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JAS0010.1177/0021909618777269Journal of Asian and African StudiesKim

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Journal of Asian and African Studies
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East Asia International Relations © The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0021909618777269
https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909618777269
Where Does a Poor Fit Exist, and journals.sagepub.com/home/jas

What to Do about It

Min-hyung Kim
Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, Korea

Abstract
This article seeks to critically assess the relevance of International Relations Theory (IRT) for East Asia
International Relations (IR). After identifying the shortcomings of IRT in explaining East Asia IR, the article
provides several ways to modify it with a goal to make it more suitable for East Asia IR. Its central claim is
that the IRT’s bias toward European experiences and great power politics generates unsatisfactory accounts
for and inaccurate predictions about East Asia IR. This does not mean, however, that we should treat IRT
as completely irrelevant and develop an indigenous theory of East Asia IR. Given that no single theory is
complete and perfectly relevant across time and space and that many core concepts and key variables of IRT
are also pertinent for East Asia IR, our efforts should instead be made to refine the existing IRT and make
it more suitable for East Asia IR by problematising its major assumptions and central claims on the basis of
East Asian experiences. This will save IRT from being a region-specific and a country-specific theory of IR.

Keywords
East Asian state behavior, East Asian experiences, East Asian institutions, East Asian IR, international
relations theory

Introduction
As of now, there seems to be the consensus among East Asian specialists (e.g. Acharya, 2007;
Acharya and Buzan, 2007, 2010; Alagappa, 2011; Johnston, 2012; Kang, 2003, 2013) that the
prominent International Relations Theory (IRT) – by the prominent IRT, I chiefly mean realism and
liberalism in general and neorealism and neoliberalism in particular – does not adequately capture
the full range of international relations (IR) in East Asia. For instance, David Kang (2003: 57)
asserts that ‘Most international relations theory is inductively derived from the European experi-
ence of the past four centuries, during which Europe was the locus and generator of war, innova-
tion, and wealth.’ Muthiah Alagappa (2011: 194) also writes that ‘The study of International

Corresponding author:
Min-hyung Kim, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, 26 Kyungheedae-ro
Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul, 02447, Republic of Korea.
Email: min-hyung@khu.ac.kr
2 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

Relations (IR), including theorising international interaction, has been essentially a Western enter-
prise grounded almost exclusively in the histories, experiences, and intellectual traditions of the
United States and Europe.’ Similarly, Alastair Iain Johnston (2012: 54) notes that ‘much of the
published IR research in the United States (and Europe) appears to systematically exclude or
downplay East Asian cases.’
What these scholars unanimously point out is that East Asian states’ behavioral patterns defy the
accounts and expectations of prominent IRT. Given the criticisms of IRT in the literature of East
Asia IR, the goal of this article is two-fold. First, it critically assesses the relevance of IRT for East
Asia IR and tries to identify where a poor fit exists; second, it seeks to explore ways to make IRT
a more compelling explanatory framework for East Asia IR.
I make the following claims in the article. Many East Asian states’ experiences, behaviors, and
preferences illustrate that direct applications of IRT’s several key assumptions to East Asia IR are
problematic. The main reason is that, being insensitive to East Asia’s unique history as well as its
social and cultural practices, the IRT’s bias toward European experiences and great power politics
generates unsatisfactory accounts for and inaccurate predictions about East Asia IR. This does not
mean, however, that we should treat IRT as completely irrelevant and develop an indigenous the-
ory of East Asia IR. Given that no single theory is complete and perfectly relevant across time and
space and that many core concepts and key variables of IRT are also pertinent for East Asia IR, our
efforts should instead be made to refine the existing IRT and make it more suitable for East Asia IR
by problematising its major assumptions and central claims on the basis of East Asian experiences.
This will save IRT from being a region-specific and a country-specific theory of IR.
The organisation of the article is as follows. The first section assesses the explanatory power of
major IR theories for East Asia IR. The second section discusses the perils of nascent attempts by
some East Asian specialists to develop an indigenous East Asian theory of IR. The third section
offers several suggestions for ways to modify IRT to make it more relevant for East Asia IR. The
concluding section addresses the implications of ‘bringing East Asia in’ for IRT’s explanatory
power and its further development.

IRT and East Asia IR

As mentioned above, IRT has largely been developed based on the experiences, histories, and intel-
lectual traditions of the Western world (Alagappa, 2011: 194). Given its ‘eurocentric’ bias, it is not
surprising that when applied to IR in other regions of the world, it has the limited explanatory
power, despite its claim of universality. Although there are many areas where IRT is a poor fit for
East Asia IR, the salient examples of East Asia IR that defy straight applications of the IRT logic
involve the following propositions: the assumption of an anarchical international system; the bal-
ancing behavior of states for survival; institutionalisation/legalisation for international coopera-
tion; and leadership in international institutions; the role of historical memories.

International system vs. East Asian regional system

Anarchy is one of the most important assumptions for realism and liberalism. ‘Anarchy’ refers to
the absence of the overarching government that can enforce rules and regulate conflicts between
states in the international system. This sets international politics apart from domestic politics where
governments have supreme authority within their territory. Given the threat of anarchy, states in the
international system are concerned about their survival, and thus self-help, as opposed to other-
help, becomes the principle of the behavior of all states as they do not trust one another (Waltz,
1979). The so-called ‘security dilemma’ – i.e. the tendency of states to view defensive arming of
Kim 3

their enemies as threatening, and so arm themselves in response and everyone’s security declines,
as this leads to an arms race between them – is also a consequence of the anarchical international
system (Jervis, 1978).
The assumption of anarchy has been contested for the East Asian regional system. For instance,
Kang (2013) points out that unlike the European ‘Westphalian’ system that highlights a formal
equality between states and balance-of-power politics, East Asian history shows that the East Asian
regional system has had a number of different systems (e.g. hierarchy, multipolarity, unipolarity),
in which East Asian states often viewed unequal power relationships among them as being legiti-
mate, because they valued their relative status or social standing as being equal to their military
might. Stressing this ideational (as opposed to material) factor of power (e.g. hierarchy is rela-
tional), Kang contends that ‘in East Asia observed regularities often appear much more to conform
to the nature of hierarchy than to the distribution of capabilities’ (Kang, 2013: 200). Similarly,
through the comparative study of international systems, Ringmar (2012) asserts that contrary to the
anarchical Westphalian system, the Sino-centric system was hierarchical whereas the Tokugawa
system was mixed – i.e. anarchical in political terms but strongly hierarchical in social terms. Like
Kang, he emphasizes the relationship between constituent units and argues that because both the
Sino-centric system and the Tokugawa system were relational, instead of atomistic, ‘sovereignty
could be shared and functionally divided without logical contradictions’ (Ringmar, 2012: 20).
After all, East Asian experiences illustrate that ‘anarchy’ as a core assumption of IRT has lim-
ited value in explaining East Asia IR. Contrary to the expectations of major IRT, East Asian states
do not always behave on the principle of self-help. Hence, it seems fair to say that anarchy may be
the perpetual feature of the global system, but it often does not adequately describe the East Asian
regional system.

East Asian state behavior

Realism (neorealism, in particular) assumes that states always balance against each others’ power
(Waltz, 1979) or against a potential threat1 (Walt, 1987). Given states’ ‘ultimate goal of survival’2
in the international system, the balance of power (either internally through states’ own military
build-up or externally through forming alliances) forms almost automatically (Waltz, 1979). For
many realists, the balance of power is indeed a universal empirical law in the international system
(Nexon, 2009; Schweller, 2006). And given anarchy and states’ survival concern, balancing is a
more common state behavior than bandwagoning (Walt, 1987). In addition, unsure of their allies’
honoring their commitment, states (great powers, in particular) rarely balance externally because
they only trust internal balancing (Parent and Rosato, 2015). This balancing behavior of states3
becomes a major source of interstate conflict when the existing hegemonic state’s power is chal-
lenged by a newly rising contender and the gap between the two powers becomes narrow (Organski
and Kugler, 1980).
With that being said, East Asian states’ behaviors often do not conform to the range of these
predictions. A telling example is the behaviors of China’s neighboring states. The two cases in
point here are the responses of South Korea, and the Member States of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), to China’s rise.
First, in the case of South Korea, it is worth remembering that China was South Korea’s former
military adversary that fought for North Korea during the Korean War. China is still a main ally and
key patron of North Korea, South Korea’s major security threat. Despite China’s rapid ascendance,
however, South Korea has not really pursued a hard balancing strategy against China (Kang, 2009;
Kim, 2016a). Rather, Seoul has actively engaged China and sought to deepen its economic and
political ties with Beijing since the diplomatic normalisation of the two countries in 1992. How are
4 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

we to explain Seoul’s puzzling behavior like this? China clearly has offensive capabilities and
geographic proximity to South Korea to be the latter’s great security threat. Do South Koreans not
really fear China’s growing power, as some scholars claim? (e.g. Kang, 2009). Although debatable,
recent poll results show that South Koreans do fear China’s growing power (Chung, 2012; Moon
and Li, 2010). In addition, China has continuously provided economic aid and political support to
North Korea, despite Pyongyang’s series of provocations (e.g. a torpedo attack on the South Korean
Navy Corvette Cheonan in March 2010, which took the lives of 46 sailors on board; the shelling
of Yeonpyeong Island in the Yellow Sea in November 2010, which killed two South Korean
Marines and two civilians; and persistent long-range missile4 and nuclear5 tests against the strong
warnings of international society). Why has South Korea not engaged in internal or hard-balancing
against China’s growing power, then? The absence of South Korea’s internal or hard-balancing
behavior against China’s rise is puzzling, if one seeks an explanation from the lens of prevailing
IRT.
Second, ASEAN states’ response to China’s rise is also illustrative. Instead of internal or hard
balancing, small states in Southeast Asia have sought various strategies such as engagement,
accommodating, hedging, and insurance. In other words, without strengthening their own military
power or forming exclusive alliance with external powers, these weaker states engaged China
politically as well as economically and tied down China in institutions while buying insurance
through maintaining a forward US military presence in the region (Johnston, 2012: 60). Hence,
Goh (2007/08: 116) asserts that ‘there is little evidence of direct internal or external balancing
against China by states such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, which have the most acute
historical, territorial, and political dispute with it.’
In sum, the behaviors of East Asian states in response to China’s rise highlight the problem of
directly applying several major IRT assumptions to the case of East Asia IR. Above all, IRT’s great
power bias6 appears to be ill-equipped to explain the strategic behavior of small and middle powers
in East Asia.

East Asian institutions and leadership

According to neoliberal institutionalism, international institutions are created to facilitate coopera-
tion among states with common interests (Keohane, 1984). By reducing the uncertainty that is
prevalent in world politics and limiting asymmetries in information, international institutions pro-
mote interstate cooperation. For international institutions to be effective, however, states should
accept the constraints of institutional rules, because international institutions can reduce uncer-
tainty only ‘insofar as governments commit themselves to known rules and procedures and main-
tain these commitments even under pressure to renege’ (Keohane, 1984: 257). As such, the pursuit
of flexibility through ‘keeping one’s options open’ is viewed as self-defeating in international
cooperation (Keohane, 1984: 17). This is well-illustrated by Moravcsik’s (1998) liberal intergov-
ernmentalism, a major theory of European integration. He argues that sovereign governments in an
anarchical international system choose to ‘pool or delegate’7 decision-making power to interna-
tional institutions to bolster the credibility of international commitment: ‘Governments are likely
to accept pooling or delegation as a means to assure that other governments will accept agreed
legislation and enforcement, to signal their own credibility, or to lock in future decisions against
domestic opposition’ (Moravcsik, 1998: 73). Simply put, a high level of institutionalisation is what
the mainstream IRT is recommending for an effective international cooperation.
As Keohane (1984: 6) and Moravcsik (1998: 5) admit, however, both neoliberal institutionalism
and liberal intergovernmentalism were developed based on relations among the advanced market
economies (in particular, European democracies) where the shared interests of similarly functioning
Kim 5

economies are manifold. When applied to East Asia in which there is a huge variation in states’
economic and political systems, therefore, they display numerous shortcomings. For example,
unlike transatlantic (e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Organization) or European (e.g. the European Union)
institutions, most East Asian institutions – whether they are security or economic institutions – are
highly under-institutionalised and under-legalised. Take ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), for exam-
ple. ARF was formed in 1993 as a principal forum for security dialogue in East Asia. Composed of
27 members8 in the Asia-Pacific region, it functions as an institutional mechanism where its partici-
pants discuss current regional security issues and develop cooperative measures to enhance peace
and stability. Led by ASEAN, however, ARF displays an extremely low level of institutionalisation.
It has neither a secretariat nor headquarters. With no functional base of binding commitments and
enforcement mechanisms, decisions in ARF are made not by voting but by consensus. Even agreed-
upon decisions are subject to being implemented on a non-binding and voluntary basis. Indeed, ARF
deliberately sought to avoid the creation of well-defined legalistic institutional structures by embrac-
ing ASEAN leadership and the ‘ASEAN Way’ (which emphasizes non-interference in the domestic
affairs of other states, respect for sovereignty and equality, and consensus- and consultation-based
decision-making rather than majority rules) as a code of conduct (Johnston, 1999).
The ASEAN plus Three (APT) is another example of East Asian institutions. It was created in
1997 by ASEAN-10 plus the three Northeast Asian states (i.e. China, Japan, and South Korea) as a
currency swap system to increase members’ hard currency reserve. Its main goal is to defend mem-
ber states from speculative attacks and avoid potential liquidity crises stemming from unexpected
capital outflows. What is worth nothing here is that like ARF, APT is also highly under-institution-
alised. It has no central authority that oversees the arrangements among its members’ finance
ministries and central banks, which results in leaving discretion over the swap’s activation in the
hands of the creditor, rather than an independent supranational organisation (Henning 2009: 3). In
addition, from the outset, ASEAN and the ASEAN Way have led the APT process with no signifi-
cant efforts so far to formally legalize the institution.
In sum, the avoidance of excessive institutionalisation/legalisation is one of the most distinctive
features of East Asian institutions such as ARF and APT (Acharya, 1997; Kahler, 2000). Moreover,
those institutions are often led by a weak power such as ASEAN, instead of great powers. European
experience-based IRT in its current form does not seem to be well equipped to explain either the
distinctive features of East Asian institutions or the ‘small power’ leadership in those institutions.

Historical/collective memory for East Asia IR

Until recently, historical/collective memory has generally not been a major independent variable in
the prominent IRT.9 The large-N studies in the IR literature on peace and conflict mostly ignore
historical/collective memory when explaining the behaviors of states. For many East Asia special-
ists, however, ‘historical memory (and its expression in nationalism and ethnocentrism) is a key
source of interstate conflict, persistent security dilemmas, and ongoing disputes over territory’
(Johnston, 2012: 69)10.
For example, due to their shared experience as the colonies of Western great powers (Thailand
is an exception here), ASEAN states are extremely protective about their sovereignty. As Kahler
(2000: 561) contends, deep concerns about sovereignty costs are embedded in the domestic politics
of most Asian societies. Hence, ASEAN from the outset has displayed a strong commitment to
preserving (as opposed to pooling or delegating) sovereignty. Even when ASEAN members agreed
to create an ASEAN community (which is composed of ASEAN economic, security, and social and
cultural communities where ASEAN states are expected to transfer some degree of national poli-
cymaking authority to the regional centre) in the Declaration of Bali Concord II in 2003, they
6 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

reaffirmed the sovereignty-enhancing ASEAN Way principles – that is, respect for sovereignty,
non-interference in domestic affairs of other members, and consensus-based decision-making.
Indeed, ASEAN states’ obsession with sovereignty, which is rooted in their historical/collective
memory of colonial experiences, is the single most important factor that makes some ASEAN
observers (e.g. Desker, 2015; Kim, 2011; Kurlantzick, 2014) skeptical about the future of ASEAN
integration, despite ASEAN’s goal to be a single market (like the EU) and a security community.
In addition, it is what makes the process of ASEAN integration distinct from that of European
integration where sovereignty has been pooled and delegated to Brussel to a great extent.
Historical/collective memory is also a critical variable that drives interstate relations in Northeast
Asia (Johnston, 2012: 68). As Weber (2011) notes, its persistence in the region still cultivates the
hostile images of the Other and functions as a major obstacle for interstate cooperation. Take South
Korea-Japan relations, for instance. Because of their great sufferings during Japan’s occupation of
Korea between 1910 and 1945, South Koreans largely view Japan’s rearmament as a much bigger
security threat than China’s growing military power, despite the fact that Japan is South Korea’s
quasi ally (i.e. linked through the US security alliances with Japan and South Korea), whereas
China is North Korea’s main ally and patron as well as South Korea’s former military adversary.
Indeed, owing to the unresolved historical issues between South Korea and Japan, such as the cur-
rent Abe administration’s denial of the Japanese military’s use of comfort women (sex slaves)
during World War II, Japan’s frequent attempts to educate its young generations with a distorted
history book, and territorial disputes over Dokdo/Takesima islands, the former leader of South
Korea (i.e. Park Geun-hye) did not have a single summit meeting with Japan’s Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe until 2 November 2015 even though they came to power in late 2012 (Abe) and early
2013 (Park), respectively. On the contrary, Park met Chinese president Xi Jinping 8 times from
2013 to May 2017, when she was ousted due to impeachment. Setting Japan’s correct interpreta-
tion of history as a precondition, the Park government had repeatedly rejected the Abe govern-
ment’s requests for a summit meeting. As a matter of fact, South Korea’s distrust of Japan may be
part of the reason that South Korea has concluded a free-trade agreement with many countries
including the US, China, the EU, and ASEAN, but not yet Japan.
To sum up, for many East Asian states, historical/collective memory is not just an issue of the
past, but an issue of the present.11 It often becomes a determining factor for interstate cooperation
and conflict. And it is highly likely that it will be an important issue of the future as well. This sug-
gests that the shift in the distribution of power in East Asia might be a less important variable than
historical animosities and nationalistic sentiments in explaining the cause of regional instability
(Choi A, 2008: 319). After all, IRT’s insensitiveness (this applies more to rational theories of neo-
realism and neoliberalism than to social theory of constructivism) to historical/collective memory
appears to be one of the reasons that IRT’s applications to East Asia IR often generate unsatisfac-
tory accounts and inaccurate predictions.

Developing IRT of East Asia or modifying IRT for East Asia IR?
Although the study of East Asia IR is still better described by theory consumption than by theory
production (Johnston, 2012: 70), there have recently been serious efforts by some East Asian spe-
cialists to develop an indigenous theory of East Asia IR. Their rationale is that if IRT is to be rel-
evant for East Asia IR, it should be based on local peculiarities and contexts. These efforts are most
salient in China where Chinese IR scholars seek to construct a Chinese School of IR.12 For exam-
ple, some Chinese scholars of IR emphasize that contrary to the Western concept of ‘sovereign
equality’ in the Westphalian system, civilisational ordering principles like the concept of ‘tianxia’
(all-under-heaven), which is a hierarchy based on Confucian notions of social harmony,
Kim 7

traditionally regulated interstate relations in East Asia (Johnston, 2012: 62). China’s historical
tribute system – ‘a hierarchical international order that governed a stable relationship between
imperial China and its neighbours’ (Kin, 2014: 40) – is a good case in point where the all-inclusive-
ness of the ‘tianxia’ worldview is underpinned. And in the all-under-heaven worldview, the logic
of relationality, as opposed to the Western logic of causation, dictates how states behave (Schneider,
2014: 694). Here, relations, which are ‘the most significant content of social life and the hub of all
social activities’ (Qin, 2009: 14; quoted in Schneider, 2014: 694), rather than military capabilities
and cultural attraction, are the very sources of power and there is no power apart from relations
(Schneider, 2014: 702). Also, some Chinese IR scholars draw attention to the fact that in opposition
to the traditional security studies’ stance, the morality of the state leader played an important role
in determining the state’s relative power in ancient China (Kin, 2014: 38). According to them, a
virtuous ruler leads by example and inspires loyalty in his subjects and creates a harmonious world
that unites people and politics as ‘all-under-heaven’ (Schneider, 2014: 689). After all, building an
indigenous Chinese IR theory based on the Chinese tradition is what Chinese IR scholars seek to
achieve. Maintaining that the IR theory development is ‘driven by the need to solve the practical
problems of a particular nation’, therefore, Qin Yaquing, vice president of China Foreign Affairs
University, proposes that Chinese IR theories should be developed to resolve China’s core prob-
lems13 (Kin, 2014: 37).
What is worth stressing here is that the main purpose of creating a Chinese School of IR thus far
appears to construct a world order from Chinese perspectives rather than to explain a world that
already exists (Alagappa, 2011: 222). The problem here, as Alagappa (2011: 223) points out, is that
‘The effort to develop national schools of IR (like a Chinese school) based on national experiences
and traditions could become a limiting factor in the quest to produce universal knowledge.’14 In
fact, a key element of a ‘good theory’15 is generalizability (i.e. scientific universalism). In other
words, IRT should be as generalizable as possible across time and across space. An IRT of East
Asia that is sensitive to East Asian history, experiences, political systems, and local culture may be
strong in terms of its internal validity but may have a significant external validity problem, as it is
likely to be less relevant in other regions of the world. An important question to ask here is: even
if possible, would we (i.e. the IR field as a whole) really be better off with a number of region-
specific and country-specific IRTs (e.g. IRT of East Asia, IRT of Latin America, IRT of the Middle
East, IRT of Africa, a Chinese School of IRT, a Korean School of IRT, a Japanese School of IRT, a
Saudi Arabian School of IRT, a Brazilian School of IRT, a South African School of IRT)?
It is important to recognize that almost all theories are incomplete and imperfect. Thus, it is not
surprising that they cannot provide answers to all problems. This means that whereas IR scholars
should try to enhance IRT’s generalizability, it is hard to imagine the emergence of an IRT that is
perfectly relevant across time and space.16 In addition, given that falsifiability is also a key element
of a good theory at least among Popperians, an imperfect IRT should be viewed as strength rather
than as weakness.17 As Ikenberry and Mastanduno (2003: 422) contend, core concepts and key
variables of IRT such as hegemony, the distribution of power, international regime, and political
identity are as relevant for East Asia IR as anywhere else, although their application must be sensi-
tive to the particular historical and cultural aspect of relations in the region to enjoy full explana-
tory power. Instead of rejecting IRT as irrelevant, therefore, a productive way to handle the problem
of a poor fit between IRT and East Asia IR is to refine the existing IRT and make it more suitable
for East Asia IR by problematising IRT’s major assumptions and key claims on the basis of East
Asian experiences.
Although this is a daunting task, there are numerous ways to make IRT more relevant for East
Asia IR. In what follows, I make several suggestions that may help IRT to ‘get East Asia right’.
8 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

Suggestions for the IRT modification

As illustrated above, East Asia IR in general and East Asian state behavior in particular are not
easily explained by the prevailing lenses of IRT. This is because whereas IRT has a Western (par-
ticularly European) origin, the patterns of interstate conflict and cooperation as well as norms and
institutions developed in East Asia are quite distinct from those of Europe (Kang, 2013: 200). What
should be done to save IRT for East Asia IR? Instead of taking the ‘analytical eclecticism’
approach18 (Katzenstein and Sil, 2004; Katzenstein, 2008), which, if taken carelessly (e.g. by mix-
ing key concepts and assumptions of each research tradition at will or taking a ‘garbage can’ style
approach where anything goes), is at peril to collapse the boundaries of IR research traditions, I
suggest the following.
First of all, IRT’s assumption of an anarchical international system needs to be relaxed. Anarchy
is not the perpetual feature of the international system (Wendt, 1999). Indeed, a world of hierarchy
(e.g. a world of empires, hegemonic orders, tributary systems) has been prevalent in international
history (Lake, 2011). Given the increasing complexity of international politics, ‘few scholars
explicitly frame their research around the fact of formal international anarchy anymore’ (Mattern
and Zarakol, 2016: 626). Instead, a growing range of scholarship in IR now seeks to theorize world
politics via an analytical focus on hierarchies (e.g. Cooley, 2005; Lake, 2011; Barder, 2015a;
Mattern and Zarakol, 2016: 624). The works by Lake (2011) and Ikenberry (2011) on hierarchy, in
particular, ‘have opened the door to theorising its prevalence and in problematising the conceptual
dominance of anarchy’ (Barder, 2015b: 9). As illustrated earlier, anarchy does not effectively cap-
ture East Asia’s current or its past regional systems.19 Even Western Europe’s current regional
system, where the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization plays an important stabilising role,
does not appear to be an anarchical system. Hence, the assumption of anarchy should be rethought
with careful attention to IR in a particular region.
Second, IRT needs to take East Asian state preferences seriously (for a liberal theory of state
preferences, see Moravcsik, 1997), if it is to be a more relevant account for East Asia IR. State
preferences refer to ‘the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of gov-
ernments’ (Moravcsik, 1997: 513). In East Asia where small states take the lead in security and
economic regionalism (e.g. the ARF, the APT), state preferences are a key to understand a small
power leadership. For example, Kim (2012: 114) argues that what is essential to understand the
weak power-driven (i.e. ASEAN-led) Asia-Pacific regionalism is the disfavour of regional powers
(e.g. the US, China, Japan, South Korea, ASEAN states) of alternative types of leadership (i.e. a
hegemonic leadership, a great-power leadership, and a middle-power leadership). ASEAN leader-
ship is preferred by most states in the region due to the undesirability of those alterative
leaderships.
Likewise, a compelling account for the main characteristics of East Asian institutions that
emphasizes informality and the avoidance of legalisation requires keen attention to East Asian
states’ preferences on institutional design. As Kahler (2000: 549) notes, ‘institutions that display
rules with high levels of obligation and precision and that delegate rule interpretation and enforce-
ment to third parties are heavily concentrated in West Europe.’ Those institutions, however, are not
favoured by East Asian states. To be sure, as constructivists (e.g. Acharya, 1997) argue, ASEAN-
led regional institutions (the ARF and the APT, in particular) have been driven by informal ASEAN
norms such as musjawarah (consultation) and mufakat (consensus) and ASEAN principles such as
respect for sovereignty, non-interference in other states’ domestic affairs, and the avoidance of
controversial issues. What is worth emphasising here, though, is the fact that the creation and
design of weak East Asian institutions reflect the state preferences of all regional powers. In other
words, most states in the region believe that those weak institutions serve their national interests as
Kim 9

they do not carry high sovereignty costs. This implies that more institutionalisation and legalisation
in the region is also possible, as their preferences on institutional design and management may
change in the future, depending on the shift in the regional strategic environment.
Many East Asian states’ puzzling behaviors that defy IRT’s expectations can also be explained
when careful attention is paid to their preferences. For example, North Korea’s series of recent
nuclear and missile provocations despite its main ally’s (China’s) explicit oppositions make sense
if one takes into account Pyongyang’s preferences for keeping its nuclear weapons for its regime
survival rather than for a bargaining chip (Kim, 2016b). South Korea’s efforts to deepen its eco-
nomic and political ties with China (South Korea’s former adversary as well as North Korea’s main
patron), although maintaining a US-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance, reflect Seoul’s preference
for a hedging strategy towards US and China, which is derived from Seoul’s dual concerns about
its future economic prosperity and security. Japan’s efforts to strengthen US-Japan security alliance
instead of arming itself in the post-Cold War world, despite the emergence of a nuclear-armed
North Korea and the rapid rise of China, reflect Japan’s preference for avoiding nuclear armaments
and an arms race in the region that would significantly impede its recovery from the decades-long
economic recession. ASEAN states’ increasing reluctance to take sides in the hegemonic competi-
tion between the US and China also mirrors ASEAN states’ preferences for deepening economic
ties with Beijing while maintaining US military presence in East Asia.
In short, IRT needs to be sensitive to the main sources and impact of East Asian states’ prefer-
ences. Because of distinct historical experiences (e.g. colonialism), disparate historical interstate
relations (e.g. hierarchical and relational), and dissimilar institutional and cultural practices (e.g.
informality), East Asian states’ preferences are quite different from those of Western (European)
states on which IRT was developed. Only when East Asian states’ preferences are taken into
account, therefore, is IRT likely to provide compelling accounts for East Asia IR, which often
times goes against IRT’s predictions.20
Third, the sharp division of studies between international security and international political
economy still exists in prominent IRT. As Kim (2016a) notes, the dichotomy as a research strategy
reflects the division of labor with which IR’s two subfields of international security and interna-
tional political economy have developed in the postwar world. During the Cold War, for example,
the bipolar rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union dominated the security agenda. Because
the two leading states had few economic interactions, the separation of studies between interna-
tional security and international political economy was largely legitimate (Kirshner, 1997: 1). It
actually generated valuable insights for state behaviors. The dichotomous approach, however, does
not seem to be able to convincingly explain interstate relations in the post-Cold War era, where
economically independent states vigorously compete with one another for their prosperity as well
as survival, with no excessive fear about military conflicts between economic partners.
Sino-ROK relations are a good case in point. Since the Sino-ROK diplomatic normalisation in
1992, economic ties between the two countries have grown dramatically. In the area of economic
cooperation, Sino-ROK bilateral trade increased about 24 times between 1992 and 2010. In 2004,
China replaced the US as South Korea’s largest trading partner for both exports and imports. As of
2014, the Sino-ROK trade was about 40 times bigger than that of the Sino-North Korea trade
(Pollack, 2014). That said, as a traditional ally of North Korea, China still assists Pyongyang’s
regime survival by providing economic aid (energy and food, among others) and political support.
Although Beijing has been upset by Pyongyang’s series of nuclear and ballistic missile tests that
ignored China’s explicit warnings, it has no intention to abandon its strategic communist ally.
Indeed, despite some doubts about its effectiveness, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and
Mutual Assistance, which was signed between the two countries in 1961 and obliged either party
to come to the military assistance of the other when attacked, is still in place. Moreover, China’s
10 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

trade with North Korea has recently increased, despite its tightening of economic sanctions against
Pyongyang after the latter’s series of nuclear and long-range missile tests. The question is, then,
why has South Korea deepened its economic and political ties with a rapidly rising China, instead
of balancing against it? China was a former military adversary of South Korea, and it is still a main
ally and key patron of North Korea, which is South Korea’s biggest security threat. Shouldn’t
South Korea be worried about its growing economic dependence on China? A compelling answer
to this question requires an analysis of the linkage between security and economics for interstate
relations. To be sure, the US-ROK alliance, which provides a security guarantee (e.g. a nuclear
umbrella) to South Korea, is a key structural variable that enables Seoul to engage and deepen its
economic ties with China in the first place. It is worth stressing, however, that Seoul’s belief that
growing Sino-ROK economic interdependence will reduce a chance of war between the two coun-
tries, also plays an important role in South Korea’s strategic choice of engaging (as opposed to
internal or hard-balancing) China. What the case of South Korea’s response to China’s rise illus-
trates is that IRT needs to be more sensitive to the linkage between security and economics, if it
wants to ‘get East Asia right’. In other words, the dichotomy between security and economics in
the IR research in general and the IRT development in particular needs to be broken down more
substantially,21 although there have recently been some improvements (e.g. Goldstein and
Mansfield, 2012; Mansfield and Pollins, 2003; Ripsman and Paul, 2010).
Fourth, since the appearance of Wendt’s seminal works (Wendt, 1987; 1992; 1994; 1995; 1999),
social constructivism has successfully challenged neorealism and neoliberalism and thereby posi-
tioned itself as a major IRT over the past three decades. Indeed, it has played a huge role in moving
forward the IR field in general and IRT in particular. Likewise, by placing greater emphasis on
distinctive regional cultures, regional norms, and regional identities, social constructivism has
made significant contributions to the understanding of East Asia IR. Challenging the dominance of
realist theory to East Asia IR, social constructivists highlighted Asian values (e.g. respect for
authority, priority placed on the nation’s stability and prosperity over individual freedom, hard
work ethic), the ASEAN Way, and colonial experiences in explaining conflict and cooperation in
East Asia. In fact, constructivist theory has become so prevalent in the last two decades that some
observers (e.g. Khoo, 2004: 45) call it an orthodoxy, especially for Southeast Asian security
studies.
That said, as Checkel (1998: 342) points out, most constructivist accounts, like rational choice
theory, remain nothing more than a theory or a method. There are two major reasons why this is the
case. The first reason has to do with constructivist theory’s lack of sustained attention to agency,
without which social constructivists ‘will find themselves unable to explain where their powerful
social structures (norms) come from in the first place and, equally important, why and how they
change over time’ (Checkel, 1998: 339). Indeed, bringing individual (particularly, domestic)
agency back in is necessary for the structure-centred approach (as opposed to rationalists’ agent-
centred approach) of constructivists’ empirical work ‘if mutual constitution is to be taken seriously
as a way of thinking about the social world’ (Checkel, 1998: 340). Checkel’s early criticism of the
need to theorize the role of agency in constructivist research has yet to be sufficiently addressed by
many constructivist works (see a similar point in Bucher, 2007: 25–26, where he argues that ‘con-
structivism should not further neglect the role of agency’). The second reason is, as Moravcsik
(1998: 670) asserts, the ‘unwillingness of constructivists to place their claims at any real risk of
empirical disconfirmation’. Constructivism’s failure to test stems from almost non-existence of
two critical elements of social science in its theory – i.e. distinctive testable hypotheses and meth-
ods to test such hypotheses against best alternative theories or a null hypothesis of random state
behavior (Moravcsik, 1996: 670). Given that ‘A theory can be evaluated only if it generates distinc-
tive observable implications (hypotheses) different from those generated by the best alternative
Kim 11

theories’ (Checkel and Moravcsik, 2001: 228), more theoretical elaboration or more precise speci-
fication of causal mechanisms for constructivism – e.g. ‘if-then’ propositions that can generate
predictions about variation in the importance of socialisation across cases – is necessary (Checkel
and Moravcsik, 2001: 239). In other words, ‘substantive, middle range theory, which would pro-
vide constructivists with a set (or better, competing sets) of research questions and hypotheses that
could be tested in various cross-national and longitudinal studies’ is currently missing in social
constructivism (Checkel, 1998: 342). This point should be taken seriously by many constructivist
approaches to East Asia IR, including Acharya’s approach of ‘thick description’ for ASEAN (see,
for instance, Acharya 2001; and for further critiques of constructivism, see Zehfuss, 2002; Guzzini
and Leander, 2006; and Ringmar, 2016.)

Conclusion
This article has sought to critically assess the relevance of IRT for East Asia IR. After identifying
the shortcomings of IRT in explaining East Asia IR, the article has provided several ways to modify
it with a goal to make it more suitable for East Asia IR. In what follows, the article discusses the
implications of ‘bringing East Asia in’ for IRT in particular and the IR field in general.
With the rise of East Asian powers in the post-Cold War world, it has become clear that IRT can
no longer ignore East Asia IR. In particular, the rise of China as a potential challenger to US
hegemony in the world and the growing normative power of ASEAN in East Asia encouraged IR
scholars to test IRT’s explanatory power against East Asian cases. As Johnston (2012: 56) asserts,
‘Ignoring East Asian cases in IR might mean that many of the claims in transatlantic IR theory
today have external validity problems, and including these cases/observations might mean our
theories of IR require serious revision.’ For example, the literature on ASEAN-led regionalism
illustrates how small and weak (as opposed to large and strong) powers can shape both security and
economic agenda in world politics, which has not been the major concern of IRT. By identifying
the conditions under which small and weak states (e.g. ASEAN states) exercise leverage over big-
ger and stronger states (Johnston, 2012: 62), therefore, East Asian cases help IR scholars to revisit
accepted theories and challenge conventional wisdoms in their theoretical literatures (Acharya and
Buzan, 2010) . A good example here is Kang’s (2010) analysis of East Asian history, which ques-
tions the eurocentric bias of the existing IR literature and opens a possibility that the more hierar-
chical East Asian international system could be an alternative model of the European anarchical
international system. As Alagappa (2011: 196–197) notes, East Asian cases can enrich existing
concepts and perspectives in IR, and in doing so they make both IRT more generalizable and the
IR discipline more international.
In sum, IRT’s shortcomings in explaining East Asia IR have thus far been quite extensively
identified by many East Asian specialists. There is no question that IRT should be sensitive to East
Asian experiences if it is to be more relevant and generalizable. However, this should not be read
as meaning that East Asia specialists must dismiss IRT and develop an indigenous IR theory of
East Asia, which is independent of IRT. Once well-developed, an indigenous IR theory of East Asia
may identify some important variables that the eurocentric IRT has omitted, but it may end up
being a theory of East Asia IR, which is irrelevant elsewhere. In fact, it seems counterproductive
to develop an East Asia-specific theory of IR as it is likely to lead to further fragmentations of the
IR field on a regional basis. A more productive way is, therefore, to modify IRT by bringing East
Asia in, so that it can reduce the eurocentric bias, while maintaining its scientific universalism.
Further tests of IRT against East Asian histories, practices, and cultures will certainly expand the
conceptual tools for IR theory-building. As Acharya and Buzan (2010: 3) argues, ‘If we are to
improve IRT as a whole, then Western theory needs to be challenged not just from within, but also
12 Journal of Asian and African Studies 00(0)

from outside.’ And this is a responsibility of not just East Asian specialists. It is also a responsibil-
ity of the IR field as a whole (Johnston, 2012: 69).

Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article: This research was supported by the Series in Asian Studies Program at the Asia Centre of
Seoul National University (2014).

Notes
  1. According to Walt, threats are a function of ‘geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived
intentions’ (Walt, 1987: 5).
  2. It is worth noting that although classical realists, like structural realists (neorealists), do not deny that
survival is ‘the narrowest common goal’ of states in the international system, they nonetheless emphasize
that states desire more than survival and ‘pursue a broad range of goals...that vary from state to state’
(Kirshner, 2015: 160). For classical realists’ critique of neorealism, see Kirshner (2015).
  3. For a good discussion of the balancing behavior of states or balance of power theory, see Nexon (2009),
Kaufman, Little, and Wohlforth (2007), and Wohlforth et al. (2007).
  4. North Korea tested 11 ballistic missiles from 1 January 2017 to 31 July 2017 alone. The intercontinental
ballistic missile launched on 28 July 2017 appeared, for the first time, capable of reaching the American
West Coast. See Sanger et al. (2017). On 28 November 2017, North Korea test-fired another newly
developed ICBM called ‘Hwasong-15’ that exhibited a potential range of over 8,000 miles, enough to
reach Washington or any other part of the US. See Landler (2017).
  5. North Korea has thus far conducted six nuclear tests since 2006. The sixth and biggest test, which
Pyongyang claims was a hydrogen bomb test, was done on 2 September 2017. See Sanger and Choe
(2017).
  6. See, for instance, Waltz’s claim that ‘a general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the
great powers’ (Waltz, 1979: 73).
  7. According to Moravcsik (1998: 67), ‘Sovereignty is pooled when governments agree to decide future
matters by voting procedures other than unanimity.’ On the other hand, ‘Sovereignty is delegated when
supranational actors are permitted to take certain autonomous decisions, without an intervening inter-
state vote or unilateral veto.’
 8. ARF members are ASEAN-10 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei,
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) plus Japan, the USA, a representative of the EU, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, China, Russia, India, Papua New Guinea, Mongolia, North Korea,
Pakistan, Timor Leste, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.
  9. This is the case for realism and liberalism rather than constructivism and critical theories. In fact, there is
a large literature in constructivist and critical theories that analyse the impact of memory on IR. See, for
example, Zehfuss (2002), Edkins (2003), Bell (2006), Bleiker and Hutchinson (2008), and Fierke and Fattah
(2009). For a good overview of the intersections between memory, politics, and violence, see Bell (2009).
10. In this regard, Jennifer Lind’s work (Lind, 2010) is a welcome contribution to East Asia IR).
11. See Tang (2011) for a similar point. Tang argues that ‘collective memories are often resilient, partly
because they form part of our (collective) identities.’
12. As for the discussions of the attempts to develop a Korean school of IR, see Chun (2010); Choi A (2008);
Choi JK (2008).
13. In this regard, Cheung Chi Kin (Kin, 2014: 45) contends that rather than a purely academic activity for
theoretical pluralism, ‘the development of Chinese IR theory is also a political practice that seeks to
address a foreign policy problem.’
14. See Yan (2011) for a skeptical view on constructing a Chinese School of IRT. Schneider (2014: 703) also
points out that ‘some of the calls for a “China School” of International Relations, are problematic due to
the proclaimed uniqueness of the respective approaches.’
15. What constitutes a good theory is debatable among IR scholars. For instance, whether or not
Kim 13

generalizability and falsifiability constitute a good theory is a claim in contention in IR, particularly
among constructivists and critical theorists. I follow here a research tradition set out by King et al.
(1994: 35–36, 100–105). For a good description of ‘what is a good theory,’ see van Evera (1997:
17–21).
16. Mearsheimer (2001) contends that because ‘social-science theories are gross simplifications of reality,
even the most brilliant theories can be right, say, only 75 percent of the time’. See Kaplan (2012).
17. It should be pointed out, however, that although the Popperian criterion of falsifiability gets a lot of sup-
port from practicing scientists, ‘it does not appear to work very well even when applied to established
sciences such as physics.’ For a further discussion of falsifiability as an element of IR theory, see Jackson
(2011: 1–23, 50–57).
18. An analytical eclecticism approach ‘regards existing research traditions fluidly and is willing to bor-
row selectively from each to construct accounts that travel across the sides of the triangle representing
constructivism, realism, and liberalism’ (Katzenstein and Sil, 2004: 17). Given the gap between the
academic world and the real world of policymaking, it seeks to construct policy-relevant ‘middle-range
theories’ drawn from more than one paradigm (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010),
19. The current East Asian system – i.e. the so-called US-centred hub-and-spoke system where many states
in the region have bilateral security alliances with the US, but not with one another (see Kupchan, 1998:
63; Kim, 2016a: 723) – could also be viewed as being hierarchical in a sense that the US positioned at
the centre has multiple bilateral alliance relationships with a number of far weaker security partners of
the region.
20. As mentioned earlier, historical/collective memory plays an important role in East Asia IR, and it seems
that the significance of historical/collective memory can also be factored in for East Asian states’ prefer-
ences on interstate cooperation.
21. Most of the existing studies on the nexus between economics and security deal with the linkage at the
regional level, rather than at the dyadic interstate level. For example, the collections in Goldstein and
Mansfield (2012) tackle the nexus between security and economics in the IR of East Asia, such as the
impact of regional economic institutions on East Asian security. More efforts need to be made to test the
linkage between economic interdependence and conflict/peace at the dyadic interstate level.

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Kim 17

Author biography
Min-hyung Kim is an Associate Professor of political science and international relations at Kyung Hee
University in Seoul, Korea (Republic of Korea). He received his PhD from the University of Washington and
taught at the University of Washington, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, and Illinois Wesleyan University.
His research interests include international relations theory, East Asian security, South Korea’s foreign pol-
icy, East Asian regionalism, international political economy, and European integration. He has published,
among others, in International Political Science Review, Journal of Strategic Studies, Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, Asian Survey, Pacific Focus, Asian Perspective, Journal of Asian and African Studies,
Journal of European Public Policy, and Journal of European Integration. He was a Jean Monnet Fellow
(2009–2010) at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute,
Florence, Italy and a POSCO Visiting Fellow (2016) at the East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, US.