ELECTION CASES BATCH 4

1. TECSON vs. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Ronal Allan Kelly Poe’s (FPJ) disqualification in the presidential elections
for having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he
is a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding
that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the
Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.

ISSUES:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:
1.) NO, The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate”
for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held."Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the
Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President before the
elections.

2.) NO, Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided
that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." FPJ’s
grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His
citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would
have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in
1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited
from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s
citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino
citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate.

Petitioner failed to substantiate his case to prove whether or not there has been material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of
the Omnibus Election Code.

*mahabal ang ruling sa book. Refer to page 158-159

2. Velez vs Poe, GR No. 161634

Note: The first three cases namely Tecson vs Comelec, Velez vs Poe, Fornier vs Poe are three consolidated cases.

FACTS:

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Zoilo Velez filed a case which raised the issue of citizenship on Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (a.k.a Fernando Poe, Jr.),
one qualification needed in the presidential election. He raised that FPJ is not a natural born citizen because he is
not a Filipino since his ancestors are not Filipino citizens including Lorenzo Poe (grandfather), a mestizo, Allan
Poe (father), a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelly (mother), an American citizen.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court must dismiss the petition.

RULING:

Yes. The Court must, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity the petitions in GR No. 161434 (Tecson vs Poe)
and GR No. 161634 (Velez vs Poe) both having been directly elevated to this Court in the latter’s capacity as the
only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vie-presidential election contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the
primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.

The Court dismiss the case and held that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines even though he is an
illegitimate child.

3. Fornier vs Poe

Facts: Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a Fernando Poe, Jr.) filed his COC for President of the Philippines. In his
CoC, FPJ represented himself to be a natural born citizen of the Philippines and changed his name to “Fernando
Jr.”, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939. Fornier filed a petition with the Comelec to disqualify FPJ on the
basis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation by claiming to be natural born Filipino when in truth, according
to Fornier, his parents were foreigners. FPJ’s mother Bessie Kelley was an American while his father Allan F.
Poe, was Spanish. Also, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, since the latter is an
illegitimate child of an alien mother (his father was already married to Paulita Gomez, and he later only married
Bessie after FPJ was born). The Comelec dismissed this petition for lack of merit. Fornier sought reconsideration
but the same was denied, hence, this petition before the SC for certiorari (Rule 64&65).

Issue: W/N the Supreme Court can take cognizance of FPJ’s disqualification case.

Ruling: Yes. The court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possess jurisdiction over the petition,
filed under Rule 64 in relation to rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civproc. This case assails the resolution
of the Comelec for alleged GAoD in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition which prayed for the
disqualification of FPJ on the basis of material misrepresentation in his COC.

4. BENGZON VS HRET; GR NO. 124480

FACTS: Private Respondent (PR) Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the PH but ceased to be one when enlisted
in the US Marine Corps and took an oath of allegiance to the US in accordance with CA No. 63.

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 PR reacquired his Ph citizenship through repatriation. He ran for and was elected as the Representative
against petitioner. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case claiming that PR was not qualified to be a member of the
House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required.
ISSUE: Whether PR can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.

RULING: YES. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original
status before he lost his Ph. Again, Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.

2. Coquilla vs. COMELEC (Sec 63.7 Citizenship of repatriated citizen)

Facts: Petitioner Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar, where he grew up and
resided.In 1965, he joined the US Navy and subsequently naturalized as a US citizen.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, albeit
continued making several trips to the US.On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines subsequently after his application for repatriation was approved.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar.On February 27,
2001, he filed his COC stating therein that he has been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.On March
5, 2001, respondent incumbent mayor of Oras who was running for re-election, sought the cancellation of
petitioner’s COC on the ground that the latter had resided in Oras for only about 6 months since when he took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines. On May 14, 2001, petitioner garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed mayor of Oras.

Issue: W/n petitioner is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.

Ruling: Yes. Upon repatriation, a former natural-born Filipino is deemed to have recovererd his original status
as a natural-born citizen. (Book)

6. Mayor Jose UGDORACION vs. COMELEC & Ephraim TUNGOL

FACTS: Jose Ugdoracion (petitioner) & Ephraim Tungol (PR) were rival mayoralty candidates in the Mun of
Albuquerque, Bohol.

PR filed a petition to deny due or cancel the COC of petitioner contending that petitioner committed material
misrepresentation in declaring his eligibility because he is actually a “greencard” holder or permanent resident of
the US.

It appears that petitioner became a permanent resident of USA on Sept. 26, 2001. However, petitioner stated in
his COC that he had resided in Albuquerque for 41 years before May 14, 2007 & he is not a permanent resident
or an immigrant to a foreign country.

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The COMELEC 1st Div. cancelleged petitioner’s COC. Petitioner filed an MR alleging that his status as a
“greencard” holder was not of his own making but a mere offshoot of a petition filed by his sister.

COMELEC En Banc denied the MR & affirmed the 1st Div.’s ruling.

ISSUE: WON petitioner relinquished his civil status?

HELD: Yes. The general rule is that the domicile of origin is not easily lost; it is lost only when there is an actual
removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new
one, and acts which correspond with such purpose. In the instant case, however, Ugdoracions acquisition of a
lawful permanent resident status in the United States amounted to an abandonment and renunciation of
his status as a resident of the Philippines; it constituted a change from his domicile of origin, which
was Albuquerque, Bohol, to a new domicile of choice, which is the USA.

7. Marcos vs Comelec

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez- Marcos filed a COC for the position of Representative on the First Congressional
District of Leyte. Stated in her COC that she has stayed in the said place for seven (7) months. Subsequently,
the respondent Cirilo Montejo filed a petition for the cancellation and disqualification of Marcos’s candidacy,
on the ground of failure to meet the constitutional requisite of one year residency. The COMELEC then granted
the petition of Montejo to disqualify Marcos on the election holding that the latter had already abandoned
Tacloban, Leyte as her place of Domicile when she lived and even voted in Ilocos and Manila. Also, they
alleged that Imelda Marcos lost her domicile of origin when she married and lived with her husband former
President Ferdinand Marcos in Ilocos Norte and San Juan Manila. Marcos then filed amended for her COC
modifying seven months to “since childhood” asserting that the seven months she wrote was just an honest
misinterpretation.

In an en banc resolution, Marcos’s was declared as the winner and was qualified to run. However, her
proclamation was suspended due to her issue in residency. Marcos then went to the Supreme Court to appeal
her case.

Issues:
1) W/N the Constitution speaks of domicile and not mere residence - Yes.
2) W/N there was an abandonment of domicile - No.
3) W/N a wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by operation of law upon marriage - No.
4) Omitted - mere comment, not important
Rulings:
1) “Residence” is synonymous with “domicile.” When the Constitution speaks of residence in election law, it
actually means only domicile. Domicile means an individual’s permanent home, a place which whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they
disclose intent. Domicile includes the twin elements of 1) The fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed
place and 2) Animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

2) An abandonment of domicile requires the voluntary act of relinquishing former domicile with an intent to
supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing. An individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different places. The absence from domicile to pursue a profession, to
study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment.

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3) The term “residence” may mean one thing in civil law and another in political law. The presumption that a
wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the
use of the term “residence” in the Civil Code Art 110. What Mrs. Marcos gained upon marriage was actual
residence, but she did not lose her domicile of origin.

8. DOMINO vs COMELEC (4 RULINGS SA BOOK—PERTAINING TO SAME ISSUE)

FACTS: Domino filed his COC for the position of District Representative of the Sarangani Province indicating
in item no. 9 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 and 2
months immediately preceding the election.

Private respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel COC, which was
assigned to the 2nd Division of the COMELEC. Private respondents alleged that Domino is not a resident, much
less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.

COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified. Domino filed for MR, but
it was denied.

For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he
has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. Domino presented before the COMELEC the following: Copy
of the Contract of Lease executed January 15, 1997; Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Absolute
Deed of sale; Certified True Copy of the Notice of Approval of Application for registration approved by the
Election Registration Board; and, Copy of claim card in the name of respondent that he is a registered voter of
Sarangani.

Petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed on the ground that COMELEC committed
GADALEJ in relation to the disqualification of Domino, and the COMELEC en banc’s denial of DOMINO’s
motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. W/N Domino has resided in the subject congressional district for at least 1 year immediately preceding
the May 11, 1998 Elections
2. Was the Lease Contract enough proof to prove residence?
RULINGS:

1. NO. While “residence” simply requires bodily presence in a given place, “domicile” requires not only such
bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent
place of abode, one’s home.
A person’s “domicile” once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one
is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate (1) an actual removal or
an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and, (3) definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
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“Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some
other reasons, one intends to return. “Domicile” is a question of intention and circumstances. In the
consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3)
a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.

2. NO. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO’s intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile. As a general
rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as
a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of
these elements is absent.

9. Perez v COMELEC

Facts: On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for representative of the 3rd district
of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later on Mar. 30, 1998, petitioner, as a voter and citizen,
filed in the Comelec a petition for the disqualification of private respondent as a candidate on the ground that he
had not been a resident of the district for at least 1 year immediately before the day of the elections as required
by Art. 6, Sec 6 of the Constitution.

On May 10, 1998, the first division of the Comelec, in a unanimous resolution, dismissed the petition for
disqualification, finding private respondent Aguinaldo qualified to run as representative for the 3rd district of
Cagayan.

Issue: W/N residency in respondent’s coc for governor actually connotes domicile to warrant his
disqualification

Ruling: No. It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a coc, which ought to be decisive in determining whether
or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.

The registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or
lost his residence.

10. Fernandez vs HRET |

Facts: Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna.
In his Certificate of Candidacy, he indicated that he is a resident of Sta. Rosa City, Laguna.Private respondent
sought the cancellation of petitioner’s COC and the latter’s disqualification as a candidate on the ground of an
alleged material misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past elections, he
had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan was located in the Fourth Legislative District of
the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao,
Laguna, which was also outside the First District.

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 In order to buttress his claim that he and his family actually resided in Sta. Rosa, Laguna beginning at least in
February 2006, petitioners evidence included, among others: (a) original and extended lease contracts for a
townhouse in Villa de Toledo, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna; (b) certification issued by the President of
the Villa de Toledo Homeowners Association, Inc, that petitioner has been a resident of said Subdivision since
February 2006; (c) affidavits of petitioners neighbors in Villa de Toledo attesting that petitioner has been a
resident of said subdivision since February 2006; (d) certification of the barangay chairman of Barangay Balibago,
Sta. Rosa, Laguna that petitioner is a resident of Villa de Toledo within the said barangay; (e) certificates of
attendance of petitioners children in schools located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna since 2005; and (f) DTI certificates of
business issued in the name of petitioner and his wife to show that they own and operate businesses in Sta. Rosa,
Laguna since 2003.HRET ruled in favor of private respondent. (Included sya sa book so if mag tanong si atty)

Issue: WON petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency requirement to be a Member of
the House of Representatives, as provided in the 1987 Constitution.

Ruling: YES. The SC found the interpretation of the HRET of the residency requirement under the Constitution
to be overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual circumstances of this case.

The petitioner adequately shown that his transfer of residence to Sta.Rosa was bona fide and was not
merely for complying with the residency requirement under the election laws. It stated that the Constitution does
not require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that
he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day

The Court stressed that the law does not require persons to be in their home 24 hours a day, seven
days a week to fulfill the residency requirement and exercising their rights of ownership thereto in other
places aside from the address they had indicated in their place of residence in their COC.

11. Abella vs Comelec

Facts:

Benjamin P. Abella was the official candidate of the Liberal Party for provincial governor of Leyte
while Adelina Y. Larrazabal substituted her husband to run for Governor of Leyte.

Abella intervened in the disqualification case against Larrazabal and filed a complaint before the
COMELEC charging the latter with falsification and misrepresentation of her residence in her certificate of
candidacy.

COMELEC, upon motion of Larrazabal, lifted its TRO against her proclamation paving Larrazabal's
proclamation and her assumption to the Office of Governor of Leyte while the hearings in the disqualification
case continued. Then COMELEC found Larrazabal was neither resident of Kananga, Leyte nor a registered voter
thereat. With these findings, the COMELEC disqualified the petitioner as governor of the province of Leyte.

Issue:

Whether or not Abella meets the residence requirement to run for Governor of the Province of Leyte.

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Held:

Yes.

Adelina Larrazabal lacks the required residence on the evidence of record to the effect that despite
protestations to the contrary made by the petitioner, she has established her residence at Ormoc City from 1975
to the present and not at Kananga, Leyte. In the absence of any evidence to prove otherwise, the reliance on
the provisions of the Family Code was proper and in consonance with human experience.

12. JUAN SANCHEZ vs OSCAR DEL ROSARIO G.R. No. L-16878 April 26, 1961

FACTS: In a petition for quo warranto brought by Juan Sanchez, a defeated candidate for the office of
councilor in the municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan, against Oscar del Rosario, a winning candidate for the same
position, the Court of First Instance of said province rendered judgment unseating respondent from said elective
office on the ground of the latter's ineligibility because on the date of his election he was only 21yrs and 3months
old; the laws at that time required that a candidate must not be less than 23yrs of age. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the fact that petitioner knew of respondent’s age disqualification before the election and having
failed to question the same makes him stopped from instituting this proceeding for quo warranto?

HELD:
NO. Estoppel does not and will not lie in the case at bar. This is because constitutional or statutory
provisions providing for the qualifications of candidates are mandatory. The matter is one affecting public
interest; hence estoppels, if at all, should be applied sparingly.

13. Aquino vs. Comelec

Main Point: Residence requirement is mandatory

Facts: Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the
new Second Legislative District of Makati City and thereafter won in such election.

Private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of
petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which,
under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections

Comelec En Banc then reversed the earlier decision of Second division of Comelec and held petitioner
disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in
the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be disqualified for the lack of qualification of residence

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Ruling: Yes. The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be
a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the
elections. Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction. Constitutional
provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character.

14. FRIVALDO v. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22,
1988, and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities, Sorsogon represented by Salvador Estuye,
filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo alleging that he is not a Filipino Citizen.
Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos

ISSUE: WON the Petitioner`s proclamation as governor be annulled.

RULING: YES. Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution provides that all public officials and employees owe
the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local
Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a
qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that
a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. The qualifications prescribed for
elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility especially if they mistakenly believed, that the candidate was
qualified.The Citizenship qualification requires strict application.

15. LABO vs. COMELEC

FACTS: In the January 20, 1988 elections, Ramon J. Labo, Jr. was proclaimed as the new elected Mayor of
Baguio City. Six days later, Luis Lardizabal, the private respondent, filed a petition for quo warranto which
according to the petitioner may not be valid because the filing fee was not paid yet. While the petition for quo
warranto was being argued, the question of the petitioner's citizenship was brought about. The petitioner asks this
court to restrain the COMELEC from looking into the question of his citizenship.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC can be restrain from looking into the qualification of the elective offivers.

RULING: Yes. The qualification for an elective office are continuing requirements, once any of them lost
during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited.

16. Ortega v. COMELEC (Section 65: Qualifications)

Facts: Ramon Labo, Jr., who again, believing that he is a Filipino citizen, launched his candidacy for mayor of
Baguio City in the 11 May 1992 elections by filing his certificate of candidacy on 23 March. Roberto Ortega
also filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office on 25 March. On 26 March, Ortega filed a
disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Comelec seeking to cancel Labo’s certificate of candidacy
on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that the latter is a “natural-born”

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citizen of the Philippines. On 9 May, the Comelec resolved the petition, denied due course and cancelled Labo’s
certificate of candidacy. The next day, acting on Labo’s ex-parte motion, the Comelec allowed Labo to be voted
upon as Mayoral candidate until the final resolution of the issue, in the event the case is raised to the Supreme
Court. On 13 May, Comelec resolved, motu proprio, to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins
in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio. On 15 May, Labo filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court. Meanwhile, Labo garnered the highest number of votes.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner is qualified for the contested office.

Held: No. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. Undoubtedly,
petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office.
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: “An
elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement
for holding an elective office.—Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the
fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for
holding an elective office. As mandated by law: “An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines.

His election does not automatically restore his Philippine Citizenship, the possession of which is an
indispensable requirement for holding public office. Petitioner Labo’s status has not changed in the case at bar.
To reiterate, he (Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not automatically
restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for holding public
office.

In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere application for repatriation
does not and cannot amount to an automatic reacquisition of the applicant’s Philippine citizenship. To date,
however, and despite favorable recommendation by the Solicitor General, the Special Committee on
Naturalization had yet acted upon said application for repatriation. Indeed, such fact is even admitted by
petitioner. In the absence of any official action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere application for
repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to an automatic reacquisition of the applicant’s Philippine citizenship.

17. Roseller de Guzman vs Comelec

Facts: Petitioner was running as vice mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Respondent de la Cruz, opponent of
petitioner questions the citizen requirement of petitioner, saying that he has dual citizenship in accordance with
RA 9225 (Reacquiring of Citizenship), and has not renounced his American citizen, which is a requirement
when someone with dual citizenship wants to be elected. Petitioner claims that such renunciation was impliedly
done when he submitted his Certificate of Candidacy

Issue: Won filing of a certificate of candidacy ipso facto equates to renunciation of foreign citizenship
under RA 9225.

Held: No. The requisites for a person with dual citizenship are: 1. Meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by existing laws and 2. Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The oath of allegiance to the
Philippines and filing of Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a

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personal sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship.

18. Cordova vs COMELEC GR 176974 February 19, 2009

FACTS: Gaudencio M. Cordora accused Gustavo S. Tambunting of violating Sec. 74 in relation to Section
262 of the OEC (An election offense by Misrepresenting contents of Certificate of Candidacy). Cordora presented
a Bureau of Immigration certificate which states that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is American:
upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001.
According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting was naturalized in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2
December 2000.
Tambunting and presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of a Filipino mother
and an American father. Tambunting denied that he was naturalized. The certificate of citizenship conferred by
the US government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him merely confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship
acquired at birth. He also claims that possession of an American passport did not mean that he is not a Filipino
citizen; that he took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to R.A. No. 9225; that he has resided
in the Philippines since birth; and that the residency requirement is not the same as citizenship.
The COMELEC En Banc dismissed Cordora’s complaint and denied Cordora’s MR. This is a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order under Rule 65 (1997 ROP).

ISSUE: W/N there is sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an election offense

RULING: No. In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries
of origin even after their naturalization. Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that naturalized citizens who
reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" aside from the oath of allegiance
prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and
executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal
and COMELEC, Velasco v. COMELEC, and Japzon v. COMELEC, all of which involve natural-born
Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country and thereafter ran for elective office in
the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a
naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him

19. AZNAR versus COMELEC (185 SCRA 703)

Facts: Emilio “Lito” Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial
Governor of Cebu in the 18 January 1988 elections. Petitioner, Jose B. Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a petition
for the disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen since he is a citizen of the United
States. COMELEC en banc decided to suspend the proclamation. Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino citizen,
alleging that (1) he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio
Osmeña, Sr., (2) that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport, (3) that he was continuously
residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months, and (4) that he
has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship.

11
Held: NO. Osmena is still a Filipino. The court held that Aznar’s contention was not meritorious. Aznar’s argument
that Osmeña is not a Filipino citizen and therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of
Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence. Aznar failed to provide proof that
Osmeña has lost the citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63, these are: (1) by naturalization
in a foreign country, (2) by express renunciation of citizenship, or (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship in any of the
modes provided. By virtue of his being a son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmeña is a Filipino remains.
In this case, Osmeña denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since
1963.The court held that the dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, that because Osmeña obtained certificates of
Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in1979, he
should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship, does not hold water.

The court in this case held that Osmeña is still a Filipino citizen. It may also be noted he was not even declared
a dual citizen

20. Section 65

Ernesto Mercado v. Eduardo Barrios Manzano

FACTS: Parties are candidates for vice mayor of Makati. Manzano’s proclamation was suspended due to a
pending petition for disqualification filed against him by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that Manzano was a US
citizen. COMELEC 2nd division granted petition, and ordered cancellation of Manzano’s COC pursuant to 40
(d) of the Local Gov’t Code, dual citizens are not allowed to run for any elective position. Manzano holds dual
citizenship.

Manzano filed MR, COMELEC en banc reversed 2nd division ruling. He was born in San Francisco, but both of
his parents are Filipinos. His parents brought him to PH w/ an American passport and registered him as an
alien w/ the Bureau of Immigration and was issued an alien certificate of registration. This was not counted as
a loss of PH citizenship because he did not renounce it and did not take an oath of allegiance to US. Also
he registered as a voter in 1992, 1995 and 1998, which is a renunciation of his US citizenship. He no longer had
US citizenship. Manzano was proclaimed.

ISSUE: WON the filing of COC is an effective renunciation of Manzano’s US citizenship.

HELD: Yes. The COC contained statements:

 “I am a natural born Filipino citizen”

 “I am not a permanent resident of/immigrant to a foreign country”
 “…..I will support and defend the PH Constitution and will maintain true faith and ALLEGIANCE
thereto.”
It effectively renounced his American citizenship and removed any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. Manzano admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States

12
on April 22, 1997. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship.
The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before
the termination of his American citizenship.

[Sa book for this particular part, in passing lang ang Mercado v. Manzano and it was just explaining the holding
of a foreign passport.]

21. Valles vs Comelec

FACTS: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian
mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later
married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate,
as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as
candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind May run for public office.

Ruling: Book: Yes. the fact that a child of Filipino parents was born in another country has not been included
as a ground for losing one's Philippine citizenship. The fact that Rosalind had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office under R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 40(d) providing that
those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

For candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their
certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of
candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen It
is significant to note that on January 15, 1992, Rosalind executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia

22. Lopez v Comelec

Facts: Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay,
San Dionisio, Iloilo City. On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the
Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the disqualification of petitioner on the
ground that he is an American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,
petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003. He returned to
the Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all the qualifications to run
for Barangay Chairman. Petitioner emerged as the winner. However, Comelec issued a resolution disqualifying
him

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is qualified to run for such position despite having dual citizenship

13
Ruling: No. In contrast, petitioner was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought American citizenship and
renounced his Filipino citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-acquiring Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law.

Courts 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 in 2003. R.A. No.
9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public
office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.(Emphasis added)
This new law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath. Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. His victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy.

23. LABO VS. COMELEC

176 SCRA 1 (1989)

FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through his
marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said
marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization in
Australia made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost
through (1)naturalization in a foreign country; (2)express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by oath of
allegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.

24. AZNAR versus COMELEC (185 SCRA 703)

Facts:

14
Emilio “Lito” Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor
of Cebu in the 18 January 1988 elections. Petitioner, Jose B. Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
disqualification of Osmeña on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen since he is a citizen of the United States.
COMELEC en banc decided to suspend the proclamation. Osmeña maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging
that (1) he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña,
Sr., (2) that he is a holder of a valid and subsistingPhilippine Passport, (3) that he was continuously residing in the
Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months, and (4) that he has been a
registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.

Issue: Whether or not Aznar had presented proof that Osmeña had lost his Philippine Citizenship.

Held: No. Aznar failed to present direct proof that Osmeña had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes
provided by law. The fact that Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino. The petitioner must prove that the candidate sought to be disqualified had lost his Philippine
citizenship.

Osmena is still a Filipino. The court held that Aznar’s contention was not meritorious. Aznar’s argument that
Osmeña is not a Filipino citizen and therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of
Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence. Aznar failed to provide proof that
Osmeña has lost the citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63, these are: (1) by naturalization
in a foreign country, (2) by express renunciation of citizenship, or (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship in any of the
modes provided. By virtue of his being a son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmeña is a Filipino remains.
In this case, Osmeña denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is a holder of a valid and
subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since
1963.The court held that the dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, that because Osmeña obtained certificates of
Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in1979, he
should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship, does not hold water.

The court in this case held that Osmeña is still a Filipino citizen. It may also be noted he was not even declared a
dual citizen.

25. Frivaldo vs Comelec

Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo filed his COC describing himself as a “natural born” citizen of the Philippines. He was
proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office. The League of Municipalities filed with
the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having
been naturalized in the United States.

Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as
American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial
governor of Sorsogon.

Ruling: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under the
Constitution.

15
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively
participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really
wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No.
473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. The citizenship qualification requires strict application.

26. FAYPON VS QUIRINO; 96 PHIL 294

FACTS: Counsel for the petitioner argues that in addition to other qualifications; residence for at least one year
in the municipality were the municipal officer is elected, is sufficient; whereas the residence requirement for a
provincial officer such as that of the provincial governor must be a bona fide residence in the province for at least
one year prior to his election.

ISSUE: W/N the said contention is correct.

RULING: NO. The residence requirement for elective provincial and municipal officials is the same.

Supplemental:

If any inference is to be drawn from the words "bona fide," it is that in the case of a municipal office in
addition to other qualifications an actual residence in the municipality for at least one year of a candidate for
municipal office would be sufficient to make him eligible for such office; whereas in the case of a provincial
office in addition to other qualifications a residence in good faith in the province for not less than one year of a
candidate for provincial office, although he may not actually be present therein, would be enough to make him
eligible for such office.

27. Coquilla vs. COMELEC (Sec 65. Residence)

Facts: Petitioner Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar, where he grew up and resided.In
1965, he joined the US Navy and subsequently naturalized as a US citizen.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, albeit continued
making several trips to the US.On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines subsequently
after his application for repatriation was approved.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar.On February 27,
2001, he filed his COC stating therein that he has been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.On March
5, 2001, respondent incumbent mayor of Oras who was running for re-election, sought the cancellation of
petitioner’s COC on the ground that the latter had resided in Oras for only about 6 months since when he took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines. On May 14, 2001, petitioner garnered the highest number of votes and was
subsequently proclaimed mayor of Oras.

Issue: WON petitioner satisfied the residency requirement for the position of mayor.

16
Ruling: NO. The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling”
or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually
intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is
usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of a
new domicile (domicile of choice).

In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a US citizen after enlisting in the US
Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, he was an
alien.

28. PUNDAODAYA VS COMELEC

FACTS: This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) En Banc which declared private respondent Arsenio Densing Noble qualified to run for municipal
mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local
Elections. Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya is married to Judith Pundaodaya, who ran against Noble for the
position of municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.

Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification against Noble alleging that the latter lacks the residency
qualification prescribed by existing laws for elective local officials; that he never resided nor had any physical
presence at a fixed place in Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; and that he does not
appear to have the intention of residing therein permanently. Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is in fact a resident
of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, where he also maintains a business called OBERT Construction Supply.

ISSUE; Should “residence” and “domicile” be construed as referring to “dwelling”? Did Noble effectively change
his domicile?

RULING: No to both. In Japzon v. Commission on Elections, it was held that the term “residence” is to be
understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or
legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi).” In Domino v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.

The documentary evidence of Noble, however, failed to convince the Court that he successfully effected a
change of domicile. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled
with conduct indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a
declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode. In this case, Noble’s
marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his actual physical presence in Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental. Neither does it prove an intention to make it his permanent place of residence.

17
29. Ugdoracion vs Comelec

FACTS: Jose Ugdoracion and Ephraim Tungol were rival mayoralty candidates in Albuquerque, Bohol. Tungol
filed a petition to cancel Ugdoracion’s COC contending that the latter’s declaration of eligibility for Mayor
constituted material misrepresentation; that he is actually a “green card” holder or a permanent resident of the
US.It appears that Ugdoracion became a permanent US resident on September 26, 2001 and was issued an
Alien Number by the USINS. COMELEC cancelled Ugdoracion’s COC and removed his name from the
certified list of candidates for Mayor. His motion for recon was denied. Hence, the petition imputing grave
abuse of discretion to the COMELEC.

Issue: W/N Ugdoracion’s COC should be cancelled

Ruling: Yes. It has been settled that a Filipino’s acquisition of a permanent resident status abroad constitutes an
abandonment of his docicile and residence in the PH. In short, the greencard holder renounces his status as a
resident of the PH.
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40(f) of the Local Government Code, disqualify a
permanent resident of, or an immigrant to, a foreign country, unless said person waives his status.

30. CAASI vs CA

FACTS: Mateo Caasi (rival of Merito Miguel for position of Mayor) petitions for the review of the CA’s
dismissal of the appealed disqualification case against respondent Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao for being a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is
a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he
may freely enter the US for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is
a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan that he voted in all previous elections.

COMELEC has earlier dismissed the petitions on the ground that the possession of a green card by Miguel does
not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.

ISSUE: W/N the green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States

RULING: YES. Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel’s immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted
an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to
visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the United States with the intention to live there permanently as
evidenced by his application for an immigrant’s (not a visitor’s or tourist’s) visa. Based on that application of his,
he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.
Immigration to the US by virtue of a “green card’ which entitles one to reside permanently in that country,
constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

31. Gallego v Verra

18
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CFI-
Leyte, which declared illegal the petitioner’s election to the office of municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte in the
election of December 1940, on the ground that he did not meet the residence qualification.Gallego is a native of
Abuyog, Leyte.

Gallego registered himself as an elector in Bukidnon and voted in the election for assemblymen held in
December 1938, and in January 1940. He obtained and paid for his residence certificate it was stated that he had
resided in the said municipality for one and a half years. Gallego became mayor of Bukidnon. Under the
foregoing facts, the CA declared that Gallego lost his domicile in Abuyog at the time he was elected mayor.

ISSUE: W/N Gallego lost his domicile of origin in Abuyog, Leyte

RULING: NO. In the definition of “residence”in the election law, it states that in order to acquire a domicile by
choice, there must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an intention to remain there;
and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

In this case, the court believed that Gallego had no intention to stay in Malaybalay.

Where the evidence of the alleged lack of residence is weak, the will of the voters should prevail.

32. ROMUALDEZ vs. RTC, Br. 7, TACLOBAN CITY (1993)

FACTS: Petitioner is a natural-born citizen. However, in 1986, during the days of People Power, relatives
of the deposed President (Marcos), fearing for their personal safety, fled the country. One of them are the
Romuladezes – they left the country and sought asylum in the United States. However, in 1991, the U.S.
Immigration informed them to depart from the U.S. or else they’ll be deported. Upon receipt of the information,
Romuladez went back to the Philippines and did not delay his return to his residence in Leyte and immediately
registered himself as a voter.
In 1992, herein private respondent Advincula filed a petition to exclude petitioner from the list of the
voters alleging that the latter is a U.S. resident, and residency is a qualification for a registered voter. However,
the MTC denied the petition but when the respondent elevated the petition to the RTC, the appellate court reversed
MTC’s ruling and disqualified Romuldez as a registered voter. Hence, this case.

ISSUES: W/N petitioner abandoned his residence

RULING: No. In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he
term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile", which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention."
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return.

Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn,
to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
(2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.

19
Given his identity and the circumstances during the time, petitioner’s sudden departure from the country cannot
be described as "voluntary," or as "abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these terms are used in
applying the concept of "domicile by choice.

33. Alcantara vs Secretary of Interior

Facts: Petitioners are confinees at the Culion Leper Colony in Culion, Palawan, having voted in previous
decisions in the Philippine Islands. That after a public meeting, they adopted a resolution demanding a right to
vote in the upcoming Plebiscite and requesting the electoral precincts be established within the radius of the
colony so that qualified voters therein could register. The resolution was sent to the Governor-General who
referred the same to the Secretary of Interior, and through its legal division ruled that no new electorate
precincts could be created because the Plebiscite was considered a special election.
Petitioners requested by telegram, the Interior Department to authorize the Balala Electoral Board of
Inspectors to register the qualified voters of the colony. The request was denied on the ground that Petitioners
were not bona fide residents of Culion Palawan, not having been residents of Culion for six months next preceding
the day of the plebiscite, for they have not acquired residence in Culion as they are confined as lepers against
their will and having no intention to reside therein as provided in Secs. 430-431 of the Administrative Code, as
amended.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioners are residents of Culion, Palawan, and as such, qualified to register and
vote therein in the upcoming plebiscite.
Held: Yes. Court ruled that under our liberal, petitioners are residents of Culion, Palawan, and entitled to register
and vote in the upcoming plebiscite, but the case must be remanded to the Balala Electoral Board of Inspectors
to determine if petitioners have the prescribed qualifications and none of the disqualifications under Sec. 431 and
432 of the Revised Administrative Code.
There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine where a person actually resides, but each
case must depend on its particular facts. The well-established rules are: (1) a person must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) where once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and
(3) a person can have only one domicile at a time.

34. BENJAMIN P. ABELLA vs COMELEC, and ADELINA Y. LARRAZABAL G.R. No. 100710
September 3, 1991
FACTS:
Larrazabal was proclaimed as governon of Kalanga, Leyte. However, petitioners posits that Larrazabal is
not a resident of Kananga, Leyte anymore but of Ormoc City wherein she established her new residence there
with her husband. Larrazabal claims otherwise; that her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City
thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS
REVERTENDI evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the course of the years, although
she had physically resided at Ormoc City."

ISSUE: WON she is no longer a resident of Kananga, leyte?

HELD:
Yes. The principle of Animus Revertendi is: Mere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to
pursue studies, engage in business, or practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or
20
loss of such residence. The determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon
intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. However, in this case there is no
evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any
calling, profession or business. What is clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband
and considers herself a resident therein. The intention of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in
Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present. The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years
does not signify an intention to continue her residence therein. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit
places where we formerly resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives therein although for intents
and purposes we have already transferred our residence to other places.
35. Larena vs Teves 61 Phil 36 (1934) – Residence

Facts: Pedro Teves, who was born in the municipality of Dumaguete, Oriental Negros, and who, from the year
1904 up to the present, has had his own house in said municipality and lived with his family in said house.

In the year 1919 he registered in the list of voters of the municipality of Bacong; ran for representative for the
second district of Oriental Negros to which said municipality of Bacong belongs; again ran for reelection in the
year 1922; and launched his candidacy for member of the provincial board of Oriental Negros in 1925, stating
under oath in his certificates of candidacy that he was a resident of said municipality of Bacong, Oriental Negros,
without having ever registered as elector in any of the precincts of the municipality of Dumaguete from said year,
1919, and having ordered the cancellation of his name in the list of voters of said municipality of Bacong only on
April 5, 1934.

Issue: W/N Pedro Teves may be considered a resident in the place of his origin for the purposes of the Election
Law, notwithstanding the fact that he was already elected in a different municipality.

Ruling: Yes.

A previous registration as voter of a candidate in a municipality other the one in which he is elected does not
disqualify him because of abandonment of his residence of origin in the municipality where he is elected. Thus,
a candidate did not lose his residence of origin in the town where he was born, notwithstanding the fact
that he registered in the list of voters of another municipality and ran for representative in the district where
that municipality belonged, and later ran for office in the town where he was born.

36. Tanseco vs Arteche 57 Phil 227 (1932) – Residence

Facts: The principal controversy in the case arises on the question whether the respondent, Pedro R. Arteche, had
requisite residential qualification at the time he was chosen provincial governor of Samar in the election of June
2, 1931. In section 2071 of the Administrative Code it is declared that no person shall be eligible for election he
is a qualified elector in the province and has, among other things, been a bona fide resident therein for at least one
year prior to the election. The relator (plaintiff) in this case asserts that the respondent had not had his residence
in the Province of Samar during the year prior to the election, having been in fact during that time a resident of
the City of Manila, where he had his home.

Pedro R. Arteche was born in the municipality of Zumarraga, Samar. When he was a mere baby his parents
removed to Catbalogan, where they have since lived. He studied in different locations (Samar, Tacloban) for high
school. And took up law in Manila. He also worked in Manila and established his residence there. He made rare
21
and merely casual visits to the province of his nativity. He repaired to Catbalogan in 1931 to open his campaign
as a candidate for governor.

Issue: W/N Pedro Arteche is entitled to claim his former domicile as his residence.

Ruling: No. The fact that the person, after moving to another place and fixing his residence in that place, may
have had a floating intention to return to his former domicile upon some indefinite occasion, does not entitle
him to claim such former domicile as his residence.

37. Nuval vs. Guray

Facts: Gregorio Nuval filed, in civil case of the Court of First Instance of La Union, in his dual capacity as a
voter duly qualified and registered in the election list of the municipality of Luna and as a duly registered
candidate for the office of municipal president of said municipality, a petition against Norberto Guray asking
for the exclusion of his name from the election list of said municipality, not being a qualified voter of said
municipality sine he had not resided therein for six months as required by section 431 of the said Administrative
Code.

Proceedings were had upon the petition and Judge E. Araneta Diaz, rendered judgment dismissing it because, in
his opinion, Norberto Guray was a bona fide resident of the municipality of Luna from January 1, 1927. As that
order was not appealable, Norberto Guray's name remained in the election list of the municipality of Luna.

Nuval appealed and the lower court erred in holding that the judgment rendered upon Gregorio Nuval's petition
for the cancellation of Norbeto Guray's name on the election list of Luna is conclude and constitutes res judiata
in the present case.

Issue: Whether or not the registration of Guray’s as a voter list bars Nuval from questioning Guray’s
residency

Ruling:

No. Registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a candidate’s lack of
residency

In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) Identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and
(c) identity of issues (Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 850). And as in the case of the petition for
exclusion and in the present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no identity either of parties, or of things or
litigious matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata.

38. SAYA- ANG vs. COMELEC

FACTS: A COMELEC resolution denying due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy for Barangay captain
for not being residents of the barangay was promulgated on the very day of the elections. Petitioner still had 5
days to file its motion for reconsideration filed a motion for reconsideration. The Barangay Board of Canvassers

22
rightly retained petitioner’s name in the list of qualified candidates and cannot be faulted from counting the votes
cast in favor of the petitioner. Petitioners was proclaimed winner the following day of the elections.

Petitioner were not given the chance to present his evidence and was not served a copy of the COMELEC
Resolution denying due course to their COC for Barangay Captain for not being a residents.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC resolution disqualifying the petitioner will be final and executory.

RULING: NO. A decision by the Comelec to disqualify a candidate shall become final and executory only after
a period of five days as explicitly provided under Sec. 3 Rule 39 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

In the present case, the assailed Resolution denying due course to petitioners certificates of candidacy was
promulgated on the very day of the elections. On that day, therefore, the decision of the Comelec had not yet
become final and executory since petitioners still had 5 days to file his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently
, the petitioner was proclaimed winner the following day having garnered the most number of votes. The
Resolution of respondent Comelec ordering their names to be deleted from the list of qualified candidates only
became final and executory five days from the promulgation thereof. The Court pointed out that petitioners
have already been proclaimed as the winners in the elections. They have already taken their oaths of office
and are, at present, serving their constituents in their respective barangays. When voters have honestly
cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers tasked under the law to direct
the elections and guard the purity of the ballot did not do their duty.

******39. wala pa****

40. SOCRATES VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Hagedorn had served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-
1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to ran for the same
position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, the
incumbent mayor, Socrates, faced recall proceedings. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the
recall election. Socrates filed a petition to disqualify Hagedorn on the ground that the latter cannot run for the
said post for his 4th consecutive term having been elected and having served as mayor for 3 consecutive full terms
immediately prior to the recall election for the same post.

ISSUE: Is Hagedorn disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule?

RULING: NO. The prohibited election refers to the next three regular election for the same office following the
end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition for two reasons;

1. A subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after the three consecutive
terms. And
2. The intervening periodconstitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
41. Ortega v. COMELEC (Effect of ineligible candidate)

Facts: Ramon Labo, Jr., who again, believing that he is a Filipino citizen, launched his candidacy for mayor of
Baguio City in the 11 May 1992 elections by filing his certificate of candidacy on 23 March. Roberto Ortega
23
also filed his certificate of candidacy for the same office on 25 March. On 26 March, Ortega filed a
disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Comelec seeking to cancel Labo’s certificate of candidacy
on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that the latter is a “natural-born”
citizen of the Philippines. On 9 May, the Comelec resolved the petition, denied due course and cancelled Labo’s
certificate of candidacy. The next day, acting on Labo’s ex-parte motion, the Comelec allowed Labo to be voted
upon as Mayoral candidate until the final resolution of the issue, in the event the case is raised to the Supreme
Court. On 13 May, Comelec resolved, motu proprio, to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins
in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio. On 15 May, Labo filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court. Meanwhile, Labo garnered the highest number of votes.

Issue: Whether the resolution canceling Labo’s certificate of candidacy (hence, his disqualification) warrants
the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared Mayor of Baguio City.

Held: The 9 May 1992 Comelec resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy had already become final
and executory on 14 May, a day before Labo filed his petition in the Supreme Court. The Comelec’s ruling is
final and executory with 5 days, after the parties the copy thereof, unless restrained by the Supreme Court. This
is pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and Section 3 of Rule 39 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. Labo, thus, cannot be proclaimed as Mayor of Baguio City. His disqualification, however, does not
necessarily entitle Ortega to be proclaimed as mayor. The ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. While
Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact
remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office. Having lost in the election for mayor, Ortega was obviously not the choice of the people of
Baguio City. As a consequence of both parties’ ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred. In view of such vacancy, the vice-mayor elect of the city in the said elections was declared Mayor of
Baguio City after being proclaimed by the City Board of Canvassers.

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.

42 Papandayan vs Comelec
GR. 151981

Facts: Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he was not a resident of
Tuburan, Lanao del Sur, for both of them are running for mayor in said place. Comelec actually disqualified
petitioner. However, during the elections, although already disqualified, he garnered the highest number of
votes, but the declaration of his win was suspended. The disqualification case went up to the SC which favored
petitioner, saying that he is in fact qualified to run as mayor and be proclaimed as such if he wins.

Issue: Won Comelec may be ordered to direct its canvassers to proclaim petitioner as duly elected mayor.

Held: Yes. The disqualification case having been decided by this court in petitioner;s favor, the annulment of
the herein challenged order suspending petitioners proclamation follows as a necessary legal consequence. Such
effect is deemed read into the decision in the disqualification case notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner
did not specifically pray for such relief.
43. Quinto vs. Comelec G.R No.189698 February 22 2010

24
[This is a decision on MR filed by COMELEC]

FACTS: The Court PREVIOUSLY HELD in its 2009 Decision (same GR. No as this case) unconstitutional
the following provisions of law:

Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code:

“Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or-controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same
at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certification of candidacy.”

And COMELEC Resolution 8678 Section 4(a) that reads:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.- a) Any person holding a public appointive office
or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

The reasons: (1) They violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because of the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive offices and those holding elective positions; (2) They are overbroad
insofar as they prohibit the candidacy of all civil servants holding appointive posts: (a) without distinction as to
whether or not they occupy high/influential positions in the government, and (b) they limit these civil servants
activity regardless of whether they be partisan or nonpartisan in character, or whether they be in the national,
municipal or barangay level; and (3) Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental
right of these public appointive officials.

ISSUE: W/N the previous decision should be reversed.

RULING: YES. The above provisions are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The provisions implement
Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from
engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. The constitutional ban does not cover elected
officials because, by the very nature of their office, they engage in partisan political activities almost all year
round, even outside of the campaign period.

The provisions are not overbroad. The overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep… whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured
through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied.

In the case at bar, the probable harm to society in permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office,
even as they actively pursue elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected
candidacies blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.

44. Dimaporo vs mitra

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FACTS:Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during the
1987 congressional elections.Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of ARMM.
Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR Under Art
IX of Sec 67 of theOmnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending to resume
performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not able to
regain his seat in theCongress.Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman because Art.
IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to the members of
Congress.

ISSUE: W/N Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for another
government position

HELD: No. In the constitution there is a new chapter on the accountability of public officers. In the 1935
Constitution, it was provided that public office is a public trust. Public officers should serve with the highestdegree
of responsibility and integrity. If you allow a Batasan or a governor or a mayor who has mandated to serve for 6
years to file for an office other than the one he was elected to, then that clearly shows that he did not intend to
serve the mandate of the people which was placed.

BOOK: all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate
which they have received from their constituents.

45. Omnibus Election Code[OEC] Sec. 67 – Validity*

308 SCRA 770 June 21, 1999

Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo, et al. v. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioners are incumbent provincial/municipal officials in Cagayan. Aguinaldo was governor. They
sought to prevent COMELEC from enforcing Sec. 67 of the OEC during the 1998 elections for violating the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. Aforesaid section states that any elective official, whether national
or local, running for a different office other than the one he is holding, except for Pres. And Vice Pres. are
deemed resigned from his office upon filing of his COC. However, Sec. 11 of the Automated Election System
Act states that they are only deemed resigned upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the
position for which he/she is running.

Petitioners argue that it shortens the terms of office of elected officials, in violated of Art. 10 of the
Constitution. [3 years, 3 terms]. COMELEC asserts that there is no violation of the equal protection clause
because the reason why incumbents running for the same position are not deemed resigned is to avoid the
disruption of delivery of essential services. While incumbents running for a different position are deemed
resigned because they are considered to have abandoned their posts by running for other posts.

ISSUE: WON Sec. 67 of the OEC is violative of Art. 10 of the Constitution.

HELD: No. OEC Sec. 67 does not violate Art. 10 of the Constitution because it does not unduly cut short
the term of office of local officials. What is expressed in Sec. 67 is in fact, “voluntary renunciation.”

46. Santiago vs Ramos

26
Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. She filed an
election protest but was subsequently elected as senator and assumed office.

Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a
Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.

Held:
YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or considered withdrawn as
a consequence of her election and assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions
thereof.

Sec. 67. Candidates holding elective office. - Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-President,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

OEC, 67 applies exclusively to an incumbent elective official who files a certificate of candidacy for any
office "other than the one he is holding in a permanent capacity." It does not apply to a person who is not
holding an elective position, such as a person who ran for president and apparently lost, and filed a
protest, and while it was pending filed a certificate of candidacy for senator.

47. Dimaporo v Mitra

Facts: Dimaporo was elected as a representative for the second legislative district of Lanao del Sur during
the1987 congressional elections. Dimaporo filed a certificate of candidacy for the position of governor of
ARMM. Secretary and Speaker of the House excluded the name of Dimaporo from the Roll of Members of HR
Under Art IX of Sec 67 of the Omnibus Election Code. Dimaporo lost the election wrote a letter intending to
resume performing his duties and functions as an elected member of the Congress. Unfortunately, he was not
able to regain his seat in the Congress. Dimaporo contended that he did not lose his seat as a Congressman
because Art. IX Sec. 67 of BP 881 is not operative in the present constitution, and therefore not applicable to
the members of Congress. He cited that the following are the grounds for a term to be shortened:
1.Holding any officer or employment in the government or ant subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof.
2. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for a disorderly behavior 3.Disqualification as determined by a resolution
of the electoral tribunal in an election contest 4.Voluntary renunciation of office

ISSUE: Whether or not Dimaporo can still be considered as a member of Congress even after he has filed for
another government position is he deemed automatically resigned

Ruling: Yes. As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces
automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as
petitioner opines, that the other position be actually held. Accordingly, a congressman who filed a
certificate of candidacy for governor in ARMM is ipso facto resigned from his position. He could not
reassume his congressional position after he lost. The fact that the ground cited in OEC 67 is not

27
mentioned in the constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of the members of
Congress does not preclude its application to present members of Congress.

Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy
for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is
forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official.

48. Monroy v. CA

FACTS: Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when on September
15,1961, his certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in theforthcoming elections
was filed with the Comelec. Three days later, or on September 18,1961, Monroy filed a letter withdrawing said
certificate of candidacy. The Comelec approved the withdrawal. But on September 21, 1961, Felipe del Rosario,
then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had
forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question.
ISSUE: Did Monroy cease to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy was filed on
September 15, 1961? (Whether there was a withdrawal of candidacy)
HELD: Yes. The withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner to his former position.
Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code (which reads “Any elective provincial ,municipal or city official running for
an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the
moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy”) makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective
upon the filing of the certificate of for another office. Thus a mayor who filed a certificate of candidacy for another
position and later withdrew the certificate with COMELEC’s approval, forfeited his position as mayor.

49. FERMIN vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Fermin was a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan. Petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the
transfer of his registration record to the said barangay claiming that he had been a resident of Barangay Indatuan
for 1 year and 6 months. The creation of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite, formally making Indatuan
a component of Northern Kabuntalan. Thereafter, the COMELEC approved petitioner's application for the
transfer of his voting record and registration as a voter of Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan.
Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan. Private respondent filed a
disqualification case against petitioner alleging that the petitioner did not possess the period of residency required
for candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC and in his application for transfer of voting record.
Elections were held without any decision being rendered by the COMELEC in the said case. Dilangalen emerged
as the victor and Fermin subsequently filed an election protest with the RTC. The COMELEC 2nd Division,
disqualified Fermin for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his declaration that
he is a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before Datu Ampatuan, Fermin could
not have been a resident of Indatuan for at least one year. Petitioner argues that he has been a resident of Indatuan
long before the creation of Northern Kabuntalan.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for disqualification and petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC have different
effects.

HELD:
28
YES. A petition for disqualification can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the
LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different
effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate,
the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate
at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.

In Miranda v Abaya, the SC made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can validly
be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she has been denied due course or cancelled under Section
78 cannot be substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.

The Court finds the COMELEC to have gravely abused its discretion when it precipitately declared that Fermin
was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan for at least one year prior to the said elections. COMELEC relied on a
single piece of evidence to support its finding.

50. Reyes vs Comelec

Facts: Petitioner Renato Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro.
An administrative complaint was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) by Ernesto Manalo.
It was alleged that petitioner exacted and collected P50,000.00 from each market stall holder in the Public Market;
that certain checks issued to him by the Department of Interior and Local government were never received by the
Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer. SP found petitioner guilty and
ordered his removal from office. However, a TRO was issued by the RTC, thus the decision of the SP could not
be served upon Reyes. The TRO later expired, however, subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon him
failed.

Reyes later filed his COC with the Comelec for mayor in Bongabong. Private respondent Rogelio de Castro
sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160) which states: 40. Disqualification. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:… (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case. But, because of
the absence of any contrary order from the COMELEC, petitioner Reyes was voted for in the elections.

Issue: W/N petitioner’s re-election to the position of mayor is valid.

Ruling: NO. A public officer who was found guilty in an administrative case and ordered removed in a
decision that became final and executory before the election is no qualified to run for reelection. Although
petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the temporary restraining
order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and it
thereafter became final, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly
removed from office and, pursuant to 40 (b) of the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from running for
reelection.

51. AGUINALDO VS SANTOS; 1992

FACTS: After a coup d'etat, petitioner (governor)was ordered to show cause why should not be suspended or remove
from office for disloyalty.
29
Petitioner was found guilty as charged and was removed from office.
While this case was pending, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor for the
coming elections. Three separate petitions for his disqualification were then filed for he had been removed from
office.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner can be removed from office upon being re-elected given the pending case against him.

RULING: NO If before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision
removing a public officer could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed
expired, and he is reelected, he can no longer be removed, because his reelection operates as a condonation of the
officer’s previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him for it.

52. Lingating vs. Comelec GR 153475 11/13/2002 (Sec. 68.3) Removed Officials

Facts: During the first term of Mayor Sulong, an administrative complaint was filed against him and several other
individuals for Dishonesty, Falsification of Public Documents, Malversation of Public Funds and violation of RA
No. 3019. On February 4 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the
charges and ordered his removal from office. Mayor Sulong filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of
appeal shortly thereafter. The Sanggunian ordered the complainant in AC No 12-91 to comment. Pending appeal,
then Vice-Mayor Vicente Imbing took his oath and assumed the office of Mayor of Lapuyan on March 3, 1992
pursuant to Section 68 of the Local Gov't Code which allows for the execution pending appeal of administrative
decisions. From February 1992 - August 2001, no comment was ever filed by the complainant in AC No 12-91
nor has the Sanggunian resolved Sulong's MR/Appeal.

On May 3, 2001 Lingating filed with a petition for disqualification of Cesar Sulong on the ground that petitioner
is disqualified from running for any elective local position having been removed from office during his first term
(1988-1991) as a result of an administrative case (AC No 12-91) pursuant to Section 40(b) of the Local
Government Code. Respondent Sulong denied that the decision in AC No 12-91 had ever become final and
executory since up to the filing of the disqualification case, no comment has been filed nor has the appeal been
resolved. After the parties had filed their memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.

Issue: WON respondent Sulong is disqualified to run for local election

Ruling: NO. The filing of motion for reconsideration by Sulong prevented the decision of Sangguniang
Panlalawigan from becoming final. There is thus no decision finding Sulong guilty to speak of. Neither can the
succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, to the office of mayor be considered proof that
the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because it appears to have been made pursuant to Sec 68 [16] of
the Local Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory.

53. FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

30
FACTS: Petitioner Florentino P. Blanco was the mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan from 1987 up to 1992. During
the May 8, 1995 elections, petition ran as a candidate for the same mayoralty position and won during the
canvassing by more than 6,000 votes over private respondent Eduardo A. Alarilla. Private respondent filed a
petition for the disqualification of petitioner on the ground of vote-buying which resulted in the suspension of
petitioner's proclamation.
On August 15, 1995, public respondent issued a resolution disqualifying petitioner as candidate for the
said position due to violation of Sec. 261 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code.
During the 1998 elections, petitioner again ran as a mayoralty candidate. Domiciano G. Ruiz, a voter of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, sought to disqualify him on the basis of the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 122258. But the
Comelec dismissed the said petition on the ground that petitioner was not disqualified under Sec 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

During the May 14, 2001 elections, petitioner again ran for a mayoralty position, but private respondent
sought petitioner's disqualification based on the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 122258.

During the May 10, 2004 elections, petitioner again ran as a mayoralty candidate, but private respondent
sought to disqualify him based on the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 122258. Petitioner withdrew his certificate of
candidacy, so the petition for disqualification was dismissed for being moot. In a Decision dated November 6,
2005, the RTC declared petitioner eligible to run for an elective office and that petitioner be declared as eligible
to run for public office.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that petitioner
is disqualified to run for an elective office
RULING: Yes. Where petitioner was disqualified in an administrative proceeding to run for mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan in the May 8, 1995 elections for vote buying in violation of Sec. 68 of the OEC. During
the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner ran anew for the mayoralty position; and gain, petitioner was disqualified
by the Comelec from running pursuant to Sec. 40(b) of the LGC for having been removed from office as a result
of the administrative case, it was HELD that Comelec erred because removal from office entails the ouster
of an incumbent before the expiration of his term. Petitioner never help office because his proclamation
was stopped. Hence, he was disqualified from continuing as a candicate only in the May 8, 1995 elections.

54. Rodriguez vs Comelec

Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. were candidates for the
gubernatorial post of Quezon Province. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez
31
challenged Rodriguez’ victory via petition for quo warranto alleging that the latter has a pending case (for
fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property.) in LA, hence, a
fugitive from justice and thus disqualified for the elective position.

Rodriguez emerged as the victorious candidate. Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez’
proclamation which the COMELEC granted.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC decision suspending the proclamation of Rodriguez is valid?

Ruling: No. A “fugitive from justice” is a person who, after being charged, flees to avoid prosecution or who,
after conviction flees to avoid punishment. A person is not a fugitive from justice if at the time he returned to
the Philippines from abroad, no complaint had been filed against him abroad.

55. Caasi vs COMELEC (Consolidated with Caasi vs CA case)

FACTS: Mateo Caasi (rival of Merito Miguel for position of Mayor) petitions for the review of the CA’s
dismissal of the appealed disqualification case against respondent Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao for being a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is
a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he
may freely enter the US for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is
a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan that he voted in all previous elections.

COMELEC has earlier dismissed the petitions on the ground that the possession of a green card by Miguel does
not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines.

ISSUE: whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A.
prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988

RULING: NO. A permanent resident of a foreign country is not eligible to run for elective office in the
Philippines. To be “qualified to run for elective office” in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who
is a green card holder must have “waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country.”
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself
constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for
elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was “disqualified to run for any elective office”.

Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card
to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18,
1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was
null and void.

56. MACALINTAL v COMELEC

FACTS: Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the ground that the provision that a

32
Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he
executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the requirement
that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote
for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s argument is correct.

HELD: No. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the
Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile
and resident are interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is
concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes
an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for
purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the
affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.

57. Singco vs COMELEC

Facts: Private respondent filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on ground of turncoatism, attaching thereto three
Identical affidavits and other documentary evidence to support his allegations. Considering the pendency of the
disqualification suit against petitioner, the COMELEC sent a telegram order to the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Ginatilan ordering the latter to suspend the proclamation with respect to petitioner, pursuant to the COMELEC's
earlier Resolution No. 8584, holding in abeyance the proclamation of any candidate that has ally disqualification
suit.

Despite the order, however the Municipal Board of Canvassers proceeded to proclaim petitioner as Mayor
of Ginatilan, Cebu, prompting private respondent, to immediately perform the COMELEC of the proclamation
of Singco and pray in his motion for the setting aside of the proclamation of Singco. Acting on the motion, tile
COMELEC, set aside petitioner's proclamation and required the Board of Canvassers to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against it; they issued resolution 9310 declaring Singco as disqualified
candidate.

Issue: W/N petitioner’s right to due process was violated

Ruling: Yes. COMELEC should hold a full dress hearing in accordance with the requirements of due
process, and the parties given fun opportunity to present all evidence relevant to the issue of turncoatism.
Unquestionably, the challenged resolution in the present case was based merely on pleadings without petitioner
having been accorded the right to be fully heard as he demanded, clearly in disregard to his right to due process.
For it is not enough that petitioner was given the opportunity to answer the petition for disqualification.

58. Gonzales vs COMELEC

Facts: Gonzales filed his certificate of candidacy as an official candidate for mayor of the Bicol Saro Party
then, Imperial as KBL provincial chairman filed with the Comelec a petition to disqualify Gonzales on the
ground that he (Gonzales) had changed his political party from KBL to the Bicol Saro Party.

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 A week later Comelec issued a resolution disqualifying Gonzales for having changed his political party
affiliation within six months prior to the election. Gonzales claims that he had never been furnished up to this
time with a copy of that resolution After the canvass of the votes, the board of canvassers proclaimed Ireneo T.
Sales, Jr., the KBL candidate, as the duly elected mayor. The votes cast in favor of Gonzales were not counted
because he was considered disqualified

Issue: W/N the Comelec committed a grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying Gonzales or whether he
was denied procedural due process.

Held: Yes. SC hold that the rudimentary requirements of fair play demand that Gonzales be afforded ample
opportunity to prove that he never disaffiliated from the Bicol Saro Party and that he did not affiliate with the
KBL.

The Comelec denied due process to a candidate sought to be disqualified where it disqualified the
candidate without hearing the candidate’s evidence, denied his motion for reconsideration in a somewhat
high-handed or cavalier manner, did not bother to resolve the factual issues raised in the affidavits
supporting his motion for reconsideration, and released the disqualification resolution on the eve of the
election.

59. RODOLFO FARIÑAS vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-52431 July 30, 1981
FACTS:
Rodolfo Fariñas was he standard bearer of the Nacionalista Party for the position of mayor. Later, he filed
with the Commission on Elections in Manila another certificate of candidacy wherein he indicated that he was
nominated by the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan as its official candidate for mayor. In view of the 2 COCs, Antonio
F. Lazo iled with the Comelec a petition to disqualify Fariñas. A copy was served to farinas to which he answered
although it was unverified. The Comelec issued a resolution thereafter holding that Fariñas’ candidacy should not
be given due course because of turncoatism and “for engaging in partisan political activities before the campaign
period”. Fariñas filed in this Court a petition for Certiorari wherein he assailed that resolution. In spite of the
disqualification resolution, Farinas still won over Lazo. Theorizing that the Comelec had tacitly acknowledged
that he was qualified for the position of mayor, Fariñas filed a motion to withdraw his instant petition for being
moot and academic; COMELEC says otherwise.

ISSUE: WON there should be a re-hearing of the case?

HELD: Yes. The previous hearing before lawyer Horacio Apostol of the Comelec was summary in
character and was not adequate to cover the factual issues involved in the case. The parties had no chance to file
memoranda. Due to the numerous pending disqualification cases and the nearness of the election, the Comelec
did not have ample time and opportunity to receive evidence in this case and to deliberate thereon. Its abbreviated
resolution is an indication that the case had not been thoroughly threshed out. There is some basis for Fariñas’
observation that the said resolution was a “midnight disqualification resolution” and that he was denied due
process (referring to another case). The comelec should hold a full-dress hearing of a disqualification suit in
accordance with the requirements of due process, otherwise the case will be remanded; such as the case at
bar. The Comelec is directed to set anew for hearing the disqualification petition of respondent Lazo, to receive
the evidence of the parties and to render another decision.

60. Potenciano vs Comelec,

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Facts: Comelec issued resolution proclaiming Etcubañez as the Governor-elect of the Province of Aurora on Feb
4 1980. A petition was filed by one Gonzales (a reg. voter) seeking the disqualification of Etcubañez, a candidate
under KBL on the ground that he was an official candidate of the LP and won as Lt. Governor of the Sub-province
of Aurora in the local elections of 1971. Comelec [Resolved] motu proprio to [dismiss] the petition.
As is clear from the assailed order of February 4, 1980 there was no hearing whatsoever on the petition for
disqualification of Etcubañez thereafter proclaimed as Governor elect of the Province of Aurora. The petition in
this case was filed with this Court only on February 11, 1980. A week before, on February 4, 1980, Etcubañez
was proclaimed.

Issue: W/N there was denial of due process when the court motu proprio dismissed the case withoun any
hearing.
Ruling: Yes. The Comelec denied due process to a candidate sought to be disqualified where it
disqualified the candidate – motu propio without any hearing.
The petition is remanded to respondent Commission on Elections and should be treated as either a regular
election protest or a quo warranto proceeding based on ineligibility of Etcubañez

61. Gomez vs. Comelec

Facts: Primitive B. Torrecampo, a registered voter of the municipality, filed a petition with the, Commission on
Elections, to disqualify Gomez as a candidate on the ground of "turn-coatism" in that "at least within six months
immediately preceding January 30, 1980, he was affiliated with the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) party (as)
the municipal chairman thereof"; and that the herein petitioner's "change of party affiliation is violative of
Section 10, Article XII (c) of the Constitution in relation to Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52.

On January 28,1980, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8529, granting Torecampos petition and ordering
the cancellation of the herein petitioner's certificate of candidacy for the reason that Gomez was elected
Chairman of the KBL Municipal Chapter of Numancia, Aklan and while being a bona fide and active member
of the KBL having been elected therefor and without having formally resigned therefrom, filed with the
Commission on Elections his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Numancia, Aklan, in
violation of the Constitution and other pertinent laws.

On that same day, the herein petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of COMELEC Resolution No.
8529, alleging that said Resolution was issued without notice and without affording him a chance to be heard;
and that the finding of "turn-coatism" is groundless.

Issue: Whether or not the resolution of Comelec was rendered without hearing thus depriving petitioner
the due process of law

Ruling: Yes.This Court, through Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, stressed "Fidelity to the authoritative
command in the leading case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, (69 Phil. 635) as to the observance
by administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers of the cardinal requirements of due process, the
most prominent of which are the right to a hearing and the necessity for substantial evidence in support of its
ruling." And, in Gonzales vs. COMELEC, the extent and scope of a hearing were spelled out thusly: "A

35
hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case
and that evidence should be taken into account in the adjudication of the case."

It results that COMELEC Resolution No. 8529, dated January 28, 1980, which was issued without proper notice
and hearing, is arbitrary and therefore, of no force and effect

62. DOMINGO vs. COMELEC

FACTS: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Ernesto Domingo, Jr. and private respondent Benjamin
Abalos, Jr. were both mayoralty candidates of Mandaluyong City. After Abalos ’ was proclaimed as winner,
petitioner filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Abalos’father influences, induces or corrupt
public school teachers who were Board of Election Inspectors by giving substantial allowances and others.
However, the affidavits of the three teachers who participated in the controversial “Pasyal-Aral” do not contain
anything but bare declarations. Nothing in these affidavits suggests, let alone sets out, knowledge on any degree
of participation of private respondent in the grant of these allowances. The name of private respondent was not
even mentioned or alluded to by any of the three affiants. COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit
treating it merely as an attempt of the petitioner to mislead the COMELEC.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner was not afforded due process.

RULING: NO. Where opportunity to be heard is accorded, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is
no denial of procedural due process. Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party
was given the chance to be heard in his motion for reconsideration.

63. GABOY vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner, a Nacionalista candidate, was elected Mayor of Tangalan, Aklan. It appears, however, that
earlier, the COMELEC in its Resolution No. 8916 dated February 5, 1980 cancelled his certificate of candidacy,
in view of the petition f or disqualification f or alleged turncoatism filed by one Anton T. Estrada. COMELEC
issued ex-parte an order directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim respondent
Aniceto Fernandez, Jr. as the duly elected mayor. Petitioner had filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of February 5, 1980, but since no action on the said motion was taken by the COMELEC, even as the
date fixed by law for the assumption of office drew closer, petitioner filed the instant petition, claiming that the
COMELEC committed an abuse of discretion in issuing the aforesaid resolution. He claimed that he was denied
due process of law as he was not afforded any formal hearing.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC resolution violated the petitioner’s right to due process.

RULING: YES. There is clearly a violation of petitioner's right to due process. The questioned resolution of the
COMELEC was based merely on the pleadings, consisting of only a petition for disqualification and petitioner's
answer thereto, and without petitioner having been accorded the right to be fully heard in his defense.

64. Say Ang v. COMELEC (Petition, notice and hearing)

Facts: Petitioners herein, Eduardo T. Saya-ang, Sr. and Ricardo T. Lara, were candidates for the Office of
Barangay Captain of Barangays Congan and New Aklan respectively for the Synchronized Sangguniang
36
Kabataan (SK) and Barangay Elections. Petitioner Saya-ang filed his certificate of candidacy in Barangay
Congan. On the other hand, petitioner Lara filed his own certificate of candidacy in Barangay New Aklan. A
letter-report was submitted by Acting Election Officer Alim to the Law Department of the Comelec which
stated that petitioners herein are not residents of the barangays they wish to be elected in. In turn, the Law
Department of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) submitted its study to the Comelec en
banc recommending the denial of due course to the certificates of candidacy of petitioners. On the day of the
elections, the Comelec, issued En Banc Resolution which essentially denied due course to the certificates of
candidacy of petitioners herein. Despite the Resolution, petitioners were still proclaimed as winners, having
garnered the most number of votes in their respective barangays. Petitioners took their oath of office.

Issue: W/N the Comelec has the jurisdiction to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.

Held: Yes. At the very outset, it must be made clear that the Comelec has jurisdiction to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after the elections, if for any reason no final
judgment of disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted
for and receives the highest number of votes, and provided further that the winning candidate has not been
proclaimed or taken his oath of office. Furthermore, a decision by the Comelec to disqualify a candidate shall
become final and executory only after a period of five days.

A petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be heard summarily after due notice.—It is clear, however,
that under Section 3, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, a petition to cancel a certificate of Candidacy
shall be heard summarily after due notice. The same rules also provide that when the proceedings are authorized
to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be required to submit their position
papers together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence; and when there is a need for
clarification of certain matters, at the discretion of the Commission en banc or the Division, the parties may be
allowed to cross-examine the affiants.

65 Ticzon vs Dizon
103 SCRA 671

Facts: Armedilla filed a case against Respondent for turncoating as he allegedly ran under the banner of KBL
while being an active member of Nacionalista Party for not more than 6 months prior the election. Such change
of political party was prohibited. Armedilla claims that due process was denied of him when Comelec dismissed
his case. Comelec as a defense claims that the parties agreed to submit the petition for resolution only through
the pleadings and affidavits as basis.

Issue: Won there was denial of due process

Held: NO. Armadilla failed to overthrow the defense of Respondent that he was already a KBL partisan. It
does not amount to denial of due process where the parties agreed to submit the petition for
disqualification for resolution on the basis of the pleadings and affidavits and the Comelec decides the
case without any hearing. Besides, he changed his party more than 6 months from election thus putting him
not guilty of turncoating.
66. Ang Tibay vs. CIR 69 Phil 635 (1940)

BOOK: See Ang Tibay although not an election case, for the requirements of due process.

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FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the
National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid
off were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union National Workers Brotherhood
(NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting
NLU.

The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU
went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The
Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: What are the requirements of due process?

RULING: Administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also
make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be
complied with by observing the following:

1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof.
2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish
the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely
nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be
“substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.
6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

Anyway, motion for new trial should be granted, and the case remanded to the CIR.

Domingo v Comelec

FACTS: Assailed in this special civil action for certiorari are the En Banc Resolution of the COMELEC and
the Resolution of the COMELEC 1st Division, which dismissed, for lack of merit, the petition for
disqualification filed by Domingo against private respondent, the incumbent mayor of Mandaluyong City.

Petitioner Ernesto Domingo, Jr. and private respondent Benjamin Abalos, Jr- both mayoralty candidates. After
private respondent's proclamation, Domingo filed petition for disqualification, on the ground that, during the
campaign period, private respondent "prodded" his father, then incumbent Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin
Abalos, Sr., to give "substantial allowances" to public school teachers appointed as chairpersons and members
of the Boards of Election Inspector (BEIs) for Mandaluyong City.
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Petitioner's allegations obtain from the “Pasyal-Aral" outing for public school teachers, then Mayor Abalos, Sr.
announcing that the teachers appointed to the BEIs will each be given substantial allowances. Petitioner alleged
that it was done so as to influence them into voting for him (Benhur) and ensuring his victory. Petitioner
presented as evidence photographs and of the said activity, affidavits of 3 public school teachers, and videotapes
showing Mayor Abalos Sr. announcing Benhur as the one responsible for such release.

Petitioner alleges that private respondent's act of "prodding" his father constitutes a violation of Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code.

In dismissing the petition for disqualification for insufficiency of evidence and lack of merit, the COMELEC
1st Division admonished petitioner and his counsel for attempting to mislead the COMELEC by making false
and untruthful statements in his petition.

On reconsideration, the COMELEC, En Banc, affirmed the findings and conclusions of its 1st Division.

ISSUE: Did the COMELEC act with grave abuse of discretion in its act of dismissing the petition for
disqualification for insufficiency of evidence, despite the "overwhelming" pieces of evidence of petitioner,
consisting of the video cassette, pictures and affidavits, which were "not denied" by private respondent and
presented "no evidence" to substantiate his defense

HELD: The burden of proving that private respondent indirectly influenced the public school teachers of
Mandaluyong City, through his father, Abalos, Sr., was a burden that petitioner failed to meet. Neither is this
burden overcome by the argument that private respondent, for himself, had "no evidence" to rebut
petitioner's allegations, since the burden of proving factual claims rests on the party raising them

Besides, it is not true that private respondent gave only denials and did not present any evidence to his defense.
Benhur presented in evidence a certified true copy of Joint Circular No. 1, series of 1998, issued by the DECS,
DBM and DILG, which authorized the payment of allowances of public school teachers chargeable to local
government funds. The Joint Circular provided the basis for private respondent's argument that the
disbursement of funds by then mayor Abalos, Sr. was valid as having been made pursuant to administrative
circular, and was not an unlawful attempt made in conspiracy with private respondent to secure the latter's
victory in the elections.

In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC's decision to dismiss the petition for
disqualification. The conclusion that petitioner's evidence is insufficient to support the charge of violation of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code was arrived at only after a careful scrutiny of the evidence at hand,
especially of the videotapes of petitioner.

BOOK: A petition for disqualification requires merely the determination of whether the respondent
committed acts tp merit his disqualification from office, and is done through an administrative
proceeding which is summary in character and requires only a clear preponderance of evidence.

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68. Decision favoring eligibility

Emmanuel Sinaca v. Miguel Mula

FACTS: 1998 Elections, 2 opposing factions of the ruling party Lakas filled in separate candidates for the
position of mayor in the municipality of Malimano, Surigao del Norte. One faction [Barbers Wing] nominated
Garchil Canoy. While the other [Matugas Wing] nominated Teodoro Sinaca, Jr. | Mula is a vice-mayor
candidate belong to Barbers. He filed a petition for disqualification against Teodoro. COMELEC 2nd division
disqualified him as mayor candidate, ordering cancellation of his COC because of prior bigamy conviction—a
crime involving moral turpitude. Teodoro filed MR. Emmanuel Sinaca was an independent candidate who
joined Matugas and became the substitute mayoralty candidate.

Mula filed a disqualification case against him, stating that the substitution was illegal, and that substitution
should only take place when a party loses representation upon disqualification of their candidate. Canoy is still
representing the party, Teodoro’s disqualification did not prejudice the party. COMELEC 2nd division dismissed
petition. COMELEC en banc reversed, disqualified Emmanuel on the ground that he was an independent
candidate for councilor prior to his nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate
who was a Lakas party member.

ISSUE: WON Emmanuel is eligible to be the substitute mayoralty candidate.

HELD: Yes. The validity of Emmanuel’s nomination as substitute candidate has been rendered moot and
academic by his proclamation as the duly elected municipal mayor. Where a candidate has received popular
mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the
candidate's eligibility for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the people. Above and beyond all, the
determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else,
that must prevail. The will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy
had not been properly sworn to.

69. Gonzales vs Comelec

Facts: Gonzales filed his certificate of candidacy as an official candidate for mayor of the Bicol Saro Party. On
January 11, 1980, Imperial as KBL provincial chairman filed with the Comelec a petition to disqualify Gonzales
on the ground that he (Gonzales) had changed his political party from KBL to the Bicol Saro Party the Comelec
issued a resolution disqualifying Gonzales for having changed his political party affiliation within six months
prior to the election. petitioner contends that the basis for his disqualification is insubstantial. It consisted
merely of his attendance at an organization meeting of the KBL.

Gonzales allowed his wife Virginia R. Gonzales to file her certificate of candidacy to substitute for him as the
Bicol Saro Party's candidate for mayor. the board of canvassers proclaimed Ireneo T. Sales, Jr., the KBL
candidate, as the duly elected mayor.

40
Gonzales filed with the Comelec a motion for the reconsideration. the view of the Solicitor General that,
because Gonzales allowed his wife to substitute for him, he is estopped to question the resolution disqualifying
him. His motion was denied

Issue: W/N he is estopped from questioning the resolution

Ruling: No. We hold that the rudimentary requirements of fair play demand that Gonzales be afforded ample
opportunity to prove that he never disaffiliated from the Bicol Saro Party and that he did not affiliate with the
KBL.The Comelec disqualified Gonzales without hearing his evidence. It denied his motion for reconsideration
in a somewhat high-handed or cavalier manner.
A candidate who is sought to be disqualified and allows another to substitute for him is not estopped to
question the resolution disqualify ing him, where he was constrained to resort to any expedient in order
that the effort and money spent in the campaign would not be wasted.

70. Ortega v Comelec

FACTS:

Ramon Labo, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baguio City. Roberto Ortega, also filed
his certificate of candidacy for the same office. Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before
the COMELEC on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein that he is a "natural-
born" citizen of the Philippines. At the hearing, Ortega presented the decision of this Court in Labo v.
Commission on Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989]) declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines. Labo, on the
other hand, though represented by counsel, did not present any evidence. Labo won the election. However,
Comelec suspended the proclamation for failure to present evidence of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Issue; Whether or not COMELEC can legally suspend the proclamation of a disqualified candidate even such
candidate received the winning number of votes.

Ruling: Yes. Counsel who filed an unresolved disqualification petition may consider asking the Comelec
for a restraining order against the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified if it appears
that such candidate has won the election, pending resolution of the disqualification petition.

The Comelec can legally suspend the proclamation of a disqualified candidate, even though he
received the winning number of votes.

71. Singco vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Petitioner was a candidate for Mayor in Ginatilan, Cebu, in the elections of January 30, 1980 under the
banner of the National Union for Liberation (NUL). Private respondent was also a candidate for the same post
under the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL). Before the elections, on January 16, 1980, private respondent filed
a petition to disqualify petitioner on ground of turncoatism, COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying the
candidate.

Petitioner seeks the nullification of the challenged resolution on ground of denial of due process, alleging that
said resolution was issued without benefit of hearing and the same was not supported by substantial
41
evidence. Furthermore, the petitioner contended that the questioned resolution was based merely on the pleadings
and no formal hearing was ever conducted.

ISSUE: Whether COMELEC denied due process

RULING: Yes, the challenged resolution in the present case was based merely on pleadings without petitioner
having been accorded the right to be fully heard as he demanded, clearly in disregard to his right to due
process. For it is not enough that petitioner was given the opportunity to answer the petition for
disqualification. Petitioner disowned the documents attached to the petition which allegedly were submitted by
him as Chairman of the KBL, alleging that his signature was forged. He also refuted the affidavit by the supposed
witness to his attendance to a KBL meeting by submitting another affidavit of the same witness who claimed that
the first affidavit was secured thru coercion. These allegations raise questions of fact that could have been thresed
out fully by the COMELEC through an actual hearing.

The COMELEC denied due process to a candidate sought to be disqualified where it disqualified the
candidate based on the pleadings and affidavits.

72. YASON VS COMELEC, 134 SCRA 371

FACTS:
On January 4, 1980 at 2:45 in the afternoon, petitioner Yason filed his CoC for Mayor of Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro. On the blank space in Item No. 4 indicating “Political Party/Group or Aggrupation,” he stated
“Nationalists (NP).”
However, he changed his mind and went back to Municipal Election Registrar and erased the words and letters,
“Nationalists (NP).” Over the erased items, he typed “Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL).” The same thing was
done for item No. 5, “state if nominated by Political Party” where the word “Yes” was erased and “Kilusang
Bagong Lipunan (KBL)” typed clearly as the answer. Both changes in items 4 and 5 were initialed by Yason.
On election day, after Yason came to know from the Certified List of Candidates furnished by the Comelec for
posting in election booths and guidance of citizens’ election committees that Comelec had listed him in the official
line-up of NP candidates, he immediately disclaimed knowledge of his having been nominated by the NP
provincial chapter.
Suarez filed with Comelec a petition for disqualification of Yason as candidate. The Comelec ordered to consider
all votes cast for Yason as stray and to declare Suarez as duly elected mayor.

Issue:
Whether or not the time to file petition for disqualification should be the day before the election.

Ruling:
Yes. A petition to disqualify a candidate, as would validly cancel any votes cast for him as “stray votes” if granted,
should be filed before the day of elections. This will enable a substitute candidacy to be filed thus giving the
electorate a choice of alternative candidates. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 8434 which mandated the

42
exact deadline for filing of petitions for disqualification. Suarez filed his petition for disqualification of Yason
after the results were already known. The Court ruled that the petition to disqualify the petitioner was filed long
after the deadline for filing had lapsed. Considering its lack of merit, it may not be validated on equitable grounds.
A party who files a petition beyond the deadline should consider asking for its validation on equitable
grounds, but he must show that the petition is meritorious.

43