ERRORS COMMITTED BY A JUDGE IN THE EXERCISE OF ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTIONS CANNOT BE CORRECTED THROUGH

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS BUT SHOULD BE ASSAILED INSTEAD THROUGH JUDICIAL REMEDIES

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ) ANTONIO M. LORENZANA,
Complainant, vs. JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas City,
Respondent.

FACTS: The complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed
Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave Incompetence, Irregularity in
the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge,
Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCP’s
objections and despite serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed rehabilitation receiver for
SCP and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of SCP’s creditors; he is also a partner
of the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.
2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as "consultative meetings" in her
Order2 dated May 11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel
and sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters and
features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings
that she would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent
dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the limits of her authority and effectively usurped and
pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be off-record so that there would
be no record that she had favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).
5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the
knowledge and presence of SCP and its creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser and, at the
same time, as her financial adviser to guide her in the formulation and development of the rehabilitation
plan, for a fee of P3.5M at SCP’s expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of
Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP, leading to
EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP could
confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the allegation that there was a need for the creation of a
management committee), the respondent denied SCP’s requests and delayed the issuance of the order
until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty. Ferdinand
Topacio; blocked his every attempt to speak; refused to recognize his appearances in court; and made
condescending and snide remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure
on Corporate Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to
her in the Rules, without asking for permission to extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the court’s power
to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include the power to amend, modify and alter it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIB’s favor and
made comments and rulings in the proceedings that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and personal
involvement in the case.

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that the
respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her photographs in a social networking
website called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of
finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered by a shawl, allegedly
suggesting that nothing was worn underneath except probably a brassiere.

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of
the law as the complainant failed to prove that her orders were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or
corruption. The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation
proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the respondent’s explanation in the charge of failure
to observe the reglementary period. Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority
and gross incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the subject of disciplinary action. On
the other hand, on allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s
observations that the respondent’s act of posting seductive photos in her Friendster account contravened the
standard of propriety set forth by the Code.
ISSUE:
WON respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.

RULING:
We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition of a fine on
the respondent but modify the amount as indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sison’s finding of
gross ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a management committee
without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no
magistrate should be forgetful or careless about.

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at best, legal
errors correctible not by a disciplinary action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the
complainant. "An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order
or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal." Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings but should be assailed instead through judicial remedies.

In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by the
complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof
indicating the respondent’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind of evidence would
have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the
respondent acted regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainant’s failure to establish
with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of bias and partiality must fail.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud,
corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan.
Besides his bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with competent proof. Bad
faith cannot be presumed and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually
proven.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for
which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand Pesos (P21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby
ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING
OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
 Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares vs. Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra
A.C. No. 11394. December 1, 2016

Facts
This instant administative case arose from a verified complaint for disbarment filed by complainant complainant Maria
Victoria G. Belo-Henares (complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws 2 and engaged in the specialized field of cosmetic surgery.3 On the other
hand, respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio ), who filed criminal cases against
complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection
and making her ill in 2009.

In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account insulting and verbally abusing complainant. The
complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that were intended to destroy and ruin
BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around 300 employees for no fair or justifiable cause.
His posts include the following excerpts:

Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My Client’s Ass, Belo. Senator Adel
Tamano, don’t kiss Belo’s ass. Guys and girls, nagiisip na akong tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to Kick some ass!!! I will
launch a national campaign against Plastic Politicians -No guns, No goons, No gold -IN GUTS I TRUST!

Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio’s Big Bang on Friday -You will go down in Medical History as
a QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS, BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, L.A.
TIMES c/o my partner in the U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles �� (September 22 at 11:18pm)

Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against me through her office receptionist in Taytay Rizal.
Haaaaay, style-bulok at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna ng Payola ang kaso … si Imelda
Marcos nga sued me for P300 million pesos and ended up apologizing to me, si Belo pa kaya? (September 15 at
12:08pm

Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may ‘extra-legal’ budget yon. Kaya Lang, bistado ko na kung sino-sino ang
tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka bumagsak pa isang ahensya ng gobyerno dito, hahaha (August 9 at 10:31pm)

Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BA TCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NJYO AKO KUNG MAGKANONG
PANGSUHOL NJ BELO PARA MADIIN AKO HA???? I just [want] to know how much she hates me, ok? Ang payola
budget daw niya runs into tens of millions …. (September 15 at 3:57pm) xxx xxx xxx
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to inspire public hatred, destroy her
reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics, as well as to extort the amount of P200 Million from her as evident from
his demand letter dated August 26, 2009, complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment against respondent
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2551.

In defense, respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy,
asserting that the posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on his private account on Facebook, meant to be
shared only with his circle of friends of which complainant was not a part. He also averred that he wrote the posts in the
exercise of his freedom of speech, and contended that the complaint was filed to derail the criminal cases that his client,
Norcio, had filed against complainant. He denied that the remarks were vulgar and obscene, and that he made them in
order to inspire public hatred against complainant. He likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from her,
explaining that he sent the demand letter as a requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case for estafa, as well as the
civil case for damages against her. Finally, respondent pointed out that complainant was a public figure who is, therefore,
the subject of fair comment.

Issues:
1. Whether respondent can validly invoke his right to privacy.
2. Whether respondent can validlyn invoke freedom of speech.

SC Ruling
Respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks about complainant and BMGI on
his Facebook account. In defense, however, he invokes his right to privacy, claiming that they were "private remarks" on
his "private account" that can only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when complainant accessed the same, she
violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.
The defense is untenable. Before, can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking activity -in this
case, Facebook -it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can materialize in cyberspace
through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in
the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant, which posts respondent
insists were set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or
features of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a select few. Therefore,
without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were
visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant
consideration.
Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts were limited to or viewable by his
"Friends" only, there is no assurance that the same -or other digital content that he uploads or publishes on his Facebook
profile -will be safeguarded as within the confines of privacy, in light of the following:
1. Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and
share in any conceivable way";
2. A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;
3. The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
4. A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are not Facebook friends with
the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends.

Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection from the prying
eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend can share said
content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Face book
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends
of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy is negated.

As to the second issue, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is
not absolute. As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-
truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with malice
tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng
Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing people to
destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the name and reputation of complainant, as
well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant
disfigured ( "binaboy ") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's
services -all these despite the pendency of the criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant. He even
threatened complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa -which is contrary to one's obligation "to act with
justice."

In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting and
undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter
violation of the following provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 7.03 -A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Rule 8.01 -A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Rule 19.01 -A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in
any case or proceeding.

By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent disregarded the fact that, as
a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that
he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and decent. Instead, he acted
inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive
way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and BMGI' s reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is exposed to criticism does
not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. In this case, respondent's remarks against complainant breached the
said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively sanctioned.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Mauricio Ulep vs The Legal Clinic
Topics:

“A lawyer, making known his legal services shall only use true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts.”—Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility

“A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory
or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications for legal services.”—Rule 3.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility

Facts of the Case:

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales, was to move toward
specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms.

Atty. Ulep files a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of its advertisements which states undignified phrases
like-- “Secret Marriage? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Information on DIVORCE, ANNULMENT, ABSENCE,
VISA. The Legal Clinic, Inc. Please call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am to 6:00pm 7 th Floor Victoria Bldg.
UN Avenue, Manila.”

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in The Philippine Star
because it is composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s situation no matter how complicated it is,
especially on marriage problems like the Sharon and Gabby situation.

Citing John Bates vs. The State Bar of Arizona, Atty. Nogales said that it should be allowed based on this American
Jurisprudence. According to him, there is nothing wrong with making known the legal services his Legal Clinic has
to offer.

Issue:

Whether or not such advertisement may be allowed.

Court Ruling:

The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals, which is undoubtedly beyond the domain of the paralegals. As
stated in a previous jurisprudence, practice of law is only reserved for the members of the Philippine bar, and not to
paralegals. As with the Legal Clinic’s advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a
lawyer in making known his legal services must use only honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts.

A lawyer cannot advertise his talents in a manner that a merchant advertise his goods. The Legal Clinic promotes
divorce, secret marriages, bigamous marriages which are undoubtedly contrary to law.

The only allowed form of advertisements would be: (1.) Citing your involvement in a reputable law list, (2.) An
ordinary professional card (3.) Phone directory listing without designation to a lawyer’s specialization.
ZALDIVAR VS GONZALES (1988)
FACTS:
Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar, governor of Antique was one of the several defendants in Criminal Cases for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act pending before the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner filed a case against both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman. Petitioner alleged that the latter, as Tanodbayan was no longer vested with power and authority
independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and
employees, under the 1987 Constitution, hence the cases filed were all null and void.

The Court then issued a TRO ordering respondents Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to cease and desist in further
investigating and arrest of the petitioner.

However, Gonzales continued filing a case against Zaldivar and also issued an alleged contemptuous statements
to the media, the “Philippine Daily Globe:” stating that Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case, and that SC
is only favoring the rich and the influential persons. The latter also said, that while the President had been
prodding him to prosecute graft cases, even if they involve the high and mighty, the SC had been restraining
him to do his official duties. Thus, this prompted Zaldivar to file a motion for contempt to Gonzales.

SC ordered Gonzales to explain himself. The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely
exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged
communications and fair criticism in the public interest.

ISSUE:
Whether Gonzales is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD:
Yes, Gonzales is guilty of contempt.

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that
right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted
to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.

The Court is compelled to hold that the statements made by Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for
the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent’s statements, especially the charge
that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision, necessarily implying that the justices of
the Court betrayed their oath of office, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements
very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration
of justice in the country.

In re: Almacen, the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the
duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

The Supreme Court suspended Gonzales indefinitely from the practice of law.
Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court.”

Facts:

SC
Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares against
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. In said
case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort women to compel certain
officers of the executive department to espouse their claims for reparation and demand apology from
the Japanese government for the abuses committed against them by the Japanese soldiers during
World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion for reconsideration.

UPLawFaculty
37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement
on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Court’s decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty.
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in the face of allegations of
plagiarism in his work.

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact,
but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how
he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those
of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the
members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty,
integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the
comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and
invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to
their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys,
and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.

Issue:

Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

Issuance of show cause order resolution to the respondents (UP Law Faculty) as to why they should
not be disciplined as members of the Bar per issues stated above.

[case is ongoing]

Dissenting Opinion:

(1) Serreno, J.
This Court, as complaining party, must state plainly how its ability to view the motion for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision can be affected in any way by the UP Law Faculty’s statement.
It must also state plainly how its ability to enforce its future orders would be eroded by the release of
the UP Law Faculty Statement. The milieu in which the Vinuya decision was received by the public is
well-known. It is not as if any outrage at the Vinuya decision was caused by the UP Law Faculty
Statement alone. It is also incredible how the Court can claim that its honesty, integrity and
competence could be eroded by an extraneous act of any person other than itself. Either one is
honest, has integrity, or is competent – or he is not. No one can undermine those qualities other than
the one in whom they inhere.

Even more important to keep in mind is the apparently redemptive intent of the UP Law Faculty when
it issued its statement. The statement is headlined by the phrase “Restoring Integrity.” In the second
paragraph, the Faculty says: “Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy that surrounded it,
it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction, as this
would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system.” In the next paragraph, it says:
“The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own
conduct, whether collectively or through its members, is beyond reproach.” In the same paragraph, it
further says: “It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely above any
and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.”

Carpio Morales, J.

The Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive flexing of the judicial muscle that could hardly
be characterized as judicious. This knee-jerk response from the Court stares back at its own face,
since this judicial act is the one that is “totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of misplaced
vigilance.”
In the matter of the charges of plagiarism, etc., against Associate
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo. [A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC]

FACTS:

On April 28, 2010, the Supreme Court issued a decision which dismissed a petition filed by the
Malaya Lolas Organization in the case of Vinuya vs Romulo. Atty. Herminio Harry Roque Jr., counsel
for Vinuya et al, questioned the said decision. He raised, among others, that the ponente in said case,
Justice Mariano del Castillo, plagiarized three books when the honorable Justice “twisted the true
intents” of these books to support the assailed decision. These books were: a. A Fiduciary Theory of
Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal of International Law (2009); b.
Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western Reserve Journal
of International Law (2006); and c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams,
Cambridge University Press (2005).
As such, Justice del Castillo is guilty of plagiarism, misconduct, and at least inexcusable negligence.
Interestingly, even the three foreign authors mentioned above, stated that their works were used
inappropriately by Justice Del Castillo and that the assailed decision is different from what their works
advocated.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is plagiarism in the case at bar.

HELD: No. There is no plagiarism. Even if there is (as emphasized by the Supreme Court in its ruling
on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Vinuya et al in 2011), the rule on plagiarism cannot be
applied to judicial bodies.

No Plagiarism

At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas. To
plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from
(another) and pass them off as ones own.The passing off of the work of another as ones own is thus
an indispensable element of plagiarism.

According to Black’s Law Dictionary: Plagiarism is the “deliberate and knowing presentation of
another person’s original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own.”

This cannot be the case here because as proved by evidence, in the original drafts of the assailed
decision, there was attribution to the three authors but due to errors made by Justice del Castillo’s
researcher, the attributions were inadvertently deleted. There is therefore no intent by Justice del
Castillo to take these foreign works as his own.

But in plagiarism, intent is immaterial.

On this note, the Supreme Court stated that in its past decisions, (i.e. U.P Board of Regents vs CA,
313 SCRA 404), the Supreme Court never indicated that intent is not material in plagiarism. To adopt
a strict rule in applying plagiarism in all cases leaves no room for errors. This would be very
disadvantageous in cases, like this, where there are reasonable and logical explanations.

On the foreign authors’ claim that their works were used inappropriately

According to the Supreme Court, the passages lifted from their works were merely used as
background facts in establishing the state on international law at various stages of its development.
The Supreme Court went on to state that the foreign authors’ works can support conflicting theories.
The Supreme Court also stated that since the attributions to said authors were accidentally deleted, it
is impossible to conclude that Justice del Castillo twisted the advocacies that the works espouse.

No Misconduct

Justice del Castillo is not guilty of misconduct. The error here is in good faith. There was no malice,
fraud or corruption.

No Inexcusable Negligence (explanation of Justice Del Castillo)

The error of Justice del Castillo’s researcher is not reflective of his gross negligence. The researcher
is a highly competent one. The researcher earned scholarly degrees here and abroad from reputable
educational institutions. The researcher finished third in her class and 4th in the bar examinations.
Her error was merely due to the fact that the software she used, Microsoft Word, lacked features to
apprise her that certain important portions of her drafts are being deleted inadvertently. Such error on
her part cannot be said to be constitutive of gross negligence nor can it be said that Justice del
Castillo was grossly negligent when he assigned the case to her. Further, assigning cases to
researchers has been a long standing practice to assist justices in drafting decisions. It must be
emphasized though that prior to assignment, the justice has already spelled out his position to the
researcher and in every sense, the justice is in control in the writing of the draft.

With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos researcher also explained, most
legal references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes or
in internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found
items that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her main
manuscript, a smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need.

She electronically cut relevant materials from books and journals in the Westlaw website and pasted
these to a main manuscript in her computer that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed
report to the Justice. She used the Microsoft Word program. Later, after she decided on the general
shape that her report would take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not
fit, changing the positions in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting
paragraphs, sentences, and words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief
editor, demanded. Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court
researchers use everyday in their work.