, known as Local Government Lode, has already been
repealed by Republic Act No. 7160 known as Local Government Code of 1991 which took effect on
January 1, 1992. Section 5(d) of the new Code provides that rights and obligations existing on the
date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any other source of prestation
involving a local government unit shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of the said
contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were vested.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court
dated December 17, 1990 which granted the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner as
PNP Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic Command from enforcing the demolition of market stalls
along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets is hereby
RESERVED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005]
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC., respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from
Lucena City, assailed, via a petition for prohibition and injunction against the City of Lucena, its Mayor,
[1]
and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City
Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an
invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against monopolies. The salient provisions of the ordinances are:
Ordinance No. 1631 [2]
AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A

FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A
COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA
xxx
SECTION 1. There is hereby granted to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or
assigns, hereinafter referred to as the grantee, a franchise to construct, finance, establish, operate, and
maintain a common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena.
SECTION 2. This franchise shall continue for a period of twenty-five years, counted from the approval of
this Ordinance, and renewable at the option of the grantee for another period of twenty-five (25) years
upon such expiration.
xxx
SECTION 4. Responsibilities and Obligations of the City Government of Lucena. During the existence of
the franchise, the City Government of Lucena shall have the following responsibilities and obligations:
xxx
(c) It shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus and/or
jeepney terminal.
xxx
Ordinance No. 1778 [3]

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES,
MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE,
AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES OF
1995
xxx
SECTION 1. The entrance to the City of Lucena of all buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger
jeepneys is hereby regulated as follows:
(a) All buses, mini-buses and out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the
city and are hereby directed to proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their
passengers.
(b) All temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the
effectivity of this ordinance.
xxx
SECTION 3. a) Section 1 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses from other municipalities and/or local government units
going to Lucena City are directed to proceed to the Common Terminal located at Diversion Road, Brgy.
Ilayang Dupay, to unload and load passengers.
xxx
c) Section 3 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local
government units shall utilize the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal at Diversion Road,
Brgy. Ilayang Dupay, this City, and no other terminals shall be situated inside or within the City
of Lucena;
d) Section 4 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Passenger buses, mini-buses, and jeepney type mini-buses coming from other municipalities and/or local
government units shall avail of the facilities of the Lucena Grand Central Terminal which is hereby
designated as the officially sanctioned common terminal for the City of Lucena;
e) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 1557, Series of 1995, is hereby amended to read as follows:
The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the permanent common terminal as this is the entity which
was given the exclusive franchise by the Sangguniang Panglungsod under Ordinance No. 1631;(Em
phasis and underscoring supplied)
These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for another
twenty five years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal
facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the

traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within
the city, as the Explanatory Note-Whereas Clause adopting Ordinance No. 1778 states:
WHEREAS, in line with the worsening traffic condition of the City of Lucena, and with the purpose of
easing and regulating the flow of the same, it is imperative that the Buses, Mini-Buses and out-of-town
jeepneys be prohibited from maintaining terminals within the City, but instead directing to proceed to the
Lucena Grand Central Terminal for purposes of picking-up and/or dropping off their passengers; [4]
Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by the
ordinances.
Petitioner, Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., claiming legal interest as the grantee of the exclusive
franchise for the operation of the common terminal, was allowed to intervene in the petition before the trial
[5]
court.
In the hearing conducted on November 25, 1998, all the parties agreed to dispense with the
presentation of evidence and to submit the case for resolution solely on the basis of the pleadings filed. [6]
By Order of March 31, 1999, Branch 54 of the Lucena RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive portion
[7]
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. Declaring City Ordinance No. 1631 as valid, having been issued in the exercise of the police power of
the City Government of Lucena insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal,
Inc., to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the
City of Lucena;
2. But however, declaring the provision of Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 to the effect that the City
Government shall not grant any third party any privilege and/or concession to operate a bus, mini-bus
and/or jeepney terminal, as illegal and ultra vires because it contravenes the provisions of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code;
3. Declaring City Ordinance No. 1778 as null and void, the same being also an ultra vires act of the City
Government of Lucena arising from an invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the police power,
more specifically, declaring illegal [sections 1(b), 3(c) and 3(e)];
4. Ordering the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition and/or Injunction directing the respondents public
officials, the City Mayor and the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Lucena, to cease and desist from
implementing Ordinance No. 1778 insofar as said ordinance prohibits or curtails petitioner from
maintaining and operating its own bus terminal subject to the conditions provided for in Ordinance
No. 1557, Sec. 3, which authorizes the construction of terminal outside the poblacion of Lucena City; and
likewise, insofar as said ordinance directs and compels the petitioner to use the Lucena Grand
Central Terminal Inc., and furthermore, insofar as it declares that no other terminals shall be
situated, constructed, maintained or established inside or within the City of Lucena; and
furthermore,
5. The Motion to Dismiss filed by the Intervenor, Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc., dated October 19,
1998, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) [8]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order having been denied by Order of August
[9]
6, 1999, it elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 before this Court. This Court, by Resolution
[10] [11]
of November 24, 1999, referred the petition to the Court of Appeals with which it has concurrent
[12]
jurisdiction, no special and important reason having been cited for it to take cognizance thereof in the first
instance.
By Decision of December 15, 2000, the appellate court dismissed the petition and affirmed the
[13]
challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate
[14]
court by Resolution dated June 5, 2001, petitioner once again comes to this Court via petition for
[15]
review, this time assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
[16]
Decision on the petition hinges on two issues, to wit: (1) whether the trial court has jurisdiction over
the case, it not having furnished the Office of the Solicitor General copy of the orders it issued therein, and
(2) whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted the subject ordinances.
Petitioner argues that since the trial court failed to serve a copy of its assailed orders upon the Office
of the Solicitor General, it never acquired jurisdiction over the case, it citing Section 22, Rule 3 of the Rules
which provides:
SEC. 22. Notice to the Solicitor General.In any action involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
executive order, presidential decree, rules or regulations, the court in its discretion, may require the
appearance of the Solicitor General who may be heard in person or through representative duly
designated by him. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Furthermore, petitioner invokes Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 63 which respectively provide:
SEC. 3. Notice on Solicitor General. In any action which involves the validity of a statute, executive
order or regulation, or any other governmental regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the
party assailing the same and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question.
SEC. 4. Local government ordinances. In any action involving the validity of a local government
ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local government unit involved shall be
similarly notified and entitled to be heard. If such ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional, the
Solicitor General shall also be notified and entitled to be heard. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Nowhere, however, is it stated in the above-quoted rules that failure to notify the Solicitor General
about the action is a jurisdictional defect.
In fact, Rule 3, Section 22 gives the courts in any action involving the validity of any ordinance, inter
alia, discretion to notify the Solicitor General.
Section 4 of Rule 63, which more specifically deals with cases assailing the constitutionality, not just
the validity, of a local government ordinance, directs that the Solicitor General shall also be notified and
entitled to be heard. Who will notify him, Sec. 3 of the same rule provides it is the party which is assailing
the local governments ordinance.
More importantly, however, this Court finds that no procedural defect, fatal or otherwise, attended the
disposition of the case. For respondent actually served a copy of its petition upon the Office of the Solicitor
General on October 1, 1998, two days after it was filed. The Solicitor General has issued a Certification to
that effect. There was thus compliance with above-quoted rules.
[17]
Respecting the issue of whether police power was properly exercised when the subject ordinances
were enacted: As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly exercised its
police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are

reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. [18]
That traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern, cannot be gainsaid. In Calalang v.
Williams which involved a statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and
[19]
regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads, this Court held:
In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the
least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and
the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. (Emphasis supplied)
[20]
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in
the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite
for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.
Respondents suggestion to have this Court look behind the explicit objective of the ordinances which,
to it, was actually to benefit the private interest of petitioner by coercing all bus operators to patronize its
terminal does not lie. Lim v. Pacquing instructs:
[21] [22]
. . . [T]his Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was enacted to benefit a select group which
was later given authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of legislative
motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per
Black, J.) There is, in the first place, absolute lack of evidence to support ADCs allegation of improper
motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second place, as already averred, this Court cannot go
behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD No. 771, which are reasonable and even laudable.
(Underscoring supplied) [23]
This leaves for determination the issue of whether the means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang
Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the subject
[24]
ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already
existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise
for which was granted to petitioner. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus
compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of petitioner.
In De la Cruz v. Paras, this Court declared unconstitutional an ordinance characterized by
[25]
overbreadth. In that case, the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan prohibited the operation of all night clubs,
cabarets and dance halls within its jurisdiction for the protection of public morals. Held the Court:
It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the t
erm reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attainedby a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonablerestrictions rather
than by an absolute prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: The Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under
the guise of police regulation. It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a
clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of
patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by
those therein employed. (Underscoring supplied) [26]

In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, this Court, in declaring unconstitutional the resolution subject
[27]
thereof, advanced a similar consideration. That case involved a resolution issued by the Professional
Regulation Commission which prohibited examinees from attending review classes and receiving handout
materials, tips, and the like three days before the date of examination in order to preserve the integrity and
purity of the licensure examinations in accountancy. Besides being unreasonable on its face and violative
of academic freedom, the measure was found to be more sweeping than what was necessary, viz:
Needless to say, the enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the
licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by
depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days when they
should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their
mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself would be like uprooting the tree to get
rid of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such
leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss,
then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners
should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) [28]
As in De la Cruz and Lupangco, the ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadth.
[29] [30]
They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since the
compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and
charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have
[31]
been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights
are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to
societal problems.
From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang
[33]
Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of
passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed
to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright
proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered
as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack
adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead
of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with
permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals
is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal
are barred from operating at all.
Petitioner argues, however, that other solutions for the traffic problem have already been tried but
proven ineffective. But the grant of an exclusive franchise to petitioner has not been shown to be the only
solution to the problem.
While the Sangguniang Panlungsod, via Ordinance No. 1557, previously directed bus owners and
[34]
operators to put up their terminals outside the poblacion of Lucena City, petitioner informs that said
ordinance only resulted in the relocation of terminals to other well-populated barangays, thereby giving rise
to traffic congestion in those areas. Assuming that information to be true, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
[35]

was not without remedy. It could have defined, among other considerations, in a more precise manner, the
area of relocation to avoid such consequences.
As for petitioners argument that the challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the power of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to [r]egulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibitencroachments or obstacles
thereon and, when necessary in the interest of public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and
illegal constructions in public places: Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are
[36]
encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The buses which indiscriminately load and unload
passengers on the city streets are. The power then of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit
encroachments and obstacles does not extend to terminals.
Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate business
which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the community.
But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged indirect effects upon the flow of
traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se.
Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial
proceedings, as was done in the case at bar.
In Estate of Gregoria Francisco v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
[37]
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances
without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate
safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity
(Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the quonset building is a
legitimate business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights of property, of health or of
comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for
that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
In Pampanga Bus Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac where the appellant-municipality similarly argued
[39]
that the terminal involved therein is a nuisance that may be abated by the Municipal Council via an
ordinance, this Court held: Suffice it to say that in the abatement of nuisances the provisions of the Civil
Code (Articles 694-707) must be observed and followed. This appellant failed to do.
As for petitioners claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been proven effective in easing
traffic congestion: Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is reasonably
necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the
constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified
whenever they happen to be effective.
The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the
establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private sector, copies of
which were submitted to this Court by petitioner. The weight of popular opinion, however, must be balanced
with that of an individuals rights.
There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject
only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration
to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one
even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right. [40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
[1]
Records at 1-10.
[2]
Rollo at 118-120.
[3]
Id. at 226-229.
[4]
Id. at 227.
[5]
Records at 55-59.
[6]
Id. at 339.
[7]
Id. at 328-360.
[8]
Id. at 358-360.
[9]
Id. at 384-399.
[10]
Id. at 467-470.
[11]
CA Rollo at 18-59.
[12]
Id. at 327.
[13]
Id. at 548-557.
[14]
Id. at 560-572.
[15]
Id. at 622-623.
[16]
Rollo at 9-407 inclusive of Annexes A - Y.
[17]
CA Rollo at 498.
[18]
DECS v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533, 537 (1989).
[19]
70 Phil. 726 (1940).
[20]
Id. at 733.
[21]
Rollo at 539.
[22]
240 SCRA 649 (1995).
[23]
Id. at 677-678.
[24]
Rollo at 505.
[25]
123 SCRA 569 (1983).
[26]
Id. at 578.
[27]
160 SCRA 848 (1988).
[28]
Id. at 860.
[29]
Supra.
[30]
Supra.
[31]
Rollo at 59.
[32]
CRUZ, I., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1995).
[33]
Rollo at 496, 509-510.
[34]
Id. at 109.
[35]
Memorandum of Petitioner, id. at 510.

[36]
Section 458(5)(vi), LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE of 1991.
[37]
199 SCRA 595 (1991).
[38]
Id. at 601.
[39]
3 SCRA 816 (1961).
[40]
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376. (1989).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 138810. September 29, 2004]
BATANGAS CATV, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR, respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
In the late 1940s, John Walson, an appliance dealer in Pennsylvania, suffered a decline in the sale of
television (tv) sets because of poor reception of signals in his community. Troubled, he built an antenna on
top of a nearby mountain. Using coaxial cable lines, he distributed the tv signals from the antenna to the
homes of his customers. Walsons innovative idea improved his sales and at the same time gave birth to a
new telecommunication system -- the Community Antenna Television (CATV) or Cable Television. [1]
This technological breakthrough found its way in our shores and, like in its country of origin, it spawned
legal controversies, especially in the field of regulation. The case at bar is just another occasion to clarify a
shady area. Here, we are tasked to resolve the inquiry -- may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the
subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction?
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Batangas CATV, Inc. (petitioner herein) against
the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Mayor of Batangas City (respondents herein) assailing the Court of
Appeals (1) Decision dated February 12, 1999 and (2) Resolution dated May 26, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV
[2] [3]
No. 52361. The Appellate Court reversed and set aside the Judgment dated October 29, 1995 of the
[4] [5]
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Batangas City in Civil Case No. 4254, holding that neither of the
[6]
respondents has the power to fix the subscriber rates of CATV operators, such being outside the scope of
the LGUs power.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting [7]
petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the
Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified
therein, provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod. [8]
Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per
month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it
[9]
secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction docketed as Civil
Case No. 4254. It alleged that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the
subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the
Philippines.
On October 29, 1995, the trial court decided in favor of petitioner, thus:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, the defendants, their representatives, agents, deputies or other persons
acting on their behalf or under their instructions, are hereby enjoined from canceling plaintiffs permit
to operate a Cable Antenna Television (CATV) system in the City of Batangas or its environs or in

any manner, from interfering with the authority and power of the National Telecommunications
Commission to grant franchises to operate CATV systems to qualified applicants, and the right of
plaintiff in fixing its service rates which needs no prior approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsodof
Batangas City.
The counterclaim of the plaintiff is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED. [10]
The trial court held that the enactment of Resolution No. 210 by respondent violates the States
deregulation policy as set forth by then NTC Commissioner Jose Luis A. Alcuaz in his Memorandum dated
August 25, 1989. Also, it pointed out that the sole agency of the government which can regulate CATV
operation is the NTC, and that the LGUs cannot exercise regulatory power over it without appropriate
legislation.
Unsatisfied, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
52361.
On February 12, 1999, the Appellate Court reversed and set aside the trial courts Decision,
ratiocinating as follows:
Although the Certificate of Authority to operate a Cable Antenna Television (CATV) System is
granted by the National Telecommunications Commission pursuant to Executive Order No. 205,
this does not preclude the Sangguniang Panlungsod from regulating the operation of the CATV in
their locality under the powers vested upon it by Batas Pambansa Bilang 337, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1983. Section 177 (now Section 457 paragraph 3 (ii) of Republic Act
7160) provides:
Section 177. Powers and Duties The Sangguniang Panlungsod shall:
a) Enact such ordinances as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the responsibilities
conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for health and safety,
comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve the morals, and promote the prosperity and
general welfare of the community and the inhabitants thereof, and the protection of property therein;
xxx
d) Regulate, fix the license fee for, and tax any business or profession being carried on and
exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the city, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist
transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards which
shall remain under the licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall
exercise such authority without infringement on the taxing and regulatory powers of the city
government;
Under cover of the General Welfare Clause as provided in this section, Local Government Units can
perform just about any power that will benefit their constituencies. Thus, local government units can
exercise powers that are: (1) expressly granted; (2) necessarily implied from the power that is expressly
granted; (3) necessary, appropriate or incidental for its efficient and effective governance; and (4)essential
to the promotion of the general welfare of their inhabitants. (Pimentel, The Local Government Code of
1991, p. 46)

Verily, the regulation of businesses in the locality is expressly provided in the Local Government
Code. The fixing of service rates is lawful under the General Welfare Clause.
Resolution No. 210 granting appellee a permit to construct, install and operate a community antenna
television (CATV) system in Batangas City as quoted earlier in this decision, authorized the grantee to
impose charges which cannot be increased except upon approval of the Sangguniang Bayan. It further
provided that in case of violation by the grantee of the terms and conditions/requirements specifically
provided therein, the City shall have the right to withdraw the franchise.
Appellee increased the service rates from EIGHTY EIGHT PESOS (P88.00) to ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY PESOS (P180.00) (Records, p. 25) without the approval of appellant. Such act breached
Resolution No. 210 which gives appellant the right to withdraw the permit granted to appellee. [11]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. [12]
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of error:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE GENERAL WELFARE

CLAUSE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AUTHORIZES RESPONDENT
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD TO EXERCISE THE REGULATORY FUNCTION SOLELY
LODGED WITH THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION UNDER
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 205, INCLUDING THE AUTHORITY TO FIX AND/OR APPROVE
THE SERVICE RATES OF CATV OPERATORS; AND
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION APPEALED FROM AND
DISMISSING PETITIONERS COMPLAINT. [13]
Petitioner contends that while Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, extends
to the LGUs the general power to perform any act that will benefit their constituents, nonetheless, it does
not authorize them to regulate the CATV operation. Pursuant to E.O. No. 205, only the NTC has the
authority to regulate the CATV operation, including the fixing of subscriber rates.
Respondents counter that the Appellate Court did not commit any reversible error in rendering the
assailed Decision. First, Resolution No. 210 was enacted pursuant to Section 177(c) and (d) of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 337, the Local Government Code of 1983, which authorizes LGUs to regulate
businesses. The term businesses necessarily includes the CATV industry. And second, Resolution No. 210
is in the nature of a contract between petitioner and respondents, it being a grant to the former of a franchise
to operate a CATV system. To hold that E.O. No. 205 amended its terms would violate the constitutional
prohibition against impairment of contracts. [14]
The petition is impressed with merit.

Earlier, we posed the question -- may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction? A review of pertinent laws and jurisprudence
yields a negative answer.
President Ferdinand E. Marcos was the first one to place the CATV industry under the regulatory
power of the national government. On June 11, 1978, he issued Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
[15]
1512 establishing a monopoly of the industry by granting Sining Makulay, Inc., an exclusive franchise to
[16]
operate CATV system in any place within the Philippines. Accordingly, it terminated all franchises,
permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments

or by any instrumentality or agency of the national government. Likewise, it prescribed the subscriber
[17]
rates to be charged by Sining Makulay, Inc. to its customers. [18]
On July 21, 1979, President Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 894 vesting upon the
Chairman of the Board of Communications direct supervision over the operations of Sining Makulay,
Inc. Three days after, he issued E.O. No. 546 integrating the Board of Communications
[19] [20]
and the
Telecommunications Control Bureau to form a single entity to be known as the
[21]
National
Telecommunications Commission. Two of its assigned functions are:
a. Issue Certificate of Public Convenience for the operation of communications utilities and
services, radio communications systems, wire or wireless telephone or telegraph systems, radio
and television broadcasting system and other similar public utilities;
b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators of public service
communications; and determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such
public utility facilities and services except in cases where charges or rates are established by
international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies
recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates;
Although Sining Makulay Inc.s exclusive franchise had a life term of 25 years, it was cut short by the
advent of the 1986 Revolution. Upon President Corazon C. Aquinos assumption of power, she issued E.O.
No. 205 opening the CATV industry to all citizens of the Philippines. It mandated the NTC to grant
[22]
Certificates of Authority to CATV operators and to issue the necessary implementing rules and
regulations.
On September 9, 1997, President Fidel V. Ramos issued E.O. No. 436 prescribing policy guidelines
[23]
to govern CATV operation in the Philippines. Cast in more definitive terms, it restated the NTCs regulatory
powers over CATV operations, thus:
SECTION 2. The regulation and supervision of the cable television industry in the Philippines shall
remain vested solely with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
SECTION 3. Only persons, associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives, granted a

Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority by the Commission may install, operate and
maintain a cable television system or render cable television service within a service area.
Clearly, it has been more than two decades now since our national government, through the NTC,
assumed regulatory power over the CATV industry. Changes in the political arena did not alter the trend.
Instead, subsequent presidential issuances further reinforced the NTCs power. Significantly, President
Marcos and President Aquino, in the exercise of their legislative power, issued P.D. No. 1512, E.O. No. 546
and E.O. No. 205. Hence, they have the force and effect of statutes or laws passed by Congress. That [24]
the regulatory power stays with the NTC is also clear from President Ramos E.O. No. 436 mandating that
the regulation and supervision of the CATV industry shall remain vested solely in the NTC. Blacks Law
Dictionary defines sole as without another or others. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light
[25]
of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the
exclusion of other bodies.
But, lest we be misunderstood, nothing herein should be interpreted as to strip LGUs of their general
power to prescribe regulations under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code. It must be
emphasized that when E.O. No. 436 decrees that the regulatory power shall be vested solely in the NTC,
it pertains to the regulatory power over those matters which are peculiarly within the NTCs competence,
such as, the: (1) determination of rates, (2) issuance of certificates of authority, (3) establishment of areas
of operation, (4)examination and assessment of the legal, technical and financial qualifications of applicant
operators, (5) granting of permits for the use of frequencies, (6) regulation of ownership and

operation, (7) adjudication of issues arising from its functions, and (8) other similar matters. Within these
[26]
areas, the NTC reigns supreme as it possesses the exclusive power to regulate -- a power comprising
varied acts, such as to fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method or established mode; to direct by
rule or restriction; or to subject to governing principles or laws.[27]
Coincidentally, respondents justify their exercise of regulatory power over petitioners CATV operation
under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code of 1983. The Court of Appeals sustained
their stance.
There is no dispute that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, like other local legislative bodies, has
been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of B.P.
Blg. 337, the Local Government Code of 1983. That it continues to posses such power is clear under the
new law, R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991). Section 16 thereof provides:
SECTION 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among others, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of
the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant,
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
In addition, Section 458 of the same Code specifically mandates:
SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, x x x:
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State
to LGUs. Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their
[28]
constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Accordingly, we
have upheld enactments providing, for instance, the regulation of gambling, the occupation of rig
[29]
drivers, the installation and operation of pinball machines, the maintenance and operation of
[30] [31]
cockpits, the exhumation and transfer of corpses from public burial grounds, and the operation of hotels,
[32] [33]
motels, and lodging houses as valid exercises by local legislatures of the police power under the general
[34]
welfare clause.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare
clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties.
(It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV
system the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of
large regions allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators. This is the same [35]
regulation that it exercises over all private enterprises within its territory.
But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain
Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power.
The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the States
deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
I.
Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature.
Necessarily, its act must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. To test its validity, we must apply the

particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal
corporations. [36]
Speaking for the Court in the leading case of United States vs. Abendan, Justice Moreland said: An
[37]
ordinance enacted by virtue of the general welfare clause is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental
law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or
is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. In De la Cruz vs.
Paraz, we laid the general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general
[38]
welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation,
and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O. No. 436 insofar
as it permits respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power exclusively vested in the NTC, i.e., the
power to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators. As earlier discussed, the fixing of subscriber
rates is definitely one of the matters within the NTCs exclusive domain.
In this regard, it is appropriate to stress that where the state legislature has made provision for the
regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that the subject matter shall be fully covered by the
statute, and that a municipality, under its general powers, cannot regulate the same conduct. In Keller vs.
[39]
State, it was held that: Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing
[40]
it to adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a general statute,
a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which is completely covered
by a general statute of the legislature, may be rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of
statewide concern, and the legislature has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its
declaration is binding throughout the State. A reason advanced for this view is that such ordinances
are in excess of the powers granted to the municipal corporation. [41]
Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised
by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law.
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws
of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is
universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal
[42]
authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law
or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality,
[43]
there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law. In the language
[44]
of Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.), this Court, in Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., ruled that:
[45]
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot
be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that
the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in
the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature.
It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy.
As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right,
the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a
wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not
prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned.
They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without

meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local
government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions.
The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere
statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government
units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
Respondents have an ingenious retort against the above disquisition. Their theory is that the regulatory
power of the LGUs is granted by R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991), a handiwork of the
national lawmaking authority. They contend that R.A. No. 7160 repealed E.O. No. 205 (issued by President
Aquino). Respondents argument espouses a bad precedent. To say that LGUs exercise the same
regulatory power over matters which are peculiarly within the NTCs competence is to promote a scenario
of LGUs and the NTC locked in constant clash over the appropriate regulatory measure on the same subject
matter. LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the
exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
At any rate, we find no basis to conclude that R.A. No. 7160 repealed E.O. No. 205, either expressly
or impliedly. It is noteworthy that R.A. No. 7160 repealing clause, which painstakingly mentions the specific
laws or the parts thereof which are repealed, does not include E.O. No. 205, thus:
SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code." Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby
repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and
issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a
(3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No.
144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended;
Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos.
381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Section 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree
No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Neither is there an indication that E.O. No. 205 was impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 7160. It is a settled
rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of
such intentions. In Mecano vs. Commission on Audit, we ruled:
[46]
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given

effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that
the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and
manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not
a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first
enactment.
As previously stated, E.O. No. 436 (issued by President Ramos) vests upon the NTC the power to
regulate the CATV operation in this country. So also Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95, the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7925 (the Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the Philippines). This
shows that the NTCs regulatory power over CATV operation is continuously recognized.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably
destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws
deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of coordinate branches of the government. On the [47]
assumption of a conflict between E.O. No. 205 and R.A. No. 7160, the proper action is not to uphold one
and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This recourse finds application
here. Thus, we hold that the NTC, under E.O. No. 205, has exclusive jurisdiction over matters affecting
CATV operation, including specifically the fixing of subscriber rates, but nothing herein precludes LGUs
from exercising its general power, under R.A. No. 7160, to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of their constituents. In effect, both laws
become equally effective and mutually complementary.
The grant of regulatory power to the NTC is easily understandable. CATV system is not a mere local
concern. The complexities that characterize this new technology demand that it be regulated by a
specialized agency. This is particularly true in the area of rate-fixing. Rate fixing involves a series of
technical operations. Consequently, on the hands of the regulatory body lies the ample discretion in the
[48]
choice of such rational processes as might be appropriate to the solution of its highly complicated and
technical problems. Considering that the CATV industry is so technical a field, we believe that the NTC, a
specialized agency, is in a better position than the LGU, to regulate it. Notably, in United States vs.
Southwestern Cable Co., the US Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Communications Commissions
[49]
(FCCs) jurisdiction over CATV operation. The Court held that the FCCs authority over cable systems
assures the preservation of the local broadcast service and an equitable distribution of broadcast services
among the various regions of the country.
II.
Resolution No. 210 violated the States deregulation policy.

Deregulation is the reduction of government regulation of business to permit freer markets and
competition. Oftentimes, the State, through its regulatory agencies, carries out a policy of deregulation to
[50]
attain certain objectives or to address certain problems. In the field of telecommunications, it is recognized
that many areas in the Philippines are still unserved or underserved. Thus, to encourage private sectors to
venture in this field and be partners of the government in stimulating the growth and development of
telecommunications, the State promoted the policy of deregulation.
In the United States, the country where CATV originated, the Congress observed, when it adopted the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, that there was a need to provide a pro-competitive, deregulatory national
policy framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced
telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by opening all
telecommunications markets to competition. The FCC has adopted regulations to implement the
requirements of the 1996 Act and the intent of the Congress.
Our country follows the same policy. The fifth Whereas Clause of E.O. No. 436 states:
WHEREAS, professionalism and self-regulation among existing operators, through a nationally

recognized cable television operators association, have enhanced the growth of the cable television
industry and must therefore be maintained along with minimal reasonable government regulations;

This policy reaffirms the NTCs mandate set forth in the Memorandum dated August 25, 1989 of
Commissioner Jose Luis A. Alcuaz, to wit:
In line with the purpose and objective of MC 4-08-88, Cable Television System or Community Antenna
Television (CATV) is made part of the broadcast media to promote the orderly growth of the Cable
Television Industry it being in its developing stage. Being part of the Broadcast Media, the service
rates of CATV are likewise considered deregulated in accordance with MC 06-2-81 dated 25
February 1981, the implementing guidelines for the authorization and operation of Radio and
Television Broadcasting stations/systems.
Further, the Commission will issue Provisional Authority to existing CATV operators to authorize their
operations for a period of ninety (90) days until such time that the Commission can issue the regular
Certificate of Authority.
When the State declared a policy of deregulation, the LGUs are bound to follow. To rule otherwise is
to render the States policy ineffective. Being mere creatures of the State, LGUs cannot defeat national
policies through enactments of contrary measures. Verily, in the case at bar, petitioner may increase its
subscriber rates without respondents approval.
At this juncture, it bears emphasizing that municipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate,
created not only as local units of local self-government, but as governmental agencies of the state. The [51]
legislature, by establishing a municipal corporation, does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty;
absolve itself from its right and duty to administer the public affairs of the entire state; or divest itself of any
power over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter was granted. [52]
Respondents likewise argue that E.O. No. 205 violates the constitutional prohibition against
impairment of contracts, Resolution No. 210 of Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod being a grant of
franchise to petitioner.
We are not convinced.
There is no law specifically authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV system.
Whatever authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos issued
P.D. No. 1512 terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system
previously granted by local governments. Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, only persons,
associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or
Certificate of Authority by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or
render cable television service within a service area. It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or
legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises. Consequently, the protection
[53]
of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges,
franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires. [54]
One last word. The devolution of powers to the LGUs, pursuant to the Constitutional mandate of
ensuring their autonomy, has bred jurisdictional tension between said LGUs and the State. LGUs must be
reminded that they merely form part of the whole. Thus, when the Drafters of the 1987 Constitution
enunciated the policy of ensuring the autonomy of local governments, it was never their intention to create
[55]
an imperium in imperio and install an intra-sovereign political subdivision independent of a single sovereign
state.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 12, 1999 as well as its Resolution dated May 26, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52461, are hereby
REVERSED. The RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 4254 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., on leave.
[1]
Mary Alice Mayer, John Walson: An Oral History, August 1987 (USA).
[2]
Rollo at 51-56. Per Associate Justice Buenaventura O. Guerrero (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Alio-
Hormachuelos and Teodoro P. Regino (retired).
[3]
Rollo at 58.
[4]
Entitled Batangas CATV, Inc. versus The Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod and Batangas City Mayor.
[5]
Rollo at 86-90.
[6]
Entitled Batangas CATV, Inc. vs. The Batangas City Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Batangas City Mayor.
[7]
Rollo at 70-73.
[8]
Id. at 72.
[9]
Id. at 84, dated April 26, 1994.
[10]
Rollo at 89-90.
[11]
Id. at 56.
[12]
Id. at 58.
[13]
Id. at 19.
[14]
Section 10. Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that: No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
[15]
The fourth Whereas Clause of P.D. 1512 reads:
WHEREAS, because of technological advances in equipment and facilities, CATV systems have acquired a more significant role in
the socio-political life of the nation, requiring the exercise of regulatory power by the national government.
[16]
Decree Creating an Exclusive Franchise to Construct, Operate and Maintain a Community Antenna Television System in the
Philippines in favor of Sining Makulay, Incorporated.
[17]
Section 10 of P.D. No. 1512.
[18]
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1512.
[19]
Creating a Ministry of Public Works and a Ministry of Transportation and Communications.
[20]
Created under Article III, Chapter I, Part X of the Integrated Reorganization Plan, as amended.
[21]
Created under Article IX, id.
[22]
Dated June 30, 1987.
[23]
Prescribing Policy Guidelines to Govern the Operations of Cable Television in the Philippines.
[24]
Miners Association of the Philippines vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 98332, January 16, 1995, 240 SCRA 100.
[25]
Sixth Edition at 1391.
[26]
See National Telecommunications Commission Practices & Procedures Manual, April 27,1992; PLDT vs. National
Telecommunication Commission, G.R. No. 94374, February 21, 1995, 241 SCRA 486.
[27]
Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition at 1286.
[28]
US vs. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102 (1918).
[29]
Id.
[30]
People vs. Felisarta, G.R. No. 15346, June 29, 1962, 5 SCRA 389.
[31]
Miranda vs. City of Manila, G.R. Nos. L-17252 & L-17276, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 613.

[32]
Chief of the Philippine Constabulary vs. Sabungan Bagong Silang, Inc., G.R. No. L-22609, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 336; Chief
of P.C. vs. Judge of CFI of Rizal, G.R. Nos. L-22308 & L-22343-4, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 607.
[33]
Viray vs. City of Caloocan, G.R. No. L-23118, July 26, 1967, 20 SCRA 791.
[34]
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA
849.
[35]
See New York State Commission on Cable Television vs. Federal Communication Commission.
[36]
According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be
unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. The Solicitor General vs. The Metropolitan Manila
Authority, G.R. No. 102782, December 11, 1991, 204 SCRA 837.
Though designated as resolution, Resolution No. 210 is actually an ordinance as it concerns a subject that is inherently legislative in
character, 37 Am. Jur. p. 667. Dillon comments, thus: "A resolution concerning a subject which is inherently legislative in its
character and for which an ordinance is required, will, if adopted with all the formalities required in the case of an ordinance,
be regarded as an ordinance and given effect accordingly. The substance, and not the form, of the corporate act is what
governs. Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 5th ed., Vol. II, pp. 594-897.
[37]
24 Phil 165 (1913).
[38]
G.R. No. L-41053, February 27, 1976, 69 SCRA 556.
[39]
56 Sm Jur 2d 375 citing Birmingham vs. Allen, 251 Ala 198, 36 So 2d 297; Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal 636, 192 P442, 21 ALR 1172;
Thrower vs. Atlanta, 124 Ga 1, 52 SE 76.
[40]
46 Ariz 106, 47 P2d 442.
[41]
56 Sm Jur 2d 375 citing Savannah vs. Hussey, 21 Ga 80; Corvallis vs. Carlile, 10 Or 139; Judy vs. Lashley, 50 W Va 628, 41 SE
197.
[42]
56 Am Jur 2d 374 citing West Chicago Street R.Co. vs. Illinois, 201 US 506, 50 L Ed 845, 26 S Ct 518; Ex parte Byrd, 84 Ala 17,4
So 397; Mclaughlin vs. Retherford, 207 Ark 1094, 184 SW2d 461.
[43]
56 Am Jur 2d 374 citing Sims vs. Alabama Water Co., 205 Ala 378, 87 So 688, 28 ALR 461; Abbot vs. Los Angeles, 53 Cal 2d 674,
3 Cal Rptr 158, 349 P2d 974, 82 ALR 2d 385; Phillips vs. Denver, 19 Colo 179, 34 P 902; Miami Beach vs. Texas Co., 141
Fla 616, 194 So 368, 128 ALR 350.
[44]
Johnson vs. Philadelphia, 94 Miss 34, 47 So 526, see also Kraus vs. Cleveland, 135 Ohio St 43, 13 Ohio Ops 323, 19 NE2d 159.
[45]
G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994, 234 SCRA 255.
[46]
G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992, 216 SCRA 500.
[47]
Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, Corp. Inc., supra.
[48]
Republic vs. Medina, L-32068, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 643.
[49]
392 U.S. 157 (1968).
[50]
Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed. at 443.
[51]
Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 237 NC 52, 74 SE2d 310; Othello vs. Harder, 46 Wash 2d 747,
284 P2d 1099.
[52]
Laramie County vs. Albany County, 92 US 307, 23 Led 552; People ex rel. Raymond Community High School Dist. vs. Bartlett, 304
Ill 283, 136 NE 654.
[53]
36 Am Jur 2d 11.
[54]
36 Am Jur 2d 7 citing Grand Trunk W.R. Co. vs. South Bend, 227 US 544, 57 L ed 633, 33 S Ct. 303; Murray vs. Pocatello, 226
US 318, 57 Led 239, 33 S Ct 107; Home Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Los Angeles, 211 US 265, 53 L ed 176, 29 S Ct 50; Birmingham
& P.M. Street R. Co. vs. Birmingham Street R. Co. 79 Ala 465; Westminster Water Co. vs. Westminster, 98 Md 551, 56 A
990; Elizabeth City vs. Bank, 150 NC 407, 64 SE 189; State ex rel. Webster vs. Superior, Ct.67 Wash 37, 120 P 861.
[55]
Section 25, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 187836 November 25, 2014
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, NAMELY, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, and

VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, Petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 187916
JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE, MA. LOURDES M. ISIP-GARCIA, RAFAEL P.

BORROMEO JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION, minors MARIAN REGINA B. TARAN, MACAILA
RICCI B. TARAN, RICHARD KENNETH B. TARAN, represented and joined by their parents
RICHARD AND MARITES TARAN, minors CZARINA ALYSANDRA C. RAMOS, CEZARAH
ADRIANNA C. RAMOS, and CRISTEN AIDAN C. RAMOS represented and joined by their
mother DONNA C. RAMOS, minors JAZMIN SYLLITA T. VILA AND ANTONIO T. CRUZ IV,
represented and joined by their mother MAUREEN C. TOLENTINO, Petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE MAYOR FRANCISCO DOMAGOSO, COUNCILORS ARLENE
W. KOA, MOISES T. LIM, JESUS FAJARDO LOUISITO N. CHUA, VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ,
JOHN MARVIN C. NIETO, ROLANDO M. VALERIANO, RAYMUNDO R. YUPANGCO, EDWARD
VP MACEDA, RODERICK D. V ALBUENA, JOSEFINA M. SISCAR, SALVADOR PHILLIP H.
LACUNA, LUCIANO M. VELOSO, CARLO V. LOPEZ, ERNESTO F. RIVERA,1 DANILO VICTOR
H. LACUNA, JR., ERNESTO G. ISIP, HONEY H. LACUNA-PANGAN, ERNESTO M. DIONISO, JR.
and ERICK IAN O. NIEVA, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION AND PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM

CORPORATION, Intervenors.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Challenged in these consolidated petitions2 is the validity of Ordinance No. 81873 entitled "AN
ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 8119, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ‘THE MANILA
COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND ZONING ORDINANCE OF 2006,’ BY CREATING A
MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) AND HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-3), AND PROVIDING FOR
ITS ENFORCEMENT" enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila (Sangguniang
Panlungsod) on 14 May 2009.
The creation of a medium industrial zone (1-2) and heavy industrial zone (1-3) effectively lifted the
prohibition against owners and operators of businesses, including herein intervenors Chevron

Philippines, Inc. (Chevron), Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell), and Petron Corporation
(Petron), collectively referred to as the oil companies, from operating in the designated commercial
zone – an industrial zone prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 80274 entitled "AN ORDINANCE
RECLASSIFYING THE LAND USE OF THAT PORTION OF LAND BOUNDED BY THE
PASIGRIVER IN THE NORTH, PNR RAILROAD TRACK IN THE EAST, BEATA ST. IN THE
SOUTH, PALUMPONG ST. IN THE SOUTHWEST AND ESTERO DE PANDACAN IN THE WEST,
PNR RAILROAD IN THE NORTHWEST AREA, ESTERO DE PANDACAN IN THE NORTHEAST,
PASIG RIVER IN THE SOUTHEAST AND DR. M. L. CARREON IN THE SOUTHWEST, THE AREA
OF PUNTA, STA.ANA BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER, MARCELINO OBRERO ST., MAYO 28
ST. AND THE F. MANALO STREET FROM INDUSTRIAL II TO COMMERCIAL I," and Ordinance
No. 81195 entitled "AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING THE MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE
PLAN AND ZONING REGULATIONS OF 2006 AND PROVIDING FOR THE ADMINISTRATION,
ENFORCEMENT AND AMENDMENT THERETO."
The Parties
Petitioners allege the parties’ respective capacity to sue and be sued, viz:
Petitioners Residence Suing capacity aside from being

in Manila residents of Manila other personal
circumstances
G.R. No. 187836
SJS Officer Samson S. Alcantara Not mentioned in Manila taxpayer;

(Alcantara) the petition; One of the petitioners in SJS v.
holding office in Atienza (G.R. No. 156052);*
Ermita, Manila Pesident of ABAKADA GURO
PARTY LIST with members who
are residents of the City of Manila
SJS Officer Vladimir Alarique T. Pandacan One of the petitioners in SJS v.

Cabigao (Cabigao) Atienza (G.R. No. 156052)
* The allegation is inaccurate. SJS Officer Alcantara is actually one of the counsels for petitioner SJS
in G.R. No. 156052. The petitioners in that case are the SJS itself, Cabigao and Bonifacio S.
Tumbokon (Tumbokon).
G.R. No. 187916
Former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. San Andres Former Mayor of Manila;
(Mayor Atienza) Secretary of Department of
Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR)

Bienvinido M. Abante Sta. Ana Citizen and taxpayer;
member of the House of
Representatives
Ma. Lourdes M. Isip-Garcia San Miguel Incumbent City Councilor of the

City of Manila
Rafael P. Borromeo Paco Incumbent City Councilor of the

City of Manila
Jocelyn Dawis-Asuncion Sta. Mesa Incumbent City Councilor of the

City of Manila
Minors Marian Regina B. Taran, Paco Citizens, real estate owners and
Macalia Ricci B. Taran, Richard taxpayers
Kenneth B. Taran, represented and
joined by their parents Richard and
Marites Taran
Minors Czarina Alysandra C. Tondo Citizens, real estate owners and

Ramos, Cezarah Adrianna C. taxpayers
Ramos, and Cristen Aidan C. Ramos
represented and joined by
their mother Donna c. Ramos
Minors Jasmin Syllita T. Vila and Sta. Ana Citizens, real estate owners and
Antonio T. Cruz IV, represented and taxpayers
joined by their mother Maureen C.
Tolentino
Respondents Sued in their capacity as
G.R. Nos. 187836 and 187916
Former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) Incumbent Mayor of Manila at

the time of the filing of the
present petitions
Respondents Sued in their capacity as

G.R. No. 187916
Vice-Mayor Francisco Domagoso (Vice-Mayor Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer

Domagoso) of the City Council of Manila
Arlene Woo Koa Principal author of City

Ordinance No. 8187
Moises T. Lim, Jesus Fajardo, Louisito N. Chua, Personal and official capacities as
Victoriano A. Melendez, John Marvin Nieto, Rolando M. councilors who voted and approved
Valeriano, Raymondo R. Yupangco, Edward VP City Ordinance No. 8187
Maceda, Roderick D. Valbuena, Josefina M. Siscar,
Phillip H. Lacuna, Luciano M. Veloso, Carlo V. Lopez,
Ernesto F. Rivera,6 Danilo Victor H. Lacuna, Jr., Ernesto
G. Isip, Honey H. Lacuna-Pangan, Ernesto M. Dionisio,
Jr., Erick Ian O. Nieva
The following intervenors, all of which are corporations organized under Philippine laws, intervened:7
Intervenors Nature of Business
Chevron Philippines, importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum

Inc. (CHEVRON) products in the Philippines since 1922
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum manufacturing, refining, importing, distributing and

Corporation (SHELL) marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines
Petron Corporation (PETRON) manufacturing, refining, importing, distributing and

marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines
They claim that their rights with respect to the oil depots in Pandacan would be directly affected by
the outcome of these cases.
The Antecedents
These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr.8 (hereinafter
referred to asG.R. No. 156052), where the Court found: (1) that the ordinance subject thereof –
Ordinance No. 8027 – was enacted "to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of the
inhabitants of Manila;"9 (2) that it had passed the tests of a valid ordinance; and (3) that it is not
superseded by Ordinance No. 8119.10 Declaring that it is constitutional and valid,11 the Court
accordingly ordered its immediate enforcement with a specific directive on the relocation and
transfer of the Pandacan oil terminals.12
Highlighting that the Court has soruled that the Pandacan oil depots should leave, herein petitioners
now seek the nullification of Ordinance No. 8187, which contains provisions contrary to those

embodied in Ordinance No. 8027. Allegations of violation of the right to health and the right to a
healthful and balanced environment are also included.
For a better perspective of the facts of these cases, we again trace the history of the Pandacan oil
terminals, aswell as the intervening events prior to the reclassification of the land use from Industrial
II to Commercial I under Ordinance No. 8027 until the creation of Medium Industrial Zone and Heavy
Industrial Zone pursuant to Ordinance No. 8187.
History of the Pandacan

Oil Terminals
We quote the following from the Resolution of the Court in G.R. No. 156052:
Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated along the banks of the Pasig [R]iver.
Atthe turn of the twentieth century, Pandacan was unofficially designated as the industrial center of
Manila. The area, then largely uninhabited, was ideal for various emerging industries as the nearby
river facilitated the transportation of goods and products. In the 1920s, it was classifiedas an
industrial zone. Among its early industrial settlers werethe oil companies. x x x On December 8,
1941, the Second World War reached the shores of the Philippine Islands. x x x [I]n their zealous
attempt to fend off the Japanese Imperial Army, the United States Army took control of the
Pandacan Terminals and hastily made plans to destroy the storage facilities to deprive the
advancing Japanese Army of a valuable logistics weapon. The U.S. Army burned unused petroleum,
causing a frightening conflagration. Historian Nick Joaquin recounted the events as follows:
After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941, all army fuel storage dumps were set
on fire. The flames spread, enveloping the City in smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze,
endangering bridges and all riverside buildings. … For one week longer, the "open city" blazed—a
cloud of smoke by day, a pillar of fire by night.
The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and rendered its network of depots and
service stations inoperative.
After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan changed as Manila rebuilt itself. The
three major oil companies resumed the operation of their depots. But the district was no longer a
sparsely populated industrial zone; it had evolved into a bustling, hodgepodge community. Today,
Pandacan has become a densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000 people, majority of
whom are urban poor who call it home. Aside from numerous industrial installations, there are also
small businesses, churches, restaurants, schools, daycare centers and residences situated there.
Malacañang Palace, the official residence of the President of the Philippines and the seat of
governmental power, is just two kilometers away. There is a private school near the Petron depot.
Along the walls of the Shell facility are shanties of informal settlers. More than 15,000 students are
enrolled in elementary and high schools situated near these facilities. A university with a student
population of about 25,000 is located directly across the depot on the banks of the Pasig [R]iver.
The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies’ distribution terminals and depot
facilities. The refineries of Chevron and Shell in Tabangao and Bauan, both in Batangas,
1âwphi 1
respectively, are connected to the Pandacan Terminals through a 114-kilometer underground

pipeline system. Petron’s refinery in Limay, Bataan, on the other hand, also services the depot. The
terminals store fuel and other petroleum products and supply 95% of the fuel requirements of Metro
Manila, 50% of Luzon’s consumption and 35% nationwide. Fuel can also be transported through
barges along the Pasig [R]iver ortank trucks via the South Luzon Expressway.13 (Citations omitted)

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
dated 12 October 2001 between the oil companies
and the Department of Energy (DOE)
On 12 October 2001, the oil companies and the DOE entered into a MOA14 "in light of recent
international developments involving acts of terrorism on civilian and government
landmarks,"15 "potential new security risks relating to the Pandacan oil terminals and the impact on
the surrounding community which may be affected,"16 and "to address the perceived risks posed by
the proximity of communities, businesses and offices to the Pandacan oil terminals, consistent with
the principle of sustainable development."17 The stakeholders acknowledged that "there is a need for
a comprehensive study to address the economic, social, environmental and security concerns with
the end in view of formulating a Master Plan to address and minimize the potential risks and hazards
posed by the proximity of communities, businesses and offices to the Pandacan oil terminals without
adversely affecting the security and reliability of supply and distribution of petroleum products to
Metro Manila and the rest of Luzon, and the interests of consumers and users of such petroleum
products in those areas."18
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027

against the continued stay of the oil depots
The MOA, however, was short-lived.
On 20 November 2001, during the incumbency of former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Mayor Atienza)
– nowone of the petitioners in G.R. No. 187916 – the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance
No. 802719 reclassifying the use of the land in Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from
Industrial II to Commercial I.
The owners and operators of the businesses thus affected by the reclassification were given six
months from the date of effectivity of the Ordinance within which to stop the operation of their
businesses.
Nevertheless, the oil companies weregranted an extension of until 30 April 2003 within which to
comply with the Ordinance pursuant to the following:
(1) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)20 dated 26 June 2002 between the City of Manila
and the Department of Energy (DOE), on the one hand, and the oil companies, on the other,
where the parties agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most
viable and practicable option"21 and committed to adopt specific measures22 consistent with
the said objective;
(2) Resolution No. 97 dated 25 July 200223 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which ratified
the 26 June 2002 MOU but limited the extension of the period within which to comply to six
months from 25 July 2002; and
(3) Resolution No. 13 dated 30 January 200324 of the Sanguniang Panlungsod, which
extended the validity of Resolution No. 97 to 30 April 2003, authorized then Mayor Atienza to
issue special business permits to the oil companies, and called for a reassessment of the
ordinance.
Social Justice Society v. Atienza (G.R. No. 156052):

The filing of an action for mandamus

before the Supreme Court
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
In the interim, an original action for mandamus entitled Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.
docketed as G.R. No. 15605225 was filed on 4 December 2002 by Tumbokon and herein petitioners
SJS and Cabigao against then Mayor Atienza. The petitioners sought to compel former Mayor
Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and cause the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil
companies.26
Issuance by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction
and preliminary mandatory injunction,
and status quo order in favor of the oil companies
Unknown to the Court, during the pendency of G.R. No. 156052, and before the expiration of the
validity ofResolution No. 13, the oil companies filed the following actions before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila: (1) an action for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction – by Chevron; (2) a petition
for prohibition and mandamus also for the annulment of the Ordinance with application for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction – by Shell; and (3) a petition
assailing the validity of the Ordinance with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) – by Petron.27
Writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in favor
of Chevron and Shell on 19 May 2003. Petron, on the other hand, obtained a status quo order on 4
August 2004.28
The Enactment of Ordinance No. 8119 defining the Manila land use plan and zoning regulations
On 16 June 2006, then Mayor Atienza approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled "An Ordinance
Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing
for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto."29
Pertinent provisions relative to these cases are the following:
(a) Article IV, Sec. 730 enumerating the existing zones or districts in the City of Manila;
(b) Article V, Sec. 2331 designating the Pandacan oil depot area as a "Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone" (O-PUD); and
(c) the repealing clause, which reads:
SEC. 84. Repealing Clause. – All ordinances, rules, regulations in conflict with the provisions of this
Ordinance are hereby repealed; PROVIDED, That the rights that are vested upon the effectivity of
this Ordinance shall not be impaired.32
7 March 2007 Decision in G.R. No. 156052;

The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan terminals

On 7 March 2007, the Court granted the petition for mandamus, and directed then respondent Mayor
Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.33
Confined to the resolution of the following issues raised by the petitioners, to wit:
1. whether respondent [Mayor Atienza]has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal
Ordinance No. 8027.34
the Court declared:
x x x [T]he Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As
the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not
been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so. x x x
xxxx
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the
subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunianhave made the respondent’s duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. x x x
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with
Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the Cityof Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that
legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world,
witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade
Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is toprotect the residents of Manila from the
catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.35 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted)
13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;

Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional
The oil companies and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DOE, filed their motions
for leave to intervene and for reconsideration of the 7 March 2007 Decision. During the oral
arguments, the parties submitted to the power of the Court torule on the constitutionality and validity
of the assailed Ordinance despite the pendency of the cases in the RTC.36
On 13 February 2008, the Court granted the motions for leave to intervene of the oil companies and
the Republic of the Philippines but denied their respective motions for reconsideration. The
dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, x x x

We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. In
coordination with the appropriate agencies and other parties involved, respondent Mayor is hereby
ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site.37
13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;

Ordinance No. 8027 was not impliedly repealed
by Ordinance No. 8119
The Court also ruled that Ordinance No. 8027 was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 8119.
On this score, the Court ratiocinated:
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict between the two
ordinances. There is no conflict between the two ordinances. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the
Pandacan area from Industrial II to Commercial I. Ordinance No. 8119, Section 23, designated it as
a "Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD)." In its Annex "C" which defined the zone
boundaries, the Pandacan area was shown to be within the "High Density Residential/Mixed Use
Zone (R-3/MXD)." x x x [B]oth ordinances actually have a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning
classification from industrial to commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential commercial
(Ordinance No. 8119)
xxxx
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a certain area described therein
(the Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law as it
covers the entire city of Manila.
xxxx
x x x The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be taken to indicate the legislative intent to
repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter, including Ordinance No. 8027, a special
enactment, since the aforequoted minutes (an official record of the discussions in the Sanggunian)
actually indicated the clear intent to preserve the provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.38
Filing of a draft Resolution amending Ordinance No. 8027 effectively allowing

the oil depots to stay in the Pandacan area; Manifestation and
Motion to forestall the passing of the new Ordinance filed in G.R. No. 156052
On 5 March 2009, respondent then Councilor Arlene W. Koa, filed with the Sangguniang
Panlungsod a draft resolution entitled "An Ordinance Amending Ordinance No. 8119 Otherwise
Known as ‘The Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006’ by Creating a
Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) and Providing for its
Enforcement."39 Initially numbered as Draft Ordinance No. 7177, this was later renumbered as
Ordinance No. 8187, the assailed Ordinance in these instant petitions.
Considering that the provisions thereof run contrary to Ordinance No. 8027, the petitioners in G.R.
No. 156052 filed a "Manifestation and Motion to: a) Stop the City Council of Manila from further
hearing the amending ordinance to Ordinance No. 8027; [and] b) Transfer the monitoring of the
enforcement of the Resolution of the Honorable Court on this case dated 13 February 2008 from
Branch 39, Manila Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court."40

28 April 2009 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;
Second Motion for Reconsideration denied with finality;
succeeding motions likewise denied or otherwise noted without action
On 28 April 2009, pending the resolution of the Manifestation and Motion, the Court denied with
finalitythe second motion for reconsideration dated 27 February 2008 of the oil companies.41
It further ruled that no further pleadings shall be entertained in the case.42
Succeeding motions were thus deniedand/or noted without action. And, after the "Very Urgent
Motion to Stop the Mayor of the City of Manila from Signing Draft Ordinance No. 7177 and to Cite
Him for Contempt if He Would Do So" filed on 19 May 2009 was denied on 2 June 2009 for being
moot,43 all pleadings pertaining to the earlier motion against the drafting of an ordinance to amend
Ordinance No. 8027 were noted without action.44
The Enactment of Ordinance No. 8187

allowing the continued stay of the oil depots
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim), who
succeeded Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187.45
The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027,
Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or provisions inconsistent
therewith46 thereby allowing, once again, the operation of "Pollutive/Non-Hazardous and
Pollutive/Hazardous manufacturing and processing establishments" and "Highly Pollutive/Non-
Hazardous[,] Pollutive/Hazardous[,] Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous[,] Non-Pollutive/Extremely
Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous manufacturing
and processing establishments" within the newly created Medium Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy
Industrial Zone (1-3) in the Pandacan area.
Thus, where the Industrial Zoneunder Ordinance No. 8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone (I-1),
Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium Industrial Zone (I-2) and a Heavy Industrial Zone
(I-3), where petroleum refineries and oil depots are now among those expressly allowed.
Hence these petitions.
The Petitions
G.R. No. 187836
To support their petition for prohibition against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187, the petitioner
Social Justice Society (SJS) officers allege that:
1. The enactment of the assailed Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power because
the measures provided therein do not promote the general welfare of the people within the
contemplation of the following provisions of law:
a) Article III, Section 18 (kk)47 of Republic Act No. 409 otherwise known as the
"Revised Charter of the City of Manila," which provides that the Municipal Board shall
have the legislative power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper;

b) Section 1648 of Republic Act No. 7160 known as the Local Government Code,
which defines the scope of the general welfare clause;
2. The conditions at the time the Court declared Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional in G.R.
No. 156052 exist to this date;
3. Despite the finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 156052, and notwithstanding that the
conditions and circumstances warranting the validity of the Ordinance remain the same, the
Manila City Council passed a contrary Ordinance, thereby refusing to recognize that "judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system of
the Philippines;"49 and
4. Ordinance No. 8187 is violative of Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution of the
Philippines on the duty of the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the
people"50 and "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology."51 Petitioners pray that Ordinance No. 8187 of the City of Manila be declared null
and void, and that respondent, and all persons acting under him, be prohibited from
enforcing the same.
G.R. No. 187916
The petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Injunction against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187 of former Secretary of Department
of Environment and Natural Resources and then Mayor Atienza, together with other residents and
taxpayers of the City of Manila, also alleges violation of the right to health of the people and the right
to a healthful and balanced environment under Sections 15 and 16 of the Constitution.
Petitioners likewise claim that the Ordinance is in violation of the following health and environment-
related municipal laws, and international conventions and treaties to which the Philippines is a state
party:
1. Municipal Laws –
(a) Sections 4,52 12,53 1954 and 3055 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the
Philippine Clean Air Act;
(b) Environment Code (Presidential Decree No. 1152);
(c) Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); and
(d) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
2. International Conventions and Treaties to which the Philippines is a state party –
a. Section 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that

"[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person;"
b. Articles 6,56 2457 and 2758 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, summarized
by the petitioners in the following manner:
1. the human right to safe and healthy environment[;]

2. human right to the highest attainable standard of health[;]
3. the human right to ecologically sustainable development[;]
4. the human right to an adequate standard of living, including access to safe food and
water[;]
5. the human right of the child to live in an environment appropriate for physical and mental
development[; and]
6. the human right to full and equal participation for all persons in environmental decision-
making and development planning, and in shaping decisions and policies affecting one’s
community, at the local, national and international levels.59
Petitioners likewise posit that the title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance
No. 8119 when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. According to them, Ordinance No.
8027 was never mentioned in the title and the body of the new ordinance in violation of Section 26,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Also pointed out by the petitioners is a specific procedure outlined in Ordinance No. 8119 that should
be observed when amending the zoning ordinance. This is provided for under Section 81 thereof,
which reads:
SEC. 81. Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance. The proposed amendments to the Zoning
Ordinance asreviewed and evaluated by the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO)shall be
submitted to the City Council for approval of the majority of the Sangguniang Panlungsod members.
The amendments shall be acceptable and eventually approved: PROVIDED, That there is sufficient
evidence and justification for such proposal; PROVIDED FURTHER,That such proposal is consistent
with the development goals, planning objectives, and strategies of the Manila Comprehensive Land
Use Plan. Said amendments shall take effect immediately upon approval or after thirty (30) days
from application.
Petitioners thus pray that:
1. upon filing of [the] petition, [the] case be referred to the Court [E]n Banc, and setting (sic)
the case for oral argument;
2. upon the filing of [the] petition, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the
respondents from publishing and posting Manila City Ordinance No. 8187 and/or posting of
Manila City Ordinance No. 8187; and/or taking any steps to implementing (sic) and/or
enforce the same and after due hearing, the temporary restraining order be converted to a
permanent injunction;
3. x x x Manila City Ordinance 8187 [be declared] as null and void for being repugnant to the
Constitution and existing municipal laws and international covenants;
4. x x x the respondents [be ordered] to refrain from enforcing and/or implementing Manila
City Ordinance No. 8187;

5. x x x respondent City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim [be enjoined] from issuing any permits
(business or otherwise) to all industries whose allowable uses are anchored under the
provisions of Manila Ordinance No. 8187; and
6. x x x respondent Mayor of Manila Alfredo S. Lim [be ordered] to comply with the Order of
the Honorable Court in G.R. 156052 dated February 13, 2008.60
The Respondents’ Position on the Consolidated Petitions
Respondent former Mayor Lim
In his Memorandum,61 former Mayor Lim, through the City Legal Officer, attacks the petitioners’ lack
of legal standing to sue. He likewise points out that the petitioners failed to observe the principle of
hierarchy of courts.
Maintaining that Ordinance No. 8187 is valid and constitutional, he expounds on the following
arguments:
On the procedural issues, he contends that: (1) it is the function of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to
enact zoning ordinances, for which reason, it may proceed to amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119
without prior referral to the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals (MZBAA) as prescribed
under Section 80 (Procedure for Re-Zoning) and the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO)
pursuant to Section 81 (Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance) of Ordinance No. 8119, especially
when the action actually originated from the Sangguniang Panlungsod itself; (2) the Sangguniang
Panlungsod may, in the later ordinance, expressly repeal all or part of the zoning ordinance sought
to be modified; and (3) the provision repealing Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119 is not violative of
Section 26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which requires that every bill must embrace only one
subject and that such shall be expressed in the title.
On the substantive issues, he posits that the petitions are based on unfounded fears; that the
assailed ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; that it is consistent with the general welfare
clause and public policy, and is not unreasonable; that it does not run contrary to the Constitution,
municipal laws, and international conventions; and that the petitioners failed to overcome the
presumption of validity of the assailed ordinance.
Respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso and the City Councilors who voted in favor of the assailed
ordinance
On 14 September 2012, after the Court gave the respondents several chances to submit their
Memorandum,62 they, through the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, prayed that the Court
dispense with the filing thereof.
In their Comment,63 however, respondents offered a position essentially similar to those proffered by
former Mayor Lim.
The Intervenors’ Position on the Consolidated Petitions
On the other hand, the oil companies sought the outright dismissal of the petitions based on alleged
procedural infirmities, among others, incomplete requisites of judicial review, violation of the principle
of hierarchy of courts, improper remedy, submission of a defective verification and certification
against forum shopping, and forum shopping.

As to the substantive issues, they maintain, among others, that the assailed ordinance is
constitutional and valid; that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is in the best position to determine the
needs of its constituents; that it is a valid exercise of legislative power; that it does not violate health
and environment-related provisions of the Constitution, laws, and international conventions and
treaties to which the Philippines is a party; that the oil depots are not likely targets of terrorists; that
the scaling down of the operations in Pandacan pursuant to the MOU has been followed; and that
the people are safe in view of the safety measures installed in the Pandacan terminals.
Incidentally, in its Manifestation dated 30 November 2010,64 Petron informed the Court that it will
"cease [the] operation of its petroleum product storage facilities"65 in the Pandacan oil terminal not
later than January 2016 on account of the following:
2.01 Environmental issues, many of which are unfounded, continually crop up and tarnish the
Company’s image.
2.02. The location of its Pandacanterminal is continually threatened, and made uncertain preventing
long-term planning, by the changing local government composition. Indeed, the relevant zoning
ordinances have been amended three (3) times, and their validity subjected to litigation.66
Intervening Events
On 28 August 2012, while the Court was awaiting the submission of the Memorandum of
respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso and the councilors who voted in favor of the assailed
Ordinance, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which composition had already substantially changed,
enacted Ordinance No. 828367 entitled "AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 2 OF ORDINANCE
NO. 8187 BY RECLASSIFYING THE AREA WHERE PETROLEUM REFINERIES AND OIL
DEPOTS ARE LOCATED FROM HEAVY INDUSTRIAL (1-3) TO HIGH INTENSITY
COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE (C3/MXD).
The new ordinance essentially amended the assailed ordinance to exclude the area where
petroleum refineries and oil depots are located from the Industrial Zone.
Ordinance No. 8283 thus permits the operation of the industries operating within the Industrial Zone.
However, the oil companies, whose oil depots are located in the High Intensity Commercial/Mixed
Use Zone (C3/MXD), are given until the end of January 2016 within which to relocate their terminals.
Former Mayor Lim, who was then the incumbent mayor, did not support the amendment. Maintaining
that the removal of the oil depots was prejudicial to public welfare, and, on account of the pending
cases in the Supreme Court, he vetoed Ordinance No. 8283 on 11 September 2012.68
On 28 November 2012, former Mayor Lim filed a Manifestation informing this Court that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod voted to override the veto, and that he, in turn, returned it again with his
veto. He likewise directed the Sangguniang Panlungsod to append his written reasons for his veto of
the Ordinance, so that the same will be forwarded to the President for his consideration in the event
that his veto is overridden again.69
On 11 December 2012, Shell also filed a similar Manifestation.70
Meanwhile, three days after former Mayor Lim vetoed the new ordinance, Atty. Luch R. Gempis, Jr.
(Atty. Gempis), Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, writing on behalf of respondents Vice-
Mayor Domagoso and the City Councilors of Manila who voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance,

finally complied with this Court’s Resolution dated 17 July 2012 reiterating its earlier directives71 to
submit the said respondents’ Memorandum.
In his Compliance/Explanation with Urgent Manifestation72 dated 13 September 2012, Atty. Gempis
explained that it was not his intention to show disrespect to this Court or to delay or prejudice the
disposition of the cases.
According to him, he signed the Comment prepared by respondents Vice-Mayor and the City
Councilors only to attest that the pleading was personally signed by the respondents. He clarified
that he was not designated as the legal counsel of the respondents as, in fact, he was of the
impression that, pursuant to Section 481(b)(3) of the Local Government Code,73 it is the City Legal
Officer who isauthorized to represent the local government unit or any official thereof in a litigation. It
was for the same reason that he thought that the filing of a Memorandum may already be dispensed
with when the City Legal Officer filed its own on 8 February 2010. He further explained that the
Ordinance subject of these cases was passed during the 7th Council (2007-2010); that the
composition of the 8th Council (2010-2013) had already changed after the 2010 elections; and that
steps were already taken to amend the ordinance again. Hence, he was in a dilemma as to the
position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time he received the Court’s Resolution of 31 May
2011.
Atty. Gempis, thus, prayed that the Court dispense with the filing of the required memorandum in
view of the passing of Ordinance No. 8283.
Issue
The petitioners’ arguments are primarily anchored on the ruling of the Court in G. R. No. 156052
declaring Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional and valid after finding that the presence of the oil
terminals in Pandacan is a threat to the life and security of the people of Manila. From thence, the
petitioners enumerated constitutional provisions, municipal laws and international treaties and
conventions on health and environment protection allegedly violated by the enactment of the
assailed Ordinance to support their position.
The resolution of the present controversy is, thus, confined to the determination of whether or not the
enactment of the assailed Ordinance allowing the continued stay of the oil companies in the depots
is, indeed, invalid and unconstitutional.
Our Ruling
We see no reason why Ordinance No. 8187 should not be stricken down insofar as the presence of
the oil depots in Pandacan is concerned.
We first rule on the procedural issues raised by the respondents and the oil companies.
At the outset, let it be emphasized that the Court, in G.R. No. 156052, has already pronounced that
the matter of whether or not the oil depots should remain in the Pandacan area is of transcendental
importance to the residents of Manila.74

We may, thus, brush aside procedural infirmities, if any, as we had in the past, and take cognizance
of the cases75 if only to determine if the acts complained of are no longer within the bounds of the
Constitution and the laws in place.76
Put otherwise, there can be no valid objection to this Court’s discretion to waive one or some
procedural requirements if only to remove any impediment to address and resolve the serious
constitutional question77 raised in these petitions of transcendental importance, the same having
farreaching implications insofar as the safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila, and
even its neighboring communities, are concerned.
Proper Remedy
Respondents and intervenors argue that the petitions should be outrightly dismissed for failure on
the part of the petitioners to properly apply related provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of Court,
and/or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate remedy available
to them.
To begin with, questioned is the applicability of Rule 6578 of the Rules of Court to assail the validity
and constitutionality of the Ordinance.
… there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law…
Rule 65 specifically requires that the remedy may be availed of only when "there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."79
Shell argues that the petitioners should have sought recourse before the first and second level
courts under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,80 which govern "the enforcement or
violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations."81 Petron additionally
submits that the most adequate remedy available to petitioners is to have the assailed ordinance
repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In the alternative, a local referendum may be had. And,
assuming that there were laws violated, the petitioners may file an action for each alleged violation
of law against the particular individuals that transgressed the law.
It would appear, however, that the remedies identified by the intervenors prove to be inadequate
toresolve the present controversies in their entirety owing to the intricacies of the circumstances
herein prevailing.
The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases is embodied in Sec. 2, Part I, Rule I
thereof. It states that the Rules shall govern the procedure in civil, criminal and special civil actions
before the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the Regional Trial Courts involving enforcement or violations of
environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations such as but not limited to the following:
(k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act;
xxxx

(r) R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;
xxxx
(y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, x x x; and other existing laws that relate to the conservation,
development, preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and natural
resources.82 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While, indeed, there are allegations of violations of
environmental laws in the petitions, these only serve as collateral attacks that would support the
other position of the petitioners – the protection of the rightto life, security and safety. Moreover, it
bears emphasis that the promulgation of the said Rules was specifically intended to meet the
following objectives:
SEC. 3. Objectives.—The objectives of these Rules are:
(a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology;
(b) To provide a simplified, speedy and inexpensive procedure for the enforcement of
environmental rights and duties recognized under the Constitution, existing laws, rules and
regulations, and international agreements;
(c) To introduce and adopt innovations and best practices ensuring the effective enforcement
of remedies and redress for violation of environmental laws; and
(d) To enable the courts to monitor and exact compliance with orders and judgments in
environmental cases.83
Surely, the instant petitions are not within the contemplation of these Rules.
Relative to the position of Petron, it failed to consider that these petitions are already a sequel to
G.R. No. 156052, and that there are some issues herein raised that the remedies available at the
level of the Sangguniang Panlungsod could not address. Neither could the filing of an individual
action for each law violated be harmonized with the essence of a "plain, speedy, and adequate"
remedy.
From another perspective, Shell finds fault with the petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court when,
pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme Court exercises only appellate
jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance.84 Thus:
Section 5.The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courtsin:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. (Emphasis supplied)

To further support its position, it cites the case of Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of
Manila,85 where the petitioners sought the nullification of the mayor’s executive order and the
council’s ordinance concerning certain functions of the petitioners that are vested in them by law.
There, the Court held:
Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in essence, it seeks the
declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and
executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.86 Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
xxx
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.87
Assuming that a petition for declaratory relief is the proper remedy, and that the petitions should
have been filed with the Regional Trial Court, we have, time and again, resolved to treat such a
petition as one for prohibition, provided that the case has far-reaching implications and
transcendental issues that need to be resolved,88 as in these present petitions.
On a related issue, we initially found convincing the argument that the petitions should have been
filed with the Regional Trial Court, it having concurrent jurisdiction with this Court over a special civil
action for prohibition, and original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. However, as we
have repeatedly said, the petitions at bar are of transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.89 In the case of Jaworski v. PAGCOR,90 the Court ratiocinated:
Granting arguendothat the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that weset aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. x x x This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but
to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
…persons aggrieved thereby…
As to who may file a petition for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, Petron posits that petitioners
are not among the "persons aggrieved" contemplated under Sections 1 to 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.
Chevron argues that petitioners, whether as "citizens," taxpayers," or legislators," lack the legal
standing toassail the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8187. It further claims that
petitioners failed to show that they have suffered any injury and/or threatened injury as a result of the
act complained of.91
Shell also points out that the petitions cannot be considered taxpayers’ suit, for then, there should be
a claim that public funds were illegally disbursed and that petitioners have sufficient interest
concerning the prevention of illegal expenditure of public money.92 In G.R. No. 187916, Shell
maintains that the petitioners failed to show their personal interest in the case and/or to establish
that they may represent the general sentiments of the constituents of the City of Manila so as to be
treated as a class suit. Even the minors, it argues, are not numerous and representative enough for
the petition to be treated as a class suit. Asto the city councilors who joined the petitioners in
assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187, Shell posits that they cannot invoke the ruling in Prof.

David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo,93 where the Court held that legislators may question the
constitutionality of a statute, if and when it infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators, because
of the absence of the allegation that the assailed ordinance indeed infringes upon their prerogatives.
Former Mayor Lim submitted a similar position supported by a number of cases on the concept of
locus standi,94 the direct injury test,95 an outline of the stringent requirements of legal standing when
suing as a citizen,96 as a taxpayer,97 as a legislator and in cases where class suits are filed in behalf
of all citizens.98
Their arguments are misplaced.
In G.R. No. 156052, we ruled that the petitioners in that case have a legal right to seek the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 because the subject of the petition concerns a public right, and
they, as residents of Manila, have a direct interest in the implementation of the ordinances of the
city. Thus:
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance,
petitioner SJS states that it is a political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has
its offices in Manila. It claims to have many members who are residents of Manila. The other
petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding
concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the
execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any
specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the
enforcement of the city’s ordinances.99 x x x (Citations omitted)
No different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit the enforcement of the assailed ordinance,
and who deal with the same subject matter that concerns a public right. Necessarily, the people who
are interested in the nullification of such an ordinance are themselves the real parties in interest, for
which reason, they are no longer required to show any specific interest therein. Moreover, it is worth
mentioning that SJS, now represented by SJS Officer Alcantara, has been recognized by the Court
in G.R. No. 156052 to have legal standing to sue in connection with the same subject matter herein
considered. The rest of the petitioners are residents of Manila. Hence, all of them have a direct
interest in the prohibition proceedings against the enforcement of the assailed ordinance.
In the case of Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through Alternative Legal Services, Inc.
(IDEALS, INC.) v. Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corporation
(PSALM),100 involving a petition for certiorari and prohibition to permanently enjoin PSALM from
selling the Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation (K-
Water), the Court ruled:
"Legal standing" or locus standihas been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that
is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. x x x This Court, however, has
adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft
anissue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public. Thus, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the
mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
There can be no doubt that the matter of ensuring adequate water supply for domestic use is one of
paramount importance to the public. That the continued availability of potable water in Metro Manila

might be compromised if PSALM proceeds with the privatization of the hydroelectric power plant in
the Angat Dam Complex confers upon petitioners such personal stake in the resolution of legal
issues in a petition to stop its implementation.101 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
In like manner, the preservation of the life, security and safety of the people is indisputably a right of
utmost importance to the public. Certainly, the petitioners, as residents of Manila, have the required
personal interest to seek relief from this Court to protect such right.
… in excess of its or his jurisdiction,

or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction…
Petron takes issue with the alleged failure of the petitioners to establish the facts with certainty that
would show that the acts of the respondents fall within the parameters of the grave abuse of
discretion clause settled by jurisprudence, to wit:
x x x "[G]rave abuse of discretion" means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be
so patent and gross asto amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of law.102
It is pointless to discuss the matter at length in these instant cases of transcendental importance in
view of the Court’s pronouncement, in Magallona v. Ermita.103 There it held that the writs of
certiorariand prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of statutes, notwithstanding
the following defects:
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict
observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot
issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of
petitioners.
Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its
constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of
certiorariand prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, and
indeed, of acts of other branches of government. Issues of constitutional importx x x carry
such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to
take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, noncompliance with the letter
of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such
law.104 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Requisites of judicial review
For a valid exercise of the power of judicial review, the following requisites shall concur: (1) the
existence of a legal controversy; (2) legal standing to sue of the party raising the constitutional
question; (3) a plea that judicial review be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.105
Only the first two requisites are put in issue in these cases.

On the matter of the existence of a legal controversy, we reject the contention that the petitions
consist of bare allegations based on speculations, surmises, conjectures and hypothetical grounds.
The Court declared Ordinance No. 8027 valid and constitutional and ordered its implementation.
Withthe passing of the new ordinance containing the contrary provisions, it cannot be any clearer
that here lies an actual case or controversy for judicial review. The allegation on this, alone, is
sufficient for the purpose.
The second requisite has already been exhaustively discussed.
Proof of identification required in the notarization

of the verification and certification against forum
shopping in G.R. No. 187916
At the bottom of the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping of the petition in G.R. No.
187916 is the statement of the notary public to the effect that the affiant, in his presence and after
presenting "an integrally competent proof of identification with signature and photograph,"106 signed
the document under oath.
Citing Sec. 163 of the Local Government Code,107 which provides that an individual acknowledging
any document before a notary public shall present his Community Tax Certificate (CTC), Chevron
posits that the petitioner’s failure to present his CTC rendered the petition fatally defective warranting
the outright dismissal of the petition.
We disagree.
The verification and certification against forum shopping are governed specifically by Sections 4 and
5,Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
Section 4 provides that a pleading, when required to be verified, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading if it lacks a proper verification while Section 5 requires that the certification to be executed
by the plaintiff or principal party be under oath.
These sections, in turn, should be read together with Sections 6 and 12, Rule 2 of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice.
Section 6108 of the latter Rules, specifically, likewise provides that any competent evidence of identity
specified under Section 12 thereof may now be presented before the notary public, to wit:
SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the
identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to passport, driver’s
license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of Investigation
clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter’s ID, Barangay certification, Government
Service and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth
card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID,
seaman’s book, alien certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration,
government office ID, certification from the National Council for the Welfare of Disable
Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) certification; or

(b) x x x.109
Forum shopping
Shell contends that the petitioners in G.R. No. 187836 violated the rule against forum shopping
allegedly because all the elements thereof are present in relation to G.R. No. 156052, to wit:
1. "identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both
actions" – According to Shell, the interest of petitioner SJS in G.R. No. 156052 and the
officers of SJS in G.R. No. 187836 are clearly the same. Moreover, both actions implead the
incumbent mayor of the City of Manila as respondent. Both then respondent Mayor Atienza
in G.R. No. 156052 and respondent former Mayor Lim in G.R. No. 187836 are sued in their
capacity as Manila mayor.
2. "identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
fact(s)" – Shell contends that, in both actions, petitioners assert the same rights to health and
to a balanced and healthful ecology relative to the fate of the Pandacan terminal, and seek
essentially the same reliefs, that is, the removal of the oil depots from the present site.
3. "the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other" – Relative to the filing of the Manifestation and Motion to: a) Stop the City Council of
Manila from further hearing the amending ordinance to Ordinance No. 8027 x x x
(Manifestation and Motion) and Very Urgent Motion to Stop the Mayor of the City of Manila
from Signing Draft Ordinance No. 7177 [now Ordinance No. 8187] and to Cite Him for
Contempt if He Would Do So (Urgent Motion) both in G.R. No. 156052, Shell points out the
possibility that the Court would have rendered conflicting rulings "on cases involving the
same facts, parties, issues and reliefs prayed for."110
We are not persuaded.
In Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos,111 the Court expounded on the nature of forum shopping. Thus:
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered
in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by
appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make
a favorable disposition. The established rule is that for forum shopping to exist, both actions must
involve the same transactions, same essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical
causes of actions, subject matter, and issues. x x x112 (Citations omitted) It bears to stress that the
present petitions were initially filed, not to secure a judgment adverse to the first decision, but,
precisely, to enforce the earlier ruling to relocate the oil depots from the Pandacan area.
As to the matter of the denial of the petitioners’ Manifestation and Urgent Motion in G.R. No. 156052,
which wereboth incidental to the enforcement of the decision favorable to them brought about by the
intervening events after the judgment had become final and executory, and which involve the same
Ordinance assailed in these petitions, we so hold that the filing of the instant petitions is not barred
by res judicata.
In the same case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos involving the refiling of a complaint, which
had been earlier dismissed without qualification that the dismissal was with prejudice, and which had

not been decided on the merits, the Court declared that such re-filing did not amount to forum
shopping. It ratiocinated:
It is not controverted that the allegations of the respective complaints in both Civil Case No. 95-1387
and Civil Case No. 96-0225 are similarly worded, and are identical in all relevant details, including
typographical errors, except for the additional allegations in support of respondents’ prayer for the
issuance of preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 95-1387. It is similarly not disputed that both
actions involve the same transactions; same essential facts and circumstances; and raise identical
causes of actions, subject matter, and issues.
xxxx
x x x The dismissal of Civil Case No. 95-1387 was without prejudice. Indeed, the Order dated 20
November 1995, dismissing Civil Case No. 95-1387 was an unqualified dismissal. More significantly,
its dismissal was not based on grounds under paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court, which dismissal shall bar the refiling of the same action or claim as crystallized in
Section 5 of Rule 16 thereof, thus:
SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal. – Subject to the right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss
based on paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or
claim.
From the foregoing, it is clear that dismissals under paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of Rule
16 of the Rules of Court constitute res judicata, to wit:
(f) That the cause of action isbarred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
xxxx
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned,
or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute
of frauds.
Res judicata or bar by prior judgmentis a doctrine which holds that a matter that has been
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and
conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the
same cause. Res judicata exists when the following elements are present: (a) the former judgment
must be final; (b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter; (3)it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) and there must be, between the first and
second actions, identity ofparties, subject matter, and cause of action.113 (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted)
Here, it should be noted that this Court denied the said Manifestation and Urgent Motion, and
refused to act on the succeeding pleadings, for being moot.114 Clearly, the merits of the motion were
not considered by the Court. The following disquisition of the Court in Spouses Cruz v. Spouses
Caraosis further enlightening:
The judgment of dismissal in Civil Case No. 95-1387 does not constitute res judicata to sufficiently
bar the refiling thereof in Civil Case No. 96-0225. As earlier underscored, the dismissal was one

without prejudice. Verily, it was not a judgment on the merits. It bears reiterating that a judgment on
the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a
judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point. The dismissal of the
case without prejudice indicates the absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free
to litigate the matter in a subsequent action asthough the dismissed action had not been
commenced.115(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Considering that there is definitely no forum shopping in the instant cases, we need not discuss in
detail the elements of forum shopping.
II
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is
vested with the power to "reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city"116 subject to the pertinent
provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed by another
ordinance.117 These have been properly applied in G.R. No. 156052, where the Court upheld the
position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the land subject of the Ordinance,118 and
declared that the mayor has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, provided that it has not been
repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or otherwise annulled by the courts.119 In the same case,
the Court also used the principle that the Sanguniang Panlungsod is in the best position to
determine the needs of its Constituents120 – that the removal of the oil depots from the Pandacan
area is necessary "to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals."121
Do all these principles equally apply to the cases at bar involving the same subject matter to justify
the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance?
We answer in the negative.
We summarize the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsodon the matter subject of these petitions.
In 2001, the Sanggunian found the relocation of the Pandacan oil depots necessary. Hence, the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027.
In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian had already changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was
passed in favor of the retention of the oil depots. In 2012, again when some of the previous
members were no longer re-elected, but with the Vice-Mayor still holding the same seat, and
pending the resolution of these petitions, Ordinance No. 8283 was enacted to give the oil depots
until the end of January 2016 within which to transfer to another site. Former Mayor Lim stood his
groundand vetoed the last ordinance.
In its Comment, the 7th Council (2007-2010) alleged that the assailed Ordinance was enacted to
alleviate the economic condition of its constituents.122
Expressing the same position, former Mayor Lim even went to the extent of detailing the steps123 he
took prior to the signing of the Ordinance, if only to show his honest intention to make the right
decision.
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the conditions with respect to the operations of
the oil depots existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ to this
day, as would later be discussed, the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter has
thrice changed, largely depending on the new composition of the council and/or political affiliations.
The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the "general welfare" of the city does not after all

gear towards the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning, but is, one way or another,
dependent on the personal preference of the members who sit in the council as to which particular
sector among its constituents it wishes to favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city councilors, has changed its view on the
matter, favoring the city’s economic related benefits, through the continued stay of the oil terminals,
over the protection of the very lives and safety of its constituents, it is imperative for this Court to
make a final determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which specific right of the
inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present controversy, history reveals that there is
truly no such thing as "the will of Manila" insofar as the general welfare of the people is concerned.
If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara124 by Justice Laurel, we say when the judiciary mediates
we do notin reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to the Court by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
III
The measures taken by the intervenors to lend support to their position that Manila is now safe
despite the presence of the oil terminals remain ineffective. These have not completely removed the
threat to the lives of the in habitants of Manila.
In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 was declared as a
guarantee for the protection of the constitutional right to life of the residents of Manila. There, the
Court said that the enactment of the said ordinance was a valid exercise of police power with the
concurrence of the two requisites: a lawful subject – "to safeguard the rights to life, security and
safety of all the inhabitants of Manila;"125 and a lawful method – the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027
reclassifying the land use from industrial to commercial, which effectively ends the continued stay of
the oil depots in Pandacan.126
In the present petitions, the respondents and the oil companies plead that the Pandacan Terminal
has never been one of the targets of terrorist attacks;127 that the petitions were based on unfounded
fears and mere conjectures;128and that the possibility that it would be picked by the terrorists is nil
given the security measures installed thereat.129
The intervenors went on to identify the measures taken to ensure the safety of the people even with
the presence of the Pandacan Terminals. Thus:
1. Chevron claims that it, together with Shell and Petron, continues to enhance the safety
and security features of the terminals. They likewise adopt fire and product spill prevention
measures in accordance with the local standards set by the Bureau of Fire Protection,
among others, and with the international standards of the American Petroleum Industry
("API") and the National Fire Prevention and Safety Association ("NFPSA"); that since 1914,
the oil depots had not experienced "any incident beyond the ordinary risks and
expectations"130 of the residents of Manila; and that it received a passing grade on the safety
measures they installed in the facilities from the representatives of the City of Manila who
conducted an ocular inspection on 22 May 2009; and
2. Referring to the old MOU entered into between the City of Manila and the DOE, on the
one hand, and the oil companies, on the other, where the parties thereto conceded and
acknowledged that the scale-down option for the Pandacan Terminal operations is the best

alternative to the relocation of the terminals, Shell enumeratesthe steps taken to scale down
its operations.
As to the number of main fuel tanks, the entire Pandacan Terminal has already decommissioned
twenty-eight out of sixty-four tanks. Speaking for Shell alone, its LPG Spheres, which it claims is the
only product that may cause explosion, was part of those decommissioned, thereby allegedly
removing the danger of explosion. Safety buffer zones and linear/green parks were likewise created
to separate the terminal from the nearest residential area. Shell’s portion of the oil depot is likewise
allegedly equipped with the latest technology to ensure air-quality control and waterquality control,
and to prevent and cope with possible oil spills with a crisis management plan in place in the event
that an oil spill occurs. Finally, Shell claims that the recommendations of EQE International in its
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study, which it says is one of the leading independent risk
assessment providers in the world and largest risk management consultancy, were sufficiently
complied with; and that, on its own initiative, it adopted additional measures for the purpose, for
which reason, "the individual risk level resulting from any incident occurring from the Pandacan
Terminal, per the QRA study, is twenty (20) times lower compared to the individual risk level of an
average working or domestic environment."131
We are not persuaded.
The issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist attacks has
already been passed upon in G. R. No. 156052. Based on the assessment of the Committee on
Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila and the then position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod,132 the Court was convinced that the threat of terrorism is imminent. It
remains so convinced.
Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the very nature of the depots
where millions of liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products, regardless of whether ornot
the composition may cause explosions, has no place in a densely populated area. Surely, any
untoward incident in the oil depots, beit related to terrorism of whatever origin or otherwise, would
definitely cause not only destruction to properties within and among the neighboring communities but
certainly mass deaths and injuries.
With regard to the scaling down of the operations in the Pandacan Terminals, which the oil
companies continue to insist to have been validated and recognized by the MOU, the Court,in G.R.
No. 156052, has already put this issue to rest. It specifically declared that even assuming that the
terms of the MOU and Ordinance No. 8027 were inconsistent, the resolutions ratifying the MOU
gave it full force and effect only until 30 April 2003.133
The steps taken by the oil companies, therefore, remain insufficient to convince the Court that the
dangers posed by the presence of the terminals in a thickly populated area have already been
completely removed.
For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point or another, no matter how
remote it is as perceived by one or some, we cannot allow the right to life to bedependent on the
unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and theories of probability have no place in situations where the
very life of not just an individual but of residents of big neighborhoods is at stake.
IV

It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere subdual of risk of catastrophe, that we saw in and
made us favor Ordinance No. 8027. That reason, unaffected by Ordinance No. 8187, compels the
affirmance of our Decision in G.R. No. 156052.
In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to the continued stay of
the oil depots, we follow the same line of reasoning used in G.R. No. 156052, to wit: Ordinance No.
8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public
safety and general welfare" of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take
measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack
on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in
the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development
of the City of Manila which recommended the approval of the ordinance:
(1) the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile
products which include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel,
gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;
(2) the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
(3) it is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang Palace; and
(4) in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the
neighboring communities.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants
of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it (sic) there is
such a target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to
remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. According to respondent:
Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident which showed that what was perceived
to be impossible to happen, to the most powerful country in the world at that, is actually possible.
The destruction of property and the loss of thousands of lives on that fateful day became the impetus
for a public need. Inthe aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of terrorism continued [such] that it
became imperative for governments to take measures to combat their effects.
xxxx
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without
a doubt, there are no impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the
inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed their desire for the
relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny and preserve their lives
and safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors’ warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats
of economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.134
The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a
terrorist target even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to
persuade this Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at

risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan
Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
There is, therefore, no need to resolve the rest of the issues.
Neither is it necessary to discuss at length the test of police power against the assailed ordinance.
Suffice it to state that the objective adopted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod to promote the
constituents’ general welfare in terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic rights to
life, security and safety of the people.
In. G.R. No. 156052, the Court explained:
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand
tolose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious:
life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a
few individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail.135
We thus conclude with the very final words in G.R. No. 156052:
On Wednesday, January 23, 2008, a defective tanker containing 2,000 liters of gasoline and 14,000
liters of diesel exploded in the middle of the street a short distance from the exit gate of the
Pandacan Terminals, causing death, extensive damage and a frightening conflagration in the vicinity
of the incident. Need we say anthing about what will happen if it is the estimated 162 to 211 million
liters [or whatever is left of the 26 tanks] of petroleum products in the terminal complex will blow
up?136
As in the prequel case, we note that as early as October 2001, the oil companies signed a MOA with
the DOE obliging themselves to:
... undertake a comprehensive and comparative study ... [which] shall include the preparation ofa
Master Plan, whose aim is to determine the scope and timing of the feasible location of the
Pandacan oil terminals and all associated facilities and infrastructure including government support
essential for the relocation such as the necessary transportation infrastructure, land and right of way
acquisition, resettlement of displaced residents and environmental and social acceptability which
shall be based on mutual benefit of the Parties and the public.
such that:
Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their operations in the Pandacan Terminals, they
cannot feign unreadiness considering that they had years to prepare for this eventuality.137
On the matter of the details of the relocation, the Court gave the oil companies the following time
frames for compliance:
To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation of assets and personnel, the intervenors
Chevron Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation shall, within
a nonextendible period of ninety (90) days, submit to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39,

the comprehensive plan and relocation schedule which have allegedly been prepared. The presiding
judge of Manila RTC, Branch 39 will monitor the strict enforcement of this resolution.138
The periods were given in the Decision in G.R. No. 156052 which became final on 23 April 2009.
Five years have passed, since then. The years of non-compliance may be excused by the swing of
local legislative leads. We now stay the sway and begin a final count.
A comprehensive and well-coordinated plan within a specific timeframe shall, therefore, be observed
in the relocation of the Pandacan Terminals. The oil companies shall begiven a fresh non-extendible
period of forty-five (45) days from notice within which to submit to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
39, Manila an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule. The relocation, inturn, shall be
completed not later than six months from the date of their submission. Finally, let it be underscored
that after the last Manifestation filed by Shell informing this Court that respondent former Mayor Lim
vetoed Ordinance No. 8283 for the second time, and was anticipating its referral to the President for
the latter’s consideration, nothing was heard from any of the parties until the present petitions as to
the status of the approval or disapproval of the said ordinance. As it is, the fate of the Pandacan
Terminals remains dependent on this final disposition of these cases.
VI
On the matter of the failure of Atty. Gempis to immediately comply with the directives of this Court to
file the Memorandum for the Vice-Mayor and the city councilors who voted in favor of the assailed
Ordinance, the records do not bear proof that he received a copy of any of the resolutions pertaining
to the filing of the Memorandum.
A narration of the events from his end would show, however, that he was aware of the directive
issued in 2009 when he stated that "when the City Legal Officer filed its Memorandum dated 8
February 2010, [he] thought the filing of a Memorandum for the other respondent city officials could
be dispensed with."139 There was also a categorical admission that he received the later Resolution of
31 May 2011 but that he could not prepare a Memorandum defending the position of respondents
vice-mayor and the city councilors who voted in favor of Ordinance No. 8187 in view of the ongoing
drafting of Ordinance No. 8283, which would change the position of the Sanggunian, if subsequently
approved.
The reasons he submitted are notimpressed with merit.
That he was not officially designated as the counsel for the vicemayor and the city councilors is
beside the point. As an officer of the court, he cannot feign ignorance of the fact that"a resolution of
this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and
completely."140 As early as 2009, he should have immediately responded and filed a Manifestation
and therein set forth his reasons why he cannot represent the vice-mayor and the city councilors.
And, even assuming that the 31 May 2011 Resolution was the first directive he personally received,
he had no valid excuse for disregarding the same. Worse, the Court had to issue a show cause
order before he finally heeded.
Atty. Gempis should "strive harderto live up to his duties of observing and maintaining the respect
dueto the courts, respect for law and for legal processes and of upholding the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession in order to perform his responsibilities asa lawyer effectively."141
In Sibulo v. Ilagan,142 which involves a lawyer’s repeated failure to comply with the directives of the
Court, the penalty recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was reduced from
suspension to reprimand and a warning. The Court ratiocinated:

Considering, however, that respondent was absolved of the administrative charge against him and is
being taken to task for his intransigence and lack of respect, the Court finds that the penalty of
suspension would not be warranted under the circumstances.
xxxx
To the Court’s mind, a reprimand and a warning are sufficient sanctions for respondent’s
disrespectful actuations directed against the Court and the IBP. The imposition of these sanctions in
the present case would be more consistent with the avowed purpose of disciplinary case, which is
"not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering
the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court."143
We consider the participation of Atty. Gempis in this case and opt to be lenient even as we reiterate
the objective of protecting the dispensation of justice. We deem it sufficient to remind Atty. Gempis
to be more mindful of his duty as a lawyer towards the Court.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Ordinance No. 8187 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID with respect to the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil
Terminals.
The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing
Ordinance No. 8187. In coordination with the appropriate government agencies and the parties
1âwphi 1
herein involved, he is further ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil terminals out of
the Pandacan area.
As likewise required in G.R. No. 156052, the intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc., Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation, and Petron Corporation shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45)
days, submit to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Manila an updated comprehensive plan and
relocation schedule, which relocation shall be completed not later than six (6) months from the date
the required documents are submitted. The presiding judge of Branch 39 shall monitor the strict
enforcement of this Decision.
For failure to observe the respect due to the Court, Atty. Luch R. Gempis, Jr., Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, is REMINDED of his duties towards the Court and WARNED that a
repetition of an act similar to that here committed shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


(On leave)
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On leave.
1
In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the motion to drop respondent
Ernesto Rivera as a party-respondent on the ground that he actually voted against the
enactment of the assailed ordinance. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, (no proper pagination,
should be pp. 148-149).

2
Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. I, pp. 3-20. Petition (for Prohibition) filed on 1 June 2009;
rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 11-115. Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamusand
Certiorari (with Application for an Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order) filed on 5
June 2009. Id. at 116. Resolution dated 9 June 2009 consolidating G.R. No. 187916 with
G.R. No. 187836.
3
Approved by former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim on 28 May 2009. Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol.
I, pp. 70-75. Annex "A" of the Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamusand Certiorari.
4
Approved by former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. on 28 November 2001. Id. at 76-77. Annex
"B" of the Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.
5
Approved by former Mayor Jose L. Atienza on 16 June 2006. Id. at 78-115. Annex "C" of
the Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.
6
In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the motion to drop respondent
Ernesto Rivera as a party-respondent on the ground that he actually voted against the
enactment of the assailed ordinance. Rolloin G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, (no proper pagination,
should be pp. 148-149).
7
Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. III, pp. 917-1065, Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by
Petron on 1 December 2009; pp. 1234-1409, Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Attached Comment-in-Intervention filed by Shell on 15 December 2009; rolloin G.R.
No. 187916, Vol. II, pp. 367-373, Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached
Consolidated Comment in Intervention filed by Chevron on 25 November 2009.
8
546 Phil. 485 (2007). Decision and Resolution 568 Phil. 658 (2008).
9
Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 658, 703 (2008).
10
Id. at 684.
11
Id. at 699.
12
Id. at 723.
13
Id. at 673-676.
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. II, pp. 428-432. Annex "1" of the Urgent Petition for
14
Prohibition, Mandamusand Certiorari.
The MOA reads:
xxxx
1. Immediately upon the execution of this Agreement, CALTEX, PETRON and

SHELL shall jointly undertake a comprehensive and comparative study of the various
alternatives to minimize the potential risks and hazards posed bythe proximity of
communities, businesses and offices to the Pandacan oil terminals and to respond to
such risks and hazards to the satisfaction of the relevant stakeholders. The study
shall include the preparation of a Master Plan, whose aim is to determine the scope

and timing of the feasible relocation of the Pandacan oil terminals and all associated
facilities and infrastructure including government support essential for the relocation
such as the necessary transportation infrastructure, land and right of way acquisition,
resettlement of displaced residents and environmental and social acceptability which
shall be based on mutual benefit of the Parties and the public.
The study and Master Plan shall also take into full consideration (i) the integrity,
reliability and security of supply and distribution of petroleum products to Metro
Manila and the rest of Luzon as well as the interest of consumers and users of such
petroleum products; (ii) the impact of relocation on the other depots/terminals
similarly situated in other parts of the country; (iii) the security, safety and welfare of
the inhabitants around the current site and those of the proposed sites; and (iv) the
incremental investment, operating and other related costs for the proposed
relocation.
The study and Masterplan shall be completed within twelve (12) months from the
date of execution of this Agreement.
2. The DOE shall participate in the presentation of the study and Master Plan by,
among others, providing the policy framework and recommending the necessary
infrastructure, fiscal and non-fiscal, investment incentives and other support
measures as enumerated in paragraph 1 above including the promotion of
appropriate legislative proposals, coordination with other government agencies,
identification of the necessary governmental resources and the provision of other
measures that would facilitate the attainment of objectives of this Agreement.
3. Subject to paragraphs 1 & 2 hereof, the Master Plan shall be implemented in

phases to be completed within a period of no more than five (5) years from the date
of execution of this Agreement; provided, that the commencement of the first phase
shall occur within 2003.
4. The relocation of the Pandacan liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), facilities of

CALTEX, PETRON and SHELL shall form part of the first phase of relocation.
xxxx
15
Id. at 429.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Rolloin G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 76.
The Ordinance reads:
ORDINANCE NO. 8027

AN ORDINANCE RECLASSIFYING THE LAND USE OF THAT PORTION OF LAND
BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER IN THE NORTH, x x x FROM INDUSTRIAL II TO
COMMERCIAL I
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, THAT:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public
safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its
adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the
north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the
southwest, and Estero de Pandacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area,
Estero de Pandacan in the northeast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in
the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero
St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to
Commercial I.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are
no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period ofsix (6) months from
the date of effectivity of thisOrdinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of
businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
20
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. II, pp. 434-440. Annex "2" of the Consolidated Comment in
Intervention.
21
Id. at 435.
22
Id.at 435-436.
The oil companies undertook to do the following:
Section 1.- Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall,
upon signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan
Terminals which shall include, among others, the immediate
removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the
LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer and
green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. x x x
Section 2.– Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL
COMPANIES shall establish joint operations and management, including the
operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with international
and domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic considerations and
standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the
Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. A
separate agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and conditions
of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3.- The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones
mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES

and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the OIL
COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and DOE, on the other hand, tasked themselves to:
Section 1.- The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its
appropriate action with the view of implementing the spirit and intent thereof.
Section 2.- The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent of
this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to continuously operate in compliance with
legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the
scale down program.
Section 3.- The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES’
compliance with the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4.- The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the
safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at preventing future
occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other
unauthorized parties.
23
Id. at 580-581. Annex "6" of the Consolidated Comment in Intervention.
24
Id. at 582.
25
Supranote 8.
26
Id.at 490.
27
Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supranote 9 at 671.
28
Id.
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 78-115. Annex "C" of the Urgent Petition for
29
Prohibition, Mandamusand Certiorari.
30
Id.at 79-80.
SEC. 7. Division into Zones or Districts – To effectively carry out the provisions of this
Ordinance, the City of Manila is hereby divided into the following zones or districts as shown
in the Official Zoning Maps.
A. General Residential Zone:
1. High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)
B. Commercial Zones:
2. Medium Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C-2/MXD)

3. High Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C-3/MXD)
C. Industrial Zone:
4. Light Industrial Zone (I-1)
D. Institutional Zones:
5. General Institutional Zone (INS-G)
6. University Cluster Zone (INS-U)
E. Public Open Space Zones:
7. General Public Open Space Zone (POS-GEN)
7.a Parks and Plazas (POS-PP)
7.b Playground and Sports Field/Recreation Zone (POS-PSR)
8. Cemetery Zone (POS-CEM)
F. Others
9. Utility Zone (UTL)
10. Water Zone (WTR)
11. Overlay Zones:
11.1 Histo-Cultural Heritage Overlay Zone (O-HCH)
11.2 Planned Unit Development Overlay Zone (O-PUD)
11.3 Buffer Overlay Zone (O-BUF) (Emphasis supplied)
31
Id.at 92.
SEC. 23. Use Regulations in Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD). – O-PUD
Zones are identified specific sites in the Cityof Manila wherein the project site is
comprehensively planned as an entity via unitary site plan which permits flexibility in
planning/design, building siting, complementarily of building types and land uses, usable
open spaces and the preservation of significant natural land features, pursuant toregulations
specified for each particular PUD. Enumerated below are identified PUD:
xxxx
6. Pandacan Oil Depot Area
xxxx

Enumerated below are the allowable uses:
1. all uses allowed in all zones where it is located
2. the [Land Use Intensity Control (LUIC)] under which zones are located shall, in all
instances be complied with
3. the validity of the prescribed LUIC shall only be [superseded] by the development controls
and regulations specified for each PUD as provided for each PUD as provided for by the
masterplan of respective PUDs. (Emphasis supplied)
32
Id. at 114.
33
Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr. supranote 8 at 494.
34
Id. at 490-491.
35
Id. at 493-494.
36
37
Id. at 723.
38
Id. at 1792-1793.
39
Rolloin G.R. No. 156052, pp. 1793. Manifestation and Motion filed on 18 March 2009.
40
Id. at 1792 -1803.
41
Id. at 1813-1816. Resolution dated 28 April 2009.
42
Id. at 1816.
43
Id. (no proper pagination, should be pp. 1844-1845. Resolution dated 2 June 2009.
44
Id. (no proper pagination, should be p. 1846). Resolution dated 9 June 2009 with respect to
the City Legal Office’s Motion to Excuse from Filing Comment (on Petitioners’ Manifestation
and Motion and on Petitioners’ Very Urgent Motion to Cite the Members of the City Council in
Direct Contempt of Court), and the Comment. Id. (no proper pagination, should be pp. 1880-
1881).
Resolution dated 23 June 2009 with respect to the Reply to the Comment filed by the
counsel for the petitioners.
45
Rollo, in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 70-74.
The Ordinance reads:
ORDINANCE NO. 8187

AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 8119, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE
MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND ZONING ORDINANCE OF 2006", BY
CREATING A MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) AND HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-3),
AND PROVIDING FOR ITS ENFORCEMENT.
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, in session, assembled, THAT:
SECTION 1. Ordinance No. 8119, otherwise known as the "Manila Comprehensive Land
Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006" is hereby amended by creating a Medium
Industrial Zone (1-2) and Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) to read as follows:
1. Use Regulations in Medium Industrial Zone (1-2)
The Medium Industrial Zone (I-2) shall be for Pollutive/NonHazardous and

Pollutive/Hazardous manufacturing and processing establishments. Enumerated below are
the allowable uses:
a. Pollutive/Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture and canning of ham
2. Poultry processing and canning
3. Large-scale manufacture of ice cream
4. Corn Mill/Rice Mill
5. Chocolate and Cocoa Factory
6. Candy Factory
7. Chewing Gum Factory
8. Peanuts and other nuts factory
9. Other chocolate and confectionary products
10. Manufacture of flavoring extracts
11. Manufacture of food products n.e.c (vinegar, vetsin)
12. Manufacture of fish meal
13. Oyster shell grading
14. Manufacture of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations
15. Manufacture of stationary, art goods, cut stone and marble products
16. Manufacture of abrasive products

17. Manufacture of miscellaneous non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.
18. Manufacture of cutlery, except table flatware
19. Manufacture of hand tools
20. Manufacture of general hardware
21. Manufacture of miscellaneous cutlery hand tools and general hardware n.e.c.
22. Manufacture of household metal furniture
23. Manufacture of office, store and restaurant metal furniture
24. Manufacture of metal blinds, screens and shades
25. Manufacture of miscellaneous furniture and fixture primarily of metal n.e.c.
26. Manufacture of fabricated structural iron and steel
27. Manufacture of architectural and ornamental metal works
28. Manufacture of boiler, tanks and other structural sheet metal works
29. Manufacture of other structural products n.e.c.
30. Manufacture of metal cans, boxes and containers
31. Manufacture of stamped coated and engraved metal products
32. Manufacture of fabricated wire and cable
33. Manufacture of heating, cooking and lighting equipment except electrical
34. Metal sheet works generally of manual operation
35. Manufacture of other fabricated metal products except machinery and equipment
n.e.c.
36. Manufacture or assembly of agricultural machinery and equipment
37. Native plow and harrow factory
38. Repair of agricultural machinery
39. Manufacture or assembly of service industry machines
40. Manufacture or assembly of elevators or escalators

41. Manufacture or assembly of sewing machines
42. Manufacture or assembly of cooking ranges
43. Manufacture or assembly of water pumps
44. Refrigeration industry
45. Manufacture or assembly of other machinery and equipment except electrical

n.e.c.
46. Manufacture and repair of electrical apparatus
47. Manufacture and repair of electrical cables and wires
48. Manufacture of cables and wires
49. Manufacture of other electrical industrial machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
50. Manufacture or assembly of electric equipment such as radio, television, tape,

tape recorders and stereo
51. Manufacture or assembly of radio and television transmitting, signaling and

detection equipment
52. Manufacture or assembly of telephone and telegraphic equipment
53. Manufacture of other electronic equipment and apparatus n.e.c.
54. Manufacture of industrial and commercial electrical appliances
55. Manufacture of household cooking, heating and laundry appliances
56. Manufacture of other electrical appliances n.e.c.
57. Manufacture of electrical lamp fixtures
b. Pollutive/Hazardous (sic) Industries
1. Flour Mill
2. Cassava Flour Mill
3. Manufacturing of coffee
4. Manufacturing of unprepared animal feeds, other grain milling n.e.c.
5. Production prepared feed for animals
6. Cigar and cigarette Factory

7. Curing and redrying tobacco leaves
8. Miscellaneous processing tobacco leaves n.e.c.
9. Weaving hemp textile
10. Jute spinning and weaving
11. Miscellaneous spinning and weaving mills n.e.c.
12. Hosiery mill
13. Underwear and outwear knitting mills
14. Fabric knitting mills
15. Miscellaneous knitting mills n.e.c.
16. Manufacture of mats and mattings
17. Manufacture of carpets and rugs
18. Manufacture of cordage, rope and twine
19. Manufacture of related productsfrom abaca, sisal, henequen, hemp, cotton,

paper, etc.
20. Manufacture of linoleum and other surface coverings
21. Manufacture of machines for leather and leather products
22. Manufacture of construction machinery
23. Manufacture of machines for clay, stove and glass industries
24. Manufacture, assembly, repair, rebuilding of miscellaneous special industrial

machinery and equipment n.e.c.
25. Manufacture of dry cells, storage battery and other batteries
26. Boat building and repairing
27. Ship repairing industry, dock yards, dry dock, shipways
28. Miscellaneous shipbuilding and repairing n.e.c.
29. Manufacture of locomotive and parts
30. Manufacture of railroads and street cars

31. Manufacture of assembly of automobiles, cars, buses, trucks and trailers
32. Manufacture of wood furniture including upholstered
33. Manufacture of rattan furniture including upholstered
34. Manufacture of box beds and mattresses
2. Use Regulations in Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3)
The Heavy Industrial Zone (1-3) shall be for highly Pollutive/NonHazardous;

Pollutive/Hazardous; Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; Non-Pollutive/Extremely
Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous manufacturing and processing
establishments. Enumerated below are the allowable uses:
a. Highly Pollutive/Non-Hazardous Industries
1. Meat processing, curing, preserving except processing of ham, bacon, sausage

and chicharon
2. Milk processing plants (manufacturing filled, reconstituted or recombined milk,

condensed or evaporated)
3. Butter and cheese processing plants
4. Natural fluid milk processing (pasteurizing, homogenizing, vitaminizing bottling of

natural animal milk and cream related products)
5. Other dairy products n.e.c.
6. Canning and preserving of fruits and fruit juices
7. Canning and preserving of vegetables and vegetable juices
8. Canning and preserving of vegetable sauces
9. Miscellaneous canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables, n.e.c.
10. Fish canning
11. Patis factory
12. Bagoong factory
13. Processing, preserving and canning of fish and other seafoods, n.e.c.
14. Manufacture of dessicated coconut
15. Manufacture of starchand its by-products

16. Manufacture of wines from juices of local fruits
17. Manufacture of malt and malt liquors
18. Manufacture of soft drinks carbonated water
19. Manufacture of instant beverages and syrups
20. Other non-alcoholic beverages, n.e.c.
21. Other slaughtering, preparing and preserving meat products, n.e.c.
b. Highly Pollutive/Hazardous Industries
1. Vegetable oil mills, including coconut oil
2. Manufacturing of refined cooking oil and margarine
3. Manufacture of fish, marine and other animal oils
4. Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats, n.e.c.
5. Sugar cane milling (centrifugal refined)
6. Sugar refining
7. Muscovado Sugar Mill
8. Distilled, rectified and blended liquors, n.e.c.
9. Cotton textile mill
10. Ramie textile mill
11. Rayon and other man-made fiber textile mill
12. Bleaching and drying mills
13. Manufacture of narrow fabrics
14. Tanneries and leather finishing plants
15. Pulp mills
16. Paper and paperboard mills
17. Manufacture of fiberboard
18. Manufacture of inorganic salts and compounds

19. Manufacture of soap and cleaning preparations
20. Manufacture of hydraulic cement
21. Manufacture of lime and lime kilns
22. Manufacture of plaster
23. Products of blast furnace, steel works and rolling mills
24. Product of iron and steel foundries
25. Manufacture of smelted and refined non-ferrous metals
26. Manufacture of rolled, drawn or astruded non-ferrous metals
27. Manufacture of non-ferrous foundry products
c. Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture of industrial alcohols
2. Other basic industrial chemicals
3. Manufacture of fertilizers
4. Manufacture of pesticides
5. Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials and man-made fibers except

glass
6. Petroleum refineries and oil depots
7. Manufacture of reclaimed, blended and compound petroleum products
8. Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal
d. Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture of paints
2. Manufacture of varnishes, shellac and stains
3. Manufacture of paint removers
4. Manufacture of other paint products
5. Manufacture of matches

6. Manufacture of tires and inner tubes
7. Manufacture of processed natural rubber not in rubber plantations
8. Manufacture of miscellaneous rubber products, n.e.c.
e. Non-Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture of compressed and liquefied gases
SEC. 2. The land use where the existing industries are located, the operation of
which are permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby classified as Industrial Zone.
The City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) shall prepare an amended
Zoning Map and Zoning Boundaries which shall be submitted to the City Council for
review.
SEC. 3. The Zoning Fees shall be ₱10/sq. m. of total floor area for MEDIUM
INDUSTRIAL ZONE (1-2) and ₱10/sq. m. of total floor area for HEAVY INDUSTRIAL
ZONE (1-3).
SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. – Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119
and all other Ordinances or provisions therein inconsistent with the provisions of this
Ordinance are hereby repealed, amended, rescinded or modified accordingly.
SEC. 5. Effectivity Clause. – This Ordinance shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
its publication in accordance with law.
x x x x.
46
Id.at 74.
Sec. 4 of Ordinance No. 8187 reads:
SEC. 4. Repealing Clause.– Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119
and all other Ordinances or porvisions therein inconsistent with the provisions of this
Ordinance are hereby repealed, amended, rescinded or otherwise modified
accordingly.
Section 18. Legislative powers.– The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative
47
powers:
xxxx
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and
safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace
good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants,
and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred bythis chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances which shall not exceed to two hundred pesos fine or six months’
imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.

48
SECTION 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
49
Article 8, Civil Code.
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
50
health consciousness among them.
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
51
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
52
SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights.- Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following
rights of citizens are hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee
their enjoyment:
[a] The right to breathe clean air;
[b] The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principles of
sustainable development;
[c] The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and

monitoring of environmental policies and programs and in the decision-making
process;
[d] The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development

policies, plans and programs projects or activities that may have adverse impact on
the environment and public health;
[e] The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any
activity, undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in
the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere of
harmful or hazardous substances;
[f] The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or
her rights effectively under this Act;
[g] The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in
violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compelthe rehabilitation and
cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of penal sanctions against
violators of environmental laws; and
[h] The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting
from the adverse environmental and public health impact of a project or activity.

53
SEC. 12. Ambient Air Quality Guideline Values and Standards.- The Department, in
coordination with other concerned agencies, shall review and orrevise and publish annually a
list of hazardous air pollutants with corresponding ambient guideline values and/or standard
necessary to protect health and safety, and general welfare. The initial list and values of the
hazardous air pollutants shall be as follows:
a) For National Ambient Air Quality Guideline for Criteria Pollutants:
Short Long
Terma Termb
Averaging Averaging
Pollutants µg/Ncm ppm µg/Ncm ppm
Time Time
Suspended
Particulate 230d 24 hours 90 ---- 1 yeare
Matterc-TSP
-PM-10 150f 24 hours 60 ---- 1 yeare
Sulfur Dioxidec 180 0.07 24 hours 80 0.03 1 year
Nitrogen Dioxide 150 0.08 24 hours ---- ---- ----
Photochemical
140 0.07 1 hour ---- ---- ----
Oxidants
As Ozone 60 0.03 8 hours ---- ---- ----
Carbon Monoxide 35mg/Ncm 30 1 hour ---- ---- ----
10mg/Ncm 9 8 hours
Leadg 1.5 ---- 3 monthsg 1.0 ---- 1 year
a Maximum limits represented by ninety-eight percentile (98%) values not to

be exceed more than once a year.
b Arithmetic mean
c SO2 and Suspended Particulate matter are sampled once every six days
when using the manual methods. A minimum of twelve sampling days per
quarter of forty-eight sampling days each yearis required for these methods.
Daily sampling may be done in the future once continuous analyzers are
procured and become available.

d Limits for Total Suspended Particulate Matter with mass median diameter
less than 25-50 um.
e Annual Geometric Mean
f Provisional limits for Suspended Particulate Matter with mass median

diameter less than 10 microns and below until sufficient monitoring data are
gathered to base a proper guideline.
g Evaluation of this guideline is carried out for 24-hour averaging time and
averaged over three moving calendar months. The monitored average value
for any three months shall not exceed the guideline value.
b) For National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Source Specific Air Pollutants from
Industrial
Sources/Operations:
Averaging
Concentration2 Method of Analysis/
Pollutants1 time
µ/Ncm ppm Measurement3
(min.)
Nesselerization/ Indo
1. Ammonia 200 0.28 30
Phenol
2. Carbon
30 0.01 30 Tischer Method
Disulfide
3. Chlorine and
Chlorine
100 0.03 5 Methyl Orange
Compounds
expressed as Cl2
Chromotropic acid Method

4. Formaldehyde 50 0.04 30 or MBTH Colorimetric
Method
5. Hydrogen Volhard Titration with Iodine

200100 0.13 30
Chloride Solution
6. Hydrogen
100 0.07 30 Methylene Blue
Sulfide
7. Lead 20 30 AASc

8. Nitrogen
375,260 0.20,0.14 30,60 Greiss- Saltzman
Dioxide
9. Phenol 100 0.03 30 4-Aminoantiphyrine
10. Sulfur 0.18,

470,340 30,60 Colorimetric-Pararosaniline
Dioxide 0.13
11. Suspended
Particulate
Matter-TSP 300 ---- 60 Gravimetric
1 Pertinent ambient standards for Antimony, Arsenic, Cadmium, Asbestos,

Nitric Acid and Sulfuric Acid Mists in the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations
may be considered as guides in determining compliance.
2 Ninety-eight percentile (98%) values of 30-minute sampling measured at

250C and one atmosphere pressure.
3 Other equivalent methods approved by the Department may be used.
The basis in setting up the ambient air quality guideline values and standards shall
reflect, among others, the latest scientific knowledge including information on:
a) Variable, including atmospheric conditions, which of themselves or in

combination with other factors may alter the effects on public health or
welfare of such air pollutant;
b) The other types of air pollutants which may interact with such pollutant to
produce an adverse effect on public health or welfare; and
c) The kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public health or welfare
which may be expected from presence of such pollutant in the ambient air, in
varying quantities.
The Department shall base such ambient air quality standards on World Health
Organization (WHO) standards, but shall not be limited to nor be less stringent than
such standards.
54
SEC. 19. Pollution From Stationary Sources.- The Department shall, within two (2) years
from the effectivity of this Act, and every two (2) years thereafter, review, or as the need
therefore arises, revise and publish emission standards, to further improve the emission
standards for stationary sources of air pollution. Such emission standards shall be based on
mass rate of emission for all stationary source of air pollution based on internationally
accepted standards, but not be limited to, nor be less stringent than such standards and with
the standards set forth in this section. The standards, whichever is applicable, shall be the

limit on the acceptable level of pollutants emitted from a stationary source for the protection
of the public’s health and welfare.
With respect to any trade, industry, process and fuel-burning equipment or industrial plant
emitting air pollutants, the concentration at the point of emission shall not exceed the
following limits:
Maximum
Standard Applicable
Pollutants Permissible Method of Analysisa
to Source
Limits (mg/Ncm)
1. Antimony and Its

Any source 10 as Sb AASb
compounds
2. Arsenic and its

Any source 10 as As AASb
compounds
3. Cadmium and its

Any source 10 as Cd AASb
compounds
4. Carbon
Any industrial Source 500 as CO Orsat analysis
Monoxide
5. Copper and its

Any industrial source 100 ax Cu AASb
Compounds
Any source other

6. Hydrofluoric Titration with
than the manufacture
Acids and Fluoride 50 as HF Ammonium
of Aluminum from
compounds Thiocyanate
Alumina
7. Hydrogen i) Geothermal Power c.d

Cadmium Sulfide
Sulfide Plants Method
ii) Geothermal
e
Exploration and
welltesting
iii) Any source other Cadmium Sulfide

7 as H2S
than (i) and (ii) Method
Any trade, industry or

8. Lead 10 as Pb AASb
process

AASb/Cold-Vapor
5 as elemental
9. Mercury Any Source Technique or Hg
Hg
Analyzer
10. Nickel and its

compounds,
Any source 20 as Ni AASb
except Nickel
Carbonylf
2,000 as acid
i) Manufacture of and NOx and Phenol-disulfonic acid
11. NOx
Nitric Acid calculated as Method
NO2
ii) Fuel burning steam Phenol-disulfonic acid

generators Method
<1,500 as
Existing Source
NO2/td>
New Source
• Coal-Fired 1,000 as NO2
• Oil-Fired 500 as NO2
iii) Any source other Phenol-disulfonic acid

than (i) adn (ii) Method
Existing Source 1000 as NO2
New Source 500 as NO2
12. Phosphorus
Any source 200 as ₱2O5 Spectrophotometry
Pentoxideg
13. Zinc and its

Any source 100 as Zn AASb
Compounds
a Other equivalent methods approved by the Department may be used.
b Atomic Absorption Specttrophotometry

cAll new geothermal power plants starting construction by 01 January 1995 shall
control HsS emissions to not more than 150 g/GMW-Hr
dAll existing geothermal power plants shall control HsS emissions to not more than
200 g/GMW-Hr within 5 years from the date of effectivity of these revised regulations.
eBest practicable control technology for air emissions and liquid discharges.
Compliance with air and water quality standards is required.
f Emission limit of Nickel Carbonyl shall not exceed 0.5 mg/Ncm.
g Provisional Guideline
Provided, That the maximum limits in mg/ncm particulates in said sources shall be:
1. Fuel Burning Equipment
a) Urban or Industrial Area 150 mg/Ncm
b) Other Area 200 mg/Ncm
2. Cement Plants (Kilns, etc.) 150 mg/Ncm
3. Smelting Furnaces 150 mg/Ncm
4. Other Stationary Sourcesa 200 mg/Ncm
a Other Stationary Sources means a trade,process, industrial plant, or fuel burning

equipment other than thermal power plants, industrial boilers, cement plants,
incinerators and smelting furnaces.
Provided, further, That the maximum limits for sulfur oxides in said sources shall be:
(1) Existing Sources
(i) Manufacture of Sulfuric

2.0gm.Ncm as SO3
Acid and Sulf(on)ation Process
(ii) Fuel burning Equipment 1.5gm.Ncm as SO2
(iii) Other Stationary Sourcesa 1.0gm.Ncm as SO3
(2) New Sources

(i) Manufacture of Sulfuric
1.5 gm.Ncm as SO3
Acid and Sulf(on)ation Process
(ii) Fuel Burning Equipment 0.7 gm.Ncm as SO2
(iii) Other Stationary Sourcesa 0.2 gm.Ncm as SO3
a Other Stationary Sources refer to existing and new stationary sources other than
those caused by the manufacture of sulfuric acid and sulfonation process, fuel
burning equipment and incineration.
For stationary sources of pollution not specifically included in the immediately

preceding paragraph, the following emission standards shall not be exceeded in the
exhaust gas:
I. Daily And Half Hourly Average Values
Daily Half
Average Hourly
Values Average
Values
10 mg/m3 30 mg/m3
Total dust
Gaseous and vaporous organic substances, 10 mg/m3 20 mg/m3
expressed as total organic carbon
Hydrogen chloride (HCl) 10 mg/m3 60 mg/m3
Hydrogen fluoride (HF) 1 mg/m3 4 mg/m3
Sulfur dioxide (SO2) 50 mg/m3 200 mg/m3
Nitrogen monoxide (NO) and Nitrogen dioxide

(NO2), expressed as nitrogen dioxide for
200 mg/m3 400 mg/m3
incineration plants with a capacity exceeding 3
tonnes per hour
Nitrogen monoxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide

(NO2), expressed as nitrogen dioxide for
300 mg/m3
incineration plants with a capacity of 3 tonnes per
hour or less
Ammonia 10 mg/m3 20 mg/m3

II. All the Average Values Over the Sample Period of a Minimum of 4 and Maximum
of 8 Hours.
Cadmium and its compounds, expressed as cadmium (Cd) total 0.05
Thallium and its compounds, expressed as thallium (Tl) mg/m3
Mercury and its Compounds, expressed as mercury (Hg) 0.05 mg/m3
Antimony and its compounds, expressed as antimony (Sb)
total 0.5
Arsenic and its compounds, expressed as arsenic (As)
mg/m3
Lead and its compounds, expressed as lead ( Pb)
Chromium and its compounds, expressed as chromium (Cr)
Cobalt and its compounds, expressed as cobalt (Co)
Copper and its compounds, expressed as copper (Cu)
Manganese and its compounds, expressed as manganese (Mn)
Nickel and its compounds, expressed as nickel (Ni)
Vanadium and its compounds, expressed as vanadium (V)
Tin and its compounds, expressed as tin (Sn)
These average values cover also gaseous and the vapor forms of the relevant heavy
metal emission as well as their compounds: Provided, That the emission of dioxins
and furans into the air shall be reduced by the most progressive techniques:
Provided, further, That all average of dioxin and furans measured over the sample
period of a minimum of 5 hours and maximum of 8 hours must not exceed the limit
value of 0.1 nanogram/m3.
Pursuant to Sec. 8 of this Act, the Department shall prepare a detailed action plan
setting the emission standards or standards of performance for any stationary source
the procedure for testing emissions for each type of pollutant, and the procedure for
enforcement of said standards.
Existing industries, which are proven to exceed emission rates established by the
Department in consultation with stakeholders, after a thorough, credible and
transparent measurement process shall be allowed a grace period of eighteen (18)

months for the establishment of an environmental management system and the
installation of an appropriate air pollution control device : Provided, That an extension
of not more than twelve (12) months may be allowed by the Department on
meritorious grounds.
SEC. 30. Ozone-Depleting Substances.-Consistent with the terms and conditions of the
55
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and other international
agreements and protocols to which the Philippines is a signatory, the Department shall
phase out ozone-depleting substances.
Within sixty (60) days after the enactment of this Act, the Department shall publish a
list of substances which are known to cause harmful effects on the stratospheric
ozone layer.
56
Article 6
1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and
development of the child.
57
Article 24
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and
rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived
of his or her right of access to such health care services.
2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in particular, shall
take appropriate measures:
(a) To diminish infant and child mortality;
(b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and healthcare

to all children with emphasis on the development of primary health care;
(c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of

primary health care, through, inter alia, the application of readily available
technology and through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean
drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of
environmental pollution;
(d) To ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers;
(e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and children,
are informed, have access to education and are supported in the use of basic
knowledge of child health and nutrition, the advantages of breastfeeding,
hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention of accidents;
(f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family
planning education and services.

3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to
abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.
4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage international co-operation with

a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the right recognized in the
present article. In this regard, particular account shall be taken of the needs of
developing countries.
Article 27 1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living
58
adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development.
2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the childhave the primary responsibility to
secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living
necessary for the child's development.
3. States Parties, in accordancewith national conditions and within their means, shall
take appropriate measures to assist parents and others responsible for the child to
implement this right and shall in case of need provide material assistance and
support programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.
4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of
maintenance for the child from the parents or other persons having financial
responsibility for the child, both within the State Party and from abroad. In particular,
where the person having financial responsibility for the child lives in a State different
from that of the child, States Parties shall promote the accession to international
agreements or the conclusion of such agreements, as well as the making of other
appropriate arrangements.
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 44. Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and
59
Certiorari.
60
Id. at 58-59.
61
Rolloin G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1846-1926.
Resolutions dated 20 October 2009, rolloin G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I (no proper pagination,
62
should be 319-320; 15 June 2010, rolloin G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1979-1980; 31
August 2010, rolloin G.R. No. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2002-2003; 31 May 2011, rolloin G.R.
No. 187916, Vol. V, pp. 2347-2348; and 17 July 2012, rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. VI, pp.
2746-2747.
63
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 282-300.
64
Id., Vol. IV, pp. 2128-2132.
65
Id. at 2129.
66
Id.
67
Id., Vol. V, pp. 2661-2662.

The new Ordinance reads:
ORDINANCE NO. 8283
AN ORDINANCEAMENDING SECTION 2 OF ORDINANCE NO. 8187 BY RECLASSIFYING

THE AREA WHERE PETROLEUM REFINERIES AND OIL DEPOTS ARE LOCATED FROM
HEAVY INDUSTRIAL (1-3) TO HIGH INTENSITY COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE
(C3/MXD)
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, in session, assembled, THAT:
SEC. 1. Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8187 shall be amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. The land use where the existing industries are located, the operation of which are
permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby classified as Industrial Zone except the area
where petroleum refineries and oil depotsare located, which shall be classified as High
Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD)."
SEC. 2. Owners or operators of petroleum refineries and oil depots, the operation of which
are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period until the end of
January 2016 within which to relocate the operation of their businesses.
SEC. 3. The City Planning and Development Office shall prepare an amended zoning map
and zoning boundaries which shall be submitted to the City Council for review.
SEC. 4. All ordinances or provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Ordinance are hereby repealed, amended, rescinded or modified accordingly.
SEC. 5. This Ordinance shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in accordance
with law.
This Ordinance was finally enacted by the City Council of Manila on August 28, 2012.
PRESIDED BY:
FRANCISCO "Isko Moreno" DOMAGOSO

Vice-Mayor and Presiding Officer
City Council, Manila
68
Id.at 2662.
The bottom portion of Ordinance No. 8283 reads:
BY HIS HONOR, THE MAYOR ON 11 Sept. 2012,
I veto this Ordinance for being prejudicial to public welfare and in view of the pending
cases in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 187836 and G.R. No. 187916)
69
Id. at 2516-2518.

70
Id. at 2526-2534.
Resolutions dated 20 October 2009, rolloin G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I (no proper pagination,
71
should be 319-320); 15 June 2010, rolloin G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1979-1980; 31
August 2010, rolloin G.R. No. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2002-2003; 31 May 2011, rolloin G.R.
No. 187916, Vol. V, pp. 2347-2348; and 17 July 2012, rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. VI, pp.
2746-2747.
72
Rolloin G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2495-2503.
73
SECTION 481. Qualifications, Term Powers and Duties. – x x x
xxxx
(b) The legal officer, the chief legal counsel of the local government unit, shall take
charge of the office for legal services and shall:
xxxx
(3) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the legal officer shall:
(i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings
wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a
party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or
municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component
city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employedto represent the adverse
party;
74
Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9 at 679.
In that case, the Court held:
x x x [The DOE] seeks to intervene in order to represent the interests of the members
of the public who stand to suffer if the Pandacan Terminals’ operations are
discontinued. x x x Suffice it to say at this point that, for the purpose of hearing all
sides and considering the transcendental importance of this case, we will also allow
DOE’s intervention. (Emphasis supplied)
Santiago v. COMELEC, 336 Phil. 848, 880 (1997) citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, G.R.
75
No. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 134 further citing the landmark Emergency
Powers Cases (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949).
Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 274 Phil. 323, 335 (1991) citing
76
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Hon. Tan, 246 Phil. 380,
385 (1988).
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian

77
Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 798 (1989).
78
Sections 1 to 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
xxxx
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal,

corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
xxxx
Section 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by
the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent.
79
Id.
80
Resolution dated 13 April 2010 in A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC.
81
Sec. 2, Part I, Rule I, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
82
Id.
83
Sec. 3, Part I, Rule I, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
Rolloin G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2202-2203. Memorandum of Shell citing Ortega v.
84
Quezon City Government, 506 Phil. 373 (2005).
85
465 Phil. 529 (2004).

Id. at 541 citing Philnabank Employees Association v. Estanislao, G.R. No. 104209, 16
86
November 1993, 227 SCRA 804, 811.
Id. at 542 citing Tano v. Hon. Gov. Socrates, 343 Phil. 670, 698 (1997); Macasiano v.
87
National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 107921, 1 July 1993, 224 SCRA 236, 243.
Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617 SCRA 623, 638 citing Del Mar v.
88
Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 400 Phil 307 (2000) and Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil.
461 (1998).
Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 400 Phil. 307 (2000); Sen. Jaworski v.
89
Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 464 Phil. 375, 384 (2004).
90
Sen. Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 464 Phil. 375, 385 (2004).
91
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2100. Memorandum of Chevron.
Chevron relied on the ruling in Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v. Hon. Romulo,
489 Phil. 710, 718 (2005) where the Court held:
For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
Id.at 2222. Memorandum of Shell citing Velarde v. SocialJustice Society,G.R. No. 159357,
92
28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 283 and Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 320 Phil. 171 (1995)
93
522 Phil. 705 (2006).
94
Id. at 1859 citing Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003).
95
Id.citing Tolentino v. COMELEC, 465 Phil. 385 (2004).
Rolloin G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 1858-1859 citing Francisco v. House of
96
Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003).
97
Id.; Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 283.
Id.; Id. at 1863 citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA
98
792.
99
Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr., supra note 8 at 492-493.
100
G.R. No. 192088, 9 October 2012, 682 SCRA 602.
101
Id. at 633-634.
Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. V, p. 2144-2145. Memorandum of Petron citing Aduan v.
102
Chong, G.R. No. 172796, 13 July 2009, 592 SCRA 508; see also Tañada v. Angara, 338

Phil. 546 (1997); Duero v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 12 (2002); D.M. Consunji v. Esguerra,
328 Phil. 1168 (1996); and Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 271 Phil. 592 (1991)
citing Carson v. Judge Pantanosas, Jr., 259 Phil. 628 (1989).
103
G.R. No. 187167, 16 August 2011, 655 SCRA 476.
104
Id. at 487-488.
105
IBP v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 632 (2000) citing Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 and 113888, 19 August 1994, 235 SCRA 506
citingLuz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, 4
December 1990, 192 SCRA 51; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 184 Phil. 369 (1980);
and People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 62. Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and
106
Certiorari.
107
Rolloin G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2097.
Sec. 163. Presentation of Community Tax Certificate on Certain Occassions. – (a)

When an individiual subject to the community tax acknowledges any document
before a notary public, takes the oath of office upon election or appointment to any
position in the government service; receives any license, certificate, or permit from
any public authority; pays any tax or fee; receives any money from any public fund;
transacts other official business; or receives any salary or wage from any person or
corporation, it shall be the duty of any person, officer or corporation with whom such
transaction is made or business done or from whom any salary or wage is received
to reequire such individual to exhibit the community tax certificate. x x x. (Emphasis
and underscoring in the Memorandum of Chevron)
108
Sec. 6. Jurat. - "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or
document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public oridentified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document.
109
As amended by Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC.
110
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2216.
111
550 Phil. 98 (2007).
112
Id. at 107.

113
Id. at 108-110.
Rollo in G.R. No. 156052 (no proper pagination, should be p. 1844). Resolution dated 2
114
June 2009.
115
Supra note 110 at 110-111.
116
Section 458(a)(2)(viii), Local Government Code.
117
Tuzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90107, 21 August 1992, 212 SCRA 739, 747.
Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.applying Section 458(a)(2)(viii) of the Local
118
Government Code.
119
Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr., supranote 8 at 493 citing supranote 116.
120
121
Id. at 702.
Rolloin G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 296. Comment of respondents Vice-Mayor Domagoso
122
and the City Councilors who voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance.
123
Id., Vol. IV, pp. 1852-1857. Memorandum of former Mayor Lim.
Former Mayor Lim narrated that when he received the draft Ordinance for his
approval, he did not readily act upon it but took the time to seriously study the pros
and cons of enacting the Ordinance; that he issued Executive Order No. 18creating
an ad hoc panel to conduct a study thereon; that the Assistant City Treasurer of
Manila submitted to him a list of properties that would be affected by the proposed
ordinance and the real property taxes they paid from 2007 to 2009; that he
conducted a stakeholders’ consultative meeting composed of some Cabinet
Secretaries and other officials, including the Joint Foreign Chamber of Commerce of
the Philippines; that Engr. Rodolfo H. Catu (Engr. Catu), Officer in Charge of the City
Planning and Development Office, together with the ad hoc panel earlier created,
conducted an ocular inspection of the Pandacan Terminal, and submitted a favorable
recommendation; that he also sought guidance from His Eminence, Gaudencio
Cardinal Rosales; that he received a profile of the safety and security features
installed at the Pandacan oil depots from Shell; that he likewise personally conducted
an ocular inspection where he was assured by then President Arroyo and her cabinet
secretaries, who happened to visit the site on the same day, that they interpose no
objection to the proposed ordinance; and that the European Chamber of Commerce
expressed support to the ordinance. It was only then that he madea decision to
approve the Ordinance.
124
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
125
Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supranote 9.
126
Id. at 704-707.

Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 2103-2104. Memorandum of Chevron; rolloin G.R.
127
No. 187836, Vol. V, pp. 2220-2225. Memorandum of Petron.
128
Id. at 1883. Memorandum of former Mayor Lim.
129
Id.at 2285-2310. Memorandum of Shell.
130
Id. at 2112. Memorandum of Chevron. Emphasis supplied.
131
Id. at 2280. Memorandum of Shell.
132
Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9 at 702-703.
133
Social Justice Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr., supra note 8 at 494.
134
Social Justice Society v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., supra note 9 at 702-720.
135
Id. at 720.
136
Id. at 722-723.
137
Id. at 721.
138
Id. at 723.
Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. V, p. 2496. Compliance/Explanation with Urgent

139
Manifestation of Atty. Gempis, Jr.
140
Gone v. Atty. Macario Ga, A.C. No. 7771, 6 April 2011, 647 SCRA 243, 250.
Sibulo v. Ilagan, 486 Phil. 197, 204 (2004) citing Canons 1, 7, and 11, Code of
141
Professional Responsibility.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 204-205 citing Dr. Gamilla v. Atty. Mariño, Jr., 447 Phil. 419 (2003).

SECOND DIVISION
March 23, 2015
G.R. No. 197115
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Secretary of Agriculture, Petitioner,

vs.
FEDERICO DACLAN, JOSEFINA COLLADO and her husband FEDERICO DACLAN, TEODORO
DACLAN and MINVILUZ DACLAN as surviving heirs of deceased JOSE
DACLAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 197267
FEDERICO DACLAN, JOSEFINA COLLADO, TEODORO DACLAN and MINVILUZ DACLAN as

surviving heirs of deceased JOSE DACLAN, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and represented by the Secretary of Agriculture and
PROVINCE OF LA UNION, represented by its PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari1 assailing 1) the January 25, 2011
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90014 which set aside the July 31, 2007
Decision3 of Branch 32 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, as well as 2) the CA’s
May 30, 2011 Resolution4 denying the parties’ respective Motions for Reconsideration.5
Factual Antecedents
The facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in May 1972, the Agoo Breeding Station (or "breeding station") was established by the
Department of Agriculture, through the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), Region I, for the purpose of
breeding cattle that would be distributed to the intended beneficiaries pursuant to the livelihood
program of the national government. In support of the said project, plaintiffs6 executed four (4)
documents denominated as Deed of Donation in favor of defendant Republic of the Philippines (or

"Republic") donating to the latter four (4) parcels of land, more particularly described in the following
Tax Declarations (TD):
1.TD No. 23769 registered in the name of Federico Daclan covering a [parcel of] land with an
area of 15,170 square meters, more or less;
2.TD No. 38240 registered in the name of Josefina Collado covering a [parcel of] land with
an area of 3,440 square meters, more or less;
3.TD No. 27220 registered in the name of Teodoro Daclan covering a [parcel of] land with an
area of 2,464 square meters, more or less;
4.TD No. 1875 registered in the name of Jose Daclan (deceased father of plaintiff Minviluz
Daclan) covering a [parcel of] land with an area of 1,769 square meters, more or less.
These parcels of land are located at Barrio Nazareno, Agoo, La Union. The donation was subject to
the conditions that these parcels of land 1) shall be used solely for the establishment of a breeding
station, and 2) shall not be used for any other purpose, except with the previous consent of the
donors or their heirs.
Sometime in 1991, the powers and functions of certain government agencies, including those of the
Department of Agriculture (DA), were devolved to the local government units pursuant to Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code". Thus, defendant Province of La
Union (or "Province") assumed the powers and functions of the DA, in the operation of the breeding
station.7
In particular, the deeds of donation8 stipulated –
a.That the land herein mentioned shall be used for the establishment of a breeding station and shall
not be used for any other purpose, except with the previous consent of the DONOR or his heirs;
xxxx
c.That in case of non-use, abandonment or cessation of the activities of the BUREAU OF ANIMAL
INDUSTRY, possession or ownership shall automatically revert to the DONOR and all permanent
improvements existing thereon shall become the property of the DONOR; x x x9
All in all, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197267 – Federico Daclan, Josefina Collado, Teodoro Daclan,
Jose Daclan (the Daclans) – and several others donated around 13 hectares of land to the Republic.
The uniform deeds of donation covering these parcels of land contained the same conditions,
including the above stipulations relative to exclusive purpose/use and automatic reversion.10
Sometime after the donations were made, the La Union Medical Center (LUMC) was constructed on
a 1.5-hectare portion of the 13-hectare donated property.11
In a September 4, 2003 Letter12 to the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, the Daclans and
other donors demanded the return of their donated lands on the ground that the breeding station has
ceased operations and that the land has been abandoned.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On March 28, 2005, the Daclans filed Civil Case No. A-2363 for specific performance against the
Republic and the Province of La Union. The case was assigned to Branch 32 of the RTC of Agoo, La
Union (Agoo RTC). The Daclans essentially claimed in their Amended Complaint13 that pursuant to
the automatic reversion clause in the deeds of donation, they are entitled to a return of their donated
parcels of land after the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) ceased operating the breeding station, but
that the Republic and the Province failed to honor the said clause and refused to return their land.
They thus prayed that the defendants be ordered to return to them the donated land, with all
improvements existing thereon.
In its Answer,14 the Province alleged that the Daclans have no cause of action since the breeding
station was still existing – although this time it is being operated by the Province, pursuant to the
devolution program under the Local Government Code of 1991, and that the Daclans violated the
deeds of donation because they have occupied the donated land and have begun fencing the same.
It prayed for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the grant of injunctive relief.
In a subsequent Manifestation,15 the Republic opted to adopt the above Answer filed by the Province.
In their Reply,16 the Daclans claimed that the donated land cannot be assigned by the Republic to the
Province as the deeds of donation did not include the Republic’s successors or assigns as intended
beneficiaries; that contrary to the Province’s claim, the breeding station is not operational and has
been abandoned, and the existing heads of cattle found therein do not belong to the government but
to former officials of the BAI; and that with the automatic reversion clause, they are granted the
immediate right to occupy the subject land, and no injunctive relief should issue against them.
Upon motion of the parties, an ocular inspection of the premises was conducted, and a
Commissioner’s Report17was prepared and issued thereafter. The report indicated in part that –
From information gathered from Ms. Cresencia Isibido, a caretaker of the Agoo Breeding Station, the
land had an original area of thirteen (13) hectares. At present though, only eleven point five (11.5)
hectares is [sic] being occupied by the Agoo Breeding Station as 1.5 hectares was [sic] occupied by
the La Union Medical Center.
At a distance of about 200 meters from the main entrance of the breeding station, an office is located
at the south of said lot. Beside the office is a shed where six (6) young goats (kids) are housed.
Another shed where goats are housed is located at the northern side of the lot, fronting a water
pump station.
It was likewise gathered that at present, the breeding station has a total number of fifty (50) goats.
Also, there are six (6) cows roaming in the pasture land. Four (4) of these cows are pregnant. It was
clarified that these cows belong to the Cross Australian Bi-Bhraman [sic] breed.
There are four (4) caretakers in the breeding station, all of whom are employed by the provincial
government of La Union. They receive salary from the provincial government and they likewise
submit monthly reports to the Provincial Veterinarian. These four caretakers are Cresencia Isibido,
Manuel Daclan, Ruben Daclan (son of plaintiff Federico Daclan), and Tita Fortes.
The group left the breeding station at around 3:30pm.
Agoo, La Union, this 14th day of December, 2006.18
During trial, the witnesses testified as follows:

To substantiate their claim, the plaintiffs presented the following witnesses whose testimonies are
summarized, thus:
REINERIO BELARMINO[,] JR., is 46 years old, married, a resident of Namnama, San Fernando, La
Union, and Regional Director of the Department of Agriculture, Region 1.
Dir. Belarmino testified that by virtue of a subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum, he
brought to Court a photocopy of a letter he issued to Atty. Benjamin Tabios, Legal Consultant of the
Department of Agriculture dated October 14, 2003.
Dir. Belarmino said that while he confirmed and affirmed the contents of the letter, he nevertheless
could not agree on [sic] one sentence written therein. This pertains to the entry that the artificial
breeding station is no longer operational. He explained that although he signed the letter, it was his
legal officer who prepared the same.
Further, he said that he had been calling his legal officer since it was the latter who drafted said
letter. He clarified that upon personal verification, he found out that it was not the artificial breeding
station that was not [operational]. Rather, it was the breeding station that was not operational.
He likewise mentioned that as early as 1993, the Department of Agriculture, particularly the Bureau
of Animal Industry, gave up the breeding station because of the devolution. In particular, the
operation of the breeding station was transferred to the Province of La Union. However, he affirmed
that in the deed of donation, there is no mention of the Province of La Union. Likewise, there is no
mention of any successor.
He clarified though that no breeding activity was done by the Department of Agriculture through the
Bureau of Animal Industry since 1993 because ownership of the breeding station was transferred to
the Province of La Union. The transfer was made without the consent of the donors since the
transfer was between two government entities.
On the ocular inspection which was conducted, Dir. Belarmino affirmed that at present, there are six
cows and fifty (50) goats in the breeding station. However, he clarified that said 50 goats are not the
same goats that were turned over to the province of La Union as a result of the devolution.
TEODORO DACLAN, 84 years old, married, retired government employee and a resident of
Nazareno, Agoo, La Union, testified that he is one of the plaintiffs in this case.
He said that he executed a Deed of Donation in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, then
represented by the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. He clarified that as embodied in their
complaint, they seek to enforce the common provision that in case of non-use, abandonment or
cessation of activities of the Bureau of Animal Industry, possession and ownership of the lots subject
of donation shall revert x x x to the donors.
In this respect, he said that the Department of Agriculture, through the Bureau of Animal Industry,
has no on-going breeding activity in the abovementioned lots. He maintained that he came to know
of such non-operation of the breeding station as early as thirteen (13) years ago.
He likewise testified that he was never informed of any devolution which transferred the operations
of the breeding station from the Bureau of Animal Industry to the Province of La Union. Moreover,
his permission was never sought for the use of the donated lots by the Province of La Union.

FEDERICO DACLAN, 83 years old, married, retired employee of the Bureau of Animal Industry and
a resident of Brgy. Nazareno, Agoo, La Union, also testified.
He said that he is one of the plaintiffs in this case. Plaintiff Teodoro Daclan is his brother while
plaintiff Minviluz Daclan is his niece. His spouse, Josefina Collado, is likewise a co-plaintiff.
He added that he donated a parcel of land with an area of 15,170 square meters located at
Nazareno, Agoo, La Union in favor of the Republic of the Philippines through the Secretary of
Agriculture.
Further, he reiterated that as embodied in the deed of donation, one of the conditions therein is that
the land shall be used as a breeding station and shall not be used for any other purpose, except with
the previous consent of the donor or his heirs.
He maintained that since 1993 up to the present, the lot is no longer being used as a breeding
station nor has the defendant province of La Union sought his permission for the use of said lot for
any other purpose.
JOSEFINA COLLADO, 72 years old, married, housewife and a resident of Nazareno, Agoo, La
Union testified that she and her husband donated a parcel of land situated at Nazareno, Agoo, La
Union in favor of the Republic of the Philippines through the Secretary of Agriculture.
She said that at present, there is no breeding activity being conducted on said lot. She added that
there has been no breeding activity for a long time now. Further, she clarified that she and the other
plaintiffs were never notified of a devolution so much so that the operation of the breeding station
was transferred to defendant Province of La Union. Also, the defendant Province of La Union never
secured their consent for the use of the lot for any other purpose other than a breeding station.
MINVILUZ DACLAN, 75 years old, single, retired teacher and resident of San Pedro, Agoo, La Union
testified that she is the [daughter] of the late Jose Daclan. She said that during the lifetime of her
father, she was aware of a Deed of Donation executed by her father in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines represented by the then Secretary of Agriculture.
She said that the lot subject of the donation is situated in Nazareno, Agoo, La Union. Likewise, she
testified that the donation was premised on the condition that a breeding station is to be established
in said property. However, she maintained that there is no such breeding station.
Further, she was not aware if her father gave his consent for the use of the property for any other
purpose other than for a breeding station. She emphasized that her father gave his consent only for
the use of a breeding station. Likewise, she has not been consulted nor her permission sought for if
the land can be used for any other purpose other than for breeding.
The defendant Province of La Union presented the following witnesses whose testimonies are
summarized, thus:
CRESENCIA ISIBIDO, 58 years old, single, government employee and a resident of San Pedro,
Agoo, La Union testified that she is employed at the Office of the Veterinarian, particularly at the
Agoo Breeding Station at Nazareno, Agoo, La Union.
Particularly, she has been employed thereat since August 28, 1974, initially as Farm Worker and
now, as Farm Foreman. As foreman, she exercises supervision over her co-employees and over all

animals in the breeding station. She clarified that in 1989, there were six (6) personnel assigned at
the breeding station. She likewise clarified that from 1974 until 1989, she received her salary from
the Bureau of Animal Industry.
During the devolution of 1993, she started receiving her salary from the provincial government of La
Union. She added though that even after devolution took place, the operation of the Agoo Breeding
Station continued.
Likewise, she testified that from the time she was promoted as farm foreman, goats, cattle and swine
were being maintained at the breeding station. She recalled that there were about twenty (20) cattle,
seventy (70) goats and eight (8) swine.
When the devolution took place, she specified that the activities in the breeding station included
production of animals, forage and artificial insemination. She said that the cattles in the breeding
station were either subjected to natural insemination or artificial insemination. Upon the other hand,
goats are subjected to natural insemination. Aside from artificial or natural insemination, greasing is
also being conducted in the breeding station.
DR. NIDA GAPUZ, 47 years old, married, Provincial Veterinarian and a resident of Bauang, La
Union testified that she is the provincial veterinarian of the province of La Union since October,
2006. Prior to her appointment as provincial veterinarian, she was the Supervisor Agriculturist of the
Provincial Veterinarian’s Office. Again, prior to her appointment as supervisor agriculturist, she was
Agricultural Center Chief II of the same office.
She recalled that in 1983, their office was under the Department of Agriculture Regional Office.
Thereafter, they were transferred to the Provincial Office of the Department of Agriculture. She said
that at that time, the Agoo Breeding Station was already existing.
Thereafter, with the advent of devolution, the Office of the Provincial Veterinarian was created and
eventually, they were separated from the Department of Agriculture.
Further, she testified that in her capacity as Agricultural Center Chief II, she handled the facilities for
the Agoo Breeding Station and the La Union Breeding Station, both of which are under the office of
the provincial veterinarian.
She mentioned that she used to visit the Agoo Breeding Station at least two (2) times a month. She
added that natural as well as artificial insemination activities were conducted in said breeding
station. As such, she explained that one of the purpose[s] of the breeding station is to reproduce and
disperse animals.
At present, she said that the breeding station engages in goat dispersal and cattle production. There
are no swine since swine production was phased out because of the establishment of the La Union
Medical Center within the vicinity of the breeding station.
Likewise, she said that at present, there are seven (7) heads of cattle being raised in the breeding
station. Of these, two (2) are pregnant. There are also forty-six (46) heads of goats.
ATTY. MAURO CABADING, 53 years old, married, Provincial Assessor and a resident of San
Fernando City, La Union testified that he is familiar with the Agoo Breeding Station because he took
photographs thereof sometime last year.

He explained that he was directed by the governor and the provincial administrator to take
photographs of the breeding station to determine whether the allegations contained in the complaint
filed by herein plaintiffs [are] true or not. He then proceeded to the Agoo Breeding Station
accompanied by his driver and a personnel from the Provincial Veterinarian’s Office.
He maintained that he can recognize the photographs taken at the breeding station since it was his
camera that was used in taking pictures. He then started identifying the photographs, making
mention of those which depicted cows, goats and houses for cows and goats. Also, he said that the
[owner] of the goats and cows seen at the photographs he took is the provincial government of La
Union.19
On July 31, 2007, the Agoo RTC rendered its Decision20 in Civil Case No. A-2363, which decreed
thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment DISMISSING this
instant case for specific performance.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court held that although the functions and powers of the BAI were transferred to the
Province by virtue of devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991, the Province continued
to operate the breeding station. It added that the Daclans’ consent to the transfer of functions and
powers was not necessary as to affect the validity of the donations of their lands; devolution of
power took effect by operation of law. It held further that contrary to the Daclans’ claims, the
preponderance of evidence suggested that the operations of the breeding station never ceased; and
there are farm animals, buildings, structures, and offices being supervised by four caretakers whose
salaries were being paid by the Province, and these personnel submit monthly reports of operations
to the provincial veterinarian.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Daclans took the Agoo RTC’s July 31, 2007 Decision to the CA via appeal. On January 25,
2011, the CA issued the assailed Decision, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed July 31, 2007 decision of Branch 32 of the
Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union is hereby SET ASIDE. The donation insofar as the 1.5
hectare portion of the donated parcels of land that is now being used by the La Union Medical
Center for its medical facility, hence no longer being used for the purpose for which the donation was
constituted, is hereby declared revoked. Accordingly, possession and ownership of that particular
portion of the donated parcels of land shall revert to the donor/s or their heir/s.
SO ORDERED.22
In essence, the CA agreed with the findings of fact of the Agoo RTC, except that it held that the
Province violated the exclusive use stipulations in the deeds of donation when it allowed the
construction of the LUMC within a portion of the donated lands, as the operation of a human medical
facility has no relation to the operation of an animal breeding station, and it has not been shown that
the consent of the donors was obtained prior to the construction of the LUMC. Thus, with respect to
the portion occupied by the LUMC, the automatic reversion clauses in the deeds of donation apply.
The appellate court held further that even the Office of the Solicitor General conceded that if any
violation of the deeds of donation occurred, it could only affect that portion which is no longer used
as a breeding station. Finally, it upheld the validity of the automatic reversion clauses in the subject

deeds of donation, which it found to be consistent with law, morals, good customs, public order and
public policy.
Both the Daclans and the Republic moved for reconsideration, but on May 30, 2011, the CA issued
the second assailed disposition sustaining its judgment.
The present Petitions were thus filed.
In an October 3, 2011 Resolution23 of the Court, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Issues
The following issues are raised:
By the Republic in G.R. No. 197115
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER VIOLATED THE

PROVISIONS OF THE DEEDS OF DONATION.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DIRECTING THE PETITIONER TO RETURN

PORTION/S OF THE PARCEL/S OF LAND DONATED BY RESPONDENTS AND/OR THEIR
FOREBEARS BASED ON AN UNESTABLISHED INFERENCE.24
By the Daclans in G.R. No. 197267
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE THE MAIN ISSUES RAISED BY THE
PETITIONERS IN THE TRIAL COURT AND BEFORE IT.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A

WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE ESTABLISHED FACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE.25
The Parties’ Respective Arguments
G.R. No. 197115. For the Republic, the lone point of contention is that the CA could not validly order
the return to the Daclans of the donated 1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is situated because it
has not been proved that such portion formed part of lands originally donated by the Daclans. The
Republic contends that the Daclans donated only an aggregate of 2.2843 hectares, while the
breeding station sits on 13 hectares of donated land; the Daclans did not prove during trial that the
1.5-hectare land where the LUMC is erected sits within the 2.2843 hectares donated by them. It
maintains that if reversion must occur, the Daclans must first clearly identify the land on which the

LUMC is erected as theirs. Thus, it prays that the July 31, 2007 Decision of the Agoo RTC be
reinstated.
For their part, the Daclans adopt their Petition in G.R. No. 197267 as their Comment to the
Republic’s Petition. In turn, the Republic manifested that it was adopting its Comment26 to the
Daclans’ Petition in G.R. No. 197267 as its Reply.
G.R. No. 197267. The Daclans in their Petition insist that the deeds of donation they executed are
"personal and exclusively limited to the parties, the donor and the donee. (They do) not extend to or
inure to the benefit of their successors and assigns;"27 the rights and obligations of the parties to the
donations are not transmissible by their nature or stipulation. Thus, the unauthorized turnover of the
breeding station to the Province by the BAI – the sole beneficiary under the deeds of donation –
constitutes a violation of the terms of the deeds of donation, thus giving ground for reversion; and
with the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991, the BAI ceased to exist and was
abolished. Thus, the donated lands automatically revert to their original owners. They add that the
evidence clearly indicates that the donated lands are no longer being used as a breeding station, but
merely grazing land for a few animals whose ownership is even in doubt. Finally, the Daclans decry
the failure of the Province to provide "agricultural extension and on-site research services and
facilities" as required under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code
of 1991, which thus constitutes a violation of the stipulation contained in the deeds of donation to
develop and improve the livestock industry of the country. Thus, they pray that the assailed CA
dispositions be set aside completely and all their donated lands be reverted to them.
Notably, the Daclans admit in their Petition that the 1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is
constructed does not form part of the lands they donated to the government, but belongs to "other
donors who are not parties to the case."28
In its Comment29 with a prayer for the denial of the Daclans’ Petition and reinstatement of the July 31,
2007 Decision of the Agoo RTC, the Republic argues that the question of whether the breeding
station is still in operation is one of fact which should not be disturbed at this stage of the
proceedings; that the Daclans’ admission in their Petition that the 1.5-hectare portion where the
LUMC is constructed does not form part of the lands they donated to the government contradicts its
argument that the CA committed serious error in ordering the reversion of the said portion to them;
that it is not merely the BAI which acted as the donee, but the Republic itself – represented by the
Secretary of the Department of Agriculture – which is the recipient of the Daclans’ donated lands
under the deeds; and that the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991 did not result in the
cessation of operations of the Agoo breeding station.
In an August 28, 2013 Manifestation,30 the Province adopted the Republic’s Comment to the Petition
as its own.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Republic’s Petition in G.R. No. 197115 and denies that of the Daclans’ in G.R.
No. 197267.
The preponderance of evidence points to the fact that the breeding station remained operational
even after its transfer from the Republic to the Province. The activities of the BAI did not cease even
after it was dissolved after the government adopted the policy of devolution under the Local
Government Code of 1991; these activities were merely transferred to the Province. Thus, the
witnesses for the Daclans and the Republic uniformly declared that the breeding station remained
operational even after the Local Government Code of 1991 was put into effect. Particularly, Regional

Director Reinerio Belarmino, Jr. of the Department of Agriculture, Region 1 declared that after the
breeding station was transferred to the Province, he saw upon ocular inspection that there remained
six cows and fifty goats on the premises. Cresencia Isibido testified that as Farm Foreman, she
exercised supervision over her co-employees in the breeding station; that in 1989, there were six
personnel assigned at the breeding station; that from 1974 until 1989, she received her salary from
the BAI; that after devolution, she started receiving her salary from the Province; and that even after
devolution, the operation of the Agoo Breeding Station continued, and goats, cattle and swine were
being maintained thereat. Dr. Nida Gapuz, La Union Provincial Veterinarian, said that natural as well
as artificial insemination activities were being conducted at the breeding station, as well as goat
dispersal and cattle production. Atty. Mauro Cabading, La Union Provincial Assessor, testified that
he was directed by the Governor and the Provincial Administrator to take photographs of the
breeding station in order to verify the complaint filed by the Daclans; that he then proceeded to the
Agoo Breeding Station; that he took photographs of the animals – cows and goats – therein; and that
the Province owned said animals at the breeding station.
As against the bare assertions of the Daclans that the breeding station was abandoned and became
non-operational, the testimonies of the above public officers are credible. "In the absence of any
1avvphi1
controverting evidence, the testimonies of public officers are given full faith and credence, as they
are presumed to have acted in the regular performance of their official duties."31
Devolution cannot have any effect on the donations made by the Daclans to the Republic. As
defined, "devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority
upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities."32 It
includes "the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and
personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and
responsibilities."33 While the breeding station may have been transferred to the Province of La Union
by the Department of Agriculture as a consequence of devolution, it remained as such, and
continued to function as a breeding station; and the purpose for which the donations were made
remained and was carried out. Besides, the deeds of donation did not specifically prohibit the
subsequent transfer of the donated lands by the donee Republic. The Daclans should bear in mind
that "contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in cases where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation
or by provision of law."34 Thus, as a general rule, rights and obligations derived from contract are
transmissible.
The Daclans lament the supposed failure of the Province to provide "agricultural extension and on-
site research services and facilities" as required under the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Local Government Code of 1991, which failure they believe, constituted a violation of the
stipulation contained in the deeds of donation to develop and improve the livestock industry of the
country. Yet this cannot be made a ground for the reversion of the donated lands; on the contrary, to
allow such an argument would condone undue interference by private individuals in the operations of
government. The deeds of donation merely stipulated that the donated lands shall be used for the
establishment of a breeding station and shall not be used for any other purpose, and that in case of
non-use, abandonment or cessation of the activities of the BAI, possession or ownership shall
automatically revert to the Daclans. It was never stipulated that they may interfere in the
management and operation of the breeding station. Even then, they could not directly participate in
the operations of the breeding station.
Thus, even if the BAI ceased to exist or was abolished as an office, its activities continued when its
functions were devolved to the local government units such as the Province of La Union. It cannot be
said that the deeds of donation may be nullified just by the fact that the BAI became defunct; its
functions continued in the government offices/local government units to which said functions were
devolved.

Lastly, the CA cannot validly order the return to the Daclans of the donated 1.5-hectare portion
where the LUMC is situated, because such portion was not donated by them. They admitted that the
1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is constructed does not form part of the lands they donated to
the government, but belonged to other donors who are not parties to the instant case. As far as the
Daclans are concerned, whatever they donated remains part of the breeding station and so long as it
remains so, no right of reversion accrues to them. Only the original owner-donor of the 1.5-hectare
portion where the LUMC is constructed is entitled to its return.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves as follows:
1. The January 25, 2011 Decision and May 30, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R CV No. 90014 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
2.The Petition in G.R. No. 197115 is GRANTED. The July 31, 2007 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32 dismissing Civil Case No. A-2363 is REINSTATED;
and
3.The Petition in G.R. No. 197267 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE**

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
*
Per Special Order No. 1955 dated March 23, 2015.
**
Per Special Order No. 1956 dated March 23, 2015.
1
Rollo, G.R. No. 197115, pp. 12-36; G.R. No. 197267, pp. 8-42.
2
Rollo, G.R. No. 197115, pp. 38-48; penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and
concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.
3
Id. at 72-87; penned by Judge Clifton U. Ganay.
4
Id. at 50.
5
CA rollo, pp. 174-192.
6
Petitioners in G.R. No. 197267.
7
Rollo, G.R. No. 197267, pp. 184-185.
8
Records, pp. 7-10.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 11; Rollo, G.R. No. 197267, p. 189.
Rollo, G.R. No. 197115, pp. 27, 29, 44; G.R. No. 197267, p. 189; Records, pp. 227-228,
11
343.
12
Records, p. 11.
13
Id. at 63-69.
14
Id. at 84-87.
15
Id. at 102-103.
16
Id. at 88-91.
17
Id. at 227-228; prepared and signed by Commissioner Dante R. Evangelista.
18
Id. at 228.

19
Id. at 344-351.
20
Rollo, G.R. No. 197115, pp. 72-87.
21
Id. at 87.
22
Id. at 47.
23
Id. at 136.
24
Id. at 18-19.
25
Id., G.R. No. 197267, p. 18.
26
Id. at 235-251.
27
Id. at 19.
28
Id. at 32-33.
29
Id. at 235-251.
30
Id. at 263-265.
31
Peligrino v. People, 415 Phil. 94, 121-122 (2001).
32
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE of 1991, Section 17(e).
33
Id., Section 17(i).
34
CIVIL CODE, Article 1311.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramirez & Ortigas for appellant.
Tañada, Teehankee & Carreon for appellee.
SANTOS, J.:
An appeal interposed on June 23, 1965 by plaintiff-appellant, Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership,
from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, at Pasig, Hon. Andres Reyes
presiding, which dismissed its complaint in Civil Case No. 7706, entitled, "Ortigas & Company,
Limited Partnership, plaintiff, v. Feati Bank and Trust Company, defendant," for lack of merit.
The following facts — a reproduction of the lower court's findings, which, in turn, are based on a
stipulation of facts entered into by the parties are not disputed. Plaintiff (formerly known as "Ortigas,
Madrigal y Cia") is a limited partnership and defendant Feati Bank and Trust Co., is a corporation
duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. Plaintiff is engaged in real
estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision
along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong, Rizal. 1
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles, as
vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land, known
as Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision, situated at Mandaluyong, Rizal. On
July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor
of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the
corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment)
and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:
1. The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used the Buyer exclusively
for residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones
or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed
at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b)
provided with modern sanitary installations connected either to the public sewer or to
an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters
from its boundary lines. 2

The above restrictions were later annotated in TCT Nos. 101509 and 101511 of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal, covering the said lots and issued in the name of Emma Chavez.3
Eventually, defendant-appellee acquired Lots Nos. 5 and 6, with TCT Nos. 101613 and 106092
issued in its name, respectively and the building restrictions were also annotated
therein. 4 Defendant-appellee bought Lot No. 5 directly from Emma Chavez, "free from all liens and
encumbrances as stated in Annex 'D', 5 while Lot No. 6 was acquired from Republic Flour Mills
through a "Deed of Exchange," Annex "E". 6 TCT No. 101719 in the name of Republic Flour Mills
likewise contained the same restrictions, although defendant-appellee claims that Republic Flour
Mills purchased the said Lot No. 6 "in good faith. free from all liens and encumbrances," as stated in
the Deed of Sale, Annex "F" 7 between it and Emma Chavez.
Plaintiff-appellant claims that the restrictions annotated on TCT Nos. 101509, 101511, 101719,
101613, and 106092 were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the
beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of the big landed
estate of plaintiff-appellant where commercial and industrial sites are also designated or
established. 8
Defendant-appellee, upon the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River, has been declared a
commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal. 9 It alleges that plaintiff-appellant 'completely sold and transferred to
third persons all lots in said subdivision facing Epifanio de los Santos Avenue" 10 and the subject lots
thereunder were acquired by it "only on July 23, 1962 or more than two (2) years after the area ...
had been declared a commercial and industrial zone ... 11
On or about May 5, 1963, defendant-appellee began laying the foundation and commenced the
construction of a building on Lots Nos. 5 and 6, to be devoted to banking purposes, but which
defendant-appellee claims could also be devoted to, and used exclusively for, residential purposes.
The following day, plaintiff-appellant demanded in writing that defendant-appellee stop the
construction of the commerical building on the said lots. The latter refused to comply with the
demand, contending that the building was being constructed in accordance with the zoning
regulations, defendant-appellee having filed building and planning permit applications with the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, and it had accordingly obtained building and planning permits to
proceed with the construction.12
On the basis of the foregoing facts, Civil Case No. 7706, supra, was submitted in the lower court for
decision. The complaint sought, among other things, the issuance of "a writ of preliminary injunction
... restraining and enjoining defendant, its agents, assigns, and those acting on its or their behalf
from continuing or completing the construction of a commercial bank building in the premises ...
involved, with the view to commanding the defendant to observe and comply with the building
restrictions annotated in the defendant's transfer certificate of title."
In deciding the said case, the trial court considered, as the fundamental issue, whether or not the
resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as
part of the commercial and industrial zone of the municipality, prevailed over the building restrictions
imposed by plaintiff-appellant on the lots in question. 13 The records do not show that a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued.
The trial court upheld the defendant-appellee and dismissed the complaint, holding that the subject
restrictions were subordinate to Municipal Resolution No. 27, supra. It predicated its conclusion on
the exercise of police power of the said municipality, and stressed that private interest should "bow

down to general interest and welfare. " In short, it upheld the classification by the Municipal Council
of the area along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue as a commercial and industrial zone, and held that
the same rendered "ineffective and unenforceable" the restrictions in question as against defendant-
appellee.14 The trial court decision further emphasized that it "assumes said resolution to be valid,
considering that there is no issue raised by either of the parties as to whether the same is null and
void. 15
On March 2, 1965, plaintiff-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision, 16 which
motion was opposed by defendant-appellee on March 17, 1965.17 It averred, among others, in the
motion for reconsideration that defendant- appellee "was duty bound to comply with the conditions of
the contract of sale in its favor, which conditions were duly annotated in the Transfer Certificates of
Title issued in her (Emma Chavez) favor." It also invited the trial court's attention to its claim that the
Municipal Council had (no) power to nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant
corporation." 18
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration in its order of March 26, 1965. 19
On April 2, 1965 plaintiff-appellant filed its notice of appeal from the decision dismissing the
complaint and from the order of March 26, 1965 denying the motion for reconsideration, its record on
appeal, and a cash appeal bond." 20On April 14, the appeal was given due course 21 and the records
of the case were elevated directly to this Court, since only questions of law are raised. 22
Plaintiff-appellant alleges in its brief that the trial court erred —
I. When it sustained the view that Resolution No. 27, series of 1960 of the Municipal
Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal declaring Lots Nos. 5 and 6, among others, as part of
the commercial and industrial zone, is valid because it did so in the exercise of its
police power; and
II. When it failed to consider whether or not the Municipal Council had the power to
nullify the contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee and when it did not
make a finding that the building was erected along the property line, when it should
have been erected two meters away from said property line. 23
The defendant-appellee submitted its counter-assignment of errors. In this connection, We already

had occasion to hold in Relativo v. Castro 24 that "(I)t is not incumbent on the appellee, who occupies
a purely defensive position, and is seeking no affirmative relief, to make assignments of error, "
The only issues to be resolved, therefore, are: (1) whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid
exercise of police power; and (2) whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the
contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.
1. The contention that the trial court erred in sustaining the validity of Resolution No. 27 as an
exercise of police power is without merit. In the first place, the validity of the said resolution was
never questioned before it. The rule is that the question of law or of fact which may be included in
the appellant's assignment of errors must be those which have been raised in the court below, and
are within the issues framed by the parties. 25 The object of requiring the parties to present all
questions and issues to the lower court before they can be presented to the appellate court is to
enable the lower court to pass thereon, so that the appellate court upon appeal may determine
whether or not such ruling was erroneous. The requirement is in furtherance of justice in that the
other party may not be taken by surprise. 26 The rule against the practice of blowing "hot and cold" by
assuming one position in the trial court and another on appeal will, in the words of Elliot, prevent

deception. 27 For it is well-settled that issues or defenses not raised 28 or properly litigated 29 or
pleaded 30 in the Court below cannot be raised or entertained on appeal.
In this particular case, the validity of the resolution was admitted at least impliedly, in the stipulation
of facts below. when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. The only controversy then as stated
by the trial court was whether or not the resolution of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong ... which
declared lots Nos. 4 and 5 among others, as a part of the commercial and industrial zone of the
municipality, prevails over the restrictions constituting as encumbrances on the lots in
question. 31 Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution below, even if impliedly, plaintiff-
appellant cannot now change its position on appeal.
But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day for plaintiff-appellant to raise the issue of
the invalidity of the municipal resolution in question, We are of the opinion that its posture is
unsustainable. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy
Act," 32 empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances
or regulations"; 33 for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power
through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a
regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision. As a
matter of fact the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding ... "
An examination of Section 12 of the same law 34 which prescribes the rules for its interpretation
likewise reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be "liberally construed in its favor"
and that "(A)ny fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in
favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist." The same section further mandates
that the general welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to
local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of the
people in the community. The only exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out
of a contract between "a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other," in
which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The exceptions, clearly,
do not apply in the case at bar.
2. With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot nullify the contractual obligations
assumed by the defendant-appellee – referring to the restrictions incorporated in the deeds of sale
and later in the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to defendant-appellee – it should
be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not
absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. 35 Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable
of powers" 36 and "in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, 37 the exercise
of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, 'whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guarantee. 38 As this Court held through Justice Jose P. Bengzon in Philippine Long
Distance Company vs. City of Davao, et al. 39 police power "is elastic and must be responsive to
various social conditions; it is not, confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on
past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life." We were even more
emphatic in Vda. de Genuino vs. The Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., 40 when We declared: "We
do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be made
to prevail through the state's exercise of its police power.
Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of highway 54, now E. de los Santos Avenue
(EDSA, for short) from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River as an industrial and commercial zone,

was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police
power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality, Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area, especially
where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and
commercial complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs
through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of
traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or
welfare of the residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning and
subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal
'council, was reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject
resolution.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances, stressed this Court, speaking
thru Justice Laurel in the leading case of Calalang v. Williams et al., 41 Thus-
As was said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 US 223, 238 49 L. ed.
169), 'the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a business
lawful today may in the future, because of changed situation, the growth of
population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and welfare, and
be required to yield to the public good.' And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil. 440), it was
observed that 'advancing civilization is bringing within the scope of police power of
the state today things which were not thought of as being with in such power
yesterday. The development of civilization), the rapidly increasing population, the
growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of
the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state,
have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly
were not so considered. 42 (Emphasis, supplied.)
Thus, the state, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens, in order to secure the general comfort health and prosperity of the state 43 and to this
fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. 44
The need for reconciling the non-impairment clause of the Constitution and the valid exercise of
police power may also be gleaned from Helvering v. Davis 45 wherein Mr. Justice Cardozo, speaking
for the Court, resolved the conflict "between one welfare and another, between particular and
general, thus —
Nor is the concept of the general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial
a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the nation What is
critical or urgent changes with the times. 46
The motives behind the passage of the questioned resolution being reasonable, and it being a "
legitimate response to a felt public need," 47 not whimsical or oppressive, the non-impairment of
contracts clause of the Constitution will not bar the municipality's proper exercise of the power. Now
Chief Justice Fernando puts it aptly when he declared: "Police power legislation then is not likely to
succumb to the challenge that thereby contractual rights are rendered nugatory." 48
Furthermore, We restated in Philippine American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General49 that laws and
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power are read into contracts agreed upon by the
parties. Thus —

Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between
the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read
into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts
against impairments presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of
which contractual relations are worthwhile – a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society.
Again, We held in Liberation Steamship Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 50 through Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, that ... the law forms part of, and is read into, every contract, unless clearly excluded
therefrom in those cases where such exclusion is allowed." The decision in Maritime Company of the
Philippines v. Reparations Commission, 51 written for the Court by Justice Fernando, now Chief
Justice, restates the rule.
One last observation. Appellant has placed unqualified reliance on American jurisprudence and
authorities 52 to bolster its theory that the municipal resolution in question cannot nullify or supersede
the agreement of the parties embodied in the sales contract, as that, it claims, would impair the
obligation of contracts in violation of the Constitution. Such reliance is misplaced.
In the first place, the views set forth in American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling
in the Philippines, the laws of which must necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention
of its own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the
context of other local legislation related thereto. 53 and Burgess, et al v. Magarian, et al., 55 two Of the
cases cited by plaintiff-appellant, lend support to the conclusion reached by the trial court, i.e. that
the municipal resolution supersedes/supervenes over the contractual undertaking between the
parties. Dolan v. Brown, states that "Equity will not, as a rule, enforce a restriction upon the use of
property by injunction where the property has so changed in character and environment as to make
it unfit or unprofitable for use should the restriction be enforced, but will, in such a case, leave the
complainant to whatever remedy he may have at law. 56 (Emphasis supplied.) Hence, the remedy of
injunction in Dolan vs. Brown was denied on the specific holding that "A grantor may lawfully insert in
his deed conditions or restrictions which are not against public policy and do not materially impair the
beneficial enjoyment of the estate. 57 Applying the principle just stated to the present controversy, We
can say that since it is now unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health and comfort, to use Lots Nos. 5
and 6 for strictly residential purposes, defendants- appellees should be permitted, on the strength of
the resolution promulgated under the police power of the municipality, to use the same for
commercial purposes. In Burgess v. Magarian et al. it was, held that "restrictive covenants running
with the land are binding on all subsequent purchasers ... " However, Section 23 of the zoning
ordinance involved therein contained a proviso expressly declaring that the ordinance was not
intended "to interfere with or abrogate or annul any easements, covenants or other agreement
between parties." 58 In the case at bar, no such proviso is found in the subject resolution.
It is, therefore, clear that even if the subject building restrictions were assumed by the defendant-
appellee as vendee of Lots Nos. 5 and 6, in the corresponding deeds of sale, and later, in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 101613 and 106092, the contractual obligations so assumed cannot prevail
over Resolution No. 27, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, which has validly exercised its police
power through the said resolution. Accordingly, the building restrictions, which declare Lots Nos. 5
and 6 as residential, cannot be enforced.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from, dismissing the complaint, is hereby
AFFIRMED. "without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee * and Aquino,JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I hold it is a matter of public knowledge that the place in question is commercial. It would be worse if
the same were to be left as residential and all around are already commercial.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The exhaustive and lucid opinion of the Court penned by Justice Guillermo S. Santos commends
itself for approval. I feel no hesitancy, therefore, in yielding concurrence, The observation, however,
in the dissent of Justice Vicente Abad Santos relative to restrictive covenants calls, to my mind, for
further reflection as to the respect to which they are entitled whenever police power legislation,
whether on the national or local level, is assailed. Before doing so, however, it may not be amiss to
consider further the effect of such all-embracing attribute on existing contracts.
1. Reference was made in the opinion of the Court to Philippine American Life Insurance Company
v. Auditor General. 1 The ponente in that case was Justice Sanchez. A concurrence came from me. It
contained this qualification: "It cannot be said, without rendering nugatory the constitutional
guarantee of non-impairment, and for that matter both the equal protection and due process clauses
which equally serve to protect property rights, that at the mere invocation of the police power, the
objection on non-impairment grounds automatically loses force. Here, as in other cases where
governmental authority may trench upon property rights, the process of balancing, adjustment or
harmonization is called for. 2 After referring to three leading United States Supreme Court decisions,
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 3 Nebbia v. New York, 4 and Norman v. Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad Co., 5 I stated: "All of the above decisions reflect the view that an enactment of a
police power measure does not per se call for the overruling of objections based on either due
process or non-impairment based on either due process or non-impairment grounds. There must be
that balancing, or adjustment, or harmonization of the conflicting claims posed by an exercise of
state regulatory power on the one hand and assertion of rights to property, whether of natural or of
juridical persons, on the other. 'That is the only way by which the constitutional guarantees may
serve the high ends that call for their inclusion in the Constitution and thus effectively preclude ally
abusive exercise of governmental authority." 6 Nor did my concurrence stop there: "In the opinion of
the Blaisdell case, penned by the then Chief Justice Hughes, there was this understandable stress
on balancing or harmonizing, which is called for in litigations of this character: 'The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of
which contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to secure
the peace and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with
the necessary residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this
Court.' Also to the same effect: 'Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be
consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserve power cannot
be construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be construed to destroy the
reserved power in its essential aspects. 'They must be construed in harmony with each other. This

principle precludes a construction which would permit the State to adopt as its policy the repudiation
of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce them. But it does not follow
that conditions may not arise in which a temporary restraint of enforcement may be consistent with
the spirit and purpose of the constitutional provision and thus be found to be within the range of the
reserved power of the State to protect the vital interests of the community.' Further on, Chief Justice
Hughes likewise stated: 'It is manifest from this review of our decisions that there has been a
growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a rational
compromise between individual rights and public welfare. " 7 This is the concluding paragraph of my
concurrence in the Philippine American Life Insurance Co. case: "If emphasis be therefore laid, as
this concurring opinion does, on the pressing and inescapable need for such an approach whenever
a possible collision between state authority and an assertion of constitutional right to property may
exist, it is not to depart from what sound constitutional orthodoxy dictates. It is rather to abide by
what is compels. In litigations of this character then, perhaps much more so than in other disputes,
where there is a reliance on a constitutional provision, the judiciary cannot escape what Holmes fitly
referred to as the sovereign prerogative of choice, the exercise of which might possibly be impugned
if there be no attempt, however slight, at such an effort of adjusting or reconciling the respective
claims of state regulatory power and constitutionally protected rights." 8
I adhere to such a view. This is not to say that there is a departure therefrom in the able and
scholarly opinion of Justice Santos. It is merely to stress what to my mind is a fundamental postulate
of our Constitution. The only point I would wish to add is that in the process of such balancing and
adjustment, the present Constitution, the Philippine American Life Insurance Co. decision having
been promulgated under the 1935 Charter, leaves no doubt that the claim to property rights based
on the non-impairment clause has a lesser weight. For as explicitly provided by our present
fundamental law: "The State shall promote social Justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security
of all the people. Towards this end, the
State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property,
and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. 9
2. Now as to restrictive convenants, accurately included by Hart and Sacks under the category of
"private directive arrangements. " 10 Through them people are enable to agree on how to order their
affairs. They could be utilized to govern their affairs. They could be utilized to govern their future
conduct. It is a well-known fact that the common law relies to a great extent on such private directive
arrangements to attain a desirable social condition. More specifically, such covenants are an
important means of ordering one aspect of property relationships. Through them, there could be
delimitation of land use rights. It is quite understandable why the law should ordinarily accord them
deference, It does so, it has been said, both on grounds of morality and utility. Nonetheless, there
are limits to the literal enforcement of their terms. To the extent that they ignore technological or
economic progress, they are not automatically entitled to judicial protection. Clearly, they must
"speak from one point of time to another." 11 The parties, like all mortal, do not have the power of
predicting the future with unfailing certainty. In cases therefore where societal welfare calls for police
power legislation, the parties adversely affected should realize that arrangements dealing with
property rights are not impressed with sanctity. That approach, in my view, was the guiding principle
of the opinion of the Court. f fence my full and entire concurrence.
ABAD SANTOS, J:, dissenting:
Although Resolution No. 27, series of 1960, of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal, is valid
until otherwise declared, I do not believe that its enactment was by virtue of the police power of that
municipality. I do not here dispute the concept of police power as stated in Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80
Phil. 77 (1948) for as a matter of fact I accept it. And I agree also that it is elastic and must be

responsive to various social conditions, etc. as ruled in PLDT vs. City of Davao, L-23080, Oct. 26,
1965, 15 SCRA 244. But Resolution No. 27, cannot be described as promotive of the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people of Mandaluyong. On the
contrary, its effect is the opposite. For the serenity, peace and quite of a residential section would by
the resolution be replaced by the chaos, turmoil and frenzy of commerce and industry. Where there
would be no industrial and noise pollution these bane of so-called progress would now pervade and
suffocate the environment to the detriment of the ecology. To characterize the ordinance as an
exercise of police power would be retrogressive. It will set back all the efforts of the Ministry of
Human Settlements to improve the quality of life especially in Metro Manila. It will make Metro
Manila, not the city of man as envisioned by its Governor but a city of commerce and industry.
Considering, therefore, that Resolution No, 2-1 was not enacted in the legitimate exercise of police
power, it cannot impair the restrictive covenants which go with the lands that were sold by the
plaintiff-appellant. I vote for the reversal of the appealed decision.
# Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I hold it is a matter of public knowledge that the place in question is commercial. It would be worse if
the same were to be left as residential and all around are already commercial.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The exhaustive and lucid opinion of the Court penned by Justice Guillermo S. Santos commends
itself for approval. I feel no hesitancy, therefore, in yielding concurrence, The observation, however,
in the dissent of Justice Vicente Abad Santos relative to restrictive covenants calls, to my mind, for
further reflection as to the respect to which they are entitled whenever police power legislation,
whether on the national or local level, is assailed. Before doing so, however, it may not be amiss to
consider further the effect of such all-embracing attribute on existing contracts.
1. Reference was made in the opinion of the Court to Philippine American Life Insurance Company
v. Auditor General. 1 The ponente in that case was Justice Sanchez. A concurrence came from me. It
contained this qualification: "It cannot be said, without rendering nugatory the constitutional
guarantee of non-impairment, and for that matter both the equal protection and due process clauses
which equally serve to protect property rights, that at the mere invocation of the police power, the
objection on non-impairment grounds automatically loses force. Here, as in other cases where
governmental authority may trench upon property rights, the process of balancing, adjustment or
harmonization is called for. 2 After referring to three leading United States Supreme Court decisions,
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 3 Nebbia v. New York, 4 and Norman v. Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad Co., 5 I stated: "All of the above decisions reflect the view that an enactment of a
police power measure does not per se call for the overruling of objections based on either due
process or non-impairment based on either due process or non-impairment grounds. There must be

that balancing, or adjustment, or harmonization of the conflicting claims posed by an exercise of
state regulatory power on the one hand and assertion of rights to property, whether of natural or of
juridical persons, on the other. 'That is the only way by which the constitutional guarantees may
serve the high ends that call for their inclusion in the Constitution and thus effectively preclude ally
abusive exercise of governmental authority." 6 Nor did my concurrence stop there: "In the opinion of
the Blaisdell case, penned by the then Chief Justice Hughes, there was this understandable stress
on balancing or harmonizing, which is called for in litigations of this character: 'The policy of
protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of
which contractual relations are worthwhile a government which retains adequate authority to secure
the peace and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with
the necessary residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this
Court.' Also to the same effect: 'Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be
consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation of that power. The reserve power cannot
be construed so as to destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be construed to destroy the
reserved power in its essential aspects. 'They must be construed in harmony with each other. This
principle precludes a construction which would permit the State to adopt as its policy the repudiation
of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denial of means to enforce them. But it does not follow
that conditions may not arise in which a temporary restraint of enforcement may be consistent with
the spirit and purpose of the constitutional provision and thus be found to be within the range of the
reserved power of the State to protect the vital interests of the community.' Further on, Chief Justice
Hughes likewise stated: 'It is manifest from this review of our decisions that there has been a
growing appreciation of public needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a rational
compromise between individual rights and public welfare. " 7 This is the concluding paragraph of my
concurrence in the Philippine American Life Insurance Co. case: "If emphasis be therefore laid, as
this concurring opinion does, on the pressing and inescapable need for such an approach whenever
a possible collision between state authority and an assertion of constitutional right to property may
exist, it is not to depart from what sound constitutional orthodoxy dictates. It is rather to abide by
what is compels. In litigations of this character then, perhaps much more so than in other disputes,
where there is a reliance on a constitutional provision, the judiciary cannot escape what Holmes fitly
referred to as the sovereign prerogative of choice, the exercise of which might possibly be impugned
if there be no attempt, however slight, at such an effort of adjusting or reconciling the respective
claims of state regulatory power and constitutionally protected rights." 8
I adhere to such a view. This is not to say that there is a departure therefrom in the able and
scholarly opinion of Justice Santos. It is merely to stress what to my mind is a fundamental postulate
of our Constitution. The only point I would wish to add is that in the process of such balancing and
adjustment, the present Constitution, the Philippine American Life Insurance Co. decision having
been promulgated under the 1935 Charter, leaves no doubt that the claim to property rights based
on the non-impairment clause has a lesser weight. For as explicitly provided by our present
fundamental law: "The State shall promote social Justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security
of all the people. Towards this end, the
State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private property,
and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits. 9
2. Now as to restrictive convenants, accurately included by Hart and Sacks under the category of
"private directive arrangements. " 10 Through them people are enable to agree on how to order their
affairs. They could be utilized to govern their affairs. They could be utilized to govern their future
conduct. It is a well-known fact that the common law relies to a great extent on such private directive
arrangements to attain a desirable social condition. More specifically, such covenants are an
important means of ordering one aspect of property relationships. Through them, there could be
delimitation of land use rights. It is quite understandable why the law should ordinarily accord them
deference, It does so, it has been said, both on grounds of morality and utility. Nonetheless, there

are limits to the literal enforcement of their terms. To the extent that they ignore technological or
economic progress, they are not automatically entitled to judicial protection. Clearly, they must
"speak from one point of time to another." 11 The parties, like all mortal, do not have the power of
predicting the future with unfailing certainty. In cases therefore where societal welfare calls for police
power legislation, the parties adversely affected should realize that arrangements dealing with
property rights are not impressed with sanctity. That approach, in my view, was the guiding principle
of the opinion of the Court. f fence my full and entire concurrence.
ABAD SANTOS, J:, dissenting:
Although Resolution No. 27, series of 1960, of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal, is valid
until otherwise declared, I do not believe that its enactment was by virtue of the police power of that
municipality. I do not here dispute the concept of police power as stated in Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80
Phil. 77 (1948) for as a matter of fact I accept it. And I agree also that it is elastic and must be
responsive to various social conditions, etc. as ruled in PLDT vs. City of Davao, L-23080, Oct. 26,
1965, 15 SCRA 244. But Resolution No. 27, cannot be described as promotive of the health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people of Mandaluyong. On the
contrary, its effect is the opposite. For the serenity, peace and quite of a residential section would by
the resolution be replaced by the chaos, turmoil and frenzy of commerce and industry. Where there
would be no industrial and noise pollution these bane of so-called progress would now pervade and
suffocate the environment to the detriment of the ecology. To characterize the ordinance as an
exercise of police power would be retrogressive. It will set back all the efforts of the Ministry of
Human Settlements to improve the quality of life especially in Metro Manila. It will make Metro
Manila, not the city of man as envisioned by its Governor but a city of commerce and industry.
Considering, therefore, that Resolution No, 2-1 was not enacted in the legitimate exercise of police
power, it cannot impair the restrictive covenants which go with the lands that were sold by the
plaintiff-appellant. I vote for the reversal of the appealed decision.
#Footnotes
1 Record on Appeal, p. 110.
2 Id., pp. 4-5. Emphasis supplied.
3 Id pp. 111-112.
4 Id., p. 112.
5 Id., p. 80.
6 Id., p. 86.
7 Id., p. 94.
8 Id., pp. 11 2-113.
9 Id., pp. 60 and 113.
10 Brief for Defendant-Appellee, p. 2.

11 Id, p. 3.
12 Record on Appeal, pp. 113-114.
13 Id., p. 114.
14 Id., pp. 114-115.
15 Id., p. 114.
16 Id., p. 116.
17 Id., p.118.
18 Id., p. 117.
19 Id., p. 127.
20 Id., pp. 127-129.
21 Id., p. 130.
22 Ibid.
23 See Brief for Defendant-Appellee, pp. 30-31.
24 76 Phil. 563, 567 (1946).
25 Sec. 18, Rule 46, Revised Rules of Court; Tan Machan v. De la Trinidad 3 Phil.
684, (1946).
26 Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court, Vol. 111, 1968 Ed., p. 648, citing Jones v.
Seymour, 95 Art. 593, 597, 130 S.W. 560.
27 Id., pp.638-649, cit Elliot on Appellate Procedure, 416-417.
28 Sumerariz, et al. vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, et al., L-23764, Dec.
26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1374: San Miguel Brewery, et al. vs. Vda. de Joves. et al., L-
24258, June 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 1093, 1097. See also Tuason vs. Hon. Arca, et al.,
L- 24346, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1308, 1312.
29 Plaridel Surety and Ins. Co. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-21520, Dec.
11, 1967, 21 SCRA 1187.
30 Manila Port Service, et al vs, Court of Appeals, et al., L21890, March 29. 1968, 22
SCRA 1364.
31 Record on Appeal, p. 114.
32 Sec. 3 reads:

Sec. 3. Additional powers of provincial boards, municipal boards or city councils and
municipal and regularly organized municipal district councils.
xxx xxx xxx
Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding Municipal Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in
municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for their respective cities and municipalities subject to the approval of the
City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Cities and municipalities may,
however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to
planning and zoning. (Emphasis supplied).
33 Emphasis supplied.
34 The full text of Section 12 follows:
SEC. 12. Rules for the Interpretation of the Local Autonomy Act. —
1. Implied power of a province, a city or municipality shall be liberally

construed in its favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power should be interpreted infavor of the local
government and it shall be presumed to exist.
2. The general welfare clause be liberally interpreted in case of local

governments in promoting the economic condition, social welfare and
material progress of the people in the community.
3. Vested rights existing at the time of the promulgation of this arising

out of a contract between a province, city or municipality on one hand
and third party on the other, should be governed by the original terms
and provisions of the same, and in no case would this act infringe
existing right.
35 Primicias vs. Fugoso 80 Phil, 77 (1948).
36 Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 (1919), citing earlier authorities, Justice
Malcolm ponente.
37 Edu v. Ericta, L-3206, Oct. 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 487, Justice Fernando, now Chief
Justice, speaking for the court.
38 See Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila, L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849, Justice Fernando, now Chief Justice,
also wrote the decision for the Court.
39 L-23080, Oct. 20, 1965, 15 SCRA 244, 247-248.
40 L-25035, Feb. 26, 1968, 22 SCRA 792, 797.
41 70 Phil. 726 (1940).

42 Id., P. 734; Emphasis supplied.
43 Id., p. 733, citing U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218 (1915).
44 Id., p. 733.
45 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
47 Edu v. Ericta, supra, p. 489.
48 Fernando on the Philippine Constitution, 1974 ed., p. 558.
49 L-19255, January 18, 1968, 22 SCRA 135, citing Home Building and Loan
Association v. Blaisedell, 78 L. ed., 413, 428.
50 L-25389-90, June 27, 1968, 28 SCRA 1115, citing Manresa, Comm. Vol. 8, part 2
(5th Ed.) p. 535.
51 L-29203, July 26, 1971, 40 SCRA 75.
52 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 9-17.
53 Proctor & Gamble Philippine Manufacturing Corporation vs. Commissioner of

Customs, L-24173, May 23, 1968, 23 SCRA 691.
54 170 NE 425, 428 Illinois (1930).
55 243 NW 356, 358-359 Iowa (1932).
56 Op. Cit at p. 427.
57 Id., Id.
58 Op. Cit. at p. 358.
1 L-19244, January 18, 1968, 22 SCRA 135.
2 Ibid, 148.
3 290 US 398 (1934).
* Justice Teehankee was co-counsel for defendant-appellee.
4 291 US 502 (1934).
5 294 US 240 (1935).
6 Ibid, 151-152.

7 Ibid., 152-153.
8 Ibid., 155.
9 Article II, Section 6 of the Constitution.
10 H. Hart and A. Sacks, The Legal Process, 124.
11 Ibid, 125.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130230. April 15, 2005]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. DANTE O.

GARIN, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
At issue in this case is the validity of Section 5(f) of Republic Act No. 7924 creating the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), which authorizes it to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers
licenses in the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations.
The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued
a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street,
Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The following statements were printed on the TVR:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE MMDA TRAFFIC OPERATIONS CENTER
PORT AREA MANILA AFTER 48 HOURS FROM DATE OF APPREHENSION FOR
DISPOSITION/APPROPRIATE ACTION THEREON. CRIMINAL CASE SHALL BE FILED FOR
FAILURE TO REDEEM LICENSE AFTER 30 DAYS.
VALID AS TEMPORARY DRIVERS LICENSE FOR SEVEN DAYS FROM DATE OF

APPREHENSION.[1]
Shortly before the expiration of the TVRs validity, the respondent addressed a letter [2] to then MMDA
Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his drivers license, and expressing his preference for his
case to be filed in court.
Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint[3] with application for preliminary
injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque, on 12 September 1995, contending
that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the
MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination
of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The
respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore
unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
In support of his application for a writ of preliminary injunction, Garin alleged that he suffered and
continues to suffer great and irreparable damage because of the deprivation of his license and that, absent
any implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the confiscation of his license have no
legal basis.
For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out that the powers
granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines and
penalties for traffic violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary retains the
right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued that the doctrine of separation of
powers does not preclude admixture of the three powers of government in administrative agencies.[4]

The MMDA also refuted Garins allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the governing board and
policy making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the implementing rules for Sec. 5(f) of Rep.
Act No. 7924 and directed the courts attention to MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15
April 1995. Respondent Garin, however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-
95-001, as he claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a quorum.
Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort issued a temporary restraining order on 26 September 1995, extending
the validity of the TVR as a temporary drivers license for twenty more days. A preliminary mandatory
injunction was granted on 23 October 1995, and the MMDA was directed to return the respondents drivers
license.
On 14 August 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision [5] in favor of the herein respondent
and held that:
a. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular Meeting of the MMDA Council held on March 23,
1995, hence MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, authorizing confiscation of drivers licenses
upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio.
b. The summary confiscation of a drivers license without first giving the driver an opportunity to be
heard; depriving him of a property right (drivers license) without DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in
Court the complaint of supposed traffic infraction, cannot be justified by any legislation (and is) hence
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the temporary writ of preliminary injunction is hereby made permanent; th(e) MMDA is
directed to return to plaintiff his drivers license; th(e) MMDA is likewise ordered to desist from
confiscating drivers license without first giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate
proceeding.
In filing this petition,[6] the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in the court below and
contends that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege
subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the public safety and welfare. The
petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute a taking without
due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation.
To buttress its argument that a licensee may indeed appeal the taking and the judiciary retains the
power to determine the validity of the confiscation, suspension or revocation of the license, the petitioner
points out that under the terms of the confiscation, the licensee has three options:
1. To voluntarily pay the imposable fine,
2. To protest the apprehension by filing a protest with the MMDA Adjudication Committee, or
3. To request the referral of the TVR to the Public Prosecutors Office.
The MMDA likewise argues that Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 was validly passed in the
presence of a quorum, and that the lower courts finding that it had not was based on a misapprehension of
facts, which the petitioner would have us review. Moreover, it asserts that though the circular is the basis
for the issuance of TVRs, the basis for the summary confiscation of licenses is Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No.
7924 itself, and that such power is self-executory and does not require the issuance of any implementing
regulation or circular.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan
Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at
any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer confiscate drivers licenses as a matter of course in
cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed TVRs were given seven days from the date of
implementation of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license or vehicle plates. [7]

It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to enjoin the petitioner from
confiscating drivers licenses is concerned, recent events have overtaken the Courts need to decide this
case, which has been rendered moot and academic by the implementation of Memorandum Circular No.
04, Series of 2004.
The petitioner, however, is not precluded from re-implementing Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001,
or any other scheme, for that matter, that would entail confiscating drivers licenses. For the proper
implementation, therefore, of the petitioners future programs, this Court deems it appropriate to make the
following observations:
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may withhold in the exercise of its police
power.
The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but
a privilege granted by the state, which may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its
police power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural due process
requirements. This is consistent with our rulings in Pedro v. Provincial Board of Rizal[8] on the license to
operate a cockpit, Tan v. Director of Forestry[9] and Oposa v. Factoran[10] on timber licensing agreements,
and Surigao Electric Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Surigao[11] on a legislative franchise to operate an electric
plant.
Petitioner cites a long list of American cases to prove this point, such as State ex. Rel.
Sullivan,[12] which states in part that, the legislative power to regulate travel over the highways and
thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable
manner to conserve the safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments of
potential danger, their registration and the licensing of their operators have been required almost from their
first appearance. The right to operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a
privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the interest of the public safety and
welfare. The power to license imports further power to withhold or to revoke such license upon
noncompliance with prescribed conditions.
Likewise, the petitioner quotes the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Funk,[13] to the
effect that: Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and power. The use of them constitutes an element of
danger to persons and property upon the highways. Carefully operated, an automobile is still a dangerous
instrumentality, but, when operated by careless or incompetent persons, it becomes an engine of
destruction. The Legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the commonwealth, not only may, but
must, prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be operated on the highways. One of the primary
purposes of a system of general regulation of the subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure
the competency of the operator of motor vehicles. Such a general law is manifestly directed to the promotion
of public safety and is well within the police power.
The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the legislature, in the exercise of police
power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may be
operated on the state highways.
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,[14] we categorically stated
that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all
its functions are administrative in nature.
The said case also involved the herein petitioner MMDA which claimed that it had the authority to open
a subdivision street owned by the Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. to public traffic because it is an agent of
the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. From this premise,
the MMDA argued that there was no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune
Street to the public.
Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA
is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its
predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the

community. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the street
was invalid.
We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power, as an
inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties
or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.
Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body
of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power
to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or
local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as
are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991.[15] A local
government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs.[16] Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays,
which exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies.
Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage
of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and
administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed
under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus:
. . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that
empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the
charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down
policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations,
non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these
are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:
Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. -- -x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the
process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide
services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of the local government
units concerning purely local matters.
Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that
given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the
implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. [17] (footnotes omitted, emphasis
supplied)

Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the
petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need
of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.
3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.
Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila
Development Authority. The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states that the petitioner shall install and
administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of
traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke
drivers licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of Rep. Act No.
4136[18] and P.D. No. 1605[19] to the contrary notwithstanding, and that (f)or this purpose, the Authority shall
enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila, through its traffic operation center, and may deputize
members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security guards, or members
of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions
and requirements as the Authority may impose.
Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to
whom legislative powers have been delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not
precluded and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of
its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all
traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs.[20]
This is consistent with our ruling in Bel-Air that the MMDA is a development authority created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector, which may enforce, but not enact,
ordinances.
This is also consistent with the fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute is to be read
in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it,[21] and is supported by the criteria in cases
of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.[22]
A last word. The MMDA was intended to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend
local political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided by the individual LGUs, especially
with regard to transport and traffic management,[23] and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the petitioner
to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited
by the MMDAs enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner must be reminded that its efforts in
this respect must be authorized by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a legitimate source.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
[1]
Records, p. 10.
[2]
Id., p. 11.
[3]
Id., p. 1.
[4]
Memorandum for Defendants, Records, pp. 178 -185.
[5]
Id., pp. 187-190, penned by Hon. Helen Bautista-Ricafort.
[6]
Records, pp. 197-225.
[7]
Sec. 7, Mem. Circ. No. 04, Series of 2004.

[8]
56 Phil 123 (1931).
[9]
G.R. No. L-24548, 27 October 1983, 125 SCRA 302.
[10]
G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792.
[11]
G.R. No. L-22766, 30 August 1968, 24 SCRA 898.
[12]
63 P. 2d 653, 108 ALR 1156, 1159.
[13]
323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 (108 ALR 1161).
[14]
G.R. No. 135962, 27 March 2000, 328 SCRA 836, penned by Justice Reynato S. Puno.
[15]
Sec. 16 of Book I of the Local Government Code of 1991 states:
General Welfare.-Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and
those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate
and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
[16]
Supra, Note 18, p. 844, citing Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary, pp. 95-98 [1996], citing UP Law
Center Revision Project, Part II, 712 [1970] citing Sady, Improvement of Local Government Administration for Development
Purpose, Journal of Local Administration Overseas 135 [July 1962].
[17]
Ibid., pp. 849-860.
[18]
Entitled An Act to Compile the Laws Relative to Land Transportation and Traffic Rules, to Create a Land Transportation Commission
and for Other Purposes, approved on 20 June 1964. Sec. 29 thereof states:
Confiscation of drivers license.- Law enforcement and peace officers duly designated by the Commissioner shall,
in apprehending any driver for violations of this Act or of any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and
regulations, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Commission
therefore which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the
time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid
thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of apprehension will cause suspension
and revocation of his license. (emphasis supplied)
[19]
Entitled Granting the Metropolitan Manila Commission Certain Powers Related to Traffic Management and Control in Metropolitan
Manila, Providing Penalties, and for Other Purposes, dated 21 November 1978.
SEC. 5.- In case of traffic violations, the drivers license shall not be confiscated but the erring driver shall be
immediately issued a traffic citation ticket prescribed by the Metropolitan Manila Commission which shall state the violation
committed, the amount of fine imposed for the violation and an advice that he can make payment to the city or municipal
treasurer where the violation was committed or to the Philippine National Bank or Philippine Veterans Bank or their branches
within seven days from the date of issuance of the citation ticket. (emphasis supplied)
[20]
Section 3(b), Rep. Act No. 7924.
[21]
Thus, in Briad Agro Development Corporation v. dela Serna, (G.R. No. 82805, 29 June 1989, 174 SCRA 524) we upheld the grant
of concurrent jurisdiction between the Secretary of Labor or its Regional Directors and the Labor Arbiters to pass upon
money claims, among other cases, the provisions of Article 217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding, as enunciated
in Executive Order No. 111. Holding that E.O. 111 was a curative law intended to widen workers access to the Government
for redress of grievances, we held,the Executive Order vests in Regional Directors jurisdiction, [t]he provisions of Article
217 of this Code to the contrary notwithstanding, it would have rendered such a proviso - and the amendment itself - useless
to say that they (Regional Directors) retained the self-same restricted powers, despite such an amendment. It is fundamental
that a statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it. (See also Philtread Workers Union
v. Confessor, G.R. No. 117169, 12 March 1997, 269 SCRA 393.)
[22]
In Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes, (G.R. No. 60549, 26 October 1983, 125 SCRA 221) we upheld the constitutionality of Presidential
Decree No. 564, the Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, and Proclamation No. 2052 declaring certain
municipalities in the province of Cebu as tourist zones. The law granted the Philippine Tourism authority the right to
expropriate 282 hectares of land to establish a resort complex notwithstanding the claim that certificates of land transfer
and emancipation patents had already been issued to them thereby making the lands expropriated within the coverage of
the land reform area under Presidential Decree No. 2, and that the agrarian reform program occupies a higher level in the
order of priorities than other State policies like those relating to the health and physical well-being of the people, and that
property already taken for public use may not be taken for another public use. We held that, (t)he petitioners have failed to
overcome the burden of anyone trying to strike down a statute or decree whose avowed purpose is the legislative perception
of the public good. A statute has in its favor the presumption of validity. All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor
of the constitutionality of a law. The courts will not set aside a law as violative of the Constitution except in a clear case

(People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). And in the absence of factual findings or evidence to rebut the presumption of validity, the
presumption prevails (Ermita-Malate Hotel, etc. v. Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849; Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424).
In the same manner, we upheld in Dumlao v. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392)
the first paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that any retired elective provincial, city or municipal
official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement
of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected is disqualified to run for the same elective local office from which he
has retired. Invoking the need for the emergence of younger blood in local politics, we affirmed that the constitutional
guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is
germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class. (See also Tropical Homes, Inc, v.
National Housing Authority, G.R. No. L-48672, 31 July 1987 152 SCRA 540; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47791, 11
March 1978, 82 SCRA 55; People v. Vera, GR No. 45685, 65 Phil 56 [1937].)
[23]
Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 7924.

EN BANC
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, G.R. No. 177597

Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN,
Respondents.
x------------------------x
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, G.R. No. 178628
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent. July 16, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These consolidated petitions[1] seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.[2]
The Facts
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for
the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight
municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by
Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).[4] Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of
Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted
against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power
to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,[5] enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of
the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.MMA Act 201 provides:
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang,
Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from
the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is
hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
xxxx
Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by
the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of the regular members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve
their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or where they are residents:Provided,

that where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation
of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have
preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time being be appointed
by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and
qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries
they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in
accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province.
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato
as a part thereof, shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities[6] were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting
Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of
Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City,
although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of
the Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29

October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No.
3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of
the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March
2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation
of the COMELECs Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,[7] provides
in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the
recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by
Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29
March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed
only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.[8]
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending
Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question

as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao
with Cotabato City).[9]
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema
contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution[10] and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.[11] Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first
legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating
Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative
district.[12] Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped
Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts.
In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to
reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of
certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in
the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of
prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P.
Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of
Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007,
Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan
including Cotabato City. Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is
constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or
reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first
legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not
reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit
as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that
Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city.[13]

Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents Comments and
reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902.
In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No. 177597
to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under
Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives
without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. The parties
submitted their compliance as follows:
(1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court
in Felwa v. Salas[14] stated that when a province is created by statute, the corresponding
representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot
provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a
reapportionment; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) affirms the apportionment
of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate
the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces.
(2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its earlier stance
on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema,
contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is self-executing. Thus, every new
province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in
the House of Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and
(3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds:
(a) the province contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is created
by an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces;
(b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
enact measures relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative
districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every
province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the disproportionate representation
of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional Assembly can create provinces
without regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has
a population of less than 250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of
Representatives.

On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments
on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative,
whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative
district for such new province.[15]
In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No.
177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments.[16] On the
question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No.
177597 adopted the following positions:
(1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid
delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9),
Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their organic acts,
legislative powers over other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people of the region and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.[17] However,
Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in RA 7160 in
the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. [18] Thus, Sema
proposed that Section 19 should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from
prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with the minimum criteria under RA 7160.[19]
(2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is

unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those
granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant
under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to
prescribe standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of
provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause;
and
(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus
effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution
of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional
because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and Section 6,[20] Article X of the Constitution and (b) the

power to create provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X
of the Constitution.
On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen reiterated in
their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4
September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position on this issue
considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional.
The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral arguments on 27
November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628
consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R. No. 178628 echoed Sema's contention that the
COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters
of Cotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives. In its Comment to the
petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress
of the appropriate law.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:

(A) Preliminarily
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the
constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative
of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.
(B) On the merits

(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional;
and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly
under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative
in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for
such province.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is
valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City]), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding
Cotabato City).
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2)
MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902 is valid.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate

to Test the Constitutionality of
Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by any tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[21] On the other hand, the writ of
Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.[22] True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No.
7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[23] Nor is there a law which
specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for
representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. These, however, do not justify
the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance
of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the
constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.[24]
Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation

Does Not Moot the Petition
There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the 14
May 2007 elections for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted
this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an
inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of
MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition,
one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the
district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City will be included in the canvassing of
ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution
of the novel issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently
concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as
the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.

On the Main Issues
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly

Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must
comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed
in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to
delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under
its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the
Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the
power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,[25] subject to compliance with the criteria established in
the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create
provinces, cities or municipalities.[26]
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power
to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation
under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the
express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.[27] In the present case,
the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.

There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of
the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is
followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For
the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative
district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also
the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000
involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys population reaches 250,000, the
city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or
city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate
at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly
delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of
Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned

Only by an Act of Congress
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the power to increase
the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts,
is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance

with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase,
through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers
Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts
necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress
exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that
regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only
through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,[29] we held that the power
of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and
thus is vested exclusively in Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion

legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable
membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be

embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for
regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national
legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,
cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly
under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts.
This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative
powers over:
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
of the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions,

expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act,
provides, The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following
matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no

legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district
whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a
legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the next national elections from the
effectivity of the law.[30]
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office,
and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.[31] It would be
incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national
office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district
representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national
funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional
legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create
a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its
legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys
legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the
exclusive nature of Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from
creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that:
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which
includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied)
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that each province shall have at least one representative. Thus, the creation
of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional.
Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution,
which provides:

Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may
be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set
forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members
apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose
population has so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the
Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty
days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29 October
2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007
elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that when a
province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence
neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by
operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.
The contention has no merit.
First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating
the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for
congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for creati[ng]

congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution. The Court
answered in the negative, thus:
The Constitution ordains:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred
and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as
nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each
province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an
apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not
otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of
Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for
the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the
present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as
practicable, contiguous and compact territory.
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly,
through the creation of a province for each province shall have at least one member in the
House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts within a
province. The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the
territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not
apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not
only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the
apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when
a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district, comes into existence
neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment,
but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions under which
a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum
of 120 representative districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation
under consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into other
provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representative districts, without complying
with the aforementioned requirements.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative
districts indirectly through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the
creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative
districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because
in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the
new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.

What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not
emanate alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress
power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a
province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the
Constitution provides that each province shall have at least one representative in the House
of Representatives. This does not detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create
legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body,
except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a province such
legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress
can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only
Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff
Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first
legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district
by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute
Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section
5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that [E]ach city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative.
Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of
Representatives. Under Section 19,[33] Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can
create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in
Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum
contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.[34] The
following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
(1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can
create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior
legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250
fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise);

(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based
on one representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because
the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section
461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at least
250,000; and
(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in
the House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous
creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No. 177597
highlights the absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
provinces:
Justice Carpio:
So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and pack
Congress with their own representatives [?]
Atty. Vistan II:[35]
Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that.
Justice Carpio:
So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x provinces x x
x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five (35) new representatives in the House of
Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you are saying? That can be
done, under your theory[?]
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.
Justice Carpio:

Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new provinces, there
may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000) [population], x x x, and they will each
have one representative x x x to Congress without any national law, is that what you are
saying?
Atty. Vistan II:
Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying.
xxxx
Justice Carpio:
So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one thousand
(1000) representatives to the House of Representatives without a national law[,] that
is legally possible, correct?
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on
regional autonomy,[37] nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous
consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our
Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated
by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly
recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the
regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, [A]ny province
that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at

least one Member, refers to a province created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is
that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase
that only Congress can decide.Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 219[38] district
representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members
shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats
available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200
seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a
need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress
can create new provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative
powers of regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x. The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act
(RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established within the framework of the
Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM shall
be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves
also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the
creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in
Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the
creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative
districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate case.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section
5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because

the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power
only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province
without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a
legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a
national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers
of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM
Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic
and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely
complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as
Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No.

9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we
declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan.Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO


PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
In G.R. No. 177597, for the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus; in G.R. No. 178628, for declaratory relief and for the writs of
prohibition and mandamus.
[2]
The petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, Bai Sandra S. A. Sema (Sema), further seeks to compel the COMELEC to exclude from the canvassing the
votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the legislative district in question in the 14 May 2007 elections. On the other hand, the petitioner in
G.R. No. 178628, Perfecto Marquez, prays that the Court order the COMELEC to conduct a special election for representative of the First District
of Maguindanao with Cotabato City.
[3]
Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, and Upi. The second legislative district is composed of 19
municipalities (Talitay, Talayan, Guindulungan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu Piang, Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay, Mamasapano, South
Upi, Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah Sangki, Buluan, Datu Paglas, Gen, S.K. Pendatun, Sultan Sa Barongis, Rajah Buayan, Pagalungan,
Pagagawan and Paglat).
[4]
The enactment of the organic acts for the autonomous regions of the Cordilleras and Muslim Mindanao is mandated under Sections 18 and 19,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
[5]
The provision reads:
SECTION 19. Creation, Division or Abolition of Provinces, Cities, Municipalities or

Barangay. The Regional Assembly may create, divide, merge, abolish, or substantially alter boundaries
of provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangay in accordance with the criteria laid down by Republic Act
No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. The Regional Assembly may prescribe standards lower
than those mandated by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, in the
creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities,

or barangay. Provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangay created, divided, merged, or whose boundaries
are altered without observing the standards prescribed by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government
Code of 1991, shall not be entitled to any share of the taxes that are allotted to the local governments units
under the provisions of the Code.
The financial requirements of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangay so created,
divided, or merged shall be provided by the Regional Assembly out of the general funds of the Regional
Government.
The holding of a plebiscite to determine the will of the majority of the voters of the areas
affected by the creation, division, merger, or whose boundaries are being altered as required by Republic
Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, shall, however, be observed.
The Regional Assembly may also change the names of local government units, public places
and institutions, and declare regional holidays. (Emphasis supplied)
Before the enactment of RA 9054, the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays was vested in Congress (for
provinces, cities and municipalities) and in the sangguniang panlalawigan and sangguniang panlungsod (for barangays). (See Sections
384, 448, and 460 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.)
[6]
Sultan Mastura (created from Sultan Kudarat), Northern Kabuntulan (created from Kabuntulan) and Datu Blah Sinsuat (created from Upi).
[7]
The Memorandum reads in pertinent parts:
The record shows the former province of Maguindanao was divided into two new provinces (Shariff Kabunsuan and
Maguindanao), in view of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act (MMAA) No. 201, which authority was conferred to under
Section 17, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 giving the ARMM, thru its Regional Legislative Assembly, the power to
legislate laws including the enactment of the Local Government Code of ARMM.
The newly created province of Shariff Kabunsuan comprises the municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat,
Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, Upi and Datu Blah, including Cotabato City [which] belongs
to the first district of Maguindanao province.
It must be emphasized that Cotabato City is not included as part of ARMM although geographically located within the first
district of the former Maguindanao province. Cotabato City is not voting for provincial officials. This is the reason why
Cotabato City was not specifically mentioned as part of the newly created province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
Geographically speaking since [sic] Cotabato City is located within the newly created province of Shariff Kabunsuan having
been bounded by municipalities of Sultan Kudarat, Datu Odin Sinsuat and Kabuntalan as its nearest neighbors. Following
the rule in establishing legislative district, it shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
However, legally speaking, it may arise question of legality [sic] if Cotabato City will be appended as part of the newly
created Shariff Kabunsuan province. Under our Constitution [it is] only Congress that shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards provided for under Section 5(1) of Article VI.
xxxx
In order to avoid controversy on the matter, pending the enactment of appropriate law by Congress, it would be prudent and
logically feasible to maintain status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the first district of Maguindanao.
[8]
Resolution No. 7845 pertinently provides:
WHEREAS, the Province of Maguindanao consists of two legislative districts, with Cotabato City as part of the
first legislative district.
WHEREAS, Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 provided for the creation of the new Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan comprising the municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang,
Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura and Upi, all of the first legislative district of the mother Province of Maguindanao,
except Cotabato City which is not part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao; while the remaining
municipalities of Talisay, Talayan, Guindulungan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu Piang, Shariff Aguak, Datu
Unsay, Mamasapano, South Upi, Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah Sangki, Buluan, Datu Paglas, Gen. S. K. Pendatun,
Sultan Sa Barongis, Rajah Buayan, Pagalungan, Pagagawan, and Paglat, all of the second legislative district of
the mother Province of Maguindanao, shall remain with said province;
WHEREAS, the last paragraph of Section 5 of Muslim Mindanao Autonomy (MMA) Act No. 201 provides that
(e)xcept as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato City as a
part thereof, shall remain.;
WHEREAS, by reason of said provision of MMA Act No. 201, the first legislative district of the Province
of Maguindanao is now made up of Cotabato City only, and its second legislative district, the municipalities
of Talisay, Talayan, Guindulungan, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu Piang, Shariff Aguak, Datu Unsay,
Mamasapano, South Upi, Ampatuan, Datu Abdullah Sangki, Buluan, Datu Paglas, Gen. S. K. Pendatun,
Sultan Sa Barongis, Rajah Buayan, Pagalungan, Pagagawan, and Paglat[.] (Emphasis supplied)
In the earlier Resolution No. 7801, dated 11 January 2007, the COMELEC allocated one legislative seat each for the provinces of
Maguindanao and Shariff Kabunsuan for the 14 May 2007 elections.

[9]
Resolution No. 7902 reads in full:
This pertains to the amendment of Minute Resolution No. 07-0407 dated March 6, 2007, entitled, IN THE MATTER OF
THE MEMORANDUM OF ATTY. WYNNE B. ASDALA, ACTING DIRECTOR III, LAW DEPARTMENT, RELATIVE
TO THE STUDY/RECOMMENDATION OF SAID DEPARTMENT RE: CONVERSION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT OF
MAGUINDANAO INTO A REGULAR PROVINCE PER MINUTE RESOLUTION NO. 07-0297 DATED FEBRUARY
20, 2007. The dispositive portion of which reads:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to adopt the
recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by
Congress, to maintain status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First District
of Maguindanao.
The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to amend the pertinent portion of Minute Resolution No. 07-0407
to now read, as follows[:]
[]Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that the district
shall be known as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of
Maguindanao with Cotabato City).
Let the Executive Director advise the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato City accordingly. (Emphasis in the original)
[10]
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
[11]
Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall
be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the
basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose
population has so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such
adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.
[12]
Consistent with her claim that Cotabato City is not part of Shariff Kabunsuans legislative district, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition
for the disqualification of respondent Dilangalen as candidate for representative of that province (docketed as SPA No. A07-0).
[13]
Respondent Dilangalen asserts, and petitioner does not dispute, that as of 2000, Cotabato City had a population of 163,849, falling short of the
minimum population requirement in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which provides: Each legislative district shall comprise,
as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)
[14]
124 Phil. 1226 (1966).
[15]
As provided in the Resolution of 16 October 2007.
[16]
The Court also required Sema to submit with her Memorandum the certifications from the Department of Finance, the Lands Management
Bureau, the National Statistics Office, and the Department of Interior and Local Government that at the time of the creation of Shariff
Kabunsuan on 28 August 2006 it met the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of RA 7160.
[17]
SEC. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries
substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city or municipality, or any other political subdivision,
or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a barangay located within
its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code.
[18]
SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
[19]
Rollo, p. 229.
[20]
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released
to them.
[21]
Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[22]
Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[23]
See, however, Macabago v. Commission on Elections (440 Phil. 683 [2002]) where the Court held that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
will lie to question the constitutionality of an election regulation if the COMELEC has acted capriciously or whimsically, with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[24]
Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC, 409 Phil. 571 (2001); Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-32717, 26 November 1970,
36 SCRA 228.
[25]
Sections 385 and 386, RA 7160.
[26]
Sections 441, 449 and 460, RA 7160.
[27]
Section 20, Article X, Constitution.
[28]
See Section 2, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution and Section 5, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.
[29]
312 Phil. 492, 501 (1995).
[30]
Section 48 of Republic Act No. 8507 (Charter of Paraaque City) provides:
Section 48. Legislative District. As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Paraaque shall have its own
legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national election after the passage of this
Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 50 of Republic Act No. 7839 (Charter of City of Pasig) provides:

Section 50. Legislative District. As highly urbanized, the City of Pasig shall have its own legislative
district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act.
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 58 of Republic Act No. RA 9230 provides:
Section 58. Representative District. The City of San Jose del Monte shall have its own representative
district to commence in the next national election after the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9355 provides:
Section 7. Legislative District. The Province of Dinagat Islands shall constitute one, separate legislative district
to commence in the next national election after the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
[31]
In his Concurring Opinion in Paras v. Commission on Elections (332 Phil. 56, 66 [1996]), then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. stated:
The term regular local election must be confined to the regular election of elective local officials, as distinguished
from the regular election of national officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-President,
Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-Governors of provinces,
Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and
municipalities, punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective regional officials
of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized
by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied)
[32]
Supra note 13 at 1235-1236.
[33]
See note 3.
[34]
Section 461 provides: Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department
of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics
Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or
units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprise two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute
to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers and non-
recurring income.
[35]
Atty. Edgardo Carlos B. Vistan II, counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 177597.
[36]
TSN (27 November 2007), pp. 64-69.
[37]
Unlike the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, the 1987 Constitution mandates, in Section 15, Article X, the creation of autonomous regions in
the Cordilleras and Muslim Mindanao to foster political autonomy. See Cordillera Broad Coalition v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
79956, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 495.
[38]
Website of House of Representatives as of 12 May 2008.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 100152. March 31, 2000]
ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, Hon. MAMINDIARA MANGOTARA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
RTC, 12th Judicial Region, Br. 1, Iligan City; SAMAHANG OPTOMETRIST Sa PILIPINAS -
Iligan City Chapter, LEO T. CAHANAP, City Legal Officer, and Hon. CAMILO P. CABILI,
City Mayor of Iligan, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the dismissal by the
Court of Appeals of the original petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by the herein
petitioner against the City Mayor and City Legal Officer of Iligan and the Samahang Optometrist sa
Pilipinas - Iligan Chapter (SOPI, for brevity).
The antecedent facts leading to the filing of the instant petition are as follows:
Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After consideration of
petitioners application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor
issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following conditions:
1. Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial
store;
2. Acebedo cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for
patients, because these are functions of optical clinics;
3. Acebedo cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first
been made by an independent optometrist (not its employee) or independent optical
clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-
Ban and similar eyeglasses;
4. Acebedo cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban
and similar glasses and frames;
5. Acebedo is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent
optometrist.[1]
On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI), Iligan Chapter,
through its Acting President, Dr. Frances B. Apostol, lodged a complaint against the petitioner before the
Office of the City Mayor, alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit
and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit.
Acting on such complaint, then City Mayor Camilo P. Cabili designated City Legal Officer Leo T. Cahanap
to conduct an investigation on the matter. On July 12, 1989, respondent City Legal Officer submitted a
report to the City Mayor finding the herein petitioner guilty of violating all the conditions of its business
permit and recommending the disqualification of petitioner from operating its business in Iligan City. The

report further advised that no new permit shall be granted to petitioner for the year 1989 and should only
be given time to wind up its affairs.
On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business
Permit effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.
On October 17, 1989, petitioner brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for
restraining order/preliminary injunction against the respondents, City Mayor, City Legal Officer and
Samahan ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas-Iligan City Chapter (SOPI), docketed as Civil Case No. 1497
before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch I. Petitioner alleged that (1) it was denied due
process because it was not given an opportunity to present its evidence during the investigation
conducted by the City Legal Officer; (2) it was denied equal protection of the laws as the limitations
imposed on its business permit were not imposed on similar businesses in Iligan City; (3) the City Mayor
had no authority to impose the special conditions on its business permit; and (4) the City Legal Officer
had no authority to conduct the investigation as the matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of Optometry.
Respondent SOPI interposed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies but on November 24, 1989, Presiding Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara deferred
resolution of such Motion to Dismiss until after trial of the case on the merits. However, the prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction was granted. Thereafter, respondent SOPI filed its answer.
On May 30, 1990, the trial court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and
dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction it earlier issued. Petitioners motion for reconsideration met the
same fate. It was denied by an Order dated June 28, 1990.
On October 3, 1990, instead of taking an appeal, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with the Court of Appeals seeking to set aside the questioned Order of Dismissal, branding
the same as tainted with grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
On January 24, 1991, the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
[2]
Petitioners motion reconsideration was also denied in the Resolution dated May 15, 1991.
Undaunted, petitioner has come before this court via the present petition, theorizing that:
A.
THE RESPONDENT COURT, WHILE CORRECTLY HOLDING THAT THE

RESPONDENT CITY MAYOR ACTED BEYOND HIS AUTHORITY IN IMPOSING THE
SPECIAL CONDITIONS IN THE PERMIT AS THEY HAD NO BASIS IN ANY LAW OR
ORDINANCE, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SAID SPECIAL CONDITIONS
NEVERTHELESS BECAME BINDING ON PETITIONER UPON ITS ACCEPTANCE
THEREOF AS A PRIVATE AGREEMENT OR CONTRACT.
B.
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

CONTRACT BETWEEN PETITIONER AND THE CITY OF ILIGAN WAS ENTERED
INTO BY THE LATTER IN THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS PROPRIETARY FUNCTIONS.

Although petitioner agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted
beyond the scope of his authority in imposing the assailed conditions in subject business permit, it has
excepted to the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the said conditions nonetheless became binding on
petitioner, once accepted, as a private agreement or contract. Petitioner maintains that the said special
conditions are null and void for being ultra vires and cannot be given effect; and therefore, the principle of
estoppel cannot apply against it.
On the other hand, the public respondents, City Mayor and City Legal Officer, private respondent SOPI
and the Office of the Solicitor General contend that as a valid exercise of police power, respondent City
Mayor has the authority to impose, as he did, special conditions in the grant of business permits.
Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The State,
[3]
through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies
of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. This
[4]
delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code
which provides:
Sec. 16. General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of
the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of
appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of
their inhabitants.
The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all matters
affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community. Police
power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if
exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. [5]
The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. It is provided
for by law.
Section 171, paragraph 2 (n) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1983, reads:
Sec. 171. The City Mayor shall:
xxx
n) Grant or refuse to grant, pursuant to law, city licenses or permits, and revoke the same
for violation of law or ordinance or the conditions upon which they are granted.
However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal
protection of the law.
Succinct and in point is the ruling of this Court, that:

"x x x While a business may be regulated, such regulation must, however, be within the
bounds of reason, i. e., the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provision
cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling
subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation,
be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes
the fundamental law of the land or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public
policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a
common right." [6]
In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to petitioner was
burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court of Appeals that
respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special conditions in its permit as the
same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents and private respondent SOPI, on the
other hand, are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions on petitioners business permit
is well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power.
As aptly discussed by the Solicitor General in his Comment, the power to issue licenses and permits
necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to revoke
or cancel, likewise includes the power to restrict through the imposition of certain conditions. In the case
of Austin-Hardware, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, it was held that the power to license carries with it the
[7]
authority to provide reasonable terms and conditions under which the licensed business shall be
conducted. As the Solicitor General puts it:
"If the City Mayor is empowered to grant or refuse to grant a license, which is a broader
power, it stands to reason that he can also exercise a lesser power that is reasonably
incidental to his express power, i. e. to restrict a license through the imposition of certain
conditions, especially so that there is no positive prohibition to the exercise of such
prerogative by the City Mayor, nor is there any particular official or body vested with such
authority"
[8]
However, the present inquiry does not stop there, as the Solicitor General believes. The power or
authority of the City Mayor to impose conditions or restrictions in the business permit is indisputable.
What petitioner assails are the conditions imposed in its particular case which, it complains, amount to a
confiscation of the business in which petitioner is engaged.
Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and the issuance of a
license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is usually granted by the local
authorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular
profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or some
form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural
person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.
In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the
business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of
optometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does have in its employ, persons who are duly
licensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
The case of Samahan ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas vs. Acebedo International Corporation, G.R. No.
117097, promulgated by this Court on March 21, 1997, is in point. The factual antecedents of that case
[9]

are similar to those of the case under consideration and the issue ultimately resolved therein is exactly
the same issue posed for resolution by this Court en banc.
In the said case, the Acebedo International Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal Mayor an
application for a business permit for the operation of a branch of Acebedo Optical in Candon, Ilocos Sur.
The application was opposed by the Samahan ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas-Ilocos Sur Chapter, theorizing
that Acebedo is a juridical entity not qualified to practice optometry. A committee was created by the
Office of the Mayor to study private respondents application. Upon recommendation of the said
committee, Acebedos application for a business permit was denied. Acebedo filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court but the same was dismissed. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial courts disposition, prompting the Samahan ng Optometrists to elevate the matter to this Court.
The First Division of this Court, then composed of Honorable Justice Teodoro Padilla, Josue Bellosillo,
Jose Vitug and Santiago Kapunan, with Honorable Justice Regino Hermosisima, Jr. as ponente, denied
the petition and ruled in favor of respondent Acebedo International Corporation, holding that "the fact that
private respondent hires optometrists who practice their profession in the course of their employment in
private respondents optical shops, does not translate into a practice of optometry by private respondent
itself." The Court further elucidated that in both the old and new Optometry Law, R.A. No. 1998,
[10]
superseded by R.A. No. 8050, it is significant to note that there is no prohibition against the hiring by
corporations of optometrists. The Court concluded thus:
"All told, there is no law that prohibits the hiring by corporations of optometrists or
considers the hiring by corporations of optometrists as a practice by the corporation itself
of the profession of optometry."
In the present case, the objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioners business permit
could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioners employ to produce a valid certificate of
registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued
primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such
permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like that of optometry. Such a function is within the exclusive
domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this
case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
It is significant to note that during the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee of the Senate
and the House of Representatives on R.A. 8050 (Senate Bill No. 1998 and House Bill No. 14100), the
committee failed to reach a consensus as to the prohibition on indirect practice of optometry by
corporations. The proponent of the bill, former Senator Freddie Webb, admitted thus:
"Senator Webb: xxx xxx xxx
The focus of contention remains to be the proposal of prohibiting the indirect practice of optometry by
corporations. We took a second look and even a third look at the issue in the bicameral conference, but a
compromise remained elusive." [11]
Former Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani likewise voted her reservation in casting her vote:
"Senator Shahani: Mr. President
The optometry bills have evoked controversial views from the members of the panel.
While we realize the need to uplift the standards of optometry as a profession, the
consensus of both Houses was to avoid touching sensitive issues which properly belong
to judicial determination. Thus, the bicameral conference committee decided to leave the
issue of indirect practice of optometry and the use of trade names open to the wisdom of
the Courts which are vested with the prerogative of interpreting the laws." [12]

From the foregoing, it is thus evident that Congress has not adopted a unanimous position on the matter
of prohibition of indirect practice of optometry by corporations, specifically on the hiring and employment
of licensed optometrists by optical corporations. It is clear that Congress left the resolution of such issue
for judicial determination, and it is therefore proper for this Court to resolve the issue.
Even in the United States, jurisprudence varies and there is a conflict of opinions among the federal
courts as to the right of a corporation or individual not himself licensed, to hire and employ licensed
optometrists.[13]
Courts have distinguished between optometry as a learned profession in the category of law and
medicine, and optometry as a mechanical art. And, insofar as the courts regard optometry as merely a
mechanical art, they have tended to find nothing objectionable in the making and selling of eyeglasses,
spectacles and lenses by corporations so long as the patient is actually examined and prescribed for by a
qualified practitioner.
[14]
The primary purpose of the statute regulating the practice of optometry is to insure that optometrical
services are to be rendered by competent and licensed persons in order to protect the health and
physical welfare of the people from the dangers engendered by unlicensed practice. Such purpose may
be fully accomplished although the person rendering the service is employed by a corporation. [15]
Furthermore, it was ruled that the employment of a qualified optometrist by a corporation is not against
public policy. Unless prohibited by statutes, a corporation has all the contractual rights that an individual
[16]
has and it does not become the practice of medicine or optometry because of the presence of a
[17]
physician or optometrist. The manufacturing, selling, trading and bartering of eyeglasses and spectacles
[18]
as articles of merchandise do not constitute the practice of optometry. [19]
In the case of Dvorine vs. Castelberg Jewelry Corporation, defendant corporation conducted as part of
[20]
its business, a department for the sale of eyeglasses and the furnishing of optometrical services to its
clients. It employed a registered optometrist who was compensated at a regular salary and commission
and who was furnished instruments and appliances needed for the work, as well as an office. In holding
that the corporation was not engaged in the practice of optometry, the court ruled that there is no public
policy forbidding the commercialization of optometry, as in law and medicine, and recognized the general
practice of making it a commercial business by advertising and selling eyeglasses.
To accomplish the objective of the regulation, a state may provide by statute that corporations cannot sell
eyeglasses, spectacles, and lenses unless a duly licensed physician or a duly qualified optometrist is in
charge of, and in personal attendance at the place where such articles are sold. In such a case, the
[21]
patients primary and essential safeguard lies in the optometrists control of the "treatment" by means of
prescription and preliminary and final examination. [22]
In analogy, it is noteworthy that private hospitals are maintained by corporations incorporated for the
purpose of furnishing medical and surgical treatment. In the course of providing such treatments, these
corporations employ physicians, surgeons and medical practitioners, in the same way that in the course
of manufacturing and selling eyeglasses, eye frames and optical lenses, optical shops hire licensed
optometrists to examine, prescribe and dispense ophthalmic lenses. No one has ever charged that these
corporations are engaged in the practice of medicine. There is indeed no valid basis for treating
corporations engaged in the business of running optical shops differently.
It also bears stressing, as petitioner has pointed out, that the public and private respondents did not
appeal from the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Consequently, the holding by the Court of Appeals that the
act of respondent City Mayor in imposing the questioned special conditions on petitioners business permit
is ultra vires cannot be put into issue here by the respondents. It is well-settled that:

"A party who has not appealed from the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief
from the appellate court other than what he had obtain from the lower court, if any, whose
decision is brought up on appeal. [23]
xxx an appellee who is not an appellant may assign errors in his brief where his purpose
is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal
of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed." [24]
Thus, respondents submission that the imposition of subject special conditions on petitioners business
permit is not ultra vires cannot prevail over the finding and ruling by the Court of Appeals from which
they (respondents) did not appeal.
Anent the second assigned error, petitioner maintains that its business permit issued by the City Mayor is
not a contract entered into by Iligan City in the exercise of its proprietary functions, such that although
petitioner agreed to such conditions, it cannot be held in estoppel since ultra vires acts cannot be given
effect.
Respondents, on the other hand, agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the business permit in
question is in the nature of a contract between Iligan City and the herein petitioner, the terms and
conditions of which are binding upon agreement, and that petitioner is estopped from questioning the
same. Moreover, in the Resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
held that the contract between the petitioner and the City of Iligan was entered into by the latter in the
performance of its proprietary functions.
This Court holds otherwise. It had occasion to rule that a license or permit is not in the nature of a
contract but a special privilege.
"xxx a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or
permitee, and is not a property in the constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional
proscription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend. A license is
rather in the nature of a special privilege, of a permission or authority to do what is within
its terms. It is not in any way vested, permanent or absolute." [25]
It is therefore decisively clear that estoppel cannot apply in this case. The fact that petitioner acquiesced
in the special conditions imposed by the City Mayor in subject business permit does not preclude it from
challenging the said imposition, which is ultra vires or beyond the ambit of authority of respondent City
Mayor. Ultra vires acts or acts which are clearly beyond the scope of ones authority are null and void and
cannot be given any effect. The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is
otherwise null and void or ultra vires.
The Court of Appeals erred in adjudging subject business permit as having been issued by respondent
City Mayor in the performance of proprietary functions of Iligan City. As hereinabove elaborated upon, the
issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory in nature. The
authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is
essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare
clause of the Local Government Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 22995
REVERSED; and the respondent City Mayor is hereby ordered to reissue petitioners business permit in
accordance with law and with this disposition. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., see concurring opinion.
Vitug, J., please see dissent.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Panganiban, and Pardo, JJ., joined Mr. Justice Vitug in his dissent.
[1]
Annex A to Memorandum of Respondent City Mayor and City Legal Officer of Iligan, Rollo, p. 231-232.
[2]
Associate Justice Luis Javellana, ponente; Associate Justice Alfredo Marigomen and Associate Justice Artemon Luna, members.
[3]
Binay vs. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508.
[4]
Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157.
[5]
Procter and Gamble Phils. vs. The Municipality of Jagna, 94 SCRA 894.
[6]
Balacuit vs. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182.
[7]
69 SCRA 564.
[8]
Comment by the Solicitor General, p. 8; Rollo, p. 78.
[9]
270 SCRA 298.
[10]
Ibid, p. 306.
[11]
Saturday, June 3, 1995, "Approval of the Conference Committee Report on S. No. 1998 and H. No. 14100, Record of the Senate,
p. 847.
[12]
Ibid.
[13]
128 ALR 586.
[14]
House of $8.50 Eyeglasses, Inc. vs. State Board of Optometry, 288 Ala 349, 261 So 2d 27; State ex rel. Board of
Optometry vs. Sears Roebuck and Co., 102 Ariz 175, 427 Pd 126.
[15]
Silver v. Lansburgh and Brother, 72 App DC 77, 11 F2d 518, 128 ALR 582; 61 Am Jur 2d 289.
[16]
Georgia State Examiners v. Friedmans Jewelers (183 Ga 669, 189 SE 238).
[17]
State ex rel McKittrick vs. Gate City Optical Co., 339 Mo 427, 97 SW 2d 89).
[18]
Dickson vs. Flynn, 246 App Div 341, 286 NYS 225.
[19]
State ex rel. Brother vs. Beck Jewelry Enterprises, Inc., 220 Ind. 276, 41 NE 2d 622, 141 ALR 876) (61 Am Jur 187); Kindy
Opticians, Inc. vs. State Board of Examiners in Optometry, 1939, 291 Mich 152, 289 NW 112, 113; New Jersey State Bd. of
Optometrists vs. S.S. Kresge Co., 113 NJL 287, 174 A 353).
[20]
Dvorine vs. Castelberg Jewelry Corp., 170 Md. 661, 185 A 562.
[21]
Roschen vs. Ward, 279 US 337, 73 L Ed 722, 49 S Ct 336.
[22]
Small and Maine Board of Registration and examination in Optometry, 293 A 2d 786.
[23]
Policarpio vs. CA, 269 SCRA 344; Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation vs. NLRC, 279 SCRA 312;
Quintanilla vs. CA, 279 SCRA 397.
[24]
La Campana Food Products, Inc. vs. Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, 142 SCRA 394, 398.
[25]
Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., petitioner, vs. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA BONCODIN in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, intervenor.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local government
units (LGUs). Such power enables him to see to it that LGUs and their officials execute their tasks in
accordance with law. While he may issue advisories and seek their cooperation in solving economic
difficulties, he cannot prevent them from performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve
their goals. He may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the law. Thus, the withholding
of a portion of internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by administrative fiat.
The Case
Before us is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to annul Section 1 of
Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures
by 25 percent of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin
respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue
allotments.
On November 17, 1998, Roberto Pagdanganan, through Counsel Alberto C. Agra, filed a Motion for
Intervention/Motion to Admit Petition for Intervention,[1] attaching thereto his Petition in Intervention[2] joining
petitioner in the reliefs sought. At the time, intervenor was the provincial governor of Bulacan, national
president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and chairman of the League of Leagues of Local
Governments. In a Resolution dated December 15, 1998, the Court noted said Motion and Petition.
The Facts and the Arguments
On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372. Its full text, with emphasis on
the assailed provisions, is as follows:
"ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372
ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998

WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires
continued prudence in government fiscal management to maintain economic stability and
sustain the country's growth momentum;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management measures to
match expenditures with available resources;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and direct:
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and
colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and local governments units
will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for
the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services
items, along the following suggested areas:
1. Continued implementation of the streamlining policy on organization and staffing by deferring action on
the following:
a. Operationalization of new agencies;
b. Expansion of organizational units and/or creation of positions;
c. Filling of positions; and
d. Hiring of additional/new consultants, contractual and casual personnel, regardless of funding

source.
2. Suspension of the following activities:
a. Implementation of new capital/infrastructure projects, except those which have

already been contracted out;
b. Acquisition of new equipment and motor vehicles;
c. All foreign travels of government personnel, except those associated with

scholarships and trainings funded by grants;
d. Attendance in conferences abroad where the cost is charged to the government

except those clearly essential to Philippine commitments in the international field
as may be determined by the Cabinet;
e. Conduct of trainings/workshops/seminars, except those conducted by government

training institutions and agencies in the performance of their regular functions
and those that are funded by grants;
f. Conduct of cultural and social celebrations and sports activities, except those
associated with the Philippine Centennial celebration and those involving regular
competitions/events;

g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases where it constitutes the only source of
compensation from government received by the person concerned;
h. Publications, media advertisements and related items, except those required by law
or those already being undertaken on a regular basis;
i. Grant of new/additional benefits to employees, except those expressly and

specifically authorized by law; and
j. Donations, contributions, grants and gifts, except those given by institutions to victims
of calamities.
3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs

4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of fuel, water, office supplies, electricity and other utilities
5. Deferment of projects that are encountering significant implementation problems
6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and the use of savings and reserves
SECTION 2. Agencies are given the flexibility to identify the specific sources of cost-savings,
provided the 25% minimum savings under Section 1 is complied with.
SECTION 3. A report on the estimated savings generated from these measures shall be
submitted to the Office of the President, through the Department of Budget and Management,
on a quarterly basis using the attached format.
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue
allotment to local government units shall be withheld.
SECTION 5. The Development Budget Coordination Committee shall conduct a monthly review of the fiscal
position of the National Government and if necessary, shall recommend to the President the imposition
of additional reserves or the lifting of previously imposed reserves.
SECTION 6. This Administrative Order shall take effect January 1, 1998 and shall remain valid for the entire
year unless otherwise lifted.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 27th day of December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen
hundred and ninety-seven."
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section
4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld
from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power
of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of
general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further argues
that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of Section 286 of the Local
Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to
each of these units its share in the national internal revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO 372 was issued
to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation" and constituted merely an
exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal
autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce their total

expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of
the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their
revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation
by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."
The Issues
The Petition[3] submits the following issues for the Court's resolution:
"A. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion [in] ordering all LGUS to
adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU[']S fiscal autonomy
"B. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the withholding
of 10% of the LGU[']S IRA"
In sum, the main issue is whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their
expenditures by 25 percent; and (b) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their
internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local
governments.
Additionally, the Court deliberated on the question whether petitioner had the locus standi to bring this
suit, despite respondents' failure to raise the issue.[4] However, the intervention of Roberto Pagdanganan
has rendered academic any further discussion on this matter.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.

Main Issue:
Validity of AO 372
Insofar as LGUs Are Concerned
Before resolving the main issue, we deem it important and appropriate to define certain crucial
concepts: (1) the scope of the President's power of general supervision over local governments and (2) the
extent of the local governments' autonomy.
Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to one
of general supervision. It reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. x x x"
This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,[5] the Court
contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of
control over executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms --
supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows:

"x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or
set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter."[6]
In Taule v. Santos,[7] we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of
checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the
fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the
scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight
over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body," [8] we said.
In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,[9] the difference between control and supervision was further
delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these
rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates
or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay
down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed,
they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their
own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules
are followed.
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. [10] The members
of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of
control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and
decisions changed, suspended or reversed.[11] In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by
the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By
constitutional fiat, they are subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold
or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.
Extent of Local Autonomy
Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments is the
state policy of ensuring local autonomy.[12]
In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,[13] we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization."The grant of
autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local
governments, x x x not x x x to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central
administration and local government units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to
regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government.[14]
Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local
governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law may provide. [15] The
difference between decentralization of administration and that of power was explained in detail in Limbona
v. Mangelin[16] as follows:
"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There

is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative
powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable,'[17] and 'ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social

progress.'[18] At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general supervision'[19] over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs
are administered according to law.'[20] He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his
own.[21]
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the
favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to
'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to
the central authorities but to its constituency."[22]
Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative
powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make
governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and
development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally
must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire
country still lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.,
Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government.[23]
The Nature of AO 372
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudential precepts, let us now look into the nature of AO 372. As
its preambular clauses declare, the Order was a "cash management measure" adopted by the government
"to match expenditures with available resources," which were presumably depleted at the time due to
"economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation." Because of a looming financial crisis, the
President deemed it necessary to "direct all government agencies, state universities and colleges,
government-owned and controlled corporations as well as local governments to reduce their total
expenditures by at least 25 percent along suggested areas mentioned in AO 372.
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the
exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments
have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national
taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work
within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local
governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not. Hence, the necessity of a
balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials,[24] who in
any case are partners in the attainment of national goals.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by
way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national
goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency
of the government,[25] primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and
integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs[26] for the entire country. However, under the
Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to
"consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government
units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.
Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:[27]

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the
President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary
of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and
Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress
and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue
allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent
(30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current fiscal year x x x."
There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an
unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of
the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local
Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year
preceding the current one.
Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and
the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national government
was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted
consultations with the different leagues of local governments.Without these requisites, the President has
no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.
The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the
President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all
government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain
economic stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any
sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within
the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized
as an exercise of the power of control.
While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we agree with
petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the Local Government Code have not been satisfied, we
are prepared to accept the solicitor general's assurance that the directive to "identify and implement
measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation"
is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with
local autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates
from a boss to a subaltern.
Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for
fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's
call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal
sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this light that
we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard to Section 1.
Withholding a Part of LGUs' IRA
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less
than the Constitution.[28] The Local Government Code[29] specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject
to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose."[30] As a rule,
the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. [31] The provision is,
therefore, imperative.

Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the
LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee
of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and
the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld,
often temporarily."[32] Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not
matter. Any retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis,
Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal
autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to
withhold the LGUs IRA, but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within
the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal
methods.
Refutation of Justice Kapunan's Dissent
Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan dissents from our Decision on the grounds that, allegedly, (1) the
Petition is premature; (2) AO 372 falls within the powers of the President as chief fiscal officer; and (3) the
withholding of the LGUs IRA is implied in the President's authority to adjust it in case of an unmanageable
public sector deficit.
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred and the
challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the
administrative order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action in advance
of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial
function."
This is a rather novel theory -- that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before
they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is
whether the Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated
by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Taada v. Angara,[33] this Court held that when
an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the
controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval
of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty. Said the Court:
"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 'The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld.'[34] Once a 'controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised
before this Court x x x , it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.'[35]
xxxxxxxxx
"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases,[36] it will not shirk, digress from or
abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in
appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government."
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:[37]

"x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The courts, as guardians
of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the
Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act
unconstitutional and void."
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case,
settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
Besides, the issue that the Petition is premature has not been raised by the parties; hence it is deemed
waived. Considerations of due process really prevents its use against a party that has not been given
sufficient notice of its presentation, and thus has not been given the opportunity to refute it.[38]
Second, on the President's power as chief fiscal officer of the country. Justice Kapunan posits that
Section 4 of AO 372 conforms with the President's role as chief fiscal officer, who allegedly "is clothed by
law with certain powers to ensure the observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the
legal prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs, taking into account the constitutional and statutory
mandates."[39] He cites instances when the President may lawfully intervene in the fiscal affairs of LGUs.
Precisely, such powers referred to in the Dissent have specifically been authorized by law and have
not been challenged as violative of the Constitution. On the other hand, Section 4 of AO 372, as explained
earlier, contravenes explicit provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) and the Constitution. In other
words, the acts alluded to in the Dissent are indeed authorized by law; but, quite the opposite, Section 4 of
AO 372 is bereft of any legal or constitutional basis.
Third, on the President's authority to adjust the IRA of LGUs in case of an unmanageable public sector
deficit. It must be emphasized that in striking down Section 4 of AO 372, this Court is not ruling out any
form of reduction in the IRAs of LGUs. Indeed, as the President may make necessary adjustments in case
of an unmanageable public sector deficit, as stated in the main part of this Decision, and in line with Section
284 of the LGC, which Justice Kapunan cites. He, however, merely glances over a specific requirement in
the same provision -- that such reduction is subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses
of Congress and, more importantly, with the presidents of the leagues of local governments.
Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the need for "interaction between the national government and
the LGUs at the planning level," in order to ensure that "local development plans x x x hew to national
policies and standards." The problem is that no such interaction or consultation was ever held prior to the
issuance of AO 372. This is why the petitioner and the intervenor (who was a provincial governor and at
the same time president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and chairman of the League of
Leagues of Local Governments) have protested and instituted this action. Significantly, respondents do not
deny the lack of consultation.
In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section 287[40] of the LGC as impliedly authorizing the President to
withhold the IRA of an LGU, pending its compliance with certain requirements.Even a cursory reading of
the provision reveals that it is totally inapplicable to the issue at bar. It directs LGUs to appropriate in their
annual budgets 20 percent of their respective IRAs for development projects. It speaks of no positive power
granted the President to priorly withhold any amount. Not at all.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their successors are hereby
permanently PROHIBITED from implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43, respectively dated
December 27, 1997 and December 10, 1998, insofar as local government units are concerned.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., see dissenting opinion.
Purisima, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., join J. Kapunan in his dissenting opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In striking down as unconstitutional and illegal Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 372 ("AO No.
372"), the majority opinion posits that the President exercised power of control over the local government
units ("LGU), which he does not have, and violated the provisions of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution,
which states:
SEC. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national
taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
and Section 286(a) of the Local Government Code, which provides:
SEC. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. - (a) The share of each local government unit shall be
released, without need of any further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or
barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of
each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the
national government for whatever purpose.
The share of the LGUs in the national internal revenue taxes is defined in Section 284 of the same
Local Government Code, to wit:
SEC. 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. - Local government units shall have a share in
the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the
current fiscal year as follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%);
(b) On the second year, thirty-five (35%) percent; and
(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%).
Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector
deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of
Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and
Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress
and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue
allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent
(30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current fiscal year: Provided, further, That in the first year of the effectivity of this Code, the local
government units shall, in addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal revenue allotment which
shall include the cost of devolved functions for essential public services, be entitled to receive
the amount equivalent to the cost of devolved personal services.

xxx
The majority opinion takes the view that the withholding of ten percent (10%) of the internal revenue
allotment ("IRA") to the LGUs pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget
Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation as called for in Section 4 of AO No. 372
transgresses against the above-quoted provisions which mandate the "automatic" release of the shares of
the LGUs in the national internal revenue in consonance with local fiscal autonomy. The pertinent portions
of AO No. 372 are reproduced hereunder:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372
ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998
WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires
continued prudence in government fiscal management to maintain economic stability and
sustain the countrys growth momentum;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management measures to
match expenditures with available resources; NOW THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS,
President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby order and direct:
SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including x x x local government units
will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total appropriations for non-
personal services items, along the following suggested areas:
xxx
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue
allotment to local government units shall be withheld.
xxx
Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued Administrative Order No.
43 (AO No. 43), amending Section 4 of AO No. 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the IRA to be withheld
from the LGUs, thus:
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 43
AMENDING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372 DATED 27 DECEMBER 1997 ENTITLED

"ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998"
WHEREAS, Administrative Order No. 372 dated 27 December 1997 entitled "Adoption of
Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998" was issued to address the economic
difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation in 1997;

WHEREAS, Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 372 provided that the amount equivalent to
10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld; and,
WHEREAS, there is a need to release additional funds to local government units for vital
projects and expenditures.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, President of the Republic of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order the reduction of the
withheld Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of local government units from ten percent to five
percent.
The five percent reduction in the IRA withheld for 1998 shall be released before 25 December
1998.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 10th day of December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen
hundred and ninety eight.
With all due respect, I beg to disagree with the majority opinion.
Section 4 of AO No. 372 does not present a case ripe for adjudication. The language of Section 4 does
not conclusively show that, on its face, the constitutional provision on the automatic release of the IRA
shares of the LGUs has been violated. Section 4, as worded, expresses the idea that the withholding is
merely temporary which fact alone would not merit an outright conclusion of its unconstitutionality,
especially in light of the reasonable presumption that administrative agencies act in conformity with the law
and the Constitution. Where the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged construction has not yet
been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative order, the determination of the
scope and constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too
remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function. Petitioners have not shown that
the alleged 5% IRA share of LGUs that was temporarily withheld has not yet been released, or that the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) has refused and continues to refuse its release. In view
thereof, the Court should not decide as this case suggests an abstract proposition on constitutional issues.
The President is the chief fiscal officer of the country. He is ultimately responsible for the collection
and distribution of public money:
SECTION 3. Powers and Functions. - The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the
President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and
control of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the
budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government
operations, administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of
organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or
organizational implications.1
In a larger context, his role as chief fiscal officer is directed towards "the nation's efforts at economic and
social upliftment"2 for which more specific economic powers are delegated. Within statutory limits, the
President can, thus, fix "tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government, 3 as he is also
responsible for enlisting the country in international economic agreements.4 More than this, to achieve
"economy and efficiency in the management of government operations," the President is empowered to
create appropriation reserves,5 suspend expenditure appropriations,6 and institute cost reduction schemes.7
As chief fiscal officer of the country, the President supervises fiscal development in the local
government units and ensures that laws are faithfully executed. 8 For this reason, he can set aside tax
ordinances if he finds them contrary to the Local Government Code.9 Ordinances cannot contravene

statutes and public policy as declared by the national govemment.10 The goal of local economy is not to
"end the relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local
government units,"11 but to make local governments "more responsive and accountable" [to] "ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress."12
The interaction between the national government and the local government units is mandatory at the
planning level. Local development plans must thus hew to "national policies and standards 13 as these are
integrated into the regional development plans for submission to the National Economic Development
Authority. "14 Local budget plans and goals must also be harmonized, as far as practicable, with "national
development goals and strategies in order to optimize the utilization of resources and to avoid duplication
in the use of fiscal and physical resources."15
Section 4 of AO No. 372 was issued in the exercise by the President not only of his power of general
supervision, but also in conformity with his role as chief fiscal officer of the country in the discharge of which
he is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure the observance of safeguards and auditing requirements,
as well as the legal prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs, taking into account the constitutional 16 and
statutory17 mandates.
However, the phrase "automatic release" of the LGUs' shares does not mean that the release of the
funds is mechanical, spontaneous, self-operating or reflex. IRAs must first be determined, and the money
for their payment collected.18 In this regard, administrative documentations are also undertaken to ascertain
their availability, limits and extent. The phrase, thus, should be used in the context of the whole budgetary
process and in relation to pertinent laws relating to audit and accounting requirements. In the workings of
the budget for the fiscal year, appropriations for expenditures are supported by existing funds in the national
coffers and by proposals for revenue raising. The money, therefore, available for IRA release may not be
existing but merely inchoate, or a mere expectation. It is not infrequent that the Executive Department's
proposals for raising revenue in the form of proposed legislation may not be passed by the legislature. As
such, the release of IRA should not mean release of absolute amounts based merely on mathematical
computations. There must be a prior determination of what exact amount the local government units are
actually entitled in light of the economic factors which affect the fiscal situation in the country. Foremost of
these is where, due to an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President may make the necessary
adjustments in the IRA of LGUs. Thus, as expressly provided in Article 284 of the Local Government Code:
x x x (I)n the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public
sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government
and Secretary of Budget and Management and subject to consultation with the
presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the "liga," to
make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local
government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%)
of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current fiscal year. x x x.
Under the aforecited provision, if facts reveal that the economy has sustained or will likely sustain such
"unmanageable public sector deficit," then the LGUs cannot assert absolute right of entitlement to the full
amount of forty percent (40%) share in the IRA, because the President is authorized to make an adjustment
and to reduce the amount to not less than thirty percent (30%). It is, therefore, impractical to immediately
release the full amount of the IRAs and subsequently require the local government units to return at most
ten percent (10%) once the President has ascertained that there exists an unmanageable public sector
deficit.
By necessary implication, the power to make necessary adjustments (including reduction) in the IRA
in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit, includes the discretion to withhold the IRAs temporarily
until such time that the determination of the actual fiscal situation is made. The test in determining whether
one power is necessarily included in a stated authority is: "The exercise of a more absolute power
necessarily includes the lesser power especially where it is needed to make the first power effective." 19 If

the discretion to suspend temporarily the release of the IRA pending such examination is withheld from the
President, his authority to make the necessary IRA adjustments brought about by the unmanageable public
sector deficit would be emasculated in the midst of serious economic crisis. In the situation conjured by the
majority opinion, the money would already have been gone even before it is determined that fiscal crisis is
indeed happening.
The majority opinion overstates the requirement in Section 286 of the Local Government Code that
the IRAs "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for
whatever purpose" as proof that no withholding of the release of the IRAs is allowed albeit temporary in
nature.
It is worthy to note that this provision does not appear in the Constitution. Section 6, Art X of the
Constitution merely directs that LGUs "shall have a just share" in the national taxes "as determined by law"
and which share shall be automatically released to them. This means that before the LGUs share is
released, there should be first a determination, which requires a process, of what is the correct amount as
dictated by existing laws. For one, the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code allows
deductions from the IRAs, to wit:
Article 384. Automatic Release of IRA Shares of LGUs:
xxx
(c) The IRA share of LGUs shall not be subject to any lien or hold back that may be
imposed by the National Government for whatever purpose unless otherwise provided in
the Code or other applicable laws and loan contract on project agreements arising from
foreign loans and international commitments, such as premium contributions of LGUs to the
Government Service Insurance System and loans contracted by LGUs under foreign-
assisted projects.
Apart from the above, other mandatory deductions are made from the IRAs prior to their release, such
as: (1) total actual cost of devolution and the cost of city-funded hospitals;20 and (2) compulsory
contributions21 and other remittances.22 It follows, therefore, that the President can withhold portions of IRAs
in order to set-off or compensate legitimately incurred obligations and remittances of LGUs.
Significantly, Section 286 of the Local Government Code does not make mention of the exact amount
that should be automatically released to the LGUs. The provision does not mandate that the entire 40%
share mentioned in Section 284 shall be released. It merely provides that the "share" of each LGU shall
be released and which "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose." The provision on automatic release of IRA share should, thus, be read
together with Section 284, including the proviso on adjustment or reduction of IRAs, as well as other relevant
laws. It may happen that the share of the LGUs may amount to the full forty percent (40%) or the reduced
amount of thirty percent (30%) as adjusted without any law being violated. In other words, all that Section
286 requires is the automatic release of the amount that the LGUs are rightfully and legally entitled
to, which, as the same section provides, should not be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of
the national revenue taxes. So that even if five percent (5%) or ten percent (10%) is either temporarily or
permanently withheld, but the minimum of thirty percent (30%) allotment for the LGUs is released pursuant
to the President's authority to make the necessary adjustment in the LGUS' share, there is still full
compliance with the requirements of the automatic release of the LGUs' share.
Finally, the majority insists that the withholding of ten percent (10%) or five percent (5%) of the IRAs
could not have been done pursuant to the power of the President to adjust or reduce such shares under
Section 284 of the Local Government Code because there was no showing of an unmanageable public
sector deficit by the national government, nor was there evidence that consultations with the presiding
officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the various leagues had taken place and the
corresponding recommendations of the Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government
and the Budget Secretary were made.

I beg to differ. The power to determine whether there is an unmanageable public sector deficit is lodged
in the President. The President's determination, as fiscal manager of the country, of the existence of
economic difficulties which could amount to "unmanageable public sector deficit" should be accorded
respect. In fact, the withholding of the ten percent (10%) of the LGUs' share was further justified by the
current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation as shown by one of
the "WHEREASES" of AO No. 372.23 In the absence of any showing to the contrary, it is presumed that
the President had made prior consultations with the officials thus mentioned and had acted upon the
recommendations of the Secretaries of Finance, Interior and Local Government and Budget. 24
Therefore, even assuming hypothetically that there was effectively a deduction of five percent (5%) of
the LGUs' share, which was in accordance with the President's prerogative in view of the pronouncement
of the existence of an unmanageable public sector deficit, the deduction would still be valid in the absence
of any proof that the LGUs' allotment was less than the thirty percent (30%) limit provided for in Section
284 of the Local Government Code.
In resume, the withholding of the amount equivalent to five percent (5%) of the IRA to the LGUs was
temporary pending determination by the Executive of the actual share which the LGUs are rightfully entitled
to on the basis of the applicable laws, particularly Section 284 of the Local Government Code, authorizing
the President to make the necessary adjustments in the IRA of LGUs in the event of an unmanageable
public sector deficit. And assuming that the said five percent (5%) of the IRA pertaining to the 1998 Fiscal
Year has been permanently withheld, there is no showing that the amount actually released to the LGUs
that same year was less than thirty percent (30%) of the national internal revenue taxes collected, without
even considering the proper deductions allowed by law.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
1
Executive Order No. 292, Book IV, Title XVII, Chapter 1.
2
Garcia v. Corona, G.R. No. 132451, December 17, 1999.
3
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VI, Section 28 (2).
4
Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997).
5
Executive Order No. 292, Book VI, Chapter 5, Section 37.
6
Id., at Section 38.
7
Id., at Section 48.
8
San Juan v. CSC, 196 SCRA 69 (1991).
9
Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994).
10
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc. and PAGCOR, 234 SCRA 255 (1994).
11
Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271, 286 (1991).
12
Id., at 287.
13
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government code of 1991, Rule XXIII, Article 182 (1) (3).
14
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, Rule XXIII, Article 182 (j) (1) (2).
15
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, Rule XXXIV, Article 405 (b).
16
1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. X, Section 6.
17
Republic Act No. 7160, Title III, Section 286.
18
Hector De Leon, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND CASES, p. 505 (1991).
19
Separate Opinion of J. Esguerra in Aquino v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183 (1974).
20
Republic Act No. 8760 (General Appropriations ACT for FY 2000).
21
See Eexecutive Order No. 190 (1999), Directing The Department of Budget And Management To Remit directly The Contributions And Other
Remittances Of Local Government Units To the Concerned National Government Agencies (NGA), Government Financial Institutions (GFI),
And Government Owned And/Or Controlled Corporations (GOCC).
22
Republic Act No. 8760 (General Appropriations Act for FY 2000). Includes debt write-offs under Sec. 531 of the Local Government Code: Debt
Relief for Local Government Units.-- xxx
(e) Recovery schemes for the national government.---xxx
The national government is hereby authorized to deduct from the quarterly share of each local government unit in the internal revenue collections
an amount to be determined on the basis of the amortization schedule of the local unit concerned: Provided, That such amount shall not exceed
five percent (5%) of the monthly internal revenue allotment of the local government unit concerned.
23
WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires continued prudence in government fiscal
management to maintain economic stability and sustain the countrys growth momentum.

24
Section 3, Rule 131 of the RULES OF COURT provides:
SEC. 3 Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other
evidence:
xxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
xxx.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 48-55.
[2]
Ibid., pp. 56-75.
[3]
This case was deemed submitted for decision on September 27, 1999, upon receipt by this Court of respondents' 10-page Memorandum, which
was signed by Asst. Sol. Gen. Mariano M. Martinez and Sol. Ofelia B. Cajigal. Petitioner's Memorandum was filed earlier, on September 21,
1999. Intervenor failed, despite due notice, to submit a memorandum within the alloted time; thus, he is deemed to have waived the filing of one.
[4]
Issues of mootness and locus standi were not raised by the respondents. However, the intervention of Roberto Pagdanganan, as explained in the
main text, has stopped any further discussion of petitioner's standing. On the other hand, by the failure of respondents to raise mootness as an issue,
the Court thus understands that the main issue is still justiciable. In any case, respondents are deemed to have waived this defense or, at the very
least, to have submitted the Petition for resolution on the merits, for the future guidance of the government, the bench and the bar.
[5]
97 Phil. 143, May 30, 1955; per Padilla, J.
[6]
Ibid., pp. 147-148. Reiterated in Ganzon v. Kayanan, 104 Phil. 484 (1985); Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, 200 SCRA 271, August 5, 1991;
Taule v. Santos, 200 SCRA 512, August 12, 1991.
[7]
Ibid.; citing Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569, December 24, 1965; Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958); and
Mondano v. Silvosa, supra.
[8]
Ibid., p. 522; citing Hebron v. Reyes, ibid., per Concepcion, J.
[9]
235 SCRA 135, 142, August 4, 1994.
[10]
1, Art. VII of the Constitution.
[11]
Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 739.
[12]
The Constitution provides:
"Sec. 25[, Art. II]. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments."
"Sec. 2[, Art. X]. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy."
[13]
200 SCRA 271, 286, August 5, 1991, per Sarmiento, J.; citing 3, Art. X of the Constitution.
[14]
Ibid.
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
170 SCRA 786, 794-795, February 28, 1989, per Sarmiento, J.
[17]
Citing 3, Art. X, 1987 Const.
[18]
Citing 2, BP 337.
[19]
Citing 4, Art. X, 1987 Const.
[20]
Citing BP 337; and Hebron v. Reyes, supra.
[21]
Citing Hebron v. Reyes, supra.
[22]
Citing Bernas, "Brewing storm over autonomy," The Manila Chronicle, pp. 4-5.
[23]
234 SCRA 255, 272, July 20,1994.
[24]
San Juan v. Civil Service Commission, 196 SCRA 69, 79, April 19, 1991.
[25]
9, Art. XII of the Constitution.
[26]
3, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title II, Book V, EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).

[27]
284. See also Art. 379 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991.
[28]
6 of Art. X of the Constitution reads:
"Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them."
[29]
286 (a) provides:
"Automatic Release of Shares. -- (a) The share of each local government unit shall be released, without need of any further action, directly to the
provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which
shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose."
[30]
Emphasis supplied.
[31]
Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 239.
[32]
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed.
[33]
272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
[34]
Citing Aquino Jr. v. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196, September 17, 1974.
[35]
Citing Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, 337, March 1, 1993.
[36]
Cf. Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496, December 21, 1989.
[37]
281 SCRA 330, 347-48, November 5, 1997, per Puno, J.
[38]
See Philippine National Bank v. Sayo, Jr., 292 SCRA 202, July 9, 1998; Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 656, January 23, 1998.
[39]
Footnotes omitted.
[40]
"Sec. 287. Local Development Projects. -- Each local government unit shall appropriate in its annual budget no less than twenty percent (20%)
of its annual internal revenue allotment for development projects. Copies of the development plans of local government units shall be furnished the
Department of Interior and Local Government."

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 175368 April 11, 2013
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES and HON. ANGELO T. REYES,
in his capacity as Secretary of DENR, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,1 praying that this Court order the following:
( 1) declare as unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise
known as The Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076,
otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2) prohibit and bar respondents
from exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of the
Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the
Small-Scale Mining permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
The Facts are as follows:
On March 28, 1996, Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) filed with the
DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office No. III (MGB R-III) an Application for
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) covering an area of 61,136 hectares situated
in the Municipalities of San Miguel, San Ildefonso, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.2
On April 29, 1998, the MGB R-III issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's Application for Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement for failure to secure area clearances from the Forest
Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR Regional Office No. III.3
On November 11, 1998, Golden Falcon filed an appeal with the DENR Mines and Geosciences
Bureau Central Office (MGB-Central Office), and sought reconsideration of the Order dated April 29,
1998.4
On February 10, 2004, while Golden Falcon's appeal was pending, Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto
S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Liberato Sembrano filed with the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan their respective Applications for Quarry Permit (AQP), which
covered the same area subject of Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement.5
On July 16, 2004, the MGB-Central Office issued an Order denying Golden Falcon's appeal and
affirming the MGB R-III's Order dated April 29, 1998.

On September 13, 2004, Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with the PENRO of
Bulacan an Application for Exploration Permit (AEP) covering 5,281 hectares of the area covered by
Golden Falcon's Application for Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.6
On October 19, 2004, DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos, in response to MGB R-III Director
Arnulfo V. Cabantog's memorandum query dated September 8, 2004, categorically stated that the
MGB-Central Office's Order dated July 16, 2004 became final on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days
after Golden Falcon received the said Order, per the Certification dated October 8, 2004 issued by
the Postmaster II of the Philippine Postal Corporation of Cainta, Rizal.7
Through letters dated May 5 and May 10, 2005, AMTC notified the PENRO of Bulacan and the MGB
R-III Director, respectively, that the subject Applications for Quarry Permit fell within its (AMTC's)
existing valid and prior Application for Exploration Permit, and the the former area of Golden Falcon
was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 per the Memorandum dated October 19, 2004
of the MGB Director, Central Office.8
On June 24, 2005, Ricardo Medina, Jr., PENRO of Bulacan, indorsed AMTC's letter to the Provincial
Legal Officer, Atty. Eugenio F. Resurreccion, for his legal opinion on which date of denial of Golden
Falcon's application/appeal – April 29, 1998 or July 16, 2004 − is to be considered in the deliberation
of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB) for the purpose of determining when the land
subject of the Applications for Quarry Permit could be considered open for application.
On June 28, 2005, Provincial Legal Officer Eugenio Resurreccion issued a legal opinion stating that
the Order dated July 16, 2004 of the MGB-Central Office was a mere reaffirmation of the Order
dated April 29, 1998 of the MGB R-III; hence, the Order dated April 29, 1998 should be the
reckoning period of the denial of the application of Golden Falcon.
On July 22, 2005, AMTC filed with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal protest against the aforesaid
Applications for Quarry Permit on the ground that the subject area was already covered by its
Application for Exploration Permit.9
On August 8, 2005, MGB R-III Director Cabantog, who was the concurrent Chairman of the PMRB,
endorsed to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, Governor Josefina M. dela Cruz, the aforesaid
Applications for Quarry Permit that had apparently been converted to Applications for Small-Scale
Mining Permit of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez
(formerly Liberato Sembrano).10
On August 9, 2005, the PENRO of Bulacan issued four memoranda recommending to Governor
Dela Cruz the approval of the aforesaid Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit.11
On August 10, 2005, Governor Dela Cruz issued the corresponding Small-Scale Mining Permits in
favor of Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Gerardo R. Cruz and Lucila S. Valdez.12
Subsequently, AMTC appealed to respondent DENR Secretary the grant of the aforesaid Small-
Scale Mining Permits, arguing that: (1) The PMRB of Bulacan erred in giving due course to the
Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit without first resolving its formal protest; (2) The areas
covered by the Small-Scale Mining Permits fall within the area covered by AMTC's valid prior
Application for Exploration Permit; (3) The Applications for Quarry Permit were illegally converted to
Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permit; (4) DENR-MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos' ruling that
the subject areas became open for mining location only on August 11, 2004 was controlling; (5) The
Small-Scale Mining Permits were null and void because they covered areas that were never
declared People's Small-Scale Mining Program sites as mandated by Section 4 of the People's

Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (6) Iron ore is not considered as one of the quarry resources,
as defined by Section 43 of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, which could be subjects of an
Application for Quarry Permit.13
On August 8, 2006, respondent DENR Secretary rendered a Decision14 in favor of AMTC. The
DENR Secretary agreed with MGB Director Horacio C. Ramos that the area was open to mining
location only on August 11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after the receipt by Golden Falcon on July 27,
2004 of a copy of the MGB-Central Office's Order dated July 16, 2004, which Order denied Golden
Falcon's appeal. According to the DENR Secretary, the filing by Golden Falcon of the letter-appeal
suspended the finality of the Order of denial issued on April 29, 1998 by the Regional Director until
the resolution of the appeal on July 16, 2004 by the MGB-Central Office. He stated that the
Applications for Quarry Permit were filed on February 10, 2004 when the area was still closed to
mining location; hence, the Small-Scale Mining Permits granted by the PMRB and the Governor
were null and void. On the other hand, the DENR Secretary declared that AMTC filed its Application
for Exploration Permit when the area was already open to other mining applicants; thus, AMTC’s
Application for Exploration Permit was valid. Moreover, the DENR Secretary held that the questioned
Small-Scale Mining Permits were issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the
authority of the Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of R.A. No. 7942, because the area was
never proclaimed to be under the People's Small-Scale Mining Program. Further, the DENR
Secretary stated that iron ore mineral is not considered among the quarry resources.
The dispositive portion of the DENR Secretary’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-III-02-04 of Atlantic Mines and Trading
Corp. is declared valid and may now be given due course. The Small-Scale Mining Permits, SSMP-
B-002-05 of Gerardo Cruz, SSMP-B-003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado, SSMP-B-004-05 of Benedicto
S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of Lucila S. Valdez are declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, the
said permits are hereby CANCELLED.15
Hence, petitioner League of Provinces filed this petition.
Petitioner is a duly organized league of local governments incorporated under R.A. No. 7160.
Petitioner declares that it is composed of 81 provincial governments, including the Province of
Bulacan. It states that this is not an action of one province alone, but the collective action of all
provinces through the League, as a favorable ruling will not only benefit one province, but all
provinces and all local governments.
Petitioner raises these issues:
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 17(B)(3)(III) OF THE, 1991 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND
SECTION 24 OF THE PEOPLE'S SMALL-SCALE MINING ACT OF 1991 ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR PROVIDING FOR EXECUTIVE CONTROL AND INFRINGING UPON
THE LOCAL AUTONOMY OF PROVINCES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE ACT OF RESPONDENT [DENR] IN NULLIFYING, VOIDING AND

CANCELLING THE SMALL-SCALE MINING PERMITS AMOUNTS TO EXECUTIVE CONTROL,
NOT MERELY SUPERVISION AND USURPS THE DEVOLVED POWERS OF ALL PROVINCES.16

To start, the Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this petition because it is tasked
under Section 504 of the Local Government Code of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the
provincial level;17 adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials
and employees;18 and exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as
the league may prescribe for the welfare of the provinces.19
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the
Government, it bears emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that
a statute is presumed to be valid.20This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers
which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for
each other's acts.21 This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional
where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,22 leaving no doubt
or hesitation in the mind of the Court.23
In this case, petitioner admits that respondent DENR Secretary had the authority to nullify the Small-
Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has
control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-Scale Mining Program is subject to
control by respondent DENR.
Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three
statutes: (1) R.A. No. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. No. 7076 or the
People's Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995.24 The pertinent provisions of law sought to be declared as unconstitutional by
petitioner are as follows:
R.A. No. 7061 (The Local Government Code of 1991)
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant
and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested
upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and
offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such
other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate,
or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx
(3) For a Province:c
xxxx
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,
enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law,
small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydro electric
projects for local purposes; x x x25
R.A. No. 7076 (People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991)
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. - There is hereby created under the direct
supervision and control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board, herein called the

Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and shall exercise the following
powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a people’s small-scale
mining area, an area that is declared a small-mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of
this Act.26
Petitioner contends that the aforecited laws and DENR Administrative Order No. 9640 (the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995) did not explicitly confer
upon respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, or
cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by
the PMRB. The statutes are also silent as to the power of respondent DENR Secretary to substitute
his own judgment over that of the Provincial Governor and the PMRB.
Moreover, petitioner contends that Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076, which confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the
power of control are unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President (and Executive
Departments and her alter-egos) has the power of supervision only, not control, over acts of the local
government units, and grants the local government units autonomy, thus:
The 1987 Constitution:
Article X, Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure that the acts of their component
units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.27
Petitioner contends that the policy in the above-cited constitutional provision is mirrored in the Local
Government Code, which states:
SEC. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. - (a) Consistent with the basic policy
on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to
ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities,
and independent component cities; through the province with respect to component cities and
municipalities; and through the city and municipality with respect to barangays.28
Petitioner contends that the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code
of 1991 show that the relationship between the President and the Provinces or respondent DENR,
as the alter ego of the President, and the Province of Bulacan is one of executive supervision, not

one of executive control. The term "control" has been defined as the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his/her duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for the latter, while the term "supervision" is the power of a
superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function in accordance with law.29
Petitioner argues that respondent DENR Secretary went beyond mere executive supervision and
exercised control when he nullified the small-scale mining permits granted by the Provincial
Governor of Bulacan, as the former substituted the judgment of the latter.
Petitioner asserts that what is involved here is a devolved power.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to regulate small-scale mining has been
devolved to all provinces. In the exercise of devolved powers, departmental approval is not
necessary.30
Petitioner contends that if the provisions in Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 and Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of
the Local Government Code of 1991 granting the power of control to the DENR/DENR Secretary are
not nullified, nothing would stop the DENR Secretary from nullifying, voiding and canceling the small-
scale mining permits that have been issued by a Provincial Governor.
Petitioner submits that the statutory grant of power of control to respondents is unconstitutional, as
the Constitution only allows supervision over local governments and proscribes control by the
executive departments.
In its Comment, respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, stated that contrary
to the assertion of petitioner, the power to implement the small-scale mining law is expressly limited
in Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code, which provides that it must be carried out
"pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR." Moreover,
the fact that the power to implement the small-scale mining law has not been fully devolved to
provinces is further amplified by Section 4 of the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, which
provides, among others, that the People's Small-Scale Mining Program shall be implemented by the
DENR Secretary.
The petition lacks merit.
Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the

Constitution31 provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State."
Moreover, paragraph 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides that "the Congress may,
by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens x x x."
Pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, R.A. No. 7076 or the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991, was enacted, establishing under Section 4 thereof a People's Small-Scale
Mining Program to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned
government agencies.
The People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 defines "small-scale mining" as "refer[ring] to mining
activities, which rely heavily on manual labor using simple implement and methods and do not use
explosives or heavy mining equipment."32

It should be pointed out that the Administrative Code of 198733 provides that the DENR is, subject
to law and higher authority, in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate, under
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-
scale mining law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR
under the Local Government Code of 1991, while the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991
provides that the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program is to be implemented by the DENR
Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies.
Indeed, Section 4, Article X (Local Government) of the Constitution states that "[t]he President of the
Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments," and Section 25 of the Local
Government Code reiterates the same. General supervision by the President means no more than
seeing to it that laws are faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within the law.34
The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X,
Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical
language, the decentralization of government authority.35 It does not make local governments
sovereign within the State.36 Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject
to limitations like following national policies or standards,37 and those provided by the Local
Government Code, as the structuring of local governments and the allocation of powers,
responsibilities, and resources among the different local government units and local officials have
been placed by the Constitution in the hands of Congress38 under Section 3, Article X of the
Constitution.
Section 3, Article X of the Constitution mandated Congress to "enact a local government code which
shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate
among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide
for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units."
In connection with the enforcement of the small-scale mining law in the province, Section 17 of the
Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 17. Basic Services and Facilities. - (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant
and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested
upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and
offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such
other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate,
or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following:
xxxx
(3) For a Province:c
xxxx
(iii) Pursuant to national policies and subject to supervision, control and review of the DENR,
enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-based forestry projects, pollution control law,

small-scale mining law, and other laws on the protection of the environment; and mini-hydro electric
projects for local purposes;39
Clearly, the Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining
law to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review
of the DENR, which is in charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization of the
country's natural resources.40
Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 is in harmony with R.A. No. 7076 or the
People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991,41 which established a People's Small-Scale Mining
Program to be implemented by the Secretary of the DENR, thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared of the State to promote, develop, protect and
rationalize viable small-scale mining activities in order to generate more employment opportunities
and provide an equitable sharing of the nation's wealth and natural resources, giving due regard to
existing rights as herein provided.
xxxx
Sec. 4. People's Small-Scale Mining Program. - For the purpose of carrying out the declared policy
provided in Section 2 hereof, there is hereby established a People's Small-Scale Mining Program to
be implemented by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
hereinafter called the Department, in coordination with other concerned government agencies,
designed to achieve an orderly, systematic and rational scheme for the small-scale development and
utilization of mineral resources in certain mineral areas in order to address the social, economic,
technical, and environmental problems connected with small-scale mining activities.
xxxx
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. – There is hereby created under the direct
(a) Declare and segregate existing gold-rush areas for small-scale mining;
(b) Reserve future gold and other mining areas for small-scale mining;
(c) Award contracts to small-scale miners;
(d) Formulate and implement rules and regulations related to small-scale mining;
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a people’s small-scale
mining area, an area that is declared a small-mining; and
(f) Perform such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives of
this Act.42
DENR Administrative Order No. 34, series of 1992, containing the Rules and Regulations to
implement R.A. No. 7076, provides:

SEC. 21. Administrative Supervision over the People's Small-Scale Mining Program. − The following
DENR officials shall exercise the following supervisory functions in the implementation of the
Program:
21.1 DENR Secretrary – direct supervision and control over the program and activities of the
small-scale miners within the people's small-scale mining area;
21.2 Director − the Director shall:
a. Recommend the depth or length of the tunnel or adit taking into account the: (1)
size of membership and capitalization of the cooperative; (2) size of mineralized
areas; (3) quantity of mineral deposits; (4) safety of miners; and (5) environmental
impact and other considerations;
b. Determine the right of small-scale miners to existing facilities in consultation with

the operator, claimowner, landowner or lessor of an affected area upon declaration of
a small-scale mining area;
c. Recommend to the Secretary the withdrawal of the status of the people's small-
scale mining area when it can no longer be feasibly operated on a small-scale basis;
and
d. See to it that the small-scale mining contractors abide by small-scale mines safety
rules and regulations.
xxxx
SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. − The Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board
created under R.A. 7076 shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the
Secretary:
22.1 Declares and segregates existing gold rush area for small-scale mining;
22.2 Reserves for the future, mineralized areas/mineral lands for people's small-scale
mining;
22.3 Awards contracts to small-scale miners’ cooperative;
22.4 Formulates and implements rules and regulations related to R.A. 7076;
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within ninety (90) days
upon filing of protests or complaints; Provided, That any aggrieved party may appeal within
five (5) days from the Board's decision to the Secretary for final resolution otherwise the
same is considered final and executory; and
22.6 Performs such other functions as may be necessary to achieve the goals and objectives
of R.A. 7076.
SEC. 6. Declaration of People's Small-Scale Mining Areas. – The Board created under R.A. 7076
shall have the authority to declare and set aside People's Small-Scale Mining Areas in sites onshore

suitable for small-scale mining operations subject to review by the DENR Secretary thru the
Director.43
DENR Administrative Order No. 23, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, adopted on August 15, 1995,
provides under Section 12344thereof that small-scale mining applications should be filed with the
PMRB45 and the corresponding permits shall be issued by the Provincial Governor, except small-
scale mining applications within the mineral reservations.
Thereafter, DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, otherwise known as the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942, otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
adopted on December 19, 1996, provides that applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits shall be
filed with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor through the concerned Provincial/City Mining
Regulatory Board for areas outside the Mineral Reservations and with the Director though the
Bureau for areas within the Mineral Reservations.46 Moreover, it provides that Local Government
Units shall, in coordination with the Bureau/ Regional Offices and subject to valid and existing mining
rights, "approve applications for small-scale mining, sand and gravel, quarry x x x and gravel permits
not exceeding five (5) hectares."47
Petitioner contends that the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. No. 7076, DENR Administrative
Orders Nos. 95-23 and 96-40 granted the DENR Secretary the broad statutory power of control, but
did not confer upon the respondents DENR and DENR Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate,
nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts
entered into by the Board.
The contention does not persuade.
The settlement of disputes over conflicting claims in small-scale mining is provided for in Section 24
of R.A. No. 7076, thus:
Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. − There is hereby created under the direct
xxxx
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a people's small-scale mining
area, an area that is declared a small mining area; x x x
Section 24, paragraph (e) of R.A. No. 7076 cited above is reflected in Section 22, paragraph 22.5 of
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7076, to wit:
SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. – The Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board
created under R.A. No. 7076 shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by
the Secretary:
xxxx
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within ninety (90) days upon filing
of protests or complaints; Provided, That any aggrieved party may appeal within five (5) days from

the Board's decision to the Secretary for final resolution otherwise the same is considered final and
executory; x x x
In this case, in accordance with Section 22, paragraph 22.5 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 7076, the AMTC filed on July 22, 2005 with the PMRB of Bulacan a formal
protest against the Applications for Quarry Permits of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Liberato
Sembrano (replaced by Lucila Valdez) and Gerardo Cruz on the ground that the subject area was
already covered by its Application for Exploration Permit.48 However, on August 8, 2005, the PMRB
issued Resolution Nos. 05-8, 05-9, 05-10 and 05-11, resolving to submit to the Provincial Governor
of Bulacan the Applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz,
Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz for the granting/issuance of the said permits.49 On August 10, 2005,
the Provincial Governor of Bulacan issued the Small-Scale Mining Permits to Eduardo Mercado,
Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz based on the legal opinion of the Provincial Legal
Officer and the Resolutions of the PMRB of Bulacan.
Hence, AMTC filed an appeal with respondent DENR Secretary, appealing from Letter-Resolution
No. 05-1317 and Resolution Nos. 05-08, 05-09, 05-10 and 05-11, all dated August 8, 2005, of the
PMRB of Bulacan, which resolutions gave due course and granted, on August 10, 2005, Small-Scale
Mining Permits to Eduardo D. Mercado, Benedicto S. Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz
involving parcels of mineral land situated at Camachin, Doña Remedios Trinidad, Bulacan.
The PMRB of Bulacan filed its Answer, stating that it is an administrative body, created under R.A.
No. 7076, which cannot be equated with the court wherein a full-blown hearing could be conducted,
but it is enough that the parties were given the opportunity to present evidence. It asserted that the
questioned resolutions it issued were in accordance with the mining laws and that the Small-Scale
Mining Permits granted were registered ahead of AMTC's Application for Exploration Permit. Further,
the Board stated that the Governor of Bulacan had the power to approve the Small-Scale Mining
Permits under R.A. No. 7160.
The DENR Secretary found the appeal meritorious, and resolved these pivotal issues: (1) when is
the subject mining area open for mining location by other applicants; and (2) who among the
applicants have valid applications. The pertinent portion of the decision of the DENR Secretary
1âwphi 1
reads:
We agree with the ruling of the MGB Director that the area is open only to mining location on August
11, 2004, fifteen (15) days after the receipt by Golden Falcon on July 27, 2004 of a copy of the
subject Order of July 16, 2004. The filing by Golden Falcon of the letter-appeal suspended the
1âwphi1
finality of the Order of Denial issued on April 29, 1998 by the Regional Director until the Resolution
thereof on July 16, 2004.
Although the subject AQPs/SSMPs were processed in accordance with the procedures of the
PMRB, however, the AQPs were filed on February 10, 2004 when the area is still closed to mining
location. Consequently, the SSMPs granted by the PMRB and the Governor are null and void
making thereby AEP No. III-02-04 of the AMTC valid, it having been filed when the area is already
open to other mining applicants.
Records also show that the AQPs were converted into SSMPs. These are two (2) different
applications. The questioned SSMPs were issued in violation of Section 4 of RA 7076 and beyond
the authority of the Provincial Governor pursuant to Section 43 of RA 7942 because the area was
never proclaimed as "People's Small-Scale Mining Program." Moreover, iron ore mineral is not
considered among the quarry resources.

xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Application for Exploration Permit, AEP-III-02-04 of Atlantic Mines and Trading
Corp. is declared valid and may now be given due course. The Small-Scale Mining Permits, SSMP-
B-002-05 of Gerardo Cruz, SSMP-B-003-05 of Eduardo D. Mercado, SSMP-B-004-05 of Benedicto
S. Cruz and SSMP-B-005-05 of Lucila S. Valdez are declared NULL AND VOID. Consequently, the
said permits are hereby CANCELLED.50
The Court finds that the decision of the DENR Secretary was rendered in accordance with the power
of review granted to the DENR Secretary in the resolution of disputes, which is provided for in
Section 24 of R.A. No. 707651 and Section 22 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations.52 It is
noted that although AMTC filed a protest with the PMRB regarding its superior and prior Application
for Exploration Permit over the Applications for Quarry Permit, which were converted to Small-Scale
Mining Permits, the PMRB did not resolve the same, but issued Resolution Nos. 05-08 to 05-11 on
August 8, 2005, resolving to submit to the Provincial Governor of Bulacan the Applications for Small-
Scale Mining Permits of Eduardo Mercado, Benedicto Cruz, Lucila Valdez and Gerardo Cruz for the
granting of the said permits. After the Provincial Governor of Bulacan issued the Small-Scale Mining
Permits on August 10, 2005, AMTC appealed the Resolutions of the PMRB giving due course to the
granting of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor.
Hence, the decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration Permit of
AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the Small-Scale Mining Permits
issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the power of review granted to the DENR
Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DENR Secretary's
power to review and, therefore, decide, in this case, the issue on the validity of the issuance of the
Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a quasi-
judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law is, and what the legal rights of the
contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the
facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.53 The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-
judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent
necessary in settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial
function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with "substitution of judgment" of the
Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor "control" over the said act of the
Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of AMTC over conflicting claims based on
the law.
In determining whether Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24
of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional, the Court has been guided by Beltran v. The Secretary of
Health, 54 which held:
The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law
to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The
ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this Court to
declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor. Otherwise,
the petition must fail. 55
In this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of
Section 17 (b )(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section 24 'of R.A. No.7076 failed
to overcome the constitutionality of the said provisions of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION



JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA



Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2 DENR Decision, rollo, pp. 53,54.
3 Rollo, p. 54.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 55.
8 Id.
9 Comment of Respondents, id. at 74.
10 Annex "B," id. at 25.
11 Annexes "D" to "D-3," id. at 30-33.
12 Annexes "E" to "E-3," id. at 34-49.
13 Decision of the DENR Secretary, id. at 56.
14 Rollo, p. 53.
15 Id. at 58-59. (Emphasis in the original.)
16 Id. at 8-9.
17 R.A. No. 7160, Section 504 (b).
18 R.A. No. 7160, Section 504 (c).
19 R.A. No. 7160, Section 504 (h).
Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005, 465
20
SCRA 47, 62; 503 Phil. 43, 53 (2005).
21 Id. at 62-63; id.
22 Id. at 63; id. at 54.

23 Id.; id.
Sec. 42. Small-Scale Mining. – Small-scale mining shall continue to be governed by

24
Republic Act No. 7076 and other pertinent laws.
Citing National Liga Ng Mga Barangay v. Paredes, G.R. Nos. 130775 and 131939,
29
September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 130; 482 Phil. 331 (2004).
30Citing Tano v. Socrates, G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 154; 343 Phil. 670
(1997).
31 The Constitution, Article XII, Section 2. − All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial
uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and
limit of the grant.
xxxx
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by

Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence
fishermen and fish- workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons. (Emphases
supplied.)
32
R.A. No. 7076, Sec. 2.
33 The Administrative Code of 1987, Title XIV, Chapter 1:
SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. – (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources

equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
xxxx
SEC. 2. Mandate. − (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall
be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. (Emphasis supplied)
34Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., The Constitution of the Philippines A Commentary, Vol. II, ©
1988, p. 379, citing III RECORD 451-452.
Cordillera Board Coalition v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 79956, January 29, 1990, 181
35
SCRA 495.
36Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991,
197 SCRA 52.
37 Jose N. Nolledo, The Local Government Code of 1991 Annotated, 2004 edition, p. 10.
38Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.., The Constitution of the Philippines A Commentary, Vol. II, ©
1988, supra note 34, at 377.
39 Emphases supplied.
40The Administrative Code of 1987, Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Chapter
1, Section 2 (2).
41 R.A. No. 7076 was approved on June 27, 1991 and took effect on July 19, 1991.
44DENR Administrative Order No. 95-936, SEC. 123. General Provisions. − Small-scale
mining applications shall be filed with, processed and evaluated by the Provincial/City Mining
Regulatory Board concerned and the corresponding permits to be issued by the
Provincial/City Mayor concerned except small-scale mining applications within the mineral
reservations which shall be filed, processed and evaluated by the Bureau and the
corresponding permit to be issued by the Director.
x x x The implementing rules and regulations of R.A. No. 7076, insofar as they are
not inconsistent with the provisions of these implementing rules and regulations, shall
continue to govern small-scale mining operations. (Emphasis supplied.)
45SEC. 23. Composition of the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. – The Board shall
be composed of the following:

23.1 Representative from the DENR Regional Office concerned—Chairman;
23.2 Governor or City Mayor or their duly authorized representative—Member
23.3 One (1) Small-Scale mining representative—Member or as per Section 24.3

hereof;
23.4 One (1) Large-Scale mining representative—Member;
23.5 One (1) representative from a nongovernment organization—Member; and
23.6 Staff support to the Board to be provided by the Department.
46 DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, Chapter IX, Section 103.
47 DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40, Chapter 1, Section 8.
48 Decision of the DENR Secretary, rollo, pp. 2-3.
49 Annexes "C" to "C-3," id. at. 26-29.
50 Rollo, pp. 57-58. (Emphasis supplied)
51Sec. 24. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. − There is hereby created under the
direct supervision and control of the Secretary a provincial/city mining regulatory board,
herein called the Board, which shall be the implementing agency of the Department, and
shall exercise the following powers and functions, subject to review by the Secretary:
xxxx
(e) Settle disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within a people’s
small-scale mining area, an area that is declared a small-mining area; and x x x
(Emphasis supplied.)
52SEC. 22. Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board. – The Provincial/City Mining Regulatory
Board created under R.A. No. 7076 shall exercise the following powers and functions,
subject to review by the Secretary:
xxxx
22.5 Settles disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims within ninety (90)
days upon filing of protests or complaints; Provided, That any aggrieved party may
appeal within five (5) days from the Board's decision to the Secretary for final
resolution otherwise the same is considered final and executory; x x x
53 Doran v. Luczon, Jr., G.R. No. 151344, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 106.
54 GR. Nos. 133640, 133661, and 139147, November 25,2005,476 SCRA 168.
55 Beltran v. Secretary of Health, supra, at 199-200.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
CONCURRING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
I concur in the result. However, there appears to be a need to address the issue of whether
petitioner League of Provinces of the Philippines has legal standing to assail the constitutionality of
the subject laws.
Petitioner is a duly organized league of local governments incorporated under Republic Act No.
7610, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. It claims that it is composed of 81 local
governments, including the province of Bulacan. It further claims that the instant case is a collective
action of all provinces - in that, a favorable ruling will not only benefit the province of Bulacan, but
also all the other provinces and local governments.
The ponencia upheld petitioner's legal standing to file this petition because the latter is tasked, under
Section 504 of the Local Government Code, to promote local autonomy at the provincial level, adopt
measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and employees, and
exercise such other powers and perform such duties and functions as the league may prescribe for
the welfare of the provinces.
I concur that the League has legal standing to assail the constitutionality of the subject laws.
A divergent position had been advanced by Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen. He says that, "in case of
a citizen's suit, the 'interest of the person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct
and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way."1 He further claims that, "As an
organization that represents all provinces, it did not suffer an actual injury or an injury n fact,
resulting from the implementation of the subject provisions."2 He, therefore, concludes that the
League has no standing to assail the constitutionality of the subject laws.
A public action is a suit brought to vindicate a right belonging to the public qua public. Based on
present jurisprudence, except in cases involving issues of transcendental importance,3 it can only be
brought by the proper representative of the public – one who has standing. Generally, the one who
has standing is the one who suffered or immediately stands to suffer actual injury or injury in
fact.4 Injury in fact means damage that is distinct from those suffered by the public.5 This is different
from legal injury or injury in law, which results from a violation of a right belonging to a person.6
The divergent position appears to confuse the general requirement for standing with standing in
citizens’ suits. The latter normally presupposes that there is no one who suffered injury in fact.
Therefore, any citizen is allowed to bring the suit to vindicate the public’s right. Instructive are the
pronouncements of this Court in the seminal case of Severino v. Governor-General:7

It is true, as we have stated, that the right which he seeks, to enforce is not greater or different from
that of any other qualified elector in the municipality of Silay. It is also true that the injury which he
would suffer in case he fails to obtain the relief sought would not be greater or different from that of
the other electors; but he is seeking to enforce a public right as distinguished from a private right.
The real party in interest is the public, or the qualified electors of the town of Silay. Each elector has
the same right and would suffer the same injury. Each elector stands on the same basis with
reference to maintaining a petition to determine whether or not the relief sought by the relator should
be granted.
xxx
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is
a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the
general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for
the reason "that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in
mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule
does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error."
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could
be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character. (Emphasis supplied)
Also, the divergent position appears to confuse public actions with class suits (a species of private
action) when it stated that "[p]rovinces do not have a common or general interest on matters related
to mining that the League of Provinces can represent." Under Section 12 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, "common or general interest" is a requirement in class suits. It is not a requirement for
standing in public actions.
Finally, the divergent position also appears to confuse the general requirement for standing and
standing in citizens’ suits, with organizational or associational standing. The latter does not require
an association to suffer injury in fact. The question is whether such organization can bring a suit on
behalf of its members who have suffered the injury in fact. In short, can the representatives of the
public be themselves represented in a suit.
In this jurisdiction, we have acknowledged the standing of associations to sue on behalf of their
members. In Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals,8 we held that:
The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This 1âwphi1
view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An association has standing
to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action.
An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.
Thus, based on jurisprudence, the League has legal standing to question the constitutionality of the
subject laws, not only in behalf of the province of Bulacan, but also its other members.
Apart from jurisprudence, the League is also vested with statutory standing. The League of
Provinces’ primary purpose is clear from the provisions of the Local Government Code, viz:
SEC. 502. Purpose of Organization. - There shall be an organization of all provinces to be known as
the League of Provinces for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues

affecting provincial and metropolitan political subdivision government administration, and securing,
through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. For this purpose, the Metropolitan Manila Area
and any metropolitan political subdivision shall be considered as separate provincial units of the
league. (Emphasis supplied)
This purpose is further amplified by the grant to it of certain powers, functions and duties, which are,
viz:
SEC. 504. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of Provinces. - The league of provinces
shall:
(a) Assist the national government in the formulation and implementation of the policies,
programs and projects affecting provinces as a whole;
(b) Promote local autonomy at the provincial level;
(c) Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and
employees;
(d) Encourage peoples participation in local government administration in order to promote

united and concerted action for the attainment of countrywide development goals;
(e) Supplement the efforts of the national government in creating opportunities for gainful
employment within the province;
(f) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the provinces in
consonance with the policies, programs and projects of the national government;
(g) Serve as a forum for crystallizing and expressing ideas, seeking the necessary
assistance of the national government and providing the private sector avenues for
cooperation in the promotion of the welfare of the provinces; and
(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as the league
may prescribe for the welfare of the provinces and metropolitan political
subdivisions.9 (Emphasis supplied)
In League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC,10 this Court upheld the League of Cities’
standing of the basis of Section 499 of the Local Government Code which tasks it with the "primary
purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government administration
and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto."
Other instances of statutory standing can be found in: ( 1) the Constitution, which allows any citizen
to challenge "the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof;"11 (2) the Administrative Code wherein "any party
aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency decision may seek judicial review;"12 (3) the Civil Code
which provides that "if a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance,
such action shall be commenced by the city or municipal mayor,"13and (4) the Rules of Procedure in
Environmental Cases by which "any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental
laws."14

All told, to adopt the divergent position will destabilize jurisprudence and is tantamount to ignoring
the clear mandate of law.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
2
Emphases supplied.
3David v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, 171424, 03
May 2006 citing Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949); Aquino v. Comelec, G.R. No. L-
No. 40004, 31 January 1975, 62 SCRA 275; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No.
133250, 09 July 2002, 384 SCRA 152; Bagong Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora, G.R. Nos.
138570, 138572, 138587, 138680, 138698, 10 October 2000, 342 SCRA 449; Lim v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, 11 April 2002, 380 SCRA 739.
4 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
5Dissenting Opinion, J. Puno, Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, 05 May
1994.
6 BPI Express Card Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120639, 25 September 1998.
7 16 Phil. 366 (1910).
8G.R. No. 131719, 25 May 2004. See also Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, G.R.
No. 115381, 23 December 1994; Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Defensor, G.R. No.
163980, 03 August 2006.
9 Local Government Code.
10 G.R. No. 176951, 18 November 2008.
11 Sec. 18, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
12 Sec. 25(2), Chapter 4, Book VII.
13 Article 701.
14 Section 5, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC.

CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result.
This is a case of overlapping claims, which involve the application of the Mining Act, and the Small-
Scale Mining Act. It is specific to the facts of this case, which are:
The Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Regional Office No. III (MGB R-Ill) denied Golden Falcon
Mineral Exploration Corporation's (Golden Falcon) application for Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) on April29, 1998 for failure to secure the required clearances.1
Golden Falcon appealed the denial-with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-Central Office (Central
Office).2 The appeal was denied only on July 16, 2004 or six years after Golden Falcon·appealed.3
On February 10, 2004, pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the Central Office, certain persons filed
with the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office "(PENRO) of Bulacan their
applications for quarry permit covering the same area subject of Golden Falcon's FTAA application.4
On September 13, 2004, after the Central Office denied Golden Falcon’s appeal, Atlantic Mines and
Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed an application for exploration permit covering the same subject
area with the PENRO of Bulacan.5
Confusion of rights resulted from the overlapping applications of AMTC and the persons applying for
quarry permits. The main question was when did the subject area become open for small scale
mining applications. At that time, the provincial government did not question whether it had
concurrent or more superior jurisdiction vis-a-vis the national government.
It was upon query by MGB R-III Director Arnulfo Cabantog that DENR-MGB Director Horacio Ramos
stated that the denial of Golden Falcon’s application became final fifteen days after the denial of its
appeal to the Central Office or on August 11, 2004.6 Hence, the area of Golden Falcon’s application
became open to permit applications only on that date.
After the MGB Director issued the statement, however, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan, Atty.
Eugenio F. Ressureccion issued a legal opinion on the issue, stating that the subject area became
open for new applications on the date of the first denial on April 29, 1998.7
On the basis of the Provincial Legal Officer’s opinion, Director Cabantog of MGB R-III endorsed the
applications for quarry permit, now converted to applications for small-scale mining permit, to the
Governor of Bulacan.8 Later on, the Governor issued the small-scale mining permits.9
Upon appeal by the AMTC, the DENR Secretary declared as null the small-scale mining permits
issued by the Governor on the ground that they have been issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A.
No. 7076 and beyond the authority of the Governor.10 According to the DENR Secretary, the area

was never proclaimed to be under the small-scale mining program.11 Iron ores also cannot be
considered as a quarry resource.12
The question in this case is whether or not the provincial governor had the power to issue the
subject permits.
The fact that the application for small-scale mining permit was initially filed as applications for quarry
permits is not contested.
Quarry permits, however, may only be issued "on privately-owned lands and/or public lands for
building and construction materials such as marble, basalt, andesite, conglomerate, tuff, adobe,
granite, gabbro, serpentine, inset filling materials, clay for ceramic tiles and building bricks, pumice,
perlite and other similar materials..."13 It may not be issued on "...resources that contain metals or
metallic constituents and/or other valuable materials in economic quantities."14
Not only do iron ores fall outside the classification of any of the enumerated materials in Section 43
of the Mining Act, but iron is also a metal. It may not be classified as a quarry resource, hence, the
provincial governor had no authority to issue the quarry permits in the first place. Probably realizing
this error, the applications for quarry permit were converted to applications for small-scale mining
permit.
Even so, the issuance of the small-scale mining permit was still beyond the authority of the provincial
governor. Small-scale mining areas must first be declared and set aside as such before they can be
made subject of small-scale mining rights.15 The applications for small-scale mining permit, in this
case, involved covered areas, which were never declared as people’s small-scale mining areas. This
is enough reason to deny an application for small-scale mining permit. Permits issued in disregard of
this fact are void for having been issued beyond the authority of the issuing officer.
Therefore, there was no issue of local autonomy. The provincial governor did not have the
competence to issue the questioned permits.
Neither does the League of Provinces have any standing to raise the present constitutional issue.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."16 The
fundamental question is "whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."17
In case of a citizens’ suit, the "interest of the person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must
be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has
sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement,
and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way."18 In the case of Telecommunications
and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. and GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC, we said that
a citizen who raises a constitutional question may only do so if s/he could show: (1) that s/he had
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury; (2) that the actual or threatened injury was a
result of an allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (3) that the injury is traceable to the
challenged action; and (4) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.19
The Petitioner League of Provinces’ status as an organization of all provinces duty-bound to promote
local autonomy20 and adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of provinces21 does not clothe
it with standing to question the constitutionality of the Section 17(b)(iii) of the Local Government
Code and Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 7076 or the Small-Scale Mining Act.

As an organization that represents all provinces, it did not suffer an actual injury or an injury in fact,
resulting from the implementation of the subject provisions. It cannot be said either that the
provinces that Petitioner represents suffered the same injury when the Central Office nullified the
permits issued by the Governor of Bulacan.
Provinces do not have a common or general interest on matters related to mining that the League of
Provinces can represent. Each province has a particular interest to protect and claims to pursue that
are separate and distinct from the others. Therefore, each is unique as to its reasons for raising
issues to the Court. The League of Provinces cannot represent all provinces on mining-related
issues. The perceived wrong suffered by the Province of Bulacan when the Central Office allegedly
exercised control does not necessarily constitute a wrong suffered by the other provinces.
Furthermore, the Constitution provides for two types of local governance other than the national
government: 1) The territorial and political subdivisions composed of provinces, cities, municipalities
and barangays; and 2) autonomous regions.22 The division of Article X of the Constitution
distinguishes between their creation and relationship with the national government.
The creation of autonomous regions takes into consideration the "historical and cultural heritage,
economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics"23 which its constituent
geographical areas share in common. These factors are not considered in the creation of territorial
and political subdivisions.
Autonomous regions are not only created by an act of the Congress. The Constitution also provides
for a plebiscite requirement before the organic act that creates an autonomous region becomes
effective.24 This constitutes the creation of autonomous regions a direct act of the people. It means
that the basic structure of an autonomous region, consisting of the executive department and
legislative assembly, its special courts, and the provisions on its powers may not be easily amended
or superseded by a simple act of the Congress.
Moreover, autonomous regions have powers, e.g. over their administrative organization, sources of
revenues, ancestral domain, natural resources, personal, family and property relations, regional
planning development, economic, social and tourism development, educational policies, cultural
heritage and other matters.25
On the other hand, the creation of territorial and political subdivisions is subject to the local
government code enacted by the Congress without a plebiscite requirement.26 While this does not
disallow the inclusion of provisions requiring plebiscites in the creation of provinces, cities, and
municipalities, the local government code may be amended or superseded by another legislative act
that removes such requirement. Their government structure, powers, and responsibilities, therefore,
are always subject to amendment by legislative acts.
The territorial and political subdivisions and autonomous regions are granted autonomy under the
Constitution.27The constitutional distinctions between them imply a clear distinction between the
kinds of autonomy that they exercise.
The oft-cited case of Limbona v. Mangelin28 penned by Justice Sarmiento distinguishes between two
types of autonomy:
…autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is

decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make
local governments ‘more responsive and accountable,’ and ‘ensure their fullest development as self-

reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development
and social progress’…
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is
free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in
that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
xxx
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X sec.
15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the
effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class
is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and
the Department of Local Government)…
I agree that autonomy, as phrased in Section 2 of Article X of the Constitution, which pertains to
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, refers only to administrative autonomy.
In granting autonomy, the national government does not totally relinquish its powers.29 The grant of
autonomy does not make territorial and political subdivisions sovereign within the state or an
"imperium in imperio".30 The aggrupation of local government units and the creation of regional
development councils in Sections 13 and 14 of Article X of the Constitution do not contemplate grant
of discretion to create larger units with a recognized distinct political power that is parallel to the
state. It merely facilitates coordination and exchange among them, still, for the purpose of
administration.
Territorial and political subdivisions are only allowed to take care of their local affairs so that
governance will be more responsive and effective to their unique needs.31 The Congress still retains
control over the extent of powers or autonomy granted to them.
Therefore, when the national government invalidates an act of a territorial or political subdivision in
the exercise of a power that is constitutionally and statutorily lodged to it, the territorial or political
subdivision cannot complain that its autonomy is being violated. This is especially so when the
extent of its autonomy under the Constitution or law does not include power or control over the
matter, to the exclusion of the national government.
However, I do not agree that Limbona v. Mangelin correctly categorized the kind of autonomy that
autonomous regions enjoy.
In that case, the court tried to determine the extent of self-government of autonomous governments
organized under Presidential Decree No. 1618 on July 25, 1979. This is prior to the autonomous
regions contemplated in the 1987 Constitution.
Autonomous regions are granted more powers and less intervention from the national government
than territorial and political subdivisions. They are, thus, in a more asymmetrical relationship with the
national government as compared to other local governments or any regional formation.32 The
Constitution grants them legislative powers over some matters, e.g. natural resources, personal,
family and property relations, economic and tourism development, educational policies, that are
usually under the control of the national government. However, they are still s"ubject to the

supervision of the President. Their establishment is still subject to the framework of the Constitution,
particularly, sections 15 to 21 of Article X, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic
of the Philippines.
The exact contours of the relationship of the autonomous government and the national government
are defined by legislation such as Republic Act No. 9054 or the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao. This is not at issue here and our pronouncements should not cover the
provinces that may be within that autonomous region.
Considering the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 54.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 55.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 55-56.
9 Id. at 56.
10 Id. at 58.
11
Id.
12 Id.
13 Republic Act. No. 7492, Sec. 43; See also Sec. 3(at). Mining Act.
14 Republic Act. No. 7492, Sec. 3(at).
15 Republic Act. No. 7076, Sec. 5. Small-Scale Mining Act.

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160, 216 (2006) citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th
16
Ed. p. 941 (1991).
17 Galicto v. Aquino III, G..R. No. 193978, February 28, 2012, 667 SCRA 150, 170.
Kilosbayan v. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 130, 142, citing
18
Valmonte v. PCSO, G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987.
19 G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998, 289 SCRA 337 (This case was cited by Justice Mendoza
in his separate opinion in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, et al.
[G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 336 SCRA 81] wherein he referred to actual or
threatened injury as "injury in fact" of an actual or imminent nature. Expounding, he said that
"the 'injury in fact' test requires more than injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the
party seeking review be himself among those injured.").
20 Republic Act. No. 7160, Sec. 504(b).
21 Republic Act. No. 7160, Sec. 504(c).
22 CONSTITUTION, Article X, Sec. 1.
23 CONSTITUTION, Art. X, Sec. 15.
27 CONSTITUTION, Art. X, Sec. 2 and Sec. 15.
28 Limbona v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA 786.
29See Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000, 336 SCRA 201 for
discussion on the extent of local autonomy.
30 Basco, et al., v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52.
31 Supra note 29.
32 CONSTITUTION., Art. X, Sec. 14 provides: "The President shall provide for regional
development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government officials,
regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-
governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization
to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social
growth and development of the units in the region."

S E C O N D D I V I S I O N
LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP, G.R. No. 136349

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -
PUNO, J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
THE CITY OF PASIG, HON. AZCUNA, and

MARIETTA A. LEGASPI, in her GARCIA, JJ.
capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 165 and THE COURT OF
APPEALS,
Promulgated:
Respondents.
January 23, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SANDOVAL GUTIERREZ, J.:
Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the benefit of a small community
which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a

recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot be considered to be for public
use. Its expropriation is not valid. In this case, the Court defines what constitutes a genuine
necessity for public use.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October
31, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 affirming the Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165,
Pasig City, dated May 7, 1996 in S.C.A. No. 873. Likewise assailed is the Resolution [3] of the
same court dated November 20, 1998 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case are:
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of
4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent,
notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be
used for the sports development and recreational activities of the residents of Barangay
Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the
then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose
was allegedly in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities
to deserving poor sectors of our community.
On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of
her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient
nor suitable to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community.
In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of
petitioners property is to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents.
Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for
expropriation, docketed as SCA No. 873. Respondent prayed that the trial court, after due notice
and hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; that commissioners be

appointed for the purpose of determining the just compensation; and that judgment be rendered
based on the report of the commissioners.
On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
I
PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, CONSIDERING THAT:
(A) THERE IS NO GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE

TAKING OF THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE
EXPROPRIATED.
(B) PLAINTIFF HAS ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY

CHOSEN THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE
EXPROPRIATED.
(C) EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT DEFENDANTS

PROPERTY MAY BE EXPROPRIATED BY PLAINTIFF,
THE FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY TO BE
EXPROPRIATED FAR EXCEEDS SEVENTY-EIGHT
THOUSAND PESOS (P78,000.00)
II
PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT IS DEFECTIVE IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE,

CONSIDERING THAT:
(A) PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ALLEGE WITH CERTAINTY THE

PURPOSE OF THE EXPROPRIATION.

(B) PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
PREREQUISITES LAID DOWN IN SECTION 34, RULE VI
OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; THUS, THE INSTANT
EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING IS PREMATURE.
III
THE GRANTING OF THE EXPROPRIATION WOULD VIOLATE

SECTION 261 (V) OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE.
IV
PLAINTIFF CANNOT TAKE POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT

PROPERTY BY MERELY DEPOSITING AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO
FIFTEEN PERCENT (15%) OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY BASED
ON THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY.[4]
On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss, [5] on the ground
that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational
activities of the residents of Pasig. As to the issue of just compensation, the trial court held that
the same is to be determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court in its Order of July
31, 1996. Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City as
commissioners to ascertain the just compensation. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court
of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41860. On October
31, 1997, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated November 20, 1998.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:
THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED 31 OCTOBER 1997

(ATTACHMENT A) AND RESOLUTION DATED 20 NOVEMBER 1998

(ATTACHMENT B) ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, THE RULES OF COURT
AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS

GENUINE NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE
PETITIONERS PROPERTY.
B. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE

PUBLIC USE REQUIREMENT FOR THE
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH.
C. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT

RESPONDENT CITY OF PASIG HAS COMPLIED
WITH ALL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT FOR THE
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN.
THE COURT A QUOS ORDER DATED 07 MAY 1996 AND 31 JULY 1996,
WHICH WERE AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS,
EFFECTIVELY AMOUNT TO THE TAKING OF PETITIONERS
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW:
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

APPLYING OF RULE ON ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTS TO
THE DOCUMENTS ATTACHED TO RESPONDENT CITY
OF PASIGS COMPLAINT DATED 07 APRIL 1995 TO
JUSTIFY THE COURT A QUOS DENIAL OF
PETITIONERS RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE
COMPLAINT FOR EXPROPRIATION (THE MOTION TO
DISMISS DATED 21 APRIL 1995).

III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN

APPLYING THE RULE ON HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION
OF FACTS ALLEGED IN A COMPLAINT CONSIDERING
THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY PETITIONER
IN THE EXPROPRIATION CASE BELOW WAS THE
RESPONSIVE PLEADING REQUIRED TO BE FILED
UNDER THE THEN RULE 67 OF THE RULES OF COURT
AND NOT AN ORIDNARY MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER
RULE 16 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
The foregoing arguments may be synthesized into two main issues one substantive and one
procedural. We will first address the procedural issue.
Petitioner filed her Motion to Dismiss the complaint for expropriation on April 25, 1995. It was
denied by the trial court on May 7, 1996. At that time, the rule on expropriation was governed by
Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. Within the time specified in the summons, each defendant, in lieu
of an answer, shall present in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all his
objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his property for the use or purpose specified
in the complaint. All such objections and defenses not so presented are waived. A copy of the motion
shall be served on the plaintiffs attorney of record and filed with the court with proof of service.
The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly constitutes the responsive pleading
which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the pleading
that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the defendants property for the use
specified in the complaint. All that the law requires is that a copy of the said motion be served on
plaintiffs attorney of record. It is the court that at its convenience will set the case for trial after the
filing of the said pleading.[6]
The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner
hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, specifically that there is a

genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property for public use. Pursuant to the above Rule,
the motion is a responsive pleading joining the issues. What the trial court should have done was
to set the case for the reception of evidence to determine whether there is indeed a genuine
necessity for the taking of the property, instead of summarily making a finding that the taking is
for public use and appointing commissioners to fix just compensation. This is especially so
considering that the purpose of the expropriation was squarely challenged and put in issue by
petitioner in her motion to dismiss.
Significantly, the above Rule allowing a defendant in an expropriation case to file a motion to
dismiss in lieu of an answer was amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect
on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule 67 now expressly mandates that any objection or defense to the
taking of the property of a defendant must be set forth in an answer.
The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 on October
31, after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, is of no moment. It is only fair that the Rule
at the time petitioner filed her motion to dismiss should govern. The new provision cannot be
applied retroactively to her prejudice.
We now proceed to address the substantive issue.
In the early case of US v. Toribio,[7] this Court defined the power of eminent domain as the right
of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public
exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation
therefor. It has also been described as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private
property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government.[8]
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates
the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility
corporations,[9] subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent
power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by
statute.[10] Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes
the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and lays
down the parameters for its exercise, thus:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the

provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That, the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner
and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That, the local government unit may immediately
take possession of the property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the
amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the
fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a)
the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character
of the purpose of the taking.[11]
In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a genuine
necessity which justifies the condemnation of her property. While she does not dispute the
intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there must be a genuine necessity for the
proposed use and purposes. According to petitioner, there is already an established sports
development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and
being utilized by its residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan. Respondent does not
dispute this. Evidently, there is no genuine necessity to justify the expropriation.
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from the necessity
and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of
Manila,[12] we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a
genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character. Moreover, the
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land.
In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College,[13] we ruled that necessity within the rule that the
particular property to be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a
reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with
the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the property owner consistent
with such benefit.
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that
there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners property. Our scrutiny of the records shows
that the Certification[14] issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the
basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that
the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-
profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said
Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility.
Petitioners lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and

categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists
an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the
Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
The right to own and possess property is one of the most cherished rights of men. It is so
fundamental that it has been written into organic law of every nation where the rule of law prevails.
Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of ones property is clearly
established, it shall be the duty of the courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private
property. Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable sanctity which the
Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the
taking of private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a
public character, must also be shown to exist.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 are REVERSED. The complaint for
expropriation filed before the trial court by respondent City of Pasig, docketed as SCA No. 873,
is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo at 75-86. Penned by Associate Justice Gloria C. Paras (deceased), with Associate Justice Lourdes Tayao-Jaguros and
Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili (both retired), concurring.
[2]
Id. at 136-139.
[3]
Id. at 87-88. Per Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera (retired)
and Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali.
[4]
Id. at 156-158.
[5]
Id. at 139.
[6]
Rural Progress Administration v. De Guzman, 87 Phil. 176, 178 (1950).
[7]
15 Phil. 85 (1910).
[8]
See Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 40 Phil. 550, 558-559 (1919).
[9]
See Northeastern Gar Transmission Co. v. Collins, 138 Conn. 582, 87 A2d 139.
[10]
City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 US 439, 7 L. Ed, 850, 50 S. Ct. 360.
[11]
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (1996 ed). 372-373.
[12]
40 Phil. 349 (1919).
[13]
85 Phil. 663 (1950).
[14]
Rollo at 168.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998]
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAAQUE, petitioner, vs. V.M. REALTY CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paraaque, cannot authorize an expropriation of
private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly
and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the
sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. On the other hand, the principle of res
judicata does not bar subsequent proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legal
requirements for its valid exercise are complied with.
Statement of the Case
These principles are applied by this Court in resolving this petition for review on certiorari of the July
22, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 48048, which affirmed in toto the Regional
[1] [2] [3]
Trial Courts August 9, 1994 Resolution. The trial court dismissed the expropriation suit as follows:
[4]
The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain is not disputed. However, such right
may be exercised only pursuant to an Ordinance (Sec. 19, R.A. No. 7160). In the instant case, there is no
such ordinance passed by the Municipal Council of Paraaque enabling the Municipality, thru its Chief
Executive, to exercise the power of eminent domain. The complaint, therefore, states no cause of action.
Assuming that plaintiff has a cause of action, the same is barred by a prior judgment. On September 29,
1987, the plaintiff filed a complaint for expropriation involving the same parcels of land which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 17939 of this Court (page 26, record). Said case was dismissed with prejudice
on May 18, 1988 (page 39, record). The order of dismissal was not appealed, hence, the same became
final. The plaintiff can not be allowed to pursue the present action without violating the principle of [r]es
[j]udicata. While defendant in Civil Case No. 17939 was Limpan Investment Corporation, the doctrine
of res judicata still applies because the judgment in said case (C.C. No. 17939) is conclusive between the
parties and their successors-in-interest (Vda. de Buncio vs. Estate of the late Anita de Leon).The herein
defendant is the successor-in-interest of Limpan Investment Corporation as shown by the Deed of
Assignment Exchange executed on June 13, 1990.
WHEREFORE, defendants motion for reconsideration is hereby granted. The order dated February 4,
1994 is vacated and set aside.
This case is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. [5]

Factual Antecedents
Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of Paraaque
[6]
filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent V.M. Realty
[7]
Corporation over two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917), with a
combined area of about 10,000 square meters, located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila,
and covered by Torrens Certificate of Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of
alleviating the living conditions ofthe underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a
socialized housing project. Parenthetically, it was also for this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to
[8]
its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a
[9]
negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not accept. [10]
Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
134, issued an Order dated January 10, 1994, giving it due course. Acting on petitioners motion, said
[11]
court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject
[12]
property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value
based on its current tax declaration.
On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its Answer containing affirmative defenses and a
counterclaim, alleging in the main that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was
[13]
filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code);
and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. On private respondents
motion, its Answer was treated as a motion to dismiss. On March 24, 1994, petitioner filed its opposition,
[14] [15]
stressing that the trial courts Order dated February 4, 1994 was in accord with Section 19 of RA 7160, and
that the principle of res judicata was not applicable.
Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 Resolution nullifying its February 4, 1994 Order
[16]
and dismissing the case. Petitioners motions for reconsideration and transfer of venue were denied by the
trial court in a Resolution dated December 2, 1994. Petitioner then appealed to Respondent Court, raising
[17]
the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Resolution of the Paraaque Municipal Council No. 93-95, Series of 1993
is a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of Section 19, R.A. 7180 [sic] in
the exercise of the power of eminent domain by the plaintiff-appellant.
2. Whether or not the complaint in this case states no cause of action.
3. Whether or not the strict adherence to the literal observance to the rule of procedure resulted
in technicality standing in the way of substantial justice.
4. Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to the present case. [18]
As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial courts Decision. Respondent
Court, in its assailed Resolution promulgated on January 8, 1997, denied petitioners Motion for
[19]
Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, this appeal. [20]
The Issues
Before this Court, petitioner posits two issues, viz.:

1. A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and effect of an ordinance and
will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable when public interest is
primarily involved. [21]
The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
First Issue:
Resolution Different from an Ordinance
Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law because the terms ordinance
[22]
and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit
through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and
[23]
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a private
property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property
through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation
proceedings. (Italics supplied.)
[24]
The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government,
which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may
[25]
therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subject
to the latters control and restraints, imposed through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations. In this case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain,
[26]
also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides as follows:
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for
the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time
of the taking of the property. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent
domain:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of
the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor
and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and
other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated,
but said offer was not accepted.[27]
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant
to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor
be authorized through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals to show that a [28]
resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by an LGU. This case, however, is not
[29]
in point because the applicable law at that time was BP 337, the previous Local Government Code, which
[30]
had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA
7160, the present Local Government Code which was already in force when the Complaint for
[31]
expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose.

We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and ordinance are
synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is
merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance [32]
possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two
are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members. [33]
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would
have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a
clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires
that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance.Indeed, [l]egislative intent is determined
principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice. In the instant case, there
[34]
is no reason to depart from this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd,
or unjust.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a fundamental or private
right of the people. Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language -- from resolution under
[35]
BP 337 to ordinance under RA 7160 -- demands a strict construction. No species of property is held by
individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the
right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public
purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should
not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation. [36]
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to
authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160,
the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the
[37]
clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the
implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of eminent
domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.
In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the policy embodied in Section 2, Article X of the Constitution,
which provides that territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. It merely upholds the
law as worded in RA 7160. We stress that an LGU is created by law and all its powers and rights are
sourced therefrom. It has therefore no power to amend or act beyond the authority given and the limitations
imposed on it by law. Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not

eminent but inferior domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes
only of a share in eminent domain. Indeed, the national legislature is still the principal of the local
[38]
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. [39]
Complaint Does Not State a Cause of Action
In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that its Sanguniang Bayan passed an
ordinance on October 11, 1994 which reiterated its Resolution No. 93-35, Series of 1993, and ratified all
the acts of its mayor regarding the subject expropriation. [40]
This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner merely alleged the existence of such an
ordinance, but it did not present any certified true copy thereof. In the second place,petitioner did not raise
this point before this Court. In fact, it was mentioned by private respondent, and only in passing. In any
[41]
event, this allegation does not cure the inherent defect of petitioners Complaint for expropriation filed on
September 23, 1993. It is hornbook doctrine that:
x x x in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
question submitted before the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint
itself. Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically
admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? [42]
The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the Complaint for expropriation
which was based on a mere resolution. The absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to
lack of cause of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the
trial courts Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit.
Second Issue:
Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for the application
[43] [44]
of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior
expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds application in generally
all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private
[45]
property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right to
exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of
eminent domain is plenary and, like police power, can reach every form of property which the State might
need for public use. All separate interests of individuals in property are held of the government under this
[46]
tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the
highest and most exact idea of property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people
in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession of the property whenever the
public interest requires it. Thus, the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising
[47]
said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain,
it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an

expropriation suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the same issue;
it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed
by law, and subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property. By the same [48]
token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of eminent domain through a mere
resolution will not bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that
matter, all others are properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also
true of the principle of law of the case. In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the
[49]
State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment
over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The State or its
authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same property, once all legal
requirements are complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of eminent
domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to petitioners proper exercise of its
power of eminent domain over subject property. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 21-25.
Special Sixth Division, composed of J. Antonio M. Martinez (now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court), ponente and
[2]
chairman; and JJ. Ricardo P. Galvez and Hilarion L. Aquino, concurring.

[3]
See Rollo, p. 25.
[4]
Penned by acting Presiding Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
[5]
Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, p. 2; Rollo, p. 70.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 41-43.
[7]
Ibid., pp. 27-32.
[8]
Petitioners Memorandum, p. 1; Rollo, p. 184.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[10]
Complaint, p. 3; Rollo, p. 29.
[11]
Rollo, p. 45.
[12]
Ibid., p. 47.
[13]
Ibid., pp. 48-51.
[14]
Private respondents Memorandum, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 197-198.
[15]
Rollo, pp. 66-68.
[16]
Ibid., pp. 69-70.
[17]
Ibid., pp. 71-72.
[18]
Ibid., pp. 78-79.
[19]
Ibid., p. 26.
[20]
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 13, 1998, when the Court received private respondents Memorandum.
[21]
[22]
Ibid., p. 4; Rollo, p. 188.
[23]
Ibid.
[24]
Paragraph A.
[25]
Moday vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586, 592, February 20, 1997.
[26]
Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 173, 179-180, May 17, 1993, per Quiason, J.
[27]
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key To National Development, 1993 ed., p. 110.
[28]
Supra.
[29]
Approved on February 10, 1983 and published in 79 O.G. No. 7. See Moday vs. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 593. Sec. 9 of BP 337
[30]
reads:
SEC. 9. Eminent Domain. --- A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian,
exercise the right of eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.

[31]
Effective January 1, 1992.
Mascuana vs. Provincial Board of Negros Occidental, 79 SCRA 399, 405, October 18, 1977; cited in private respondents
[32]
Memorandum, p. 5.
[33]
Article 107, pars. a and c, Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 7160; cited in Pimentel, Jr., supra, pp. 163-164.
Azarcon vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 747, 762, February 26, 1997, per Panganiban, J.; citing Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248
[34]
SCRA 590, 596, September 28, 1995.
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil 349, 366 (1919), and Arriete vs. Director of Public Works, 58 Phil 507, 511
[35]
(1933). See also Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p. 348.
[36]
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., p. 59.
See Villa vs. Llanes, Jr., 120 SCRA 81, 84, January 21, 1983, and Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil 655, 676 (1947). See also Art. 7,
[37]
Civil Code of the Philippines.

[38]
Bernas, supra, pp. 348-349.
[39]
Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, Corp., Inc., 234 SCRA 255, 272-273, July 20, 1994, per Cruz, J.
[40]
Rollo, pp. 81-82.
[41]
See private respondents Memorandum, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 201-202.
Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 205, 210, July 15, 1991, per Cruz, J.; citing The
[42]
Heirs of Juliana Clavano vs. Genato, 80 SCRA 217, 222, October 28, 1977.
[43]
Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 25.
[44]
Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, p. 2; Rollo, p. 70.
[45]
Republic vs. Director of Lands, 99 SCRA 651, 657, September 11, 1980.
[46]
Bernas, supra, p. 349.
[47]
Ibid.
[48]
See National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 577, March 11, 1996.
[49]
182 SCRA 142, 147-148, February 12, 1990.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 161656. June 29, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA, COMMODORE EDGARDO

GALEOS, ANTONIO CABALUNA, DOROTEO MANTOS & FLORENCIO
BELOTINDOS, petitioners, vs. VICENTE G. LIM, respondent.
RESOLUTION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions.[1] When the state wields its power of eminent domain,
there arises a correlative obligation on its part to pay the owner of the expropriated property a just
compensation. If it fails, there is a clear case of injustice that must be redressed. In the present case, fifty-
seven (57) years have lapsed from the time the Decision in the subject expropriation proceedings became
final, but still the Republic of the Philippines, herein petitioner, has not compensated the owner of the
property. To tolerate such prolonged inaction on its part is to encourage distrust and resentment among
our people the very vices that corrode the ties of civility and tempt men to act in ways they would otherwise
shun.
A revisit of the pertinent facts in the instant case is imperative.
On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil action for
expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots
932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing a military
reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name
of Eulalia Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of 13,164 square meters.
After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the Order of the CFI dated
October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the CFI
rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.
The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it was dismissed on March 11, 1948.
An entry of judgment was made on April 5, 1948.
In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National Airports Corporation a
claim for rentals for the two lots, but it denied knowledge of the matter. Another heir, Nestor Belocura,
brought the claim to the Office of then President Carlos Garcia who wrote the Civil Aeronautics
Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on said claim. On September 6,
1961, Lt. Manuel Cabal rejected the claim but expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots
within a reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the Denzons successors-in-
interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-Panerio,[2] filed with the same CFI an
action for recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in possession of the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208.
In the interim or on November 9, 1961, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and 939 were
issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was
the phrase subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, Lots
932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value.

On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that
they are the owners and have retained their right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republics
failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the
annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the Republic. In view
of the differences in money value from 1940 up to the present, the court adjusted the market value
at P16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date of entry in the expropriation
proceedings, until full payment.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza and Panerio appealed from the CFI
Decision, in view of the amount in controversy, directly to this Court. The case was docketed as No. L-
21032.[3] On May 19, 1966, this Court rendered its Decision affirming the CFI Decision. It held that
Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there having been no payment
of just compensation by the Republic. Apparently, this Court found nothing in the records to show that the
Republic paid the owners or their successors-in-interest according to the CFI decision. While it deposited
the amount of P9,500,00, and said deposit was allegedly disbursed, however, the payees could not be
ascertained.
Notwithstanding the above finding, this Court still ruled that Valdehueza and Panerio are not entitled
to recover possession of the lots but may only demand the payment of their fair market value, ratiocinating
as follows:
Appellants would contend that: (1) possession of Lots 932 and 939 should be restored to them
as owners of the same; (2) the Republic should be ordered to pay rentals for the use of said
lots, plus attorneys fees; and (3) the court a quo in the present suit had no power to fix the value
of the lots and order the execution of the deed of sale after payment.
It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having been a transfer
of said lots in favor of the Government. The records do not show that the Government paid the
owners or their successors-in-interest according to the 1940 CFI decision although, as
stated, P9,500.00 was deposited by it, and said deposit had been disbursed. With the records
lost, however, it cannot be known who received the money (Exh. 14 says: It is further certified
that the corresponding Vouchers and pertinent Journal and Cash Book were destroyed during
the last World War, and therefore the names of the payees concerned cannot be
ascertained.) And the Government now admits that there is no available record showing
that payment for the value of the lots in question has been made (Stipulation of Facts, par.
9, Rec. on Appeal, p. 28).
The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if so, in what
amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and
executory judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for public use, as part of
an airport, and ordered sold to the Government. In fact, the abovementioned title
certificates secured by plaintiffs over said lots contained annotations of the right of the
National Airports Corporation (now CAA) to pay for and acquire them. It follows that both
by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations
upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their
expropriated lots which are still devoted to the public use for which they were
expropriated but only to demand the fair market value of the same.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein
respondent,[4] as security for their loans. For their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage
foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No. 23934 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 63894 was issued in
his name.

On August 20, 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 10, Cebu City, against General Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as Commander of Naval District V of the Philippine Navy,
Antonio Cabaluna, Doroteo Mantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein petitioners. Subsequently, he
amended the complaint to implead the Republic.
On May 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Vicente Lim and against all
defendants, public and private, declaring plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive
owner of Lot No. 932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to
possession. The monetary claims in the complaint and in the counter claims contained in the
answer of defendants are ordered Dismissed.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. CV No. 72915. In
its Decision[5] dated September 18, 2003, the Appellate Court sustained the RTC Decision, thus:
Obviously, defendant-appellant Republic evaded its duty of paying what was due to the
landowners. The expropriation proceedings had already become final in the late 1940s
and yet, up to now, or more than fifty (50) years after, the Republic had not yet paid the
compensation fixed by the court while continuously reaping benefits from the
expropriated property to the prejudice of the landowner. x x x. This is contrary to the
rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but also the
payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a
decade or more, in this case more than 50 years, before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with the loss. To allow the taking of the landowners properties, and in
the meantime leave them empty-handed by withholding payment of compensation while
the government speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse, for
government to subsequently decide to abandon the property and return it to the
landowners, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never
be sanctioned. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404).
xxxxxx
An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or
uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a
legal or equitable title or interest in the real property, which is the subject matter of the action.
Also the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as cloud on plaintiffs title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity
or legal efficacy (Robles vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 97). In view of the foregoing
discussion, clearly, the claim of defendant-appellant Republic constitutes a cloud, doubt
or uncertainty on the title of plaintiff-appellee Vicente Lim that can be removed by an
action to quiet title.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the appealed May 4,
2001 Decision of Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-12701, the
said decision is UPHELD AND AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

Undaunted, petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court a petition for
review on certiorari alleging that the Republic has remained the owner of Lot 932 as held by this Court
in Valdehueza vs. Republic.[6]
In our Resolution dated March 1, 2004, we denied the petition outright on the ground that the Court of
Appeals did not commit a reversible error. Petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration but we
denied the same with finality in our Resolution of May 17, 2004.
On May 18, 2004, respondent filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an entry of judgment. We
only noted the motion in our Resolution of July 12, 2004.
On July 7, 2004, petitioners filed an urgent plea/motion for clarification, which is actually a second
motion for reconsideration. Thus, in our Resolution of September 6, 2004, we simply noted without action
the motion considering that the instant petition was already denied with finality in our Resolution of May
17, 2004.
On October 29, 2004, petitioners filed a very urgent motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration
of our Resolution dated September 6, 2004 (with prayer to refer the case to the En Banc). They maintain
that the Republics right of ownership has been settled in Valdehueza.
The basic issue for our resolution is whether the Republic has retained ownership of Lot 932 despite
its failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the
judgment of the CFI rendered as early as May 14, 1940.
Initially, we must rule on the procedural obstacle.
While we commend the Republic for the zeal with which it pursues the present case, we reiterate that
its urgent motion for clarification filed on July 7, 2004 is actually a second motion for reconsideration. This
motion is prohibited under Section 2, Rule 52, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
provides:
Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment
or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.
Consequently, as mentioned earlier, we simply noted without action the motion since petitioners
petition was already denied with finality.
Considering the Republics urgent and serious insistence that it is still the owner of Lot 932 and in the
interest of justice, we take another hard look at the controversial issue in order to determine the veracity of
petitioners stance.
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his
private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process
is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. [7] Accordingly,
Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.
The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused to pay respondents
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots 932 and 939. The length of time and the manner
with which it evaded payment demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude. The
final judgment in the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was entered on April 5, 1948. More
than half of a century has passed, yet, to this day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-
handed. Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be viewed as fair. This is
more so when such delay is accompanied by bureaucratic hassles. Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact
that respondents predecessors-in-interest were given a run around by the Republics officials and agents.
In 1950, despite the benefits it derived from the use of the two lots, the National Airports Corporationdenied
knowledge of the claim of respondents predecessors-in-interest. Even President Garcia, who sent a letter
to the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite the payment,

failed in granting relief to them. And, on September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots, nothing happened.
The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republics delay is contrary to the rules of fair play,
as just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owners of the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just. In jurisdictions similar to ours,
where an entry to the expropriated property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that
if the compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.[8]
Corollarily, in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya,[9] similar to the present case,
this Court expressed its disgust over the governments vexatious delay in the payment of just compensation,
thus:
The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be paid for their land
which was taken for use as a public high school. As a matter of fair procedure, it is the duty
of the Government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to supply
all required documentation and facilitate payment of just compensation. The imposition of
unreasonable requirements and vexatious delays before effecting payment is not only
galling and arbitrary but a rich source of discontent with government. There should be
some kind of swift and effective recourse against unfeeling and uncaring acts of middle
or lower level bureaucrats.
We feel the same way in the instant case.

More than anything else, however, it is the obstinacy of the Republic that prompted us to dismiss its
petition outright. As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay
respondents predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16,248.40 as reasonable market value of the two lots in
question. Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several decades to pass without obeying this Courts
mandate. Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule of law,
which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private property. While it is true that all
private properties are subject to the need of government, and the government may take them whenever
the necessity or the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees that when
this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by compensation.[10] From the
taking of private property by the government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied
promise to compensate the owner for his loss.[11]
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is not a grant
but a limitation of power. This limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against
the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the individuals rights. Given this function,
the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the expropriator, the government,
and liberally in favor of the property owner.[12]
Ironically, in opposing respondents claim, the Republic is invoking this Courts Decision
in Valdehueza, a Decision it utterly defied. How could the Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when
it has not paid its owner the just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? The recognized
rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in
other democratic jurisdictions. In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. et al., vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[13] thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the
condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the
condemnors title relates back to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act,
or the commissioners report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.

x x x Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the
time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually
made. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to
property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In
fact, the decisions appear to be uniform to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure,
it was held that actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition
precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State albeit not to the
appropriation of it to public use. In Rexford v. Knight, the Court of Appeals of New York said
that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the
payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was
complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that both on principle and authority the
rule is . . . that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the
property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the
title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been
made to him.
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively
examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction
is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and
irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid...(Emphasis
supplied.)
Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner
to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republics acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full
payment of just compensation within a reasonable time.[14]
Significantly, in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia[15] this Court ruled that the expropriation of lands consists
of two stages, to wit:
x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in
the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that
the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by the court with
the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. x x x.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed.
In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation,[16] we ruled that, the process is not completed until payment
of just compensation. Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-
interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.
The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled to recover possession of
Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its fair market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that
non-payment of just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the private landowners

to recover possession of the expropriated lots. This is our ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[17] and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority.[18] However, the facts
of the present case do not justify its application. It bears stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just
compensation twice, the first was in the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-
seven (57) years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republics failure to pay just
compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such circumstance, recovery of possession is
in order. In several jurisdictions, the courts held that recovery of possession may be had when property has
been wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act under the power of eminent
domain[19] or where a rightful entry is made and the party condemning refuses to pay the
compensation which has been assessed or agreed upon; [20] or fails or refuses to have the
compensation assessed and paid.[21]
The Republic also contends that where there have been constructions being used by the military, as
in this case, public interest demands that the present suit should not be sustained.
It must be emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived of his property for the public
convenience.[22] In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,[23] we ruled:
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are
concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it
is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution.
Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even
the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no
exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the
Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny
him that right.
The right covers the persons life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III
of the Constitution. With regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of
Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
The Republics assertion that the defense of the State will be in grave danger if we shall order the
reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an overstatement. First, Lot 932 had ceased to operate as an airport.
What remains in the site is just the National Historical Institutes marking stating that Lot 932 is the former
location of Lahug Airport. And second, there are only thirteen (13) structures located on Lot 932, eight (8)
of which are residence apartments of military personnel. Only two (2) buildings are actually used as
training centers. Thus, practically speaking, the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent will only affect a handful
of military personnel. It will not result to irreparable damage or damage beyond pecuniary estimation, as
what the Republic vehemently claims.
We thus rule that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle respondent to recover
possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic. Unless this form of swift and effective relief is granted
to him, the grave injustice committed against his predecessors-in-interest, though no fault or negligence on
their part, will be perpetuated. Let this case, therefore, serve as a wake-up call to the Republic that in the
exercise of its power of eminent domain, necessarily in derogation of private rights, it must comply with the
Constitutional limitations. This Court, as the guardian of the peoples right, will not stand still in the face of
the Republics oppressive and confiscatory taking of private property, as in this case.
At this point, it may be argued that respondent Vicente Lim acted in bad faith in entering into a contract
of mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio despite the clear annotation in TCT No. 23934 that Lot 932
is subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation [to acquire said parcels of land] x x x
upon previous payment of a reasonable market value.

The issue of whether or not respondent acted in bad faith is immaterial considering that the Republic
did not complete the expropriation process. In short, it failed to perfect its title over Lot 932 by its failure to
pay just compensation. The issue of bad faith would have assumed relevance if the Republic actually
acquired title over Lot 932. In such a case, even if respondents title was registered first, it would be the
Republics title or right of ownership that shall be upheld. But now, assuming that respondent was in bad
faith, can such fact vest upon the Republic a better title over Lot 932? We believe not. This is because
in the first place, the Republic has no title to speak of.
At any rate, assuming that respondent had indeed knowledge of the annotation, still nothing would
have prevented him from entering into a mortgage contract involving Lot 932 while the expropriation
proceeding was pending. Any person who deals with a property subject of an expropriation does so at his
own risk, taking into account the ultimate possibility of losing the property in favor of the government. Here,
the annotation merely served as a caveat that the Republic had a preferential right to acquire Lot
932 upon its payment of a reasonable market value. It did not proscribe Valdehueza and Panerio from
exercising their rights of ownership including their right to mortgage or even to dispose of their property.
In Republic vs. Salem Investment Corporation,[24] we recognized the owners absolute right over his property
pending completion of the expropriation proceeding, thus:
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the property
passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and
terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with the registered
owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an owner, including
the right to dispose of his property subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire
it through expropriation.
It bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to respondent in 1964, they
were still the owners thereof and their title had not yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never
did. Such title or ownership was rendered conclusive when we categorically ruled in Valdehueza that: It is
true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not having been a transfer of said
lots in favor of the Government.
For respondents part, it is reasonable to conclude that he entered into the contract of mortgage with
Valdehueza and Panerio fully aware of the extent of his right as a mortgagee. A mortgage is merely an
accessory contract intended to secure the performance of the principal obligation. One of its characteristics
is that it is inseparable from the property. It adheres to the property regardless of who its owner may
subsequently be.[25] Respondent must have known that even if Lot 932 is ultimately expropriated by the
Republic, still, his right as a mortgagee is protected. In this regard, Article 2127 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the improvements, growing
fruits, and the rents or income not yet received when the obligation becomes due, and to the
amount of the indemnity granted or owing to the proprietor from the insurers of the property
mortgaged, or in virtue of expropriation for public use, with the declarations, amplifications,
and limitations established by law, whether the estate remains in the possession of the
mortgagor or it passes in the hands of a third person.
In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not
entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, [26]however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just compensation within five (5)[27] years from the finality of the judgment in
the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. This is in consonance with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and
dishonor the judgment.[28]To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay
just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of

just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals,[29] we defined just compensation as not only the
correct determination of the amount to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property
within a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 72915 is
AFFIRMED in toto.
The Republics motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated March 1, 2004 is DENIED with
FINALITY. No further pleadings will be allowed.
Let an entry of judgment be made in this case.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) at 4.
[2]
They were joined by their husbands, Angel Valdehueza and Pablo Panerio, and father, Jose Galeos.
[3]
May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 107.
[4]
The mortgage was duly annotated at the back of the mortgagors title in 1964, while the Decision of this Court in Valdehueza vs.
Republic was annotated in 1974.
[5]
Penned by Justice Sergio L. Pestao (retired) and concurred in by Justices Perlita J. Tria Tirona and Jose C. Mendoza.
[6]
Supra.
[7]
Coscuella vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-77765, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA 393, citing Province of Pangasinan vs. CFI Judge of
Pangasinan, Branch VIII, 80 SCRA 117, 120-121 (1977).
[8]
Law of Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Volume II 931 citing Cushman vs. Smith, 34 Me. 247; and see Davis vs. Russel, 47 Me. 443.
[9]
No. L-64037, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 291.
[10]
26 Am Jur 2d 168.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1995 Ed., at 58-59.
[13]
G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343.
[14]
Just compensation is described as a full and fair equivalent of the property taken from the private owner by the expropriator. This
is intended to indemnify the owner fully for the loss he has sustained as a result of the expropriation. The measure of this
compensation is not the takers gain but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation, to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full,
ample. (Manila Railroad Co. vs. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286).
[15]
G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 576, 583-584.
[16]
G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000, 334 SCRA 320, 329.
[17]
G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 611.
[18]
G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003, 395 SCRA 494.
[19]
Law of Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Volume II 927 citing Robinson vs. Southern California Ry.Co., 129 Cal. 8, 61 Pac.
947; Meeker vs. Chicago, 23 Ill. App. 23; Wilson vs. Muskegon etc. R.R. Co., 132 Mich. 469, 93 N.W. 1059; Illinois Cent.R.R.
Co. vs. Hoskins, 80 Miss. 730, 32 So. 150, 92 Am St. Rep. 612; McClinton vs. Pittsburg etc. Ry Co., 66 Pa St. 404
[20]
Id., citing White vs. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co., 64 Ia. 281,20 N.W. 436; St. Joseph & Denver City R.R. Co. vs. Callender,
13 Kan. 496; Blackshire vs. Atchison,Topeka and Sta. Fe R.R. Co., 13 Kan. 514; Kanne v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry.Co.,
30 Minn. 423; Bartleson vs. Minneapolis, 33 Minn. 468; Wheeling etc. R.R.Co. vs. Warrell, 122 Pa St. 613, 16 Alt 20

[21]
Id., citing Connellsville Gas Coal Co. vs. Baltimore, etc. R.R. Co., 216 Pa St.309, 65 Atl. 669.
[22]
Law of Eminent Domain, Third Edition, Volume II 929 citing Hooper vs. Columbus & Western Ry.Co., 78 Ala. 213; Stratten vs.
Great Western & Bradford Ry.Co., 40 L.J. Eq. 50. In the latter case the court says. With regard to what is said as to public
interests, I am not inclined to listen to any suggestion of public interest as against private rights acquired in a lawful way. I
do not think that the interest of the public in using something that is provided for their convenience is to be upheld at the
price of saying that a persons property is to be confiscated for that purpose. A man who comes to this court is entitled to
have his rights ascertained and declared, however, inconvenient it may be to third persons to whom it may be a convenience
to have the use of his property.
[23]
Supra at 375-376.
[24]
Supra.
[25]
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, 14th Ed., Book V, at 1021.
[26]
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, supra. and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority, supra.
[27]
Section 6, Rule 39 provides that: A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the
date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced
by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter
by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations.
[28]
Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, No. L-30098, February 18, 1970.
[29]
No. L-77765, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA 393.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7708 May 30, 1955
JOSE MONDANO, petitioner,

vs.
FERNANDO SILVOSA, Provincial Governor of Surigao, JOSE ARREZA and OLIMPIO EPIS,
Members of the Provincial Board, respondents.
D. Avila and C. H. Lozada for petitioner.

Olimpio R. Epis in his own behalf and for his co-respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of
Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the
Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter
Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the
conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the
respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10
April the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and was
served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial governor with provincial board. On the
same day, the provincial governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from
office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the
petitioner over his objection.
The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents from
further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against him and for a declaration that
the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor is illegal and without legal
effect.
On 4 May 1954 the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued after filing and approval of a
bond for P500.
The answer of the respondents admits the facts alleged in the petition except those that are
inferences and conclusions of law and invokes the provisions of section 79 (c)of the Revised
Administrative Code which clothes the department head with "direct control, direction, and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . ." and to that end "may order the
investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person
who shall conduct such investigations; . . ."and the rule in the case of Villena vs. Secretary of
Interior, 67 Phil. 452, which upheld "the power of the Secretary of Interior to conduct at its own
initiative investigation of charges against local elective municipal officials and to suspend them
preventively," on the board proposition "that under the presidential type of government which we
have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by
paragraph 1, section 11, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Departments, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive."

The executive departments of the Government of the Philippines created and organized before the
approval of the Constitution continued to exist as "authorized by law until the Congress shall provide
otherwise."1 Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The President shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over
all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he has
been granted only the power of general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department
head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision over all bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not
have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under
his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person
in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under
his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already stated, the
President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section
79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the corresponding
department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for the
reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office,
such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the
Constitution. If "general supervision over all local governments" is to be construedas the same power
granted to the Department Head in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then there
would no longer be a distinction or difference between the power of control and that of supervision.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other
hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that
of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code
and 37 of Act No. 4007. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and
investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression,
corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude."2 And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching
the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally
or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal
treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official
integrity of the officer in question." 3 Section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to
the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . .
municipalities . . .. If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as
that vested in the Department Head by section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such
additional power must be deemed to have been abrogated by section 10 (1), Article VII, of the
Constitution.
In Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz. 93, this Court held that the power of the President to remove
officials from office as provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be
done "conformably to law;" and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he "may at any
time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the (Philippine
Islands) Philippines." Again, this power of removal must be exercised conformably to law.
In the indorsement to the provincial governor the Assistant Executive Secretary requested
immediate investigation, appropriate action and report on the complaint indorsed to him, and called
his attention to section 2193 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for the institution of
judicial proceedings by the provincial fiscal upon direction of the provincial governor. If the

indorsement of the Assistant Executive Secretary be taken as a designation of the provincial
governor to investigate the petitioner, then he would only be acting as agent of the Executive, but the
investigation to be conducted by him would not be that which is provided for in sections 2188, 2189
and 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges preferred against the respondent are not
malfeasances or any of those enumerated or specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative
Code, because rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his duties as
mayor nor do they constitute or involve" neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of
maladministration of office." True, they may involve moral turpitude, but before the provincial
governor and board may act and proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Revised
Administrative Code referred to, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by the
provincial governor of charges and trial by the provincial board. Even the provincial fiscal cannot file
an information for rape without a sworn complaint of the offended party who is 28 years of age and
the crime of concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon sworn complaint of the offended
spouse.4 The charges preferred against the petitioner, municipal mayor of Mainit, province of
Surigao, not being those or any of those specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board is unauthorized and illegal. The
suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and
without authority of law.
The writ of prohibition prayed for is granted, without pronouncement as to costs.
Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and
Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G. R. No. 126661. December 3, 1999]
JOSE S. ANDAYA and EDGARDO L. INCIONG, petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
Cebu City, Branch 20, and THE CITY OF CEBU, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from a decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch
20, commanding petitioner Jose S. Andaya as Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7, to
include P/Chief Inspector Andres Sarmiento in the list of five (5) recommendees to be submitted to the
mayor from which list the mayor shall select the City Director, Cebu City Police Command (chief of police).
On January 3, 1996, the position of City Director, Cebu City Police Command (chief of police) became
vacant after P/Supt. Antonio Enteria was relieved of command.
Sometime in January 1996, petitioner Andaya submitted to the City Mayor, Cebu City a list of five (5)
eligibles for the mayor to choose one to be appointed as the chief of police of Cebu City. The mayor did not
choose anyone from the list of five (5) recommendees because the name of P/Chief Inspector Andres
Sarmiento was not included therein.
However, petitioner Andaya refused to agree to Mayor Alvin B. Garcias request to include the name
of Major Andres Sarmiento in the list of police officers for appointment by the mayor to the position of City
Director (chief of police), Cebu City Police Command. Petitioner Andaya's refusal was based on his
contention that Major Andres Sarmiento was not qualified for the position of City Director (chief of police),
Cebu City Police Command, under NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 95-04 dated January 12, 1995,
particularly Item No. 8, paragraph D thereof, which provides that the minimum qualification standards for
Directors of Provincial/City Police Commands, include completion of the Officers Senior Executive Course
(OSEC) and the rank of Police Superintendent.
Due to the impasse, on March 22, 1996, the City of Cebu filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
20, Cebu City, a complaint for declaratory relief with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and
temporary restraining order against P/Chief Supt. Jose S. Andaya and Edgardo L. Inciong, Regional
Director, National Police Commission.[2]
On April 10, 1996, petitioners filed with the trial court their respective answer to the
complaint. Petitioners stated that the power to designate the chief of police of Cebu City (City Director,
Cebu City Police Command) is vested with the Regional Director, Regional Police Command No.
7. However, the mayor is authorized to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles submitted
by the Regional Director. In case of conflict between the Regional Director and the mayor, the issue shall
be elevated to the Regional Director, National Police Commission, who shall resolve the issue within five
(5) working days from receipt and whose decision on the choice of the chief of police shall be final and
executory. Thus, petitioners prayed for dismissal of the complaint for lack of legal basis and failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.[3]
On April 18, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioner Jose S.
Andaya enjoining him from replacing C/Insp. Andres Sarmiento as OIC Director or Chief of Police of the
Cebu City Police Command by designating another as OIC Chief of Police or appointing a regular
replacement for said officer, and, from submitting to the mayor a list of five (5) eligibles which did not include
the name of Major Andres Sarmiento.[4]

On July 12, 1996, the trial court rendered decision in favor of respondent City of Cebu, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as against defendants, declaring that P/CInsp. Andres Sarmiento is qualified under RA
6975 to be appointed as Chief Director or Chief of Police of the Cebu City Police Command and
whose name must be included in the list of five (5) eligibles recommended as regular
replacement to the position of the Chief of Police of said Cebu City Police Command.
The writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued in this case against defendants and their
agents, or, representatives or any other persons acting for and in their behalf enjoining and
preventing them from replacing P/CInsp. Andres Sarmiento as OIC Chief of Police of Cebu City
Police Command by designating anyone from the eligibles recommended in the two (2) lists
thereof submitted to Mayor Garcia or from any other list of said eligible recommendees for said
position is hereby made permanent.
Let a permanent writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued against defendant Jose S.
Andaya or his successor ordering the latter to include Major Andres Sarmiento in the list of five
(5) eligible persons recommended for the replacement to the position of Chief of Police of Cebu
City Police Command.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, July 12, 1996.
(s/t) FERDINAND J. MARCOS
Judge[5]
In due time, petitioners filed with the trial court their joint motion for reconsideration [6] on the ground
that the decision is contrary to Section 51 of Republic Act 6975 which only empowers the mayor to choose
one (1) from the five (5) eligibles recommended by the Regional Police Director to be named chief of police.
The mayor cannot superimpose his will on the recommending authority by insisting that his protg be
included in the list of five eligibles from which the chief of police is to be chosen.
On September 11, 1996, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration ruling that no new
matters had been raised therein.[7]
Hence, this petition[8] for review on certiorari on pure question of law.[9]
On June 11, 1997, we gave due course to the petition.[10]
At issue is whether or not the Mayor of Cebu City may require the Regional Director, Regional Police
Command No. 7, to include the mayors protg in the list of five (5) eligibles to be recommended by the
Regional Police Director to the mayor from which the mayor shall choose the City Director, City Police
Command (chief of police) City of Cebu.
We resolve the issue against the position of the city mayor.
Republic Act No. 6975, Section 51, gives authority to the mayor of Cebu City[11] to choose the chief of
police from a list of five (5) eligibles recommended by the Regional Director, Regional Police Command
No. 7.
The National Police Commission has issued Memorandum Circular No. 95-04, dated January 12,
1995, for the implementation of Republic Act No. 6975. It provides that among the qualifications for chief of

police of highly urbanized cities are (1) completion of the Officers Senior Executive Course (OSEC) and (2)
holding the rank of Police Superintendent.
The mayor of Cebu City submits that Memorandum Circular No. 95-04 of the National Police
Commission prescribing such additional qualifications is not valid as it contravenes the law.
We do not agree. Under Republic Act No. 6975, Section 51, the mayor of Cebu City shall be deputized
as representative of the Commission (National Police Commission) in his territorial jurisdiction and as such
the mayor shall have authority to choose the chief of police from a list of five (5) eligibles recommended by
the Police Regional Director. The City Police Station of Cebu City is under the direct command and control
of the PNP Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7, and is equivalent to a provincial
office.[12] Then, the Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7 appoints the officer selected by the
mayor as the City Director, City Police Command (chief of police) Cebu City. It is the prerogative of the
Regional Police Director to name the five (5) eligibles from a pool of eligible officers screened by the Senior
Officers Promotion and Selection Board, Headquarters, Philippine National Police, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, without interference from local executives. In case of disagreement between the Regional Police
Director and the Mayor, the question shall be elevated to the Regional Director, National Police
Commission, who shall resolve the issue within five (5) working days from receipt and whose decision on
the choice of the Chief of Police shall be final and executory. [13] As deputy of the Commission, the authority
of the mayor is very limited. In reality, he has no power of appointment; he has only the limited power of
selecting one from among the list of five eligibles to be named the chief of police. Actually, the power to
appoint the chief of police of Cebu City is vested in the Regional Director, Regional Police Command No.
7. Much less may the mayor require the Regional Director, Regional Police Command, to include the name
of any officer, no matter how qualified, in the list of five to be submitted to the mayor. The purpose is to
enhance police professionalism and to isolate the police service from political domination.
Consequently, we find that the trial court erred in granting preliminary injunction that effectively
restrained the Regional Director, Regional Police Command, Region 7, from performing his statutory
function. The writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 18, 1996, is contrary to law and thus
void. Similarly, the lower courts decision sustaining the City Mayors position suffers from the same legal
infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Cebu City, dated July 12, 1996, in Civil Case No. CEB-18545. In lieu thereof, the Court
renders judgment upholding the sole discretion of the Regional Director, Regional Police Command No. 7,
to submit to the mayor of Cebu City a list of five (5) eligibles from which the mayor shall choose the chief
of police. In case of the mayors refusal to make his choice within a given period due to disagreement as to
the eligible nominees, the issue shall be submitted to the Regional Director, National Police Commission,
whose decision shall be final.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), concurs but, like justice Puno on the ground of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Puno, J., concurs but on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
[1]
In Civil Case No. CEB-18545, dated July 12, 1996, Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos, presiding, Rollo, pp. 12-20.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 22-29.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 33-37, 38-44.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 45-53.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 12-20.

[6]
Rollo, pp. 55-56.
[7]
Rollo. p. 61.
[8]
Petition filed on September 27, 1996, Rollo, pp. 4-10.
[9]
Under Circular No. 2-90, dated March 9, 1990.
[10]
Rollo, p. 77.
[11]
Provided the National Police Commission has deputized him as representative of the Commission.
[12]
Napolcom Resolution No. 92-36, dated October 15, 1992, cited in Rollo, p. 36.
[13]
Napolcom Memorandum Circular No. 93-013, Section 6.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 193536
AGAPITO J. CARDINO, Petitioner,

vs.
DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
These are two special civil actions for certiorari1 questioning the resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 09-076 (DC). In G.R. No. 193237, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr.
(Jalosjos) seeks to annul the 10 May 2010 Resolution2 of the COMELEC First Division and the 11
August 2010 Resolution3 of the COMELEC En Banc, which both ordered the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material representation. In G.R. No. 193536, Agapito
J. Cardino (Cardino) challenges the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, which
applied the rule on succession under the Local Government Code in filling the vacancy in the Office
of the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte created by the cancellation of Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy.
The Facts
Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the
May 2010 elections. Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed on 6 December 2009 a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for
the Office of Mayor.
Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already
been convicted by final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino asserted
that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his conviction but stated that he had
already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’ probation in an
Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order
dated 5 February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation.

Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for
disqualification filed against him on the same grounds.4
The COMELEC En Banc narrated the circumstances of Jalosjos’ criminal record as follows:
As backgrounder, Jalosjos and three (3) others were accused of the crime of robbery on January 22,
1969 in Cebu City. On April 30, 1970, Judge Francisco Ro. Cupin of the then Circuit Criminal Court
of Cebu City found him and his co-accused guilty of robbery and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of prision correccional minimum to prision mayor maximum. Jalosjos appealed this decision
to the Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed on August 9, 1973. It was only after a lapse of
several years or more specifically on June 17, 1985 that Jalosjos filed a Petition for Probation before
the RTC Branch 18 of Cebu City which was granted by the court. But then, on motion filed by his
Probation Officer, Jalosjos’ probation was revoked by the RTC Cebu City on March 19, 1987 and the
corresponding warrant for his arrest was issued. Surprisingly, on December 19, 2003, Parole and
Probation Administrator Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a Certification attesting that respondent
Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation. This Certification was the
one used by respondent Jalosjos to secure the dismissal of the disqualification case filed against
him by Adasa in 2004, docketed as SPA No. 04-235.
This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the Commission on the decision of the Sandiganbayan
dated September 29, 2008 finding Gregorio F. Bacolod, former Administrator of the Parole and
Probation Administration, guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified
Certification on December 19, 2003 attesting to the fact that respondent Jalosjos had fully complied
with the terms and conditions of his probation. A portion of the decision of the Sandiganbayan is
quoted hereunder:
The Court finds that the above acts of the accused gave probationer Dominador Jalosjos, Jr.,
unwarranted benefits and advantage because the subject certification, which was issued by the
accused without adequate or official support, was subsequently utilized by the said probationer as
basis of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest that he filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, which prompted the said court to issue the Order dated February
5, 2004 in Crim. Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU, declaring that said probationer has complied with
the order of probation and setting aside its Order of January 16, 2004 recalling the warrant or [sic]
arrest; and that said Certification was also used by the said probationer and became the basis for
the Commission on Elections to deny in its Resolution of August 2, 2004 the petition or [sic] private
complainant James Adasa for the disqualification of the probationer from running for re-election as
Mayor of Dapitan City in the National and Local Elections of 2004.5
The COMELEC’s Rulings
On 10 May 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition and cancelled Jalosjos’
certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC First Division concluded that "Jalosjos has indeed
committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared, under oath,
that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not by reason of a final
judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served."6 The COMELEC First
Division found that Jalosjos’ certificate of compliance of probation was fraudulently issued; thus,
Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. The penalty imposed on Jalosjos was the indeterminate
sentence of one year, eight months and twenty days of prisión correccional as minimum, to four
years, two months and one day of prisión mayor as maximum. The COMELEC First Division ruled
that Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his disqualification as provided for in Section 40(a) of
Republic Act No. 7160."7

On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos’ motion for reconsideration. The
pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read:
With the proper revocation of Jalosjos’ earlier probation and a clear showing that he has not yet
served the terms of his sentence, there is simply no basis for Jalosjos to claim that his civil as well
as political rights have been violated. Having been convicted by final judgment,
Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an elective position or to hold public office. His proclamation as the
elected mayor in the May 10, 2010 election does not deprive the Commission of its authority to
resolve the present petition to its finality, and to oust him from the office he now wrongfully holds.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied for utter lack of
merit. Jalosjos is hereby OUSTED from office and ordered to CEASE and DESIST from occupying
and discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga. Let the
provisions of the Local Government Code on succession apply.
SO ORDERED.8
Jalosjos filed his petition on 25 August 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193237, while Cardino filed his
petition on 17 September 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193536.
On 22 February 2011, this Court issued a Resolution dismissing G.R. No. 193237.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The
assailed Resolution dated May 10, 2010 and Resolution dated August 11, 2010 of the Commission
on Elections in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC) are hereby AFFIRMED.9
Cardino filed a Manifestation on 17 March 2011 praying that this Court take judicial notice of its
resolution in G.R. No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 on 22 March 2011. On 29
March 2011, this Court resolved11 to consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237.Jalosjos
then filed a Manifestation on 1 June 2012 which stated that "he has resigned from the position of
Mayor of the City of Dapitan effective 30 April 2012, which resignation was accepted by the
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, Atty. Rolando E. Yebes."12 Jalosjos’ resignation was
made "in deference with the provision of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to his candidacy as
Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013."13
These cases are not rendered moot by Jalosjos’ resignation. In resolving Jalosjos’ Motion for
Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 and Cardino’s Petition in G.R. No. 193536, we address not only
Jalosjos’ eligibility to run for public office and the consequences of the cancellation of his certificate
of candidacy, but also COMELEC’s constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws relating to
the conduct of elections.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it (1) ruled that Jalosjos’ probation was revoked; (2)
ruled that Jalosjos was disqualified to run as candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte; and (3) cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy without making a finding that Jalosjos
committed a deliberate misrepresentation as to his qualifications, as Jalosjos relied in good faith
upon a previous COMELEC decision declaring him eligible for the same position from which he is

now being ousted. Finally, the Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010 were issued in
violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
In G.R. No. 193536, Cardino argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it added to the dispositive portion of its 11 August
2010 Resolution that the provisions of the Local Government Code on succession should apply.
This Court’s Ruling
The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final
judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he
was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos
was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of
Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate,
actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
The dissenting opinions affirm with modification the 10 May 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division and the 11 August 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc. The dissenting opinions
erroneously limit the remedy against Jalosjos to disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code and apply the rule on succession under the Local Government Code.
A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public office is a
false material representation which is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the same Code.
Sections 74 and 78 read:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy "that he is
eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the public office.14 If a
candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from
running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible
to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is a
ground for a petition under Section 78.

A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the
Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material
fact involving the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Thus, a person can file a petition under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under either
Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 40, Local Government Code:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Section 12, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for
any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he
has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the
expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he
again becomes disqualified.
Section 68, Omnibus Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c)
spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any

person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for
in the election laws.
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. — x x x
Prisión mayor and temporary disqualification. — The duration of the penalties of prisión mayor and
temporary disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the
penalty of disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the
principal penalty.
xxxx
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The penalties
of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following
effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held,
even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be
elected to such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the
rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2

and 3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification. — The penalties of
perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public office, profession or calling shall produce
the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling affected.
2. The disqualification for holding similar offices or employments either perpetually or during
the term of the sentence, according to the extent of such disqualification.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according
to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during
the period of his disqualification.

Art. 42. Prisión mayor — its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión mayor shall carry with it
that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the
same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon. (Emphasis supplied)
The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,15 the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article
30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of
"deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such
office." The duration of the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal
penalty. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special
disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the
period of his disqualification," which is perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and
perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person
suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false
material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
In Lacuna v. Abes,16 the Court, speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained the import of the
accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification:
On the first defense of respondent-appellee Abes, it must be remembered that appellee’s conviction
of a crime penalized with prisión mayor which carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage (Article 42, Revised
Penal Code); and Section 99 of the Revised Election Code disqualifies a person from voting if he
had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer one year or more of imprisonment.
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualifies the convict for public office
and for the right to vote, such disqualification to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27,
paragraph 3, & Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have expired on 13
October 1961.
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification for the exercise of the right of suffrage. This accessory penalty deprives the convict
of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from
temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the sentence. Article 32, Revised
Penal Code, provides:
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the
right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according
to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be
elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during
the period of disqualification.
The word "perpetually" and the phrase "during the term of the sentence" should be applied
distributively to their respective antecedents; thus, the word "perpetually" refers to the perpetual kind
of special disqualification, while the phrase "during the term of the sentence" refers to the temporary
special disqualification. The duration between the perpetual and the temporary (both special) are
necessarily different because the provision, instead of merging their durations into one period, states
that such duration is "according to the nature of said penalty" — which means according to whether
the penalty is the perpetual or the temporary special disqualification. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives
the convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually."
The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once the
judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty does not depend on
the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail sentence or not. The
last sentence of Article 32 states that "the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office
during the period of his perpetual special disqualification." Once the judgment of conviction becomes
final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of his
conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run
for any elective public office perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to
hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time his judgment of conviction became final.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to
run for public office, contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath. As
used in Section 74, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is,
having all the qualifications and none of the ineligibilities to run for public office. As this Court held in
Fermin v. Commission on Elections,17 the false material representation may refer to "qualifications or
eligibility." One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office.
If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating
under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74, then
he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. As
this Court explained in Fermin:
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on
the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is
false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is
noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks.
Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a
material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding
under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal
with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section
78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of
the winning candidate.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisión mayor, to which perpetual special
disqualification attaches by operation of law, is not a ground for a petition under Section 68 because
robbery is not one of the offenses enumerated in Section 68. Insofar as crimes are concerned,
Section 68 refers only to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code and not to crimes
under the Revised Penal Code. For ready reference, we quote again Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a)
officials performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution

prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and
261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify including the crime of
robbery as one of the offenses enumerated in this Section. All the offenses enumerated in Section
68 refer to offenses under the Omnibus Election Code. The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes
gravely errs when it holds that Jalosjos’ conviction for the crime of robbery under the Revised Penal
Code is a ground for "a petition for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC and not for
cancellation of COC under Section 78 thereof." This Court has already ruled that offenses punished
in laws other than in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a ground for a petition under Section 68.
In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia,19 the Court declared:
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC
jurisdiction.They are criminal and not administrative in nature. (Emphasis supplied)
A candidate for mayor during the 2010 local elections certifies under oath four statements: (1) a
statement that the candidate is a natural born or naturalized Filipino citizen; (2) a statement that the
candidate is not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country; (3) a statement that the
candidate is eligible for the office he seeks election; and (4) a statement of the candidate’s
allegiance to the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.20
We now ask: Did Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy
when he stated under oath that he was eligible to run for mayor? The COMELEC and the dissenting
opinions all found that Jalosjos was not eligible to run for public office. The COMELEC concluded
that Jalosjos made a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes, however, concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a
disqualification which is a ground for a petition under Section 68 and not under Section 78. The
dissenting opinion of Justice Brion concluded that the ineligibility of Jalosjos is a disqualification that
is not a ground under Section 78 without, however, saying under what specific provision of law a
petition against Jalosjos can be filed to cancel his certificate of candidacy.
What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a
petition under Section 78. However, since the false material representation arises from a crime
penalized by prisión mayor, a petition under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40
of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The petitioner has a choice whether to
anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of
the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which
remedy to adopt belongs to the petitioner.
The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of candidacy
on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can
never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.21 Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy
was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of
candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such
ground means he was never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and

the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran
unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections – Cardino –
who received the highest number of votes.
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer
is disqualified or declared ineligible22 should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy
of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a
violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate
of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such
void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such
non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a
first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or
before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are
stray votes.23 If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the
elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of
candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the
effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the
same position.
Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment
of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public
office. The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of
the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the
Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to implement the final judgment
under the law.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the
disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for
elective public office is addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC
is duty bound to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election."24 The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as
affirmed by final judgment of a competent court, is part of the enforcement and administration of "all
laws" relating to the conduct of elections.
To allow the COMELEC to wait for a person to file a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
one suffering from perpetual special disqualification will result in the anomaly that these cases so
grotesquely exemplify. Despite a prior perpetual special disqualification, Jalosjos was elected and
served twice as mayor. The COMELEC will be grossly remiss in its constitutional duty to "enforce
and administer all laws" relating to the conduct of elections if it does not motu proprio bar from
running for public office those suffering from perpetual special disqualification by virtue of a final
judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED, and the Petition in
G.R. No. 193536 is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 10 May 2010 and 11 August 2010 of the
COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Bane, respectively, in SPA No. 09-076 (DC), are
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Agapito J. Cardino ran unopposed in the May 2010
elections and thus received the highest number of votes for Mayor. The COMELEC En Bane is

DIRECTED to constitute a Special City Board of Canvassers to proclaim Agapito J. Cardino as the
duly elected Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretaries of the Department of Justice and the
Department of Interior and Local Government so they can cause the arrest of, and enforce the jail
sentence on, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. due to his conviction for the crime of robbery in a final
judgment issued by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 18) of Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CCC-
XIV-140-CEBU.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO




JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE C. MENDOZA


CERTIFICATION
of the Court.

Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
Under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2
Rollo (G.R. No. 193237), pp. 40-48; rollo (G.R. No. 193536), pp. 29-37. Signed by Presiding
Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, and Commissioners Armando C. Velasco and Gregorio
Y. Larrazabal.
3
Rollo (G.R. No. 193237), pp. 49-56; rollo (G.R. No. 193536), pp. 22-28. Signed by
Chairman Jose A.R. Melo, and Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Nicodemo T. Ferrer,
Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco, Elias R. Yusoph, and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal.
4
James A. Adasa v. Dominador Jalosjos, Jr., SPA No. 04-235. The Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division was promulgated on 2 August 2004, while the Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc was promulgated on 16 December 2006. Rollo (G.R. No. 193536), pp.
45-46.
5
Rollo (G.R. No. 193237), pp. 50-51.
6
Id. at 46; rollo (G.R. No. 193536), p. 35.
7
Id. at 47; id. at 36.
8
Id. at 55-56; id. at 27-28.
9
Rollo (G.R. No. 193237), p. 360.
10
Id. at 373-393.
11
Rollo (G.R. No. 193536), p. 178.
12
Id. at 215.
13
Id. at 218.
The Oxford Dictionary of English (Oxford University Press 2010) defines the word "eligible"
14
as "having a right to do or obtain something."
15
People v. Silvallana, 61 Phil. 636 (1935).
16
133 Phil. 770, 773-774 (1968).
17
G.R. Nos. 179695 and 182369, 18 December 2008, 574 SCRA 782.

18
Id. at 792-794.
19
442 Phil. 139, 177-178 (2002).
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will
20
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities. I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Bautista v. Commission on Elections, 359 Phil. 1, 16 (1998). See Miranda v. Abaya, 370
21
Phil. 642 (1999); Gador v. Commission on Elections, 184 Phil. 395 (1980).
Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 318 Phil. 467 (1995); Labo, Jr. v. Commission on
22
Elections, 257 Phil. 1 (1989).
Cayat v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 163776 and 165736, 24 April 2007, 522
23
SCRA 23.
24
CONSTITUTION, Art. IX-C, Sec. 2(1).
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. and Agapito Cardino were rivals in the mayoralty race in Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections.
Before election day, Cardino filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Deny
Due Course and/or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy against Jalosjos, alleging that the latter
made a material misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) when he declared that he
was eligible for the position of mayor when, in fact, he was disqualified under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code for having been previously convicted by a final judgment for a crime (robbery)
involving moral turpitude.
In his defense, Jalosjos admitted his previous, conviction but argued that he had been admitted to
probation, which allegedly restored him to all his political rights. Cardino rebutted Jalosjos' defense,
citing a court order revoking the grant of probation for Jalosjos' failure to comply with the terms and
conditions of the grant of probation.
On the very day of the election, the COMELEC resolved to grant Cardino's petition and ordered the
cancellation of Jalosjos' CoC. The COMELEC ruled that the rules on succession would then apply.
Both Cardino and Jalosjos came to the Court for redress.
On February 22, 2011, the Court denied Jalosjos’ petition, prompting Jalosjos to move for
reconsideration. During the pendency of his motion, Jalosjos manifested that he had already
tendered his resignation from his office and that the same was duly accepted by the governor of the
province of Zamboanga del Norte.

I dissent from the majority’s (i) position that the present case involves a cancellation of a certificate
of candidacy (CoC) rather than a case of disqualification and (ii) conclusion that Cardino, the
"second placer" in the 2010 elections for the mayoralty post of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte,
should be the rightful Mayor. I submit that while Cardino intended to cancel Jalosjos’ CoC, his
petition alleged acts constituting disqualification as its ground. Thus, the case should be resolved
under the rules of disqualification, not from the point of a cancellation of a CoC.
I point out in this Dissenting Opinion, as I did in the cases of Mayor Barbara Ruby C. Talaga v.
Commission on Elections, et al.1 and Efren Racel Aratea v. Commission on Elections, et al.,2 that
this case is best resolved through an analytical approach that starts from a consideration of the
nature of a CoC; the distinctions between eligibility or lack of it and disqualification; the effects of
cancellation and disqualification; and the applicable remedies.
The CoC and the Qualifications for its Filing.
As I discussed in Talaga and Aratea, a basic rule and one that cannot be repeated often enough is
that the CoC is the document that creates the status of a candidate. In Sinaca v. Mula,3 the Court
described the nature of a CoC as follows –
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the
candidate's political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a
public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is
eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and
his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated.
Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions left to Congress the task of providing the qualifications of local
elective officials. Congress undertook this task by enacting Batas Pambasa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 337
(Local Government Code or LGC), B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code or OEC) and, later,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC 1991).4
Under Section 79 of the OEC, a political aspirant legally becomes a "candidate" only upon the due
filing of his sworn CoC.5 In fact, Section 73 of the OEC makes the filing of the CoC a condition sine
qua non for a person to "be eligible for any elective public office"6 – i.e., to be validly voted for in the
elections. Section 76 of the OEC makes it a "ministerial duty" for a COMELEC official "to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy"7 filed.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 provides what a CoC must contain or state:8
Section 2. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall be under oath and
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office and constituency stated
therein; that he is eligible for said office, his age, sex, civil status, place and date of birth, his
citizenship, whether natural-born or naturalized; the registered political party to which he belongs; if
married, the full name of the spouse; his legal residence, giving the exact address, the precinct
number, barangay, city or municipality and province where he is registered voter; his post office
address for election purposes; his profession or occupation or employment; that he is not a
permanent resident or an immigrant to a foreign country; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that
he will obey the laws, legal orders, decrees, resolution, rules and regulations promulgated and
issued by the duly-constituted authorities; that he assumes the foregoing obligations voluntarily
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate are true
and correct to the best of his own knowledge. [italics supplied]

From the point of view of the common citizen who wants to run for a local elective office, the above
recital contains all the requirements that he must satisfy; it contains the basic and essential
requirements applicable to all citizens to qualify for candidacy for a local elective office. These are
their formal terms of entry to local politics. A citizen must not only possess all these requirements; he
must positively represent in his CoC application that he possesses them. Any falsity on these
requirements constitutes a material misrepresentation that can lead to the cancellation of the CoC.
On this point, Section 78 of the OEC provides:
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. [italics, emphases and underscores ours]
A necessarily related provision is Section 39 of LGC 1991 which states:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. – (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
xxxx
(c) Candidates for the position of Mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities, component
cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election day. [italics ours]
Notably, Section 74 of the OEC does not require any negative qualification except only as expressly
required therein. A specific negative requirement refers to the representation that the would-be
candidate is not a permanent resident nor an immigrant in another country. This requirement,
however, is in fact simply part of the positive requirement of residency in the locality for which the
CoC is filed and, in this sense, is not strictly a negative requirement. Neither does Section 74 require
any statement that the would-be candidate does not possess any ground for disqualification
specifically enumerated by law, as disqualification is a matter that the OEC and LGC 1991
separately deal with, as discussed below.
With the accomplishment of the CoC and its filing, a political aspirant officially acquires the status of
a candidate and, at the very least, the prospect of holding public office; he, too, formally opens
himself up to the complex political environment and processes. The Court cannot be more emphatic
in holding "that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core of the
electoral process."9
Pertinent laws10 provide the specific periods when a CoC may be filed; when a petition for its
cancellation may be brought; and the effect of its filing. These measures, among others, are in line
with the State policy or objective of ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public
service,"11 bearing in mind that the limitations on the privilege to seek public office are within the
plenary power of Congress to provide.12
The Concept of Disqualification vis-a-vis

Remedy of Cancellation; and Effects of
Disqualification.

To disqualify, in its simplest sense, is (1) to deprive a person of a power, right or privilege; or (2) to
make him or her ineligible for further competition because of violation of the rules.13 It is in these
senses that the term is understood in our election laws.
Thus, anyone who may qualify or may have qualified under the general rules of eligibility applicable
to all citizens (Section 74 of the OEC) may be deprived of the right to be a candidate or may lose the
right to be a candidate (if he has filed his CoC) because of a trait or characteristic that applies to him
or an act that can be imputed to him as an individual, separately from the general qualifications that
must exist for a citizen to run for a local public office.
In a disqualification situation, the grounds are the individual traits or conditions of, or the individual
acts of disqualification committed by, a candidate as provided under Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC
and Section 40 of LGC 1991, and which generally have nothing to do with the eligibility requirements
for the filing of a CoC.14
Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC (together with Section 40 of LGC 1991, outlined below) cover the
following as traits, characteristics or acts of disqualification: (i) corrupting voters or election officials;
(ii) committing acts of terrorism to enhance candidacy; (iii) overspending; (iv) soliciting, receiving or
making prohibited contributions; (v) campaigning outside the campaign period; (vi) removal,
destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda; (vii) committing prohibited forms of election
propaganda; (viii) violating rules and regulations on election propaganda through mass media; (ix)
coercion of subordinates; (x) threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms
of coercion; (xi) unlawful electioneering; (xii) release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds;
(xiii) solicitation of votes or undertaking any propaganda on the day of the election; (xiv) declaration
as an insane; and (xv) committing subversion, insurrection, rebellion or any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude.
Section 40 of LGC 1991, on the other hand, essentially repeats those already in the OEC under the
following disqualifications:
a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
serving sentence;
b. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
c. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
d. Those with dual citizenship;
e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
g. The insane or feeble-minded.
Together, these provisions embody the disqualifications that, by statute, can be imputed against a
candidate or a local elected official to deny him of the chance to run for office or of the chance to
serve if he has been elected.

A unique feature of "disqualification" is that under Section 68 of the OEC, it refers only to a
"candidate," not to one who is not yet a candidate. Thus, the grounds for disqualification do not apply
to a would-be candidate who is still at the point of filing his CoC. This is the reason why no
representation is required in the CoC that the would-be candidate does not possess any ground for
disqualification. The time to hold a person accountable for the grounds for disqualification is after
attaining the status of a candidate, with the filing of the CoC.
To sum up and reiterate the essential differences between the eligibility requirements and
disqualifications, the former are the requirements that apply to, and must be complied by, all citizens
who wish to run for local elective office; these must be positively asserted in the CoC.
The latter refer to individual traits, conditions or acts applicable to specific individuals that serve as
grounds against one who has qualified as a candidate to lose this status or privilege; essentially,
they have nothing to do with a candidate’s CoC.
When the law allows the cancellation of a candidate’s CoC, the law considers the cancellation from
the point of view of those positive requirements that every citizen who wishes to run for office must
commonly satisfy. Since the elements of "eligibility" are common, the vice of ineligibility attaches to
and affects both the candidate and his CoC. In contrast, when the law allows the disqualification of a
candidate, the law looks only at the disqualifying trait or condition specific to the individual; if the
"eligibility" requirements have been satisfied, the disqualification applies only to the person of the
candidate, leaving the CoC valid. A previous conviction of subversion is the best example as it
applies not to the citizenry at large, but only to the convicted individuals; a convict may have a valid
CoC upon satisfying the eligibility requirements under Section 74 of the OEC, but shall nevertheless
be disqualified.
Distinctions among (i) denying due course to or

cancellation of a CoC, (ii) disqualification,
and (iii) quo warranto
The nature of the eligibility requirements for a local elective office and the disqualifications that may
apply to candidates necessarily create distinctions on the remedies available, on the effects of lack
of eligibility and on the application of disqualification. The remedies available are essentially: the
cancellation of a CoC, disqualification from candidacy or from holding office, and quo warranto,
which are distinct remedies with varying applicability and effects. For ease of presentation and
understanding, their availability, grounds and effects are topically discussed below.
As to the grounds:
In the denial of due course to or cancellation of a CoC, the ground is essentially lack of eligibility
under the pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public
office;15 the governing provisions are Sections 78 and 69 of the OEC.16
In a disqualification case, as mentioned above, the grounds are traits, conditions, characteristics or
acts of disqualification,17 individually applicable to a candidate, as provided under Sections 68 and
12 of the OEC; Section 40 of LGC 1991; and Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. As previously
discussed, the grounds for disqualification are different from, and have nothing to do with, a
candidate’s CoC although they may result in disqualification from candidacy whose immediate effect
upon finality before the elections is the same as a cancellation. If they are cited in a petition filed
before the elections, they remain as disqualification grounds and carry effects that are distinctly
peculiar to disqualification.

In a quo warranto petition, the grounds to oust an elected official from his office are ineligibility and
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This is provided under Section 253 of the OEC and
governed by the Rules of Court as to procedures. While quo warranto and cancellation share the
same ineligibility grounds, they differ as to the time these grounds are cited. A cancellation case is
brought before the elections, while a quo warranto is filed after and may still be filed even if a CoC
cancellation case was not filed before elections.
The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the qualifications for
elective office are misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be
initiated before the elections, whereas a petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought
on the basis of two grounds - (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and
must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the election results. Under section 253, a
candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any
of the qualifications for elective office.18
Note that the question of what would constitute acts of disqualification – under Sections 68 and 12 of
the OEC and Section 40 of LGC 1991 – is best resolved by directly referring to the provisions
involved. The approach is not as straight forward in a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC
and also to a quo warranto petition, which similarly covers the ineligibility of a candidate/elected
official. In Salcedo II v. COMELEC,19 we ruled that –
In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that
the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by
this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the right to run for the elective
post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be
considered as a "material representation," the Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions
applying Section 78 of the Code.
xxxx
Therefore, it may be concluded that the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of

the Code refer to qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the
consequences imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his
certificate of candidacy are grave — to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from
serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of
the law to deprive a person of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public
office upon just any innocuous mistake. [emphases ours, citation omitted]
Thus, in addition to the failure to satisfy or comply with the eligibility requirements, a material
misrepresentation must be present in a cancellation of CoC situation. The law apparently does not
allow material divergence from the listed requirements to qualify for candidacy and enforces its edict
by requiring positive representation of compliance under oath. Significantly, where disqualification is
involved, the mere existence of a ground appears sufficient and a material representation assumes
no relevance.
As to the period for filing:
The period to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC depends on the provision of law
invoked. If the petition is filed under Section 78 of the OEC, the petition must be filed within twenty-
five (25) days from the filing of the CoC.20 However, if the petition is brought under Section 69 of the
same law, the petition must be filed within five (5) days from the last day of filing the CoC.21

On the other hand, the period to file a disqualification case is at any time before the proclamation of
a winning candidate, as provided in COMELEC Resolution No. 8696,22 while a quo warranto petition
must be filed within ten (10) days from proclamation.23
As to the effects of a successful suit:
A candidate whose CoC was denied due course or cancelled is not considered a candidate at all.
Note that the law fixes the period within which a CoC may be filed.24 After this period, generally no
other person may join the election contest. A notable exception to this general rule is the rule on
substitution. The application of the exception, however, presupposes a valid CoC. Unavoidably, a
"candidate" whose CoC has been cancelled or denied due course cannot be substituted for lack of a
CoC, to all intents and purposes.25 Similarly, a successful quo warranto suit results in the ouster of
an already elected official from office; substitution, for obvious reasons, can no longer apply.
On the other hand, a candidate who was simply disqualified is merely prohibited from continuing as
a candidate or from assuming or continuing to assume the functions of the office; substitution can
thus take place under the terms of Section 77 of the OEC.26
As to the effects of a successful suit on the right of the second placer in the elections:
In any of these three remedies, the doctrine of rejection of the second placer applies for the simple
reason that –
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He
lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
1âwphi1
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the
results under such circumstances.27
With the disqualification of the winning candidate and the application of the doctrine of rejection of
the second placer, the rules on succession under the law accordingly apply, as provided under
Section 44 of LGC 1991.
As an exceptional situation, however, the candidate with the second highest number of votes
(second placer) may be validly proclaimed as the winner in the elections should the winning
candidate be disqualified by final judgment before the elections, as clearly provided in Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646.28 The same effect obtains when the electorate is fully aware, in fact and in law and
within the realm of notoriety, of the disqualification, yet they still voted for the disqualified candidate.
In this situation, the electorate that cast the plurality of votes in favor of the notoriously disqualified
candidate is simply deemed to have waived their right to vote.29
In a CoC cancellation proceeding, the law is silent on the legal effect of a judgment cancelling the
CoC and does not also provide any temporal distinction. Given, however, the formal initiatory role a
CoC plays and the standing it gives to a political aspirant, the cancellation of the CoC based on a
finding of its invalidity effectively results in a vote for an inexistent "candidate" or for one who is
deemed not to be in the ballot. Although legally a misnomer, the "second placer" should be
proclaimed the winner as the candidate with the highest number of votes for the contested position.
This same consequence should result if the cancellation case becomes final after elections, as the
cancellation signifies non-candidacy from the very start, i.e., from before the elections.
Application of Above Rulings and Principles to the Case.

While it is apparent from the undisputed facts that Cardino did indeed file a petition for denial and/or
the cancellation of Jalosjos’ CoC, it is obvious as well, based on the above discussions, that the
ground he cited was not appropriate for the cancellation of Jalosjos’ CoC but for his disqualification.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is expressly a ground for disqualification under
Section 12 of the OEC. As a ground, it applies only to Jalosjos; it is not a standard of eligibility that
applies to all citizens who may be minded to run for a local political position; its non-possession is
not a negative qualification that must be asserted in the CoC. Hence, there can be no doubt that
what Cardino filed was effectively a petition for disqualification. This conclusion, of course, follows
the rule that the nature of a petition is determined not by its title or by its prayers, but by the acts
alleged as basis for the petition.
Unfortunately for Cardino, the position of a second placer is not given preference, both in law and in
jurisprudence with respect to the consequences of election disputes (except with well-defined
exceptional circumstances discussed above), after election has taken place.30
This approach and its consequential results are premised on the general principle that the electorate
is supreme; it registers its choice during the election and, after voting, effectively rejects the
candidate who comes in as the second placer. Under the rule that a disqualified candidate can still
stand as a candidate unless his disqualification has been ruled upon with finality before the
elections,31 Jalosjos validly stood as a candidate in the elections of May 2010 and won, although he
was subsequently disqualified. With his disqualification while already sitting as Mayor, the winning
vice-mayor, not . Cardino as a mere defeated second placer, should rightfully be seated as mayor
under Section 44 of LGC 1991 on the law on succession.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 G.R. Nos. 196804 and 197015.
2 G.R. No. 195229.
3 373 Phil. 896, 908 (1999).
4Prior to these laws, the applicable laws were the Revised Administrative Code of 1917,
R.A. No. 2264 (An Act Amending the Laws Governing Local Governments by Increasing
Their Autonomy and Reorganizing Provincial Governments); and B.P. Blg. 52 (An Act
Governing the Election of Local Government Officials).
5See, however, Section 15 of R.A. No. 8436, as amended. Penera v. Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 574, 581-586, citing Lanot v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 114.
6 Section 73 of the OEC reads:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the
same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he
files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of
them.
However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the
person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the
office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other
office or offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. [italics supplied]
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, however, adds that "any person who files his certificate of
candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts
or omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon that start of the aforesaid
campaign period." (italics supplied)
7 See Cipriano v. Commission on Elections, 479 Phil. 677, 689 (2004).
8 The statutory basis is Section 74 of the OEC which provides:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that
the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is
eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the
political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office
address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the
obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose
of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his
knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved proceeding, a
certificate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by which he has been baptized, or
if has not been baptized in any church or religion, the name registered in the office of the
local civil registrar or any other name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the
case of a Muslim, his Hadji name after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage:
Provided, That when there are two or more candidates for an office with the same name and
surname, each candidate, upon being made aware of such fact, shall state his paternal and
maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue to use the name and surname
stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was elected. He may also include one
nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly known in the locality.

The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport
size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of government not
exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
9Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642, 658 (1999). See also Bautista v. Commission on
Elections, 359 Phil. 1 (1998).
10 Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 and Section 78 of OEC.
11 1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 26.
12See Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA
96, 100-103.
13 Merriam-Webster’s 11th Collegiate Dictionary, p. 655.
14If at all, only two grounds for disqualification under the Local Government Code may as
well be considered for the cancellation of a CoC, viz.: those with dual citizenship and
permanent residence in a foreign country, or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after January 1, 1992. It may be argued that
these two disqualifying grounds likewise go into the eligibility requirement of a candidate, as
stated under oath by a candidate in his CoC.
15Fermin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 179695 and 182369, December 18, 2008,
574 SCRA 782, 792-794.
16 See Section 7 of R.A. No. 6646.
17 Sections 68 and 12 of the OEC cover these acts: (i) corrupting voters or election officials;
(ii) committing acts of terrorism to enhance candidacy; (iii) over spending; (iv) soliciting,
receiving or making prohibited contributions; (v) campaigning outside the campaign period;
(vi) removal, destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda; (vii) committing
prohibited forms of election propaganda; (viii) violating rules and regulations on election
propaganda through mass media; (ix) coercion of subordinates; (x) threats, intimidation,
terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion; (xi) unlawful electioneering;
(xii) release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds; (xiii) solicitation of votes or
undertaking any propaganda on the day of the election; (xiv) declaration as an insane; and
(xv) committing subversion, insurrection, rebellion or any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral
turpitude.
18Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377, 387 (1999), citing Aznar v. Commission on
Elections, 185 SCRA 703 (1990).
19 Supra, at 386-389.
20Loong v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 93986, December 22, 1992, 216 SCRA 760,
765-766.
21 Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 6646.

22 Section 4(B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 reads:
SEC. 4. Procedure in filing petitions. - For purposes of the preceding sections, the following
procedure shall be observed:
xxxx
B. PETITION TO DISOUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68 OF THE

OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISOUALIFY FOR LACK OF
OUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SOME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
1. A verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Section 68 of the OEC and the
verified petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some
grounds for disqualification may be filed on any day after the last day for filing of certificates
of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
23 Section 253 of the OEC.
24 Section 15 of R.A. No. 9369.
25 Miranda v. Abaya, supra note 9, at 658-660.
26Section 77 of the OEC expressly allows substitution of a candidate who is "disqualified for
any cause."
27Aquino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995, 248 SCRA
400, 424.
Cayat v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 163776 and 165736, April 24, 2007, 522
28
SCRA 23, 43-47; Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.
29 Grego v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 481, 501.
30 See: discussions at pp. 14-15.
31 Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646.
DISSENTING OPINION
REYES, J.:
With all due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion.
Subject of this case are two (2) consolidated Petitions for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. In G.R. No. 193237, petitioner Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. (Jalosjos) seeks to annul and set
aside the Resolutions dated May 10, 20101 and August 11, 20102 issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), which respectively ordered for the cancellation of his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) and denied his Motion for Reconsideration.

In G.R. No. 193536, petitioner Agapito J. Cardino"(Cardino) likewise assails the Resolution dated
August 11, 2010, particularly the dispositive portion thereof which contained the directive to apply
the provision of the Local Government Code (LGC) on succession in filling the vacated office of the
mayor.
Jalosjos attributes grave abuse of discretion on the COMELEC en banc in (1) ruling that the grant of
his probation was revoked, hence, he is disqualified to run as Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga
Del Norte, (2) cancelling his COC without a finding that he committed a deliberate misrepresentation
as to his qualifications, considering that he merely relied in good faith upon a previous decision of
the COMELEC wherein he was declared eligible to run for public office, and (3) issuing the
Resolutions dated May 10, 2010 and August 11, 2010 in violation of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.
On February 22, 2011, this Court issued a Resolution3 dismissing G.R. No. 193237, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
in (sic) Elections in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC) are hereby AFFIRMED.4
This Court ruled that Jalosjos could not have qualified to run for any public office as the grant of his
probation was revoked by the RTC, as early as March 19, 1987 and that he could not rely on the
Certification dated December 19, 2003 issued by former Parole and Probation Administrator
Gregorio F. Bacolod to assert his eligibility. We ratiocinated:
It must be remembered that by the time Bacolod submitted his Termination Report on January 23,
2004, there was no longer a probation to speak of, the same having been revoked more than 16
years earlier. Under the Probation Law of 1976, the order of revocation is not appealable. There is
no showing that the RTC ever issued a subsequent order suspending the execution of petitioner’s
sentence and granting him probation again. In fact, the RTC issued an alias warrant of arrest on
January 17, 2004 pursuant to the March 19, 1987 Order of revocation.
Thus, the same order revoking the grant of probation was valid and subsisting at the time that
petitioner supposedly completed his probation. Petitioner could not have validly complied with the
conditions of his probation and there would have been no basis for any probation officer to accept
petitioner’s compliance with a non-existent probation order.
This, plus the cloud of doubt created by Bacolod’s conviction for falsification of the certification relied
upon by petitioner, the Court cannot now rely on the presumption of regularity in the issuance of said
certification in order for us to conclude that petitioner has in fact completed his probation.
Considering that petitioner likewise has not served the sentence of his conviction for the crime of
robbery, he is disqualified to run for and hold his current position as Mayor of Dapitan City.5 (Citation
omitted)
Undeterred, Jalosjos filed a Motion for Reconsideration6 on March 22, 2011, raising the same issues
stated in his petition. Subsequently, he filed a Manifestation dated May 30, 2012, informing this
Court that he had already tendered his resignation from his position as Mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte and that the same was accepted by the Governor of the province, Atty.
Rolando E. Yebes.

I will deliberate on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Jalosjos in G.R. No. 193237 despite his
resignation from office, in conjunction with the merits of G.R. No. 193536, with which it shares
identical factual background.
The allegations in the petition filed

by Cardino in SPA No. 09-076 (DC)
bespeak of its characterization as
one for disqualification.
It is well to remember that G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193536 stemmed from the Petition to Deny Due
Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Respondent filed by Cardino against Jalosjos,
docketed as SPA No. 09-076 (DC). In the said petition, Cardino alleged:
3. Respondent Jalosjos is also of legal age, a resident of Dapitan City, a registered voter of Precinct
No. 0187B, likewise filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position with the Office of the
Comelec, Dapitan City, as that for which petitioner duly filed a certificate of candidacy, for the May
10, 2010 national and local elections on December 1, 2009, a certified true copy of said COC is
hereto attached as Annex B;
4. Respondent’s Jalosjos certificate of candidacy under oath contains material misrepresentation,

when he declared under oath, that respondent Jalosjos is eligible for the office he seeks to be
elected, par. 16, COC for Mayor, considering that he is not eligible for the position for which he filed
a certificate of candidacy because respondent was convicted by final judgment by the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CCC-XIV-140-Cebu for Robbery, an offense involving moral
turpitude and he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of "one (1) year, eight (8) Months and Twenty
(20) days of prision correctional, as minimum, to Four (4) years, Two 2 months and One (1) day of
prision mayor as maximum," a certified true (sic) of which decision is hereto attached as Annex C.
5. Respondent Jalosjos failed to serve even a single day of his sentence. The position requires that
a candidate be eligible and/or qualified to aspire for the position as required under Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code.7
On the basis of the foregoing allegations, Cardino prayed (1) that Jalosjos be declared ineligible for
the position for which he filed a COC or that his COC be cancelled or denied due course, (2) that the
Board of Election Inspectors of Dapitan City be directed to exclude all the votes cast in Jalosjos’
name, (3) that the City Board of Canvassers be ordered to suspend or hold in abeyance Jalosjos’
proclamation as the winning candidate, and (4) that Jalosjos be held liable for damages.8
Subsequently, the COMELEC First Division issued its Resolution dated May 10, 2010, granting
Cardino’s petition and cancelling Jalosjos’ COC. The COMELEC First Division ratiocinated that
Jalosjos "is not eligible by reason of his disqualification as provided for in Section 40(a) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7160."9
Jalosjos promptly filed his Motion for Reconsideration but the COMELEC en banc denied the same
in its Resolution dated August 11, 2010. Introductory to the ratio decidendi of its ruling, the
COMELEC en banc stated:
It is long settled that for a material representation to serve as ground for the cancellation of a
candidate’s certificate of candidacy, it must refer to his qualifications for elective office. Sections 39
and 40 of the Local Government Code or Republic Act No. 7160 prescribes the qualifications and
disqualifications for elective municipal officials, x x x.10

Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc correlated Sections 39 and 40 of the LGC and proceeded to
conclude that since Jalosjos was convicted by final judgment for the crime of robbery, he is
disqualified to run for any elective position or to hold office.
I fully agree with the COMELEC’s ruling that Jalosjos cannot run for any public office by reason of
possession of a ground for disqualification. However, the COMELEC laid the predicate of said
conclusion on a muddled discussion of the nature of the petition filed by Cardino and the effects of a
judgment on the same on the status of candidacy.
Verily, a candidate may be prevented from participating in the electoral race either because he is
ineligible or he suffers from any of the grounds for disqualification. Ineligibility refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in Sections 311 and 612 of Article VI, and Sections 213 and 314 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution for senatorial, congressional, presidential and vice-presidential candidates, or
under Section 3915 of the LGC for local elective candidates. On the other hand, disqualification
pertains to the commission of acts which the law perceives as unbecoming of a local servant, or to a
circumstance, status or condition rendering said candidate unfit for public service. To question the
eligibility of a candidate before the elections, the remedy is to file a petition to deny due course or
cancel the COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). If, on the other hand, any
ground for disqualification exists, resort can be made to the filing of a petition for disqualification
against the candidate thought to be unqualified for public service under Section 68 of the same
Code.
Pertinently, Section 78 of OEC states:
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
To be clear, it is not the mere ineligibility or lack of qualification which warrants the filing of a petition
to deny due course or cancel the COC but the material representation of his qualifications. Material
misrepresentation as a ground to deny due course or cancel a COC refers to the falsity of a
statement required to be entered therein, as enumerated in
Section 74 of the OEC,16 which reads:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
the best of his knowledge.
Succinctly, the material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the OEC refers to

qualifications for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences

imposed upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his COC are grave — to
prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of
the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person of such a basic
and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any innocuous mistake.17
Aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In
other words, it must be with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualification for public
office.18
On the other hand, a petition for disqualification may be filed if the candidate committed any of the
acts considered as an election offense stated in Section 68 of the OEC which reads:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having: (a)
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c)
spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited,
received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated
any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any
person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to
run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for
in the election laws.
The same petition may be filed on the ground of possession of a status or condition which makes the
candidate incapable of assuming the stern demands of public service or which places him in serious
contradiction with his oath of office, as enumerated in Section 12 of the OEC and Section 40 of the
LGC:
Section 12 of the OEC
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for
any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless
he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
again becomes disqualified.
Section 40 of the LGC
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
serving sentence;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by Cardino in SPA No. 09-076 (DC) is a confusion of the remedies of petition to
deny due course or cancel a COC and petition for disqualification. It must be remembered that while
both remedies aim to prevent a candidate from participating in the elections, they are separate and
distinct from one another. They are embraced by distinct provisions of law, which provide for their
respective prescriptive periods and particular sets of grounds. Further, each remedy entails
diverging effects on the status of candidacy of the concerned candidate thus subsuming one remedy
within the coverage of the other is a dangerous feat.
In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,19 we had the occasion to ponder on the substantial

differences between the two remedies, thus:
the wining candidate.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused
with a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in
different eventualities. Private respondent’s insistence, therefore, that the petition it filed before the
COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in the nature of a disqualification case under Section 68, as it is in
fact captioned a "Petition for Disqualification," does not persuade the Court.
xxxx
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68
of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel
a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is
false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is
merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC. Thus, in

Miranda v. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section
68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until
disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78
cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.20 (Citations omitted)
It is beyond dispute that Jalosjos cannot run for public office because of a prior conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude. While he was granted probation, his failure to comply with the terms and
conditions of this privilege resulted to the revocation of the same on March 19, 1987. It bears
reiterating that probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and
clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which may be granted to a seemingly deserving
defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense for
which he was convicted.21 As a mere discretionary grant, he must pay full obedience to the terms
and conditions appertaining thereto or run the risk of the State revoking this privilege. In Soriano v.
Court of Appeals,22 this Court underscored the import of the terms and conditions of probation, to wit:
These conditions are not whims of the trial court but are requirements laid down by statute. They are
among the conditions that the trial court is empowered to impose and the petitioner, as probationer,
is required to follow. Only by satisfying these conditions may the purposes of probation be fulfilled.
These include promoting the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with
individualized treatment, and providing an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender
which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence. Failure to comply will result in
the revocation of the order granting probation, pursuant to the Probation Law:
Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. — A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at
which time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his
failure to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another
offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation.
Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion of the
trial court. Its grant is subject to certain terms and conditions that may be imposed by the trial court.
Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its
revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.23 (Citations omitted)
On the ground of Jalosjos’ failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his probation, the RTC
revoked said grant and ordered for the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest against him. Stripped of
the privilege, he becomes an ordinary convict who is imposed with restraints in the exercise of his
civil and political rights. Specifically, under Section 40(a) of the LGC, he is disqualified to run for any
local elective office. His disqualification cannot be defeated by bare allegation that he was earlier
granted probation as this does not perfunctorily obliterate the fact of conviction and the
corresponding accessory penalties.
Further, in Baclayon v. Hon. Mutia,24 we emphasized that an order placing defendant on "probation"
is not a "sentence" but is rather a suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment
but is rather an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of
discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if
the conditions are violated.25 With the revocation of the grant of Jalosjos’ probation, the temporary
suspension of his sentence is lifted and all the ensuing disqualifications regain full effect.
Remarkably, Cardino’s challenge to Jalosjos’ candidacy was not based squarely on the fact that
there is a final judgment of conviction for robbery against him but on the ground that he made a
material misrepresentation in his COC by declaring that he is eligible to run for public office when

there is an existing circumstance which renders his candidacy unacceptable. Based on the
designation of his petition in SPA No. 09-076 (DC), Cardino intends to file a petition to cancel the
COC of Jalosjos, an action which is governed by Section 74, in relation with Section 78 of the OEC.
The combined application of these sections requires that the facts stated in the COC by the would-
be candidate be true, as any false representation of a material fact is a ground for the COC’s
cancellation or the withholding of due course.26 Essentially, the details required to be stated in the
COC are the personal circumstances of the candidate, i.e., name/stage name, age, civil status,
citizenship and residency, which serve as basis of his eligibility to become a candidate taking into
consideration the standards set under the law. The manifest intent of the law in imposing these
qualifications is to confine the right to participate in the elections to local residents who have reached
the age when they can seriously reckon the gravity of the responsibility they wish to take on and
who, at the same time, are heavily acquainted with the actual state and urgent demands of the
community.
A painstaking examination of the petition filed by Cardino with the COMELEC would reveal that while
it is designated as a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC, the ground used to support the
same actually partake of a circumstance which is more fittingly used in a petition for disqualification.
Section 40(a) of the LGC clearly enumerates a final judgment of conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude as a ground for disqualification. That Cardino employed the term "material
misrepresentation" in his disputations cannot give his petition a semblance of what is properly a
petition to cancel a COC. It bears reiterating that a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC
and a petition for disqualification are two separate and distinct actions which may be filed based on
grounds pertaining to it. Thus, a petition for cancellation of COC cannot be predicated on a ground
which is proper only in a petition for disqualification. The legislature would not have found it wise to
provide for two different remedies to challenge the candidacy of an aspiring local servant and even
provide for an enumeration of the grounds on which they may be based if they were intended to
address the same predicament. The fact that the mentioned remedies were covered by separate
provisions of law which relate to distinct set of grounds is a manifestation of the intention to treat
them severally.
Considering that the core of Cardino’s petition in SPA No. 09-076 (DC) is the existence of a final
judgment of conviction against Jalosjos, this material allegation is controlling of the characterization
of the nature of the petition regardless of the caption used to introduce the same. Cardino’s petition
must therefore be treated and evaluated as a petition for disqualification and not for cancellation of
COC. Well-settled rule is that the caption is not determinative of the nature of the petition. What
characterizes the nature of the action or petition are the material allegations therein contained,
irrespective of whether the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs prayed for therein.27
In order to conform with existing laws and established jurisprudence, the Resolution dated February
22, 2011 of this Court in G.R. No. 193237 must accordingly be modified to reflect the foregoing
clarification on the nature of Cardino’s petition in SPA No. 09-076 (DC) and the ensuing
consequences of the judgment on the same.
Turning to G.R. No. 193536, it is Cardino’s contention that with the cancellation of Jalosjos’ COC, he
should succeed to the office of the mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte as he was the only
remaining qualified candidate for said position. He posits that the cancellation of Jalosjos’ COC
retroacted to the date of its filing and rendered the latter a non-candidate as if he never filed one at
all. Consequently, all the votes cast in his favor are considered stray and his proclamation as
winning candidate did not produce any legal effect.
Further, Cardino imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for stating in the
dispositive portion of its Resolution dated August 11, 2010 that the provisions on succession in the

LGC will apply in filling the post vacated by Jalosjos. To begin with, he argues that Section 44 of the
LGC applies only when a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the mayor. A permanent
vacancy contemplates a situation whereby the disqualified mayor was duly elected to the position
and lawfully assumed the office before he vacated the same for any legal cause. It does not
embrace cancellation of COC since this eventuality has the effect of rendering the individual a non-
candidate, who cannot be voted for and much less, be proclaimed winner in the elections.28
Cardino’s disputations fail to persuade.

Cardino as a mere second placer
cannot be proclaimed mayor of
Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte.
Truly, a judgment on a petition to cancel a COC impinges on the very eligibility of an individual to
qualify as a candidate and that its ultimate effect is to render the person a non-candidate as if he
never filed a COC at all. The votes in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled are
considered stray even if he happens to be the one who gathered the majority of the votes. In such
case, the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes may be proclaimed the winner as
he is technically considered the one who received the highest number of votes. Further, the
judgment on a petition to cancel a COC does not distinguish whether the same attained finality
before or after the elections since the consequences retroact to the date of filing of the COC.
Regardless of the point in time when the cancellation of the COC was adjudged, the effect is
nevertheless the same: the person is stripped of his status as an official candidate.
Cardino’s disputations could have been tenable if the petition he filed in SPA No. 09-076 (DC) is a
petition to cancel a COC. However, the pertinent allegations of his petition bespeak of the fact that
the same is actually a petition for disqualification, the effect of which is covered by Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646, which repealed Section 72 of the OEC, to wit:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Italics ours)
Unlike a judgment on a petition to cancel a COC, the effects of a judgment on a petition for
disqualification distinguish whether the same attained finality before or after the elections. If the
judgment became final before the elections, the effect is identical to that of cancellation of a COC.
If, however, the judgment attained finality after the elections, the individual is still considered an
official candidate and may even be proclaimed winner should he muster the majority votes of the
constituency.
In Cayat v. Commission on Elections,29 we cogitated on the import of Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, to
wit:
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the
disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first
sentence of Section 6.The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections,
which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the
first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be
voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became
final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in
Cayat’s favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng’s
proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate, second to none.30 (Emphasis
supplied)
The instant case falls under the second situation contemplated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646. The
petition to disqualify Jalosjos was filed on December 6, 2009 and was resolved by the COMELEC on
the very day of elections of May 10, 2010. Thus, on the election day, Jalosjos is still considered an
official candidate notwithstanding the issuance of the COMELEC Resolution disqualifying him from
holding public office. The pendency of a disqualification case against him or even the issuance of
judgment of disqualification against him does not forthwith divest him of the right to participate in the
elections as a candidate because the law requires no less than a final judgment. Thus, the votes
cast in his name were rightfully counted in his favor and, there being no order suspending his
proclamation, the City Board of Canvassers lawfully proclaimed him as the winning candidate.
However, upon the finality of the judgment of disqualification against him on August 11, 2010, a
permanent vacancy was created in the office of the mayor which must be filled in accordance with
Section 44 of the LGC, which states:
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x.
xxxx
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily
resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no room for interpretation but
merely application.31 Accordingly, when Jalosjos was adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent
vacancy was created in the office of the mayor for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the
position. As provided by law, it is the duly-elected vice-mayor of the locality who should succeed to
the vacated office.
Following the foregoing ratiocination, Cardino’s contention that he should be proclaimed mayor of
Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte lacks legal basis. That he was the one who received the second
highest number of votes does not entitle him to any right or preference to succeeding the vacated
post. Unmistakably, he did not have the mandate of the voting populace and this must not be
defeated by substituting him, a losing candidate, in place of the disqualified candidate who received
the majority votes. In Benito v. Commission on Elections,32 we held:
In every election, the people’s choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must,
at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving
him the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no one can be declared elected in
his place.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes dies, or is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the

elective office. For to allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite
his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to
undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people’s right to elect officials of their
choice.33 (Citations omitted)
Further, in Kare v. Commission on Elections,34 we further deliberated on the reason behind the
doctrine of rejection of the second placer. We enunciated:
Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one vote. In such a case, it would be absurd to
proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters’ choice. Moreover, there are instances in
which the votes received by the second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant. In
such situations, if the equation changes because of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate,
voters’ preferences would nonetheless be so volatile and unpredictable that the results for qualified
candidates would not be self-evident. The absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among
the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the second placer. Where an
"ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or a plurality of the votes, by no mathematical
formulation can the runner-up in the election be construed to have obtained the majority or the
plurality of votes cast.35 (Citations omitted)
In other words, a second placer cannot bank on a mere supposition that he could have won the
elections had the winning candidate, who was eventually adjudged disqualified, been excluded in the
roster of official candidates. It is erroneous to assume that the sovereign will could have opted for
the candidate who received the second highest number of votes had they known of the
disqualification of the winning candidate early on. For in such event, they could have cast their votes
in favor of another candidate, not necessarily the one who received the second highest number of
votes.
Finally, Cardino impugns the wisdom of the doctrine of rejection of second placer which was first
enunciated in Topacio v. Paredes36 on the ground that the doctrine effectively discourages qualified
candidates for the same position for which the disqualified candidate was elected, in initiating a
disqualification case because the prospect of being proclaimed to the position is nil.37
The doctrine of rejection of the second placer was not conceived to suit the selfish interests of losing
candidates or arm them with a weapon to retaliate against the prevailing candidates. The primordial
consideration in adhering to this doctrine is not simply to protect the interest of the other qualified
candidates joining the electoral race but more than that, to safeguard the will of the people in whom
the sovereignty resides. The doctrine ensures that only the candidate who has the people’s faith and
confidence will be allowed to run the machinery of the government. It is a guarantee that the popular
choice will not be compromised, even in the occasion that the prevailing candidate is eventually
disqualified, by replacing him with the next-in-rank official who was also elected to office by the
authority of the electorate.
It is of no moment that, as Cardino surmised, the doctrine of rejection of the second placer
dissuades other qualified candidates in filing a disqualification case against the prevailing candidate
for lack of expectation of gain. To justify the abandonment of the doctrine following Cardino’s
asseveration is to reduce its significance and put premium on the interest of the candidate rather
than of the electorate for whose interest the election is being conducted. The doctrine was for the
protection of the public and not for any private individual’s advantage. Thus, the right to file a petition
for disqualification is not exclusive to the opposing candidate but may also be pursued by any citizen
of voting age, or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties,38 who are
minded to do so.

In ruling therefore that the provisions of the LGC shall apply in determining the rightful successor to
the office of the mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte, the COMELEC did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion. The application of the provisions of the LGC is the necessary
consequence of Jalosjos' disqualification.
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, I respectfully vote to:
(1) DISMISS G.R. No. 193536 for lack of merit.
(2) MODIFY the Resolution dated February 22, 2011 of this Court in G.R. No. 193237. The
Resolutions dated May 10, 2010 and August 11, 2010 of the COMELEC in SPA No. 09-076
(DC) should be AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. should
be declared disqualified to run as Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte and the
provisions of the Local Government Code on succession be applied in filling the vacated
office.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 G.R. No. 193237 rollo, pp. 40-48.
2 Id. at 49-56.
3 Id. at 355-360.
4 Id. at 360.
5 Id. at 359-360.
6 Id. at 373-393.
7 Id. at 57-58.
8 Id. at 59.
9 Id. at 47.
10 Id. at 53.
11Art. VI, Sec. 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read
and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
12Art. VI, Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered

voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
13Art. VII, Sec. 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.
14Art. VII, Sec. 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications
and term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He maybe
removed from office in the same manner as the President. x x x.
15Sec. 39. Qualifications. – − (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines;
a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent component cities,
component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age on election
day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang barangay
must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years of age but
not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
Justimbaste v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179413, November 28, 2008, 572
16
SCRA 736, 740.
17 Salcedo II v. COMELEC, 371 Phil. 377, 389 (1999).
18Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 761,
775-776, citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, supra note 37, at 390, citing
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995, 248
SCRA 300, Abella v. Larrazabal, 259 Phil. 992 (1989), Aquino v. Commission on Elections,
318 Phil. 467 (1995), Labo, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 105111, July 3, 1992,
211 SCRA 297, Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 327 Phil. 521 1996), Republic v. De la Rosa, G.R.
No. 104654, June 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 785.
19 G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782.

20 Id. at 792-796.
21Santos v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 642, 652 (1999), citing Francisco v. CA, 313 Phil.
241, 254(1995).
22 363 Phil. 573 (1999).
23 Id. at 583-584.
24 214 Phil. 126 (1984).
Id. at 132, citing Commonwealth ex rel. Paige vs. Smith, 198 A. 812, 813, 815, l30 Pa.
25
Super. 536.
26Velasco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA
590, 602.
27Guiang v. Co, 479 Phil. 473, 480 (2004), citing Ty v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 792
(2001).
28 G.R. No. 193536 rollo, pp. 11-12.
29 G.R. 163776, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23.
30 Id. at 45.
31 Sunga v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 310, 327 (1998).
32 235 SCRA 436 (1994).
33 Id. at 441-442.
34 G.R. No. 157526, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 264.
35 Id. at 274-275.
36 23 Phil. 238 (1912).
37 G.R. No. 193536 rollo, pp. 12-15.
38 The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Rule 25, Section 1.

CONCURRING OPINION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The all-important concern here is the effect of the conviction for robbery by final judgment of and the
probation allegedly granted to Dominador G. Jalosjos, petitioner in G.R. No. 193237, on his
candidacy for the position of Mayor of Dapitan City; and the determination of the rightful person to
assume the contested elective position upon the ineligibility of Jalosjos.
I easily CONCUR with the insightful opinion delivered for the Majority by our esteemed colleague,
Senior Associate Justice Carpio. As I see it, these consolidated cases furnish to the Court the
appropriate occasion to look again into the candidacy of a clearly ineligible candidate garnering the
majority of the votes cast in an election and being proclaimed as the winning candidate to the
detriment of the valid candidacy of his rival who has all the qualifications and suffers none of the
disqualifications. The ineligible candidate thereby mocks the sanctity of the ballot and reduces the
electoral exercise into an expensive joke.
G.R. No. 193237 is a special civil action for certiorari brought by Jalosjos to assail the Resolution
dated August 11, 2010,1 whereby the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc affirmed the
Resolution dated May 10, 20102issued by the COMELEC First Division in SPC No. 09-076 (DC).
Both Resolutions declared Jalosjos ineligible to run as Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga Del Norte
in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections pursuant to Section 40(a) of The Local Government
Code (LGC), viz:
Section 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b)
Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
xxx
Additionally, the COMELEC cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy (CoC) on the ground of
material misrepresentation made therein.
Jalosjos charges the COMELEC En Banc with committing grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that he was disqualified to run as Mayor of Dapitan City in view of the revocation of his probation;
and when it cancelled his CoC without finding that he had deliberately misrepresented his
qualifications to run as Mayor.
G.R. No. 193536 is a special civil action for certiorari commenced by Agapito J. Cardino, the only
other candidate against Jalosjos, in order to set aside the COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution dated
August 11, 2010,3 to the extent that the Resolution directed the application of the rule of succession
as provided in the LGC. Cardino challenges the COMELEC En Banc’s application of the rule of
succession under the LGC, contending that he should be considered elected as Mayor upon the
cancellation of Jalosjos’ CoC because he had been the only bona fide candidate for the position of
Mayor of Dapitan City.4 Cardino insists that the cancellation of Jalosjos’ CoC retroacted to the date
of its filing, thereby reducing him into a non-candidate.5
The special civil actions were consolidated on March 29, 2011.6

Antecedents
The antecedents are narrated in the Resolution the Court has promulgated on February 22, 2011 in
G.R. No. 193237, to wit:
On December 6, 2009, private respondent Agapito J. Cardino filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to
and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner before respondent Comelec. Petitioner and private
respondent were both candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte during the 2010
Elections. Private respondent alleged that petitioner misrepresented in his CoC that he was eligible
to run for Mayor, when, in fact, he was not, since he had been convicted by final judgment of
robbery, a crime involving moral turpitude, and he has failed to serve a single day of his sentence.
The final judgment for robbery stems from the following factual antecedents:
On April 30, 1970, the then Circuit Criminal Court (now Regional Trial Court RTC) of Cebu City
convicted petitioner of the crime of robbery and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of one (1) year,
eight (8) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, two (2)
months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the
Court of Appeals (CA). He later abandoned the appeal, which was thus dismissed on August 9,
1973. Sometime in June 1985, petitioner filed a petition for probation.
On July 9, 1985, Gregorio F. Bacolod (Bacolod), who was then the Supervising Probation Officer of
the Parole and Probation Office, recommended to the RTC the grant of petitioner's application for
probation. On the same day, the RTC issued an Order granting the probation for a period of one
year subject to the terms and conditions stated therein.
However, on August 8, 1986, Bacolod filed a Motion for Revocation of the probation on the ground
that petitioner failed to report to him, in violation of the condition of the probation. Accordingly, the
RTC issued an Order dated March 19, 1987, revoking the probation and ordering the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. A warrant of arrest was issued but remained unserved.
More than 16 years later, or on December 19, 2003, petitioner secured a Certification from the
Central Office of the Parole and Probation Administration (PPA), which was signed by Bacolod, now
Administrator of the PPA, attesting that petitioner had fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
probation.
At this time, the prosecution also decided to stir the case. It filed a motion for the issuance of an alias
warrant of arrest. The RTC granted the motion on January 16, 2004 and issued an Order for the
Issuance of an Alias Warrant of Arrest against petitioner.
On January 23, 2004, Bacolod submitted to the RTC a Termination Report stating that petitioner had
fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and, hence, his case should be deemed
terminated. On the same day, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Reconsider its January 16, 2004
Order and to Lift the Warrant of Arrest.
On January 29, 2004, James A. Adasa (Adasa), petitioner's opponent for the mayoralty position
during the 2004 Elections, filed a Petition for Disqualification against petitioner, based on Section
40(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, on the ground that the
latter has been convicted of robbery and failed to serve his sentence. Adasa later amended his
petition to include Section 40(e) of the same law, claiming that petitioner is also a "fugitive from
justice."

Meanwhile, acting on petitioner's urgent motion, the RTC issued an Order dated February 5, 2004,
declaring that petitioner had duly complied with the order of probation, setting aside its January 16,
2004 Order, and recalling the warrant of arrest.
Thus, in resolving Adasa's petition, the Comelec Investigating Officer cited the February 5, 2004
RTC Order and recommended that petitioner be declared qualified to run for Mayor. In the
Resolution dated August 2, 2004, the Comelec-Second Division adopted the recommendation of the
Investigating Officer and denied the petition for disqualification. It held that petitioner has amply
proven that he had complied with the requirements of his probation as shown by the Certification
from the PPA dated December 19, 2003, which was the basis of the February 5, 2004 RTC Order.
Adasa filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Comelec En Banc denied on December 13,
2006.
Adasa then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 176285). In a Resolution
dated June 3, 2008, the Court dismissed the petition for being moot and academic, the three-year
term of office having expired.
In a related incident, Bacolod, who issued the Certification dated December 19, 2003 to petitioner,
was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and falsification of public document
under the Revised Penal Code for issuing said Certification. On September 29, 2008, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding Bacolod guilty as charged. It held that the Certification
he issued was definitely false because petitioner did not actually fulfill the conditions of his probation
as shown in the RTC Order dated March 19, 1987, which states that the probation was being
revoked. Hence, at the time the Certification was issued, there was no longer a probation order to be
fulfilled by petitioner.
On May 10, 2010, the elections were held, and petitioner won as Mayor of Dapitan City.
On the same day, the Comelec-First Division issued a resolution granting the Petition to Deny Due
Course and cancelling petitioner's CoC.The Comelec noted that the dismissal of Adasa's petition for
disqualification hinged on the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the PPA Certification dated
December 19, 2003, declaring that petitioner had complied with the requirements of his probation. It
opined that, with the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting Bacolod, it would now appear that
the December 19, 2003 Certification was fraudulently issued and that petitioner had not actually
served his sentence; thus, the ruling on Adasa’s petition is "left with no leg to stand on."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The Comelec En Banc denied the motion in a resolution dated
August 11, 2010. The Comelec ordered him to cease and desist from occupying and discharging the
functions of the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City.7
Through the Resolution promulgated on February 22, 2011,8 the Court dismissed G.R. No. 193237,
disposing:
on Elections in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC) are hereby AFFIRMED.
On March 22, 2011, Jalosjos moved for the reconsideration of the February 22, 2011
Resolution,9 raising the same issues he had averred in his petition.

On June 1, 2012, however, Jalosjos filed a manifestation dated May 30, 2012, informing the Court
that he had meanwhile tendered his resignation as Mayor of Dapitan City effective April 30, 2012;
that his resignation had been accepted by Governor Rolando E. Yebes of
Zamboanga del Norte; and that Vice Mayor Patri Bajamunde-Chan had taken her oath of office as
the new Mayor of Dapitan City.
Disposition
I vote to affirm the disqualification of Jalosjos as a candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City; and to
sustain the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc cancelling his CoC.
I agree with the Majority that the rule of succession provided by the LGC does not apply to
determine who should now sit as Mayor of Dapitan City. Thus, I hold that Cardino, the only other
candidate with a valid CoC for Mayor of Dapitan City in the May 10, 2010 elections, had the legal
right to assume the position of City Mayor.
Let me specify the reasons for this humble concurrence.
1.
Cardino’s petition in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC)

was a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code
The COMELEC En Banc correctly held that the petition of Cardino in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC)
was in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
In Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,10 the Court pointed out that there are two remedies
available to challenge the qualifications of a candidate, namely:
(1) Before the election, pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition
exclusively on the ground that any material misrepresentation contained therein as required under
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
and –
(2) After the election, pursuant to Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
Section 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission
within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

The Court has explained that the only difference between the two remedies is that, under Section
78, the qualifications for elective office are misrepresented in the CoC, and the proceedings must be
initiated prior to the elections, while under Section 253, a petition for quo warranto may be brought
within ten days after the proclamation of the election results on either of two grounds, to wit: (a)
ineligibility; or (b) disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. A candidate is ineligible under Section
253 if he is disqualified to be elected to office; and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the
qualifications for elective office.11
In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in Fermin v. Commission on
Elections:12
the winning candidate.13
Clearly, the only instance where a petition assailing the qualifications of a candidate for elective
office can be filed prior to the elections is when the petition is filed under Section 78.14
A Section 78 petition is not to be confused with a Section 12 or Section 68 petition. The two are
different remedies, are based on different grounds, and can result in different eventualities.15 A
person who is disqualified under either Section 1216 or Section 6817 is prohibited to continue as a
candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
considered a candidate at all because his status is that of a person who has not filed a CoC.18
To ascertain whether Cardino’s petition against Jaloslos was a petition under Section 78, on one
hand, or under Section 12 or Section 68, on the other hand, it is necessary to look at its averments
and relief prayed for, viz:
1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino citizen, married, able to read and write, a registered voter
of Precinct No. 0019A, and is and has been a resident of Dapitan City, continuously since
birth up to the present;
2. Petitioner duly filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of City Mayor of Dapitan for
the election on May 10, 2010, with the Office of the Commission on Election, Dapitan City,
on December 1, 2009, which accepted and acknowledged the same, a copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex A;
3. Respondent is also of legal age, a resident of Dapitan City, a registered voter of Precinct
No. 0187B, likewise filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position with the Office of
the Comelec, Dapitan City, as that for which petitioner duly filed a certificate of candidacy, for
the May 10, 2010 national and local elections on December 1, 2009, a certified true copy of
said COC is hereto attached as Annex B;

4. Respondent’s certificate of candidacy under oath contains material misrepresentation,
when he declared under oath, that respondent is eligible for the office he seeks to be
elected, par. 16, COC for Mayor, considering that he is not eligible for the position for which
he filed a certificate of candidacy because respondent was convicted by final judgment by
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CCC-XIV-140-Cebu for Robbery, an
offense involving moral turpitude and he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of "one (1)
year, eight (8) Months and Twenty (20) Days of prision correctional, as minimum, to Four (4)
years, Two (2) months and One (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, a certified true copy
of which decision is hereto attached as Annex C;
5. Respondent failed to serve even a single day of his sentence. The position requires that a
candidate be eligible and/or qualified to aspire for the position as required under Section 74
of the Omnibus Election Code;
6. This petition is being filed within the reglementary period of within five days following the
last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission:
1. Declaring respondent, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. ineligible for the position for which he filed
certificate of candidacy and to deny due course to such filing and to cancel the certificate of
candidacy Annex B; x x x19(Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing make it evident that Cardino’s petition contained the essential allegations pertaining to
a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) Jalosjos made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false
representation referred to a material matter that would affect the substantive right of Jalosjos to run
in the elections for which he filed his CoC; and (c) Jalosjos made the false representation with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public office or to deliberately attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible.20
Worthy of noting is that the specific reliefs prayed for by the petition, supra, were not only for the
declaration that Jalosjos was "ineligible for the position for which he filed certificate of candidacy" but
also for denying "due course to such filing and to cancel the certificate of candidacy." Thereby,
Cardino’s petition attacked both Jalosjos’ qualifications to run as Mayor of Dapitan City and the
validity of Jalosjos’ CoC based on the latter’s assertion of his eligibility despite knowledge of his
conviction and despite his failure to serve his sentence. The petition was properly considered to be
in all respects as a petition to deny due course to or cancel Jalosjos’ CoC under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
2.
Jalosjos materially misrepresented his eligibility as a

candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City; hence, the
COMELEC properly cancelled his CoC
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code involves a finding not only that a person lacked the qualifications but also that he made a
material representation that was false.21 In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,22 the
Court added that there must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead, thus:

The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the purpose of
the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the would-be
candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses
cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to
deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate character
of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any
material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he
cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.23
A petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of a CoC that is short of the requirements
should not be granted.
Based on the antecedents narrated herein, I consider to be warranted the COMELEC En Banc’s
conclusion to the effect that, firstly, his conviction for robbery absolutely disqualified Jalosjos from
running as Mayor of Dapitan City, and, secondly, Jalosjos deliberately misrepresented his eligibility
when he filed his CoC.
First of all, the records show that the erstwhile Circuit Criminal Court in Cebu City had convicted
Jalosjos of the felony of robbery on April 30, 1970 and had sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of one year, eight months and 20 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to four years,
two months and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Although he had appealed, his appeal was
turned down on August 9, 1973. In June 1985, or more than 15 years after his conviction by the
Circuit Criminal Court, he filed a petition for probation.
Pursuant to Section 40(a) of the LGC,24 his having been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment rendered
Jalosjos ineligible to run for Mayor of Dapitan City. There is no quibbling about the felony of robbery
being an offense involving moral turpitude. As the Court has already settled, "embezzlement,
forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all
crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude."25
Anent moral turpitude for purposes of the election laws, the Court has stated in Teves v.
Commission on Elections:26
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his fellowmen, or to society in general.
xxx
Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, the Court clarified that:
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime
involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question,
the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while
crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in "Zari v. Flores," to wit:
"It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by
law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The
doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does

not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their
being positively prohibited."27
It is relevant to mention at this juncture that the ineligibility of a candidate based on his conviction by
final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is also dealt with in Section 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which specifically states: –
Section 12. Disqualifications. – Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for
any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a
crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless
he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to Section 12, Jalosjos remained ineligible to run for a public office considering that he had
not been granted plenary pardon for his criminal offense. The expiration of the five-year period
defined in Section 12 counted from his service of sentence did not affect the ineligibility, it being
indubitable that he had not even served his sentence at all.
It is relevant to clarify, moreover, that the five-year period defined in Section 12 is deemed
superseded by the LGC, whose Section 40(a) expressly sets two years after serving sentence as the
period of disqualification in relation to local elective positions. To reconcile the incompatibility
between Section 12 and Section 40(a), the Court has discoursed in Magno v. Commission on
Elections:28
It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on December 3, 1985
while the Local Government Code (RA 7160) took effect on January 1, 1992. It is basic in statutory
construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment must
prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the older law
and intended to change it. Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of RA 7160 or the Local
Government Code states that:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any provisions of this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of BP 881.

Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones,
and not the other way around. When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject matter of
the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed.
In David vs. COMELEC, we declared that RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies
to local government units. Section 40 thereof specially and definitively provides for disqualifications
of candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to them only. On the other hand, Section 12
of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications of candidates for any public office. It deals with the election of
all public officers. Thus, Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the disqualifications of
candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a special law which ought to prevail.

The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of candidates for local positions
from five to two years is evident. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and
give effect to the intent of the law. The reduction of the disqualification period from five to two years
is the manifest intent. (Bold emphases supplied)29
Regardless of whether the period applicable was five years or two years, Jalosjos was still ineligible
to run for any public office in any election by virtue of his having been sentenced to suffer prision
mayor. That sentence perpetually disqualified him from running for any elective office considering
that he had not been meanwhile granted any plenary pardon by the Chief Executive.
Indeed, in accordance with the express provisions of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prision
mayor imposed on Jalosjos for the robbery conviction carried the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The
effects of the accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification included the deprivation
during the term of the sentence of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to
be elected to such office.30 The effects of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage was to deprive the convict perpetually of the right to vote in any popular
election for any public office or to be elected to such office; he was further prohibited from holding
any public office perpetually.31 These accessory penalties would remain even though the convict
would be pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the pardon expressly remitted the accessory
penalties.32
Secondly, Jalosjos had no legal and factual bases to insist that he became eligible to run as Mayor
of Dapitan City because he had been declared under the RTC order dated February 5, 2004 to have
duly complied with the order of his probation. His insistence has no merit whatsoever.
Probation, by its legal definition, is only "a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and
sentence, is released subject to conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a
probation officer."33 The grant of probation cannot by itself remove a person’s disqualification to be a
candidate or to hold any office due to its not being included among the grounds for the removal of
the disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, supra. Although the original text
of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976) stated that: -
xxx an application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if
an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
the amendment of Presidential Decree No. 968 by Presidential Decree No. 199034 has made more
explicit that probation only suspends the execution of the sentence under certain conditions set by
the trial court, viz:
Section 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it
shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
For sure, probation or its grant has not been intended to relieve the convict of all the consequences
of the sentence imposed on his crime involving moral turpitude. Upon his final discharge as a
probationer, the convict is restored only to "all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction." This consequence is according to the second paragraph of
Section 16 of the Probation Law of 1976, which states: "The final discharge of the probationer shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted." There
is no question that civil rights are distinct and different from political rights, like the right of suffrage or
the right to run for a public office.
Even assuming that Jalosjos had been validly granted probation despite his having appealed his
conviction (considering that the amendment stating that an appeal barred the application for
probation took effect only on October 5, 1985 but his application for probation was earlier made in
June 1985), his disqualification pursuant to Section 40(a) of the LGC would have still attached
simply because the legal effect of a validly-granted probation was only to suspend the execution of
sentence,35 not to obliterate the consequences of the sentence on his political rights.
In reality, Jalosjos could not even legitimately and sincerely rely on his supposed final discharge
from probation. He was fully aware that he did not at all satisfy the conditions of his
probation,36 contrary to what Section 10 and Section 16 of the Probation Law definitely required, to
wit:
Section 10. Conditions of Probation. — Every probation order issued by the court shall contain
conditions requiring that the probationer shall:
(a) present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake his supervision at such
place as may be specified in the order within seventy-two hours from receipt of said order; .
(b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time and place as specified
by said officer. x x x
Section 16. Termination of Probation. — After the period of probation and upon consideration of the
report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final discharge of the
probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon
the case is deemed terminated.
The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspend as
a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for
which probation was granted.
The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished with a copy of such order.
The records indicate that the RTC revoked the order of probation on March 19, 1987 upon a motion
filed by one Gregorio Bacolod, the Supervising Probation Officer who had recommended the
approval of the application for probation. The revocation was premised on Jalosjos’ failure to report
to Bacolod in violation of the conditions of his probation. Following the revocation, the RTC issued a
warrant for the arrest of Jalosjos, but the warrant has remained unserved until this date. With the

revocation of his probation and in the absence of an order of final discharge, Jalosjos was still legally
bound to serve the sentence for robbery.
I point out for emphasis that the February 5, 2004 order of the RTC declaring that Jalosjos had duly
complied with the order of probation deserved no consideration for the following reasons, namely:
(a) the certification attesting that Jalosjos had fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation was
secured by and issued to him only on December 19, 2003, more than 16 years from the issuance of
the RTC order revoking his probation; (b) the certification was issued by Bacolod, the same
Supervising Probation Officer who had moved for the revocation of the probation; and (c) the
Sandiganbayan later on found the certification to have been falsified by Bacolod considering that at
the time of its issuance there was no longer a probation order to be fulfilled by Jalosjos.37
And, thirdly, Jalosjos argues that he acted in good faith in representing in his CoC that he was
qualified to run as Mayor of Dapitan City,38 having relied on the previous ruling of the COMELEC
adjudging him eligible to run and to be elected as Mayor of Dapitan City;39 and that it cannot then be
said that he deliberately attempted to mislead or to deceive the electorate as to his eligibility.
The argument is devoid of merit.
The COMELEC Resolution dated August 2, 2004, on which Jalosjos has anchored his claim of good
faith, was rendered on the basis of the RTC order dated February 5, 2004 that had declared Jalosjos
to have sufficiently complied with the conditions of his probation based on the certification dated
December 19, 2003. As earlier emphasized, however, the issuance of the certification dated
December 19, 2003 that became the basis for the RTC order dated February 5, 2004 proved to be
highly irregular, and culminated in the Sandiganbayan convicting Bacolod of falsification in relation to
his issuance of the certification.
Clearly, Jalosjos’ reliance on the COMELEC Resolution dated August 2, 2004 was definitely not in
good faith, but was contrary to every juridical conception of good faith, which, according to Heirs of
the Late Joaquin Limense v. Vda. De Ramos,40 is –
xxx an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition; and it
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of a
design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal good faith is a
concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his protestations
alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to
put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s
right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.41
In contrast, Jalosjos had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the finality of his conviction
and the revocation of his probation. He never denied and cannot now dispute his failure to comply
with the conditions of his probation, for he fully knew that he had never duly reported to Bacolod
during the period of his probation. The following findings rendered by the Sandiganbayan in its
Decision dated September 29, 2008 convicting Bacolod of falsification of a public document and
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 sustained the fact that Jalosjos had been unable to fulfil the terms
of his probation: –
xxx The subject Certification of the accused [Bacolod] attesting that "as per records" Mr. Jalosjos
"has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and his case is deemed terminated," is
nevertheless false because the PPA Central Office had no records of an order of final discharge
issued by the court to support the facts narrated in the subject certification that Mr. Jalosjos has
fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and that his case is deemed terminated.

Besides, the accused failed to submit any oral or documentary evidence to establish that at the time
he issued the subject Certification on December 19, 2003, Mr. Jalosjos has already fulfilled the
terms and conditions of his probation. His belated submission on January 23, 2004 of a termination
report dated January 12, 2004 does not cure or remedy the falsity of the facts narrated in the subject
certification. Rather, it strengthens the theory of the prosecution that at the time the accused issued
the subject Certification on December 19, 2003, probationer Jalosjos had not yet fulfilled the terms
and conditions of his probation because, if it were so, his submission of the said termination report
would no longer be necessary. Since the PPA Central Office had no record of a court order of final
discharge of the probationer from probation, then he should have been truthful and certified to that
effect.42
Nor could Jalosjos even feign a lack of awareness of the issuance of the warrant for his arrest
following the revocation of his probation by the RTC on March 19, 1987. This is because he filed an
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest in the RTC upon obtaining the
falsified certification issued by Bacolod.43 The absurdity of his claim of good faith was well-known
even to him because of his possession at the time he filed his CoC of all the information material to
his conviction and invalid probation. Being presumed to know the law, he knew that his conviction for
robbery and his failure to serve his sentence rendered him ineligible to run as Mayor of Dapitan City.
As a result, his affirmation of his eligibility in his CoC was truly nothing but an act tainted with bad
faith.
3.
Jalosjos did not file a valid CoC for the May 10,
2010 elections; not being an official candidate,
votes cast in his favor are considered stray
The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for any person to
be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the
Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
In turn, Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code specifies the contents of a CoC, viz:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
the best of his knowledge. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
A CoC, according to Sinaca v. Mula,44 "is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of
the candidate’s political creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run
for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is

eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and
his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated."
Accordingly, a person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his declaration that he
possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such
declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render the declarant an official candidate.
In Bautista v. Commission on Elections,45 the Court stated that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to
a valid candidacy. A person without a valid CoC cannot be considered a candidate in much the
same way as any person who has not filed any CoC cannot at all be a candidate.46
Hence, the cancellation of Jalosjos’ CoC rendered him a non-candidate in the May 10, 2010
elections.
But, even without the cancellation of his CoC, Jalosjos undeniably possessed a disqualification to
run as Mayor of Dapitan City. The fact of his ineligibility was by itself adequate to invalidate his CoC
without the necessity of its express cancellation or denial of due course by the COMELEC. Under no
circumstance could he have filed a valid CoC. The accessory penalties that inhered to his penalty of
prision mayor perpetually disqualified him from the right of suffrage as well as the right to be voted
for in any election for public office. The disqualification was by operation of a mandatory penal law.
For him to be allowed to ignore the perpetual disqualification would be to sanction his lawlessness,
and would permit him to make a mockery of the electoral process that has been so vital to our
democracy. He was not entitled to be voted for, leaving all the votes cast for him stray and legally
non-existent.
In contrast, Cardino, the only remaining candidate, was duly elected and should legally assume the
position of Mayor of Dapitan City. According to the Court in Santos v. Commission on Elections:47
Anent petitioner’s contention that his disqualification does not ipso facto warrant the proclamation of
private respondent, We find the same untenable and without legal basis since votes cast for a
disqualified candidate fall within the category of invalid non-existent votes because a disqualified
candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law. Section 155 of the Election Code provides —
"Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified shall be considered as stray and
shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot." (Italics supplied)
Considering that all the votes garnered by the petitioner are stray votes and therefore should not be
counted, We find no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec, in
proclaiming private respondent Ricardo J. Rufino the duly elected Mayor of Taytay, Rizal, he having
obtained the highest number of votes as appearing and certified in the canvass of votes submitted
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers petitioner having been legally disqualified. Such a
proclamation finds legal support from the case of Ticzon vs. Comelec 103 SCRA 671, wherein
disqualified candidate Ticzon likewise questioned the legality of the Resolution of the Comelec which
not only disqualified him but further proclaimed Dizon, the only candidate left for the disputed
position, and this Court upheld the proclamation of Cesar Dizon as Mayor of San Pablo City.48
Although the doctrine of the sovereign will has prevailed several times in the past to prevent the
nullification of an election victory of a disqualified candidate, or of one whose CoC was cancelled,
the Court should not now be thwarted from enforcing the law in its letter and spirit by any desire to
respect the will of the people expressed in an election. The objective of prescribing disqualifications
in the election laws as well as in the penal laws is obviously to prevent the convicted criminals and
the undeserving from running and being voted for. Unless the Court leads the way to see to the

implementation of the unquestionable national policy behind the prescription of disqualifications,
there would inevitably come the time when many communities of the country would be electing
convicts and misfits. When that time should come, the public trust would be trivialized and the public
office degraded. This is now the appropriate occasion, therefore, to apply the law in all its majesty in
order to enforce its clear letter and underlying spirit. Thereby, we will prevent the electoral exercise
from being subjected to mockery and from being rendered a travesty.
In closing, I consider to be appropriate and fitting the Court’s following pronouncement in Velasco v.
Commission on Elections:49
x x x We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a
sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves
defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to
certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards
election laws, that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as
directory after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v.
COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC.
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling.
We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling
can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For
one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates
election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an
informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC
which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being
rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section
78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins.
To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an
election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements.
In the process, the rule of law suffers; the clear and unequivocal legal command, framed by a
Congress representing the national will, is rendered inutile because the people of a given locality has
decided to vote a candidate into office despite his or her lack of the· qualifications Congress has
determined to be necessary.
In the present case, Velasco is not only going around the law by his claim that he is registered voter
when he is not, as has been determined by a court in a final judgment. Equally important is that he
has made a material misrepresentation under oath in his COC regarding his qualification. For these
violations, he must pay the ultimate price - the nullification of his election victory. He may also harve
to account in a criminal court for making a false statement under oath, but this is a matter for the
proper authorities to decide upon.
We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have made in the past by the clarification
that COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail
of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely
directory after the people shall have spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement
involves more than the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC
misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are

faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In
a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the
will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot
choose the electorate will. The balance must always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the law.
To rule otherwise is to slowly gnaw at the rule of law. 50
ACCORDINGLY, I JOIN the Majority in granting the petition in G.R. No. 193536; in dismissing the
petition in G.R. No. 193237 for lack of merit; and in affirming the COMELEC En Bane Resolution
dated February 22, 2011 subject to the modification that Agapito J. Cardino be proclaimed as the
duly elected Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga during the May 10, 2010 national and local
elections, and thus entitled to assume the office of Mayor of Dapitan City.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 49-56.
2 Id. at 40-48.
3 Id. at 49-56.
4 Rollo, G.R. No. 193536, p. 9.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 177.
7 Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 355-358.
8 Id. at 355-360.
9 Id. at. 373-391.
10 G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447.
11 Id. at 457.
12 G.R. No. 179695 & 182369, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782.
13 Id., pp. 792-794; emphases are part of the original text.
14Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 761,
777.
15 Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra, note 12, p. 794.

16Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority
insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted
amnesty.
This disqualification to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the
same period he again becomes disqualified.
17 Section 68. Disqualifications. ̶ Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a

party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission
of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261,
paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in
the election laws.
18 Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra, note 12, at pp. 794-796, to wit:
x x x A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of

the
Omnibus Election Code, or Section 40 of the Local Government Code. On the other hand, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a
material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different
effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue
as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section
78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
19 Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 58-59.
20See Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra, note 12; Salcedo II v. Commission on

Elections, supra, note 10.
21Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. ̶ A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as
required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.

22 G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
23 Id. at 769.
24Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence; (b)
Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
xxx
25Republic v. Marcos, G.R. Nos. 130371 & 130855, August 4, 2009, 595 SCRA 43, 63; see
also De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces, A.C. No. 439, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 954, 956.
26 G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009, 587 SCRA 1.
27 Id. at 12-13.
28 G.R. No. 147904, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 495.
29 Id. at 500-501.
30Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code gives the effects of the accessory penalties of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, to wit:
Article 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. — The
penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce
the following effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held
even if conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to
such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the
rights mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2

and
3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.

31 Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code expressly declares:
Article 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage. — The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the
exercise of the right of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of
the sentence, according to the nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular
election for any public office or to be elected to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not
be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification.
32 Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Article 42. Prision mayor; Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prision mayor shall carry
with it that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
33
Section 3(a), Presidential Decree No. 968.
34 Approved on October 5, 1985.
35 Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 968, states:
Section 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may,
after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at any time of
said defendant, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
36 Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 159-160.
37On that basis, the Sandiganbayan convicted Bacolod of two crimes, one, for a violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and, two, for falsification of public document under
the Revised Penal Code.
38 Id. at 28.
39 Id. at 27-28.
40 G.R. No. 152319, October 28, 2009, 604 SCRA 599.
41 Id. at 612; emphasis is supplied.
42 Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 159-160.
43 Id. at 153.
44 G.R. No. 135691, September 27, 1999, 315 SCRA 266, 276.
45 G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998, 298 SCRA 480, 493.
46 Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617, 624.

47 G.R. No. L-58512, July 23, 1985, 137 SCRA 740.
48 Id. at 749.
50 Id. at 614-615.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137329. August 9, 2000]
ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN and JACQUELINE M. SERIO, petitioners,

vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and VICENTE Y. EMANO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective
public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations,
potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the
electorate to evaluate the office seekers' qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for. Inasmuch as
Vicente Y. Emano has proven that he, together with his family, (1) had actually resided in a house he bought
in 1973 in Cagayan de Oro City; (2) had actually held office there during his three terms as provincial
governor of Misamis Oriental, the provincial capitol being located therein; and (3) has registered as voter
in the city during the period required by law, he could not be deemed "a stranger or newcomer" when he
ran for and was overwhelmingly voted as city mayor. Election laws must be liberally construed to give effect
to the popular mandate.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
January 18, 1999 Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc in SPA No. 98-298,
which upheld the July 14, 1998 Resolution[2] of the Comelec First Division. The assailed Resolutions ruled
that Private Respondent Vicente Y. Emano possessed the minimum period of residence to be eligible to
vote in Cagayan de Oro City, as well as be voted mayor thereof.
The Facts
The pertinent facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows.
During the 1995 elections, Vicente Y. Emano ran for, was elected, and proclaimed provincial governor
of Misamis Oriental. It was his third consecutive term as governor of the province.In his Certificate of
Candidacy dated March 12, 1995, his residence was declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
On June 14, 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration
Record in Cagayan de Oro City (geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental), a highly
urbanized city, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. On March 25, 1998, he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding two years and five
months was at 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
Among those who ran for the mayorship of the city in 1998, along with Emano, was Erasmo B.
Damasing, counsel of herein petitioners. On May 15, 1998, Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno Sr., Generoso
Q. Eligan and Jacqueline M. Serio, all residents of Cagayan de Oro City, filed a Petition before the Comelec,
docketed as SPA No. 98-298, in which they sought the disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on

the ground that he had allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence requirement. Prior to the resolution
of their Petition, the Comelec proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected city mayor. Thus, on May
29, 1998, petitioners filed another Petition before the Comelec, this time for quo warranto,[3] in which they
sought (1) the annulment of the election of private respondent; and (2) the proclamation of Erasmo B.
Damasing, who had garnered the next highest number of votes, as the duly elected mayor of the city.
In its Resolution dated July 14, 1998, the Comelec First Division denied the Petition for
Disqualification. Upon petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Consolidation, the two cases
were consolidated.[4]
Ruling of the Comelec
As earlier stated, the Comelec en banc upheld the findings and conclusions of the First Division,
holding that "[t]he records clearly show that the respondent is an actual resident of Cagayan de Oro City
for such a period of time necessary to qualify him to run for mayor therein. This fact is clearly established
by the respondent having a house in the city which has been existing therein since 1973 and where his
family has been living since then."
Additionally, it ruled:
"There is nothing in the law which bars an elected provincial official from residing and/or
registering as a voter in a highly urbanized city whose residents are not given the right to vote
for and be elected to a position in the province embracing such highly urbanized city as long as
he has complied with the requirements prescribed by law in the case of a qualified voter.
"Neither can the list of voters submitted as evidence for the petitioners showing that the
respondent was a registered voter as of March 13, 1995 in Precinct No. 12, Barangay
Poblacion, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental bolster the petitioner's argument that the respondent is
not a resident [or a] registered voter in Cagayan de Oro City since registration in said Precinct
No. 12 does not preclude the respondent from registering anew in another place."
Hence, this recourse[5] before this Court.
Issues
In their Memorandum,[6] petitioners submit that the main issue is whether the "Comelec gravely abused
its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Resolutions." Allegedly, the
resolution of this issue would depend on the following:[7]
"1. Whether or not private respondent Emano's
(a) remaining as governor of Misamis Oriental until he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor
of Cagayan de Oro City on March 25, 1998 in the May 11, 1998 election;
(b) asserting under oath [that he was] qualified to act as governor of said province until said
date; and
(c) admitting, in sworn statements, [that he was] a resident of Misamis Oriental,

precluded him from acquiring a bona fide domicile of choice for at least one (1) year in Cagayan
de Oro City prior to the May 11, 1998 elections, as to disqualify him for being a candidate for
city mayor of said City.
2. Differently stated, whether or not Emano's securing a residence certificate in Cagayan de Oro
City, holding offices as governor of Misamis Oriental in the Capitol Building located in Cagayan
de Oro City and having a house therein where [he had] stay[ed] during his tenure as governor,
and registering as a voter in said City in June 1997, would be legally sufficient, as against the
undisputed facts above enumerated, to constitute a change of his domicile of birth in Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental in favor of a new domicile of choice in Cagayan de Oro City for at least one (1)
year for purposes of qualifying him to run for city mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections.
3. Whether or not Erasmo Damasing, the candidate for mayor of Cagayan de Oro City in the
May 11, 1998 elections, who received the second highest number of votes, can be declared
winner, considering that respondent Emano was disqualified to run for and hold said office and
considering that his disqualification or ineligibility had been extensively brought to the attention
and consciousness of the voters prior to the May 11, 1998 election as to attain notoriety,
notwithstanding which they still voted for him."
Petitioners are seeking the resolution of essentially two questions: (1) whether private respondent had
duly established his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at least one year prior to the May 11, 1998 elections
to qualify him to run for the mayorship thereof; and (2) if not, whether Erasmo Damasing, the candidate
who had received the second highest number of votes, should be proclaimed mayor of the city.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Preliminary Matter: Locus Standi of Petitioners
Although not raised by the parties, the legal standing of the petitioners was deliberated upon by the
Court. We note that petitioners pray, among others, for judgment "declaring Atty. Erasmo B. Damasing as
entitled to be proclaimed winner as mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections in Cagayan de Oro City." [8] And
yet, Damasing is not a party to the instant "Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule[s] 64 and 65" brought
before us.
Under the Rules of Court, a quo warranto may be brought only by (1) the solicitor general or (2) a
public prosecutor or (3) a person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully
held or exercised by another.[9] A reading of the Rules shows that petitioners, none of whom qualify under
any of the above three categories, are without legal standing to bring this suit.
However, the present Petition finds its root in two separate cases filed before the Comelec: (1) SPC
98-298 for disqualification and (2) EPC 98-62 for quo warranto. Under our election laws and the Comelec
Rules of Procedure, any voter may file a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds provided by law, [10] or
to contest the election of a city officer on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic. [11] The
petitioners herein, being "duly-registered voters" of Cagayan de Oro City, therefore satisfy the requirement
of said laws and rules.[12]

Main Issue: Residence Qualification for Candidacy
Petitioners argue that private respondent maintains his domicile in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental, not in
Cagayan de Oro City, as allegedly shown by the following facts: (1) he had run and won as governor of the
province of Misamis Oriental for three consecutive terms immediately preceding the 1998 elections; (2) in
the pleadings he filed in connection with an election protest against him relating to the 1995 election, he
had stated that he was a resident of Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental; (3) he had fully exercised the powers and
prerogatives of governor until he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor on March 25, 1998.
Petitioners claim that in discharging his duties as provincial governor, private respondent remained a
resident of the province. They aver that residence is a continuing qualification that an elective official must
possess throughout his term. Thus, private respondent could not have changed his residence to Cagayan
de Oro City while he was still governor of Misamis Oriental.
Petitioners further contend that the following were not sufficient to constitute a change of
domicile: having a house in Cagayan de Oro City, residing therein while exercising one's office as governor
(the city being the seat of government of the province), securing a residence certificate and registering as
voter therein.
Private respondent, on the other hand, alleges that he actually and physically resided in Cagayan de
Oro City while serving as provincial governor for three consecutive terms, since the seat of the provincial
government was located at the heart of that city.[13] He also avers that one's choice of domicile is a matter
of intention, and it is the person concerned who would be in the best position to make a choice. In this case,
Emano decided to adopt Cagayan de Oro City as his place of residence after the May 1995 elections. In
fact, in January 1997, he secured his Community Tax Certificate at the City Treasurer's Office, stating
therein that he was a resident of 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City. During the general registration of voters in June 1997, he registered in one of the precincts of Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. This meant that, at the time, Emano had been a voter of the city for the minimum
period required by law. No one has ever challenged this fact before any tribunal.
Private respondent contends further that his transfer of legal residence did not ipso facto divest him of
his position as provincial governor. First, there is no law that prevents an elected official from transferring
residence while in office. Second, an elective official's transfer of residence does not prevent the
performance of that official's duties, especially in private respondent's case in which the seat of government
became his adopted place of residence. Third, as ruled in Frivaldo v. Comelec,[14] the loss of any of the
required qualifications for election merely renders the official's title or right to office open to challenge. In
Emano's case, no one challenged his right to the Office of Provincial Governor when he transferred his
residence to Cagayan de Oro City. Naturally, he continued to discharge his functions as such, until he filed
his candidacy for mayor in March 1998.
Lastly, Emano urges that the sanctity of the people's will, as expressed in the election result, must be
respected. He is not, after all, a stranger to the city, much less to its voters. During his three terms as
governor of Misamis Oriental, his life and actuations have been closely interwoven with the pulse and beat
of Cagayan de Oro City.
Public Respondent Comelec relies essentially on Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec[15] in its
Memorandum[16]which supports the assailed Resolutions, and which has been filed in view of the solicitor
general's Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment.[17] Thus, the poll body argues that "x x x the fact of
residence x x x ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
Constitution's residency qualification requirement."
Law on Qualifications of Local Elective Officials
The pertinent provision sought to be enforced is Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991,[18] which provides for the qualifications of local elective officials, as follows:

"SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they
seek to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from [seeking]
an elective office to serve that community."[19] Such provision is aimed at excluding outsiders "from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain." [20] Establishing
residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of
representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of the
community. This purpose is "best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a
given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice." [21]
Facts Showing Change of Residence
In the recent en banc case Mamba-Perez v. Comelec,[22] this Court ruled that private respondent
therein, now Representative Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo of the Third District of Cagayan, had duly proven his
change of residence from Gattaran, Cagayan (part of the First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (part of
the Third District in which he sought election as congressman). He proved it with the following facts: (1) in
July 1990, he leased and lived in a residential apartment in Magallanes Street, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (2)
in July 1995, he leased another residential apartment in Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan; (3)
the January 18, 1998 Certificate of Marriage between Aguinaldo and his second wife, Lerma Dumaguit; (4)
the Certificate of Live Birth of his second daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to him and his family
showed that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao for at least one year immediately preceding the May
1998 elections. The Court also stated that it was not "of much importance that in his [Aguinaldo's]
certificates of candidacy for provincial governor in the elections of 1988, 1992, and 1995, private respondent
stated that he was a resident of Gattaran."[23]
In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his family had actually been residing
in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had bought in 1973. Furthermore,
during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis Oriental, he physically lived in that
city, where the seat of the provincial government was located. In June 1997, he also registered as voter of
the same city. Based on our ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove that Vicente Y. Emano
was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to run for public office
therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his choice of residence.
Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de Oro City is a highly urbanized city whose
voters cannot participate in the provincial elections. Such political subdivisions and voting restrictions,
however, are simply for the purpose of parity in representation. The classification of an area as a highly
urbanized or independent component city, for that matter, does not completely isolate its residents, politics,
commerce and other businesses from the entire province -- and vice versa -- especially when the city is
located at the very heart of the province itself, as in this case.
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a
geographical part of the province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more important, it is itself the
seat of the provincial government. As a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their functions
in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting acquainted with its concerns and
interests. Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms and
consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period, could not be said to be a stranger or
newcomer to the city in the last year of his third term, when he decided to adopt it as his permanent place
of residence.

Significantly, the Court also declared in Mamba-Perez that "although private respondent declared in
his certificates of candidacy prior to the May 11, 1998 elections that he was a resident of Gattaran, Cagayan,
the fact is that he was actually a resident of the Third District not just for one (1) year prior to the May 11,
1998 elections but for more than seven (7) years since July 1990. His claim that he ha[s] been a resident
of Tuguegarao since July 1990 is credible considering that he was governor from 1988 to 1998 and,
therefore, it would be convenient for him to maintain his residence in Tuguegarao, which is the capital of
the province of Cagayan."
Similarly in the instant case, private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de
Oro City while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in the city and
resided there together with his family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and registered as a voter
therein. To all intents and purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City
and eligible to run for mayor thereof.
To petitioners' argument that Emano could not have continued to qualify as provincial governor if he
was indeed a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, we respond that the issue before this Court is whether
Emano's residence in the city qualifies him to run for and be elected as mayor, not whether he could have
continued sitting as governor of the province. There was no challenge to his eligibility to continue running
the province; hence, this Court cannot make any pronouncement on such issue. Considerations of due
process prevent us from adjudging matters not properly brought to us. On the basis, however, of the facts
proven before the Comelec, we hold that he has satisfied the residence qualification required by law for the
mayorship of the city.
We stress that the residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities
be acquainted not only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the
constituents themselves -- their needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and development, and
all matters vital to their common welfare. The requisite period would give candidates the opportunity to be
familiar with their desired constituencies, and likewise for the electorate to evaluate the former's
qualifications and fitness for the offices they seek.
In other words, the actual, physical and personal presence of herein private respondent in Cagayan
de Oro City is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties of mayor and for the voters to
evaluate his qualifications for the mayorship. Petitioners' very legalistic, academic and technical approach
to the residence requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and common-sense rationale for the
residence requirement.
Interpretation to Favor Popular Mandate
There is no question that private respondent was the overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan
de Oro City. He won by a margin of about 30,000 votes.[24] Thus, we find it apt to reiterate the principle that
the manifest will of the people as expressed through the ballot must be given fullest effect. In case of doubt,
political laws must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate.[25] Verily, in Frivaldo v.
Comelec,[26] the Court held:
"x x x [T]his Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in
order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a
reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues
in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy
to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create
greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution
and laws so zealously protect and promote."

In the same vein, we stated in Alberto v. Comelec[27] that "election cases involve public interest; thus,
laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections."
Indeed, "it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms."[28]
In sum, we hold that Respondent Comelec cannot be faulted with abuse, much less grave abuse, of
discretion in upholding private respondent's election.
Corollary Issue: Effect of Disqualification of Winner on Second Placer
With the resolution of the first issue in the positive, it is obvious that the second one posited by
petitioners has become academic and need not be ruled upon.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Comelec Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., abroad on official business.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 47-51; signed by Comms. Luzviminda G. Tancangco (officer-in-charge), Manolo B. Gorospe, Julio F. Desamito, Teresita
Dy-Liacco Flores and Japal M. Guiani.
[2]
Ibid., pp. 52-55; signed by Comms. Manolo B. Gorospe (presiding commissioner) and Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores.
[3]
Docketed as EPC No. 98-62.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 124-25.
[5]
This case was deemed submitted for resolution upon this Court's receipt of private respondent's Memorandum on April 26, 2000.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 264 et seq.
[7]
Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 9-10, signed by Attys. Ruben E. Agpalo and Renato B. Damasing.
[8]
Petition, p. 38; rollo, p. 41.
[9]
2, 3 & 5, Rule 66, Rules of Court.
[10]
2, Rule 25, Comelec Rules of Procedure, in rel. to 78, Omnibus Election Code, as amended.
[11]
253, Omnibus Election Code, as amended.
[12]
The Court desisted from further discussing whether Congress could constitutionally and by law change procedures in mandamus
or disqualification proceedings, since such constitutional issue had not specifically been raised.
[13]
See private respondent's Memorandum, signed by Attys. Frederico M. Gapuz and Armando S. Kho who erroneously labeled their
law firm as "counsel for the petitioner."
[14]
174 SCRA 245, June 23, 1989.
[15]
248 SCRA 300, September 18, 1995.
[16]
Signed by Atty. Jose P. Balbuena.
[17]
Rollo pp. 185-190; this pleading was signed by Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Cecilio O. Estoesta and Sol.
Zenaida Hernandez Perez.
[18]
RA 7160.

[19]
Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300, 313, September 18, 1995 per Kapunan, J.; citing Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil 453,
459, November 24, 1941.
[20]
Aquino v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400, 420-21, September 18, 1995, per Kapunan, J.
[21]
Ibid.
[22]
GR No. 133944, October 28, 1999, per Mendoza, J.
[23]
Ibid., p. 10.
[24]
To be exact, 29,273. See private respondent's Memorandum, p. 18. This claim was not disputed by petitioners.
[25]
Garay v. Comelec, 261 SCRA 222, 234, August 28, 1996.
[26]
Supra, p. 769.
[27]
311 SCRA 215, 222, July 27, 1999, per Romero, J. See also Punzalan v. Comelec, 289 SCRA 702, 720, April 27, 1998.
[28]
Frivaldo v. Comelec, 257 SCRA 727, 771-772, June 28, 1996, per Panganiban, J.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 151914. July 31, 2002]
TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR.
NEIL M. ALVAREZ, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated July 19, 2001, of the Second Division
[1]
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), ordering the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
petitioner Teodulo M. Coquilla for the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar in the May 14, 2001
elections and the order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew
up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized
as a U.S. citizen. From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S.
[2]
Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.
[3]
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although
he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and
lasted until August 5, 2000. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the
[4] [5]
Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of
Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No.
115123 on November 13, 2000.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar.
His application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001. On February 27,
[6]
2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar
for two (2) years.
[7]
On March 5, 2001, respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who was
running for reelection, sought the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the ground that the
latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a
resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since
November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case before the elections on May 14, 2001.
Meanwhile, petitioner was voted for and received the highest number of votes (6,131) against private
respondents 5,752 votes, or a margin of 379 votes. On May 17, 2001, petitioner was proclaimed mayor of
Oras by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. He subsequently took his oath of office.
[8]
On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted private respondents petition and
ordered the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy on the basis of the following findings:
Respondents frequent or regular trips to the Philippines and stay in Oras, Eastern Samar after
his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985 cannot be considered as a waiver of his status as a

permanent resident or immigrant . . . of the U.S.A. prior to November 10, 2000 as would qualify
him to acquire the status of residency for purposes of compliance with the one-year residency
requirement of Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Sections 65
and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. The one (1) year residency requirement contemplates of
the actual residence of a Filipino citizen in the constituency where he seeks to be elected.
All things considered, the number of years he claimed to have resided or stayed in Oras,
Eastern Samar since 1985 as an American citizen and permanent resident of the U.S.A. before
November 10, 2000 when he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by [repatriation] cannot be
added to his actual residence thereat after November 10, 2000 until May 14, 2001 to cure his
deficiency in days, months, and year to allow or render him eligible to run for an elective office in
the Philippines. Under such circumstances, by whatever formula of computation used,
respondent is short of the one-year residence requirement before the May 14, 2001 elections. [9]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the COMELEC en banc on
January 30, 2002. Hence this petition.
I.
Two questions must first be resolved before considering the merits of this case: (a) whether the 30-
day period for appealing the resolution of the COMELEC was suspended by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration by petitioner and (b) whether the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case
notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.
A. With respect to the first question, private respondent contends that the petition in this case should
be dismissed because it was filed late; that the COMELEC en banc had denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma; and that, pursuant to Rule 19, 4 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the said motion did not suspend the running of the 30-day period for filing this petition. He points
out that petitioner received a copy of the resolution, dated July 19, 2001, of the COMELECs Second Division
on July 28, 2001, so that he had only until August 27, 2001 within which to file this petition. Since the petition
in this case was filed on February 11, 2002, the same should be considered as having been filed late and
should be dismissed.
Private respondents contention has no merit.
Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the
decision, resolution, order, or ruling.
Sec. 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal. A motion to reconsider a

decision, resolution, order, or ruling, when not pro-forma, suspends the running of the period to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
The five-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration under Rule 19, 2 should be counted from the
receipt of the decision, resolution, order, or ruling of the COMELEC Division. In this case, petitioner
[10]
received a copy of the resolution of July 19, 2001 of the COMELECs Second Division on July 28, 2001.
Five days later, on August 2, 2001, he filed his motion for reconsideration. On February 6, 2002, he received
a copy of the order, dated January 30, 2002, of the COMELEC en banc denying his motion for
reconsideration. Five days later, on February 11, 2002, he filed this petition for certiorari. There is no
question, therefore, that petitioners motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division, as well as his petition for certiorari to set aside of the order of the COMELEC en banc, was filed

within the period provided for in Rule 19, 2 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and in Art. IX(A), 7 of the
Constitution.
It is contended, however, that petitioners motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did
not suspend the running of the period for filing this petition because the motion was pro forma and,
consequently, this petition should have been filed on or before August 27, 2001. It was actually filed,
however, only on February 11, 2002. Private respondent cites the finding of the COMELEC en banc that
An incisive examination of the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration shows that the
same [are] a mere rehash of his averments contained in his Verified Answer and Memorandum.
Neither did respondent raise new matters that would sufficiently warrant a reversal of the
assailed resolution of the Second Division. This makes the said Motion pro forma. [11]
We do not think this contention is correct. The motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and its
filing did suspend the period for filing the petition for certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a motion
for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion
pro forma; otherwise, the movants remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or
some other remedy. But, as we have held in another case:
[12] [13]
Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to
convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence;
and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court.
If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the consequence would be that
after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only motions for
reopening and new trial.
Indeed, in the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so
held because (1) it was a second motion for reconsideration, or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the
[14]
motion must specify the findings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the
evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in
[15] [16]
question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given notice thereof. The 16-page motion
[17] [18]
for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the foregoing defects,
and it was error for the COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioners motion for reconsideration was pro forma
because the allegations raised therein are a mere rehash of his earlier pleadings or did not raise new
matters. Hence, the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in
this case, which, as earlier shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law.
B. As stated before, the COMELEC failed to resolve private respondents petition for cancellation of
petitioners certificate of candidacy before the elections on May 14, 2001. In the meantime, the votes were
canvassed and petitioner was proclaimed elected with a margin of 379 votes over private respondent. Did
the COMELEC thereby lose authority to act on the petition filed by private respondent?
R.A. No. 6646 provides:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. (Emphasis added)

SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course To or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be
voted for and the votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of
disqualification had been rendered may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant,
the COMELEC suspends their proclamation because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation
of their certificates of candidacy are strong. Meanwhile, the proceedings for disqualification of candidates
or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections,
should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners. In Abella v.
COMELEC and Salcedo II v. COMELEC, the candidates whose certificates of candidacy were the
[19] [20]
subject of petitions for cancellation were voted for and, having received the highest number of votes, were
duly proclaimed winners. This Court, in the first case, affirmed and, in the second, reversed the decisions
of the COMELEC rendered after the proclamation of candidates, not on the ground that the latter had been
divested of jurisdiction upon the candidates proclamation but on the merits.
II.
On the merits, the question is whether petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least
one (1) year before the elections held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy. We
find that he had not.
First, 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where
he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(Emphasis added)
The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or
habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or
[21] [22]
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person
[23]
at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned
by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). [24]
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting
in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration
laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8,
1427(a) of the United States Code provides:
Requirements of naturalization . Residence
(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such
applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of filing his application for naturalization has
resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United
States for at least five years and during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing
his petition has been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time, and
who has resided within the State or within the district of the Service in the United States in which

the applicant filed the application for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously within
the United States from the date of the application up to the time of admission to citizenship, and
(3) during all the period referred to in this subsection has been and still is a person of good
moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well
disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. (Emphasis added)
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a greencard,
[25]
which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of
domicile in the Philippines.
Nor can petitioner contend that he was compelled to adopt American citizenship only by reason of his
service in the U.S. armed forces. It is noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630,
[26]
which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in
the Armed Forces of the United States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides for
the repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost his Philippine
citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on
November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998
when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate
in that year and by constantly declaring to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for
mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either
[27]
separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at
the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant
visa under 13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence
[28]
(ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine
[29]
citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he
may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives not
[30]
only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioners status when he entered the country on October 15,
1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement Philippine Immigration []
Balikbayan in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added
inscription good for one year stay. Under 2 of R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program),
[31]
the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign country and
comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a visa-free entry to the
Philippines for a period of one (1) year (3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country
on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one
year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-resident
only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He [32]
lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections in support of his contention that
[33]
the residency requirement in 39(a) of the Local Government Code includes the residency of one who is not
a citizen of the Philippines. Residency, however, was not an issue in that case and this Court did not make
any ruling on the issue now at bar. The question in Frivaldo was whether petitioner, who took his oath of
repatriation on the same day that his term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995, complied with
the citizenship requirement under 39(a). It was held that he had, because citizenship may be possessed
even on the day the candidate assumes office. But in the case of residency, as already noted, 39(a) of the
Local Government Code requires that the candidate must have been a resident of the municipality for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Nor can petitioner invoke this Courts ruling in Bengzon III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. What the Court held in that case was that, upon repatriation, a former natural-born Filipino is
[34]
deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.

Third, petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in
January 2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
requires that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality
wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval v.
Guray, however, registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a
[35]
candidates lack of residency.

Petitioners invocation of the liberal interpretation of election laws cannot avail him any. As held
in Aquino v. Commission on Elections: [36]
A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government

those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate
the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks
one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives,
not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City
would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
Fourth, petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to
be allowed to present evidence. Under 5(d), in relation to 7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of
1987), proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The
holding of a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to
be heard since he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001,
before the COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to
petitioners claim, are complete and intact in the records.
III.
The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar for two years at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC
was justified in ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. We hold that it was.
Petitioner made a false representation of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such
certificate liable to cancellation. The Omnibus Election Code provides:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to
which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election
purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Indeed, it has been held that a candidates statement in her certificate of candidacy for the position of
governor of Leyte that she was a resident of Kananga, Leyte when this was not so or that the candidate
[37]

was a natural-born Filipino when in fact he had become an Australian citizen constitutes a ground for the
[38]
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy. On the other hand, we held in Salcedo II v. COMELEC that a [39]
candidate who used her husbands family name even though their marriage was void was not guilty of
misrepresentation concerning a material fact. In the case at bar, what is involved is a false statement
concerning a candidates qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. This is a
misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy. The
cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission
on Elections en banc are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[1]
Per Presiding Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion and concurred in by Commissioners Mehol K. Sadain and Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr.
[2]
The records do not disclose when petitioner became a U.S. citizen.
[3]
Petitioners U.S. passport for 1998-2008 shows the following dates of arrival in the Philippines and dates of departure for the United
[4]
States: arrival - October 15, 1998, departure - November 3, 1998; arrival - December 20, 1998 (with no record of corresponding
departure); arrival - October 16, 1999, departure - November 1, 1999; arrival - June 23, 2000, departure - July 6, 2000; arrival - August
5, 2000 (Records, pp. 227-228).
This law, entitled AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
[5]
CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS, applies to former natural-born Filipinos who have lost
their Philippine citizenship on account of economic or political necessity. It would appear that petitioner was repatriated under this law
on the ground that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of economic necessity.
[6]
Petition, Annex O, p. 56.
[7]
Id., Annex C, p. 34.
[8]
Id., Annex H, p. 46.
[9]
Resolution, p. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 30-31 (emphasis added).
[10]
Bulaong v. COMELEC, 220 SCRA 745 (1993).
[11]
Order, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[12]
Siy v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 536 (1985); Continental Cement Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 728 (1990).
[13]
Guerra Enterprises Company, Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur, 32 SCRA 314, 317 (1970).
Manila Trading v. Enriquez, 1 SCRA 1056 (1961); City of Cebu v. Mendoza, 62 SCRA 440 (1975); Debuque v. Climaco, 99 SCRA
[14]
353 (1980); Garcia v. Echiverri, 132 SCRA 631 (1984); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Island Garment Manufacturing
Corporation, 153 SCRA 665 (1987); Vda. de Espina v. Abaya, 196 SCRA 312 (1991).
[15]
A similar rule is found in Rule 19, 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
[16]
Villarica v. Court of Appeals, 57 SCRA 24 (1974).
Jessena v. Hervas, 83 SCRA 799 (1978); Marikina Valley Development Corporation v. Flojo, 251 SCRA 87 (1995); Nieto v. De los
[17]
Angeles, 109 SCRA 229 (1981).
Sembrano v. Ramirez, 166 SCRA 30 (1988); Pojas v. Gozo-Dadole, 192 SCRA 575 (1990); Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Far
[18]
East Molasses Corporation, 198 SCRA 689 (1991).

[19]
201 SCRA 253 (1991).
[20]
312 SCRA 447 (1999).

[21]
Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890, 894 (1954).
Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645 (1928); Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453 (1941); Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408
[22]
(1993).
[23]
Aquino v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 400, 420 (1995).
[24]
25 Am. Jur. 2d, 11.
[25]
191 SCRA 229 (1990).
[26]
Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 8.
[27]
Id., pp. 9-11; id., pp. 11-13.
[28]
This provision states:
Under the conditions set forth in this Act, there may be admitted in the Philippines immigrants, termed quota immigrants not in excess
of fifty (50) of any one nationality or without nationality for any one calendar year, except that the following immigrants, termed
nonquota immigrants, may be admitted without regard to such numerical limitations.
The corresponding Philippine Consular representative abroad shall investigate and certify the eligibility of a quota immigrant previous
to his admission into the Philippines. Qualified and desirable aliens who are in the Philippines under temporary stay may be admitted
within the quota, subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of section 9 of this Act.
(a) The wife or the husband or the unmarried child under twenty-one years of age of a Philippine citizen, if accompanying or following
to join such citizen;
(b) A child of alien parents born during the temporary visit abroad of the mother, the mother having been previously lawfully admitted
into the Philippine for permanent residence, if the child is accompanying or coming to join a parent and applies for admission within
five years from the date of its birth;
(c) A child born subsequent to the issuance of the immigration visa of the accompanying parent, the visa not having expired;
(d) A woman who was citizen of the Philippines and who lost her citizenship because of her marriage to an alien or by reason of the
loss of Philippine citizenship by her husband, and her unmarried child under twenty-one years of age, if accompanying or following to
join her;
(e) A person previously lawfully admitted into the Philippines for permanent residence, who is returning from a temporary visit abroad
to an unrelinquished residence in the Philippines, (As amended by Sec. 5, Rep. Act No. 503.)
(f) The wife or the husband or the unmarried child under twenty-one years of age, of an alien lawfully admitted into the Philippines for
permanent residence prior to the date on which this Act becomes effective and who is resident therein, if such wife, husband, or child
applies for admission within a period of two years following the date on which this Act becomes effective;
(g) A natural born citizen of the Philippines, who has been naturalized in a foreign country, and is returning to the Philippines for
permanent residence, including the spouse and minor children, shall be considered a non-quota immigrant for purposes of entering
the Philippines (As amended by Rep. Act No. 4376, approved June 19, 1965).
[29]
See R. Ledesma, An Outline of Philippine Immigration and Citizenship Laws 135 (1999).
[30]
C.A. No. 63, 2.
[31]
The COMELEC considered November 10, 2000 as the date of petitioners repatriation. Section 2 of R.A. No. 8171 provides,
[32]
however, Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration
in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
[33]
257 SCRA 727 (1996).
[34]
G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001.
[35]
54 Phil. 645 (1928).
[36]
248 SCRA 400, 429 (1995).
[37]
Abella v. Larazabal, 180 SCRA 509 (1989); Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991).
[38]
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297 (1992).
[39]
312 SCRA 447 (1999).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120099. July 24, 1996]
EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, BIENVENIDO O.

MARQUEZ, JR., respondents.
DECISION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. (Rodriguez and
Marquez, for brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992
elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor.
Marquez challenged Rodriguez victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC (EPC No.
92-28). Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed on November 12,
1985, is pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims,
grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property.Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice"
which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code
(R.A. 7160), so argued Marquez.
The COMELEC dismissed Marquez quo warranto petition (EPC No. 92-28) in a resolution of February
2, 1993, and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof.
Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal of EPC No. 92-28 before this Court via petition
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 112889. The crux of said petition is whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive
from justice" as contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code based on the alleged
pendency of a criminal charge against him (as previously mentioned).
In resolving that Marquez petition (112889), the Court in "Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC" promulgated
on April 18, 1995, now appearing in Volume 243, page 538 of the SCRA and hereinafter referred to as
the MARQUEZ Decision, declared that:
x x x, fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from
jurisprudence (x x x), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of
the term."[1]
Whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" under the definition thus given was not passed upon
by the Court. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the directive
to proceed therewith with dispatch conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision. Rodriguez sought a
reconsideration thereof. He also filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit Additional Argument in Support of the
Motion for Reconsideration" to which was attached a certification from the Commission on Immigration
showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985 roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the
criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles court. The Court however denied a
reconsideration of the MARQUEZ Decision.
In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of
governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for disqualification before the
COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice." This petition
for disqualification (SPA No. 95-089) was filed by Marquez on April 11, 1995 when Rodriguez' petition

for certiorari (112889) from where the April 18, 1995 MARQUEZ Decision sprung was still then pending
before the Court.
On May 7, 1995 and after the promulgation of the MARQUEZ Decision, the COMELEC promulgated
a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28 (quo warranto case) and SPA No. 95-089 (disqualification
case). In justifying a joint resolution of these two (2) cases, the COMELEC explained that:
1. EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 are inherently related cases;
2. the parties, facts and issue involved are identical in both cases
3. the same evidence is to be utilized in both cases in determining the common issue of whether Rodriguez
is a "fugitive from justice"
4. on consultation with the Commission En Banc, the Commissioners unanimously agreed that a
consolidated resolution of the two (2) cases is not procedurally flawed.
Going now into the meat of that Consolidated Resolution, the COMELEC, allegedly having kept in
mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice", found Rodriguez to be one. Such finding
was essentially based on Marquez' documentary evidence consisting of
1. an authenticated copy of the November 12, 1995 warrant of arrest issued by the Los Angeles Municipal
Court against Rodriguez, and
2. an authenticated copy of the felony complaint
which the COMELEC allowed to be presented ex-parte after Rodriguez walked-out of the hearing of the
case on April 26, 1995 following the COMELEC's denial of Rodriguez' motion for postponement. With the
walk-out, the COMELEC considered Rodriguez as having waived his right to disprove the authenticity of
Marquez' aforementioned documentary evidence. The COMELEC thus made the following analysis:
"The authenticated documents submitted by petitioner (Marquez) to show the pendency of a criminal
complaint against the respondent (Rodriguez) in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.,
and the fact that there is an outstanding warrant against him amply proves petitioner's contention that the
respondent is a fugitive from justice. The Commission cannot look with favor on respondent's defense that
long before the felony complaint was allegedly filed, respondent was already in the Philippines and he did
not know of the filing of the same nor was he aware that he was being proceeded against criminally. In a
sense, thru this defense, respondent implicitly contends that he cannot be deemed a fugitive from justice,
because to be so, one must be aware of the filing of the criminal complaint, and his disappearance in the
place where the long arm of the law, thru the warrant of arrest, may reach him is predicated on a clear
desire to avoid and evade the warrant. This allegation in the Answer, however, was not even fortified with
any attached document to show when he left the United States and when he returned to this country, facts
upon which the conclusion of absence of knowledge about the criminal complaint may be derived. On the
contrary, the fact of arrest of respondent's wife on November 6, 1985 in the United States by the Fraud
Bureau investigators in an apartment paid for respondent in that country can hardly rebut whatever
presumption of knowledge there is against the respondent."[2]
And proceeding therefrom, the COMELEC, in the dispositive portion, declared:
"WHEREFORE, considering that respondent has been proven to be fugitive from justice, he is hereby
ordered disqualified or ineligible from assuming and performing the functions of Governor of Quezon
Province. Respondent is ordered to immediately vacate said office. Further, he is hereby disqualified from
running for Governor for Quezon Province in the May 8, 1995 elections. Lastly, his certificate of
candidacy for the May 8, 1995 elections is hereby set aside."
At any rate, Rodriguez again emerged as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the
position of governor.

On May 10 and 11, 1995, Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation which the
COMELEC granted on May 11, 1995. The Provincial Board of Canvassers nonetheless proclaimed
Rodriguez on May 12, 1995.
The COMELEC Consolidated Resolution in EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089 and the May 11,
1995 Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation thus gave rise to the filing of the instant petition
for certiorari (G.R. No. 120099) on May 16, 1995.
On May 22, 1995, Marquez filed an "Omnibus Motion To Annul The Proclamation Of Rodriguez To
Proclaim Marquez And To Cite The Provincial Board of Canvassers in Contempt" before the COMELEC (in
EPC No. 92-28 and SPA No. 95-089).
Acting on Marquez' omnibus motion, the COMELEC, in its Resolution of June 23, 1995, nullified
Rodriguez' proclamation and ordered certain members of the Quezon Province Provincial Board of
Canvassers to explain why they should not be cited in contempt for disobeying the poll body's May 11, 1995
Resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation. But with respect to Marquez' motion for his proclamation,
the COMELEC deferred action until after this Court has resolved the instant petition (G.R. No. 120099).
Rodriguez filed a motion to admit supplemental petition to include the aforesaid COMELEC June 23,
1995 Resolution, apart from the May 7 and May 11, 1995 Resolutions (Consolidated Resolution and Order
to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation, respectively).
As directed by the Court, oral arguments were had in relation to the instant petition (G.R. No. 120099)
on July 13, 1995.
Marquez, on August 3, 1995, filed an "Urgent Motion For Temporary Restraining Order Or Preliminary
Injunction" which sought to restrain and enjoin Rodriguez "from exercising the powers, functions and
prerogatives of Governor of Quezon x x x." Acting favorably thereon, the Court in a Resolution dated August
8, 1995 issued a temporary restraining order. Rodriguez' "Urgent Motion To Lift Temporary Restraining
Order And/Or For Reconsideration" was denied by the Court in an August 15, 1995 Resolution. Another
similar urgent motion was later on filed by Rodriguez which the Court also denied.
In a Resolution dated October 24, 1995, the Court
"x x x RESOLVED to DIRECT the Chairman of the Commission on Elections ('COMELEC') to

designate a Commissioner or a ranking official of the COMELEC to RECEIVE AND EVALUATE such
legally admissible evidence as herein petitioner Eduardo Rodriguez may be minded to present by way of
refuting the evidence heretofore submitted by private respondent Bienvenido Marquez, Sr., or that which
can tend to establish petitioner's contention that he does not fall within the legal concept of a fugitive from
justice. Private respondent Marquez may likewise, if he so desires, introduce additional and admissible
evidence in support of his own position. The provisions of Sections 3 to 10, Rule 33, of the Rules of
Court may be applied in the reception of the evidence. The Chairman of the COMELEC shall have the
proceedings completed and the corresponding report submitted to this Court within thirty (30) days from
notice hereof."
The COMELEC complied therewith by filing before the Court, on December 26, 1995, a report entitled
"EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES and COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" wherein the COMELEC, after
calibrating the parties' evidence, declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the
main opinion of the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the
Consolidated Resolution. In arriving at this new conclusion, the COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a
material element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case
because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before
the criminal charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985).
But the COMELEC report did not end there. The poll body expressed what it describes as its
"persistent discomfort" on whether it read and applied correctly the MARQUEZ Decisiondefinition of
"fugitive from justice". So as not to miss anything, we quote the COMELEC's observations in full:

x x x. The main opinion's definition of a 'fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but also those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.' It
proceeded to state that:
This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary Third Edition, p. 399
by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King v. Noe, 244 SC 344; 137 SE 2d 102,
103; Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin v. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter 2d p. 792), and it
may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
But in the majority of the cases cited, the definition of the term 'fugitive from justice' contemplates other
instances not explicitly mentioned in the main opinion. Black's Law Dictionary begins the definition of
the term by referring to a 'fugitive from justice' as:
(A) person, who, having committed a crime, flees from jurisdiction of the court where crime was
committed or departs from his usual place of abode and conceals himself within the district. x x x
Then, citing King v. Noe, the definition continues and conceptualizes a 'fugitive from justice' as:
x x x a person who, having committed or been charged with a crime in one state, has left its jurisdiction
and is found within the territory of another when it is sought to subject him to the criminal process of the
former state. (our emphasis)
In Hughes v. Pflanz, the term was defined as:
a person who, having committed within a state a crime, when sought for, to be subjected to criminal
process, is found within the territory of another state.
Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. considers the term as an:
expression which refers to one having committed, or being accused, of a crime in one jurisdiction and is
absent for any reason from that jurisdiction.
Specifically, one who flees to avoid punishment x x x (Italics ours)
From the above rulings, it can be gleaned that the objective facts sufficient to constitute flight from justice
are: (a) a person committed a 'crime' or has been charged for the commission thereof; and (b) thereafter,
leaves the jurisdiction of the court where said crime was committed or his usual place of abode.
Filing of charges prior to flight is not always an antecedent requirement to label one a 'fugitive from
justice. Mere commission of a 'crime' without charges having been filed for the same and flight
subsequent thereto sufficiently meet the definition. Attention is directed at the use of the word 'crime'
which is not employed to connote guilt or conviction for the commission thereof. Justice Davide's
separate opinion in G.R. No. 112889 elucidates that the disqualification for being a fugitive does not
involve the issue of the presumption of innocence, the reason for disqualification being that a person 'was
not brought within the jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was
brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully evaded
service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification then is based on his flight
from justice.

Other rulings of the United States Supreme Court further amplify the view that intent and purpose for
departure is inconsequential to the inquiry. The texts, which are persuasive in our jurisdiction, are more
unequivocal in their pronouncements. In King v. US (144 F. 2nd 729), citing Roberts v. Reilly (116 US
80) the United States Supreme Court held:
x x x it is not necessary that the party should have left the state or the judicial district where the crime is
alleged to have been committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of avoiding an anticipated
prosecution, but that, having committed a crime within a state or district, he has left and is found in
another jurisdiction (Italics supplied)
Citing State v. Richter (37 Minn. 436), the Court further ruled in unmistakable language:
The simple fact that they (person who have committed crime within a state) are not within the state to
answer its criminal process when required renders them, in legal intendment, fugitives from justice.
THEREFORE, IT APPEARS THAT GIVEN THE AUTHORITIES CITED IN G.R. NO. 112889, THE
MERE FACT THAT THERE ARE PENDING CHARGES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THAT
PETITIONER RODRIGUEZ IS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAKE PETITIONER A 'FUGITIVE FROM
JUSTICE.'
From the foregoing discussions, the determination of whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from
justice hinges on whether or not Rodriguez' evidence shall be measured against the two instances
mentioned in the main opinion, or is to be expanded as to include other situations alluded to by the
foreign jurisprudence cited by the Court. In fact, the spirited legal fray between the parties in this case
focused on each camp's attempt to construe the Court's definition so as to fit or to exclude petitioner
within the definition of a 'fugitive from justice'. Considering, therefore, the equally valid yet different
interpretations resulting from the Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. 112889, the Commission deems it
most conformable to said decision to evaluate the evidence in light of the varied constructions open to it
and to respectfully submit the final determination of the case to the Honorable Supreme Court as the final
interpreter of the law."
The instant petition dwells on that nagging issue of whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice, the
determination of which, as we have directed the COMELEC on two (2) occasions (in the MARQUEZ
Decision and in the Court's October 24, 1995 Resolution), must conform to how such term has been defined
by the Court in the MARQUEZ Decision. To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice":
"x x x includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution."
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from
a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment
when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated
judgment of conviction.
Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines
from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April
27[3] and June 26 of 1995,[4] preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on
November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by
almost five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint
and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant much
less conviction to speak of yet at such time. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez
deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from

justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found in the circumstances of
Rodriguez.
With that, the Court gives due credit to the COMELEC in having made the. same analysis in its "x x x
COMMISSION'S EVALUATION". There are, in fact, other observations consistent with such analysis made
by the poll body that are equally formidable so as to merit their adoption as part of this decision, to wit:
"It is acknowledged that there was an attempt by private respondent to show Rodriguez' intent to evade
the law. This was done by offering for admission a voluminous copy of an investigation report (Exhibits I
to I-17 and J to J-87 inclusive) on the alleged crimes committed which led to the filing of the charges
against petitioner. It was offered for the sole purpose of establishing the fact that it was impossible for
petitioner not to have known of said investigation due to its magnitude. Unfortunately, such conclusion
misleads because investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive or prolonged, are shrouded with
utmost secrecy to afford law enforcers the advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those who would
be charged. Otherwise, the indiscreet conduct of the investigation would be nothing short of a well-
publicized announcement to the perpetrators of the imminent filing of charges against them. And having
been forewarned, every effort to sabotage the investigation may be resorted to by its intended objects.But
if private respondent's attempt to show Rodriguez' intent to evade the law at the time he left the United
States has any legal consequence at all, it will be nothing more than proof that even private respondent
accepts that intent to evade the law is a material element in the definition of a fugitive.
"The circumstantial fact that it was seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez' departure that charges against
him were filed cannot overturn the presumption of good faith in his favor. The same suggests nothing
more than the sequence of events which transpired. A subjective fact as that of petitioner's purpose cannot
be inferred from the objective data at hand in the absence of further proof to substantiate such claim.In
fact, the evidence of petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his compulsion to return to the
Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns against
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. For indeed, not long after petitioner's arrival in the country, the
upheaval wrought by the political forces and the avalanche of events which occurred resulted in one of
the more colorful events in Philippine history. The EDSA Revolution led to the ouster of former Pres.
Marcos and precipitated changes in the political climate. And being a figure in these developments,
petitioner Rodriguez began serving his home province as OIC-Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986. Then, he was elected Governor in 1988 and continues to be involved in
politics in the same capacity as re-elected Governor in 1992 and the disputed re-election in
1995. Altogether, these landmark dates hem in for petitioner a period of relentless, intensive and
extensive activity of varied political campaigns first against the Marcos government, then for the
governorship. And serving the people of Quezon province as such, the position entails absolute dedication
of one's time to the demands of the office.
"Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be filed against him at the time he
left the United States, it becomes immaterial under such construction to determine the exact time when he
was made aware thereof. While the law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, does not countenance flight
from justice in the instance that a person flees the jurisdiction of another state after charges against him or
a warrant for his arrest was issued or even in view of the imminent filing and issuance of the same,
petitioner's plight is altogether a different situation. When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a
state not his own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him while in the
relative peace and service of his own country, the fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction
of the former state does not qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice.
"The severity of the law construed in the manner as to require of a person that he subject himself to the
jurisdiction of another state while already in his country or else be disqualified from office, is more

apparent when applied in petitioner's case. The criminal process of the United States extends only within
its territorial jurisdiction. That petitioner has already left said country when the latter sought to subject
him to its criminal process is hardly petitioner's fault. In the absence of an intent to evade the laws of the
United States, petitioner had every right to depart therefrom at the precise time that he did and to return to
the Philippines. No justifiable reason existed to curtail or fetter petitioner's exercise of his right to leave
the United State and return home. Hence, sustaining the contrary proposition would be to unduly burden
and punish petitioner for exercising a right as he cannot be faulted for the circumstances that brought him
within Philippine territory at the time he was sought to be placed under arrest and to answer for charges
filed against him.
"Granting, as the evidence warrants, that petitioner Rodriguez came to know of the charges only later, and
under his circumstances, is there a law that requires petitioner to travel to the United States and subject
himself to the monetary burden and tedious process of defending himself before the country's courts?
"It must be noted that moral uprightness is not a standard too far-reaching as to demand of political
candidate the performance of duties and obligations that are supererogatory in nature. We do not dispute
that an alleged 'fugitive from justice' must perform acts in order not to be so categorized. Clearly, a person
who is aware of the imminent filing of charges against him or of the same already filed in connection with
acts he committed in the jurisdiction of a particular state, is under an obligation not to flee said place of
commission. However, as in petitioner's case, his departure from the United States may not place him
under a similar obligation. His subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and non-submission to the
jurisdiction of the former country does not operate to label petitioner automatically a fugitive from
justice. As he was a public officer appointed and elected immediately after his return to the country,
petitioner Rodriguez had every reason to devote utmost priority to the service of his office. He could not
have gone back to the United States in the middle of his term nor could he have traveled intermittently
thereto without jeopardizing the interest of the public he serves. To require that of petitioner would be to
put him in a paradoxical quandary where he is compelled to violate the very functions of his office."
However, Marquez and the COMELEC (in its "COMMISSION'S EVALUATION" as earlier quoted)
seem to urge the Court to re-define "fugitive from justice." They espouse the broader concept of the term
as culled from foreign authorities (mainly of U.S. vintage) cited in the MARQUEZ Decision itself, i.e., that
one becomes a "fugitive from justice" by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is
pending against him, regardless of whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight.
Suffice it to say that the "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded re-definition
of "fugitive from justice" (which is at variance with the MARQUEZ Decision) and proceed therefrom in
resolving the instant petition. The various definitions of that doctrine have been laid down in
People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992, 999, to wit:
"'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it
means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the
same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or
not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before
the court." (21 C.J.S. 330)
"It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding
appeal is substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or
issues adjudicated on the prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be
considered or readjudicated therein." (5 C.J.S. 1267)

"In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where, after a definite determination, the
court has remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse to examine question other than those
arising subsequently to such determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance with
its mandate; and if the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions of the
appellate court, its action will not be questioned on a second appeal.
"As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the law of the case whether
that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a
rehearing." (5 C.J.S. 1276-77).
"Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the
case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court,
as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due
consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion." (5 C.J.S. 1286-87).
To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive
from justice") are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition.The MARQUEZ Decision was
an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 (the Marquez' quo warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant
petition is also an appeal from EPC No. 92-28 although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly with SPA
No. 95-089 (Marquez' petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And
we specifically refer to the concept of "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ
Decision which highlights the significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC,
with their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize.
Besides, to re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when
hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.
To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a
person seeking to run for any elective local position under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code,
should be understood according to the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:
"A 'fugitive from justice' includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." (Italics ours.)"
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already
been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight.Not being a "fugitive from
justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
Resolutions of the COMELEC dated May 7, 1995 (Consolidated Resolution), May 11, 1995 (Resolution
suspending Rodriguez' proclamation) and June 23, 1995 (Resolution nullifying Rodriguez' proclamation
and ordering the Quezon Province Provincial Board of Canvassers to explain why they should not be cited
in contempt) are SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Vitug, J., dissents.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.

[1]
243 SCRA 538, 542.
[2]
COMELEC Consolidated Resolution, Rollo, pp. 95-96.
[3]
Rollo, p. 164.
[4]
Rollo, p. 476.

FIRST DIVISION
AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., G.R. No. 170432
CECILIA P. FRANCIA,
AND HEIRS OF BENJAMIN
P. FRANCIA, Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
- v e r s u s - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.
MUNICIPALITY OF
MEYCAUAYAN,
Respondent. Promulgated:
March 24, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On February 6, 2003, respondent Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan filed a complaint for
expropriation[1] against petitioners Amos P. Francia, Jr., Cecilia P. Francia and Benjamin P. Francia[2] in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16. Respondent needed petitioners' 16,256 sq. m.
idle property at the junction of the North Expressway, Malhacan-Iba-Camalig main road artery and the

MacArthur Highway.[3] It planned to use it to establish a common public terminal for all types of public utility
vehicles with a weighing scale for heavy trucks.
In their answer,[4] petitioners denied that the property sought to be expropriated was raw land. It was in fact
developed[5] and there were plans for further development. For this reason, respondents offer price
of P2,333,500 (or P111.99 per square meter) was too low.
After trial, the RTC ruled that the expropriation was for a public purpose. The construction of a common
terminal for all public utility conveyances (serving as a two-way loading and unloading point for commuters
and goods) would improve the flow of vehicular traffic during rush hours. Moreover, the property was the
best site for the proposed terminal because of its accessibility. Thus, on November 8, 2004, the RTC issued
the following order:[6]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, after [respondent] has deposited with this Court the fifteen percent (15%)
of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated,
it may take immediate possession of the property upon issuance of writ of possession that this court will issue
for that purpose.
Further, the purposes of assessment and determination of the area needed that will suit the purpose of
expropriation and just compensation of the lot sought to be expropriated, the court hereby appoints
commissioners to be composed of the officer-in-charge of this court, Lerida Socorro E. Joson and one each
from [respondent] and [petitioners].
Notify all parties concerned.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the November 8, 2004 order but the motion was denied in an
order dated January 31, 2005.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) contending that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its November 8, 2004 and January 31, 2005 orders. They
claimed that the trial court issued the orders without conducting a hearing to determine the existence of a
public purpose.
On July 28, 2005, the CA rendered a decision[8] partially granting the petition. Finding that petitioners were
deprived of an opportunity to controvert respondent's allegations, the appellate court nullified the order of
expropriation except with regard to the writ of possession. According to the CA, a hearing was not necessary
because once the expropriator deposited the required amount (with the Court), the issuance of a writ of
possession became ministerial.
Petitioners moved for partial reconsideration but their motion was denied. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioners essentially aver that the CA erred in upholding the RTC's orders that, in expropriation cases,
prior determination of the existence of a public purpose was not necessary for the issuance of a writ of
possession.
We deny the petition.
Section 19 of Republic Act 7160[9] provides:
Section 19. Eminent Domain. ― A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant
to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
and pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and that such offer was not accepted; Provided,
further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing
of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property

to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property. (emphasis
supplied)[10]
Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be expropriated, it
must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the proper court and (2) deposit
with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value based on its current tax
declaration.[11] The law does not make the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the
issuance of a writ of possession.[12]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO ADOLFO S. AZCUNA


TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 296-M-2003. Annex G, rollo, pp. 146-152. The complaint was filed pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 2002-14
authorizing the Municipality of Meycauayan to institute expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of petitioners' property. The said
ordinance was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Bulacan in Kapasiyahan Blg. 376-T on August 15, 2002.
[2]
Petitioner Benjamin P. Francia was substituted by his heirs upon his death pursuant to Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court.
[3]
Covered by TCT No. 123604 (M).
[4]
Annex H, rollo, pp. 153-160.
[5]
Among its improvements were a Caltex gasoline station and a hollow blocks factory.
[6]
Penned by Judge Thelma R. Pinero-Cruz. Annex B, rollo, pp. 124-126.
[7]
Id., p. 126.
[8]
Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Santiago Javier Ranada (retired) of the
Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals. Dated July 28, 2005. Id., pp. 106-123.
[9]
The Local Government Code of 1991.
[10]
Cf. Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7160, Rule VI, Art. 36:
Article 36. Expropriation proceedings. (a) If the [local government unit (LGU)] fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose or welfare through
purchase, LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation
proceedings.
(b) The local chief executive shall cause the provincial, city, or municipal attorney concerned or, in his absence, the provincial or city prosecutor, to file
expropriation proceedings in the proper court in accordance with the Rules of Court and other pertinent laws.
(c) The LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the
proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated. (emphasis supplied)
[11]
See Robern Development Corporation v. Judge Quitain, 373 Phil. 773, 794-801 (1999). See also Biglang-awa v. Hon. Bacalla, 399 Phil. 308, 317-
325 (2000).
[12]
City of Iloilo v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 154614, 25 November 2004, 444 SCRA 269, 283 citing City of Manila v. Serrano, 412 Phil. 754, 763 (2001).

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142971. May 7, 2002]
THE CITY OF CEBU, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES APOLONIO and BLASA

DEDAMO, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In its petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner City
of Cebu assails the decision of 11 October 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
59204[1] affirming the judgment of 7 May 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Cebu City, in Civil
Case No. CEB-14632, a case for eminent domain, which fixed the valuation of the land subject thereof on
the basis of the recommendation of the commissioners appointed by it.
The material operative facts are not disputed.
On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed in Civil Case No. CEB-14632 a complaint for
eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. The petitioner alleged therein
that it needed the following parcels of land of respondents, to wit:
Lot No. 1527
Area----------------------------1,146 square meters

Tax Declaration---------------03472
Title No.-----------------------31833
Market value------------------P240,660.00
Assessed Value---------------P72,200.00
Lot No. 1528
Area--------------------------------------------------------793 square meters

Area sought to be-----------------------------------------478 square meters expropriated
Tax Declaration-------------------------------------------03450
Title No. ---------------------------------------------------31832
Market value for the whole lot--------------------------P1,666,530.00
Market value of the Area to be expropriated----------P100,380.00
Assessed Value--------------------------------------------P49,960.00
for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of
Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel
Roads in Cebu City. The lots are the most suitable site for the purpose. The total area sought to be
expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an assessed value of P1,786,400. Petitioner deposited with the
Philippine National Bank the amount of P51,156 representing 15% of the fair market value of the property
to enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of the property pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No.
7160.[2]

Respondents, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the purpose for which their property
was to be expropriated was not for a public purpose but for benefit of a single private entity, the Cebu
Holdings, Inc. Petitioner could simply buy directly from them the property at its fair market value if it wanted
to, just like what it did with the neighboring lots. Besides, the price offered was very low in light of the
consideration of P20,000 per square meter, more or less, which petitioner paid to the neighboring
lots. Finally, respondents alleged that they have no other land in Cebu City.
A pre-trial was thereafter had.
On 23 August 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The motion was granted by the trial court on 21 September 1994.[3]
On 14 December 1994, the parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement [4] wherein
they declared that they have partially settled the case and in consideration thereof they agreed:
1. That the SECOND PARTY hereby conforms to the intention to [sic] the FIRST PARTY in expropriating
their parcels of land in the above-cited case as for public purpose and for the benefit of the general
public;
2. That the SECOND PARTY agrees to part with the ownership of the subject parcels of land in favor of the
FIRST PARTY provided the latter will pay just compensation for the same in the amount determined by
the court after due notice and hearing;
3. That in the meantime the SECOND PARTY agrees to receive the amount of ONE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (1,786,400.00) as provisional payment
for the subject parcels of land, without prejudice to the final valuation as maybe determined by the court;
4. That the FIRST PARTY in the light of the issuance of the Writ of Possession Order dated September 21,
1994 issued by the Honorable Court, agreed to take possession over that portion of the lot sought to be
expropriated where the house of the SECOND PARTY was located only after fifteen (15) days upon the
receipt of the SECOND PARTY of the amount of P1,786,400.00;
5. That the SECOND PARTY upon receipt of the aforesaid provisional amount, shall turn over to the FIRST
PARTY the title of the lot and within the lapse of the fifteen (15) days grace period will voluntarily demolish
their house and the other structure that may be located thereon at their own expense;
6. That the FIRST PARTY and the SECOND PARTY jointly petition the Honorable Court to render judgment
in said Civil Case No. CEB-14632 in accordance with this AGREEMENT;
7. That the judgment sought to be rendered under this agreement shall be followed by a supplemental
judgment fixing the just compensation for the property of the SECOND PARTY after the Commissioners
appointed by this Honorable Court to determine the same shall have rendered their report and approved
by the court.
Pursuant to said agreement, the trial court appointed three commissioners to determine the just
compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated. The commissioners were Palermo M. Lugo, who was
nominated by petitioner and who was designated as Chairman; Alfredo Cisneros, who was nominated by
respondents; and Herbert E. Buot, who was designated by the trial court. The parties agreed to their
appointment.
Thereafter, the commissioners submitted their report, which contained their respective assessments
of and recommendation as to the valuation of the property.
On the basis of the commissioners report and after due deliberation thereon, the trial court rendered
its decision on 7 May 1996,[5] the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in accordance with the
report of the commissioners.
Plaintiff is directed to pay Spouses Apolonio S. Dedamo and Blasa Dedamo the sum of pesos:
TWENTY FOUR MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND AND NINE HUNDRED
THIRTY (P24,865.930.00) representing the compensation mentioned in the Complaint.

Plaintiff and defendants are directed to pay the following commissioners fee;
1. To Palermo Lugo - P21,000.00

2. To Herbert Buot - P19,000.00
3. To Alfredo Cisneros - P19,000.00
Without pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the commissioners report was
inaccurate since it included an area which was not subject to expropriation. More specifically, it contended
that Lot No. 1528 contains 793 square meters but the actual area to be expropriated is only 478 square
meters. The remaining 315 square meters is the subject of a separate expropriation proceeding in Civil
Case No. CEB-8348, then pending before Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
On 16 August 1996, the commissioners submitted an amended assessment for the 478 square meters
of Lot No. 1528 and fixed it at P12,824.10 per square meter, or in the amount of P20,826,339.50. The
assessment was approved as the just compensation thereof by the trial court in its Order of 27 December
1996.[6] Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the decision was amended to reflect the new valuation.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No.
59204. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation
at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property
at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals. In its decision of 11 October 1999,[7] the Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Still unsatisfied, petitioner filed with us the petition for review in the case at bar. It raises the sole issue
of whether just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. It asserts
that it should be, which in this case should be 17 September 1993 and not at the time the property was
actually taken in 1994, pursuant to the decision in National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals.[8]
In their Comment, respondents maintain that the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision
of the trial court because (1) the trial court decided the case on the basis of the agreement of the parties
that just compensation shall be fixed by commissioners appointed by the court; (2) petitioner did not
interpose any serious objection to the commissioners report of 12 August 1996 fixing the just compensation
of the 1,624-square meter lot at P20,826,339.50; hence, it was estopped from attacking the report on which
the decision was based; and (3) the determined just compensation fixed is even lower than the actual value
of the property at the time of the actual taking in 1994.
Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is the
Governments right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public
use or purpose.[9] However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation as
consideration therefor.
In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just
compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of actual taking. The Section reads as follows:
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. -- A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite

offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided,
further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon
the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided finally, That, the amount to be paid for
the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
value at the time of the taking of the property.
The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals.[10] We did not
categorically rule in that case that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the
complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just compensation in
eminent domain is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule admits of
an exception: where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date
of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
Also, the trial court followed the then governing procedural law on the matter, which was Section 5 of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which provided as follows:
SEC. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. -- Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the
court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first
session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and specify the time within which their
report is to be filed with the court.
More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by
them, agreed to be bound by the report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement
is a contract between the parties. It has the force of law between them and should be complied with in good
faith. Article 1159 and 1315 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:
Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting
parties and should be complied with in good faith.
Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the parties are
bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the
consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and
law.
Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996, petitioner did not interpose a serious
objection.[11] It is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now without violating the principle
of equitable estoppel. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by
his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another
to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be
prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. [12] Records show that petitioner
consented to conform with the valuation recommended by the commissioners. It cannot detract from its
agreement now and assail correctness of the commissioners assessment.
Finally, while Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be
determined at the time of the filing of the complaint for expropriation,[13]such law cannot prevail over R.A.
7160, which is a substantive law.[14]
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 59204, the petition in this case is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, 20-25. Per Montoya, S., J., ponente with Vasquez, Jr., C. and Regino, T., JJ., concurring.
[2]
Entitled The Local Government Code of 1991.
[3]
Rollo, 60.
[4]
Annex 1 of Comment, Rollo, 57-58.
[5]
Rollo, 60-63. Per judgment of Judge Meinrado P. Paredes.
[6]
Rollo, 64.
[7]
Supra note 1.
[8]
254 SCRA 577 [1996].
[9]
Moday v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 586, 592 [1997].
[10]
Supra note 8.
[11]
Rollo, 64, Per Order of Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, 27 December 1996.
[12]
Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 88, 93 [1999]; Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 309,
314 [1999].
[13]
SEC 4. Order of condemnation. -- When such motion is overruled or when any party fails to defend as required by this rule, the
court may enter an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,
for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint. xxx (emphasis, ours).
[14]
See Philippine National Bank v. Independent Planters Association, Inc., 122 SCRA 113 [1983].

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978
LAUDENCIO TORIO, GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA, MANUEL DE GUZMAN, ALFONSO R.

MAGSANOC, JESUS MACARANAS, MAXIMO MANANGAN, FIDEL MONTEMAYOR, MELCHOR
VIRAY, RAMON TULAGAN, all Members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui in 1959,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan, petitioners,
vs.
ROSALINA, ANGELINA, LEONARDO, EDUARDO, ARTEMIO, ANGELITA, ANITA, ERNESTO,
NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-30183 October 23, 1978
MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI, petitioner,

vs.
NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and the
Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Julian M. Armas, Assistant Provincial Fiscal for petitioners.
Isidro L. Padilla for respondents.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
These Petitions for review present the issue of whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta
authorized by a municipal council under Sec. 2282 of the Municipal Law as embodied in the Revised
Administrative Code is a governmental or a corporate or proprietary function of the municipality.
A resolution of that issue will lead to another, viz the civil liability for damages of the Municipality of
Malasiqui, and the members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, for a
death which occurred during the celebration of the town fiesta on January 22, 1959, and which was
attributed to the negligence of the municipality and its council members.
The following facts are not in dispute:
On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159
whereby "it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and
23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive
Committee" which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage, with Jose
Macaraeg as Chairman. the council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2
stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan Jose Macaraeg supervised the
construction of the stage and as constructed the stage for the "zarzuela" was "5-½ meters by 8

meters in size, had a wooden floor high at the rear and was supported by 24 bamboo posts — 4 in a
row in front, 4 in the rear and 5 on each side — with bamboo braces." 1
The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui

employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe arrived in the evening of
January 22 for the performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The
program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons went
up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the
stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath.
Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the
following day.
The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 11, 1959 to recover damages. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of
Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the individual members of the Municipal
Council in 1959.
Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a
legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a
town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer
for the negligence of any of its agents.
The defendant councilors inturn maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in
carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration
and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit;
furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. 2
After trial, the Presiding Judge, Hon. Gregorio T. Lantin narrowed the issue to whether or not the
defendants exercised due diligence 'm the construction of the stage. From his findings he arrived at
the conclusion that the Executive Committee appointed by the municipal council had exercised due
diligence and care like a good father of the family in selecting a competent man to construct a stage
strong enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed that was due to forces beyond the control of
the committee on entertainment, consequently, the defendants were not liable for damages for the
death of Vicente Fontanilla. The complaint was accordingly dismissed in a decision dated July 10,
1962. 3
The Fontanillas appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision Promulgated on October 31, 1968,
the Court of Appeals through its Fourth Division composed at the time of Justices Salvador V.
Esguerra, Nicasio A. Yatco and Eulogio S. Serrano reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all
the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of
P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages: P1200.00 its attorney's fees; and the costs. 4
The case is now before Us on various assignments of errors all of which center on the proposition
stated at the sentence of this Opinion and which We repeat:
Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the excercise of a municipality's governmental or

public function or is it or a private or proprietary character?
1. Under Philippine laws municipalities are political bodies corporate and as such ag endowed with
the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal
governments in conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter alia sue and
be sued, and contract and be contracted with. 5

The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public, governmental or political on the one
hand, and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised
by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they
include the legislative, judicial public, and political Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised
for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial
private and corporate. 6
As to when a certain activity is governmental and when proprietary or private, that is generally a
difficult matter to determine. The evolution of the municipal law in American Jurisprudence, for
instance, has shown that; none of the tests which have evolved and are stated in textbooks have set
down a conclusive principle or rule, so that each case will have to be determined on the basis of
attending circumstances.
In McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has
... a public character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private
(so-called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community. 7
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo v. Loy, decided by the Supreme Court of
Indiana in 1916, thus:
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In
one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance
of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental Their
officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by the are
nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are
officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities
exercise a private. proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal
persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of
such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or in. individual
capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power. (112 N. E 994-995)
In the early Philippine case of Mendoza v. de Leon 1916, the Supreme Court, through Justice Grant
T. Trent, relying mainly on American Jurisprudence classified certain activities of the municipality as
governmental, e.g.: regulations against fire, disease, preservation of public peace, maintenance of
municipal prisons, establishment of schools, post-offices, etc. while the following are corporate or
proprietary in character, viz: municipal waterwork, slaughter houses, markets, stables, bathing
establishments, wharves, ferries, and fisheries. 8 Maintenance of parks, golf courses, cemeteries and
airports among others, are also recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary character. 9
2. This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the
municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no
recovery, as a rule, can be. had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the
matter,10 nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that
they did not act wantonly and maliciously. 11 In Palafox, et al., v. Province of Ilocos Norte, et
al., 1958, a truck driver employed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte ran over Proceto
Palafox in the course of his work at the construction of a road. The Supreme Court in affirming the
trial court's dismissal of the complaint for damages held that the province could not be made liable
because its employee was in the performance of a governmental function — the construction and
maintenance of roads — and however tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed
on the province no duty to pay monetary consideration. 12

With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held
liable to third persons ex contract 13 or ex delicto. 14
Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. ...
xxx xxx xxx
the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or fine of his
employment, by which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured.
Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of
this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the
requisite elements of liability co-exist. ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed.
Sec. 1610,1647, cited in Mendoza v. de Leon, supra. 514)
3. Coming to the cam before Us, and applying the general tests given above, We hold that the ho of
the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or
proprietary function of the municipality.
Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. — fiesta may be held in each municipality not
oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council A fiesta s not be
held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for weighty
reasons, such as typhoons, foundations, earthquakes, epidemics, or other public
ties, the fiesta cannot be hold in the date fixed in which case it may be held at a later
date in the same year, by resolution of the council.
This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not
impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a
religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community
and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The
mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide
entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of
parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from
the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.
As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an
undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to
be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the
undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence, otherwise. the function becomes private or
proprietary in character. Easily, no overnmental or public policy of the state is involved in the
celebration of a town fiesta. 15
4. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is to be held liable
for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was at- tributable to the negligence of the
municipality's officers, employees, or agents.
Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . .

Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. . .
On this point, the Court of Appeals found and held that there was negligence.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Angel Novado, a witness of the defendants (now
petitioners), that a member of the "extravaganza troupe removed two principal braces located on the
front portion of the stage and u them to hang the screen or "telon", and that when many people went
up the stage the latter collapsed. This testimony was not believed however by respondent appellate
court, and rightly so. According to said defendants, those two braces were "mother" or "principal"
braces located semi-diagonally from the front ends of the stage to the front posts of the ticket booth
located at the rear of the stage and were fastened with a bamboo twine. 16 That being the case, it
becomes incredible that any person in his right mind would remove those principal braces and leave
the front portion of the stage practically unsuported Moreover, if that did happen, there was indeed
negligence as there was lack of suspension over the use of the stage to prevent such an
occurrence.
At any rate, the guitarist who was pointed to by Novado as the person who removed the two bamboo
braces denied having done go. The Court of Appeals said "Amor by himself alone could not have
removed the two braces which must be about ten meters long and fastened them on top of the stags
for the curtain. The stage was only five and a half meters wide. Surely, it, would be impractical and
unwieldy to use a ten meter bamboo pole, much more two poles for the stage curtain. 17
The appellate court also found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00
was appropriate for the construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of
wooden planks, the Post and braces used were of bamboo material We likewise observe that
although the stage was described by the Petitioners as being supported by "24" posts, nevertheless
there were only 4 in front, 4 at the rear, and 5 on each side. Where were the rest?
The Court of Appeals thus concluded
The court a quo itself attributed the collapse of the stage to the great number of
onlookers who mounted the stage. The municipality and/or its agents had the
necessary means within its command to prevent such an occurrence. Having filed to
take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage for the use of the
participants in the stage presentation prepared in connection with the celebration of
the town fiesta, particularly, in preventing non participants or spectators from
mounting and accumulating on the stage which was not constructed to meet the
additional weight- the defendant-appellees were negligent and are liable for the
death of Vicente Fontanilla . (pp. 30-31, rollo, L-29993)
The findings of the respondent appellate court that the facts as presented to it establish negligence
as a matter of law and that the Municipality failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of
the family, will not disturbed by Us in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion or a
gross misapprehension of facts." 18
Liability rests on negligence which is "the want of such care as a person of ordinary prudence would
exercise under the circumstances of the case." 19
Thus, private respondents argue that the "Midas Extravaganza" which was to be performed during
the town fiesta was a "donation" offered by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila

Railroad Co. in Caloocan, and that when the Municipality of Malasiqui accepted the donation of
services and constructed precisely a "zarzuela stage" for the purpose, the participants in the stage
show had the right to expect that the Municipality through its "Committee on entertainment and
stage" would build or put up a stage or platform strong enough to sustain the weight or burden of the
performance and take the necessary measures to insure the personal safety of the
participants. 20 We agree.
Quite relevant to that argument is the American case of Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 1942, which
was an action against the city for injuries sustained from a fall when plaintiff was descending the
steps of the city auditorium. The city was conducting a "Know your City Week" and one of the
features was the showing of a motion picture in the city auditorium to which the general public was
invited and plaintiff Sanders was one of those who attended. In sustaining the award for Damages in
favor of plaintiff, the District Court of Appeal, Second district, California, held inter alia that the "Know
your City Week" was a "proprietary activity" and not a "governmental one" of the city, that defendant
owed to plaintiff, an invitee the duty of exercising ordinary care for her safety, and plaintiff was
entitled to assume that she would not be exposed to a danger (which in this case consisted of lack of
sufficient illumination of the premises) that would come to her through a violation of defendant duty. 21
We can say that the deceased Vicente Fontanilla was similarly situated as Sander The Municipality
of Malasiqui resolved to celebrate the town fiesta in January of 1959; it created a committee in
charge of the entertainment and stage; an association of Malasiqui residents responded to the call
for the festivities and volunteered to present a stage show; Vicente Fontanilla was one of the
participants who like Sanders had the right to expect that he would be exposed to danger on that
occasion.
Lastly, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the c that it was
Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council
appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the
construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under
the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the
negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks. 22
... when it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants or agents, a
cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants or agents of the corporation. If the corporation
appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge of their duties, can continue or remove
the can hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those duties
relate to the exercise of corporate powers, and are for the benefit of the corporation in its local or
special interest, they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants, and the maxim of respondent
superior applies." ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed., Vol IV, p. 2879)
5. The remaining question to be resolved centers on the liability of the municipal councilors who
enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee.
The Court of Appeals held the councilors jointly and solidarity liable with the municipality for
damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code which provides that d any person suffering ing material
or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause to
perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief at the latter. 23
In their Petition for review the municipal councilors allege that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the holding of a town fiesta is not a governmental function and that there was negligence on
their part for not maintaining and supervising the safe use of the stage, in applying Article 27 of the

Civil Code against them and in not holding Jose Macaraeg liable for the collapse of the stage and
the consequent death of Vicente Fontanilla. 24
We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code
against the for this particular article covers a case of nonfeasance or non-performance by a public
officer of his official duty; it does not apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an
official duty.
If We are led to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as these petitioners are
concerned, it is because of a plain error committed by respondent court which however is not
invoked in petitioners' brief.
In Miguel v. The Court of appeal. et al., the Court, through Justice, now Chief Justice, Fred Ruiz
Castro, held that the Supreme Court is vested with ample authority to review matters not assigned
as errors in an appeal if it finds that their consideration and resolution are indispensable or
necessary in arriving at a just decision in a given case, and that tills is author under Sec. 7, Rule 51
of the Rules of Court. 25 We believe that this pronouncement can well be applied in the instant case.
The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review held that the celebration of a town fiesta by
the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We upheld that ruling. The legal
consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private
corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle
that a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons
composing it 26 and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or
negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless there is a
showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. 27
xxx xxx xxx
The ordinary doctrine is that a director, merely by reason of his office, is not
personally Stable for the torts of his corporation; he Must be shown to have
personally voted for or otherwise participated in them ... Fletcher Encyclopedia
Corporations, Vol 3A Chapt 11, p. 207)
Officers of a corporation 'are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation
merely because of their official relation to it, but because of some wrongful or
negligent act by such officer amounting to a breach of duty which resulted in an injury
... To make an officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of the corporation
there must have been upon his part such a breach of duty as contributed to, or
helped to bring about, the injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in the
wrongful act. ... (pp. 207-208, Ibid.)
xxx xxx xxx
Directors who merely employ one to give a fireworks Ambition on the corporate are
not personally liable for the negligent acts of the exhibitor. (p. 211, Ibid.)
On these people We absolve Use municipal councilors from any liability for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla. The records do not show that said petitioners directly participated in the defective
construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the
platform.

6. One last point We have to resolve is on the award of attorney's fees by respondent court.
Petitioner-municipality assails the award.
Under paragraph 11, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be
granted when the court deems it just and equitable. In this case of Vicente Fontanilla, although
respondent appellate court failed to state the grounds for awarding attorney's fees, the records show
however that attempts were made by plaintiffs, now private respondents, to secure an extrajudicial
compensation from the municipality: that the latter gave prorases and assurances of assistance but
failed to comply; and it was only eight month after the incident that the bereaved family of Vicente
Fontanilla was compelled to seek relief from the courts to ventilate what was believed to be a just
cause. 28
We hold, therefore, that there is no error committed in the grant of attorney's fees which after all is a
matter of judicial discretion. The amount of P1,200.00 is fair and reasonable.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as the
Municipality of Malasiqui is concerned (L-30183), and We absolve the municipal councilors from
liability and SET ASIDE the judgment against them (L-9993).
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED,
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 pp- 3-4 of Petitioner's brief
2 pp. 35-37, rollo L-29993
3 pp- 42-44, Ibid
4 pp. 21-31, Ibid.
5 Sec. 2125, Art. 1, Municipal Law as embodied in the Revised Administrative Code.
6 Mendoza v. de In 33 Phil 508; 56 Am Jur 2d 254, sec 199; Martin on the Revised
Administrative Code, 1963 ed., pp. 482-483, citing Cooley's Municipal Corporation,
pp. 136-137.
7 2nd Ed. Vol 1, Sec. 12&, p. 381, cited in Dept. of Treasury v. City of Evansville,
Sup. Ct. of Indiana, 60 N.E. 2nd 952,954.
8 supra, p. 509
9 Dept. of Treasury v. City of Evansville. supra, p. 956

10 For instance, Art. 2189, Civil Code provides "Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries, suffered by,
any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. "
11 Mendoza v. de Leon, supra, p 513. In Palma v. Graciano, the City of Cebu, et al.,
99 Phil. 72, the Court held that although the prosecution of crimes is a governmental
function and as a rule the province and City of Cebu are not civilly liable by reason
thereof, nonetheless when public official goes beyond the scope of this duty,
particularly when acting tortiously, he is not entitled to protection on account of his
office but is liable for his acts like any private individual.
12 L-10659, January 31, 1958, Unrep 102 Phil. 1186
13 Municipality of Paoay Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, et al., 86 Phil. 629; Municipality of

Moncada v. Cajuigan et al., 21 Phil. 184
14 Mendoza v. de Leon, supra, p. 513
15 We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances

plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on
this question. The case of Pope v. City of New Haven et al, was an action to recover
damages for personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July fireworks display
resulting in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants'
negligence. The defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that the
city was engaged in the performance of a public governmental duty from which it
received no pecuniary benefit and for negligence, in i lie performance 4t which no
statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was sustained by the Superior Court of
New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to allege that the
celebration was for the corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming
the order, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connection held inter alia.
Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of
purely public governmental' duties, Illness made liable by statute ... "A municipal
corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statue, concluded a
public Court of July celebration, including a display, of fireworks, and sent up a bomb
intended to explode in the air, but which Jailed to explode until it reached the ground
and then killed a spectator, was engaged in the performance of a governmental duty.
(99 A.R. 51)
This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.
At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from ttis excerpt:
July 4th. or, when that date tails upon Sunday, July 5th. is made a public holiday,
called Independence Day, by our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have
similar statutes. While there is no United States statute making a similar provision,
the different departments of the government recognize, and have recognized since
the government was established, July 4th as a national holiday. 'Throughout the
country it has been recognized and celebrated as such. These celebrations,
calculated to entertain and instruct the people generally and to arouse and stimulate
patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently take the form of literary exercises

consisting of patriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution, accompartied by
a musical program including patriotic airs sometimes preceded by the firing of
cannon and followed by fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the.
general public and their promotion a proper subject of legislation can hardly be
questioned. ... Ibid p. 52)
16 See page 8 of Court of Appeals decision, p. 28 rollo L-29993
17 p. 29, Ibid. Page 612
18 De Gala-Sison v. Manalo, 8 SCRA 595-, Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co 19

SCRA 289; Tan v. Court of Appeals, et al., 20 SCRA 54; Chan v. Court of Appeals,
et al., 33 SCRA 737, among others.
19 19 Cal Jur., P. 543; Corliss v. Manila Railroad Co., 27 SCRA 674 "
20 Respondents brief p. 70, rollo L-29993
21 129 P. 2d 511, 514
22 See page 8 of this Decision for quotation from Dillon on Municipal Corporations.
23 p. 31, rollo L-29993
24 pp. 1-3, petitioners brief
25 29 SCRA 760
26 Banque General Belge et al., v. Walter Bull & Co Inc. and Walter Bull, 47 Off.
Gaz., No. 1, 140
27 See Mindanao Motor Line, Inc. et al., v. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., L- 6 SCRA 710
28 pp. 34, 72-73, rollo L-29993

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29993 October 23, 1978
LAUDENCIO TORIO, GUILLERMO EVANGELISTA, MANUEL DE GUZMAN, ALFONSO R.

MAGSANOC, JESUS MACARANAS, MAXIMO MANANGAN, FIDEL MONTEMAYOR, MELCHOR
VIRAY, RAMON TULAGAN, all Members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui in 1959,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan, petitioners,
vs.
NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-30183 October 23, 1978
MUNICIPALITY OF MALASIQUI, petitioner,

vs.
NORMA, VIRGINIA, REMEDIOS and ROBERTO, all surnamed FONTANILLA, and the
Honorable COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Julian M. Armas, Assistant Provincial Fiscal for petitioners.
Isidro L. Padilla for respondents.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
These Petitions for review present the issue of whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta
authorized by a municipal council under Sec. 2282 of the Municipal Law as embodied in the Revised
Administrative Code is a governmental or a corporate or proprietary function of the municipality.
A resolution of that issue will lead to another, viz the civil liability for damages of the Municipality of
Malasiqui, and the members of the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, for a
death which occurred during the celebration of the town fiesta on January 22, 1959, and which was
attributed to the negligence of the municipality and its council members.
The following facts are not in dispute:
On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed Resolution No. 159
whereby "it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on January 21, 22, and
23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui 'Town Fiesta Executive
Committee" which in turn organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage, with Jose
Macaraeg as Chairman. the council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2
stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan Jose Macaraeg supervised the
construction of the stage and as constructed the stage for the "zarzuela" was "5-½ meters by 8

meters in size, had a wooden floor high at the rear and was supported by 24 bamboo posts — 4 in a
row in front, 4 in the rear and 5 on each side — with bamboo braces." 1
The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui

employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe arrived in the evening of
January 22 for the performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The
program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons went
up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the
stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath.
Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the
following day.
The heirs of Vicente Fontanilia filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 11, 1959 to recover damages. Named party-defendants were the Municipality of
Malasiqui, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the individual members of the Municipal
Council in 1959.
Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a
legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a
town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer
for the negligence of any of its agents.
The defendant councilors inturn maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in
carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration
and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit;
furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. 2
After trial, the Presiding Judge, Hon. Gregorio T. Lantin narrowed the issue to whether or not the
defendants exercised due diligence 'm the construction of the stage. From his findings he arrived at
the conclusion that the Executive Committee appointed by the municipal council had exercised due
diligence and care like a good father of the family in selecting a competent man to construct a stage
strong enough for the occasion and that if it collapsed that was due to forces beyond the control of
the committee on entertainment, consequently, the defendants were not liable for damages for the
death of Vicente Fontanilla. The complaint was accordingly dismissed in a decision dated July 10,
1962. 3
The Fontanillas appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision Promulgated on October 31, 1968,
the Court of Appeals through its Fourth Division composed at the time of Justices Salvador V.
Esguerra, Nicasio A. Yatco and Eulogio S. Serrano reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all
the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanilla the sums of
P12,000.00 by way of moral and actual damages: P1200.00 its attorney's fees; and the costs. 4
The case is now before Us on various assignments of errors all of which center on the proposition
stated at the sentence of this Opinion and which We repeat:
Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the excercise of a municipality's governmental or

public function or is it or a private or proprietary character?
1. Under Philippine laws municipalities are political bodies corporate and as such ag endowed with
the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal
governments in conformity with law, and in their proper corporate name, they may inter alia sue and
be sued, and contract and be contracted with. 5

The powers of a municipality are twofold in character public, governmental or political on the one
hand, and corporate, private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised
by the corporation in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they
include the legislative, judicial public, and political Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised
for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial
private and corporate. 6
As to when a certain activity is governmental and when proprietary or private, that is generally a
difficult matter to determine. The evolution of the municipal law in American Jurisprudence, for
instance, has shown that; none of the tests which have evolved and are stated in textbooks have set
down a conclusive principle or rule, so that each case will have to be determined on the basis of
attending circumstances.
In McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, the rule is stated thus: "A municipal corporation proper has
... a public character as regards the state at large insofar as it is its agent in government, and private
(so-called) insofar as it is to promote local necessities and conveniences for its own community. 7
Another statement of the test is given in City of Kokomo v. Loy, decided by the Supreme Court of
Indiana in 1916, thus:
Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In
one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance
of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental Their
officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by the are
nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are
officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities
exercise a private. proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal
persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of
such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or in. individual
capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power. (112 N. E 994-995)
In the early Philippine case of Mendoza v. de Leon 1916, the Supreme Court, through Justice Grant
T. Trent, relying mainly on American Jurisprudence classified certain activities of the municipality as
governmental, e.g.: regulations against fire, disease, preservation of public peace, maintenance of
municipal prisons, establishment of schools, post-offices, etc. while the following are corporate or
proprietary in character, viz: municipal waterwork, slaughter houses, markets, stables, bathing
establishments, wharves, ferries, and fisheries. 8 Maintenance of parks, golf courses, cemeteries and
airports among others, are also recognized as municipal or city activities of a proprietary character. 9
2. This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of determining the liability of the
municipality for the acts of its agents which result in an injury to third persons.
If the injury is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental function or duty no
recovery, as a rule, can be. had from the municipality unless there is an existing statute on the
matter,10 nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties honestly and in good faith or that
they did not act wantonly and maliciously. 11 In Palafox, et al., v. Province of Ilocos Norte, et
al., 1958, a truck driver employed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte ran over Proceto
Palafox in the course of his work at the construction of a road. The Supreme Court in affirming the
trial court's dismissal of the complaint for damages held that the province could not be made liable
because its employee was in the performance of a governmental function — the construction and
maintenance of roads — and however tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed
on the province no duty to pay monetary consideration. 12

With respect to proprietary functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held
liable to third persons ex contract 13 or ex delicto. 14
Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. ...
xxx xxx xxx
the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or fine of his
employment, by which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured.
Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of
this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the
requisite elements of liability co-exist. ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th ed.
Sec. 1610,1647, cited in Mendoza v. de Leon, supra. 514)
3. Coming to the cam before Us, and applying the general tests given above, We hold that the ho of
the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or
proprietary function of the municipality.
Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. — fiesta may be held in each municipality not
oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the municipal council A fiesta s not be
held upon any other date than that lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for weighty
reasons, such as typhoons, foundations, earthquakes, epidemics, or other public
ties, the fiesta cannot be hold in the date fixed in which case it may be held at a later
date in the same year, by resolution of the council.
This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not
impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a
religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the community
and not for the general welfare of the public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The
mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide
entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of
parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from
the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.
As stated earlier, there can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining the true nature of an
undertaking or function of a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to
be considered and will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the
undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence, otherwise. the function becomes private or
proprietary in character. Easily, no overnmental or public policy of the state is involved in the
celebration of a town fiesta. 15
4. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is to be held liable
for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was at- tributable to the negligence of the
municipality's officers, employees, or agents.
Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . .

Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. . .
On this point, the Court of Appeals found and held that there was negligence.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Angel Novado, a witness of the defendants (now
petitioners), that a member of the "extravaganza troupe removed two principal braces located on the
front portion of the stage and u them to hang the screen or "telon", and that when many people went
up the stage the latter collapsed. This testimony was not believed however by respondent appellate
court, and rightly so. According to said defendants, those two braces were "mother" or "principal"
braces located semi-diagonally from the front ends of the stage to the front posts of the ticket booth
located at the rear of the stage and were fastened with a bamboo twine. 16 That being the case, it
becomes incredible that any person in his right mind would remove those principal braces and leave
the front portion of the stage practically unsuported Moreover, if that did happen, there was indeed
negligence as there was lack of suspension over the use of the stage to prevent such an
occurrence.
At any rate, the guitarist who was pointed to by Novado as the person who removed the two bamboo
braces denied having done go. The Court of Appeals said "Amor by himself alone could not have
removed the two braces which must be about ten meters long and fastened them on top of the stags
for the curtain. The stage was only five and a half meters wide. Surely, it, would be impractical and
unwieldy to use a ten meter bamboo pole, much more two poles for the stage curtain. 17
The appellate court also found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00
was appropriate for the construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of
wooden planks, the Post and braces used were of bamboo material We likewise observe that
although the stage was described by the Petitioners as being supported by "24" posts, nevertheless
there were only 4 in front, 4 at the rear, and 5 on each side. Where were the rest?
The Court of Appeals thus concluded
The court a quo itself attributed the collapse of the stage to the great number of
onlookers who mounted the stage. The municipality and/or its agents had the
necessary means within its command to prevent such an occurrence. Having filed to
take the necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage for the use of the
participants in the stage presentation prepared in connection with the celebration of
the town fiesta, particularly, in preventing non participants or spectators from
mounting and accumulating on the stage which was not constructed to meet the
additional weight- the defendant-appellees were negligent and are liable for the
death of Vicente Fontanilla . (pp. 30-31, rollo, L-29993)
The findings of the respondent appellate court that the facts as presented to it establish negligence
as a matter of law and that the Municipality failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of
the family, will not disturbed by Us in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion or a
gross misapprehension of facts." 18
Liability rests on negligence which is "the want of such care as a person of ordinary prudence would
exercise under the circumstances of the case." 19
Thus, private respondents argue that the "Midas Extravaganza" which was to be performed during
the town fiesta was a "donation" offered by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila

Railroad Co. in Caloocan, and that when the Municipality of Malasiqui accepted the donation of
services and constructed precisely a "zarzuela stage" for the purpose, the participants in the stage
show had the right to expect that the Municipality through its "Committee on entertainment and
stage" would build or put up a stage or platform strong enough to sustain the weight or burden of the
performance and take the necessary measures to insure the personal safety of the
participants. 20 We agree.
Quite relevant to that argument is the American case of Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 1942, which
was an action against the city for injuries sustained from a fall when plaintiff was descending the
steps of the city auditorium. The city was conducting a "Know your City Week" and one of the
features was the showing of a motion picture in the city auditorium to which the general public was
invited and plaintiff Sanders was one of those who attended. In sustaining the award for Damages in
favor of plaintiff, the District Court of Appeal, Second district, California, held inter alia that the "Know
your City Week" was a "proprietary activity" and not a "governmental one" of the city, that defendant
owed to plaintiff, an invitee the duty of exercising ordinary care for her safety, and plaintiff was
entitled to assume that she would not be exposed to a danger (which in this case consisted of lack of
sufficient illumination of the premises) that would come to her through a violation of defendant duty. 21
We can say that the deceased Vicente Fontanilla was similarly situated as Sander The Municipality
of Malasiqui resolved to celebrate the town fiesta in January of 1959; it created a committee in
charge of the entertainment and stage; an association of Malasiqui residents responded to the call
for the festivities and volunteered to present a stage show; Vicente Fontanilla was one of the
participants who like Sanders had the right to expect that he would be exposed to danger on that
occasion.
Lastly, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the c that it was
Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council
appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in charge of the
construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under
the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the
negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks. 22
... when it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants or agents, a
cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants or agents of the corporation. If the corporation
appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge of their duties, can continue or remove
the can hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those duties
relate to the exercise of corporate powers, and are for the benefit of the corporation in its local or
special interest, they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants, and the maxim of respondent
superior applies." ... (Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed., Vol IV, p. 2879)
5. The remaining question to be resolved centers on the liability of the municipal councilors who
enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta committee.
The Court of Appeals held the councilors jointly and solidarity liable with the municipality for
damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code which provides that d any person suffering ing material
or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause to
perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief at the latter. 23
In their Petition for review the municipal councilors allege that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the holding of a town fiesta is not a governmental function and that there was negligence on
their part for not maintaining and supervising the safe use of the stage, in applying Article 27 of the

Civil Code against them and in not holding Jose Macaraeg liable for the collapse of the stage and
the consequent death of Vicente Fontanilla. 24
We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 27 of the Civil Code
against the for this particular article covers a case of nonfeasance or non-performance by a public
officer of his official duty; it does not apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying out an
official duty.
If We are led to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as these petitioners are
concerned, it is because of a plain error committed by respondent court which however is not
invoked in petitioners' brief.
In Miguel v. The Court of appeal. et al., the Court, through Justice, now Chief Justice, Fred Ruiz
Castro, held that the Supreme Court is vested with ample authority to review matters not assigned
as errors in an appeal if it finds that their consideration and resolution are indispensable or
necessary in arriving at a just decision in a given case, and that tills is author under Sec. 7, Rule 51
of the Rules of Court. 25 We believe that this pronouncement can well be applied in the instant case.
The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review held that the celebration of a town fiesta by
the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. We upheld that ruling. The legal
consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private
corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle
that a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons
composing it 26 and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or
negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless there is a
showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. 27
xxx xxx xxx
The ordinary doctrine is that a director, merely by reason of his office, is not
personally Stable for the torts of his corporation; he Must be shown to have
personally voted for or otherwise participated in them ... Fletcher Encyclopedia
Corporations, Vol 3A Chapt 11, p. 207)
Officers of a corporation 'are not held liable for the negligence of the corporation
merely because of their official relation to it, but because of some wrongful or
negligent act by such officer amounting to a breach of duty which resulted in an injury
... To make an officer of a corporation liable for the negligence of the corporation
there must have been upon his part such a breach of duty as contributed to, or
helped to bring about, the injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in the
wrongful act. ... (pp. 207-208, Ibid.)
xxx xxx xxx
Directors who merely employ one to give a fireworks Ambition on the corporate are
not personally liable for the negligent acts of the exhibitor. (p. 211, Ibid.)
On these people We absolve Use municipal councilors from any liability for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla. The records do not show that said petitioners directly participated in the defective
construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the
platform.

6. One last point We have to resolve is on the award of attorney's fees by respondent court.
Petitioner-municipality assails the award.
Under paragraph 11, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may be
granted when the court deems it just and equitable. In this case of Vicente Fontanilla, although
respondent appellate court failed to state the grounds for awarding attorney's fees, the records show
however that attempts were made by plaintiffs, now private respondents, to secure an extrajudicial
compensation from the municipality: that the latter gave prorases and assurances of assistance but
failed to comply; and it was only eight month after the incident that the bereaved family of Vicente
Fontanilla was compelled to seek relief from the courts to ventilate what was believed to be a just
cause. 28
We hold, therefore, that there is no error committed in the grant of attorney's fees which after all is a
matter of judicial discretion. The amount of P1,200.00 is fair and reasonable.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We AFFIRM in toto the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as the
Municipality of Malasiqui is concerned (L-30183), and We absolve the municipal councilors from
liability and SET ASIDE the judgment against them (L-9993).
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED,
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 pp- 3-4 of Petitioner's brief
2 pp. 35-37, rollo L-29993
3 pp- 42-44, Ibid
4 pp. 21-31, Ibid.
5 Sec. 2125, Art. 1, Municipal Law as embodied in the Revised Administrative Code.
6 Mendoza v. de In 33 Phil 508; 56 Am Jur 2d 254, sec 199; Martin on the Revised
Administrative Code, 1963 ed., pp. 482-483, citing Cooley's Municipal Corporation,
pp. 136-137.
7 2nd Ed. Vol 1, Sec. 12&, p. 381, cited in Dept. of Treasury v. City of Evansville,
Sup. Ct. of Indiana, 60 N.E. 2nd 952,954.
8 supra, p. 509
9 Dept. of Treasury v. City of Evansville. supra, p. 956

10 For instance, Art. 2189, Civil Code provides "Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and
municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries, suffered by,
any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. "
11 Mendoza v. de Leon, supra, p 513. In Palma v. Graciano, the City of Cebu, et al.,
99 Phil. 72, the Court held that although the prosecution of crimes is a governmental
function and as a rule the province and City of Cebu are not civilly liable by reason
thereof, nonetheless when public official goes beyond the scope of this duty,
particularly when acting tortiously, he is not entitled to protection on account of his
office but is liable for his acts like any private individual.
12 L-10659, January 31, 1958, Unrep 102 Phil. 1186
13 Municipality of Paoay Ilocos Norte v. Manaois, et al., 86 Phil. 629; Municipality of

Moncada v. Cajuigan et al., 21 Phil. 184
14 Mendoza v. de Leon, supra, p. 513
15 We came across an interesting case which shows that surrounding circumstances

plus the political, social, and cultural backgrounds may have a decisive bearing on
this question. The case of Pope v. City of New Haven et al, was an action to recover
damages for personal injuries caused during a Fourth of July fireworks display
resulting in the death of a bystander alleged to have been caused by defendants'
negligence. The defendants demurred to the complaint invoking the defense that the
city was engaged in the performance of a public governmental duty from which it
received no pecuniary benefit and for negligence, in i lie performance 4t which no
statutory liability is imposed. This demurrer was sustained by the Superior Court of
New Haven Country. Plaintiff sought to amend his complaint to allege that the
celebration was for the corporate advantage of the city. This was denied. In affirming
the order, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connection held inter alia.
Municipal corporations are exempt from liability for the negligent performance of
purely public governmental' duties, Illness made liable by statute ... "A municipal
corporation, which under permissive authority of its charter or of statue, concluded a
public Court of July celebration, including a display, of fireworks, and sent up a bomb
intended to explode in the air, but which Jailed to explode until it reached the ground
and then killed a spectator, was engaged in the performance of a governmental duty.
(99 A.R. 51)
This decision was concurred in by three Judges while two dissented.
At any rate the rationale of the Majority Opinion is evident from ttis excerpt:
July 4th. or, when that date tails upon Sunday, July 5th. is made a public holiday,
called Independence Day, by our statutes. All or nearly all of the other states have
similar statutes. While there is no United States statute making a similar provision,
the different departments of the government recognize, and have recognized since
the government was established, July 4th as a national holiday. 'Throughout the
country it has been recognized and celebrated as such. These celebrations,
calculated to entertain and instruct the people generally and to arouse and stimulate
patriotic sentiments and love of country, frequently take the form of literary exercises

consisting of patriotic speeches and the reading of the Constitution, accompartied by
a musical program including patriotic airs sometimes preceded by the firing of
cannon and followed by fireworks. That such celebrations are of advantage to the.
general public and their promotion a proper subject of legislation can hardly be
questioned. ... Ibid p. 52)
16 See page 8 of Court of Appeals decision, p. 28 rollo L-29993
17 p. 29, Ibid. Page 612
18 De Gala-Sison v. Manalo, 8 SCRA 595-, Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co 19

SCRA 289; Tan v. Court of Appeals, et al., 20 SCRA 54; Chan v. Court of Appeals,
et al., 33 SCRA 737, among others.
19 19 Cal Jur., P. 543; Corliss v. Manila Railroad Co., 27 SCRA 674 "
20 Respondents brief p. 70, rollo L-29993
21 129 P. 2d 511, 514
22 See page 8 of this Decision for quotation from Dillon on Municipal Corporations.
23 p. 31, rollo L-29993
24 pp. 1-3, petitioners brief
25 29 SCRA 760
26 Banque General Belge et al., v. Walter Bull & Co Inc. and Walter Bull, 47 Off.
Gaz., No. 1, 140
27 See Mindanao Motor Line, Inc. et al., v. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., L- 6 SCRA 710
28 pp. 34, 72-73, rollo L-29993

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No.
10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is being assailed for applying
Section 44 of the Local Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2
February 2011 is being questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco
(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado
applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition was issued in his favor.5
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.6
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I am a citizen, and I divest
myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of
America.

I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief.7
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, which contains, among others, the following statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true
faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.8
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections.9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that
he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American."10To further bolster his claim of
Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel
record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No.
057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the
country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010,
certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer
Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent
travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order13 requiring the respondent to
personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof.

After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and to present
evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado
garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate
for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the following
documents as evidence:14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated
03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his
family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated
03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado
went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office
of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from
January 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has
been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua
failed to present any evidence to support his contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not
conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local
Government Code."17
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim
that he is a Filipino citizen.18
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the requirements of R.A.
No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport after renouncing his US citizenship on
03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to
renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to
run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained
use of a US passport six times and his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and

renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined
as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in
foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not continue to
avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.19
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. Rommel C. Arnado’s
proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby
ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991
take effect.20
The Motion for Reconsideration and

the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on the ground that
"the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said Resolution is contrary to
law."21 He raised the following contentions:22
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the evidence consisting of
his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which show that he has substantially
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his American citizenship is
not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino citizenship, as he did not perform any act to
swear allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the issuance of his
Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and
the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for disqualification constitutes grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over
the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which
should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and
who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and
filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to
Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division
correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government
Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s

candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who
obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling, claiming that intervention is
prohibited after a decision has already been rendered, and that as a second-placer, Maquiling
undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final
adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protest even after the proclamation of the candidate whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which
allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after elections if no final judgment has
been rendered, but went on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be
prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of
the First Division allowing the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code
to take effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition as one for
disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period prescribed by law,24 having
been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First Division and granted
Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent embraced his
Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another country. It was at that time,
April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen prior to his
renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a US passport does not
operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case
of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The
petitioner in the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the conduct of
citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their
original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of allegiance to those who choose to
be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen
who chose greener pastures by working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in
the progress of Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the
mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.
xxxx

The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport. Although he
applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June 18, 2009. However, he was
not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get it about
three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine passport, the
respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the
respondent’s submission of a certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for
his travels on the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12,
2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US passport was
because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use. As probably
pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his control during that
time.25
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of
foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No.
63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in
this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either by birth or naturalization, it
is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption stands until he voluntarily
denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his
Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his
American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation.
Accordingly, all doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."26
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to
the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and enjoyment of all the privileges
of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to
his declaration that he chose to retain only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with
the twin requirements was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for
running for the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local
Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements; once any of them
is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. If a candidate is not a
citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is
disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for
the mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his
citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having received the
highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held that where a petition for
disqualification was filed before election against a candidate but was adversely resolved against him
after election, his having obtained the highest number of votes did not make his election valid. His
ouster from office does not violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the
application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when
they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who enacted the law.27
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT

Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for
public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed
as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc
for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a US passport, Maquiling now
seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public
office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the applicability of Section 44 of the
Local Government Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the
succession of the vice mayor in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be addressed seriatim as
the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is
applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a

disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the
disqualification case filed against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the
votes cast for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of
the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC
En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any

proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Mercado v. Manzano28
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision,
intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet
been no final judgment rendered.29
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc
has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-
placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by
the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this
Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents
therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The
elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has
ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by
Balua against Arnado will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and
voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest
Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required
to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.

x x x31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He took the Oath of
Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question that after performing these
twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003, he became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when
he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA,
and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By
taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the
time, however, he likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American citizenship by executing
an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of
the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.32
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after
renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship.33
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign
citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his
certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the
date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the United
States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time,
only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath.
Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as
a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which
repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his
American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation36 that he "absolutely and perpetually
renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that he
"divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States
of America."38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest
Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing
himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a
dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself
as an American citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid
for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a
positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the
certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship.39 Dual
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify
as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen
enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but
by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code,40 he was not
qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or
from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after
renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the
time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once
any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. x x x.41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not
just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates
the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently
using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that
he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.

It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively
disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running for any
elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has earlier renounced his
foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign citizen, to hold any public
office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was not notified of
the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of which he was only able to
obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.43
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national who sought
naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. That
Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a US
passport less of an act that violated the Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
representation as a US citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his
Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad."44 We
cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used
his Philippine passport as soon as he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US
passport on 24 November 2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact that after he
renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of candidacy, he used his US
passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of
Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US
passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with attendant civil
and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to
maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are
afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands
full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship,
has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
applies to his situation. He is disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from
becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential
spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as the winner in an election
contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test to address
the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be
proclaimed as the winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:

On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office
of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the respondent, Maximo Abad, were
opposing candidates for that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the
election upon the sole ground that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to
the office of the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No.
2045 having intervened.46
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a
second re-election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred
from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one
receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the
effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in
the elections x x x with that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and contrast between the
two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or
irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to
hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an examination of the ballots may find that
some other person than the candidate declared to have received a plurality by the board of
canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its
mandamus to the board of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the
manner of holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot be
determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no question as to
the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting the ballots is before the
deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the election fails entirely. In the former, we
have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for
supremacy. If it be found that the successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers)
obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former
must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one
case the question is as to who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots; in the other, the
question is confined to the personal character and circumstances of a single individual.48 (Emphasis
supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former, we have a contest in the
strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of victory cannot be
transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole question is the
eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of First Instance is
without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the eligibility of the person who obtained
the highest number of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the

contestants has been duly elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no
one had been legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that
town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be
elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second placer cannot be
proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent judge exceeded his
jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected municipal president of the
municipality of Imus at the last general election; and that said order and all subsequent proceedings
based thereon are null and void and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and
additional issues, let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.49
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have a legal basis to
stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one process with another and
explaining the effects thereof. As an independent statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate
when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to another
candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of
the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what stops the Court from adjudging
another eligible candidate who received the next highest number of votes as the winner and
bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful winner. By express
legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the first place, but by virtue of the lack of
material time or any other intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed
upon prior to election date. Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of the
elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not only pertain to his
qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public office. The number of
ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the

ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials,
those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the
electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate.
To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications

and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the
electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in
our republic.
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we
pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation
of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially
if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.51 (Emphasis supplied)
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled
that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without qualifications lest "Election
victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements."53
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered a sufficient
basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in
the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to certificates of
candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws,
that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after
the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-
ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling.
We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling
can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our elections. For
one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a way around the law that effectively negates
election requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic information to make an
informed choice about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC
which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials. Equally susceptive of being
rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC. Section
78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins.
To state the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that an
election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory then becomes a
magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any
disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any disqualification case filed against him so
he can submit himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that
its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump

constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not
democracy or republicanism. It is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the
electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an
open invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.
1âw phi 1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as

he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the
highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void
COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still
respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate
candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and
disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who
turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be
eligible as candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware
within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said
candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed
elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified
candidates who placed second to ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the
disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes
the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not
necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed
as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no
moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any

There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule because Arnado
failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15
June 2010, long after the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not
involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the individual from continuing as a
candidate, or if he has already been elected, from holding the office.
The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was
both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a dual
citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of
the enumeration from participating as candidates in the election.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus
rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that
Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his
answer to the petition when the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed
the winner.
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification
which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of
Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves
Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule
on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC
En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL
ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for any local elective position. CASAN MACODE
MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10
May 2010 elections.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission on Elections.
SO ORDERED.

Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
tr align="center">
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO








Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
of the Court.

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 38-49.
2 Id. at 50-67.
3 Id. at 229, Exhibit "1-MR," Certificate of Live Birth.
4 Id. at 241, Exhibit "12-MR," Oath of Allegiance.
5 Id. at 239, Exhibit "10-MR," Order of Approval.
6Ibid, Note 2 and Annex "1" of Duly Verified Answer, Rollo, p. 160 and Annex "2" of
Memorandum for Respondent, Rollo, p. 178.
7 Ibid, p. 160 and 178.
8Id. at 139, Annex "B" of Petition for Disqualification; Id. at 177, Annex "1" Memorandum for
Respondent.
9Id. at 134, Petition to Disqualify Rommel Cagoco Arnado and/or to Cancel his Certificate of
Candidacy for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in Connection with May 10,
2010 Local and National Elections.
10 Id. at 140, Certification.
11Id. at 191, Exhibit "A" of Memorandum for Petitioner filed before the Commission on
Elections.
12Id. at 192, Exhibit "C" of Memorandum for Petitioner filed before the Commission on
Elections.
13 Records, pp. 76-77.
14Rollo, p. 42, Resolution dated 5 October 2010, penned by Commissioner Rene V.

Sarmiento, and concurred in by Commissioner Armando C. Velasco and Gregorio Y.
Larrazabal.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 43.
17 Id. at 44.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 46-47, Resolution dated 5 October 2010.

20 Id at 48.
21 Id. at 214, Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
Id. at 193-211, Verified Motion for Reconsideration; id. at 212-246, Amended Motion for
22
Reconsideration; id. at 247-254, Rejoinder to Petitioner’s Comment/Opposition to

Respondent’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration.
24A verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the OEC and the verified
petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for
disqualification may be filed on any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy
but not later than the date of proclamation. (Sec. 4.B.1. COMELEC Resolution No. 8696).
25 Rollo, pp. 64-66, COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 2 February 2011.
26 Id. at 69, Separate Concurring Opinion.
27Id. at 72-73, Dissenting Opinion of Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento, citing the cases of
Torayno, Sr. v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574 [2000]; Santos v. COMELEC, 103 SCRA 628
[1981]; Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 1 SCRA 1102 [1961]; and Reyes v. COMELEC, 97 SCRA
500 [1980].
28 367 Phil. 132 (1999).
29 Id. at 142-143.
30 G.R. No. 105919, 6 August 1992, 212 SCRA 309.
31 Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
32See excerpts of deliberations of Congress reproduced in AASJS v. Datumanong, G.R. No.

160869, 11 May 2007, 523 SCRA 108.
In resolving the aforecited issues in this case, resort to the deliberations of Congress
is necessary to determine the intent of the legislative branch in drafting the assailed
law. During the deliberations, the issue of whether Rep. Act No. 9225 would allow
dual allegiance had in fact been the subject of debate. The record of the legislative
deliberations reveals the following:
xxxx
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations
exist — the retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In this case, he observed that there are two citizenships and therefore,
two allegiances. He pointed out that under the Constitution, dual allegiance is
inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked whether with the creation of dual
allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution.

Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the
constitutional injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that
the proposed law aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
speedy means. However, he said that in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual
citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath. He explained that the problem of dual
citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country because the
latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of allegiance to the
Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added that this is a
matter which the Philippine government will have no concern and competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual
allegiance is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the
bill, which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this
oath, the problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign
country concerned, he explained.
xxxx
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce
his foreign citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government,
and at the same time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that
there is now a case of dual citizenship and dual allegiance. Rep. Locsin clarified that
by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces
his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he wishes to
address in Congress because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a
Member of the House.
xxxx
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary
to national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual
allegiance problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of
Policy in the bill which states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the
bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship but says nothing about the other
citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another
country and in that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance
to his country of origin and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill
had left it at this stage, he explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is
required to take an oath and the last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He
then said that the problem of dual allegiance is no longer the problem of the
Philippines but of the other foreign country. (Emphasis supplied)
33See Discussion of Senators Enrile and Pimentel on Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government
Code, reproduced in Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009, 580 SCRA
12.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate
their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on §40(d) between
Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE:
Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with
dual citizenship " is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the
present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There
is no requirement that such a natural-born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority,
must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the
country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may
such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to
run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE:
Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country
of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce.
There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election
for him of his desire to be considered a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE:
But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the
Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a
citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's example, if he
does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if
he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of
Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE:

But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always
have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL:
That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also
acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
34 Supra note 28 at 153.
35 Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a

foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine

armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has
been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in
force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
36 See Note 7.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 See Cordora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009, 580 SCRA 12.
40Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
xxxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship; x x x.
41 Fivaldo v. COMELEC, 255 Phil. 934, 944 (1989).
42 Rollo, p. 46, Resolution dated 5 October 2010.

44 Id. at 66, Resolution dated 02 February 2011.
45 23 Phil. 238 (1912).
46 Id. at 240.
47 Id. at 255.
48 Id at 254-255.
49 Id. at 258
50 Supra note 41.
51 Id. at 944-945.
52 G.R. No. 180051, 24 December 2008, 575 SCRA 590, 614-615.
53Id. at 615, citing Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, 15 February 2008, 545 SCRA
635, Saya-ang v. COMELEC, 462 Phil. 373 (2003).
54 G. R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012.
55 G.R. Nos. 193237/193536, 9 October 2012.
56 G.R. No. 105111, 3 July 3 1992, 211 SCRA 297, 312.
CONCURRING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
I concur in the ponencia. Respondent Rommel Amado (Arnado) is disqualified from running for any
local elective position. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) should be directed to proclaim
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling) as the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte in the May 2010 elections.
Arnado received the highest number of votes in the May 2010 elections and was proclaimed Mayor
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Nm1e. Respondent Linog G. Balua (Balua), one of Arnado’s opponents,
filed a petition before the COMELEC against Arnado. Balua's petition to disqualify Amado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy rests on the allegation that Arnado lacks the residency and

citizenship requirements. Balua presented evidence to show that Arnado used his American
passport to enter and depart the Philippines. Maquiling, on the other hand, was also one of Arnado’s
opponents. Maquiling received the second highest number of votes next to Arnado. Maquiling filed
motions for intervention and for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane. Maquiling asserted
that he should have been proclaimed as Mayor for being the legitimate candidate with the highest
number of votes.
Arnado is a natural-born Filipino Citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship upon his naturalization as an
American citizen. Arnado applied for repatriation, and subsequently took two Oaths of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, then renounced his American citizenship. The relevant timeline is as
follows:
10 July 2008 - Arnado pledged his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
3 April 2009 - Arnado again pledged his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his American citizenship.
14 April to 25 June 2009 - Arnado used his United States of America (USA) Passport No.
057782700 to depart and enter the Philippines.
29 July to 24 November 2009 - Arnado again used his USA Passport No. 057782700 to depart and
enter the Philippines.
30 November 2009 - Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.
A certification from the Bureau of Immigration showed that Arnado arrived in the Philippines on 12
January 2010, as well as on 23 March 2010. Both arrival dates show that Arnado used the same
USA passport he used in 2009.
Despite Balua’s petition before the COMELEC, the elections proceeded without any ruling on
Arnado’s qualification. Arnado received the highest number of votes in the May 2010 elections and
was proclaimed Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
The COMELEC First Division issued its ruling on Arnado’s qualification after his proclamation. The
COMELEC First Division treated Balua’s petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy as a petition for disqualification. The COMELEC First Division granted Balua’s petition
and annulled Arnado’s proclamation. The COMELEC First Division stated that "Arnado’s continued
use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US
citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of Renunciation to enable him to run for office."
The COMELEC First Division decreed that the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local
Government Code of 19911 should take effect.
Arnado filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. Maquiling intervened, and
asserted that although the COMELEC First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the law on
succession should not apply. Instead, Maquiling should have been proclaimed as Mayor for being
the legitimate candidate with the highest number of votes.
The COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the COMELEC First Division. In
granting Arnado’s motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC En Banc stated that Arnado’s use of
his USA passport "does not operate to revert back [sic] his status as a dual citizen prior to his

renunciation as there is no law saying such." COMELEC Chair Sixto Brillantes concurred, and stated
that Arnado "after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed to have remained a
Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal and competent
proof of expatriation." Commissioner Rene Sarmiento dissented, and declared that Arnado failed to
prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the USA and that his loss of the continuing requirement of
citizenship disqualifies him to serve as an elected official. Moreover, having received the highest
number of votes does not validate Arnado’s election.
The ponencia granted Maquiling’s petition before this Court, and annulled and set aside the ruling of
the COMELEC En Banc. The ponencia declared that Arnado’s use of his USA passport did not
divest him of his Filipino citizenship but vested back in him the American citizenship he earlier
renounced. The ponencia also directed the COMELEC to proclaim Maquiling as the duly elected
Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the May 2010 elections for being the qualified candidate
who received the highest number of votes.
On Arnado’s Use of a Non-Philippine Passport
Philippine courts have no power to declare whether a person possesses citizenship other than that
of the Philippines. In Mercado v. Manzano,2 Constitutional Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas was
quoted as saying, "Dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the
laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not
she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control."3 In the
present case, we have no authority to declare that Arnado is an American citizen. Only the courts of
the USA, using American law, have the conclusive authority to make an assertion regarding
Arnado’s American citizenship.
Arnado, as a naturalized American citizen and a repatriated Filipino, is required by law to swear to
an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and execute a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship before he may seek elective Philippine public office. The pertinent sections of R.A. No.
9225 read:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath
of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept
the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
x x x x.
Arnado’s use of his American passport after his execution of an Affidavit of Renunciation of his
American Citizenship is a retraction of his renunciation. When Arnado filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on 30 November 2009, there was no longer an effective renunciation of his American
citizenship. It is as if he never renounced his American citizenship at all. Arnado, therefore, failed to
comply with the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship as found in Republic Act No. 9225. We previously discussed the
distinction between dual citizenship and dual allegiance, as well as the different acts required of dual
citizens, who may either have involuntary dual citizenship or voluntary dual allegiance, who desire to
be elected to Philippine public office in Cordora v. COMELEC:4
We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v. Manzano, Valles
v. COMELEC, and AASJS v. Datumanong. Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts as the
present case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dual citizenship by the
circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United States which follows
the doctrine of jus soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother and a Filipino father in Australia. Our
rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance both by
cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a
person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born
Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of
candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand,
is brought about by the individual’s active participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states
that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized citizen of another country is allowed
to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized
citizen’s foreign citizenship.
R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was enacted years after
the promulgation of Manzano and Valles. The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as
follows:
I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation
upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se,
but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who
reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and,
at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and
all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath
of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath

of Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our
recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC, Velasco v. COMELEC, and Japzon v. COMELEC, all
of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and
thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born
Filipino, did not subsequently become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.5
Hence, Arnado’s failure to comply with the twin requirements of R.A. No. 9225 is clearly a failure to
qualify as a candidate for Philippine elective public office. He is still deemed, under Philippine law,
holding allegiance to a foreign country, which disqualifies him from running for an elective public
office. Such failure to comply with the twin requirements of R.A. No. 9225 is included among the
grounds for disqualification in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code: "Disqualifications. – x x x.
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified
to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in election laws."
On the Selection of the Lawful Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Sur
Arnado used his USA passport after his Renunciation of American Citizenship and before he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy. This positive act of retraction of his renunciation before the filing of the
Certificate of Candidacy renders Arnado’s Certificate of Candidacy void ab initio. Therefore, Arnado
was never a candidate at any time, and all the votes for him are stray votes. We reiterate our ruling
in Jalosjos v. COMELEC6 on this matter:
Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer
is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy
of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a
violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate
of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such
void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such
non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a
first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or
before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are
stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the
elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of
candidacy is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the
effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of
candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the
same position.7
It is undisputed that Amado had to comply with the twin requirements of allegiance and renunciation.
However, Arnado’s use of his USA passport after the execution of his At1idavit of Renunciation
constituted a retraction of his renunciation, and led to his failure to comply with the requirement of
renunciation at the time he tiled his certificate of candidacy. His certificate of candidacy was thus
void ah initio. Garnering the highest number of votes for an elective position does not cure this
defect. Maquiling, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Arnado’s
ce11iticate of candidacy was void ah initio. Maquiling is the qualified candidate who actually
garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
and Vice-Mayor. - If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. x x x.
2367 Phil. 132 (1999) citing 1 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 203 (23
June 1986).
3 Id. at 147.
4 G.R. No. 176947, 19 February 2009, 580 SCRA 12. Citations omitted.
5 Id. at 23-25.
6G.R. Nos. 193237 and 193536, 9 October 2012. Citations omitted. See also Cayat v.
COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 163776 and 165736, 24 April 2007, 522 SCRA 23; and Aratea v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012.
7 Id.
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
I dissent from the ponencia’s conclusions that:
(1) respondent Rommel C. Arnado’s (Arnado) use of his US passport in traveling twice to the
US violated his Oath of Renunciation so that he reverted back to the status of a dual citizen –
a distinct ground for disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
(LGC) that barred him from assuming the office of Mayor of Kuswagan, Lanao del Norte; and
(2) the petitioner, Casan Macode Mquiling (Maquiling), the "second placer" in the 2010
elections, should be rightfully seated as Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
I base this Dissent on the following grounds:
1) Arnado has performed all acts required by Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 92251 (RA
9225) to re-acquire Philippine citizenship and to qualify and run for public office;
2) The evidence on record shows that Arnado’s use of his US passport in two trips to the US
after re-acquiring his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 and renouncing his US
citizenship, were mere isolated acts that were sufficiently justified under the given
circumstances that Arnado fully explained;

3) Arnado’s use of his US passport did not amount to an express renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 (CA 63);
4) Under the circumstances of this case, Arnado did not do anything to negate the oath of
renunciation he took;
5) At any rate, all doubts should be resolved in favor of Arnado’s eligibility after this was
confirmed by the mandate of the people of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte by his election as
Mayor; and
6) The assailed findings of facts and consequent conclusions of law are based on evidence
on record and are correct applications of law; hence, no basis exists for this Court to rule that
the Comelec en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case.
The Antecedent Facts
Respondent Rommel Cagoco Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, born to Filipino parents on
July 22, 1957 at Iligan City, Lanao del Norte.2 In 1985, he immigrated to the United States for job
purposes.3 He was deemed to have lost his Filipino citizenship by operation of law4 when he became
a naturalized citizen of the United States of America while in America.
In 2003, Congress declared it the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens
of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship upon compliance with
the statute Congress passed – RA 9225.5
Arnado, like many other Filipinos before him, at age 51 and after a stay of 23 years in the U.S.,
opted to re-affirm his Filipino citizenship by filing the required application and taking his oath before
the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, USA. His application was approved by Consul
Wilfredo C. Santos, evidenced by an Order of Approval dated July 10, 2008.6 He took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) on the same day and was accordingly issued
Identification Certificate Number SF-1524-08/2008 declaring him once more purely a citizen of the
Republic.7
On April 3, 2009, Arnado took another Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit
of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.8
Eleven days later or on April 14, 2009, Arnado left the country for the United States. According to
Bureau of Immigration records, Arnado then used a passport – US Passport (No. 057782700) – that
identified his nationality as "USA-AMERICAN." The same record also indicated that Arnado used the
same U.S. Passport when he returned to the country on June 25, 2009. This happened again when
he left for the United States on July 29, 2009 and returned to the country on November 24, 2009.9
The record does not show the exact date when Arnado applied for a Philippine passport; it shows
however that Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA, approved and issued a
Philippine Passport (No. XX 3979162) for Arnado on June 18, 2009.10 He received this passport
three (3) months later.11 Thereafter, he used his Philippine passport in his travels on the following
dates: December 11, 2009 (Departure), January 12, 2010 (Arrival), January 31, 2010 (Departure),
March 31, 2010 (Arrival), April 11, 2010 (Departure) April 16, 2010 (Arrival), May 20, 2010
(Departure) and June 4, 2010 (Arrival).12

On November 30, 2009 or six months after he fully complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225,
Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte.13
Five months after or on April 28, 2010, respondent mayoralty candidate Linog C. Balua (Balua) filed
a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC. Balua contended that Arnado is a foreigner
and is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Balua attached to his petition a Bureau of
Immigration (BI) certification dated April 23, 2010 indicating Arnado’s nationality as "USA-American"
and certifying that the name Arnado Rommel Cagoco appears in the Computer Database/Passenger
Manifest with the following pertinent travel records:14
(Significantly, Arnado also submitted the photocopy of his Philippine passport showing that he used
his Philippine passport on travels on these dates.)15
Balua also presented a computer generated travel record dated December 3, 2009 indicating that
Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines.
The record showed that Arnado left the country on April 14, 2009 and returned on June 25, 2009; he
departed again on July 29, 2009 and arrived back in the country on November 24, 2009.16 In these
lights, Arnado’s disqualification was a live election issue, well-known to the Kauswagan electorate,
who nevertheless voted Arnado into office as Mayor.17
The Comelec First Division ordered Arnado to file his Answer (to Balua’s petition) and a
Memorandum. With the petition filed a mere two weeks from election day, Arnado failed to comply,
thus giving Balua the opportunity to move that Arnado be declared in default. The Comelec,
however, failed to act on the motion as the case was overtaken by the May 10, 2010 elections.
Arnado won the election, garnering 5,952 votes over the second placer, Maquiling, who garnered
5,357 votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers subsequently proclaimed him as the duly elected
mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.18
In the Answer which he filed after his proclamation, Arnado averred that he did not commit any
material misrepresentation in his CoC, and that he was eligible to run for the office of mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; he had fully complied with the requirements of RA 9225 by taking the
required Oath of Allegiance and executing an Affidavit of Renunciation of his U.S. citizenship.19 To
support his allegations, Arnado also submitted the following documentary evidence:
(1)Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines dated
April 3, 2009;

(2) Joint-Affidavit dated May 31, 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio
Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that Arnado is a long-time
resident of Kauswagan and that he has been conspicuously and continuously residing in his
family’s ancestral house in Kauswagan;
(3) Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated
June 3, 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of his barangay and that Arnado
went to the United States in 1985 to work and returned to the Philippines in 2009;
(4) Certification dated May 31, 2010 from the Municipal Local Government Operations Office
of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr. served as Mayor of Kauswagan from
January 1964 to June 1974 and from February 15 1979 to April 15, 1986;
(5) Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has
been a registered voter of Kauswagan since April 3, 2009.20
The Comelec First Division Ruling
The Comelec First Division treated Balua’s petition as a petition for disqualification instead of a
petition for cancellation of CoC based on misrepresentation. Because Balua failed to present
evidence to support his contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States, the First Division
found no basis to conclude that Arnaldo did not meet the one-year residency requirement under the
LGC.
On the issue of citizenship, the First Division held Arnado’s act of using his US passport after
renouncing his US citizenship on April 3, 2009, effectively negated his Oath of Renunciation. As
basis, the First Division cited the Court’s ruling in In Re Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willie Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, et al. It concluded that Arnado’s continued use of his US passport was a strong
indication that he had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an
Oath of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. The Division noted in this regard the glaring
inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of his US passport and his claim that he had re-
acquired Philippine citizenship and had renounced his US citizenship.
Based on these premises, the Comelec First Division disqualified Arnado, annulled his proclamation,
and ordered that the order of succession to the mayoralty under Section 44 of the LGC be given
effect.21
Maquiling’s Intervention
While Arnado’s motion for reconsideration was pending, Maquiling intervened and filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and an opposition to Arnado’s motion for reconsideration.
Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession
under Section 44 is not applicable; he claimed that with the cancellation of Arnado’s CoC and the
nullification of his proclamation, he should be proclaimed the winner since he was the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes.22
The Comelec en banc Ruling
The Comelec en banc affirmed the First Division’s treatment of the petition as a petition for
disqualification. It also agreed with the disposition of the First Division to follow the order of

succession under Section 44, thus ruling out second placer Maquiling’s entitlement to the post of
Mayor.
The Comelec en banc however, reversed the First Division ruling and granted Arnado’s Motion for
Reconsideration. It held that by renouncing his US citizenship, Arnado became a "pure" Philippine
citizen again. It ruled that the use of a US passport does not operate to revert Arnado’s status as a
dual citizen prior to his renunciation; it does not operate to "un-renounce" what had earlier been
renounced.
The Comelec en banc further ruled that the First Division’s reliance on In Re Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Willie Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al.,23 was misplaced as the facts of this cited case are
not the same or comparable with those of the present case. Unlike the present case, the petitioner in
Yu was a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino citizen, applied for a
renewal of his Portuguese passport.
Finally, the Comelec en banc found that Arnado presented a plausible and believable explanation
justifying the use of his US passport. While his Philippine passport was issued on June 18, 2009, he
was not immediately notified of the issuance so that he failed to actually get it until after three
months later. He thereafter used his Philippine passport in his subsequent travels abroad.24
The Separate and Dissenting Opinions
Significantly, Comelec Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes issued a Separate Opinion concurring with the
Comelec majority. He opined that the use of a foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided
for under Section 1 of CA 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost. He cites the
assimilative principle of continuity of Philippine citizenship: Arnado is presumed to have remained a
Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the absence of clear and unequivocal proof of
expatriation. In addition, all doubts should be resolved in favor of Arnado’s retention of citizenship.25
In his Dissenting Opinion, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento emphasized that Arnado failed to prove
that he truly abandoned his allegiance to the United States; his continued use of his US passport
and enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen ran counter to his declaration that he chose to
retain only his Philippine citizenship. He noted that qualifications for elective office, such as
citizenship, are continuing requirements; once citizenship is lost, title to the office is deemed
forfeited.26
The Issues
The complete issues posed for the Court’s consideration are:
(1) Whether intervention is allowed in a disqualification case;
(2) Whether the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to
undoing a renunciation made, and whether the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office;
(3) Assuming Arnado is disqualified, whether the rule on succession in the LGC is applicable
in the present case;27
(4) How should doubt in the present case be resolved in light of Arnado’s election; and

(5) Whether, based on the facts presented and the applicable law, the Comelec en banc
committed grave abuse of discretion.
The Ponencia
The ponencia grants Maquiling’s petition for certiorari, thus holding that the Comelec en banc
committed grave abuse of discretion in considering the facts and the law presented. It thus holds
that Arnado is a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office under Section 40(d) of the LGC. On
this basis, the ponencia rules that with Arnado’s disqualification, second placer Maquiling should be
proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Based on this conclusion, the ponencia resolves all doubts against Arnado and disregards the
democratic decision of the Kauswagan electorate.
As the ponencia reasons it out, the act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his
Filipino citizenship. By representing himself as an American citizen, however, Arnado voluntarily and
effectively reverted to his earlier status as dual citizen. It emphasizes that such reversion is not
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his
US passport.
Thus, by the time Arnado filed his CoC on November 30, 2009, the ponencia concludes that Arnado
was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship; he was
qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40 (d) of the LGC, he was not
qualified as a candidate to run for a local elective position.28
With Arnado barred from candidacy, the ponencia further concludes that his CoC was void from the
beginning. The affirmation of Arnado’s disqualification, although made long after the elections,
reaches back to the filing of the CoC so that he was not a candidate at all in the May 10, 2010
elections. Hence, the votes cast in his favor should not be counted and Maquiling, as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of vote, should be declared the duly elected mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.29 In this manner, the ponencia effectively disenfranchised 5,952 or
52.63% of those who voted for the top two contending candidates for the position of Mayor; it rules
for a minority Mayor.
Refutation of the Ponencia
Arnado performed all acts required by Section 5(2) of RA 9225 to reacquire Philippine citizenship
and run for public office; in fact, he actively followed up his re-affirmed citizenship by running for
public office.
RA 9225 was enacted to allow the re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship by: 1)
natural-born citizens who were deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who,
after the effectivity of the law, became citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are
deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance.30
Section 3 of RA 9225 on these points reads:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby

deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
"I _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept
the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Arnado falls under the first category as a natural-born Filipino citizen who was deemed to have lost
his Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen.
Under the given facts, Arnado indisputably re-acquired Philippine citizenship after taking the Oath of
Allegiance not only once but twice – on July 10, 2008 and April 3, 2009. Separately from this oath of
allegiance, Arnado took an oath renouncing his American citizenship as additionally required by RA
9225 for those seeking public office.
Section 5 of RA 9225 on this point provides:
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (2)
Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections,31 we ruled that Section 5(2) of RA 9225 requires the twin
requirements of taking an Oath of Allegiance and the execution of a similarly sworn Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship. We said:
Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2)
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.32
Thus, the respondent in that case, Jaime Ty - a natural born Filipino citizen who subsequently
became a naturalized American citizen - became a "pure" Philippine citizen again after taking the
Oath of Allegiance and executing an Oath of Renunciation of his American citizenship. To quote our
Decision:
He was born and raised in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.
However, he left to work in the USA and eventually became an American citizen. On 2 October
2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles,
California, USA, in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. At this point, Ty still
held dual citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced
his American citizenship before a notary public and, resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen.33

In the present case, Arnado indisputably complied with the second requirement of Section 5(2) of RA
9225. On April 3, 2009, he personally executed an Affidavit of Renunciation an Oath of Allegiance
before notary public Thomas Dean M. Quijano. Therefore, when he filed his CoC for the position of
Mayor of the Municipality of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte on November 30, 2009, he had already
effectively renounced his American citizenship, solely retaining his Philippine citizenship as the law
requires. In this way, Arnado qualified for the position of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and
filed a valid CoC.
The evidence on record shows that

Arnado’s use of his US passport after his
compliance with the terms of RA 9225, was
an isolated act that was sufficiently
explained and justified.
The records bear out that Arnado used his US passport in two trips to and from the US after he had
executed his Affidavit of Renunciation on April 3, 2009. He travelled on the following dates:
Date Destination
April 14, 2009 to the U.S.
June 25, 2009 to the Philippines
July 29, 2009 to the U.S.
November 24, 2009 to the Philippines
Arnado’s Philippine passport was issued on June 18, 2009, but he was not immediately notified of
the issuance so that and he only received his passport three months after or sometime in September
2009.34 Clearly, when Arnado travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had
no Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the United States to attend to the winding
up of his business and other affairs in America. A travel document issued by the proper Philippine
government agency (e.g., a Philippine consulate office in the US) would not suffice because travel
documents could not be used; they are issued only in critical instances, as determined by the
consular officer, and allow the bearer only a direct, one-way trip to the Philippines.35
Although Arnado received his Philippine passport by the time he returned to the Philippines on
November 24, 2009, he could not use this without risk of complications with the US immigration
authorities for using a travel document different from what he used in his entry into the US on July
29, 2009. Plain practicality then demanded that the travel document that he used to enter the US on
July 29, 2009 be the same travel document he should use in leaving the country on November 24,
2009.
Given these circumstances, Arnado’s use of his US passport in travelling back to the Philippines on
November 24, 2009 was an isolated act that could not, by itself, be an express renunciation of the
Philippine citizenship he adopted as his sole citizenship under RA 9225.
Arnado’s use of his US passport was not an

express renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship under Section 1 of CA 63.

I disagree with the ponencia’s view that by using his US passport and representing himself as an
American citizen, Arnado effectively reverted to the status of a dual citizen. Interestingly, the
ponencia failed to cite any law or controlling jurisprudence to support its conclusion, and thus merely
makes a bare assertion.
The ponencia fails to consider that under RA 9225, natural-born citizens who were deemed to have
lost their Philippine citizenship because of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country and
who subsequently complied with the requirements of RA 9225, are deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship. RA 9225 cured and negated the presumption made under CA 63. Hence, as
in Japzon, Arnado assumed "pure" Philippine citizenship again after taking the Oath of Allegiance
and executing an Oath of Renunciation of his American citizenship under RA 9225.
In this light, the proper framing of the main issue in this case should be whether Arnado’s use of his
US passport affected his status as a "pure" Philippine citizen. In question form – did Arnado’s use of
a US passport amount to a ground under the law for the loss of his Filipino citizenship under CA 63?
Or alternatively, the retention of his dual citizenship status?
I loathe to rule that Arnado’s use of his US passport amounts to an express renunciation of his
Filipino citizenship, when its use was an isolated act that he sufficiently explained and fully justified. I
emphasize that the law requires express renunciation in order to lose Philippine citizenship. The
term means a renunciation that is made distinctly and explicitly and is not left to inference or
implication; it is a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language, as distinguished from
that which is inferred from conduct.36
A clear and vivid example, taken from jurisprudence, of what "express renunction" is not transpired
in Aznar v. Comelec37 where the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a
holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and
that an application for an alien certificate of registration did not amount to a renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.
In the present case, other than the use of his US passport in two trips to and from the United States,
the record does not bear out any indication, supported by evidence, of Arnado’s intention to re-
acquire US citizenship. To my mind, in the absence of clear and affirmative acts of re-acquiring US
citizenship either by naturalization or by express acts (such as the re-establishment of permanent
residency in the United States), Arnado’s use of his US passport cannot but be considered an
isolated act that did not undo his renunciation of his US citizenship. What he might in fact have done
was to violate American law on the use of passports, but this is a matter irrelevant to the present
case. Thus, Arnado remains to be a "pure" Filipino citizen and the loss of his Philippine citizenship
cannot be presumed or inferred from his isolated act of using his US passport for travel purposes.
Arnado did not violate his oath of renunciation; at any rate, all doubts should be resolved in favor of
Arnado’s eligibility considering that he received the popular mandate of the people of Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte as their duly elected mayor.
I completely agree with the ponencia that the Oath of Renunciation is not an empty or formal
ceremony that can be perfunctorily professed at any given day, only to be disregarded on the next.
As a mandatory requirement under Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it allows former natural-born Filipino
citizens who were deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country to enjoy full civil and political rights, foremost among them, the privilege
to run for public office.

I disagree however, with the conclusion that Arnado effectively negated his Oath of Renunciation
when he used his US passport for travel to the United States. To reiterate if only for emphasis,
Arnado sufficiently justified the use of his US passport despite his renunciation of his US citizenship;
when he travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had no Philippine passport
that he could have used to travel to the United States to attend to the business and other affairs that
he was leaving. If at all, he could be faulted for using his US passport by the time he returned to the
Philippines on November 24, 2009 because at that time, he had presumably received his Philippine
passport. However, given the circumstances explained above and that he consistently used his
Philippine passport for travel after November 24, 2009, the true character of his use of his US
passport stands out and cannot but be an isolated and convenient act that did not negate his Oath of
Renunciation.
The People of Kauswagan have spoken and

any doubt should be resolved in favor of
their verdict.
Separately from the issue of Arnado’s isolated act of using his US passport, we cannot ignore the
fact in a community as small as Kauswagan where the two mayoralty candidates garnered a total of
11,309 votes, Balua’s claim of Arnado’s foreign citizenship and even the latter’s residency status
could not be avoided but be live election issues. The people of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte,
therefore, made their own ruling when they elected Arnado as their mayor despite the "foreigner"
label sought to be pinned on him. At this point, even this Court should heed this verdict by resolving
all doubts regarding Arnado’s eligibility in his favor. This approach, incidentally, is not a novel
one38 as in Sinaca v. Mula,39 the Court has already ruled:
When a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all
possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate's eligibility for to rule otherwise is to
defeat the will of the people. Above and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate
should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence,
is the democracy we continue to hold sacred.
No Basic to Rule that the Comelec

Committed Grave Abuse of
Discretion.
As my last point, the Comelec en banc considered and accepted as its factual finding that Arnado’s
explanation on the use of his US passport was sufficient justification to conclude that he did not
abandon his Oath of Renunciation. This finding is undeniably based on evidence on record as the
above or incorrect is not material for as long as it is made on the basis of evidence on record, and
was made within the contemplation of the applicable law.40
In other words, the Comelec en banc properly exercised its discretion in acting on the matter; thus,
even if it hard erred in its conclusions, any error in reading the evidence and in applying the law was
not sufficiently grave to affect the exercise of its jurisdiction.41 From these perspectives, this Court
has no recourse but to dismiss the present petition for failure to show any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Comelec.
In these lights, I vote for the dismissal of the petition.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1An Act Making The Citizenship Of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent Amending For the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended And For
Other Purposes.
2 Rollo, p. 229.
3 Id. at 162.
4
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63 states:
Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in
any of the following ways and/or events:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
5 Otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
6 Rollo, p. 239.
7 Id. at 240.
8
Id. at 160.
9 Id. at 191.
10 Id. at 218.
11 Id. at 219.
12 Id. at 242-245.
13 Id. at 139.
14 Id. at 192.
15 Annexes A-1-A-4 of Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, Id. at 204-208.
16 Id. at 191.
17Balua filed the petition to disqualify and/or to cancel Arnado’s CoC on April 28, 2010, prior
to the May 10, 2010 elections. Id. at 134-136.
18 Id. at 161.

19 Id. at 148-156.
20 Id. at 160-164.
21 Id. at 38-49.
22 Id. at 89-96.
23 G.R. No. L-83882, January 24, 1989, 169 SCRA 364.
24 Rollo, pp. 50-67.
25 Id. at 68-69.
26 Id. at 70-73.
27 Ponencia, p. 10.
28 Ponencia, p. 17.
29 Id. at 26.
30De Guzman v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009, 590 SCRA
141, 156.
31 G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 331.
32 Id. at 346.
33 Id. at 344.
34 Rollo, p. 219.
35See http://www.philippineconsulatela.org/FAQs/FAQS-passport.htm#TD1 (last visited April

14, 2013).
36Board of Immigration Commissioners v. Go Callano, G.R. No. L-24530, October 31, 1968,
25 SCRA 890, 899..
37
G.R. No. 83820, May 25, 1990, 185 SCRA 703.
38See J. Panganiban’s Concurring Opinion in Bengson III v. House Representatives

Electoral Tribunal (G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, 357 SCRA 545) where respondent
Teodoro C. Cruz’ citizenship was also questioned, viz:
4. In Case of Doubt, Popular Will Prevails Fourth, the court has a solemn duty to
uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It cannot supplant the
sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan with fractured legalism. The
people of the District have clearly spoken. They overwhelmingly and unequivocally
voted for private respondent to represent them in the House of Representatives. The

votes that Cruz garnered (80, 119) in the last elections were much more than those
of all his opponents combined (66, 182).23 In such instances, all possible doubts
should be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's eligibility; to rule otherwise
would be to defeat the will of the people.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political

laws must be so constructed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed through the ballot. Public interest and the sovereign will should, at all
times, be the paramount considerations in election controversies. For it would be
better to err in favor of the people's choice than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms.
Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the
sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action
involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must
exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will
of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled
by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning
candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrative that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that
overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and
juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote See
also Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 187478,
December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 733.
39 373 Phil. 896 (1999).
40Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court states that "findings of facts of the Commission
supported by substantial evidence shall be final and non-reviewable."
41 Mitra v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
SEPARATE AND CONCURRING OPINION
ABAD, J.:
I fully concur with the majority but would add another argument in support of the decision.
Sec. 5(2) of Republic Act 9225 provides the means by which a former Philippine citizen who has
acquired foreign citizenship to later reacquire his old citizenship by complying with certain
requirements. Respondent Rommel Arnado complied with these requirements for regaining
Philippine citizenship but, because he wanted to run for public office, he also renounced his United
States (U.S.) Citizenship when he filed his certificate of candidacy, conformably with the provisions
of Republic Act 9225 that reads:
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such

before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
But his compliance with the above was challenged before the Commission on Elections (Comelec)
because Arnado afterwards twice used his U.S. passport in going to and coming from the U.S., the
country whose citizenship he had renounced.
The majority opinion amply states that by his acts, Arnado showed that he did not effectively
renounce his U.S. citizenship. To this I add that he also failed to comply with the U.S. requirements
for citizens wishing to renounce their citizenships.
Section 349 (a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)1 sets the procedure that those who
have moved their residence to other countries must observe when renouncing their U.S. citizenship.
It provides that "(a) A person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturalization,
shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing any of the following acts with the intention of
relinquishing United States nationality-x x x (5) making a formal renunciation of nationality before a
diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of State." He does not effectively renounce his citizenship who does not
comply with what his country requires of him.
Here, there is no showing that Arnado, a U.S. citizen, fulfilled the above requirement. To the eyes of
the U.S. government, Arnado remains its citizen, owing obligations of loyalty to it and subject to its
laws wherever he may be. Indeed, the U.S. government had not cancelled his passport, permitting
him to use the same a number of times after he reacquired his Philippine citizenship. If the U.S.
continues to regard Arnado as its citizen, then he has two citizenships, a ground for cancelling his
certificate of candidacy for a public office in the Philippines.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 8 U.S.C. 1481(a)(5)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147909. April 16, 2002]
MAUYAG B. PAPANDAYAN, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

FAHIDA P. BALT, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution, dated May 8, 2001, of the Second Division [1] of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), disqualifying petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr. as a
candidate for municipal mayor of the Municipality of Tubaran, Province of Lanao del Sur in the May 14,
2001 elections, and the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, dated May 12, 2001, denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
In the May 14, 2001 elections, three candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del
Sur, namely: petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr., respondent Fahida P. Balt, who was the incumbent
mayor seeking reelection, and Maiko Hassan Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of
petitioner in SPC Case No. 01-114 of the COMELEC, alleging that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay
Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
In support of her allegation, respondent submitted the joint affidavit,[2] dated February 14, 2001, of
Barangay Chairman Hadji Bashir Ayonga and two members of the Sangguniang Barangay of Tangcal,
Tubaran, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, stating that petitioner never resided in Barangay Tangcal,
Tubaran as they personally knew all the registered voters of the said barangay; that petitioner omitted to
own nor lease any house in Barangay Tangcal; and that petitioners father, the late Mauyag Papandayan,
Sr., who was a school superintendent, and his family were permanent residents of Bayang, Lanao del
Sur. Respondent also submitted a similar affidavit,[3] dated February 17, 2001, of Samoranao Sarip, a
member of the Sangguniang Barangay of Tangcal. She averred that petitioner did not state in his Voter
Registration Record,[4] accomplished on May 8, 1999, the number of years and months (Annex D-1) he had
been a resident of the Municipality of Tubaran.
In his answer,[5] petitioner claimed that he was a resident of No. 13 Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran; that
he was the son of the late Mauyag Capal Papandayan, Sr., a former school superintendent, and Hadja
Khalida Magangcong Balt; that both the Capal and Papandayan clans were natives of Tangcal, Tubaran,
and the Magangcong clan were from Boribid, Tubaran while most of the Balt clan were residents of Bayang;
that in 1990, he transferred his domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there with his wife Raina Guina
Dimaporo, whose family and relatives were residents and natives of Tangcal, Tubaran; that he managed
an agricultural land in Tubaran which he co-owned with his family; and that he filed in 1998 his certificate
of candidacy for the position of municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later withdrew.
To support his allegations, petitioner presented the following:
1. Affidavit,[6] dated March 8, 2001, of Taha C. Ali, Municipal Election Officer of the Office of the
Assistant Regional Election Director of the COMELEC, Region XII, Iligan City, stating that, based on the
continuous verification of household members in Tubaran, petitioner and his wife lived at No. 13 Barangay
Tangcal, Tubaran.
2. Affidavit of Witness,[7] dated March 8, 2001, of Delgado Caontongan, stating that he was an
elementary school teacher of Tubaran and that he was appointed Chairman of the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) of Precinct No. 28-A in Tangcal, Tubaran in the May 8, 1999 registration of voters; that he
personally received the Voter Registration Record of petitioner whom he knew to be a resident of Tubaran;

and that he knew petitioner to be a qualified voter and, for that reason, he approved petitioners Voter
Registration Record and included his name in the master list of voters in Precinct No. 28-A.
3. Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor[8] of petitioner, filed on January 11, 2001, with the COMELEC
stating, among other things, that he was born on October 14, 1964; that his place of birth was Marawi City;
that he was employed as a municipal employee of a local government unit in Bayang; that he was a resident
of Tangcal, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur; that he was a registered voter of Precinct No. 28-A in Barangay
Tangcal, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur; and that his length of residency in the Philippines was 36 years and 10
months (Annex 3-A).
4. Affidavit of Witness,[9] dated March 8, 2001, of Rafael Guina Dimaporo (brother of petitioners wife),
stating that his family and the family of petitioner were residents of Tangcal, Tubaran; that his relatives on
the maternal side (the Andag and the Guina clans) were natives of Barangays Tangcal and Datumanong,
both in the Municipality of Tubaran; and that during the May 11, 1992 national and local elections, he was
one of the mayoralty candidates who garnered the second highest number of votes.
5. Affidavit of Witness,[10] dated March 8, 2001, of Sobair Tagtal, stating that he was a farmer and one
of the share tenants of an agricultural land located in Tubaran, co-owned by petitioner and the latters
siblings; that petitioner had been managing the land and residing in Tangcal, Tubaran since 1990; and that
he knew petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy in the 1998 mayoralty election in Tubaran.
6. Certification,[11] dated March 7, 2001, by Salem Buzar, Election Officer in Bayang, Lanao del Sur,
certifying that petitioner was not registered as a voter of Bayang in the May 11, 1998 and May 14, 2001
elections.
7. Affidavit of Desistance,[12] dated March 8, 2001, of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, stating that he was
withdrawing the joint affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, which he had earlier executed, together with Hadji
Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, as he did not understand the consequences of signing the said affidavit
and its contents had not been explained to him; that he did not know that the affidavit would be used in a
disqualification case against petitioner who was a first cousin of his grandchildren; that he knew petitioner
to be a registered voter and a candidate for municipal mayor in Tubaran; and that petitioner is a native of
Tubaran because he is a descendant of Datu Sa Tatarikun Tangcal (Sumowa) on the paternal side and a
legitimate member of the Sultanate of Boribid in Tubaran on the maternal side.
8. Affidavit of Desistance,[13] dated March 8, 2001, of Samoranao Sarip, stating that he was withdrawing
the affidavit, dated February 17, 2001, which he had earlier executed, as he did not understand the
consequences of signing the said affidavit and its contents had not been explained to him; that he did not
know that the affidavit would be used in a disqualification case against petitioner; that he knew petitioner to
be a registered voter and a candidate for municipal mayor of Tubaran; and that petitioner is a native of
Tubaran because he is a descendant of Datu Sa Tatarikun Tangcal (Sumowa) on the paternal side and a
legitimate member of the Sultanate of Boribid in Tubaran on the maternal side.
In its resolution, dated May 8, 2001, the COMELEC (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-114 declared
petitioner to be disqualified and ordered his name to be stricken off the list of candidates and all votes cast
in his favor not to be counted but considered as stray votes. Citing the joint affidavit, dated February 14,
2001, of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe, and Saadori Buat and the affidavit of Samoranao Sarip
stating that petitioner had not at any time been a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran, the COMELEC ruled that it
was the fact of petitioners residence, not the statement in his certificate of candidacy, which determined
whether or not he had satisfied the residency requirement of one (1) year preceding the May 14, 2001
elections. In finding that petitioner never intended to relinquish his former domicile in Bayang, the
COMELEC took note of the testimony of petitioner in the exclusion proceedings against him before the
municipal trial court (Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T), in which petitioner stated that he was
living in Marawi City where he was the private secretary of Mayor Abdillah Ampatua.
On May 14, 2001, elections were held in Tubaran. Petitioner was among those voted by the electorate
for the position of municipal mayor. On May 15, 2001, he received a telegram [14] from the COMELEC
notifying him of the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc which denied his motion for
reconsideration.

On May 17, 2001, he filed the present petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Meanwhile, on May 19, 2001, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC (First Division) in SPC No.
01-039 seeking the issuance of an order directing the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of Tubaran to
count and tally the ballots cast in his favor during the May 14, 2001 elections pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution N. 4116. The said resolution provides that if the disqualification case has not become final and
executory on the day of the election, the BEI shall tally and count the votes of the candidate declared
disqualified.
On the other hand, respondent filed a pre-proclamation case (SPC No. 01-259) in the COMELEC.
On May 29, 2001, the First Division of the COMELEC (in SPC No. 01-039) issued an order suspending
the proclamation of petitioner as the duly elected mayor of Tubaran pending the resolution of this present
petition. However, despite the said order (in SPC No. 01-039), the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Tubaran proceeded with the proclamation of petitioner on June 3, 2001. Upon motion of respondent,
therefore, the COMELEC (First Division), in an order, dated June 25, 2001, set aside the proclamation of
petitioner, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate charges against the members of the Board
responsible for the proclamation.[15] Thereafter, the COMELEC en banc issued a resolution, dated January
30, 2002, sustaining the annulment of the proclamation of petitioner and dismissing SPC No. 01-039 for
being moot and academic. It appears that, as a consequence thereof, the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Tubaran
assumed the position of mayor pursuant to the COMELEC en banc resolution dated January 30, 2002.
On May 22, 2001, this Court required the COMELEC and respondent Fahida Balt to comment on the
petition and, upon the posting of a bond by petitioner in the amount of P10,000.00, issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the COMELEC from implementing its resolutions of May 8 and May 12, 2001.
In a manifestation,[16] dated May 28, 2001, petitioner submitted the certificates of votes (Annexes A to
A-30), duly signed by the BEI Chairman and his two members, showing that in the 31 precincts of Tubaran,
he obtained 1,744 votes [should be 1,730] votes, while respondent Balt and Bantuas obtained 1,528 votes
[should be 1,540 votes] and 974 votes [should be 967 votes], respectively. Respondent countered that,
despite these results, petitioner could not be proclaimed mayor as she had appealed from the ruling of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tubaran, wherein she sought the exclusion and the annulment of the
election returns from certain precincts in Tubaran because of massive fraud, terrorism, and substitution of
registered voters.
After canvass of the election returns, the Municipal Board of Canvassers issued a Municipal Certificate
of Canvass[17] showing the following results:
Petitioner Papandayan 1,744 votes

Respondent Balt 1,540 votes
Maiko Hassan Bantuas 968 votes
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion in lieu of a comment, recommending that this Court
grant the present petition. It contends that the joint affidavit, dated February 14, 2001, of Barangay
Chairman Hadji Bashir Ayonga and Sangguniang Barangay members Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori
Buat, stating that petitioner had not at any time been a resident of Tubaran, constituted hearsay evidence
as the three affiants were never presented during the proceedings of the case. In fact, one of the affiants,
Hadji Bashir Ayonga, later executed an Affidavit of Desistance, dated March 8, 2001, retracting his earlier
statements. As for the statements made by petitioner in Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T,
pending before the municipal trial court, that he was then not residing in Bayang but in Tubaran, Lanao del
Sur although living in Marawi City, the Solicitor General says that the same does not necessarily mean that
petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran as such answer merely means that he was previously living in
Marawi City.
In her comment, respondent insists that petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran but of Bayang. She
contends that petitioner made misrepresentations in claiming that he filed his certificate of candidacy for
mayor of Tubaran in the May 11, 1998 elections and that he was a registered voter in the May 11, 1998

elections; that when petitioner registered as a voter in Precinct No. 28-A in Tangcal, Tubaran on May 8,
1999, he refused to fill out the space corresponding to the period of his residency in Tubaran; that it was
unusual for the BEI Chairman to execute an affidavit, stating therein that he allowed the registration of the
petitioner because he had known the latter to be a legitimate resident of [Tubaran] even prior to the May 8,
1999 registration; that it was doubtful if the election officer of Tubaran really conducted a continuous
verification of household members of Tubaran; and that the certification of the election officer of Bayang
that petitioner was not a registered voter in Bayang during the May 11, 1998 and May 14, 2001 elections
does not prove that he was a registered voter in Tubaran. Respondent argues that the COMELEC did not
commit any error of jurisdiction to justify the grant of this petition for certiorari but, if at all, only an error of
judgment, which is correctible by ordinary appeal.
In his reply to respondents comment, petitioner points out that respondent did not appear at the March
9, 2001 hearing of the disqualification case before the COMELEC; that of the six witnesses whom
respondent said she was presenting, only two Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat appeared, and both
merely affirmed their joint affidavit; that, although the cross-examination of the two was reset on March 12,
2001, they nevertheless failed to appear and thus deprived petitioners counsel of the opportunity to cross-
examine them; that respondents four other witnesses Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Sultan Sarip Bilao, Osio Balbal,
and Puno Balbal did not appear either; that instead Sultan Sarip Bilao later executed an affidavit[18] denying
his earlier statement that the petitioner was not a resident of Tubaran; and that the Second Division of the
COMELEC and the COMELEC en banc did not conduct any hearing in the disqualification case and merely
relied on the recommendations submitted by the hearing officer. According to petitioner, while he filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor of Tubaran in the May 11, 1998 elections, the same was later withdrawn
on his behalf by Casim A. Guro, his brother-in-law. This fact was corroborated by Macawaris P. Masanang,
a sultan in Tubaran, who stated that he had been an Election Assistant of the COMELEC since 1978 and
that, as such, he received petitioners certificate of candidacy, which was later withdrawn by Casim A. Guro
on behalf of petitioner.
After reviewing the records, we find the foregoing allegations of petitioner to be correct. Hence, his
petition should be granted.
First. Petitioner contends that the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en banc was not
yet final and executory when the elections were held on May 14, 2001. Consequently, the Board of Election
Inspectors of Tubaran, in the exercise of its ministerial duty, had to count the votes cast in his
favor. Respondent, on the other hand, avers that the assailed resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the
COMELEC en banc had attained finality five (5) days thereafter, on May 17, 2001, as its enforcement had
not been restrained by this Court within the said period. The temporary restraining order should thus be set
aside, the same having been issued by this Court only on May 22, 2001.
At the time the elections were held in May 14, 2001, the assailed resolution, dated May 12, 2001, had
not become final and executory. Hence, the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) was duty bound to tally and
count the votes cast in favor of petitioner. As R.A. No. 6646, 6 provides:
Effect of disqualification. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
On the other hand, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, promulgated on May 7, 2001, in pertinent parts
reads:
RESOLUTION NO. 4116

This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division,
particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification cases).
Sec. 13, Rule 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions or Resolutions
provides:
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. (a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings,
provisional remedies, and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the Commission en
banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.
(b) In Special Actions and Special cases, a decision or resolution of the Commission en
banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained
by the Supreme Court.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a Division
shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days in Special Actions and Special
cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation.
Special Actions cases refer to the following:
a) Petition to deny due course to certificate of candidacy;

b) Petition to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate;
c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
....
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or
resolutions on Special Actions cases (disqualification cases); the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
1. the decision or resolution of the en banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall
become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court;
2. the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed;
3. where the ground for the disqualification case is by reason of non-residence, citizenship,
violation of election laws and other analogous cases and on the day of the election the
resolution has not become final and executory, the BEI shall tally and count the votes of such
disqualified candidate. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent, therefore, is in error in assuming that the issuance of a temporary restraining order by
this Court within five (5) days after the date of the promulgation of the assailed resolution on May 12, 2001,
of the COMELEC en banc is the operative act that prevents it from attaining finality. The purpose of
temporary restraining order was to enjoin the May 12, 2001 resolution of the COMELEC from being
enforced despite the fact that, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, par. 3, as above quoted, the
said resolution had not attained finality.

Second. Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him
disqualified on the ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran. On the other hand, respondent argues that
whether or not petitioner is a resident of Tubaran is a factual issue which has been thoroughly passed upon
and determined by the Second Division of the COMELEC and later by the COMELEC en banc.Respondent
echoes the ruling of the COMELEC in its resolution of May 12, 2001, which said that, as an administrative
body and a specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, it has more
than enough expertise in its field, and its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given
finality.
With due regard for the expertise of the COMELEC, we find the evidence to be insufficient to sustain
its resolution. We agree with the Solicitor General, to the contrary, that petitioner has duly proven that,
although he was formerly a resident of the Municipality of Bayang, he later transferred residence to Tangcal
in the Municipality of Tubaran as shown by his actual and physical presence therein for 10 years prior to
the May 14, 2001 elections.
Section 39 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides:
Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the

Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod, or sangguniang bayan,
the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other
language or dialect.
Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in resolving the issue of whether or not a
candidate has complied with the residency requirement for elective positions. The principle of animus
revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an intention to return to the place where
he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a determination whether there has been an abandonment of his
former residence which signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court of Appeals,[19] this Court
set aside the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the election of the
respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that respondents immigration to the
United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being
a green card holder, which was proof that he was a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States,
and in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before he ran for election on January 18, 1988,
respondent was held to be disqualified under 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881).
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, [20] respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2 District of Northern Samar. The House of
nd
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against claims that he was not a natural
born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. In sustaining the ruling of the HRET, this
Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino,[21] applied the concept of animus revertendi or intent to return, stating that
his absence from his residence in order to pursue studies or practice his profession as a certified public
accountant in Manila or his registration as a voter other than in the place where he was elected did not
constitute loss of residence. The fact that respondent made periodical journeys to his home province in
Laoang revealed that he always had animus revertendi.
In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v. Commission on Elections,[22] it was explained
that the determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon the intention that may
be inferred from his acts, activities, and utterances. In that case, petitioner Adelina Larrazabal, who had
obtained the highest number of votes in the local elections of February 1, 1988 and who had thus been
proclaimed as the duly elected governor, was disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of residence and
registration qualifications, not being a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. The COMELEC
ruled that the attempt of petitioner Larrazabal to change her residence one year before the election by
registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the position of governor of the province of Leyte was

proof that she considered herself a resident of Ormoc City. This Court affirmed the ruling of the COMELEC
and held that petitioner Larrazabal had established her residence in Ormoc City, not in Kananga, Leyte,
from 1975 up to the time that she ran for the position of Provincial Governor of Leyte on February 1,
1988. There was no evidence to show that she and her husband maintained separate residences, i.e., she
at Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City. The fact that she occasionally visited Kananga, Leyte
through the years did not signify an intention to continue her residence after leaving that place.
In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,[23] the Court held that domicile and residence are
synonymous. The term residence, as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. In that case, petitioner Philip G. Romualdez established his residence during
the early 1980s in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. It was held that the sudden departure from the country
of petitioner, because of the EDSA Peoples Power Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the United
States until favorable conditions had been established, was not voluntary so as to constitute an
abandonment of residence. The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there
must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3)
an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.
The record shows that when petitioner and his wife Raida Guina Dimaporo got married in 1990, they
resided in Tangcal, Tubaran. From then on, there was manifest intention on the part of petitioner to reside
in Tubaran, which he deemed to be the place of his conjugal abode with his wife. The fact that he and his
wife transferred residence from Bayang to Tubaran shows that petitioner was relinquishing his former place
of residence in Bayang and that he intended Tubaran to be his place of domicile. Although petitioner worked
as a private secretary of the mayor of Bayang, he went home to Tubaran everyday after work. This is proof
of animus manendi.
Further, the evidence shows that in the May 11, 1998 election, petitioner was registered as a voter in
Tubaran and that in fact he filed his certificate of candidacy although he later withdrew the same. In the
May 8, 1999 registration of voters, he was again registered as a voter in Precinct No. 28-A of Barangay
Tangcal in Tubaran.
In addition, the following bolster petitioners claim that since 1990 he has been a resident of Tubaran:
(a) the continuous verification of household members in Tubaran conducted by the election officer showed
that petitioner and his wife were members of household No. 13 in Barangay Tangcal, Tubaran; (b) petitioner
co-owned an agricultural land in Tubaran; and (c) Hadji Bashir Ayonga and Samoranao Sarip retracted
their previous affidavits which they had earlier executed and said that they did not understand the contents
thereof and did not know that the affidavits would be used in a disqualification case against petitioner.
Indeed, it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in determining whether or not an individual
has satisfied the Constitutions residency qualification requirement. In holding petitioner not to be a resident
of Tubaran, the COMELEC said:
Three (3) disinterested senior citizens, Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori
Buat, all from Tangcal, Tubaran executed a joint affidavit (Exhibits A to A-1) stating that the
respondent has not at any time resided or lived in said barangay. Moreover, in Election Case
Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T, the respondent admitted that he was living in Marawi City and
was private secretary to Mayor Abdillah Ampatua (T.S.N., Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to
2001-244-T). As opined by Hearing Officer Atty. Cristeto J. Limbaco, these statements made by
the respondent in open court are considered judicial admissions which do not require proof and
cannot be contradicted unless proved to have been made through palpable mistake, citing Sta.
Ana vs. Maliwat (L-23-23, August 31, 1968). On May 3, 2001, respondent through counsel
submitted a Motion to Admit Supplemental Memorandum alleging that respondent could be a

domicile of Tubaran even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places citing the
case of Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300, 302. The fact remains though that respondent
in open court admitted that he was living in Marawi City. (T.S.N. of Election Case Nos. 2001-
237-T to 2001-244-T).[24]
A candidate running for an elective office should at least have resided in the place where he
seeks election for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election. Herein
respondent is wanting in this respect.
In citing the joint affidavit of Hadji Bashir Ayonga, Hadji Taher Batawe and Saadori Buat, the
COMELEC overlooked the fact that Hadji Bashir Ayonga subsequently repudiated his affidavit on the
ground that the same had not been explained to him and he did not know that it would be used to disqualify
petitioner. Hadji Bashir Ayonga affirmed that petitioner was a resident of Tubaran. Indeed, in its findings of
fact, the COMELEC stated:
On March 8, 2001, witness for petitioner Hadji Bashir Ayonga executed an Affidavit of
Desistance thereby withdrawing his affidavit and stated that he did not know the consequences
of signing the affidavit he executed on February 14, 2001 as the same was not explained to him
and would be used in a disqualification case against the respondent. A similar affidavit was also
filed by Samoranao Sarip withdrawing his prior affidavit and stating that he did not know the
consequences of his signing said affidavit of February 17, 2001.[25]
Apparently, the COMELEC (Second Division) forgot its own findings.

Respondent claims that in Election Case Nos. 2001-237-T to 2001-244-T for exclusion of petitioner as
a voter of Tubaran, petitioner admitted that he was not a resident of that municipality but of Marawi
City. Petitioners testimony is as follows:
Atty. P. Dimaampao: MAUYAG PAPANDAYAN, Jr., what is your job now?
WITNESS: Im the private Secretary of Mayor Abdillah Ampatua.
Atty. P. Dimaampao: For how long?
WITNESS: Since he was elected Mayor of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
Atty. P. Dimaampao: Are you residing in Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
WITNESS: No, Im in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur. And I was living in Marawi City.[26]
Petitioners statement that [he] was living in Marawi City cannot be read as saying he was a resident
of Marawi City, because, when asked whether he was residing in Bayang, Lanao del Sur, he replied: No,
Im in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur. What he seems to be saying is that although he worked as a private secretary
of the Mayor of Bayang, he was not a resident of Bayang, because he was living in Tubaran.
When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position
is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding
the victors right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. [27] For the purpose of election
laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. [28] To successfully challenge petitioners
disqualification, respondent must clearly demonstrate that petitioners ineligibility is so patently antagonistic
to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent
will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. [29] Respondent failed to
substantiate her claim that petitioner is ineligible to be mayor of Tubaran.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed resolution of the COMELEC (Second
Division), dated May 8, 2001, disqualifying petitioner Mauyag B. Papandayan, Jr. as a candidate for
municipal mayor in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, and the resolution, dated May 12, 2001, of the COMELEC en

banc, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
temporary restraining order heretofore issued is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-
Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, on official leave.
Corona, J., took no part in deliberation of this case.
[1]
Per Presiding Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion and concurred in by Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 50-51; Annex C to C-1 of respondents Petition for Disqualification (of petitioner).
[3]
Id., p. 52; Annex C-2 of respondents Petition for Disqualification (of petitioner).
[4]
Id., p. 53; Annex D of respondents Petition for Disqualification (of petitioner).
[5]
Id., pp. 54-59; Annex E of Petition.
[6]
Id., p. 60, Annex 1 of petitioners Answer (to respondents Petition for Disqualification).
[7]
Id., p. 61; Annex 2 of petitioners Answer (to respondents Petition for Disqualification).
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
Id., p. 40; Annex C of Petition.
[15]
Per Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier and concurred in by Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Resurreccion Z. Borra.
[16]
Rollo, pp. 101-104.
[17]
Id., p. 179.
[18]
Id., pp. 214-215; Annex C of Reply to the Comment of the Private Respondent.
[19]
191 SCRA 229 (1990).
[20]
199 SCRA 692 (1991).
[21]
96 Phil. 294 (1954).
[22]
201 SCRA 253 (1991).
[23]
226 SCRA 408 (1993).
[24]
COMELEC (Second Division) Resolution dated May 8, 2002; Rollo, p. 28.
[25]
Id.; Rollo, p. 27.
[26]
Rollo, pp. 76-77; Annex G to G-1 of Petition.
[27]
Perez v. Commission on Elections, 317 SCRA 641 (1999) citing Gallego v. Vera, 73 Phil. 453, 459 (1941).
[28]
Millare v. Gironella, 122 SCRA 623 (1983); Pacis v. COMELEC, 25 SCRA 377 (1968); Cauton v. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 912 (1967);
Silverio v. Castro, 19 SCRA 520 (1967); Canceran v. COMELEC, 107 Phil. 607 (1960).
[29]
Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on Elections, 337 SCRA 574 (2000) citing Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 201716 January 8, 2013
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) assails and
seeks to nullify (1) the February 8, 2012 Resolution1 of the Second Division, Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and (2) the May 10, 2012 Resolution2 of the
COMELEC en banc affirming that division’s disposition. The assailed issuances, in turn, affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010,
in Election Case No. 55 declaring Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the
2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local
elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001
and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the
Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in
due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and
proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest,
paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term
on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When
Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy3 for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest,
Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, the corresponding
petition,4 docketed as SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), predicated on the three-consecutive term limit
rule. On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution5 finding for Abundo, who in
the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes6 and was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of
Viga, Catanduanes.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification
case Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega)
commenced a quo warranto7 action before the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes, docketed as
Election Case No. 55, to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his
petition to disqualify.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve
as municipal mayor, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring Abelardo
Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
SO ORDERED.9
In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,10 found Abundo to have already served
three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence,
disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term. Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared
winner in the aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and
actually served as Viga mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June
30, 2007, to be exact. To the RTC, the year and a month service constitutes a complete and full
service of Abundo’s second term as mayor.
Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, his recourse docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010.
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010, the COMELEC’s Second Division rendered the
first assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73, Virac,
Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.11
Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against Abundo on the strength of
Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared
winner in an election protest is considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the
three-term limit rule.
In time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc per its equally
assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012. The fallo of the COMELEC en banc’s Resolution reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc held in essence the
following: first, there was no involuntary interruption of Abundo’s 2004-2007 term service which
would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as he is considered never to have lost title to the
disputed office after he won in his election protest; and second, what the Constitution prohibits is for
an elective official to be in office for the same position for more than three consecutive terms and not
to the service of the term.

Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction.
Intervening Events
In the meantime, following the issuance by the COMELEC of its May 10, 2012 Resolution denying
Abundo’s motion for reconsideration, the following events transpired:
1. On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Order13 declaring its May 10, 2012
Resolution final and executory. The following day, June 21, 2012, the COMELEC issued an
Entry of Judgment.14
2. On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for Execution15 with the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac,
Catanduanes.
3. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting on Vega’s counsel’s motion16 filed a day earlier,
issued an Order17 directing the bailiff of ECAD (COMELEC) to personally deliver the entire
records to said RTC.
On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff personally delivered the entire records of the
instant case to, and were duly received by, the clerk of court of RTC-Br. 43.
4. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its receipt of the case records, the RTC-Br. 43 in
Virac, Catanduanes granted Vega’s Motion for Execution through an Order18 of even date.
And a Writ of Execution19 was issued on the same day.
5. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received the Writ of Execution and served the same
at the office of Mayor Abundo on the same day via substituted service.
6. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO20 enjoining the enforcement of the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions.
7. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court’s July 3, 2012 Resolution21 and a copy of the
TRO. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O.
Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths of office22 as mayor and vice-mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes, respectively.
8. On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of Abundo’s Seventh (7th) Most Extremely Urgent
Manifestation and Motion23 dated June 28, 2012 praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or
status quo ante Order. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor
Cesar O. Cervantes––who had taken their oaths of office the day before—assumed the
posts of mayor and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.24
9. On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion (To Admit Attached Manifestation)25 and
Manifestation with Leave to Admit26 dated July 5, 2012 stating that the TRO thus issued by
the Court has become functus officio owing to the execution of the RTC’s Decision in
Election Case No. 55.
10. On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his Comment/Opposition with Leave to the Petitioner’s
Prayer for the Issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order27 reiterating the argument that since
Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes already assumed the

posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, then a Status Quo Ante Order would
serve no purpose.
11. On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Convert the
July 3, 2012 TRO into a Status Quo Ante Order (In View of the Unreasonable and
Inappropriate Progression of Events).28
It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Abundo was dislodged from his post as incumbent
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. To be sure, the speed which characterized Abundo’s ouster despite
the supervening issuance by the Court of a TRO on July 3, 2012 is not lost on the Court. While it is
not clear whether Vice-Mayor Tarin and First Councilor Cervantes knew of or put on notice about the
TRO either before they took their oaths of office on July 4, 2012 or before assuming the posts of
mayor and vice-mayor on July 5, 2012, the confluence of events following the issuance of the
assailed COMELEC en banc irresistibly tends to show that the TRO––issued as it were to maintain
the status quo, thus averting the premature ouster of Abundo pending this Court’s resolution of his
appeal––appears to have been trivialized.
On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment on Abundo’s petition, followed not long after by
public respondent COMELEC’s Consolidated Comment.29
The Issues
Abundo raises the following grounds for the allowance of the petition:
6.1 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared the arguments in Abundo’s motion for reconsideration
as mere rehash and reiterations of the claims he raised prior to the promulgation of the
Resolution.
6.2 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has consecutively served for three terms
despite the fact that he only served the remaining one year and one month of the second
term as a result of an election protest.30
First Issue:
Arguments in Motion for Reconsideration Not Mere Reiteration
The COMELEC en banc denied Abundo’s motion for reconsideration on the basis that his arguments
in said motion are mere reiterations of what he already brought up in his appeal Brief before the
COMELEC Second Division. In this petition, petitioner claims otherwise.
Petitioner’s assertion is devoid of merit.
A comparison of Abundo’s arguments in the latter’s Brief vis-à-vis those in his Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) reveals that the arguments in the MR are elucidations and amplications of the
same issues raised in the brief. First, in his Brief, Abundo raised the sole issue of lack of jurisdiction
of the RTC to consider the quo warranto case since the alleged violation of the three-term limit has
already been rejected by the COMELEC First Division in SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), while in his
MR, Abundo raised the similar ground of the conclusiveness of the COMELEC’s finding on the issue
of his qualification to run for the current term. Second, in his Brief, Abundo assailed RTC’s reliance

on Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued that the Court’s pronouncement in Aldovino, Jr., which
dealt with preventive suspension, is not applicable to the instant case as it involves only a partial
service of the term. Abundo argued in his Brief that his situation cannot be equated with the case of
preventive suspension as held in Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued before that the almost two
years which he did not sit as mayor during the 2004-2007 term is an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term.
Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the issues in the MR are a rehash of those in the Brief.
Core Issue:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms
The pivotal determinative issue then is whether the service of a term less than the full three years by
an elected official arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest
is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term
limit for elective local officials.
On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would
have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the
2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and
occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the
rightful choice of the electorate.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. (Emphasis
supplied.)
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC)
of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. —
xxxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected. (Emphasis Ours.)
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted
constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and

(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.31
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual
milieus, has its complicated side. We shall revisit and analyze the various holdings and relevant
pronouncements of the Court on the matter.
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC,
voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall
NOT, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. In
Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the observation that the law "does not textually state that
voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect ‘continuity of
service for a full term’ for purposes of the three-term limit rule."32
As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections,33 the principle behind the three-term limit rule
covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
Put a bit differently, an elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek
immediate reelection for a fourth term,34albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same
position after the election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by
reason of the prohibition.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her
third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately
following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected." This qualification was made as a
deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely
resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from
involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.
While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes
resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local officials who were elected and served for
three terms or more, but whose terms or service was punctuated by what they view as involuntary
interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term.
Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or
assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated
candidate as the winner in an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing
party in an election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election,
removal of the official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.
This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms
were considered or not considered as having been "involuntarily interrupted or broken."
(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr.35 (1998) and Montebon v.
Commission on Elections36 (2008), the Court delved on the effects of "assumption to office by
operation of law" on the three-term limit rule. This contemplates a situation wherein an elective local
official fills by succession a higher local government post permanently left vacant due to any of the
following contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to qualify,
dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.37

In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for
a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco became mayor, by operation of law,
upon the death of the incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja. Capco was then elected and served as mayor
for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. When Capco expressed his intention to run again for the
mayoralty position during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then also a candidate
for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification for violation of the three-term limit rule.
Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the disqualification rule to apply, "it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply."38 There was, the Court ruled, no violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was not elected
to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of
law"39 when a permanent vacancy occurred in that office.
The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case of Montebon. There, Montebon had been
elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-
2004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during his second term, Montebon succeeded
and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When
Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification
was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that Montebon’s assumption
of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of service as councilor.
The Court emphasized that succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such,
it is an involuntary severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post
as councilor in order to assume office as vice-mayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot,
without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as councilor.
(2) Recall Election
With reference to the effects of recall election on the continuity of service, Adormeo v. Commission
on Elections40(2002) and the aforementioned case of Socrates (2002) provide guidance.
In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected and served as mayor of Lucena City during
terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao.
However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000
wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran
for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground he had already served as mayor for
three consecutive terms for violation of the three term-limit rule. The Court held therein that the
remainder of Tagarao’s term after the recall election during which Talaga served as mayor should
not be considered for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the
continuity of Talaga’s mayorship was disrupted by his defeat during the 1998 elections.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Socrates. The petitioners in that case assailed the
COMELEC Resolution which declared Edward Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in a recall
election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City
for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-
term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections,
in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall
proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as mayor.
Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under the three-term limit rule.
In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled:

x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the
recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent,
Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa
was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly
an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary
renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.41
The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same
office following the end of the third consecutive term and, hence, any subsequent election, like recall
election, is no longer covered x x x."42
(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City
On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of
the incumbent official’s continuity of service. The Court said so in Latasa v. Commission on
Elections43 (2003).
Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and served as mayor of
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During
his third term, Digos was converted into a component city, with the corresponding cityhood law
providing the holdover of elective officials. When Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy as mayor
for the 2001 elections, the Court declared Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of Digos City for
violation of the three-term limit rule on the basis of the following ratiocination:
This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the
said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated
his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where
petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa
never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from
discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
(Emphasis supplied.)
(4) Period of Preventive Suspension
In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused the doctrine that the period during which a
local elected official is under preventive suspension cannot be considered as an interruption of the
continuity of his service. The Court explained why so:
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should
not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official
continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office
is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists.44 (Emphasis supplied.)
(5) Election Protest

With regard to the effects of an election protest vis-à-vis the three-term limit rule, jurisprudence
presents a more differing picture. The Court’s pronouncements in Lonzanida v. Commission on
Elections45 (1999), Ong v. Alegre46(2006), Rivera III v. Commission on Elections47 (2007) and Dizon
v. Commission on Elections48 (2009), all protest cases, are illuminating.
In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the
1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null
and void on the ground of failure of elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three months before
the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ
of execution it issued. Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the
May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed
a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive
terms in the same post. The Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must
concur for the three-term limit to apply: "1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms."49
In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent in the case of
Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the
post in the May 1995 elections since his assumption of office as mayor "cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation." And as a corollary point,
the Court stated that Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having been ordered
to vacate his post before the expiration of the term, a situation which amounts to an involuntary
relinquishment of office.This Court deviated from the ruling in Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre50 owing to
a variance in the factual situations attendant.
In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte
for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004. During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during his
supposed second term, the COMELEC nullified Ong’s proclamation on the postulate that Ong lost
during the 1998 elections. However, the COMELEC’s decision became final and executory on July
4, 2001, when Ong had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to
serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same position as mayor, which his opponent opposed for violation of
the three-term limit rule.
Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he could not be considered as having served
as mayor from 1998-2001 because he was not duly elected to the post and merely assumed office
as a "presumptive winner." Dismissing Ong’s argument, the Court held that his assumption of office
as mayor for the term 1998-2001 constitutes "service for the full term" and hence, should be counted
for purposes of the three-term limit rule. The Court modified the conditions stated in Lonzanida in the
sense that Ong’s service was deemed and counted as service for a full term because Ong’s
proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the term. The Court noted that the COMELEC
decision which declared Ong as not having won the 1998 elections was "without practical and legal
use and value" promulgated as it was after the contested term has expired. The Court further
reasoned:
Petitioner Francis Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty
derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His
proclamation as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of
office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.

The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view
would mean that Alegre would – under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term
by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term
pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.51 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and ruled that the case of Ong was different, to wit:
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in
Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure
of election", and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was
nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result
of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of
service.52 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ong’s slight departure from Lonzanida would later find reinforcement in the consolidated cases of
Rivera III v. Commission on Elections53 and Dee v. Morales.54 Therein, Morales was elected mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga for the following consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004.
In relation to the 2004 elections, Morales again ran as mayor of the same town, emerged as
garnering the majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor for term commencing July 1, 2004
to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo warranto was later filed against Morales predicated on the
ground that he is ineligible to run for a "fourth" term, having served as mayor for three consecutive
terms. In his answer, Morales averred that his supposed 1998-2001 term cannot be considered
against him, for, although he was proclaimed by the Mabalacat board of canvassers as elected
mayor vis-à-vis the 1998 elections and discharged the duties of mayor until June 30, 2001, his
proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and his closest rival, Anthony Dee,
proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Pursuing his point, Morales parlayed the idea that he only served
as a mere caretaker.
The Court found Morales’ posture untenable and held that the case of Morales presents a factual
milieu similar with Ong, not with Lonzanida. For ease of reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong,
in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like Morales, had served the three-year term from the start to the
end of the term. Hence, the Court concluded that Morales exceeded the three-term limit rule, to wit:
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the
position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting
him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
xxxx
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously
without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been
mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.55 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being belatedly ousted, i.e., after the expiry of the term,
cannot constitute an interruption in Morales’ service of the full term; neither can Morales, as he
argued, be considered merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer" for purposes of
applying the three-term limit rule.

In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on Elections,56 the Court would again find the same
Mayor Morales as respondent in a disqualification proceeding when he ran again as a mayoralty
candidate during the 2007 elections for a term ending June 30, 2010. Having been unseated from
his post by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Rivera, Morales would argue this time around that the
three-term limit rule was no longer applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This time, the Court ruled
in his favor, holding that for purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term limit rule was no longer a
disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court wrote:
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to
the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case
was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the
vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May
2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter
how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not
hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.57 (Emphasis supplied)
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of

terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed
the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same
position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said
position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption
(Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the
elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e.,
from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and
Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city
does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued

stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension,
although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino,
Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his
term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of
office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need
not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for
any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of
service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).

6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after
said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does
not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His
full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because
the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
The Case of Abundo
Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling that he had already served
three consecutive terms and is, thus, barred by the constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the
current 2010-2013 term. In gist, Abundo arguments run thusly:
1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former dealt with preventive
suspension which does not interrupt the continuity of service of a term;
2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be interrupted so as to
remove him from the reach of the constitutional three-term limitation;
3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of "term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its reliance on a
mere portion of the Decision and not on the unified logic in the disquisition;
4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida58 and Rivera III v.
Commission on Elections.59
5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no interruption in the service
of Abundo since what he considered as an "interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred
before his term started; and
6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation was adjudged invalid
was interrupted while that of the protestant (Abundo) who was eventually proclaimed winner
was not so interrupted is at once absurd as it is illogical.
Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr. finds
application in the instant case. The COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose title to the office as his
victory in the protest case confirmed his entitlement to said office and he was only unable to
temporarily discharge the functions of the office during the pendency of the election protest.
We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an election protest, for which the
rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera and Dizon appear to be more attuned than the case of Aldovino
Jr., the interrupting effects of the imposition of a preventive suspension being the very lis mota in the
Aldovino, Jr. case. But just the same, We find that Abundo’s case presents a different factual
backdrop.
Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals subject of
disqualification were candidates who lost in the election protest and each declared loser during the
elections, Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was declared the rightful holder of
the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both unseated toward
the end of their respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had
assumed the remainder of the term.

Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s pronouncements in the past as instructive, and consider
several doctrines established from the 1998 case of Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino
Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving at this Court’s conclusion.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the "monopolization of political
power" and prevent elected officials from breeding "proprietary interest in their position"60 but also to
"enhance the people’s freedom of choice."61 In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "while
people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should be
taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed."62
In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares that the two-year period
during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption,
which effectively removed Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term starting July 1, 2004
to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his election
protest against Torres and his consequent proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the first
requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the official
has been elected is satisfied.
This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had served for "three
consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes
immediately before the 2010 national and local elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course the
question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary interruption during the three three-year
periods, resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundo’s mayoralty.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007
term.
There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision
of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and
served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor
Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals,63 means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and definite
period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office."64 It also means the "time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another."65 It is the period of time during which a duly
elected official has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of
Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local elected officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June
30 of the first year of said term.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May
8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor
as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said
elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed
election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor
only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the
May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally

contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully
served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as
Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An
involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one
term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.67
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of
service and voluntary renunciation of service. The word interruption means temporary cessation,
intermission or suspension.68To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent.69 When the Constitution
and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of
the service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or
giving a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word "renunciation"
connotes the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon,
decline or resign.70 Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean
to give up or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned
elected official is entitled to.
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, applying Aldovino, Jr.,71 held:
It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which jurisprudence deems an exception
to the three-term limit rule, implies that the service of the term has begun before it was interrupted.
Here, the respondent did not lose title to the office. As the assailed Resolution states:
In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to the office. On the contrary, he
actively sought entitlement to the office when he lodged the election protest case. And respondent-
appellant’s victory in the said case is a final confirmation that he was validly elected for the mayoralty
post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004-2007. At most, respondent-appellant was only unable to
temporarily discharge the functions of the office to which he was validly elected during the pendency
of the election protest, but he never lost title to the said office.72 (Emphasis added.)
The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that the actual length of service
by the public official in a given term is immaterial by reckoning said service for the term in the
application of the three-term limit rule, thus:
As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this formulation—no more than three consecutive terms—is
a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule." Therefore we cannot subscribe to
the argument that since respondent Abundo served only a portion of the term, his 2004-2007 "term"
should not be considered for purposes of the application of the three term limit rule. When the
framers of the Constitution drafted and incorporated the three term limit rule, it is clear that reference
is to the term, not the actual length of the service the public official may render. Therefore, one’s
actual service of term no matter how long or how short is immaterial.73
In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of the actual service of the
term is immaterial in his case as he was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor.
The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commend
themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot simply find its way clear to understand the poll body’s
determination that Abundo was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor during
the pendency of the election protest.

As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local
elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared
winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been
substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was
actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served
the full 2004-2007 term.
This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable
resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his
opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other
words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004—the start of the term—until May 9, 2006 or during
which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his
heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to
serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to
the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no
legal right to said position.
Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondent’s cause of action, or to COMELEC’s
resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the Court succinctly defines what temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective office means, thus:
On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post,
even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not
involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder,
while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided
by law.74
We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the instant case.
Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise
the functions of an elective post. For one, during the intervening period of almost two years,
reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the
mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal
right to assume and serve such elective office. For another, not having been declared winner yet,
Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in
the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in
the election protest accords him title to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not
entitled to the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor.
1âw phi 1
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective
interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of the remaining
term. At this juncture, We observe the apparent similarities of Mayor Abundo’s case with the cases
of Mayor Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn
were not proclaimed winners since they were non-candidates in the regularelections. They were
proclaimed winners during the recall elections and clearly were not able to fully serve the terms of
the deposed incumbent officials. Similar to their cases where the Court deemed their terms as
involuntarily interrupted, Abundo also became or was a private citizen during the period over which
his opponent was serving as mayor. If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in
Lonzanida’s service because of his subsequent defeat in the election protest, then with more reason,
Abundo’s term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted since he was not proclaimed winner
after the 2004 elections and was able to assume the office and serve only for a little more than a
year after winning the protest.

As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the "law contemplates a rest
period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government
unit."75 Applying the said principle in the present case, there is no question that during the pendency
of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good people of
Viga, Catanduanes.
Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a
rest period or break in his service because, as earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the election
protest, it was Abundo’s opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then
valid proclamation.
As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case differs from other cases involving the effects of an
election protest because while Abundo was, in the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the
one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was
a victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not possess the mandate
to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority to establish a
fortress against the injustices it may bring.
In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and cause grave injustice to
Abundo––an elected official who was belatedly declared as the winner and assumed office for only a
short period of the term. If in the cases of Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of a losing
candidate––or the person who was adjudged not legally entitled to hold the contested public office
but held it anyway––We find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant who, by
popular vote, deserves title to the public office but whose opportunity to hold the same was halted by
an invalid proclamation.
Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the injustice that may
likewise be committed against the people of Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to
choose their leaders. Like the framers of the Constitution, We bear in mind that We "cannot arrogate
unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want"76 and hence, should, as much as possible,
"allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to curtail
the power when it overreaches itself."77 For democracy draws strength from the choice the people
make which is the same choice We are likewise bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed February 8,
2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of
the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55,
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered
IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes
are ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes,
respectively, and shall revert to their original positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor,
respectively, upon receipt of this Decision.
The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED.
This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO







Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1Rollo, pp. 47-56. Rendered by Presiding Commissioner Lucenito N. Tagle and

Commissioner Elhs R. Yosoph with Commi5'ioner Augusto C. Lagman, dissenting.
Dissenting Opinion, id. at 57-58.
2Id. at 40-46, per Commissioner Elias R. Yusoph and concurred in by Chairman Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr., Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento, Lucenito N. Tagle, Armando C. Velasco
and Christian Robert S. Lim.
3 Id. at 134.
4 Id. at 127-133, dated March 10, 2010.
5Id. at 61-65, per curiam by Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento (Presiding Commissioner),

Armando C. Velasco and Gregorio Y. Larrazabal. The Resolution disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition to disqualify filed by petitioner Jose C.

Torres against respondent Abelardo M. Abundo, Sr. is hereby DENIED for LACK OF MERIT.
SO ORDERED.
6Id. at 76-78, Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates for
Viga Mayor and Vice-Mayor, dated May 11, 2010.
7 Id. at 66-74, Petition dated May 20, 2010.
8 Id. at 93-99, per Presiding Judge Lelu P. Contreras.
9 Id. at 99.
11 Rollo, pp. 55-56.
12 Id. at 46.
13Id. at 347-348, Annex "A" of Abundo’s Most Extremely Urgent Manifestation with Sixth
(6th) Reiterative Motion to Resolve the Application for the Immediate Issuance of an
Injunctive Writ Due to Supervening Event, dated June 22, 2012.
Id. at 349, Annex "A-1" of Abundo’s Most Extremely Urgent Manifestation with Sixth (6th)
14
Reiterative Motion to Resolve the Application for the Immediate Issuance of an Injunctive
Writ Due to Supervening Event, dated June 22, 2012.
15 Id. at 390, Annex "C" of Vega’s Manifestation with Leave to Admit, dated July 5, 2012.
16 Filed on June 26, 2012.
17 Rollo, p. 389, Annex "C" of Vega’s Manifestation with Leave to Admit, dated July 5, 2012.

18 Id. at 390-391, Annex "D" of Vega’s Manifestation with Leave to Admit, dated July 5, 2012.
19 Id. at 392, Annex "E" of Vega’s Manifestation with Leave to Admit, dated July 5, 2012.
20 Id. at 356-357.
21 Id. at 357.
22Id. at 462, Panunumpa sa Katungkulan of Emeterio M. Tarin done on July 4, 2012, Annex
"B" of Abundo’s Most Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Convert the July 3, 2012
Temporary Restraining Order into a Status Quo Ante Order (In View of the Unreasonable
and Inappropriate Progression of Events), dated July 4, 2012.
23 Id. at 367.
24Id. at 463, 464, Certifications of the OIC, Provincial Director of the DILG, Annexes "B-1"
and "B-2" of Abundo’s Most Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Convert the July 3, 2012
Temporary Restraining Order into a Status Quo Ante Order (In View of the Unreasonable
and Inappropriate Progression of Events), dated July 4, 2012.
25 Id. at 369-373, dated July 5, 2012.
26 Id. at 374-420, dated July 5, 2012.
27 Id. at 421-437, dated July 9, 2012.
28 Id. at 438-482, dated July 4, 2012.
29Id. at 639-665 (Vega’s Comment); id. at 668-687, 697-719 (public respondent’s Comment
and Consolidated Comment, respectively).
30 Id. at 25-27.
31 Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602.
32 Aldovino Jr., supra note 10.
33 G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 457.
34 Id.
35 G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157.
36 G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008, 551 SCRA 50.
Section 44, Chapter II "Vacancies and Succession," Title II "Elective Officials," Republic
37
Act No. 7160, Local Government Code of 1991.
38 Borja, Jr., supra note 35, at 169.

39 Id.
40 G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 90.
41 Socrates, supra note 33.
42 Id.
44 Supra note 10.
45 Supra note 31.
46 G.R. Nos. 163295 & 163354, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 473.
47 G.R. Nos. 167591 & 170577, May 9, 2007, 523 SCRA 41.
48 G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 589.
49 Lonzanida, supra note 31.
50 Supra note 46.
51 Id.
52
Id.
53 Supra note 47.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Supra note 48.
57 Id.
58 Supra note 31.
59 Supra note 47.
Borja, Jr., supra note 35, quoting Commissioner Blas F. Ople, RECORD OF THE
60
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 236-243, Session of July 25, 1986.
61 Borja, Jr., supra note 35.
62 Id.

63 No. L-30057, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 231; cited in Aldovino, Jr.
64 Id. at 240 (citations omitted).
65Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000, 347 SCRA 655,
663; cited in Aldovino, Jr., supra note 10.
66 Sec. 43. Term of Office. —
(a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this
Code shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as
may be provided for by law x x x.
67 Socrates, supra note 33.
68WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1192 (1981).
69 Id.
70Aldovino, Jr., supra note 10, at 251; citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1992 (1993).
71 Id. at 259.
72 Rollo, p. 45.
73 Id. at 54-55.
74 Aldovino, Jr., supra note 10, at 260.
75 Latasa, supra note 43.
Borja, Jr., supra note 35, quoting Commmissioner Yusup R. Abubakar, RECORD OF THE
76
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 242, Session of July 25, 1986.
Id., quoting Commmissioner Felicitas S. Aquino, RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

77
COMMISSION, 242, Session of July 25, 1986.
SEPARATE OPINION
BRION, J.:
I agree with Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.'s conclusion that the proclamation of Jose Torres, as
the "apparent winner" in the 2004 elections, effectively interrupted what could have been Abelardo
Abundo, Sr.'s full term. I write this Opinion to briefly expound on the Court's ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections1 which the Commission on

Elections ( COMELEC) erroneously relied upon in affirming the grant of the quo warranto petition
against Abundo, and to express my own views on how our present Decision should be read in light
of other three-term limit cases that have been decided under a protest case scenario.
The Aldovino ruling
The issue in Aldovino was whether the preventive suspension of a local elective official amounted to
an interruption in the continuity of his term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit rule. The
issue arose because an elective local official who is preventively suspended is prevented, under
legal compulsion, from exercising the functions of his office; thus, the question — is there then an
interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule of the Constitution?
After analyzing the first clause of the three-term limit rule (Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution) which provides:
The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
the Court observed that the limitation specifically refers to the term (or the period of time an official
has title to office and can serve), not to the service of a term.
Complementing the term limitation is the second clause of the same provision on voluntary
renunciation stating that:
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
The Court construed "voluntary renunciation" as "a loss of title to office by conscious choice."2
Based on its analysis of the provision and after a survey of jurisprudence on the three-term limit rule,
the Court concluded that the interruption of a term that would prevent the operation of the rule
involves "no less than the involuntary loss of title to office" or "at least an effective break from holding
office."3
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to
his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office
holder’s term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons
established by law. x x x.
To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X – both by structure and
substance – fixes an elective official’s term of office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive
terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of
a circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the
context of interrupting the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The
"voluntary renunciation" it speaks of refers only to the elective official’s voluntary relinquishment of
office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary "cessation of the exercise of
power or authority" that may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of
them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:

Indeed, The law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from
office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit.4 (italics supplied; citation omitted)
The Court further concluded that while preventive suspension is involuntary in nature, its imposition
on an elective local official cannot amount to an interruption of a term "because the suspended
official continues x x x in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives
of the office within the suspension period."5
Based on these clear rulings, I consider it a grave error for the Comelec to equate the situation of a
preventively suspended elective local official with the situation of a non-proclaimed candidate who
was later found to have actually won the election. With its conclusion, the Comelec thereby grossly
disregarded the nature and effects of a preventive suspension, and at the same time glossed over
the legal and factual realities that obtain in a protested election situation where one candidate is
proclaimed, only to lose out later during the term to the winner in the protest case. To state the
obvious, election protests are quite common and it is best for the Court to already provide guidance
on how a reversal decision in a protest case affects the three-term limit rule.
The proclamation alone of an apparent winner (i.e., the candidate immediately proclaimed but whose
election is protested) entitles him to take his oath of office and to perform his duties as a newly-
elected local official. That he may be characterized merely as a "presumptive winner"6 during the
pendency of a protest against him does not make him any less of a duly elected local official; for the
time being, he possesses all the rights and is burdened with all the duties of his office under the law.
In stark contrast with his situation, the non-proclaimed candidate cannot but be considered a private
citizen while prosecuting his election protest;7 he carries no title to office and is denied the exercise
of the rights and the performance of the duties and functions of an elected official.
It is from these perspectives that Aldovino cannot be used as basis for the conclusion that there had
been no interruption in the case of Abundo – the eventual election winner who is so recognized only
after winning his protest case. Notably in Aldovino, while a preventive suspension is an involuntary
imposition, what it affects is merely the authority to discharge the functions of an office that the
suspended local official continues to hold. As already mentioned above, the local elective official
continuous to possess title to his office while under preventive suspension, so that no interruption of
his term ensues.
In the present case, Torres (instead of Abundo) was immediately proclaimed the winner in the 2004
elections and effectively held title to the office until he was unseated. This circumstance necessarily
implied that Abundo had no title to the office of Mayor in the meanwhile or, at least, had an effective
break in the continuity of his term as mayor; from his first (2001-2004) term, he did not immediately
continue into his second (2004-2007) term and for a time during this term completely ceased to
exercise authority in the local government unit. It was not a mere cessation of the authority to
exercise the rights and prerogatives of the office of Mayor as in the case of Aldovino; he was not the
Mayor and had no title to this office in the meanwhile. No better proof of his loss of title exists than
the need to file an election protest to claim the seat Torres already occupied after his proclamation.
From this perspective, the Aldovino ruling cannot be used as basis for the conclusion that Abundo
enjoyed an uninterrupted 2001-2004 term.
Election to office
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,8 reiterated in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections,9 the

Court ruled that a local elective official can seek reelection in the same local government position
unless two requisites concur: the official has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same

local government post, and that he fully served the three consecutive terms. It is from the prism of
these requisites that the three-term limit rule must be viewed; in Abundo’s case, the continuity of his
first and third terms are not at issue; the issue is confined to his second term.
That Abundo has been elected to the position of Mayor in the 2004 elections is a matter that is now
beyond dispute based on the legal reality that he was eventually found, in his election protest, to be
the true choice of the electorate. This legal reality, however, is complicated by an intervening
development – the wrongful proclamation of another candidate (Torres) – so that he (Abundo) could
only take his oath of office and discharge the duties of a Mayor very much later into the 2004-2007
mayoralty term. As I have argued above to contradict the use of the Aldovino ruling, the factual
reality that he had no title to office and did not serve as Mayor while he was a protestant cannot
simply be glossed over, and cannot likewise be brushed aside by trying to draw a conclusion from a
combined reading of Ong v. Alegre10 and Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections.11 The Court cannot
avoid considering the attendant factual and legal realities, based on the requirements that Borja Jr.
established, and has no choice but to adjust its appreciation of these realities, as may be necessary,
as it had done in Ong. This, I believe, is the approach and appreciation that should be made, not the
drawing of a forced conclusion from a combined reading of Ong and Lonzanida.
In Lonzanida (where Lonzanida was the protestee), the Court considered both the requisites for the
application of the three-term limit rule absent where a local official’s (Lonzanida’s) proclamation,
supposedly for his third consecutive term in office, was later invalidated prior to the expiration of this
third term, i.e., from 1995 to 1998. With the invalidation, Lonzanida could not really be considered as
having been elected to the office since he was found not to be the real choice of the electorate – this
is the legal reality for Lonzanida. Too, he did not fully serve his (supposedly third) term because of
the intervening ruling ordering him to vacate his post. This ruling, no less equivalent to involuntary
renunciation, is the factual reality in Lonzanida’s case. Thus, an interruption of the three consecutive
terms took place.
Ong v. Alegre12 involved facts close, but not completely similar, to Lonzanida. For in Ong, the ruling
ordering the apparent winner and protestee (Francis Ong) to vacate his post came after the
expiration of the contested term, i.e., after Ong’s second term from 1998 to 2001. In holding that
both requisites were present (so that there was effectively no interruption), the Court again took the
attendant legal and factual realities into account. Its appreciation of these realities, however, came
with a twist to allow for the attendant factual situation. The Court ruled that while Joseph Alegre was
later adjudged the "winner" in the 1998 elections and, "therefore, was the legally elected mayor," this
legal conclusion "was without practical and legal use and value."13
Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation
by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998
mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions
thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.14
Effectively, while the Court defined the legalities arising from the given factual situation, it recognized
that the given facts rendered its legal conclusion moot and academic or, in short, useless and
irrelevant; while Ong effectively lost the election, he had served the full term that should belong to
the winning candidate. Based on this recognition, the Court ruled that no effective interruption took
place for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
From these perspectives, Ong did not "supersede" or "supplant" Lonzanida. Neither Ong nor the
1âwphi 1
subsequent case of Rivera III v. Commission on Elections15 says so. The evident factual variance in

Ong simply called for an adjusted appreciation of the element of "election" under the three-term limit
rule. This is what a sensible reading of these two cases yields.
In considering the case of Abundo with Lonzanida and Ong, a noticeable distinction that sets
Abundo apart is his situation as protestant, as against Lonzanida and Ong who were both protestees
– the presumptive winners whose election and proclamation were protested. Both protestees lost in
the protest and effectively were not "elected," although this was appreciated by the Court with twist
in Ong, as mentioned above. Abundo, on the other hand, successfully prosecuted his protest and
was thus recognized as the candidate whom the people voted for, subject only to the question raised
in the present case – whether this recognition or declaration rendered him "elected" from the start of
his term.
The differing factual situations of the cited cases and Abundo that necessarily gave rise to different
perspectives in appreciating the same legal question, immediately suggest that the Court’s rulings in
the cited cases cannot simply be combined nor wholly be bodily lifted and applied to Abundo. At the
simplest, both Lonzanida and Ong were protestees who faced the same legal reality of losing the
election, although Ong fully served the elected term; for Abundo, the legal reality is his recognized
and declared election victory. In terms of factual reality, Lonzanida and Abundo may be the same
since they only partially served their term, but this similarity is fully negated by their differing legal
realities with respect to the element of "election." Ong and Abundo, on the other hand, have differing
legal and factual realities; aside from their differing election results, Ong served the full term, while
Abundo only enjoyed an abbreviated term.
If at all, the parallelism that can be drawn from Ong, that can fully serve the resolution of Abundo' s
case, is the practical and purposive approach that the Court used in Ong when it implicitly
recognized that dwelling on and giving full stress to the "election" element of the three-term limit rule
(as established in Borja, Jr.) is irrelevant and pointless, given that Ong had served the full contested
term.
Under this same approach, Abundo should not be considered to have been elected for the full term
for purposes of the three-term limit rule, despite the legal reality that he won the election; as in Ong,
the factual reality should prevail, and that reality is that he served for less than this full term. Thus,
where less than a full term is served by a winning protestant, no continuous and uninterrupted term
should be recognized. This is the view that best serves the purposes of the three-term limit rule.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009,609 SCRA 234.
2 Id. at 252.
3 Id. at 259-260.
4 Id. at 260-261.

5 Id. at 264.
6Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602,
612.
7 Socrates v. COMELEC, 440 Phil. 106, 129 (2002).
8 G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157, 169.
9 Supra note 6, at 611.
10 G.R. Nos. 163295 and 163354, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 473.
11 Supra note 6.
12 Supra note 10.
13 Id. at 482.
14 Id. at 428-483.
15 G.R. Nos. 167591 and 170577, May 9, 2007, 523 SCRA 41.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137718. July 27, 1999]
REYNALDO O. MALONZO, in his capacity as City Mayor of Caloocan City, OSCAR

MALAPITAN, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Caloocan City, CHITO ABEL,
BENJAMIN MANLAPIG, EDGAR ERICE, DENNIS PADILLA, ZALDY DOLARTE, LUIS
TITO VARELA, SUSAN PUNZALAN, HENRY CAMAYO, in their capacities as
Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City, petitioners, vs. HON.
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. RONALDO V.
PUNO, in his capacity as Under-secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, and EDUARDO TIBOR, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Consistent with the doctrine that local government does not mean the creation of imperium in imperii or
a state within a State, the Constitution has vested the President of the Philippines the power of general
supervision over local government units.[1] Such grant of power includes the power of discipline over local
officials, keeping them accountable to the public, and seeing to it that their acts are kept within the bounds
of law. Needless to say, this awesome supervisory power, however, must be exercised judiciously and with
utmost circumspection so as not to transgress the avowed constitutional policy of local autonomy. As the
facts unfold, the issue that obtrudes in our minds is: Should the national government be too strong vis--vis
its local counterpart to the point of subverting the principle of local autonomy enshrined and zealously
protected under the Constitution? It is in this light that the instant case shall now be resolved.
During the incumbency of then Macario A Asistio, Jr., the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City
passed Ordinance No. 0168, S. 1994,[2] authorizing the City Mayor to initiate proceedings for the
expropriation of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate registered in the name of CLT Relaty Development Corporation
(CLT). The lot, covering an area of 799,955 square meters, was intended for low-cost housing and the
construction of an integrated bus terminal, parks and playgrounds, and related support facilities and
utilities. For this purpose, the said ordinance appropriated the amount of P35,997,975.00,[3]representing
15% of the fair market value of Lot 26 that would be required of the city government as a deposit prior to
entry into the premises to be expropriated.
It turned out, however, that the Maysilo Estate straddled the City of Caloocan and the Municipality of
Malabon, prompting CLT to file a special civil action[4] for Interpleader with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction on August 6, 1997, before the Caloocan
City Regional Trial Court, branch 124. The complaint specifically sought to restrain the defendants City of
Caloocan and Municipality of Malabon from assessing and collecting real property taxes from CLT and to
interplead and litigate among themselves their conflicting rights to claim such taxes.
On December 11, 1997, the Caloocan City Sangguniang Panlungsod, under the stewardship of
incumbent Mayor Reynaldo O. Malonzo, enacted Ordinance No. 0246, S. 1997,[5] entitled AN ORDINANCE
AMENDING AND SUPPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF CITY ORDINANCE NO. 0168, SERIES OF
1994 AND FOR OTHER RELATED PURPOSES.[6] Under this ordinance, certain amendments were
introduced, foremost of which was the city councils decision to increase the appropriated amount of
P35,997,975.00 in the previous ordinance to P39,352,047.75, taking into account the subject propertys
current fair market value.

After failing to conclude a voluntary sale of Lot 26, the city government commenced on March 23,
1998, a suit for eminent domain[7] against CLT before the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court, Branch 126,
to implement the subject propertys expropriation. Apparently disturbed by this development, the Caloocan
City Legal Officer informed the City Mayor through a letter-memorandum[8] dated April 7, 1998, of the
pending interpleader case covering Lot 26 and that the same was a Prejudicial Question which must be
resolved first by the proper court in order not to put the expropriation proceedings in question. He therefore
recommended that pending the final determination and resolution of the court on the issue (territorial
jurisdiction) raised in Civil Case No. C-18019 before Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, the expropriation of the subject property be cancelled and/or abandoned.
In the meantime, after the successful re-election bid of Malonzo, Vice-Mayor Oscar G. Malapitan wrote
him a letter[9] dated June 4, 1998, requesting the immediate repair and renovation of the offices of the
incoming councilors, as well as the hiring of additional personnel and the retention of those currently
employed in the offices of the councilors.
Malonzo acted on said letter and endorsed the same to the Office of the City Treasurer. The latter in
turn manifested through a memorandum[10]dated June 26, 1998, that since the expropriation of CLT Property
is discontinued, the appropriation for expropriation of FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P50M)[11] can be reverted
for use in a supplemental budget stating further that he certifies (F)or its reversion since it is not yet
obligated, and for its availability for re-appropriation in a supplemental budget.
Pursuant to the treasurers certification on the availability of funds to accommodate Vice-Mayor
Malapitans request, Malonzo subsequently endorsed to the Sangguniang Panlungsod Supplemental
Budget No. 01, Series of 1998, appropriating the amount of P39,343,028.00. The city council acted
favorably on Malonzos endorsement and, thus, passed Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998[12] entitled AN
ORDINANCE PROVIDING PAYMENTS FOR APPROVED ITEMS IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGET
NO. 1 CALENDAR YEAR 1998 AND APPROPRIATING CORRESPONDING AMOUNT WHICH SHALL BE
TAKEN FROM THE GENERAL FUND (REVERSION OF APPROPRIATION-EXPROPRIATION OF
PROPERTIES).
Alleging, however, that petitioners conspired and confederated in willfully violating certain provisions
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (hereinafter the "Code") through the passage of Ordinance No.
0254, S. 1998, a certain Eduardo Tibor, by himself and as a taxpayer, filed on July 15, 1998, an
administrative complaint for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office, and Abuse of Authority against petitioners
before the Office of the President (OP).[13]
After the complaint was given due course, petitioners filed on October 15, 1998 their Consolidated
Answer,[14] pointing out, among other things, that said complaint constituted collateral attack of a validly
enacted ordinance whose validity should only be determined in a judicial forum. They also claimed that the
assailed ordinance was enacted strictly in accordance with Article 417 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (hereinafter, the Rules), as amended by Administrative
Order No. 47 dated April 12, 1993.
After several exchanges of pleadings,[15] petitioners, citing Section 326 of the Code and Article 422,
Rule XXXIV of the Rules, filed on February 7, 1999, a Motion to Refer the Case to the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) on the ground that the DBM has been granted power under the Code to review
ordinances authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations of, among other things, highly urbanized
cities such as Caloocan City. This motion, however, remained unresolved.
Two days later, after learning that a certain Teotimo de Guzman Gajudo had filed an action for the
Decalaration of Nullity of Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998, before the Caloocan City Regional Trial
Court,[16] petitioners filed with the OP a Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings on
the ground that the determination of the validity of said ordinance was a prejudicial question.Likewise, this
motion was not acted upon by the OP.
Thus, without resolving the foregoing motions of petitioners, the OP rendered its assailed
judgment[17] on March 15, 1999, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, herein respondents Mayor Reynaldo Malonzo, Vice-mayor Oscar G. Malapitan
and Councilors Chito Abel, Benjamin Manlapig, Edgar Erice, Dennis Padilla, Zaldy Dolatre,
Susana Punzalan, Henry Camayo, and Luis Tito Varela, all of Caloocan City, are hereby
adjudged guilty of misconduct and each is meted the penalty of SUSPENSION[18] from office for a
period of three (3) months without pay to commence upon receipt of this Decision. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On even date, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) administered Macario E.
Asistio IIIs oath of office as Acting Mayor of Caloocan City.
Without moving for reconsideration of the OPs decision, petitioners filed before this Court on March
22, 1999, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Application for Preliminary Injunction and
Prayer for Restraining Order, With alternative Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. [19]
In a resolution of this Court dated April 5, 1999, we resolved to set the case for oral argument[20] on
April 20, 1999 while at the same time directed the parties to maintain the status quo before March 15, 1999.
To support their petition, petitioners contend that on account of the filing of an action for interpleader
by CLT, the expropriation proceedings had to be suspended pending final resolution of the boundary
dispute between Malabon and Caloocan City. Due to his dispute, the P50 million appropriation for the
expropriation of properties under current operating expenses had not been obligated and no security
deposit was forthcoming. It was not at the time a continuing appropriation. This unavoidable discontinuance
of the purpose for which the appropriation was made effectively converted the earlier expropriation of
P39,352,047.75 into savings as defined by law.
They argue further that there is no truth in the allegation that Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998 was passed
without complying with Sections 50 and 52 of the Local Government Code requiring that on the first regular
session following the election of its members and within 90 days thereafter, the Sanggunian concerned
shall adopt or update its existing rules of procedure. According to them, the minutes of the session held on
July 2, 1998 would reveal that the matter of adoption or updating of the house rules was taken up and that
the council arrived at a decision to create an ad hoc committee to study the rules.[21]Moreover, even if
the Sanggunian failed to approve the new rules of procedure for the ensuing year, the rules which were
applied in the previous year shall be deemed in force and effect until a new ones are adopted.
With respect to the OPs assumption of jurisdiction, petitioners maintained that the OP effectively
arrogated unto itself judicial power when it entertained a collateral attack on the validity of Ordinance No.
0254, S. 1998. Furthermore, primary jurisdiction over the administrative complaint of Tibor should have
pertained to the Office of the Ombudsman, as prescribed by Article XI, Sections 13 and 15 of the
Constitution. They also asserted that the declaration in the OPs decision to the effect that Ordinance No.
0254, S. 1998 was irregularly passed constituted a usurpation of the DBMs power of review over ordinances
authorizing annual or supplemental appropriations of, among others, highly-urbanized cities like Caloocan
City as provided under Section 326 of the Local Government Code of 1991. In light of said statutory
provision, petitioners opined that respondents should have deferred passing upon the validity of the subject
ordinance until after the DBM shall have made are view thereof.
Finally, petitioners complained that respondents violated the right to equal protection of the laws when
Vice-Mayor Oscar Malapitan was placed in the same class as the rest of the councilors when in truth and
in fact, as Presiding Officer of the council, he did not even vote nor participate in the deliberations. The
violation of such right, according to petitioners, made the OPs decision a nullity. They concluded that the
administrative complaint was anathema to the States avowed policy of local autonomy as the threat of
harassment suits could become a sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of local officials.
Contending that the OP decison judiciously applied existing laws and jurisprudence under the facts
obtaining in this case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)[22] disputed petitioners claims contending
that the appropriation of P39,352,047.75 contained in an earlier ordinance (Ord. NO. 0246 S. 1997) for the
expropriation of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate was a capital outlay as defined under Article 306 (d) of the

Code and not current operating expenditures. Since it was a capital outlay, the same shall continue and
remain valid until fully spent or the project is completed, as provided under Section 322 of the Code.
The OSG asserted further that the filing on August 6, 1997 of an interpleader case by CLT which owns
Lot 26 should not be considered as an unavoidable discontinuance that automatically converted the
appropriated amount into savings which could be used for supplemental budget. Since the said amount
was not transformed into savings and, hence, no funds were actually available, then the passage of
Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998 which realigned the said amount on a supplemental budget violated Section
321 of the Code requiring an ordinance providing for a supplemental budget to be supported by funds
actually available as certified by the local treasurer or by new revenue sources.
Petitioners were likewise faulted for violating Sections 50 and 52 of the Code requiring
the Sangguniang Panlungsod to adopt or update its existing rules of procedure within the first 90 days
following the election of its members. The Sanggunian allegedly conducted three readings of Ordinance
No. 0254, S. 1998 in one day and on the first day of its session (July 2, 1998) without the Sanggunian having
first organized itself and adopted its rules of procedure. It was only on July 23, 1998 that the Sanggunian
adopted its internal rules of procedure.
As regard petitioners contention that the administrative complaint of Tibor should have been filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman instead of the OP, the OSG pointed out that under Section 60 and 61 of the
Code, the OP is vested with jurisdiction to discipline, remove or suspend a local elective official for, among
other things, misconduct in office. The Ombudsman has never been vested with original and exclusive
jurisdiction regarding administrative complaints involving government officials.
Finally, the OSG sought to dismiss the petition on the grounds of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies before the OP and for failure to follow Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which prescribes that if it [the subject of the petition] involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial
agency, and unless provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals.
Preliminarily, we find a need to resolve a couple of procedural issues which have a bearing on the
propriety of this Courts action on the petition, to wit: (1) whether the Supreme Court is the proper forum
which can take cognizance of this instant petition assailing the decision of the OP, and (2) whether the
Supreme Court may entertain the instant petition despite the absence of a prior motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioners with the OP.
After a very careful and meticulous review of the parties respective positions on these matters, we find
that this Court possesses the requisite power to assume jurisdiction and rule on the petition.
It is not the first time that similar procedural challenges have been brought before this Court. Just
recently, in the case of Fortich, et al. v. Corona, et al.,[23] we again had an occasion to clarify our position on
these questions. By way of backgrounder, said case involved the so-called Win-Win Resolution of the OP
which modified tha approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area of a 144-hectare land located in San
Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon. As in this case, the OSG opposed said petition on the ground that the same
should have been filed with the Court of Appeals since what was sought to be reviewed was the OPs
decision. Facing said issues squarely, we explained that we did not find any reason why such petition
should not have been filed in this Court, holding that:
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised,
warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in
subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et al., Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman,
and Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al. As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and specifically

set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those
matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts
docket.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition
in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations (sic) so as to promptly put an end
to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national
interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and
requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a
waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-
entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon v. Court of Appeals:
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and
again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their
operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a
lengthy disquisition of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved
and proceed directly to the merits of the case. [Underscoring supplied, citations omitted].
In like manner, it is our considered view now that the instant petition has been properly brought before
us in light of the importance of the subject matter and the transcendental nature of the issues
raised.Realignment, as explained in the pleadings, is a common practice borne out of necessity and
sanctioned by law. Just how such a common practice may be carried out within the bounds of law,
considering the fact that public funds are at stake, is, we believe, an issue that is not only one of the first
impression, but likewise of considerable significance as a guide to local governance. Furthermore, as will
be discussed later, the assailed decision of the OP has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion, thus,
requiring the immediate exercise of this Courts corrective power lest public welfare, more particularly that
of the Caloocan City constituents, be jeopardized by a more circumlocutory procedure which respondents
are now insisting upon.
With respect to the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, we do not see the same as a
fatal procedural lapse that would prevent us from entertaining the more pressing questions raised in this
case. In any event, jurisprudence is replete with instances instructing us that a motion for reconsideration
is neither always a prerequisite nor a hard-and-fast rule to be followed where there are particularly
exceptional attendant circumstances such as, in the instant case, patent nullity of the questioned act and
the necessity of resolving the issues without further delay.[24]
Having therefore disposed of the procedural questions, we now turn our attention to the more crucial
substantive issues, namely:
1. Whether the Office of the President gravely abused its discretion when it found petitioners guilty of
misconduct for the reason that Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998, was allegedly tainted with
irregularity;
2. Whether Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998, violated Section 326 of the Local Government Code of
1991 on reversion of unexpended balances of appropriations;
3. Whether Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998, complied with Section 321 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 requiring that changes in the annual budget should be supported by funds actually available;
and

4. Whether Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998, was valid considering that prior to its passage there was
as yet no formal adoption of rules of procedure by the Caloocan City Sangguniang Panlungsod.
As stated earlier, the OP found petitioners guilty of misconduct on the ground that they failed to strictly
comply with certain provisions of the Code relating to the passage of the ordinance in question. Itjustified
its position, thus:
By respondents (sic) very own admission --- and these facts are a matter of record --- the
P39,352,047.75 appropriated in Ordinance 0254 to fund the approved items listed therein was
merely a portion of the P50 Million included and appropriated in the 1998 Annual Budget for
expropriation purpose and that the judicial action for expropriation --- earlier filed by the city and
for which an allocation of P39,352,047.75 out of the P50 Million appropriation for expropriation
of properties --- is still pending with the court. This being so, the amount allocated for the
expropriation cannot be reverted or be deemed as savings to serve as funds actually available
for the supplemental budget.
It cannot be argued that the unexpected turn of events mentioned by the respondents ---
referring to the filing by CLT Realty on August 6, 1997 of a complaint against the Municipality of
Malabon and the City of Caloocan for interpleader amounts to an unavoidable
discontinuance of the expropriation project, and thus effectively converted the earlier
expropriation (sic) of P39,352,047.75 into SAVINGS. For one, it was only on March 23, 1998,
that the City of Caloocan filed an expropriation case against CLT Realty (docketed as Special
Case No. 548 Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City). If, as respondents argue, the August 6,
1997 interpleader suit amounted to the unavoidable discontinuance of the expropriation project,
thus effectively turning the earlier appropriation of P39,352,047.75 into savings, then how
explain the March 23, 1998 expropriation case? For another, the records do not indicate --- not
even an allegation to this effect--- that the City of Caloocan has withdrawn the expropriation
case aforementioned which is, ordinarily, the legal route taken in the event of abandonment of
discontinuance of the expropriation project. On the contrary, the city government, as indicated in
its judicial pleadings that now form part of the records, even sought the issuance of a writ of
possession.
In this light, it is all too clear that Ordinance No. 0254 was enacted without funds actually
available as required by Section 321 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which pertinently
reads ---
xxxxxxxxx
The words actually available are so clear and certain that interpretation is neither required nor
permitted. The application of this legal standard to the facts of this case compels the conclusion
that, there being no reversion, as above-explained, the supplemental budget was not supported
by funds actually available, by funds really in the custody or possession of the treasurer.
Stated differently, it may be that the City Treasurer of Caloocan, vis-a-vis Ordinance No. 0254,
issued a certificate of availability of funds (Annex 9, answer). The issuance, however cannot
alter the reality that the funds referred to therein are not funds actually available because they
are sourced or are to be sourced from an appropriation for a capital outlay which cannot be
validly reverted or converted into savings, as respondents put it, on ground of unavoidable
discontinuance of the expropriation project.

Adding significance to the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the enactment by the
respondents of the supplemental budget was clearly tainted with undue haste. The sangguniang
panlungsod conducted the three (3) readings (the 1st the 2nd and 3rd) on the same day, July 2,
1998, its first day of session, adopted it on July 7, 1998, and approved by respondent mayor on
the following day, July 8, 1998, without first having itself organized and its rules of procedure
adopted and without first electing its officers and chairmen and the members of the different
committees in accordance with [the] provisions of the LGC (see Secs. 50 & 52, RA 7162). This
undue haste implies willful failure to respond to or comply with what the law requires which is
the essence of bad faith.
xxxxxxxxx
We are thus one with the DILG in finding respondents guilty of violating Section 321 in relation
to Section 332 of the Local Government Code of 1991. This violation constitutes misconduct, an
offense implying a wrongful intent, an unlawful behavior in relation to the office, one that usually
involves a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly
unlawful behavior by the public officer. [Citations omitted].[25]
We cannot, however, agree with the above disquisition.

The OPs premise, in our opinion, rests upon an erroneous appreciation of the facts on record. The OP
seems to have been confused as to the figures and amounts actually involved. A meticulous analysis of the
records would show that there is really no basis to support the OPs contention that the amount of
P39,352,047.75 was appropriated under Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998, since in truth and in fact, what was
appropriated in said ordinance was the amount of P39,343,028.00. The allocation of P39,352,047.75 is to
be found in the earlier Ordinance No. 0246, S. 1997 which is a separate and distinct ordinance.This point
of clarification is indeed very critical and must be emphasized at this juncture because any further
discussion would have to depend upon the accuracy of the figures and amounts being discussed.As will be
explained below, this faulty appreciation of the facts by the OP caused it to arrive at the wrong conclusion
even if it would have correctly interpreted and applied the pertinent statutory provisions.
Section 322 of the Code upon which the OP anchored its opinion that petitioners breached a statutory
mandate provides:
SEC 322. Reversion of Unexpended Balances of Appropriations, Continuing

Appropriations. Unexepended balances of appropriations authorized in the annual
appropriations ordinance shall revert to the unappropriated surplus of the general funds at the
end of the fiscal year and shall not thereafter be available for expenditure except by subsequent
enactment. However, appropriations for capital outlays shall continue and remain valid until fully
spent, reverted or the project is completed. Reversions of continuing appropriations shall not be
allowed unless obligations therefor have been fully paid or otherwise settled.
Based on the above provision, the OP reached the determination that Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998
could not have lawfully realigned the amount of P39,352,047.75 which was previously appropriated for the
expropriation of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate since such appropriation was in the nature of a capital outlay
until fully spent, reverted; or the project for which it is earmarked is completed.
The question, however, is not whether the appropriation of P39,352,047.75 could fall under the
definitions of continuing appropriation[26] and capital outlays,[27] considering that such amount was not the
subject of the realignment made by Ordinance No. 0254, Series of 1998. Rather, the issue is whether
petitioners are liable for their actions in regard to said ordinance which actually realigned a position of the
P50 million which was simply denominated in a general manner as Expropriation of Properties and
classified under Current Operating Expenditures in the 1998 Annual Budget of Caloocan City. Clearly, these
are two distinct amounts separate from each other. That this is the case has likewise been clarified in the

pleadings and during the oral argument where petitioners adequately explained that the P50 million was
NOT appropriated for the purpose of purchasing Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate but rather for expenses
incidental to expropriation such as relocation of squatters, appraissal fee, expenses for publication,
mobilization fees, and expenses for preliminary studies.[28] This position appears to us more convincing than
that of the interpretation of respondents. The appropriation of P39,352,047.75 under Ordinance No. 0246,
S. 1997 is, we believe, still a subsisting appropriation that has never been lumped together with other funds
to arrive at the sum of P50 million allocated in the 1998 budget. To be sure, denomination of the P50 million
amount as Expropriation of Properties left much to be desired and would have been confused with the
appropriation for expropriation under Ordinance No. 0246, S, 1997, but had respondents probed deeper
into the actual intention for which said amount was allocated, then they would have reached an accurate
characterization of the P50 million.
Bearing in mind, therefore, the fact that it is the P50 million which is now being realigned, the next
logical question to ask is whether such amount is capable of being lawfully realigned. To this, we answer
in the affirmative.
No less than respondents themselves argued, citing Sections 321 and 322 in relation to Section 306
(d) and (e) of the Code, that realignment shall not be allowed when what is involved are continuing
appropriations or capital outlays. But this argument becomes clearly inapplicable in view of our disquisition
above that the realignment being complained of had nothing to do with the P39,352,047.75 appropriation
for the purchase of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate which is clearly the one that is classifiable as a capital
outlay or a continuing appropriation. The realignment, as we have earlier discussed, pertained to the P50
million which was classified as Current Operating Expenditures. Having been determined as such by the
local council upon which legislative discretion is granted, then the statutory proscription does not, therefore,
apply and respondents cannot insist that it should.
Moreover, in view of the fact that what is being realigned is the P50 million appropriation which is
classified, neither as a capital outlay nor a continuing appropriation, then respondents position that
Ordinance No. 0254, S. 1998 was enacted without funds actually available and in violation of Section 321
of the Code likewise falls flat on its face. This is notwithstanding respondents assertion that the unaviodable
discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings for Lot 26 could not have automatically converted the
appropriated amount therefor into savings. For one thing, the Code appears silent and respondents
themselves have not shown how unexpected balances of appropriations revert to the general
fund. Likewise, it would be pointless to belabor this matter because it has been brought out precisely on
the assumption that the amount of P39,352,047.75, has no more leg to stand on, as explained earlier.
As to the alleged violation of Sections 50 and 52 of the Code requiring the adoption of house rules and
the organization of the council, we believe that the same hardly merits even cursory consideration.We
cannot infer the mandate of the Code that no other business may be transacted on the first regular session
except to take up the matter of adopting or updating rules. All that the law requires is that on the first regular
session the sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules or procedure. There is nothing
in the language thereof that restricts the matters to be taken up during the first regular session merely to
the adoption or updating of the house rules. If it were the intent of Congress to limit the business of the local
council to such matters, then it would have done so in clear and unequivocal terms. But as it is, there is no
such intent.
Moreover, adoption or updating of house rules would necessarily entail work beyond the day of the
first regular session. In fact, it took the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City until
July 23, 1998 to complete the task of adopting their house rules. Does this mean that prior thereto, the local
councils hands were tied and could not act on any other matter? That would certainly be absurd for it would
result in a hiatus and a paralysis in the local legislatures work which could not have been intended by the
law. Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper frienda est, ut evitatur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there
is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. [29] We believe
that there has been sufficient compliance with the Code when on the first regular session,
the Sanggunian took up the matter of adopting a set of house rules as duly evidenced by the KATITIKAN
NG KARANIWANG PULONG NG SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD NA GINANAP NOONG IKA-2 NG
HULYO, 1998 SA BAGONG GUSALI NG PAMAHALAANG LUNGSOD NG CALOOCAN [30] where Item No.

3 thereof specifically mentioned the request for creation of an ad hoc committee to study the existing house
rules.
The foregoing explanation leads us to the ineluctable conclusion that, indeed, respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion.[31] Not only are their reasoning flawed but are likewise lacking in factual and legal
support. Misconduct, being a grave administrative offense for which petitioners stood charged, cannot be
treated cavalierly. There must be clear and convincing proof on record that petitioners were motivated by
wrongful intent,[32] committed unlawful behavior in relation to their respective offices,[33] or transgressed
some established and definite rules of action.[34] But as we have stressed above, petitioners were acting
within legal bounds. Respondents seem to have turned a blind eye or simply refused to consider facts that
would have enlightened them and exculpated herein petitioners to such an extent that they arrived at their
erroneous conclusion. In view hereof, this Court is justified in striking down the impugned act of the Office
of the President.
Two motions filed in accordance with procedural rules were ignored by the Office of the President and
left unresolved: first, the February 7, 1999 Motion to Refer the Case to the DBM and second, the
Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground that the determination of the
validity of said ordinance was a prejudicial question. Motions need not necessarily grant what movant is
asking for, but they must be acknowledged and resolved. The Office of the President, being the powerful
office that law and tradition have endowed it, needs no mighty blows on the anvil of authority to ensure
obedience to its pronouncements. It would be more in keeping with its exalted stature if its actions could
safeguard the very freedoms so sedulously nurtured by the people. Even what it may deem minor lapses,
emanating as it does from such an exalted office, should not be allowed to go unchecked lest our democratic
institutions be gradually eroded.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Office of the
President in O.P. Case No. 98-H-8520 dated March 15, 1999 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction. Consequently,
respondents, their subordinates, agents, representatives, and successors-in-interest are permanently
enjoined from enforcing or causing the execution in any manner of the aforesaid decision against herein
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., in the result.
Kapunan, J., see dissenting opinion.
Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., join the dissent of J. Kapunan.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on leave.
[1]
Const. Art. X, Section 4.
[2]
Entitled AN ORDINANCE EXPROPRIATING, WITH AUTHORITY TO THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR TO INITIATE
EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDINGS, FOR PUBLIC USE, WELFARE AND BENEFIT, LOT 26 OF THE MAYSILO ESTATE IN THE
CITY OF KALOOKAN, REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION UNDER TCT NO. T-
77013, COVERING AN AREA OF SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (799,955) SQUARE
METERS, FOR LOW-COST HOUSING, AN INTEGRATED BUS TERMINAL, PARKS AND PLAYGROUNDS AND RELATED
SUPPORT FACILITIES AND UTILITIES, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR. This was enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod on March 24, 1994 and approved by the city Mayor on April 18, 1994.
[3]
Rollo, p. 156.
[4]
Docketed as Civil Case No. C-18019. During the Oral Hearing of this case on April 20, 1999, the Court was informed that this case
is still pending in the trial court.

[5]
Rollo, pp. 158-161.
[6]
This was eventually approved by the City Mayor on January 7, 1998.
[7]
Docketed as Special Civil Case No. C-548.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 179-180.
[9]
Ibid., p. 181.
[10]
Ibid., p. 182 The City Budget Department likewise concurred with the city Treasurers recommendation in this wise: I suggested
that a supplemental budget be introduced for the purpose of the next councils session. The funding source may be the reversion of
existing and unobligated P50 million appropriations for the expropriation of properties, the discontinuance of which was approved by
your Office as per recommendation of the City Legal Officer in his letter to you dated April 7, 1998. Cf. Rollo, p. 183.
[11]
This amount corresponded to the item Expropriation of properties listed on page 235 of the local Budget Preparation Form No. 152
and under the sub-heading Current Operating Expenditures.
[12]
Approved by the Office of the Mayor on July 8, 1998.
[13]
Docketed as O. P. Case No. 98-H-8520.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 75-100
[15]
Significantly, complainant Tibor expressly admitted in his Reply (Rollo, pp. 104-115) to petitioners Consolidated Answer that he
does not question the wisdom nor legality and validity of the questioned Supplemental Budget Ordinance. What is being questioned
is the precipitate, haste, and the violation of the laws committed by respondents herein before referred to in the enactment of the said
Ordinance which amounts to Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Abuse of Authority, the jurisdiction of which appropriately pertains
to this Honorable Office.
[16]
Docketed as Civil Case No. C-18683.
[17]
Rollo, pp. 56-62.
[18]
The administrative penalty was imposed upon petitioners pursuant to Sections 60 and 61 of the Local Government Code of
1991. Section 60 specifies the grounds for disciplinary actions against an elective local officials such as dishonesty, misconduct in
office and abuse of authority while Section 61 empowers the OP to act upon administrative complaints against an erring local elective
official.
[19]
Ibid., pp. 3-50.
[20]
The Oral Argument took place on April 20, 1999 in Baguio City.
[21]
A resolution was eventually passed on July 23, 1998 adopting an internal rules of procedure.
[22]
Comment, Rollo, pp. 215-241.
[23]
G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998.
[24]
Cf. Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167 (1997); Carale v. Abarintos, 269 SCRA 132 (1997).
[25]
Rollo, pp. 60-62.
[26]
SEC. 306. Definition of terms. xxx
(e) Continuing appropriation refers to an appropriation available to support obligations for a specified purpose or project, such as
those for the construction of physical structures or for the acquisition of real property or equipment, even when these obligations are
incurred beyond the budget year.
[27]
SEC. 306 Definition of terms. xxx
(d) Capital Outlays refers to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of which extend beyond the fiscal
year and which add to the assets of the local government unit concerned, including investments in public utilities such as public
markets and slaughterhouses.
[28]
Reply to OSGs Comment, Rollo, pp. 267-268.
[29]
Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 108 (1990)
[30]
Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 22-23.
[31]
See Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 279 SCRA 337 (1997); Esguerra v. Court
of Appeals, 267 SCRA 380 (1997); Taada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 (1997).
[32]
Suroza v. Honorado, 110 SCRA 396.

[33]
Guillen v. Constantino, 282 SCRA 583.
[34]
Oyao v. Pabatao, 78 SCRA 90.

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS
(SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and immemorially acknowledged so to be[.]"1 ChanRobl esVirtual awlibr ar y
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in
her capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the
Resolution3 dated March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which
granted private respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) against the implementation of the Joint Order 4 dated March 10, 20,15 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to
0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending him and several other public officers and employees of the City
Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the Resolution 5 dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the
Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt6 in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.
Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction8 (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order, prompting the Ombudsman to file a
supplemental petition9 on April 13, 2015.
The Facts
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office
of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay,
Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, 12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall
Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).13
On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators 14 to conduct a fact-finding
investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). 15 Pursuant to
the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint 16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay,
Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases17for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).19
As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the following
procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present
terms as City Mayor of Makati:
Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20

(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building project to
Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding contract 22 on September 28,
2010,23 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor in
the following amounts as follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15, 2010;25 (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19,
2011;26 (3) P92,775,202.27 on February 25, 2011;27 (4) P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011;28 (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3,
2011;29 and (6) P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;30

(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project to
Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding contract 32 on August 18, 2011,33 without the required publication
and the lack of architectural design,34 and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1)
P182,325,538.97 on October 4, 2O11;35 (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;36 (3) P80,408,735.20 on December 12,
2011;37 (4) P62,878,291.81 on February 10, 2012;38 and (5) P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;39
(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award40 for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project to
Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding contract41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the required
publication and the lack of architectural design, 43 and approved the release of the funds therefor in the amounts of
P32,398,220.0544 and P30,582,629.3045 on December 20, 2012; and
Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46
(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the September
13, 2012 contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P27,443,629.97;47 and
(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract 48 with MANA
Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building
project in the amount of P429,011.48.49
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation
and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special Panel).50Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel
issued separate orders51 for each of the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.52
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special
Panel, issued on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive
suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases. 53 The Ombudsman ruled
that the requisites for the preventive suspension of a public officer are present, 54 finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay,
Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City
had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2) the documents on record negated the
publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the release of funds; and (b) (1)
Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them
access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice
the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them. 55 Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement
the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.56
On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by
Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.57
The Proceedings Before the CA
On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its
implementation.60Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous
activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken
before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-
election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any,
thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. 61In any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the
Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt presented against him is
strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities. 62 In support of his prayer for injunctive
relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide vote in the
2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the
charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person
they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.63
On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive suspension order
through the DILG National Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director Brion), who posted a copy
thereof on the wall of the Makati City Hall after failing to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the
Makati City Hall were closed. At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the
oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor. 64
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution65 (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a

TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day. 67Citing the case of Governor
Garcia, Jr. v. CA,68 the CA found that it was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the
matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative
cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-
election meant that he can no longer be administratively charged.69 The CA then directed the Ombudsman to comment on
Binay, Jr.'s petition for certiorari .70
On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested71 that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that since
the preventive suspension order had already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain. 72
On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt, 73 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, accusing Secretary
Roxas, Director Brion, the officials of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the CA,
thereby allegedly impeding, obstructing, or degrading the administration of justice.74 The Ombudsman and Department of
Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima were subsequently impleaded as additional respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s filing of the
amended and supplemental petition for contempt 75 (petition for contempt) on March 19, 2015.76 Among others, Binay, Jr.
accused the Ombudsman and other respondents therein for willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA
against the preventive suspension order.77
In a Resolution78dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No.
139504, and, without necessarily giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the Ombudsman to
file her comment thereto.79 The cases were set for hearing of oral arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015.80
The Proceedings Before the Court
Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition
before this Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453, and the March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139504.81 The Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,
citing Section 14 of RA 6770,82 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be issued to
delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the
latter's jurisdiction;83 and (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal
and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt
proceedings.84
In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically
grants the CA judicial power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the
Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was
committed in this case when said office issued the preventive suspension order against him. 86 Binay, Jr. posits that it was
incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1 have been apprised of the condonation doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in
determining whether there was strong evidence to warrant the issuance of the preventive suspension order. 87 In this relation,
Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order given his clear
and unmistakable right to public office, and that it is clear that he could not be held administratively liable for any of the
charges against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated as a condonation of any administrative offenses he
may have committed during his previous term.88 As regards the CA's order for the Ombudsman to comment on his petition
for contempt, Binay, Jr. submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be
removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action for contempt imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment,
without necessarily resulting in removal from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not
deprive the CA of its inherent power to punish contempt.89
Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it were held, 91 granting
Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the
CA found that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive
suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.92 Particularly, it found that the
Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of
Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project
from 2007 to 2013.93 In this regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay,
Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013, 94 corresponding to the
services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases
of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica96 wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by the
Court although the payments were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected
pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.97 To this, the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of
Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.98
In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a
supplemental petition99 before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether
the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a

reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the
administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the
OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.100
On April 14 and 21, 2015,101 the Court conducted hearings for the oral arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they were
required to file their respective memoranda. 102 In compliance thereto, the Ombudsman filed her Memorandum 103 on May 20,
2015, while Binay, Jr. submitted his Memorandum the following day. 104
Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the parties to comment on each other's memoranda,
and the OSG to comment on the Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice.
On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's memoranda. 106Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015,
the OSG filed its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment, 107 simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the
Ombudsman would file its Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its "institutional position." 108 In her Memorandum
and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, the Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the
condonation doctrine.109 In view of the foregoing, the case was deemed submitted for resolution. chanr obleslaw
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral arguments conducted before this Court, the main
issues to be resolved in seriatim are as follows:
I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy; cral awlawli brar y
II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453; cr alawl awlibrar y
III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the
implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman; cr alawl awlibrar y
IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.
based on the condonation doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt
in CA- G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is partly meritorious. chanroblesl aw
I.
A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Sections 1 and 2 thereof provide:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
xxxx
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts r with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)
Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for
the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case.110
Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of
failure of justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain,
speedy[,] and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution
of the lower court or agency, x x x."111
In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of
a petition for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition. 112 These are: (a) where the order is a patent
nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been
duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c)
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of
the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency
for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court
is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings
were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
where public interest is involved.113
In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on the
authority of the CA - and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued
by the Office of the Ombudsman is put to the fore. This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental
powers of key government institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and
hence, involves an issue of transcendental public importance that demands no less than a careful but expeditious resolution.
Also raised is the equally important issue on the propriety of the continuous application of the condonation doctrine as
invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from administrative liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort
to certiorari and prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding her failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed
issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 before the CA, is justified. chanroblesl aw
II.
Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum,114 it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the
CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-
established rule that a court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The
rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.115 Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had
subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity of all
subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court
to be heard on this issue,116 as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through his comment to the Ombudsman's
Memorandum.117 That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this issue.
The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary
prayer for its dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, 118 which reads in full:
Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the
Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.
The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court 119) from issuing a
writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "[injunction
is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the
main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action." 120 Considering the textual qualifier "to

delay," which connotes a suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in
this paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive
relief.
The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is
outside the office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable
officers, Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. 121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any
serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified
complaint for impeachment, if warranted.122 Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative
cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to
investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 123
On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may
be heard against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of
law. This paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of
its decisions or findings, is vague for two (2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase "application for remedy" or the word
"findings" refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same
be taken only against a pure question of law. The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to
resolve the ambiguity.
"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in the words employed to
express it, and that when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it
may then perhaps become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time
the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be
redressed; x x x [a]nd where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing so a construction has
necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great
respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is
not conclusive."124
As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a
statute of doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision
during the legislative deliberations may be adopted,125 albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law. 126
A. The Senate deliberations cited by the

Ombudsman do not pertain to the second
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.
The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA 6770, particularly on the matter of judicial review
of her office's decisions or findings, is supposedly clear from the following Senate deliberations: 127
Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after the phrase "petition for" delete the word
"review" and in lieu thereof, insert the word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman
would only be taken not on a petition for review, but on certiorari.
The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of that? Will it be more difficult to reverse the
decision under review?
Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that the findings of facts of the Ombudsman
would be almost conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Second, we would not unnecessarily clog the
docket of the Supreme Court. So, it in effect will be a very strict appeal procedure.
xxxx
Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if there are exhaustive remedies available to a
respondent, the respondent himself has the right to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.
Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short by appealing to the Supreme Court only
on certiorari ?
Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.
Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him?

Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?
Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if he is a presidential appointee who is the
respondent, if there is f no certiorari available, is the respondent given the right to exhaust his administrative remedies first
before the Ombudsman can take the appropriate action?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the administrative law principle that before one
can go to court, he must exhaust all administrative remedies xxx available to him before he goes and seeks judicial review.
xxxx
Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee in changing the method of appeal from one of
a petition for review to a petition for certiorari?
Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision here in the bill to the effect that the finding
of facts of the Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding Officer to which I concur, that in an appeal
by certiorari , the appeal is more difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of discretion on the part of the court,
whether to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright. Is that not correct, Mr. President?
Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President
Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari , the issue is limited to whether or not the Ombudsman here has
acted without jurisdiction and has committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is that
not the consequence, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the Committee is to make it harder to have a
judicial review, but should be limited only to cases that I have enumerated.
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a distinction between a petition for review and a
petition for certiorari ; because before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any order, ruling or decision of the
COMELEC shall be by means of review. But under the Constitution it is now by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that
by this change, the court exercising judicial review will not inquire into the facts, into the evidence, because we will not go
deeply by way of review into the evidence on record but its authority will be limited to a determination of whether the
administrative agency acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of discretion. So, I assume
that that is the purpose of this amendment, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.
Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It is very well stated, Mr. President.
xxxx
The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority to render decisions. Should it be the
Ombudsman or should it be the Supreme Court?
Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr. President, it is and has to be the Supreme
Court to make the final determination.
The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.
Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have made a reservation to introduce an appropriate
change during the period of Individual Amendments.
xxxx
The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting the word CERTIORARI instead of "review"?
[Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.128

Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however, unconvinced that the provision debated on was
Section 14, RA 6770, as the Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with the suggestion of Senator Angara to
delete the word "review" that comes after the phrase "petition for review" and, in its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that
the "review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would not only be taken on a petition for review, but on certiorari"
The ensuing exchange between Senators Gonzales and Angara then dwells on the purpose of changing the method of
review from one of a petition for review to a petition for certiorari - that is, to make "the appeal x x x more difficult."
Ultimately, the amendment to the change in wording, from "petition for review" to "petition for certiorari" was approved.
Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed "petition for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in
the text of Section 14, RA 6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that this provision, particularly its second paragraph, does
not indicate what specific procedural remedy one should take in assailing a decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it only
reveals that the remedy be taken to this Court based on pure questions of law. More so, it was even commented upon
during the oral arguments of this case129 that there was no debate or clarification made on the current formulation of the
second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 per the available excerpts of the Senate deliberations. In any case, at least for the
above-cited deliberations, the Court finds no adequate support to sustain the Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no
subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.
On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these deliberations refer to another Ombudsman Act provision,
namely Section 27, RA 6770. This is because the latter textually reflects the approval of Senator Angara's suggested
amendment, i.e., that the Ombudsman's decision or finding may be assailed in a petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth
paragraph), and further, his comment on the conclusive nature of the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by
substantial evidence (third paragraph):
Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5)
days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds: chanRobl es virtual Lawli brar y
(1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision; cralawlawli brar y
(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for
reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall
be entertained.ChanRobles Virtual awlibr ary
Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's
salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in stating that a "petition for certiorari" should be
taken in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as it is well-known that under the present 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitions for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of the said Rules. However, it should be discerned that the
Ombudsman Act was passed way back in 1989130and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.131 At
that time, the governing 1964 Rules of Court,132 consistent with Section 27, RA 6770, referred to the appeal taken
thereunder as a petition for certiorari , thus possibly explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at least in the provision's
final approved version:
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal by certiorari , from a judgment of the Court of
Appeals, by filing with the Supreme Court a petition forcertiorari , within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the
denial of his motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docketing fee. The petition shall not be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of
Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)
B. Construing the second paragraph of

Section 14, RA 6770.
The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other
principles of statutory construction can apply to ascertain the meaning of the provision.
To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for
remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of
law." ; cralawl awlibr ar y
As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances
of the Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any
application of remedy" (subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for remedy,"
being a generally worded provision, and being separated from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any
remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally), except an appeal, following the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter
intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a general sense. 134 By the same principle, the word "findings," which is
also separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would therefore refer to any finding made by the
Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision.
The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is
not explicit from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only
allowable remedy against "the decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the
only remedy taken to the Supreme Court on "pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court
RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court
xxxx
Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a concise statement of the matters involved, the assignment of
errors made in the court below, and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and it should be accompanied
with a true copy of the judgment sought to be reviewed, together with twelve (12) copies of the record on appeal, if any, and
of the petitioner's brief as filed in the Court of Appeals. A verified statement of the date when notice of judgment and denial
of the motion for reconsideration, if any, were received shall accompany the petition.
Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth. If no record on appeal has been filed
in the Court of Appeals, the clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition, shall demand from the Court of
Appeals the elevation of the whole record of the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorarifrom a judgment, final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts,
whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may
include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of
law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in
the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic
procedural law that a Rule 65 petition is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment to which the
classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b) questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In fact, there is
no procedural rule, whether in the old or new Rules, which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is
also a statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body cannot be said to have intended the establishment of
conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject. Such a result would render legislation a useless and idle ceremony,
and subject the laws to uncertainty and unintelligibility.135 There should then be no confusion that the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum, the appropriate construction of this
Ombudsman Act provision is that all remedies against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited, except the
above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of law.

C. Validity of the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770.
Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a
Rule 45 appeal -which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be taken against
final decisions or orders of lower courts,136 and not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated
upon, Congress cannot interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to
apply to interlocutory "findings" issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45
appeal, the provision takes away the remedy of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial
power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's
appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar
to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which was invalidated in the case of Fabian v.
Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138
In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect of
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997
Rules of Procedure which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi-
judicial agencies, such as the Office of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of
Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,140 the Court's ratiocinations and ruling in Fabian were recounted:
The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The
Ombudsman's Act) and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the
availability of appeal before the Supreme Court to assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules
implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of
the Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not only of
increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution; it was also inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides
that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by
law." We pointedly said: chanR obl es virtual Lawli brar y
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional,
and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the CA under the provisions of Rule 43.141 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a
Rule 45 appeal and thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770142 - attempts to effectively increase the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence, 143 it is therefore concluded that the former
provision is also unconstitutional and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's posturing,144Fabian should squarely
apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act provisions are in part materia in that they "cover the same specific or
particular subject matter,"145 that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the Ombudsman.
Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the CA's subject
matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as
the Ombudsman herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion146).
This procedure, as was similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in settled case law:
The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither
of whom did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.
Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the
judges are sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or
countenance evasions thereof. When it is clear , that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is
the duty of the courts to declare that the constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgment.
Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has
been recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel
it to enter a judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is
unconstitutional, the court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction,
it necessarily follows that it may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless
the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any
time or on the court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the
case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any
proceeding.147 (Emphasis supplied)
D. Consequence of invalidity.
In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to
nullify the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory order,148 hence, unappealable.149
In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable
issuances150 of the Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this Court:
In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of
the Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by the public officer before
the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was
certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65." 152
In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013), involving a Rule 65 petition for certiorariassailing a final and
unappealable order of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case, the Court remarked that "petitioner employed
the correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."154 In this relation,
it stated that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts." Further, the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy
against final and unappealable orders of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case was a Rule 65 petition to
the CA. The same verdict was reached in Ruivivar156(September 16, 2008).
Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. That
being said, the Court now examines the objections of the Ombudsman, this time against the CA's authority to issue the
assailed TRO and WPI against the implementation of the preventive suspension order, incidental to that main case.
III.
From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any
provisional injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She
advances the idea that "[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial
intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs traditionally obtainable from the courts," 158 claiming that said writs may
work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political pressure would." 159
A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.
Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be
known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate
Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)
In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the Court traced the historical underpinnings of the Office of the
Ombudsman:
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people's
medium for airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however,
these agencies failed to fully realize their objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the effective
performance of their function as government critic.
It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it
political independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the ( 1973 Constitution, President
Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the
Office of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu
proprio, any administrative act of any administrative agency, including any government-owned or controlled corporation.
When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were

transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information, and control the prosecution of these cases.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the
1973 Constitution, its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the
state policy in Section 27, Article II and the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. These provisions read: c hanR obl es virtual Lawli brar y
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption.
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.161 (Emphasis supplied)
More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the office's mandate, and in correlation, the impetus behind its
independence:
Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the
people" against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau.
This constitutional vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly
check and guard against the ills, abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13 (8), Article XI of the
1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of
RA No. 6770 provides: chanRobl es virtual Lawli brar y
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. ChanR obl es Virtualawli brar y
As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely
falling under the broad powers granted [to] it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line
with its official function and consistent with the law and the Constitution.
The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To
support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures
and influence of officialdom and partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent"
office, x x x.
xxxx
Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government constitutional
agency that is considered "a notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers, both constitutional
and statutory, that are commensurate , with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers. 162 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the
independence of the other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:
(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain
characteristics - they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself;
additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these
'independent' bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of 'independence' would result
in the impairment of their core functions"163; cralawlawli brar y
(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to
fiscal autonomy and violative not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme
Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is
based";164 and
(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for independence. In the deliberations of
the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service
Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its
freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission

on Audit highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from
political pressure."165
At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well
as that of the foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or supervision of the Executive Department:
[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from
executive control or supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned,
jurisprudence is not scarce on how the "independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.
In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358), we emphasized that the Constitutional
Commissions, which have been characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the
President, even if they discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the
President's act of temporarily appointing the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the [Commission on Elections]
"however well-meaning" it might have been.
In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the
commissioners of the independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power of
the President.
xxxx
The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior - but is similar in degree and
kind - to the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices
fill the political interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning. 166 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which provides that "[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor,
may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after
due process," partially unconstitutional insofar as it subjected the Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the
President for violating the principle of independence. Meanwhile, the validity of Section 8 (2), RA 6770 was maintained
insofar as the Office of the Special Prosecutor was concerned since said office was not considered to be constitutionally
within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the
Constitution.167
As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three
(3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified
functions and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment
thereto is made;cralawl awlibrar y
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its]
funds for purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the
political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can only
be disciplined by an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment and
pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics." 169
That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman
from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial
tribunals and apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial
power - that is, a provisional writ of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's
rationale of insulating the office from political harassment or pressure.
B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA

6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.
The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation
conducted by her office. Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the

Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court. 170 As support, she cites the following
Senate deliberations:
Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment is necessary. I would just like to inquire for
the record whether below the Supreme Court, it is understood that there is no injunction policy against the
Ombudsman by lower courts. Or, is it necessary to have a special paragraph for that?
Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will prevent an injunction against the Ombudsman
being issued.
Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of the highest constitutional bodies, is to
subject this only to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think an injunction from the Supreme Court is, of course, in
order but no lower courts should be allowed to interfere. We had a very bad experience with even, let us say, the
Forestry Code where no injunction is supposed to be issued against the Department of Natural Resources. Injunctions are
issued right and left by RTC judges all over the country.
The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that effect?
Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.
The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the Supreme Court.
Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.171
Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, acts of the
Ombudsman, including interlocutory orders, are subject to the Supreme Court's power of judicial review As a corollary, the
Supreme Court may issue ancillary mjunctive writs or provisional remedies in the exercise of its power of judicial review over
matters pertaining to ongoing investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman. Respecting the CA, however, the
Ombudsman begs to differ.172
With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it
prohibits all courts, except this Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation. That
the constitutionality of this provision is the lis mota of this case has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue anent its
constitutionality was properly raised and presented during the course of these proceedings. 173 More importantly, its
resolution is clearly necessary to the complete disposition of this case. 174
In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral Commission (Angara),175 the "Constitution has blocked
out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative[,] and the judicial departments of
the government."176 The constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government is more commonly
known as the principle of separation of powers. In the landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),177 the Court held
that "there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the
domain of another."178 In particular, "there is a violation of the principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with
and/or (b) assumption of another department's functions."179
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the Supreme Court and all such
lower courts:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other lower courts may be established by laws
passed by Congress. Thus, through the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,180 known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," the Court of Appeals, 181 the Regional Trial Courts,182 and the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts 183were established. Later, through the passage of RA 1125, 184 and
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486,185the Court of Tax Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were respectively established.
In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers Congress
to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of all courts, exceptthat it may not deprive the Supreme Court of
its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5186 of the same Article:

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but
may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
xxxx ChanRoblesVirtual awlibr ar y
Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. In The
Diocese ofBacolod v. Commission on Elections,187 subject matter jurisdiction was defined as "the authority 'to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court and defines its powers.'"
Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the
aforementioned constitutional limitations), the Court of Appeals, and the trial courts, through the passage of BP 129, as
amended.
In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.'s main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 is Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended:
Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto,
and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]
Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial
Courts (under Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution). In view of the concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts should be followed. In People v. Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was explained as follows:
[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. 189
When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court may
then exercise its jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power.
Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the "totality
of powers a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case."190 Under Section 1, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it includes "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights
as conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the
wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because they are tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion,"
which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary. 192
Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular
case conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In other words,
procedure is the framework within which judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,193 the Court
elucidated that "[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a
given cause began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in
which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with
the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This

does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter." 194
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested
unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure
of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under
the 1935196 and 1973 Constitutions,197 had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress.198 As it now
stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to
amend the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of
institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and more independent judiciary."199
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show 200 that the Framers debated on whether or
not the Court's rule-making powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence
"The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme
Court", right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged^" in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to
delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word "[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be followed by "the phrase
with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the
Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly may repeal,
alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner
Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes
were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation
in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court and the
Legislature, have their inherent powers."201
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure. As pronounced in Echegaray:
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also r granted for the first time the power
to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution
took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this
Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.202 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of procedure, among others, the current
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of
every court's judicial power, the provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary
injunction were thus provided.
A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of during the
pendency of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result
of the main action. It is well-settled that the sole objectof a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo203 until the merits of the case can be heard.
They are usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of
them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy
the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case. In other words, they are
preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence, not a cause of action in itself, but
merely adjunct to a main suit.204 In a sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent a case from being mooted by
the interim acts of the parties.

Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary
injunction is defined under Section 1,205 Rule 58, while Section 3206 of the same Rule enumerates the grounds for its
issuance. Meanwhile, under Section 5207 thereof, a TRO may be issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction under certain procedural parameters.
The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary
writs, processes, and other means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135
of the Rules of Court which reads:
Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, f processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if
the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law208 or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules. ChanR obl es Virtualawli brar y
In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax
Appeals] to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"210 over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs
in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction," 211 the Court
ruled that said power "should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final
orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter:"212
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make
all orders that ; will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It
carries with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and
proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act
which might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.213 (Emphasis supplied)
In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:
[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act
effectively within such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the
court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to
t defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
xxxx cralawl awlibr ar y
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in
addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the
ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts,
as well as to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution
of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf
of the litigants.214 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-entrenched constitutional principle, articulated way
back in the 1936 case of Angara, that "where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power
necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred."215
In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle, by which the courts deal with diverse matters
over which they are thought to have intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-making] and general judicial housekeeping. To
justify the invocation or exercise of inherent powers, a court must show that the powers are reasonably necessary to
achieve the specific purpose for which the exercise is sought. Inherent powers enable the judiciary to accomplish
its constitutionally mandated functions."216
In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited courts from enjoining
the enforcement of a revocation order of an alcohol beverage license pending appeal,218 the Supreme Court of Kentucky
held:
[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which is reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering the rule making power
and the judicial power to be one and the same that ". . . the grant of judicial power [rule making power] to the courts by
the constitution carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the administration
of justice." (Emphases supplied)

Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive relief as an exercise of the court's inherent
power, and to this end, stated that any attempt on the part of Congress to interfere with the same was constitutionally
impermissible:
It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language framework of 28 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions,
Section 15, and once and for all make clear that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an
incidental to its constitutional grant of power, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to the administration of
justice in the case before it. In the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary in order to protect or preserve the
subject matter of the litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to make its judgment effective, may grant or issue a
temporary injunction in aid of or ancillary to the principal action.
The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the injunction, is exclusively within the
constitutional realm of the courts. As such, it is not within the purview of the legislature to grant or deny the power
nor is it within the purview of the legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under which this inherently judicial
power may be or may not be granted or denied.
This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the power of the legislature to interfere with or to inhibit
the performance of constitutionally granted and inherently provided judicial functions, x x x
xxxx
We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as
incidental to its general jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary f to the administration of justice in
the case before it. . ." This includes the inherent power to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied)
Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right to appeal in the statute does not necessarily
mean that it could control the appellate judicial proceeding:
However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does not give it the right to encroach upon the
constitutionally granted powers of the judiciary. Once the administrative action has ended and the right to appeal arises
the legislature is void of any right to control a subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have
come into play and have preempted the field.219 (Emphasis supplied)
With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770
and, in so doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by
the Ombudsman, it encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are,
by nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of
procedure which belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create, define,
and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of implementing an existing right 220 since it only provided for temporary
reliefs to preserve the applicant's right in esse which is threatened to be violated during the course of a pending litigation. In
the case of Fabian,211 it was stated that:
If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure. ChanR obles Virtualawli brar y
Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the
Rules of Court, as in the cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/ Docket
Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from
Payment of Legal Fees;223 and (c) Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-
Cortes224 While these cases involved legislative enactments exempting government owned and controlled corporations and
cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule 141 of the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees), it was,
nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure225 solely belongs
to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. On this score, the Court
described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure as exclusive and "[o]ne of the safeguards
of [its] institutional independence."226
That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts
under Section 2, Article VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII supra, does not result in
an abnegation of the Court's own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5), Article
VIII supra. Albeit operatively interrelated, these powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be
preserved under its own sphere of authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the
procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates. The first

paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives, 227 because it
does not define, prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of courts to act on certiorari cases;
the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129 which were not shown
to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy that was created
by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent to every
court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an
adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there
thus, stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.
In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first
paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically
dilutes a court's ability to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by
supervening events if no provisional injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly,
the court's acquired jurisdiction, through which it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of
judicial power, especially under the present Constitution, cannot be enervated due to a court's inability to regulate what
occurs during a proceeding's course. As earlier intimated, when jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded by law and
has been acquired by a court, its exercise thereof should be undipped. To give true meaning to the judicial power
contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court's duly promulgated rules of procedure should therefore remain
unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in whatever variant should only
subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same.
The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor
General Florin T. Hilbay (Acting Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing observations:
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of Court?
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Rule 58, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will be mistaken under the rubric of what is called
provisional remedies, our resident expert because Justice Peralta is not here so Justice Bersamin for a while. So provisional
remedy you have injunction, x x x.
xxxx
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, if you have a copy of the
Constitution, can you please read that provision? Section 5, Article VIII the Judiciary subparagraph 5, would you kindly read
that provision?
ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.

"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts..."
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. This is the power,
the competence, the jurisdiction of what constitutional organ?

The Supreme Court, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which we've already been discussed with you by my
other colleagues, is that not correct?

Correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is that not correct?


JUSTICE LEONEN:
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that not correct?

JUSTICE LEONEN:
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it part of litigation in an ordinary case?

It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it will not be rendered moot and academic,
is that not correct?

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional?

No, Your Honor.
xxxx
JUSTICE LEONEN.
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under Rule 16?

Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create remedies, x x x.
JUSTICE LEONEN.
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the power to issue the supplemental pleading called
the bill of t particular [s]? It cannot, because that's part of procedure...

That is true.
JUSTICE LEONEN
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not correct?

Correct.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what's different with the writ of injunction?

Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the part of a court that was created by Congress. In
the absence of jurisdiction... (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they create a special agrarian court it has all
procedures with it but it does not attach particularly to that particular court, is that not correct?
ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:

When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of procedure and the
Rules of Court, is that not correct?

Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an] ancillary to a particular injunction in a court, is
that not correct?

xxxx228 (Emphasis supplied)
In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, 229 the Court instructed that "[i]t is through the Constitution that the
fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among
the several departments. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which
all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer." It would then follow that laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional. 230
However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy
considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar import.
Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all
matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court
from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is
adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770)
without the Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining
the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances
were merely ancillary to the exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP
129, as amended, and which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.
IV.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI
in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 against the preventive suspension order is a persisting objection to the validity of said injunctive
writs. For its proper analysis, the Court first provides the context of the assailed injunctive writs.
A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.
By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting
Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be
suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses
or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him:
Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as
penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different
ends sought to be achieved.
Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The
purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is
found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a
preventive measure. (Emphasis supplied) ChanR obles Virtual awlibrar y
Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty
of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides: chanRobl es virtual Lawli brar y

Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be
considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.232(Emphases supplied) ChanR obl esVirtualawlibr ar y
The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six
(6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the
fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive
suspension pending an investigation, namely:
(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and
(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:
chanRobl es virtual Lawli brar y
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; cralawlawli brar y
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.233 ChanR obles Virtualawli brar y
B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.
Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance
with the requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.
The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor
Garcia, Jr. v. CA234 (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were established in the CA that the acts
subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled
jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively charged."235 Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the
condonation doctrine, among others, cautioned, in the said case, that "it would have been more prudent for [the appellate
court] to have, at the very least, on account of the extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in
the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"236 during the pendency of the proceedings.
Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed WPI was based on the condonation
doctrine, citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos237 The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief
prayed for, i.e., the nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose
preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any
administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to
2013.238 Moreover, the CA observed that although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond
his first term , i.e., the alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013, 239 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA
- still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona,
Jr.,240 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,241 wherein the condonation dobtrine was applied by the Court although the payments
were made after the official's election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed
before said re-election.242
The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine since it was a
matter of defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary
proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees with the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it was
material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which
was the subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus, since condonation was duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in passing upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that
the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,245it appears that the CA found
that the application of the condonation doctrine was already sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the preventive
suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it
was established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term,
then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be administratively charged. In other words, with condonation

having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to
determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.
With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to
determine if the CA gravely abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.
C. The origin of the condonation doctrine.
Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense,
[especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense."246
The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein
elaborated upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual
v. Hon. Provincial Board ofNueva Ecija,247 (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.
In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951,
and was later re-elected to the same position in 1955. During his second term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting
Provincial Governor filed administrative charges before the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of
authority and usurpation of judicial functions for acting on a criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 3556 on December 18
and 20, 1954. In defense, Arturo Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for the acts charged against him since they
were committed during his previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining him during his second term.
The Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo Pascual, and when
the case reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that the controversy posed a novel issue - that is, whether or not an
elective official may be disciplined for a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.
As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and
"found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions,
and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment
condones the prior misconduct."248Without going into the variables of these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded
to state that:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because
of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.249 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is really no established weight of
authority in the United States (US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an
official's re-election denies the right to remove him from office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out
during the oral arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned the condonation
doctrine.250 The Ombudsman aptly cites several rulings of various US State courts, as well as literature published on the
matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment
is nuanced:
(1) For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a public officer from his current term or office for
misconduct which he allegedly committed in a prior term of office is governed by the language of the statute or constitutional
provision applicable to the facts of a particular case (see In Re Removal of Member of Council Coppola).251 As an example,
a Texas statute, on the one hand, expressly allows removal only for an act committed during a present term: "no officer shall
be prosecuted or removed from office for any act he may have committed prior to his election to office" (see State ex rel.
Rowlings v. Loomis).252 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma allows removal from office for "acts of
commission, omission, or neglect committed, done or omitted during a previous or preceding term of office" (see State v.
Bailey)253 Meanwhile, in some states where the removal statute is silent or unclear, the case's resolution was contingent
upon the interpretation of the phrase "in office." On one end, the Supreme Court of Ohio strictly construed a removal statute
containing the phrase "misfeasance of malfeasance in office" and thereby declared that, in the absence of clear legislative
language making, the word "office" must be limited to the single term during which the offense charged against the public
officer occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes v. Probate Court of Cuyahoga County)254 Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania decided that the phrase "in office" in its state constitution was a time limitation with regard
to the grounds of removal, so that an officer could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior to the taking of the
office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman)255 The opposite was construed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the
view that an officer's inability to hold an office resulted from the commission of certain offenses, and at once rendered him
unfit to continue in office, adding the fact that the officer had been re-elected did not condone or purge the offense
(see State ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).256 Also, in the Supreme Court of New York, Apellate Division, Fourth Department, the
court construed the words "in office" to refer not to a particular term of office but to an entire tenure; it stated that the whole
purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute in question could easily be lost sight of, and the intent of the law-making
body be thwarted, if an unworthy official could not be removed during one term for misconduct for a previous one (Newman
v. Strobel).257

(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer was a successor in the same office for which he
has been administratively charged. The "own-successor theory," which is recognized in numerous States as an exception to
condonation doctrine, is premised on the idea that each term of a re-elected incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct,
but rather, regarded as one continuous term of office. Thus, infractions committed in a previous term are grounds for
removal because a re-elected incumbent has no prior term to speak of 258 (see Attorney-General v. Tufts;259State v.
Welsh;260Hawkins v. Common Council of Grand Rapids; 261Territory v. Sanches;262 and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).263
(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing nature of an offense in cases where the
condonation doctrine was invoked. In State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden,264 the public officer charged with malversation of
public funds was denied the defense of condonation by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, observing that "the large sums of
money illegally collected during the previous years are still retained by him." In State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey265 the Supreme
Court of Kansas ruled that "there is no necessity" of applying the condonation doctrine since "the misconduct continued in
the present term of office[;] [thus] there was a duty upon defendant to restore this money on demand of the county
commissioners." Moreover, in State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder,266 the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as
nondelivery and excessive prices are concerned, x x x there remains a continuing duty on the part of the defendant to make
restitution to the country x x x, this duty extends into the present term, and neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct."
Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in
the US on the condonation doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to show that Pascual had accounted for the
numerous factors relevant to the debate on condonation, an outright adoption of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not
have been proper.
At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court's decision-making. "[They] are not
relied upon as precedents, but as guides of interpretation." 267 Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the
condonation doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing
legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As
adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing
considerations against its application. 268 In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances
exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent. 269 As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a
rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society within which it
thrives.270 In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide."271
In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has
radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect
the experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting,
including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-
examination.
D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.
Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:
First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is
separate and distinct:
Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this
is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the
removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or
appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex
rel.Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs.
Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.272
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove
him therefor; and
[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS)
553.273(emphasis supplied)
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their
right to elect officers:
As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults
or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically
overrule the will of the people.274 (Emphases supplied)
The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:
(1) Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied the condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the
above-stated passages from Pascual in verbatim.
(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court clarified that the condonation doctrine does not
apply to a criminal case. It was explained that a criminal case is different from an administrative case in that the former
involves the People of the Philippines as a community, and is a public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only
the populace of the constituency he serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is only the President who may
pardon a criminal offense.
(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided under the 1987 Constitution wherein the
condonation doctrine was applied in favor of then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his re-election merely
supervened the pendency of, the proceedings.
(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by
stating that the same is justified by "sound public policy." According to the Court, condonation prevented the elective
official from being "hounded" by administrative cases filed by his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he has to
defend himself "to the detriment of public service." Also, the Court mentioned that the administrative liability condoned by re-
election covered the execution of the contract and the incidents related therewith. 279
(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein the benefit of the doctrine was extended to
then Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who was administratively charged for his involvement in an anomalous contract for the
supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed only four (4) days before the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that
notwithstanding the timing of the contract's execution, the electorate is presumed to have known the petitioner's background
and character, including his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was deemed a condonation of his prior
transgressions. More importantly, the Court held that the determinative time element in applying the condonation doctrine
should be the time when the contract was perfected; this meant that as long as the contract was entered into during a
prior term, acts which were done to implement the same, even if done during a succeeding term, do not negate the
application of the condonation doctrine in favor of the elective official.
(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman281 (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23, 2010) - wherein the Court explained the
doctrinal innovations in the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:
Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied
even if the administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged
misconduct occurred four days before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of
the administrative complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or
period of which Garcia did not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official's culpability
was committed prior to the date of reelection. 282 (Emphasis supplied) ChanRobl esVirtual awlibr ar y
The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283 also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not apply to
appointive officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the Court remarked that it would have been
prudent for the appellate court therein to have issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of a
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman in view of the condonation doctrine.
A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all
cited by the CA to justify its March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015 Resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive
writs - would show that the basis for condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never
accounted for. What remains apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential
doctrine, was - and still remains - the above-cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of US courts where
condonation was amply supported by their own state laws. With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the core
premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's re-election cuts qff the right to remove him for an administrative offense
committed during a prior term - was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the legality of that
doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms. As in the US, the propriety of condonation is - as it should be -
dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an examination of our
current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.

The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land; 284 thus, the unbending rule is
that every statute should be read in light of the Constitution.285 Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a workable
government; hence, its interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the
operation of the political branches of government. 286
As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935
Constitution which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The
provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II which states that
"[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law
to render personal military or civil service."287 Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public accountability, and
considering the dearth of jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was
no glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases
existing at that time.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent a significant change. The
new charter introduced an entire article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively
recognized, acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain
accountable to the people."
After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which
sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and
integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."288 Learning
how unbridled power could corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of
the public service by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution
strengthened and solidified what has been first proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to be
accountable to the people at all times:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all timesbe accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives. ChanRobl esVirtual awlibr ar y
In Belgica, it was explained that:
[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is
an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance
with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a public trust
connotes accountability x x x.289 (Emphasis supplied) ChanR obles Virtual awlibrar y
The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service Commission,290 and
also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. 291
For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from
office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,292 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991"
(LGC), which was approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992:
Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office
on any of the r following grounds: chanR obl es virtual Lawlibrar y
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; cralawlawli brar y
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution; cralawlawli brar y
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; cralawlawli brar y
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor; cral awlawli brar y
(e) Abuse of authority; cralawl awlibrar y
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay; cral awlawlibr ar y
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position:

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxxx
x x x x (Emphasis supplied) ChanR obl es Virtualawli brar y
In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office:
Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -
a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
perpetual disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking the civil service examinations.
In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the
elective local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office.
Note, however, that the provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's
candidacy. Nothing therein states that the administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:
Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.
xxxx
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets
the qualifications required for the office.
Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the
doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the
people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
official's administrative liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected
for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this
jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses:
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the
sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it
would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19
of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded
inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why the President cannot grant executive
clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be
invoked against an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40
(b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of
removal could not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In
similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an
accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of
condonation of administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an
officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous term, 294 or that the disqualification to hold the

office does not extend beyond the term in which the official's delinquency occurred.295 In one case,296 the absence of
a provision against the re-election of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the justification behind
condonation. In another case,297 it was deemed that condonation through re-election was a policy under their
constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our present Constitution's requirements on public
accountability. There was even one case where the doctrine of condonation was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a
party as a ground;298 while in another case, which was not reported in full in the official series, the crux of the disposition was
that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was deemed to be
incompetent.299Hence, owing to either their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for the
continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws.
At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion
of the elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election This treatment is similar
to People ex rel Bagshaw v. Thompson300 and Montgomery v. Novell301 both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an
officer cannot be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in
Section 66 (b) states that the elective local official's administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at
all events, no legal provision actually supports the theory that the liability is condoned.
Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate
of their right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process
by which a particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal
basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every
democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's administrative
liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our governing
legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether
in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the
electorate's will has been abdicated.
Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of
any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to
human experience that the electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly
points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the
public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the
electorate when they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual
knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act that is unknown. As observed
in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton304 decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:
Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of office
are reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation, implying as it
does forgiveness, connotes knowledge and in the absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive
something of which one has no knowledge.
That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be
seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch
from - and now rendered obsolete by - the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the
condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo,
Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were all relied upon by the CA.
It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines. 305 Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the
Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar
Council.306
Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to
the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by
them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.307
Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law"
prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this
matter is People v. Jabinal,308 wherein it was ruled:
[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated:
[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to
Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is
expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against
retroactivity is easy to perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested
or impairs the obligations of contract and hence, is unconstitutional.310 ChanR obles Virtualawli brar y
Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course.
Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our
jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now
abandons the condonation doctrine.
E. Consequence of ruling.
As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is
done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or
tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence."312
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were
all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance
of the subject TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance
of the subject WPI was based on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by
merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it
cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly,
the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly issued.
With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr.
administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to
have been mooted.313 As initially intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at its core,
serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and
perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's process of investigation in the instant administrative case.
F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.
This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive
suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of
the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review." 314 All of these scenarios obtain in this case:
First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the
condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of
the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates
that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.
Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to
escape administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this
is a situation of exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a
perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability from the multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it
is indubitable that paramount public interest is involved.
Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide

the bench, the bar, and the public. The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles, but
also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court
owes it to the bench, the bar, and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine came about, and now, its reasons for
abandoning the same in view of its relevance on the parameters of public office.
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local officials against the administrative
charges filed against them. To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the period of July
2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the
ground of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions
such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach of the
Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers."315 Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of
repetition and must therefore, not evade review.
In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own
jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it
notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of discussion moot. chanroblesl aw
V.
With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the Court now rules on the final issue on whether or not
the CA's Resolution316 dated March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in
CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.
The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge
for indirect contempt317 because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty therefor would result in her effective removal
from office.318 However, a reading of the aforesaid March 20, 2015 Resolution does not show that she has already been
subjected to contempt proceedings. This issuance, in? fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive for the
Ombudsman to comment, the CA has not necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition:
Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her
capacity as the Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and Local Government] are hereby DIRECTED to file Comment
on the Petition/Amended and Supplemental Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an inextendible period of
three (3) days from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) ChanR obles Virtual awlibrar y
Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a comment, wherein she may properly raise her
objections to the contempt proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound
judicial discretion, may still opt not to give due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss the same.
Sjmply put, absent any indication that the contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it would then be
premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The submission of the Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:
(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy
against the issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until
the Court adopts the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor; cralawl awlibrar y
(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect; cralawlawli brar y
(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition
for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint Decision
dated October 9, 2015 finding Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-
A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063; and
(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay,
Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.
SO ORDERED. c hanrobl es virtuallawli brar y
Sereno, C.J. Carpio, Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, and Jardeleza, JJ., no part.
Brion, J., no part/ on leave.
Mendoza, J., on leave.
Bersamin, J., please see my concurring & dissenting opinion.

Endnotes:
1
"The Works of Jeremy Bentham, published under the superintendence of his executor, John Bowring." Vol. II, Chapter IV,
p. 423, London (1843).
2
With urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or a WPI. Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 6-36.
3
Id. at 43-47. Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices Francisco P. Acosta and Eduardo B.
Peralta, Jr. concurring.
4
Id. at 53-65. Issued by petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales.
5
Id. at 50-51.
6
Dated March 18, 2015. Id. at 362-373.
7
Id. at 613-627.
8
Id. at 629-630. Signed by Division Clerk, of Court Miriam Alfonso Bautista.
9
For certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI. Id. at 606-611
10
See rollo, Vol. II, pp. 749-757.
11
RA 7080, entitled "AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER" (approved on Julv 12, 1991).
12
Approved on August 17, 1960.
13
Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 647.
14
Id.
15
Through Ombudsman Office Order No. 546, which was later on amended through Officer Order No. 546-A dated
November 18, 2014. Id. at 758-759.
16
Dated March 3, 2015. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 66-100.
17
Docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and
OMB-C-A-15-0063. See id. at 53-58.
18
Docketed as OMB-C-C-15-0059, OMB-C-C-15-0060, OMB-C-C-15-0061, OMB-C-C-15-0062, OMB-C-C-15-0063, and
OMB-C-C-15-0064. See id. at 66. See also rollo, Vol. II, p. 674.
19
As for Binay, Jr., only four (4) administrative cases and four (4) criminal cases were filed against him, particularly: (a) for
administrative cases (1) OMB-C-A-15-0058, (2) OMB-C-A-15-0061, (3) OMB-C- A-15-0062, and (4) OMB-C-A-15-0063; and
(b) for criminal cases (1) OMB-C-C-15-0059, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds
involving the design, architectural, and engineering services of MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. covering the Makati
Parking Building project, (2) OMB-C-C-15-0062, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and two (2) counts of Falsification
of Public Documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code in connection with Phase III of the Makati Parking
Building project involving Hilmarc's, (3) OMB-C-C-15-0063, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and two (2) counts of
Falsification of Public Documents in connection with Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project involving Hilmarc's, and
(4) OMB- C-C-1 5-0064, for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 and two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Documents in
connection with Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project involving Hilmarc's. (Rollo, Vol. I, p. 12; rollo, Vol. II, p. 647.)
20
Specific period covered by his first term is from Noon of June 30, 2010 to Noon of June 30, 2013.
21
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 247.
22
Id. at 248-250.
23
The original contract amount was P599,395,613.34. Due to a change order, this was later increased to P599,994,021.05.
See Disbursement Voucher; id. at 284.
24
Id. at 86-87.

25
See Disbursement Voucher for 26% completion of Phase III; id. at 270.
26
See Disbursement Voucher for 52.49% completion of Phase III; id. at 273.
27
28
29
30
31
Id. at 312.
32
Id. at 290-292.
33
The original contract amount was f 649,275,681.73. This was later increased to f 649,934,440.96. See Disbursement
Voucher; id. at 320.
34
Id. at 88.
35
See Disbursement Voucher for 33.53% completion of Phase IV; id. at 315.
36
37
38
39
See Disbursement Voucher for 100% completion of Phase IV; id. at 320.
40
Id. at 334.
41
Id. at 323-325.
42
The original contract amount was P141,649,366.00. Due to a change order, this was later increased to P143,806,161.00.
See Disbursement Voucher; id. at 349
43
Id. at 91.
44
See Disbursement Voucher for 27.31% completion of Phase V; id. at 340. See also id. at 337-339.
45
See Disbursement Voucher for 52.76% completion of Phase V; id. at 344. See also id. at 341-343.
46
Specific period covered by his second term is from Noon of June 30, 2013 to Noon of June 30, 2016.
47
See Disbursement Voucher for 100% completion of Phase V; rollo, p. 349. See also id. at 346-349.
48
For the contract amount of PI 1,974,900.00. Dated November 28,2007. Id. at 108-113.
49
See Disbursement Voucher for 100% completion of the MANA contract; id. at 126.
50
Through Ombudsman Office Order No. 178, which was later on amended through Office Order No. 180 dated March 9,
2015. See rollo, Vol. II, pp. 647-648.
52
Rollo, Vol. II, p. 648.
51
Not attached to the rollos.
53
See rollo, Vol. I, pp. 62 and 480.
54
Id. at 61.
55
Id.

56
See id. at 63 and 480. See also Ombudsman's Indorsement letter dated March 11, 2015; id. at 351.
57
See Personal Delivery Receipt; id. at 350. See also id. at 12.
58
See Binay, Jr.'s Comment/Opposition dated April 6, 2005; id. at 481. See also Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum dated May 21,
2015; rollo, Vol. 11, p. 806. The Ombudsman, however, claims that the said petition was filed on March 12, 2015; see rollo,
Vol II p 648
59
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 403-427.
60
See id. at 425-426.
61
Id. at 404.
62
Id. at 404-405.
63
Id. at 424-425.
64
See id. at 12-13. See also Director Brion's Memorandum dated March 16, 2015; id. at 352-353.
65
Id. at 43-47.
66
Id. at 47.
67
Id. at 13.
68
604 Phil. 677 (2009).
69
70
Which directive the Ombudsman complied with on March 30, 2015 (rollo, Vol. II, p. 650). See also rollo, Vol. I, p. 47.
71
See Manifestation dated March 17, 2015; rollo, Vol. I, pp. 357-360.
72
Id. at 358.
73
Not attached to the rollos.
74
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 14; rollo, Vol. II, p. 649.
75
Dated March 18, 2015. Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 362-373.
76
Id.
77
See id. at 370.
78
Id. at 50-51.
79
Which the Ombudsman complied with on March 26, 2015 (rollo, Vol. II, p. 650). See also rollo, Vol I, p. 50.
80
The CA heard oral arguments with respect to Binay, Jr.'s application for a WP1 on March 30, 2015. On the other hand, the
CA heard oral arguments with respect to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt on March 31, 2015 (see rollo, Vol. II, p. 650). See
also rollo, Vol. I, p. 51
81
82
Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," approved on November 17 1989.
85
See rollo, Vol. I, pp. 17-21.
84
See id. at 21-24.
85
See Comment/Opposition dated April 6, 2015; id. at 477-522.
86
See id. at 478-479.

87
See id. at 492-493.
88
See id. at 497-505.
89
Id. at 511.
90
Id. at 613-627.
91
Id. at 615.
92
G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768.
93
94
All of which pertains to the payment of Phase V. See id. at 346-349. See also id. at 623.
95
326 Phil. 847(1996).
96
372 Phil. 892(1999).
97
98
See id. at 623.
99
Id. at 606-611.
100
Id. at 609.
101
See Court Resolutions dated April 7, 2015 (id. at 524-525) and April 14, 2015 (id. at 634-638).
102
See April 21, 2015; id. at 639-640
103
Rollo, Vol. 11, pp. 646-745.
104
Dated May 21,2015. Id. at 803-865.
105
Id. at 951-952.
106
See Ombudsman's Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum dated July 3, 2015; id. at 1109-1161. See also Binay, Jr.'s
Comment (to Petitioners' Memorandum) dated July 3, 2015; id. at 2203-2240.
107
Id. at 959-960.
108
Id. at 959. See also Manifestation dated May 14, 2015; id. at 641.
109
See discussions on the condonation doctrine in the Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, pp. 708-733 and in the
Ombudsman's Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II pp 1144-1149,1153-1155, and 1158-1159.
110
See Republic v. Bayao, G.R. No. 179492, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 313, 322-323.
111
See Bordomeo v. CA, G.R. No. 161596, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 269, 286, citing Heirs of Spouses Reterta v.
Spouses Mores, 671 Phil. 346, 359 (2011).
112
See AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. Solid Homes, Inc., 658 Phil. 68, 19 (2011); citing Diamond Builders
Conglomeration v. Country Bankers Insurance Corporation, 564 Phil 756 769-770 (2007).
113
Republic v. Bayao, supra note 110, at 323, citing Siok Ping Tang v. Subic Bay Distribution Inc., 653 Phil. 124, 136-
137(2010).
114
See Ombudsman's Memorandum dated May 14, 2015; rollo, Vol. II, pp. 661-669.
115
Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, 506 Phil. 407,415 (2005).
116
See Court Resolution dated June 16, 2015; rollo, Vol. II, pp. 951-952.

117
Id. at 2203-2240.
118
See id. at 662-666 and 98.
119
As the Ombudsman herself concedes; see Main Petition, rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 17-18; See also Ombudsman's Memorandum,
rollo, Vol. II, pp. 661-666.
120
Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen, 487 Phil. 335, 346 (2004).
121
Section 21, RA 6770 states: chanR obles virtual Lawli brar y
Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of Jthe Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies,
including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
122
Section 22, RA 6770 states: chanR obles virtual Lawli brar y
Section 22. Investigatory Power. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious
misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint
for impeachment, if warranted.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a private person, the Ombudsman and his
Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in the investigation and proceed against such private person
as the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the
same penalties and liabilities.
123
See Alejandro v. Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, G.R. No. 173121, April 3, 2013, 695
SCRA 35, 44-46. t
124
Molina v. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167, 169 (1918).
125
See National Police Commission v. De Guzman, Jr., G.R. No. 106724, February 9, 1994, 229 SCRA, 801-807.
126
See Espino v. Cleofe, 152 Phil. 80, 87 (1973).
127
Records of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 6, August 2, 1998, pp. 174-187. As cited also in Ombudsman's
Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, p. 662.
128
Records of the Senate, Vol. II, No. 10, August 9, 1988, pp. 282-286 (full names of the senators in brackets supplied). See
also Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, pp. 662-665, emphases and underscoring in the original.
129
See Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza's interpellation; TSN of the Oral Arguments April 14 2015, p. 7.
130
Approved on November 17, 1989.
131
Effective July 1, 1997.
132
Effective January 1, 1964.
133
"The word 'or' x x x is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things
enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word." (Dayao v.
Commission on Elections,G.R. Nos. 193643 and 193704 January 29, 2013, 689 SCRA 412,428-429.)
134
Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p. 1720.
135
Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 165 Phil. 909, 914-915 (1976).
136
Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure states that a "party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment,
final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This is consistent with Item (e), Section 5 (2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
xxxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari , as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
137
356 Phil. 787(1998).
138
Note that "[o]ur ruling in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto invalidated Section 27 of Republic Act "No. 6770 and Section 7,
Rule 111 of Administrative Order No. 07 and any other provision of law implementing the aforesaid Act only insofar as they
provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court. The only
provision affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters included In said section 27, including the finality or non-
finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand." (Lapid v. CA, 390 Phil. 236, 248 [2000]).
139
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this
Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
140
587 Phil. 100(2008).
141
Id. at 111-112.
142
For ease of reference, the provision is re-stated:
"In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court."
143
There should be no statement on the Court's lack of advice and concurrence with respect to the second paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770 since the deliberations are, in fact, silent on the said provision.
144
See Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, pp. 666-667. Note that nowhere does the fourth paragraph of Section 27
delimit the phrase "orders, directives or decisions" to those rendered by the Ombudsman at the conclusion of the
administrative proceedings, as the Ombudsman submits.
145
See Philippine Economic Zone Authority v. Green Asia Construction and Development Corporation, 675 Phil. 846,
857(2011).
146
See Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p. 615.
147
Fabian supra note 137, at 800-801.
148
A preventive suspension is a mere preventive measure, and not a penalty (see Quimbo v. Gervacio, 503 Phil. 886, 891
[2005]); and hence, interlocutory in nature since it "does not terminate or finally dismiss or finally dispose of the case, but
leaves something to be done by [the adjudicating body] before the case is finally decided on the merits." (Metropolitan Bank
& Trust Company v. CA, 408 Phil. 686, 694 [2001]; see also Banares II v. Balising, 384 Phil. 567, 577 [2000]).
149
Gomales v. CA, 409 Phil. 684, 689 (2001).
150
Includes interlocutory orders, such as preventive suspension orders, as well as final and unappealable decisions or
orders under Section 27, RA 6770 which states that "[a]ny order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable."
151
G.R. No. 201643, March 12, 2014, 719 SCRA 209.
152
Id. at 219.
153
G.R. No. 184083, November 19, 2013, 709 SCRA 681.
154
Id. at 693.
155
411 Phil. 204(2001).
156
Supra note 140.
157
Rollo, Vol. 1, p. 18.

158
Id.
159
Id.
160
G.R. Nos. 196231 and 196232, January 28, 2014, 714 SCRA 611.
161
Id. at 639-641.
162
Id. at 641-642.
163
Id. at 643 (emphases supplied).
164
Id. at 644, citing Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150 (emphasis supplied).
165
Id. at 644-645 (emphases supplied).
166
Id. at 646-648.
167
See id. at 648-657.
168
See Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties Purchased by the Retired
Chief/Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC July 31 2012 678 SCRA 1, 13.
169
See Gonzales III, supra note 160, at 650, citing the Record of the Constitutional Commission Vol 2 July 26, 1986, p. 294.
170
171
Records of the Senate, August 24, 1988, p. 619. See also rollo, Vol. II, pp. 670-671 (emphases and underscoring in the
original).
172
173
See discussions in Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. 11, pp. 670-678 and Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II,
pp. 825-833. See also TSN of the Oral Arguments, April 14, 2015, pp. 5-9.
174
See People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 82 (1937), citing McGirr v. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil, 563, 568 (1915); 6 R. C. L., pp.
76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780-782, 783.
175
63 Phil. 139(1936).
176
Id. at 157.
177
G.R.Nos. 208566, 208493, and 209251, November 19, 2013, 710 SCRA 1.
178
Id. at 108.
179
Id.
180
Entitled "AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES" (approved on August 14, 1981).
181
See Section 3, Chapter 1, BP 129.
182
See Section 13, Chapter II, BP 129.
183
See Section 25, Chapter III, BP 129.
184
Entitled "An ACT Creating THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS" (approved on June 16, 1954), which was later amended by
RA 9282 (approved on March 30, 2004) and RA 9503 (approved on June 12, 2008).
185
Entitled "CREATING A SPECIAL COURT TO BE KNOWN AS 'SANDIGANBAYAN' AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
(approved on June 11, 1978), which was later amended by PD 1606 (approved on December 10, 1978), RA 7975 (approved
on March 30, 1995), and RA 8249 (approved on February 5, 1997).
186
Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari , prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari , as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
xxxx
187
See G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015, citing Reyes v. Diaz 73 Phil 484, 486 (1941)
188
254 Phil. 418 (1989).
189
Id. at 427.
190
Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Ed., p. 959, as
cited also in the Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, p. 661.
191
G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792.
192
Id. at 810, citing Cruz, Isagani A., Philippine Political Law, 1991 Ed., pp. 226-227.
193
20 Phil. 523(1911).
194
Id. at 530-531.
195
See 361 Phil. 73, 86-91 (1999).
196
Article VIII, Section 13 of the 1935 Constitution provides: chanRobles virtualLawlibr ar y
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
National Assembly shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the w7 admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)
197
Article X, Section 5 (5) of the 1973 Constitution provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batassing
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. (Emphasis supplied)
198
See Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of
Legal Fees, 626 Phil. 93, 106-109 (2010).
199
Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes,627 Phil. 543,549(2010).
200
See discussions as in the Records of the Constitutional Commission, July 14, 1986, pp. 491-492.

201
Id. at 492.
202
Supra note 195, at 88.
203
"Status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a controversy." (See Dolmar Real
Estate Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 570 Phil. 434, 439 [2008] and Preysler, Jr. v. CA, 527 Phil. 129, 136 [2006].)
204
See The Incorporators of Mindanao Institute, Inc. v. The United Church of Christ in the Philippines, G.R. No. 171765,
March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 637, 647.
205
Section 1, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: chanR obl es virtual Lawli brar y
Section 1. Preliminary injunction defined; classes. - A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act
or acts. It may cilso require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary
mandatory injunction. ChanR obles Virtualawli brar y
206
Section 3, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: chanR obl es virtual Lawli brar y
Section. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually; cral awlawli brar y
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be
done, some act or acts probably in violation of jthe rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding,
and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
207
Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No preliminary injunction shall be granted without
hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by
the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice,
the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to
be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein
provided, x x x.
However, subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court
may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but shall
immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be
served therewith, x x x.
x x x x (Emphases supplied)
208
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies may be specifically pointed out by law and thus, remain
effective unless the Supreme Court disapproves the same pursuant to Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: cralawlawl ibrar y
(5) xxx. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
209
G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014, 715 SCRA 182.
210
Id. at 204.
211
Id. at 197.
212
Id. at 204.
213
Id. at 204-205.
214
Id. at 205.

215
Supra note 175, at 177, citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 138-139.
216
(last visited July 27, 2015). See also Black's Law Dictionary, 8 th Ed., p. 798.
217
672 S.W.2d 62 (1984).
218
The particular statute [KRS 243.580(2) and (3)] reads: chanRobles virtualLawlibr ar y
(2) If a license is revoked or suspended by an order of the board, the licensee shall at once suspend all operations
authorized under his license, except as provided by KRS 243.540, though he files an appeal in the Franklin Circuit Court
from the order of revocation of suspension.
(3) No court may enjoin the operation of an order of revocation or suspension pending an appeal. If upon appeal to
the Franklin Circuit Court an order of suspension or revocation is upheld, or if an order refusing to suspend or revoke a
license is reversed, and an appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals, no court may enjoin the operation of the judgment of the
Franklin Circuit Court pending the appeal. (See Smothers, id.; emphasis supplied.)
219
See id.
220
"Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective
or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their invasions." (Primicias v. Ocampo,
93 Phil. 446, 452 [1953], citing Bustos v. Lucero, [46 Off. Gaz., January Supp., pp. 445, 448], further citing 36 C. J. 27; 52 C.
J. S. 1026); See alsoFabian, supra note 137.
221
Fabian, id. at 809.
222
629 Phil. 1 (2010).
223
Supra note 198.
224
Supra note 199.
225
Neypes v. CA, 506 Phil. 613, 626 (2005).
226
BAMARVEMPCO v. Cabato-Cortes, supra note 199, at 550.
227
See Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, pp. 668-669.
228
TSN of the Oral Arguments, April 14, 2015, pp. 64-68.
229
651 Phil. 374, 427(2010).
230
See 2 335 Phil. 82, 114 (1997).
231
503 Phil. 886 (2005).
232
Id. at 891-892.
233
The Ombudsman v. Valeroso, 548, Phil. 688, 695 (2007).
234
Supra note 68. See also rollo, Vol. I, p. 45.
235
236
Governor Garcia, Jr. supra note 68, at 690.
237
Supra note 92.
238
Rollo, Vol. I, p. 619
239
All of which Pertains to the payment of Phase V. See id. at 346-349. See also id. at 623.
240
Supra note 95.

241
Supra note 96.
242
242 Id. at 619-620.
243
See Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, p. 703-704.
244
243
See id. at 415-422.
246
Black's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., p. 315.
247
106 Phil. 466 (1959).
248
Id. at 471.
249
Id.
250
See Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's (Chief Justice Sereno) Interpellation, TSN of the Oral Arguments, April
21, 2015, p. 191.
251
155 Ohio St. 329; 98 N.E.2d 807 (1951); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct during
previous term, 42 A.L.R.3d 691 (1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), p.
252
Tex Civ App 29 SW 415 (1895), cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct during previous
term, 42 A.L.R.3d 691 (1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), p. 16, and in Silos, Miguel U., A Re-examination of
the Doctrine of Condonation of Public Officers, 84 Phil. L.J. 22, 33 (2009).
253
1956 OK 338; 305 P.2d 548 (1956); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct during
previous term, 42 A.L.R3d 691 (1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), p. 15.
254
22 Ohio St. 2d 120; 258 N.E.2d 594 (1970); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct
during previous term, 42 A.L.R.3d 691 (1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), pp. 11 and 22.
255
1946 Pa. Dist. & Cnty.; 56 Pa. D. & C. 393 (1946); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for
misconduct during previous term, 42 A.L.R3d 691 (1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), pp. 11.
256
45 La Ann 1350, 14 So 28 (1893); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct during
previous term, 42 A.L.R.3d 691 (1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), pp. 26.
257
236 App Div 371, 259 NYS 402 (1932); cited in Goger, Thomas, J.D., Removal of public officers for misconduct during
previous term, 42 A.L.R.3d 691 (1972), published by Thomson Reuters (2015), pp. 27.
258
See Ombudsman's Memorandum p. 70, rollo, Vol. II, p. 715, citing Silos, Miguel U., A Re-examination of the Doctrine of
Condonation of Public Officers, 84, Phil. LJ 22, 69 (2009).
259
239 Mass. 458; 132 N.E. 322(1921)
260
109 Iowa 19; 79 N.W. 369(1899).
261
192 Mich. 276; 158 N.W. 953 (1916).
262
14 N.M. 493; 1908-NMSC-022 (1908).
263
125 Ga. 18; 53 S.E. 811 (1906)
264
85 Minn. 41; 88 N.W. 412 (1901), cited in Silos, Miguel U., A Re-examination of the Doctrine of Condonation of Public
Officers, 84, Phil. LJ 22, 69 (2009).
265
148 Kan. 166; 80 P.2d 1095 (1938); cited in Silos, Miguel U., A Re-examination of the Doctrine of Condonation of Public
Officers, 84, Phil. LJ 22, 70 (2009).
266
199 Kan. 403; 430 P.2d 304 (1967), applying State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey, id.
267
Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines, 503 Phil. 485 (2005).

268
Supra note 177.
269
See Ombudsman Memorandum, rollo, Vol. II, p. 718, citing Cardozo, Benjamin N., The Nature of the Judicial Process
149 (1921), cited in Christopher P. Banks, Reversal of Precedent and Judicial Policy- Making: How Judicial Conceptions of
Stare Decisis in the U.S. Supreme Court Influence Social Change, 32 Akron L. Rev. 233(1999).
270
Id. at 722-723.
271
Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2401; 192 L. Ed.; 192 L. Ed. 2d 463 (2015).
272
Pascual, supra note 247, at 471.
273
Id. at 471-472.
274
Id. at 472.
275
123 Phil. 916(1966).
276
129 Phil. 553 (1967). See also Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, 138 Phil. 546 (1967) and Oliveros v. Villaluz, 156
Phil. 137 (1974).
277
Supra note 92.
278
Supra note 95.
279
Id. at 921.
280
Supra note 96.
281
633 Phil. 325(2010).
282
Id. at 335
283
577 Phil. 52, 72 (2008).
284
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 676 SCRA 579, 607.
285
Teehankee v. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634, 646 (1945), citing 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, Section 96.
286
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766 and 113888 August 19, 1994, 235
SCRA 506, 523.
287
See Silos, Miguel U., A Re-examination of the Doctrine of Condonation of Public Officers, 84, Phil. LJ 22, 69 (2009), pp.
26-27.
288
Section 27, Article II.
289
Belgica, supra note 177, at 131, citing Bernas, Joaquin G., S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines:
A Commentary, 2003 Ed., p. 1108.
290
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall insure and promote the Constitutional mandate that appointments in the
Civil Service shall be made only according to merit and fitness; that the Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel
agency of the Government shall establish a career service, adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, and courtesy in the civil service, strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability; that public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people; and that personnel functions shall be decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority to the
departments, offices and agencies where such functions can be effectively performed. (Section 1, Book V, Title I, subtitle A
of the Administrative Code of 1987; emphasis supplied).
291
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in public
service. Public officials and employees shall at all times be accountable to the people and shall discharge their
duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead modest
lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest. (Emphasis supplied) See Section 2, RA 6713 (approved on
February 20, 1989).

292
Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991" (approved on October 10 1991).
293
279 Phil. 920, 937(1991)
294
In Fudula's Petition (297 Pa. 364; 147 A. 67 [1929]), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cited (a) 29 Cyc. 1410 which
states: "Where removal may be made for cause only, the cause must have occurred during the present term of the
officer. Misconduct prior to the present term even during a preceding term will not justify a removal": and (b) "x x
x Penal Code [Cal.], paragraph 772, providing for the removal of officers for violation of duty, which states "a sheriff cannot
be removed from office, while serving his second term, for offenses committed during his first term." (Emphases
supplied)
ln Board of Commissioners of Kingfisher County v. Shutler (139 Okla. 52; 281 P. 222 [1929]), the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma held that "[u]nder section 2405, C. O. S. 1921, the only judgment a court can render on an officer being
convicted of malfeasance or misfeasance in office is removal from office and an officer cannot be removedfrom office
under said section for acts committed by him while holding the same office in a previous term." (Emphases supplied)
295
In State v. Blake (138 Okla. 241; 280 P. 833 [1929]), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma cited State ex rel. Hill, County
Attorney, v. Henschel, 175 P. 393, wherein it was said: "Under the Ouster Law (section 7603 of the General Statutes of
1915-Code Civ. Proc. 686a-), a public officer who is guilty of willful misconduct in office forfeits his right to hold the office for
the term of his election or appointment; but the disqualification to hold the office does not extend beyond the term in
which his official delinquency occurred." (Emphases supplied)
296
In Rice v. State (204 Ark. 236; 161 S.W.2d 401 [1942]), the Supreme Court of Arkansas cited (a) Jacobs v. Parham, 175
Ark. 86,298 S.W. 483, which quoted a headnote, that "Under Crawford Moses' Dig., [(i.e., a digest of statutes in the
jurisdiction of Arkansas)] 10335, 10336, a public officer is not subject to removal from office because of acts done prior to
his present term of office in view of Const., art. 7, 27, containing no provision against re-election of officer removed for
any of the reasons named therein." (Emphases supplied)
297
In State ex rel. Brlckell v. Hasty (184 Ala. 121; 63 So. 559 [1913]), the Supreme Court of Alabama held: "x x x If an
officer is impeached and removed, there is nothing to prevent his being elected to the identical office from which he
was removed for a subsequent term, and, this being true, a re election to the office would operate as a condonation
under the Constitution of the officer's conduct during the previous term, to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
from subsequent term for said conduct during the previous term. It seems to be the policy of our Constitution to make each
term independent of the other, and to disassociate the conduct under one term from the qualification or right to fill another
term, at least, so far as the same may apply to impeachment proceedings, and as distinguished from the right to indict and
convict an offending official." (Eijnphasis supplied)
298
In State Ex Rel. V. Ward (163 Tenn. 265; 43 S.W.2d. 217 [1931]), decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee,
Knoxville, it appears to be erroneously relied upon in Pascual, since the proposition "[tjhat the Acts alleged in paragraph 4 of
the petition involved contracts made by defendant prior to his present term for which he cannot now be removed from office"
was not a court ruling but an argument raised by the defendant in his demurrer.
299
In Conant v. Grosan (6 N.Y.S.R. 322 [1887]), which was cited in Newman v. Strobel(236 A.D. 371; 259 N.Y.S. 402
[1932]; decided by the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division) reads: "Our attention is called to Conant v.
Grogan (6 N.Y. St. Repr. 322; 43 Hun, 637) and Matter of King (25 N.Y. St. Repr. 792; 53 Hun, 631), both of which
decisions are of the late General Term, and neither of which is reported in full in the official series. While there are
expressions in each opinion which at first blush might seem to uphold respondent's theory, an examination of the
cases discloses the fact that the charge against each official related to acts performed during his then term of
office, and evidence of some prior irregularity was offered which in no way pertained to the charge in issue. It was
properly held that such evidence was incompetent. The respondent was not called upon to answer such charge, but an
entirely separate and different one." (Emphases supplied)
300
In People ex rel. Basshaw v. Thompson (55 Cal. App. 2d 147; 130 P.2d.237 [1942]), the Court of Appeal of California,
First Appellate District cited Thurston v. Clark, (107 Cal. 285, 40 P. 435), wherein it was ruled: "The Constitution does not
authorizethe governor to suspend an incumbent of the office of county commissioner for an act of malfeasance or
misfeasance in office committed by him prior to the date of the beginning of his current term of office as such county
commissioner." (Emphasis supplied)
301
Montgomery v. Nowell, (183 Ark. 1116; 40 S.W.2d 418 [1931]; decided by the Supreme Court of Arkansas), the
headnote reads as follows: "Crawford & Moses' Dig., 10, 335, providing for suspension of an officer on presentment or
indictment for certain causes including malfeasance, in office does not provide for suspension of an officer on being indicted
for official misconduct during a prior term of office." (Emphasis supplied)
302
See Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno's interpellation, TSN of the Oral Arguments, April 14, 2015, p. 43.
303
See Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol. 11, p. 716, citing Silos, Miguel U., A Re-examination of the Doctrine of

Condonation of Public Officers, 84, Phil. LJ 22, 69 (2009), p. 67.
304
117 N.J.L. 64; 186 A. 818(1936).
305
See Article 8 of the Civil Code.
306
632 Phil. 657(2010).
307
Id. at 686.
308
154 Phil. 565 (1974).
309
G.R. Nos. 97973 and 97998, January 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515.
310
Id. at 527.
311
Yu v. Reyes-Carpio, 667 Phil. 474, 481-482 (2011).
312
Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 202202, March 19 2013 693 SCRA 574, 599-600.
313
See Press Release dated October 9, 2015 of the Office of the Ombdusman, (visited November 9, 2015).
314
Supra note 177, at 93.
315
See Ombudsman's Memorandum, rollo, Vol II p 85.
316
Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 50-51.
317
See Amended and Supplemental Petition for Contempt dated March 18, 2015 wherein private respondent Binay, Jr.
charged, inter alia, the Ombudsman for acts constituting indirect contempt under Section 3 (b), (c), and (d) of Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court; id. at 362-375.
318
See rollo, Vol. II, pp. 734-743.
319
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
BERSAMIN, J.:
I am writing this separate opinion to memorialize my concurrence with the declaration of the ineffectiveness of the first
paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770, and of the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph thereof. The main
opinion has been written well by our esteemed colleague, Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, who has exhibited
her scholarly bent once again. But let me assure my colleagues in the Majority that if I submit this concurrence, I do not
mean to diminish in any way or degree the forcefulness and correctness of the justification for the declaration. I simply want
to underscore that Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down for authorizing the undue interference with
the prerogatives of the courts of law to adopt whatever means were allowed by law and procedure to exercise their
jurisdiction in the cases properly cognizable by them.
My dissent focuses on the main opinion's re-examination of the doctrine of condonation. This controversy does not call for
the revisit of the doctrine, and does not warrant its eventual abandonment. For the Court to persist in the re-examination, as
it does now, and to announce its abandonment of the doctrine despite the lack of the premise of justiciability is to indulge in
conjecture or in unwarranted anticipation of future controversies. We should refrain from the re-examination.
The Ombudsman's supplemental petition raised condonation for the first time but only to support her insistence that the CA
could not validly rely on the doctrine of condonation to justify its issuance of the injunction. She maintained then that
condonation was a matter of defense to be properly raised only in the appropriate administrative proceeding, viz:

6. It must be further emphasized that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant in the Ombudsman's determination of whether
the evidence of guilt is strong in issuing preventive suspension orders. Said doctrine does not go into the heart of subject-
matter jurisdiction. Neither can it oust the Ombudsman of her jurisdiction which she has already acquired. Private
respondent's claim of condonation doctrine is equally a matter of defense which, like any other defense, could be raised in
the proper pleading, could be rebutted, and could be waived.
As a defense, condonation should be passed upon after a decision on the administrative proceedings, not this early in the
proceeding.
7. The condonation doctrine, however, cannot abate the issuance of a preventive suspension order, precisely because an
order of preventive suspension does not render a respondent administratively liable. A respondent may be preventively
suspended, yet may be exonerated in the end.
8. At all events, there is no condonation because private respondent committed the acts subject of the complaint after his re-
election in 2013, as was argued by petition in public respondent Court of Appeals.
9. As mentioned earlier, there is no condonation. The assailed act (i.e. payment), by private respondent's own admission
during the proceedings before public respondent Court of Appeals, took place during the period of June and July 2013,
which was after his re-election in May 2013.1
The Ombudsman again discussed the doctrine of condonation at some length in her Memorandum as the fourth and last
argument presented on the issue of the propriety of the temporary restraining order and the writ of preliminary
injunction.2 She reiterated, however, that the doctrine was only a matter of defense that was relevant only in imposing an
administrative penalty on the respondent public elective official, to wit:
165. Thus, in deciding that the evidence of respondent Binay's guilt is strong, petitioner did not take into consideration the
so-called "condonation doctrine" the way respondent Court of Appeals did in its Third Resolution. The condonation doctrine
is applicable and relevant only to the imposition of an administrative penalty, not to the issuance of a preventive suspension,
the latter being merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.
166. Since a preventive suspension does not hold a public officer liable, it will not be affected by any "condonation" that the
electorate may extend to the public officer. Verily, for purposes of aiding an investigation, a public officer may be
preventively suspended even as, ultimately, he or she will be exonerated from administrative liability due to the condonation
doctrine. CONDONATION IS A MATTER OF DEFENSE - to be positively alleged and to be weighed according to the
evidence - during the administrative proceedings, and not at the very preliminary stage thereof. 3
I agree with the Ombudsman. The question of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA could be settled not by re-
examining and overturning the doctrine of condonation but by reference to Section 24 of the Republic Act No. 6770. It would
be plain error for us to determine whether the Court of Appeals (CA) gravely abused its discretion or not on the basis of the
doctrine of condonation.
The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section 13 (1), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, 4 while
her statutory mandate to act on administrative complaints is founded on Section 19 of Republic Act No. 6770, viz.:
Section 19. Administrative complaints. — The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or
omissions which:
1. Are contrary to law or regulation; cral awlawlibr ar y
2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; cralawl awlibr ar y
3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law; cralawl awlibr ar y
4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; cralawl awlibrar y
5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification. ChanR obles Virtualawli brar y
In line with the power to investigate administrative cases, the Ombudsman is vested with the authority to preventively
suspend respondent public officials and employees pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770, which provides:
Section 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against

such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the
charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six
(6) months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the
fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided.
It is important to note, however, that the Ombudsman has no authority to issue the preventive suspension order in
connection with criminal investigations of government officials or employees because such authority rests in the courts in
which the criminal cases are filed.5
Under Section 24, supra, two requisites must concur to render the preventive suspension order valid. The first requisite is
unique because it can be satisfied in only one way, which is that the evidence of guilt is strong in the judgment of the
Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman. But the second requisite may be satisfied in three different ways, namely: (1) that
the offense charged involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; or (2) the
charge would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him or her.6
Respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., along with other officers and employees of the City of Makati, were administratively
charged in the Office of the Ombudsman with grave misconduct, serious dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.7 In her joint order dated March 10, 2015, the Ombudsman stated that the requisites for the issuance
of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. and his corespondents were satisfied, specifically:
The first requisite is present in these cases, as shown by the supporting evidence attached as Annexes to the Complaint.
These Annexes include, among other things, sworn statements of alleged losing bidders and of some members of the
Makati City BAC attesting to the irregularities in the subject procurement; documents negating the purported publication of
bids; and disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showing disbursement of public funds by the city government.
As regard the second requisite, all the circumstances enumerated therein are likewise present. The Complaint charges
respondents with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. If
proven true, they constitute grounds for removal from public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service. Moreover, since the respondents' respective positions give them access to public records and influence on
possible witnesses, respondents' continued stay in office may prejudice the cases filed against them. Thus, their
preventive suspension without pay for a period of six (6) months is in order.
When he assailed the preventive suspension order by petition for certiorari in the CA, Binay, Jr. alleged that the preventive
suspension order was illegal and issued with grave abuse of discretion because: (1) it contravened well-settled
jurisprudence applying the doctrine of condonation; and (2) evidence of his guilt was not strong. He prayed that a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order.
The CA heeded Binay, Jr.'s prayer for injunctive reliefs chiefly on the basis of the doctrine of condonation. In the resolution
promulgated on March 16, 2015, the CA, citing the pronouncement in Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,8 granted Binay, Jr.'s
application for the temporary restraining order, holding as follows:
In Garcia v. Court of Appeals (GR No. 185132, April 24, 2009), the Supreme Court held that suspension from office of an
elective official, whether as a preventive measure or as a penalty will undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of
the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.
The Supreme Court in said case likewise found serious and urgent the question, among other matters, of whether the
alleged acts were committed in the previous term of office of petitioner therein. This is because if it were established that the
acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed during petitioner's prior term, then following settled
jurisprudence, he can no longer be administratively charged. It further declared imperative on the part of the appellate court,
as soon as it was apprised of the said considerable grounds, to issue an injunctive writ so as not to render moot, nugatory
and ineffectual the resolution of the issues in the certiorari petition. (Garcia, supra)
The Supreme Court also declared that it would have been more prudent on the part of the CA, on account of the extreme
urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in the certioraripetition, to issue a TRO while it awaits the
respective comments of the respondents and while it judiciously contemplates on whether or not to issue a writ of
preliminary injunction. It pointed out that the basic purpose of a restraining order is to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary injunction. That, it is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantive rights
and interests. (Garcia, supra)
In view of the seriousness of the issues raised in the Petition for Certiorari and the possible repercussions on the electorate

who will unquestionably be affected by suspension of their elective official, the Court resolves to grant petitioner's prayer
for a Temporary Restraining Order for a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof, conditioned upon the posting by
petitioner of a bond in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) 9
In ultimately granting the writ of preliminary injunction through its April 6, 2015 resolution, the CA, relying on the doctrine of
condonation adopted in Garcia, Jr.; Joson III v. Court of Appeals;10Aguinaldo v. Santos;11 and Salalima v. Guingona,
Jr.,12 explained:
Garcia was simply an echo of teachings in Joson v. Cowl of Appeals (G.R. No. 160652, February 13, 2006) where the High
Court declared that suspension from office of an elective official would deprive the electorate of the services of the person
they have voted into office.
Along this line, the concept of condonation, as advocated by petitioner and opposed by public respondent Ombudsman, will
assume resonance.
Premised on Aguinaldo, Salalima and Garcia, petitioner asserted that the public respondent Ombudsman can hardly impose
preventive suspension of petitioner, given his election in 2010 and re-election in 2013 as Makati City Mayor, relative to his
perceived illegal participation in anomalous activities for the Makati City Hall Building II project from 2007 to 2013.
xxxx
To reiterate, there was no disagreement that petitioner was elected in 2010 and re-elected as City Mayor of Makati in 2013.
The acts constitutive of the charges in the Complaint pertained to events from November 8, 2007, when City Ordinance No.
2007-A-015 appropriated P1,240,000,000.00 as supplemental budget for 2007. From this budget, P400,000,000.00 was
allocated for the parking building. It was allegedly during this time that a Negotiated Contract for the architectural and
engineering services were negotiated and approved. Disbursements allegedly favored Hilmarc and MANA amidst
irregularities in the bidding process during the term of petitioner as City Mayor of Makati.
Yet, to subscribe to public respondent Ombudsman's submission that condonation can only be appreciated by the
investigating body after it is ventilated as an exculpation by petitioner and considered solely by public respondent, following
the exercise of its investigatory power, will ignore the Court's constitutional power and duty to evaluate the factual and legal
foundations for, nay, impediments to, a preventive suspension in an administrative case. 13
In my view, however, the CA erroneously banked on the pronouncements in Garcia, Jr., Joson III, Aguinaldo,
and Salalima to espouse the doctrine of condonation as the basis to issue the injunctive writs under its resolutions
promulgated on March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015. In both Aguinaldo and Salalima,the Court applied the doctrine of
condonation to avoid the imposition of administrative liability upon re-elected public officials. Specifically, the Court held
in Aguinaldo that:
Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending before Us moot
and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the
candidates for governoer of Cagayan province, xxx
xxxx
Clearly then, the rule is that a public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term,
since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner
for acts he may have committed during the failed coup. 14
while in Salalima, the Court maintained that:
xxx [A]ny administrative liability which petitioner Salalima might have incurred in the execution of the retainer contract in
O.P. Case No. 5469 and the incidents related therewith and in the execution on 6 March 1992 of a contract for additional
repair and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public Market in O.P. Case No. 5450 are deemed extinguished by his
reelection in the 11 May 1992 synchronozed elections. So are the liabilities, if any, of petitioner members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Albay,who signed Resolution No. 129 authorizing petitioner Salalima to enter into the retainer
contract in question and who were reelected in the 1992 elections. This is, however, without prejudice to the institution of
appropriate civil and criminal cases as may be warranted by the attendant circumstances, xxx 15
It is clear to me that, based on the language and the factual milieu of Aguinaldo and Salalima, which both cited Pascual v.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija,16 and of other akin rulings,17 condonation shall apply only in case of the re-election of a
public officer who is sought to be permanently removed from office as a result of his misconduct, not while such public
officer is undergoing investigation. Condonation necessarily implies that the condoned act has already been found to have

been committed by the public officer. Hence, condonation applies to the penalty or punishment imposed after the conduct of
an administrative investigation. Under the circumstances, the pronouncements in Aguinaldo, Salalima and the others could
not be applicable to the preventive suspension order issued to Binay, Jr. pending his administrative investigation because
preventive suspension pending the conduct of an investigation was not yet a penalty in itself, but a mere measure of
precaution to enable the disciplining authority to investigate the charges by precluding the respondent from influencing the
witnesses against him.18
It is worth emphasis that preventive suspension is distinct from the penalty of suspension. The former is imposed on a public
official during the investigation while the latter, as a penalty, is served after the finaldisposition of the case.19 The former is
not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office, but a merely preventive measure, or a preliminary step in the
administrative investigation.20
As I see it, the CA misconstrued the milieu in Garcia, Jr. and Joson III as an application of the doctrine of condonation. The
Court notably stated in Garcia, Jr. and Joson III that "suspension from office of an elective official would deprive the
electorate of the services of the person they voted into office" in the context of determining the propriety of the issuance of
the preventive suspension order. In other words, the statement only served to remind the Ombudsman to issue the
preventive suspension orders with utmost caution in view of the gravity of the effects of suspending an incumbent elective
local official. Hence, Garcia, Jr. and Joson III did not apply the doctrine of condonation.
I further underscore that the CA was then only resolving Binay, Jr.'s application for injunctive reliefs against the preventive
suspension order issued by the Ombudsman. At that point, the CA's application of the doctrine of condonation was irrelevant
and unnecessary.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party or a
court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. 21 The requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining ordern are clearly set forth in Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.22 The sole
objective of the writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. The
writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence; 23 hence, it should not determine
the merits of a case, or decide controverted facts, for, being a preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong,
further injury, and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled. 24 As held in Saulog v. Court of
Appeals25 it is sufficient that:
x x x for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a present right which is directly threatened by an
act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing of the right claimed is necessary, its existence need not be
conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to be submitted to justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need
not be conclusive or complete but need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an idea of the justification for
the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. This should really be so since our concern here
involves only the proprietary of the preliminary injunction and not the merits of the case still pending with the trial court.
Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private respondent needs only to show that it has the ostensible
right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint x x x. (bold emphasis supplied.)
By relying on the doctrine of condonation, therefore, the CA went beyond the parameters for determining whether or not to
issue the injunctive writ. To recall, Binay, Jr. had filed his petition for certiorari in the CA primarily to assail the validity of the
preventive suspension order. What was raised for the CA to determine was whether or not the Ombudsman satisfactorily
complied with the requisites imposed by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770 to establish that Binay, Jr. and his co-
respondents had the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their petition, which was the nullification or lifting of the
preventive suspension order. In this regard, the CA plainly exceeded its jurisdiction.
In the meanwhile, the Ombudsman found Binay, Jr. administratively liable, and dismissed him from the service. By such
dismissal, the questions raised against the CA's issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the Ombudsman were
rendered moot and academic. I join the Majority in saying that the preventive suspension order, being an ancillary issuance,
was dissolved upon the Ombudsman's resolution of the administrative charges on the merits. Thus, to dwell on the
preventive suspension of Binay, Jr. and his co-respondents any further would be superfluous, for, as the Court said
in Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court:26
It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions
in which no actual interests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There is
no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition.
In short, the Court should excuse itself from exercising jurisdiction because the main case, the administrative proceeding
against the respondents, has already been decided by the Ombudsman on the merits.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I VOTE to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition for certiorari and prohibition, and,
accordingly, SET ASIDE the Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2015 by the Court of Appeals.
I further VOTE to DISSOLVE the writ of preliminary injunction issued on April 8, 2015 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 139453; and
to AFFIRM the Resolution promulgated on March 20, 2015 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 139504.
Endnotes:
1
Supplemental Petition for Certiorari , p. 4.
2
Memorandum, pp. 646-734.
3
Id. at 703-704.
4
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient; x x x
5
See Luciano v. Provincial Governor, No. L-30306, June 20, 1969, 28 SCRA 517.
6
Office of the Ombudsman v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 177211, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 350.
7
Docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-A-15-0060 OMB-C-A-15-0061 OMB-C-A-15-0062, OMB-C-A-
15-0063.
8
G.R. No. 185132, April 24, 2009.
9
CA Resolution dated March 16, 2015, pp. 4-5.
10
G.R. No. 160652, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 360.
11
G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768.
12
G.R. No. 117589-92, May 22, 1996, 257 SCRA 55.
13
CA Resolution dated April 6, 2015, pp. 6-10.
14
Aguinaldo v. Santos, G.R. No. 94] 15, August 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 768
15
Salalima v, Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 117589-92, May 22, 1996, 257 SCRA 55, 1 16.
16
106 Phil. 467 (October 31, 1959).
17
Lizares v. Hechanova, No. L-22059, May 17, 1966, 17 SCRA 58; Office of the Ombudsman v. Torres, G.R. No. 168309,
January 29, 2008, 543 SCRA 46; Garcia v. Mojica, G.R. No. 139043, September 10, 1999, 314 SCRA 207.
18
Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance Svstem v. Velasco, G R No 170463 February 2, 2011, 641 SCRA
372, 387.
19
Villaseñor v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 658, 667.
20
Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order
No. 292)
21
Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
23
Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the

commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually; cral awlawli brar y
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would
probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be
done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding,
and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
23
Unilever Philippines, (PRC), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119280, August 10, 2006.
24
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Hontanosas, Jr., G.R. No. 157 163, June 25, 2014.
25
G.R. No. 119769, September 18, 1996, 262 SCRA 51.
26
G.R. No. 200238, November 20, 2012, 686 SCRA 35.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 173121 : April 3, 2013
FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND

INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by Franklin Alejanctro (petitioneJ), assailing the
February 21, 2006 decision2 and the June 15, 2006 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88544. The CA dismissed for prematurity the petitioner's appeal on the August 20, 2004
decision4of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-03-0310-I finding him administratively
liable for grave misconduct.
The Factual Antecedents
On May 4, 2000, the Head of the Non-Revenue Water Reduction Department of the Manila Water
Services, Inc. (MWSI) received a report from an Inspectorate and Special Projects team that the Mico Car
Wash (MICO), owned by Alfredo Rap Alejandro, has been illegally opening an MWSI fire hydrant and
using it to operate its car-wash business in Binondo, Manila.5 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On May 10, 2000, the MWSI, in coordination with the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), conducted an anti-water pilferage operation against MICO.6 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
During the anti-water pilferage operation, the PNP-CIDG discovered that MICO's car-wash boys indeed
had been illegally getting water from an MWSI fire hydrant. The PNP-CIDG arrested the car-wash boys
and confiscated the containers used in getting water. At this point, the petitioner, Alfredo's father and the
Barangay Chairman or punong barangay of Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo, Manila, interfered with the
PNP-CIDG's operation by ordering several men to unload the confiscated containers. This intervention
caused further commotion and created an opportunity for the apprehended car-wash boys to
escape.7 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On August 5, 2003, the respondent Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, after
conducting its initial investigation, filed with the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman an
administrative complaint against the petitioner for his blatant refusal to recognize a joint legitimate police
activity, and for his unwarranted intervention. 8 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In its decision9 dated August 20, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found the petitioner guilty of
grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service. The Deputy Ombudsman ruled that the
petitioner cannot overextend his authority as Barangay Chairman and induce other people to disrespect
proper authorities. The Deputy Ombudsman also added that the petitioner had tolerated the illegal acts of
MICO's car-wash boys.10 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied in its
order11 of November 2, 2004.
The petitioner appealed to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In its
decision12 dated February 21, 2006, the CA dismissed the petition for premature filing. The CA ruled that
the petitioner failed to exhaust proper administrative remedies because he did not appeal the Deputy
Ombudsman's decision to the Ombudsman.
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CA ruling. On June 15, 2006, the CA denied the
motion.13chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Petition
The petitioner posits that the CA erred in dismissing his petition outright without considering Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court and Administrative Order No. 07 (otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman),14 on the belief that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the decision of
the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman can already be considered as an exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The petitioner further argues that the Office of the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction to order his dismissal from the service since under Republic Act No. (RA) 7160 (otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991), an elective local official may be removed from office only
by the order of a proper court. Finally, he posits that the penalty of dismissal from the service is not
warranted under the available facts.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, through the Office of the Solicitor General, pointed out in its
Comment15 that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies since he did not appeal the
decision of the Deputy Ombudsman to the Ombudsman. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
maintained that under RA 677016 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), the Office of the Ombudsman has
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials. It also asserted that sufficient evidence
exists to justify the petitioner's dismissal from the service.
As framed by the parties, the case poses the following issues: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
I.
WHETHER THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES REQUIRES A

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION FROM THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN TO THE
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF A RULE 43 REVIEW.
II.
WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
AND HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THEIR DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE.
III.
WHETHER PETITIONER'S ACT CONSTITUTES GRAVE MISCONDUCT TO WARRANT HIS

DISMISSAL.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
Preliminary Issues

The CA committed no reversible error in affirming the findings and conclusions of the Deputy
Ombudsman.
No further need exists to exhaust administrative remedies from the decision of the Deputy
Ombudsman because he was acting in behalf of the Ombudsman
We disagree with the CA's application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which
states that when there is "a procedure for administrative review, x x x appeal, or reconsideration, the
courts x x x will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to
and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in
the administrative forum."17 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, dated April 10, 1990, provides that: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 7. FINALITY OF DECISION. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
(1) month, or a fine equivalent to one (1) month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all
other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by
the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari shall have been filed by him
as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770. [italics supplied; emphasis and underscore ours]
Administrative Order No. 07 did not provide for another appeal from the decision of the Deputy
Ombudsman to the Ombudsman. It simply requires that a motion for reconsideration or a petition
for certiorari may be filed in all other cases where the penalty imposed is not one involving public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month, or a fine equivalent to one (1) month salary.
This post-judgment remedy is merely an opportunity for the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, to correct itself in certain cases. To our mind, the petitioner has fully exhausted
all administrative remedies when he filed his motion for reconsideration on the decision of the Deputy
Ombudsman. There is no further need to review the case at the administrative level since the Deputy
Ombudsman has already acted on the case and he was acting for and in behalf of the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of
the regular courts or administrative agencies
The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution.18 It is tasked to exercise
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers. While
Section 21 of The Ombudsman Act19 and the Local Government Code both provide for the procedure to
discipline elective officials, the seeming conflicts between the two laws have been resolved in cases
decided by this Court.20chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole,21 we pointed out that "there is nothing in the Local Government Code to
indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman
Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent x x x as to compel us to
only uphold one and strike down the other." The two laws may be reconciled by understanding the
primary jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or
employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. RA 6770 provides: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases. [italics supplied; emphasis and underscore ours]
The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade 27 and higher.22 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Consequently, as we held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez,23 any act or omission of a public
officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies.24 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the
body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction
to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. 25 In this case, the petitioner is a
Barangay Chairman, occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14.26 Under RA 7160, the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay
official, as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any erring local
elective official shall be prepared as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
xxx
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory. [italics supplied]
Since the complaint against the petitioner was initially filed with the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of
jurisdiction is concurrent.
The Ombudsman has the power to impose administrative sanctions
Section 15 of RA 677027 reveals the manifest intent of the lawmakers to give the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority. This provision covers the entire range of
administrative activities attendant to administrative adjudication, including, among others, the authority to
receive complaints, conduct investigations, hold hearings in accordance with its rules of procedure,
summon witnesses and require the production of documents, place under preventive suspension public
officers and employees pending an investigation, determine the appropriate penalty imposable on erring
public officers or employees as warranted by the evidence, and, necessarily, impose the corresponding
penalty.28
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
These powers unmistakably grant the Office of the Ombudsman the power to directly impose
administrative sanctions; its power is not merely recommendatory. We held in Office of the Ombudsman
v. Apolonio29 that: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the
Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out its mandate as protector of
the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. The Office was granted the
power to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It was given disciplinary authority
over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the Judiciary).

Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an investigation when the case
so warrants.30 (italics supplied; emphasis and underscore ours)
Substantive Issue
The petitioner is liable for grave misconduct
At the outset, we point out that the maintenance of peace and order is a function of both the police and
the Barangay Chairman, but crime prevention is largely a police matter. At the time when the police
officers were hauling the confiscated equipment, they were creating a commotion. As Barangay
Chairman, the petitioner was clearly in the performance of his official duty when he interfered. Under
Section 389(b)(3) of RA 7160, the law provides that a punong barangay must "maintain public order in the
barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal mayor and the sanggunian members in
the performance of their duties and functions." The PNP-CIDG's anti-water pilferage operation against the
car-wash boys was affecting the peace and order of the community and he was duty-bound to investigate
and try to maintain public order.31chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
After the petitioner introduced himself and inquired about the operation, the police officers immediately
showed their identifications and explained to him that they were conducting an anti-water pilferage
operation. However, instead of assisting the PNP-CIDG, he actually ordered several bystanders to defy
the PNP-CIDG's whole operation. The petitioner's act stirred further commotion that unfortunately led to
the escape of the apprehended car-wash boys.32 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The petitioner, as Barangay Chairman, is tasked to enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable
within the barangay, in the same manner that the police is bound to maintain peace and order within the
community. While the petitioner has general charge of the affairs in the barangay, the maintenance of
peace and order is largely a police matter, with police authority being predominant33 especially when the
police has began to act on an enforcement matter.34 The maintenance of peace and order in the
community is a general function undertaken by the punong barangay. It is a task expressly conferred to
the punong barangay under Section 389(b)(3) of RA 7160.35 On the other hand, the maintenance of
peace and order carries both general and specific functions on the part of the police. Section 24 of RA
6975 (otherwise known as "the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990"),36as
amended,37 enumerates the powers and functions of the police. In addition to the maintenance of peace
and order, the police has the authority to "investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal
offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution," and are charged with the
enforcement of "laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and properties."38 Examined side
by side, police authority is superior to the punong barangay's authority in a situation where the
maintenance of peace and order has metamorphosed into crime prevention and the arrest of criminal
offenders.
In this case, a criminal act was actually taking place and the situation was already beyond the general
maintenance of peace and order. The police was, at that point, under the obligation to prevent the
commission of a crime and to effect the arrest, as it actually did, of criminal offenders.
From another perspective, the peace and order function of the punong barangay must also be related to
his function of assisting local executive officials (i.e., the city mayor), under Section 389(b), Chapter III of
the Local Government Code.39 Local executive officials have the power to employ and deploy police for
the maintenance of peace and order, the prevention of crimes and the arrest of criminal
offenders.40Accordingly, in the maintenance of peace and order, the petitioner is bound, at the very least,
to respect the PNP-CIDG's authority even if he is not in the direct position to give aid. By interfering with a
legitimate police operation, he effectively interfered with this hierarchy of authority. Thus, we are left with
no other conclusion other than to rule that Alejandro is liable for misconduct in the performance of his
duties.

Misconduct is considered grave if accompanied by corruption, a clear intent to violate the law, or a
flagrant disregard of established rules, which must all be supported by substantial evidence.41 If the
misconduct does not involve any of the additional elements to qualify the misconduct as grave, the
person charged may only be held liable for simple misconduct. "Grave misconduct necessarily includes
the lesser offense of simple misconduct.''42 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Sufficient records exist to justify the imposition of a higher penalty against the petitioner. His open
interference in a legitimate police activity. and defiance of the police's authority only show his clear i1itent
to violate the law; in fact, he reneged on his first obligation as the grassroot official tasked at the first level
with the enforcement of the law. The photographs, taken together with the investigation report of the
Police Superintendent and the testimonies of the witnesses, even lead to conclusions beyond
interference and defiance; the petitioner himself could have been involved in corrupt activities, although
we cannot make this conclusive finding at this point.43 We make this observation though as his son owns
MICO whose car-wash boys were engaged in water pilferage. What we can conclusively confirm is that
the petitioner violated the law by directly interfering with a legitimate police activity where his own son
appeared to be involved. This act qualifies the misconduct as grave. Section 52(A)(3), Rule IV of the
Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that the penalty for grave
misconduct is dismissal from the service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88544.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
*Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate .Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, per Special Order
No. 1437 dated March 25. 2013. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
1 Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; rollo, pp. 9-25. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
2Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos. and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C.
Reyes, Jr. and Arturo G. Tayag; id. at 168-172. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
3 Id. at 189-190. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
4 Id. at 98-108. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
5 Id. at 98. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
7 Ibid.
?r?l??l?br?rÿ

9 Supra note 4. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
10 Id. at 106. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
11 Rollo, pp. 114-117. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
14 Dated October 15, 1991. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
15 Rollo, pp. 220-246. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
16An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and
for Other Purposes. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
17 Hon. Carale v. Hon. Abarintos, 336 Phil. 126, 135-136 (1997). ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
18 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 5. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
19Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
20 Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, G.R. NO. 172700, July 23, 2010, 625 SCRA 299. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
21 G.R. NO. 108072, December 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 242, 251. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
22 RA 8249, "An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
24 Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 154 (2001). ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
25 Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, G.R. NO. 179452, June 11, 2009, 589 SCRA 88. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
26 RA 6758, "Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
27Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases; cralawlibrary
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled

corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop,
prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties; cralawlibrary
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or
who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: provided, that the refusal by any officer without
just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty
required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer; cralawlibrary
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may provide
in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any
irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action; cralawlibrary
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents; cralawlibrary
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and
(4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: provided, that the Ombudsman under
its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public: provided, further, that any
publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true; cralawlibrary
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of
ethics and efficiency. [italics supplied
28Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-Region VII, G.R. Nos. 180236, 180341 and 180342, January 17, 2012,
633 SCRA 133. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
29 G.R. NO. 165132, March 7, 2012, 667 SCRA 583. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
30 Id. at 596. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
31 Rollo, p. 15. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
33 On the basis and predominance of the police's authority. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
34 RA 7160, Section 389(b)(1). ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
35(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal mayor
and the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and functions. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
36 Section 1. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
37 RA 8551 or the "Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998" and
Republic Act No. 9708 or "An Act Extending for Five (5) Years the Reglementary Period for Complying
with the Minimum Educational Qualification for Appointment to the Philippine National Police (PNP) and

Adjusting the Promotion System Thereof, Amending for the Purpose Pertinent Provisions of Republic Act
No. 6975 and Republic Act No. 8551 and for Other Purposes."
38 RA 6975, Section 24(a), (b) and (c), as amended. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
39(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the general welfare of
the barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the punong barangay shall: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(1) Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay; cralawlibrary
(2) Negotiate, enter into, and sign contracts for and in behalf of the barangay, upon authorization of the
sangguniang barangay; cralawlibrary
(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal mayor
and the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and functions.
40Section 62, Title VIII of RA 8551 (Participation of Local Government Executives in the Administration of
the PNP) provides: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It shall also include the power to direct the employment and deployment of units or elements of the PNP,
through the station commander, to ensure public safety and effective maintenance of peace and order
within the locality. For this purpose, the terms "employment" and "deployment" shall mean as
follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"Employment" refers to the utilization of units or elements of the PNP for purposes of protection of lives
and properties, enforcement of laws, maintenance of peace and order, prevention of crimes, arrest of
criminal offenders and bringing the offenders to justice, and ensuring public safety, particularly in the
suppression of disorders, riots, lawlessness, violence, rebellious and seditious conspiracy, insurgency,
subversion or other related activities.
41Imperial, Jr. v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. NO. 191224, October 4, 20 II, 658 SCRA
497, 506, citing Vertudes v. Buenaflor, G.R. NO. 153166, December 16. 2005.478 SCRA 210. 233. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
42 Santos v. Rasalan, CI.R. No. 15'i 7,19. February 8, 2007, 515 SCRA 97, 104. ?r?l??l?br?rÿ
43 Rollo, pp. 44-82.

SECOND DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 172700
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
- versus - ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
ROLSON RODRIGUEZ, Promulgated:
Respondent. July 23, 2010
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the 8 May 2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00528
setting aside for lack of jurisdiction the 21 September 2004 Decision[3] of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in
OMB-V-A-03-0511-H.

The Antecedent Facts
On 26 August 2003, the Ombudsman in Visayas received a complaint[4] for abuse of authority, dishonesty,
oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty against Rolson Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy.
Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. On 1 September 2003, the sangguniang bayan of
Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, through vice-mayor Jose G. Yulo, received a similar complaint[5] against
Rodriguez for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty.
In its 8 September 2003 notice,[6] the municipal vice-mayor required Rodriguez to submit his answer within
15 days from receipt of the notice. On 23 September 2003, Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss [7] the case
filed in the sangguniang bayan on the ground that the allegations in the complaint were without factual basis
and did not constitute any violation of law. In a compliance[8] dated 22 October 2003, Rodriguez alleged
complainants violated the rule against forum shopping.
Meanwhile, in its 10 September 2003 order,[9] the Ombudsman required Rodriguez to file his answer.
Rodriguez filed on 24 October 2003 a motion to dismiss [10] the case filed in the Ombudsman on the grounds
of litis pendentia and forum shopping. He alleged that the sangguniang bayan had already acquired
jurisdiction over his person as early as 8 September 2003.
The municipal vice-mayor set the case for hearing on 3 October 2003.[11] Since complainants had no
counsel, the hearing was reset to a later date. When the case was called again for hearing, complainants
counsel manifested that complainants would like to withdraw the administrative complaint filed in
the sangguniang bayan. On 29 October 2003, complainants filed a motion[12] to withdraw the complaint
lodged in the sangguniang bayan on the ground that they wanted to prioritize the complaint filed in the
Ombudsman. Rodriguez filed a comment[13] praying that the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum
shopping, not on the ground complainants stated. In their opposition, [14]complainants admitted they violated
the rule against forum shopping and claimed they filed the complaint in the sangguniang bayan without the

assistance of counsel. In his 4 November 2003 Resolution,[15] the municipal vice-mayor dismissed the case
filed in the sangguniang bayan.
In its 29 January 2004 order,[16] the Ombudsman directed both parties to file their respective verified position
papers. Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the order citing the pendency of his motion to dismiss. [17] In
its 11 March 2004 order,[18] the Ombudsman stated that a motion to dismiss was a prohibited pleading
under Section 5 (g) Rule III of Administrative Order No. 17. The Ombudsman reiterated its order for
Rodriguez to file his position paper.
In his position paper, Rodriguez insisted that the sangguniang bayan still continued to exercise jurisdiction
over the complaint filed against him. He claimed he had not received any resolution or decision dismissing
the complaint filed in the sangguniang bayan. In reply,[19] complainants maintained there was no more
complaint pending in the sangguniang bayan since the latter had granted their motion to withdraw the
complaint. In a rejoinder,[20] Rodriguez averred that the sangguniang bayan resolution dismissing the case
filed against him was not valid because only the vice-mayor signed it.
The Ruling of the Ombudsman
In its 21 September 2004 Decision,[21] the Ombudsman found Rodriguez guilty of dishonesty and
oppression. It imposed on Rodriguez the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits,
disqualification to hold public office, and forfeiture of civil service eligibilities. Rodriguez filed a motion for
reconsideration.[22] In its 12 January 2005 Order,[23] the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration.
In its 8 March 2005 Order,[24] the Ombudsman directed the mayor of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental to
implement the penalty of dismissal against Rodriguez.
Rodriguez filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its 8 May 2006 Decision,[25] the Court of Appeals set aside for lack of jurisdiction the Decision of the
Ombudsman and directed the sangguniang bayan to proceed with the hearing on the administrative case.
The appellate court reasoned that the sangguniang bayan had acquired primary jurisdiction over the person
of Rodriguez to the exclusion of the Ombudsman. The Court of Appeals relied on Section 4, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction over person of respondent, how acquired. The court shall acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the respondent by the service on him of its order or resolution indicating its initial action on the petition or by
his voluntary submission to such jurisdiction.
The appellate court noted that the sangguniang bayan served on Rodriguez a notice, requiring the latter to
file an answer, on 8 September 2003 while the Ombudsman did so two days later or on 10 September
2003.
Petitioner Ombudsman contends that upon the filing of a complaint before a body vested with jurisdiction,
that body has taken cognizance of the complaint. Petitioner cites Blacks Law Dictionary in defining what to
take cognizance means to wit, to acknowledge or exercise jurisdiction. Petitioner points out it had taken
cognizance of the complaint against Rodriguez before a similar complaint was filed in the sangguniang
bayan against the same respondent. Petitioner maintains summons or notices do not operate to vest in the
disciplining body jurisdiction over the person of the respondent in an administrative case. Petitioner
concludes that consistent with the rule on concurrent jurisdiction, the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction
should be to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan.
Private respondent Rolson Rodriguez counters that when a competent body has acquired jurisdiction over
a complaint and the person of the respondent, other bodies are excluded from exercising jurisdiction over
the same complaint. He cites Article 124 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
7160,[26] which provides that an elective official may be removed from office by order of the proper court or
the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. Private
respondent insists the sangguniang bayan first acquired jurisdiction over the complaint and his person. He
argues jurisdiction over the person of a respondent in an administrative complaint is acquired by the service
of summons or other compulsory processes. Private respondent stresses complainants violated the rule
against forum shopping when they filed identical complaints in two disciplining authorities exercising
concurrent jurisdiction.

The Issues
The issues submitted for resolution are (1) whether complainants violated the rule against forum shopping
when they filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayanidentical complaints against Rodriguez;
and (2) whether it was the sangguniang bayan or the Ombudsman that first acquired jurisdiction.
The Courts Ruling
The petition has merit.
Paragraph 1, Section 13 of Article XI of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 13. The Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office, or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, states:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions, and Duties. The Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigations of
such cases.
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee
applies only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular courts, the
Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of government. [27] Republic Act
No. 8249, otherwise known as An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, limits the
cases that are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying positions corresponding to
salary grade 27 and higher. The Sandiganbayanhas no jurisdiction over private respondent who,

as punong barangay, is occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14 under Republic Act No.
6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. [28]
Under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official, to wit:
SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any erring elective official
shall be prepared as follows:
xxxx
(c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory.
Clearly, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases
against elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary grade 27, such as private respondent
in this case.
The facts in the present case are analogous to those in Laxina, Sr. v. Ombudsman,[29] which likewise
involved identical administrative complaints filed in both the Ombudsman and the sangguniang
panlungsod against a punong barangay for grave misconduct. The Court held therein that the rule against
forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases.[30] Thus, even if
complainants filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against private
respondent, they did not violate the rule against forum shopping because their complaint was in the nature
of an administrative case.
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body
in which the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to
the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. [31] In this case, since the complaint was
filed first in the Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint, the

Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayanexercising concurrent
jurisdiction.
It is a hornbook rule that jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.[32] When herein complainants first filed the
complaint in the Ombudsman, jurisdiction was already vested on the latter. Jurisdiction could no longer be
transferred to the sangguniang bayan by virtue of a subsequent complaint filed by the same complainants.
As a final note, under Section 60 of the Local Government Code, the sangguniang bayan has no power to
remove an elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do so. [33] Unlike
the sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. The Ombudsman
is clothed with authority to directly remove[34] an erring public official other than members of Congress and
the Judiciary who may be removed only by impeachment.[35]
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 8 May 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 00528. We AFFIRM the 21 September 2004 Decision of the Ombudsman (Visayas) in
OMB-V-A-03-0511-H.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 33-43. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap, with Executive Justice Arsenio J. Magpale and Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas,
Jr., concurring.
[3]
Id. at 44-50.
[4]
Records, pp. 2-60.
[5]
CA rollo, p. 53.
[6]
Records, p. 69.
[7]
[8]
Id. at 74-75.
[9]
Records, p. 65.
[10]
Id. at 66-68.
[11]
Id. at 74.
[12]
[13]
Id. at 78-79.
[14]
Id. at 80-82.
[15]
Id. at 102-103.
[16]
Records, p. 81.
[17]
[18]
Id. at 88-89.
[19]
Id. at 99-101.
[20]
Id. at 106-107.
[21]
Id. at 26-33.
[22]
Id. at 34-48.
[23]
Id. at 122-124.
[24]
Id. at 144-145.
[25]
Rollo, pp. 33-43.
[26]
Otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
[27]
Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 154 (2001).
[28]
As implemented by the Department of Budget and Management. DBM Manual on Position Classification and Compensation Scheme in Local
Government Units.
[29]
G.R. No. 153155, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 542.
[30]
Id.

[31]
Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 179452, 11 June 2009, 589 SCRA 88; Enrique v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 79072, 10 January 1994,
229 SCRA 180.
[32]
Office of the Ombudsman v. Estandarte, G.R. No. 168670, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 155.
[33]
The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos v. Martinez, G.R. No. 170626, 3 March 2008, 547 SCRA 416.
[34]
Office of the Ombudsman v. Santiago, G.R. No. 161098, 13 September 2007, 533 SCRA 305.
[35]
Section 21, R.A. No. 6770.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 126576. March 5, 1997]
MAYOR RICARDO M. ANGOBUNG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSSION ON ELECTIONS EN

BANC, and ATTY. AURORA S. DE ALBAN, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Before us on certiorari is a petition seeking to annul and set aside Resolution No. 96-2951 dated [1]
October 15, 1996 issued by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which (1) approved
the Petition for Recall filed and signed by only one registered voter - herein private respondent Ma. Aurora
Siccuan de Alban, against petitioner - incumbent Mayor Ricardo Angobung; (2) set the further signing of
said petition by the rest of the registered voters of Tumauini, Isabela on November 9, 1996; and (3) in case
the said petition is signed by at least 25% of the total number of registered votes in Tumauni, Isabela,
scheduled the recall election on December 2, 1996.
On October 25, 1996, this court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining public respondent
[2]
COMELEC from implementing and enforcing Resolution No. 96-2951.

The facts of this case are not disputed.
Petitioner won as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local elections
of 1995. He garnered 55% of all the votes cast. Private respondent de Alban was also a candidate in said
elections.
Sometime in early September, 1996, private respondent filed with the Local Election Registrar in
Tumauni, Isabela, a Petition for Recall against petitioner. On September 12, 1996, petitioner received a
[3]
copy of this petition. Subsequently said petition was forwarded to the Regional Office in Tuguegarao,
Cagayan and then to the main office of COMELEC in Manila, for approval.
Acting on the petition, Deputy Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson submitted to the
COMELEC En Banc, a Memorandum dated October 8, 1996 recommending approval of the petition for
[4]
recall filed by private respondent and its signing by other qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of
the total number of registered voters as required by Section 69(d) of the Local Government code of 1991.
In turn acting on the abovementioned Memorandum of Deputy Executive Director Joson, the
COMELEC en banc issued the herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951.
Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional and therefore invalid,
on two main grounds: (1) that the resolution approved the Petition for Recall albeit same was signed by just
one person in violation of the statutory 25% minimum requirement as to the number of signatures supporting
and petition for recall; and (2) that the resolution scheduled the recall election within one (1) year from the
May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections.
In at least three (3) urgent motions, private respondent has sought the lifting of the Temporary
Retraining Order issued last October 25, 1996 on the twin grounds (1) that the issue of the one-year bar on
recall elections has been resolved in the case of Paras v. COMELEC promulgated on November 4, 1996;
[5]
and (2) that the procedure prescribed by Resolution No. 96-2951 involving petition signing upon initiation
of even just one person, is no different from that provided for in COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 which was
upheld as constitutional in the 1991 cases of Sanches, et al. v. COMELEC and Evardone v. COMELEC
[6] [7]

Private respondent is correct in saying that in the light of our pronouncement in Paras v. COMELEC , [8]
the recall election scheduled on December 2, 1996 in the instant case cannot be said to be barred by the
May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections. In construing the meaning of the term, regular local election in Section
74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which provides that no recall shall take place within one (1) year
x x x immediately preceding a regular local election, we ruled that for the time bar to apply, the approaching
regular local election must be one where the position of the official to be recalled, is to be actually contested
and filled by the electorate. Thus, in the instant case where the time bar is being invoked by petitioner
mayor in view of the approaching Barangay Elections in May 1997, there can be no application of the one
year bar, hence no invalidity may be ascribed to Resolution No. 96-2951 on this ground.
We, however, find petitioners second ground to be impressed with merit.
Before the enactment of the 1991 Local Government Code, the recall of public officials voted for in
popular elections, was governed by Sections 54 to 59 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 1983. Pursuant to Section 59 thereof, which states that the Commission on
Elections shall conduct and supervise the process of and election on recall x x x and, in pursuance thereof,
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2272 Sections
4 and 5 of which provide as follows:
Sec. 4. How instituted. - The recall of an elective provincial, city or municipal official shall be
commenced by the filing of a duly verified notice of recall containing the address and
precinct number of the voter filing the notice, and the name of the official sought to be
recalled, his position, and the ground(s) for the recall. Each notice shall refer to only one
official.
lex
The notice shall be filed in triplicate with the local Election Registrar if the recall
involves a city or municipal official, or with the Provincial Election Supervisor if it involves a
provincial official, one copy of which shall be posted upon receipt thereof on the bulletin
board in the city/municipal hall.
If the recall involves a provincial official, two additional copies of the notice shall also
be furnished by the voter filing the notice to the Election Registrar of each city and
municipality in the province, one copy of which shall be posted upon receipt thereof on the
bulletin board in the city/municipal hall.
In every case, the voter filing the notice of recall shall furnish a copy thereof to the
official sought to be recalled, the Commission on Elections in Manila and the Election
Records and Statistics Department of the Commission.
Section 5. Schedule and place of signing of the petition. - The Election Registrar shall submit to
the Commission on Elections, not later than ten days from filing of the notice of recall, the
schedule of the signing of the petition to recall for approval and funding x x x. [9]
In the case of Sanchez v. COMELEC , petitioners therein contended that the aforegoing Resolution
[10]
No. 2272 is unconstitutional there being no legislative enactment yet on [the] mechanism of recall as
mandated under Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution It is true, as private respondent asseverates, that we
[11]
upheld the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2272, but not because we found nothing constitutionally infirm
about the procedure of allowing the initiatory recall petition to be filed by only one person. The issue
in Sanchez was not this questioned procedure but the legal basis for the exercise by the COMELEC of its
rule-making power in the alleged absence of a grant of such power by an enabling statute on recall. Thus
we ruled:

While it is true that Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution mandates the Congress to enact a
lex
local government code providing among others for an effective mechanism of recall,
nothing in said provision could be inferred the repeal of BP 337, the local government code
existing prior to the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 3, Art. X of the Constitution
merely provides that the local government code to be enacted by Congress shall be more
responsive than the one existing at present. Until such time that a more responsive and
effective local government code is enacted, the present code shall remain in full force and
effect. Thus, under Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, (a)ll existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
Considering that the present local government code (BP 337) is still in effect,
respondent COMELECs promulgation of Resolution No. 2272 is therefore valid and
constitutional, the same having been issued pursuant to Sec. 59 of BP 337. It reads:
Sec. 59. Supervision by the Commission on Elections. - The

Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the process of and
election on recall x x x and, in pursuance thereof, promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations. [12]
We reiterated the foregoing ruling in the case of Evardone v. COMELEC in this wise:
[13]
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing
laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended,
repealed or revoked.Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of
1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as
provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government Code of 1991 will
take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg.
337) is still the law applicable to the present case.
xxx
Chapter (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of local
elective officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the respondent COMELEC to conduct
and supervise the process of and election on recall and in the exercise of such powers,
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations. x x x Thus, pursuant to the rule-making
power vested in respondent COMELEC, it promulgated Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May
1990.
We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC is valid
and constitutional. Consequently, the respondent COMELEC had the authority to approve
the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition. [14]
In Sanchez and Evardone, the COMELEC prescribed procedure of (1) allowing the recall petition to
be filed by at least one person or by less than 25% of the total number of registered voters and then (2)
inviting voters to sign said petition on a date set for that purpose, was never put to issue. As this is the crux
of the present constitutional challenge, the proper time has come for this court to issue a definitive ruling
on the matter.
Apropos for starters is the following chronicle of the evolution of the mechanism of recall as a mode of
removing a public officer by direction action of the people, essayed in the case of Garcia v. COMELEC: [15]

Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his
term of office. The peoples prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their
sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all
governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper
administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a
fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy.
Recall as a mode of removal of elective local officials made its maiden

appearance in section 2 of Article XI entitled Local Government, viz:
SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government
code which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all
its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local
government structure with an effective system of recall x x x
The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled, The Local Government Code of
1983 Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections of
local election officials, i.e., by petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of the total
number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned x x x.
Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as provided by BP
337 was exercised by our people.
In February , 1986, however, our people more than exercised their right of recall for
they resorted to revolution and they booted out of office the highest elective officials of the
land. The successful use of people power to remove public officials who have forfeited the
trust of the electorate led to its firm institutionalization of the 1987 Constitution. Its Articles
XIII expressly recognized the Role and Rights of Peoples Organizations x x x.
Section 3 of its Article X also reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum x x x. In response to this constitutional call,
Congress enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
which took effect on January 1, 1992. [16]
Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that recall of any elective x x
x municipal x x x official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five percent (25%) of
the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which
the local official sought to be recalled was elected. The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates
recall proceedings: only a petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters, may validly initiate
recall proceedings. We take careful note of the phrase, petition of at least twenty-five percent
(25%) and point out that the law does not state that the petition must be signed by at least 25% of the
registered voters; rather, the petition must be of or by, at least 25% of the registered voters, i.e., the petition
must be filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters.This is
understandable, since the signing of the petition is statutorily required to be undertaken before the election
registrar or his representative, and in the presence of a represetantive of the official sought to be recalled,
and in public place in the x x x municipality x x x. Hence, while the initiatory recall petition may not yet
[17]
contain the signatures of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters, the petition must contain the
names of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in whose behalf only one person may sign
the petition in the meantime.

We cannot sanction the procedure of the filing of the recall petition by a number of people less
than the foregoing 25% statutory requirement, much less, the filing thereof by just one person, as in the
instant case, since this is indubitably violative of clear and categorical provisions of subsisting law.
Our legislators did not peg the voter requirement at 25% out of caprice or in a vacuum. They knew that
this is the requirement under a majority of the constitution and recall statutes in various American states to
the same extent that they were aware of the rationale therefor. While recall was intended to be an effective
and speedy remedy to remove an official who is not giving satisfaction to the electorate regardless of
whether or not he is discharging his full duty to the best of his ability and as his conscience dictates, it is
[18]
a power granted to the people who, in concert, desire to change their leaders for reasons only they, as a
collective, can justify. In other words, recall must be pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser
in the elections or a small percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, its purposes as a direct remedy
of the people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to recall would
destabilize the community and seriously disrupt the running of government.
A scrutiny of the rationale underlying the time bar provisions and the percentage of minimum voter
requirement in American recall statutes, unmistakably reveals the vigilance of lawmakers against the abuse
of the power of recall. For instance, the Supreme Court of Illinois held in the case of In Re Bower that:
[19]
[t]the only logical reasons which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to
wait one year before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on
their parting voting to remove a newly elected official before having had sufficient time
to evaluate the soundness of his political policies and decisions. We view the
statutory provision requiring the number of petition signers to equal at least 45% of
the total votes case in the last general election for mayor as a further attempt to
insure that an official will not have to defend his policies against frivolous attacks
launched by a small percentage of disenchanted electors. [20]
Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of Colorado held in the case of Bernzen v. City of
Boulder that:
[21]
[t]he framers, by requiring that a recall petition contain the signatures of at least
25% of all votes cast in the last election for all candidates for the position which the person
sought to be recalled occupies, assured that a recall election will not be held in response
to the wishes of a small and unrepresentative minority. However, once at least 25% of the
electorate have expressed their dissatisfaction, the constitution reserves the recall power
to the will of the electorate. [22]
And in the case of Wallace v. Tripp , the Supreme Court of Michigan, echoed the foregoing posturings
[23]
in this wise:
Much of what has been said to justify a limit upon recall clearly not provided or contemplated by
the Constitution has revealed fears about an irresponsible electorate xxx. A much cited
Nebraska case pertaining to
a Nebraska recall statute provides some answers which are equally applicable to the Michigan
constitutional right of recall:
xxx Doubtless the provision requiring 30 per cent of the electors to sign the petition before the
council [is] compelled to act was designed to avoid such a contingency. The legislature
apparently assumed that nearly one-third of the electorate would not entail upon the taxpayers
the cost of an election unless the charges made approved themselves to their understanding
and they were seriously dissatisfied with the services of the incumbent of the office. [24]

In the instant case, this Court is confronted with a procedure that is unabashedly repugnant to the
applicable law and no less such to the spirit underlying that law. Private respondent who is a lawyer, knows
that Section 69(d) of the Local Government Code plainly provides that recall is validly initiated by a petition
of 25% of the total number of registered voters.Notwithstanding such awareness, private respondent
proceeded to file the petition for recall with only herself as the filer and initiator. She claims in her petition
that she has, together with many others in Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence in the leadership of petitioner.
But the petition does not bear the names of all these other citizens of Tumauini who have reportedly also
become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor. There is no doubt that private respondent is truly
earnest in her cause, and the very fact that she affixed her name in the petition shows that she claims
responsibility for the seeming affront to petitioners continuance in office. But the same cannot be said of all
the other people whom private respondent claims to have sentiments similar to hers. While the people are
vested with the power to recall their elected officials, the same power is accompanied by the concomitant
responsibility to see through all the consequences of the exercise of such power, including rising above
anonymity, confronting the official sought to be recalled, his family, his friends, and his supporters, and
seeing the recall election to its ultimate end. The procedure of allowing just one person to file the initiatory
recall petition and then setting a date for the signing of the petition, which amounts to inviting and courting
the public which may have not, in the first place, even entertained any displeasure in the performance of
the official sought to be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law but also tainted with an attempt to go
around the law. We can not and must not, under any and all circumstances, countenance a circumvention
of the explicit 25% minimum voter requirement in the initiation of the recall process.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is hereby
GRANTED. COMELEC Resolution No. 96-2951 is hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID and accordingly
SET ASIDE.
The RESTRAINING ORDER heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
lex
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]
Certified True Copy of Excerpt from the Minutes of the Rgular En Banc Meeting on the Commission on Elections held on October
15, 1996, Rollo, p. 34.
[2]
Rollo, p. 44.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 26-32.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 39-42.
[5]
G.R. No. 123169.
[6]
193 SCRA 317.
[7]
204 SCRA 464.
[8]
G.R No. 123169, promulgated on November 4, 1996.
[9]
Comment of the Solicitor General dated November 15, 1996, pp. 6-7, Rollo, pp. 105-106.
[10]
193 SCRA 317.
[11]
Id., p. 320.
[12]
Ibid.
[13]
204 SCRA 464.
[14]
Id., p. 470.

[15]
227 SCRA 100 [1993].
[16]
Id., pp. 108-110.
[17]
Sec. 69 (d) (I), Local Government Code of 1991.
[18]
Dunham v. Ardery, 43 Okl. 619, 143 P. 331.
[19]
41 III, 777, 242 Ne 2D, 252.
[20]
Id., p. 255.
[21]
186 Colo, 81, 525 P. 2d 416.
[22]
Id., p. 419.
[23]
358 Mich. 668, 101 N.W. 2d 312.
[24]
Id., pp. 314-315.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 140560. May 4, 2000]
JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF

BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and RICHARD
ADVINCULA, respondents.
[G.R. No. 140714. May 4, 2000]
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY OF PASAY CITY, herein represented by its

Chairman, RICHARD ADVINCULA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and HON.
JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.: Calrky
These are petitions arising from the proceedings initiated by the Preparatory Recall Assembly of Pasay
City (PRA) in the Commission on Elections in E.M. No. 99-005 entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION NO. 01, S-1999 ADOPTED ON 29 MAY 1999
FOR THE RECALL OF MAYOR JOVITO CLAUDIO OF PASAY CITY. G.R. No. 140560 is a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the nullification of the resolution, dated October 18, 1999, of the
[1]
COMELEC giving due course to the petition for the recall of petitioner Jovito O. Claudio as mayor of
Pasay City. On the other hand, G.R. No. 140714 is a petition for mandamus filed by the PRA,
represented by its Chair, Richard Advincula, to compel the COMELEC to set the date for the holding of
recall elections in Pasay City pursuant to the aforecited resolution of the COMELEC.
Jovito O. Claudio, petitioner in G.R. No. 140560, was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11,
1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998.
Sometime during the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered
to discuss the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. On May
19, 1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr. in Barangay 11, Zone 4, Pasay City,
several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening the PRA. Richard
Advincula, private respondent in G.R. No. 140560 and petitioner in G.R. No. 140714, was designated
chair.
On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and
sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999, entitled RESOLUTION
TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF
CONFIDENCE. In a letter dated June 29, 1999, Advincula, as chair of the PRA, invited the Mayor, Vice-
Mayor, Station Commander, and thirteen (13) Councilors of Pasay City to witness the formal submission
to the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the petition for recall. Mesm
As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by an affidavit of service of
the petition on the Office of the City Mayor. Pursuant to the rules of the COMELEC, copies of the petition
were posted on the bulletin boards of the local COMELEC office, the City Hall, the Police Department, the
public market at Libertad St. and Taft Avenue, and at the entrance of the Sta. Clara Church on P. Burgos

St., all in Pasay City. Subsequently, a verification of the authenticity of the signatures on the resolution
was conducted by Ligaya Salayon, the election officer for Pasay City designated by the COMELEC.
Oppositions to the petition were filed by petitioner Jovito O. Claudio, Rev. Ronald Langub, and Roberto L.
Angeles, alleging procedural and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the signatures affixed to
the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the signatories
were only representatives of the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the
proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the
election case, filed by Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of
[2]
petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recall proceedings against
petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall resolution failed to obtain the majority of all the members of the
PRA, considering that 10 were actually double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of the
barangays, 40 sangguniang kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs
executed affidavits of retraction. Slx
In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the
oppositions against it. On the issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its members, the
COMELEC held that the 1,073 members who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than
necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the total membership of the PRA
was 1,790, while the statistics of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) showed that
the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. In either case, since only a majority is required to constitute
the PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of the recall resolution. Based on the
verification made by election officer Ligaya Salayon, the COMELEC found the signatures of 958 members
of the PRA sufficient. On whether the pendency of the case questioning the proclamation of petitioner
was a prejudicial question which must first be decided before any recall election could be held, the
COMELEC ruled that it was not and that petitioner was merely using the pendency of the case to delay
the recall proceedings. Finally, on whether the petition for recall violated the bar on recall within one year
from the elective official's assumption of office, the COMELEC ruled in the negative, holding that recall is
a process which starts with the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999,
exactly one year and a day after petitioner Claudio's assumption of office, it was held that the petition was
filed on time.
Hence, these petitions. Oral arguments were held in these cases in Baguio City on April 4, 2000, after
which the Court, by the vote of 8 to 6 of its members, resolved to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 140560
[3]
for lack of showing that the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the
Court unanimously dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 140714 on the ground that the issue raised therein
had become moot and academic.
We now proceed to explain the grounds for our resolution.
In its Resolution No. 3121, dated March 9, 2000, the COMELEC set the date of the recall elections in
Pasay City on April 15, 2000. Consequently, the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 140714 to compel the
COMELEC to fix a date for the recall elections in Pasay City is no longer tenable. We are thus left with
only petitioner Claudio's action for certiorari and prohibition.
The bone of contention in this case is 74 of the Local Government Code (LCG) which provides: Scslx
[4]
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
As defined at the hearing of these cases on April 4, 2000, the issues are:

WHETHER, under Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) ...
A. The word "recall" in paragraph (b) covers a process which includes the convening of
the Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution.
B. The term "regular local election" in the last clause of paragraph (b) includes the
election period for that regular election or simply the date of such election.
(1)
On Whether the Word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local

Government Code Includes the Convening of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution
Petitioner contends that the term "recall" in 74(b) refers to a process, in contrast to the term "recall
election" found in 74(a), which obviously refers to an election. He claims that "when several barangay
chairmen met and convened on May 19, 1999 and unanimously resolved to initiate the recall, followed by
the taking of votes by the PRA on May 29, 1999 for the purpose of adopting a resolution to initiate the
recall of Jovito Claudio as Mayor of Pasay City for loss of confidence, the process of recall began" and,
since May 29, 1999 was less than a year after he had assumed office, the PRA was illegally convened
and all proceedings held thereafter, including the filing of the recall petition on July 2, 1999, were null and
void. Slxsc
The COMELEC, on the other hand, maintains that the process of recall starts with the filing of the petition
for recall and ends with the conduct of the recall election, and that, since the petition for recall in this case
was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner's assumption of office, the recall was
validly initiated outside the one-year prohibited period.
Both petitioner Claudio and the COMELEC thus agree that the term "recall" as used in 74 refers to a
process. They disagree only as to when the process starts for purposes of the one-year limitation in
paragraph (b) of 74.
We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly
or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and
then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such
resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the
scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of
[5]
which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement. Several
reasons can be cited in support of this conclusion.
First, 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the
other hand, 69 provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the electorate is
not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in
[6]
74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in
paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a
petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a
petition for recall.
Thus, there may be several PRAs held (as in the case of Bataan Province in 1993) or petitions for recall
filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal limit on the number of times such processes may be resorted
to. These are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in 74 apply
only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and not
merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to

limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of an
elective local official.
Indeed, this is the thrust of the ruling in Garcia v. COMELEC where two objections were raised against
[7]
the legality of PRAs: (1) that even the power to initiate recall proceedings is the sole prerogative of the
electorate which cannot be delegated to PRAs, and (2) that by vesting this power in a PRA, the law in
effect unconstitutionally authorizes it to shorten the term of office of incumbent elective local officials. Both
objections were dismissed on the ground that the holding of a PRA is not the recall itself. With respect to
the first objection, it was held that it is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the
Constitution gave to the people. With respect to the second objection, it was held that a recall resolution
"merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he
should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign judgment, the official
concerned remains in office . . . ." Sdaadsc
If these preliminary proceedings do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether the local official
concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in paragraph (b) against
the holding of a recall, except one year after the official's assumption of office, cannot apply to such
proceedings.
The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall election is to be found in the
purpose of the limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that
no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official concerned,
and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election.
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an
elective local official. In the Bower case cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC, it was held that
[8] [9]
"The only logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one year
before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action on their part in voting to remove a
newly elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and
decisions." The one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall because the
Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that "no removal petition shall be filed against
any officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve months." But however the period of
prohibition is determined, the principle announced is that the purpose of the limitation is to provide a
reasonable basis for evaluating the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long
as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be
held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official.
It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated before the official concerned has been
in office for one-year would be to allow him to be judged without sufficient basis. As already stated, it is
not the holding of PRA nor the adoption of recall resolutions that produces a judgment on the
performance of the official concerned; it is the vote of the electorate in the Election that does. Therefore,
as long as the recall election is not held before the official concerned has completed one year in office, he
will not be judged on his performance prematurely. Rtcspped
Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose
of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the
constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the
day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an
informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the
holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of
the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always
eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the
incumbent.

Our esteemed colleague Justice Puno says in his dissent that the purpose of the one-year period in
paragraph (b) is to provide the local official concerned a "period of repose" during which "[his] attention
should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by disturbance due to political partisanship."
Unfortunately, the law cannot really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in politics. From the
day an elective official assumes office, his acts become subject to scrutiny and criticism, and it is not
always easy to determine when criticism of his performance is politically motivated and when it is not. The
only safeguard against the baneful and enervating effects of partisan politics is the good sense and self
restraint of the people and its leaders against such shortcomings of our political system. A respite from
partisan politics may, have the incidental effect of providing respite from partisanship, but that is not really
the purpose of the limitation on recall under the law. The limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient
basis for evaluating and judging the performance of an elected local official.
In any event, it is argued that the judgments of PRAs are not "as politically unassailable as recalls
initiated directly by the people." Justice Puno cites the "embarrassing repudiation by the people of
[Kaloocan City's] Preparatory Recall Assembly" when, instead of ousting Mayor Rey Malonzo, they
reelected him.
Two points may be made against this argument.
One is that it is no disparagement of the PRA that in the ensuing election the local official whose recall is
sought is actually reelected. Laws converting municipalities into cities and providing for the holding of
plebiscites during which the question of cityhood is submitted to the people for their approval are not
always approved by the people. Yet, no one can say that Congress is not a good judge of the will of the
voters in the locality. In the case of recall elections in Kaloocan City, had it been shown that the PRA was
resorted to only because those behind the move to oust the incumbent mayor failed to obtain the
signatures of 25% of the voters of that city to a petition for his recall, there may be some plausibility for
the claim that PRAs are not as good a gauge of the people's will as are the 25 % of the voters.
Indeed, recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit cannot be more
representative of the sentiments of the people than those initiated by PRAs whose members represent
the entire electorate in the local government unit. Voters who directly initiate recalls are just as vulnerable
to political maneuverings or manipulations as are those composing PRAs. Korte
The other point regarding Justice Punos claim is that the question here is not whether recalls initiated by
25% of the voters are better. The issue is whether the one-year period of limitation in paragraph (b)
includes the convening of the PRA. Given that question, will convening the PRA outside this period make
it any more representative of the people, as the petition filed by 25 % of the registered voters is claimed to
be?
To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary
proceedings to initiate recall -
1. Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to 69, is a power which shall be
exercised by the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right
except in an election, it is clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year
period provided in paragraph (b);
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for
judging an elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election; and
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings
would unduly curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution.

As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed
office as mayor of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.
(2)
On Whether the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same

Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local Government Code includes the
Election Period for that Regular Election or Simply the Date of Such
Election
Petitioner contends, however, that the date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is within the
second period of prohibition in paragraph (b). He argues that the phrase "regular local elections" in
paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May
14, but the election period as well, which is normally at least forty five (45) days immediately before the
day of the election. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be
held. Sclaw
This contention is untenable.
The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period,
which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said so.
[10]
Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be
held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an
elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from
July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only
nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including
the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected,
because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government units" more
responsive and accountable." Sclex
Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election
Code, unless otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days before
[11]
the day of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that
the second limitation in paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital
right of the people.
To recapitulate the discussion in parts 1 and 2, 74 imposes limitations on the holding of recall elections.
First, paragraph (a) prohibits the holding of such election more than once during the term of office of an
elective local official. Second, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of such election within one year from
the date the official assumed office. And third, paragraph (b) prohibits the holding of a recall election
within one year immediately preceding a regular local election. As succinctly stated in Paras v.
COMELEC, "[p]aragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when
[12]
such elective local official may be subject to recall election, that is, during the second year of office."
(3)
On Whether the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of

the PRA and Duly Verified
Petitioner alleges other grounds for seeking the annulment of the resolution of the COMELEC ordering
the holding of a recall election. He contends that a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA

was not obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution. According to petitioner,
the 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104 of the resolution to signify their attendance and not
their concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is shown by the word "Attendance" written by hand at the top
of the page on which the signatures of the 74 begin.
This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the first time in this case. It was not
raised before the COMELEC, in which the claim made by petitioner was that some of the names in the
petition were double entries, that some members had withdrawn their support for the petition, and that
Wenceslao Trinidad's pending election protest was a prejudicial question which must first be resolved
before the petition for recall could be given due course. The order of the COMELEC embodying the
stipulations of the parties and defining the issues to be resolved does not include the issue now being
raised by petitioner. Xlaw
Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written by
mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines drawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for
the attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to believe that the 74 members of the
PRA who signed the recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting twice. It is more probable
to believe that they signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution of which the
pages in question are part.
The other point raised by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC was not duly verified,
because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized it, is not commissioned as notary public for Pasay City but for
Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not raised before the COMELEC itself. It
cannot, therefore, be raised now.
WHEREFORE, G.R. No. 140560 is DISMISSED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No. 140714 is
DISMISSED for having been rendered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED. MENDOZA, J
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Melo, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.
Puno, J., see dissenting opinion.
Vitug, J., reiterate his separate opinion in the resolution of 5 Apr. 2000.
Kapunan, J., see attached separate and dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, J., joined the dissents of JJ. Puno and Kapunan. Xsc
Pardo, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., join the dissent of J. Puno.
[1]
Per Commissioner Manolo B. Gorospe, and concurred in by Commissioner Harriet O. Demetriou. Commissioner Julio F. Desamito was on
leave.
[2]
The case has since been decided by being dismissed. See Trinidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134657, Dec. 15, 1999.

[3]
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ. Voted to dismiss the petition. Puno,
Kapunan, Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., dissented and voted to grant the petitions. Melo, J., who was in Manila for the
funeral of his brother, took no part.
[4]
R.A. No. 7160.
[5]
Thus, the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters of the local
government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.
(b) There shall be a preparatory recall assembly in every province, city, district, and municipality which shall be composed of the
following: Slxmis
(1)......provincial level. All mayors, vice mayors, and sangguniang members of the municipalities and component cities;
(2)......City level. All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the city;
(3)......Legislative District level. In cases where the sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all elective municipal officials in
the district; and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod members are elected by district, all elective barangay officials in the district; and
(4)......Municipal level. All punong barangay and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality.
(c) A majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members may convene in session in a public place and initiate a recall proceeding against
any elective official in the local government unit concerned. Recall of provincial, city, or municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a
resolution adopted by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned during its session called for the purpose.
(d) Recall of any elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five
percent (25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official
sought to be recalled was elected.
(1)......A written petition for recall duly signed before the election register or his representative and in the presence of a representative, of the
petitioner and a representative of the official sought to be recalled, and in a public place in the province, city, municipality, or barangay, as the
case may be, shall be filed with the Comelec through its office in the local government unit concerned. The Comelec or its duly authorized
representative shall cause the publication of the petition in a public and conspicuous place for a period of not less than ten (10) days nor more
than twenty (20) days, for the purpose of verifying the authenticity and genuineness of the petition and the required percentage of voters.
(2)......Upon the lapse of the aforesaid period, the Comelec or its duly authorized representative shall announce the acceptance of candidates to the
position and thereafter prepare the list of candidates which shall include the name of the official sought to be recalled. Missdaa
SEC. 71. Election on Recall. Upon the filing of a valid resolution or petition for recall with the appropriate local office of the Comelec, the
Commission or its duly authorized representative shall set the date of the election on recall, which shall not be later than thirty (30) days after the
filing of the resolution or petition for recall in the case of the barangay, city, or municipal officials, and forty-five (45) days in the case of
provincial officials. The official or officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to
the pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.
[6]
Such power is vested in the PRA or in at least 25% of the registered voters. 70(c)(d)
[7]
227 SCRA 100 (1993)
[8]
In re Bower 41 Ill. 777, 242 N.E. 2d 252 (1968)
[9]
269 SCRA 245, 256 (1997)
[10]
The Omnibus Election Code, 3, provides:
The campaign periods are hereby fixed as follows:
(a)......For President, Vice President and Senators, ninety (90) days before the day of the election; and
(b)......For Members of the House of Representatives and elective provincial, city and municipal officials, forty-five (45) days before the day of
the election.
[11]
Id.
[12]
264 SCRA 48, 54 (1996)

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CASE TITLE PAGE

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G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968

THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiff-appellee,

Fortugaleza, Lood, Sarmiento, M. T. Yap & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

No. of Lots Use

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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Republic Act No. 3039

The defendants then brought the case before Us on appeal.

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Public Corporation Cases Compilation_6

Public Corporation Cases Compilation_7

TCT Number Lot Number Use

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1 See Record on Appeal, pp. 4-6.

3 The Committee report itself was not submitted as evidence

5 Rule 64, Sec. 6, Rules of Court.

7 Cebu City v. NWSA, L-12892, Apr. 30, 1962.

10 Martin, op. cit., supra.; Gonzales, op cit., supra.; 62 C.J. 8. 437-439.

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17 Record on Appeal, pp. 8-9, 13.

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G.R. No. 71159 November 15, 1989

CITY OF MANILA, and EVANGELINE SUVA, petitioners,

The City Legal Officer for petitioners.

Jose M. Castillo for respondents.

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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendants to give

For want of merit, defendant's counterclaim is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 31)

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2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally P10,000.00

3. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P20,000.00

4. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants jointly and severally, P20,000.00

5. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, P10,000.00

6. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, on the

7. Ordering defendants, to pay plaintiffs-appellants, jointly and severally, the cost of

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 40)

The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

The grounds relied upon for this petition are as follows:

THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING

THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING

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Private respondents' contention is well-taken.

The Court further stressed:

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xxx xxx xxx

The Court added:

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All things considered, even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs

Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), J., is on leave.

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2 Presided by Judge Fidel P. Purisima.

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[G.R. No. 135962. March 27, 2000]

METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE

"SUBJECT: NOTICE of the Opening of Neptune Street to Traffic

"Dear President Lindo,