Contents

Acknowledgments vii
Notes on Contributors viii
Preface xiii

JUST HOW MODULAR IS THE MIND? 1

1 The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind

Peter Carruthers 3

2 Is the Mind Really Modular? Jesse J. Prinz 22

3 Is the Human Mind Massively Moclular?

Richard Samuels 37

HOW MUCH KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE IS INNATE? 57

4 Irrational Nativist Exuberance

Barbara C. Scholz and Geoffrey K Pullum 59

5 The Case for Linguistic Nativism

Robert J. Matthews 81

6 On the Innateness of Language James McGilvray 97

HAS COGNITIVE SCIENCE SHOWN THAT HUMAN BEINGS

ARE COGNITIVELY BOUNDED, OR IRRATIONAL? 113

7 Bounded and Rational Gerd Gigerenzer 115

8 Bounded Rationality and the Enlightenment Picture of Cognitive Virtue

David Matheson 134
ARE RULES AND REPRESENTATIONS NECESSARY
TO EXPLAIN SYSTEMATlCITV? 146

9 Cognition Needs Syntax but not Rules

Terence Horgan and john Tienson 147

10 Phenomena and Mechanisms: Putting the Symbolic, Connectionist,

and Dynamical Systems Debate in Broader Perspective
Adele Abrahamsen and William Bechtel 159

CAN CONSCIOUSNESS AND QUAUA BE REDUCED? 187

11 Consciousness and Oualia Can Be Reduced William G. Lycan 189

12 Consciousness and Oualia Cannot Be Reduced Brie Gertler 202

DOES COGNITIVE SCIENCE NEED EXTERNAL

CONTENT AT ALL? 217

13 Locating Meaning in the Mind (Where It Belongs) Ray lackendoff 219

14 The Intentional Inexistence of Language - But Not Cars

Georges Rey 237

IS THE AIM OF PERCEPTION TO PROVIDE ACCURATE

REPRESENTATIONS? 257

15 Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations?

K"kLudw� 259

16 Is the Aim of Perception to Provide Accurate Representations?

A Case for the MN08 Side Christopher Viger 275

CAN MENTAL STATES, KNOWLEDGE IN PARTICULAR,

BE DIVIDED INTO A NARROW COMPONENT AND A
BROAD COMPONENT? 289

17 Can Cognition be Factorized into Internal and External Components?

Timothy Williamson 291

18 The Internal and External Components of Cognition

Ralph Wedgwood 307

Index 326

o Contents