Energy Security and the Role of Nuclear Power in Japan

Tatsujiro Suzuki
Senior Research Scientist,
Central Research Institute of the Electric Power Industry

INTRODUCTION
The 20th Century is called the age of oil. It may be no exaggeration to say that the energy

policies of the major advanced nations of the world have been virtually built around oil. Like a

giant ship that is difficult to steer, long-term energy policies and the energy supply infrastructure

based on these policies cannot be altered significantly even when the energy situation changes.

Nuclear power generation is similarly entrenched. It involves a very large industrial

infrastructure which includes mines, fuel processing, spent fuel storage, reprocessing, and waste

disposal. Moreover, research and development require huge investments and a long lead-time.

So, once established, nuclear power generation is very hard to alter. This aspect has a most

significant meaning in considering the role that nuclear power generation plays in energy

security.

As of the end of 1998, there were 422 commercial nuclear power generation plants

(358.49 kW) in operation in the world, accounting for about 16% of the world’s electricity supply.

However, it is expected that the number of new projects in North America and Europe will

decline as plans for abolishing or early closure of nuclear power plants are increasing. This trend

implies that nuclear power generation may be expected to have a smaller share in world

electricity markets in the years to come.

On the other hand, Northeast Asia is the only region where nuclear power is expected to

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grow. Northeast Asian countries continue to pursue nuclear power generation to enhance energy

security in the face of dwindling regional oil supplies. Since the oil crises of the 1970’s, nuclear

power generation has played a major role as an alternative energy source, but there are many

problems yet to be resolved for nuclear power to continue to contribute to energy security.

First, it should be recognized that many of the problems facing the nuclear power industry

come from past policy decisions. In particular, the problems of spent fuel and radioactive waste

are greatly affected by the decisions regarding the nuclear fuel cycle and fast breeder reactors

(FBR).

Second, as exemplified by the Chernobyl accident in the former Soviet Union and the

critical accident in Tokai Village in Japan last September, such accidents, even one involving a

small part of the system, can seriously affect the fate of other nuclear power projects. Such

accidents affect social attitudes towards nuclear power, even spreading across national borders.

Therefore, sufficient attention should be given to the technical risks and the effects they pose.

Lastly and perhaps most importantly, nuclear power’s image is linked to its relationship

with nuclear weapons. Nuclear power programs for civilian and military use are given clear

distinction by law, but it is more difficult to give them technical distinction. The use and

reprocessing of plutonium have posed the greatest danger of being employed for nuclear

weapons.

The energy environment for the 21st Century is very opaque and uncertain. How can we

cope with this uncertainty? What future role will nuclear power play? To answer these questions,

it is necessary to weigh nuclear power’s role as a relatively secure alternative to fossil fuels

against its technical risks, lack of public acceptance, and potential security role.

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HISTORY OF NUCLEAR POWER DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN

Ensuring the nuclear cycle and the fast breeder reactor (FBR), as the starting point: 1950s to

1960s.

Nuclear power development in Japan began with the 1953 historic speech “Atoms For

Peace” by U.S. President Eisenhower at the United Nations. Immediately thereafter, in 1954, the

Atomic Energy Law was promulgated. This law provides for three principles (independent,

democratic, and open) for the peaceful use of nuclear power in Japan. In 1956, the Atomic

Energy Commission was organized, working out “Long-Term Plans for the Research,

Development and Use of Nuclear Power” (hereinafter called “Long-Term Plans”). The 1956

Long-Term Plans stated that: “… the basic policy dictates that the reprocessing of spent fuels be

conducted in Japan as far as possible … Japan’s effort to develop nuclear power shall aim to

develop the fast breeder reactor (FBR) which is deemed to be the most suitable atomic reactor for

Japan from the viewpoint of effective use of nuclear fuel resources.”1

With Japan lacking in uranium, the decision to opt for the FBR was a logical decision,

consistent with the prevailing worldwide trend of developing the FBR given the limit to the

world’s uranium supplies. By 1956, commercial nuclear power plants had already been in

operation in the U.S. It was also decided to introduce the light-water reactor (LWR) to be pursued

simultaneously with development of the FBR. The introduction of these technologies from the

U.S. and the decision on the use of enriched uranium was to affect Japan’s development of

nuclear power in a significant way.

In 1967, recognizing that the effort to introduce the LWR was making steady progress, the

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Atomic Energy Commission announced a Long-Term Plan which helped finalize the increasingly

fast development of FBR-nuclear fuel and a long-term commitment to it.

The LWR having come to stay and the delay in the development of the nuclear fuel cycle

In the 1970s, the introduction of nuclear power generation began to accelerate. After the

oil crisis in 1973, nuclear power became the “major electricity source as an alternative to oil.” In

1974, “three electric power laws” were promulgated (the Law for the Neighboring Area

Preparation for Power Generating facilities, the Electric Power Development Promotion Law,

and the Electric Power Development Promotion Special Accounting Law).

Under these laws, electric power location subsidies were to be given to the municipalities

(prefectures, cities, and towns) that agreed to accept nuclear power generation and other

large-scale power generation plants. The Electric Power Development Promotion Tax was

incorporated into electricity bills to fund these subsidies. Nuclear power plants were to be given

subsidies twice as high as coal-fired or oil-fired thermal power plants, providing a powerful

financial incentive. Initially, the Electric Power Development Promotion Tax charged was 0.085

yen per kWh, and it was raised to 0.30 yen per kWh in 1980. An electric power diversification

account was added to fund alternative energy research. The tax was raised to the prevailing rate

of 0.445 yen per kWh in 1983. This tax revenue was included in a special account to be shared

almost equally between the Science and Technology Agency and MITI. The tax system under the

“three electric power laws” ensures that subsidies and research funds play a major role in

promoting Japan’s policies of developing energy alternatives to oil, especially nuclear power.

In recent years, however, these three laws have proven less effective in gaining new sites

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for nuclear power. Especially after the Chernobyl accident, the only site to be agreed on was in

Totsu (in Aomori prefecture).

Although initial goals were not met, Japan saw its nuclear power development make

steady progress in the 1970s and the 1980s. The number of nuclear reactors at existing sites has

increased steadily through continued expansion since the late 1970s. Nuclear power has

maintained itself in Japan as a low-cost, stable source of electric power, with the nine major

electric power companies all owning nuclear power plants (some under construction) by the

middle of the 1980s.

On the other hand, the development of the FBR and the nuclear fuel cycle has met with

unexpected difficulties as compared with the commercial LWR. First, the operation of the

experimental FBR Jouyu was delayed until 1997, and the fast breeder prototype reactor Monju

was not completed in the 1980s. The Monju and the succeeding FBR programs will be discussed

later at length. The ATR (Advanced Thermal Nuclear Reactor) was expected to serve until the

FBR is commercialized so the prototype reactor “Fugen” continued operation. By contrast, the

demonstration reactor program experienced costly delays and was eventually cancelled due to

rising costs in the 1990s. The processing experiment for the ATR and FBR plutonium fuel

(uranium and oxide mixtures, to be called “MOX”) has been making steady progress at the PNC

(the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp) with the results matching those in

America and Europe.

The PNC had a pilot plant (90 tons per year) built in Tokai Village for the reprocessing of

the LWR spent fuel, but the operation was put on hold in the mid-1970s by the implementation of

U.S. President Carter’s policy of nuclear non-proliferation. After India’s nuclear testing in 1974,

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the danger of converting civilian-use plutonium for nuclear weapons began to attract attention,

prompting U.S. President Ford’s announcement of a temporary freeze on reprocessing for

civilian use. President Carter pushed this policy a step further, announcing an indefinite

postponement of the commercialization of the civilian-use reprocessing/FBR. As a result,

Japan’s reprocessing plans, which required America’s consent under a bilateral agreement, ran

into a large barrier.

President Carter’s policy of curtailing the reprocessing of plutonium was opposed by

Japan and Europe, which were being brought into the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Evaluation (INFCE). Japan was allowed to begin operating part of the reprocessing facilities at

Tokai Village on condition that “Japan will not commit itself to second reprocessing facility.”

Subsequently, President Reagan helped to remove the ban on reprocessing temporarily, but the

negotiations between Japan and the U.S. were most difficult, eventually leading to the revision of

the Japan-U.S. Nuclear Agreement.

Thus, the Japan-U.S. questions involving reprocessing showed that Japan’s nuclear fuel

cycle plans were linked to international politics. As a result of the long-standing Japan-U.S.

negotiations, the comprehensive consent clause under the new agreement helped significantly to

expand the degree of freedom of Japan’s plutonium plans, but the inclusion of the pollution

clause made it impossible to escape from the U.S. influence for some time.

Japan also pursued relations with European countries with nuclear capacities (especially

the U.K. and France). In the early 1970s, spent fuels were being generated in quantities that far

exceeded Japan’s reprocessing capacities. Japan needed to gain access to reprocessing facilities

in other countries. Reprocessing contracts were made with COGEMA of France and BNFL of

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the U.K. under which the recovered plutonium as well as the high-level radioactive waste

materials were to be returned to Japan. Meanwhile in the 1980s, domestic commercial

reprocessing programs also emerged. In 1980, amendments to Japanese laws also made it

possible for private-sector companies to do reprocessing. A private reprocessing company,

“Japan Nuclear Fuel Service Ltd.” (now called Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.), was created. Japan’s

electric power companies were its major equity holders. The company agreed to locate a large

commercial reprocessing plant (800 tons per year), a uranium concentration plant, and a

low-level waste disposal facility at Rokkasho Village in Aomori prefecture. Still, Japan’s plants

were producing spent fuels in quantities exceeding Japan’s reprocessing capacity, prompting the

policy for “partial reprocessing (partly interim storage)” introduced in 1987. Also, FBR

programs in America and Europe, which began before Japan’s program, started to experience

delays or even cancellations, making the economic feasibility of the use of plutonium

increasingly uncertain.

Growing public doubts and the age of surplus plutonium: 1990s up to the present

In the 1990s, the climate for nuclear power development changed significantly, with the

transportation of plutonium facing more-than-expected opposition not only from the U.S. but

also from nations along the transportation routes. This opposition surprised Japan. It had

committed to meet all the requirements according to international rules and bilateral agreements

and also had made the necessary preparations. The opposition not only raised questions about

transportation safety but also criticized Japan’s plutonium policies and its nuclear power policies

per se, even raising fear of Japan owning nuclear weapons.4

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 In answering these criticisms and fears, the Atomic Energy Commission announced a

policy of “not choosing to possess any surplus plutonium,” making the plutonium inventory

known to the general public in an effort to improve transparency and trust. Satsuki Eda as the

Minister of the Science and Technology Agency (also Chairman of the Atomic Energy

Commission) in the Hosokawa coalition cabinet organized a “Session to Hear Opinions,” trying

to make the policy making process better known to the general public.

But in 1995, Japan’s nuclear power policy was seriously affected by a sodium leakage

accident at the Monju prototype FBR.

The ill-organized effort to deal with this accident, rather than the actual technical

problems, led to doubts about the structure of the PRNFDC as the central organization to promote

the FBR. The PRNFDC disintegrated further with another accident in 1997 at the asphalt

solidification facilities in the processing plant. These accidents left questions about Japan’s FBR

development effort.

In January 1996, the governors of Fukui, Fukushima, and Niigata prefectures, the major

prefectures where nuclear power plants are located, made a direct proposal to the Prime Minister

entitled “Hoping to build a national consensus.” Taking this opportunity, the Atomic Energy

Commission made a policy statement “Toward building a national consensus,” which covered: 1)

increased disclosure of information, 2) “Atomic Roundtable Sessions” to air opinion and 3)

discussion of the FBR and radioactive waste disposal issues at a meeting yet to be organized. The

roundtable meetings and public meetings had moderators or chairmen who were non-experts

from outside the industry. Critical opinions about nuclear power and the FBR were voiced at the

sessions.

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 This effort was praised for its precedents for a new policy making process in Japan. But

the domestic climate for nuclear power has not improved. For example, the proposal for Tohoku

Electric’s planned nuclear power plant at Maki village was voted down by a majority of the

village people in August 1996. Moreover, the critical JCO accident at Tokai village in September

1999 has helped create another big obstacle to nuclear power.

A recent report on nuclear power from the December 1997 people’s meeting to discuss

the FBR remains notable. The most remarkable outcomes of the meeting were a declaration of

nuclear power as “an effective future alternative to fossil fuels” and the statement that “In

commercializing the FBR, flexibility must be used while ensuring safety and economy,” which

helped to cause a stir in the hitherto inflexible development effort6.

While supporting a continuation of the FBR research and development effort, this

proposal offered flexibility, which was contrary to the official policy of the Atomic Energy

Commission. The decision (December 1997)7 of the Atomic Energy Commission in response to

this proposal indicated increased flexibility in carrying out the nuclear power programs by stating

that “...considers the conclusion of the people’s meeting to be appropriate. The commission will

use flexibility in commercializing the FBR in respect of the development programs including the

time of commercialization.” This resulted in the virtual postponement of the demonstration

reactors planned after the “Monju.” A new development team was organized with the Japan

Nuclear Cycle Organization (JNC), the successor to the disbanded Power Reactor and the

PRNFDC. The new team will have to restart research and development efforts for the

commercialization of the FBR, potentially delaying the commercialization of the FBR until 2030

or later.

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 Delay in the development of the FBR has at least temporarily curbed demand in Japan for

plutonium. As contracted processing of plutonium in Japan and Europe has progressed,

plutonium inventory has increased from less than 1 ton in 1992 to 5 tons in Japan and 24 tons in

Europe (France and the U.K.) in 1998 for a total of 29 tons8. The Japanese government, which

wants to push the use of plutonium in order to deal with its own growing stock of plutonium, got

Cabinet approval “on the current promotion of the nuclear fuel cycle.” Normally, a decision by

the Atomic Energy Commission is a matter “to be reported to a Cabinet meeting,” but in light of

its importance, this decision was treated as a matter “to be approved by a Cabinet meeting.” This

decision included the following two important items.

[1] The promotion of Pu-thermal: Recycling plutonium in the existing LWR is called

“Pu-thermal.” The reprocessing contracts with Europe are expected to produce a total

of about 30 tons of recovered plutonium, the only outlet for which at the moment is

“Pu-thermal”. Of the opinion that all electric power companies that operate any

nuclear power plant may well employ “Pu-thermal” in turn, the Japanese government

decided that “Pu-thermal” should be employed at ten to fifteen nuclear power plants

by 2010.

[2] The storage of spent fuels: Spent fuels are being produced in quantities that far exceed

the reprocessing capacity. This excess will continue even if the reprocessing plant at

Rokkasho village opens as scheduled. Therefore, approval has been given for storage

at facilities other than nuclear power plants.

Backed up by this Cabinet approval, “Pu-thermal” had been accepted by Fukui and

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Fuskushima prefectures and approved by MITI, and a decision was almost made for it to be

commercialized within 1999. However, the September 1999 critical accident at Tokai village and

the subsequent fabrication of the MOX data have helped to delay its implementation

considerably9.

The Advisory Committee for Energy issued an interim report10 in June 1998 on spent

fuels storage after Cabinet approval. The report designated spent fuels as “recyclable fuel

resources,” emphasizing that they are an important energy resource and that they should be kept

in “interim storage” until required for reprocessing. The report also proposed that the laws and

regulations be amended to make it possible to store spent fuels at facilities other than nuclear

power plants. Based on this report, the regulations on nuclear reactors and other related matters

were revised, making possible commercial storage of spent fuels. This revision of the regulations

helped significantly to increase flexibility involving the management of spent fuels by electric

power companies. But here again, even after the storage pool (3,000 tons) of the reprocessing

plant at Rokkasho village in Aomori prefecture was completed, the data on casks containing

spent fuels were found to have been tampered with, significantly delaying the actual start of

transportation of spent fuels. The candidate sites for the interim storage have not yet been

announced. Since the lack of spent fuel storage capacity can force a nuclear power plant to

discontinue operations, this issue, in a sense, should be recognized as most important for energy

security.

Further, this issue is very closely related to the issue of high-level waste disposal. With

reprocessing a precondition in Japan, vitrified high-level radioactive materials from a nuclear

power plant are specified as high-level waste. As a result, preference was first given to

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reprocessing, and the high-level waste disposal plans began with ensuring storage of vitrified

waste from high-level radioactive materials. Despite the commissioning of storage capacities at

Rokkasho village, final disposal plans have lagged behind the rest of the advanced nations. This

adds further uncertainty to future of nuclear power development in Japan.

The Atomic Energy Commission has been listening to public opinion by organizing

public meetings to discuss the high-level wastes. But future prospects remain uncertain, with no

specific plans in sight. According to the present plans, a high-level waste organization is to be

created this year, but many issues remain to be resolved including location and funding.

CONTRIBUTION TO ENERGY SECURIY

The fiction of domestic energy

Most obvious among the goals of energy security policy is the establishment of an

independent energy supply, or, in other words, the establishment of domestic energy supply

systems. As discussed earlier, since the beginning of Japan’s nuclear power development effort,

nuclear power has been regarded as almost domestic energy when the FBR is employed.

Plutonium is essential as a major fuel for nuclear power generation. However, arguments that the

use of plutonium is a precondition for energy security are wrong as a matter of fact. There are

three paradoxes about plutonium that are important to understand.

(a) Paradox #1: The more plutonium used by a nation, the more the nation becomes influenced by

international politics.

Plutonium is produced in an existing nuclear reactor. Spent fuels contain about 1%

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plutonium. Recovering this plutonium by “reprocessing” and re-using it as fuel is called the “fuel

cycle.” So, once the nuclear fuel cycle is established at home, nuclear power becomes almost an

indigenous energy, and, moreover, if the FBR is commercialized, nuclear power becomes an

inexhaustible domestic energy. This is the basic theory behind the pursuit of plutonium as the

ultimate domestic energy source.

However, the reality is not so simple. The fact that plutonium can be used for nuclear

weapons dictates that the use of plutonium by nations such as Japan be rigorously controlled by

international law. As mentioned earlier, the use of plutonium by Japan is subject to the bilateral

agreement with the U.S. and to various other international regulations and restrictions. Thus, if

problems with any country’s plutonium use become an international issue, it can affect the

restrictions imposed on Japan. In other words, the more a nation depends on plutonium for its

nuclear power generation, the more that nation is influenced by international politics.

(b) Paradox #2: The more plutonium used, the less the value of plutonium in saving the uranium

resource.

Uranium is an exhaustible resource. To save uranium as far as possible is essential,

especially for Japan, which lacks uranium resources. As discussed earlier, the ultimate method of

nuclear power generation is by a plutonium-based FBR. But even before the FBR is

commercialized, a theoretical 20% to 30% saving of plutonium is believed to be possible by

using Pu-thermal.

However, the reality is much more complex. First, the uranium resource is an exhaustible

resource. Yet, geologically speaking, it is a relatively abundant resource. Judging from the

figures recently published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), there seems

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assuredly to be enough uranium to meet demands for at least 50 years11. If uranium in seawater is

included, the resource is a huge one12. For now, uranium prices are depressed, leaving

non-existent economic merit for Pu-thermal. When long-term resource savings are the goal,

Pu-thermal will lose its value as an energy resource rather than helping to “reduce” plutonium. In

the long-term, it will be more efficient to store away plutonium as spent fuel and recover it when

employment of the FBR requires it. Consequently, the Pu-thermal cannot be the most efficient

method of saving uranium from a long-term point of view.

(c) Paradox #3: If use of plutonium for peaceful purposes is to make progress, there should be

greater stocks of plutonium available. On the other hand, nuclear disarmament and nuclear

non-proliferation require efforts to reduce plutonium inventories.

The weapons-class plutonium used for nuclear weapons is a highly pure Pu239 90%, only

4 kg of which can make a nuclear explosive device. However, the nearly 200 kg of plutonium

produced every year by a one-million-kWh nuclear reactor is a “low grade” Pu239 60% (called

“nuclear reactor class plutonium”) and is not used as a material for nuclear weapons. Therefore,

it follows that civilian-use programs to make use of the nuclear reactor class plutonium will not

pose such a nuclear proliferation risk as the critics maintain. Also, increased peaceful use of this

material requires larger inventories, which will eventually be consumed as fuel and will not lead

to worsened nuclear proliferation risks.

Nevertheless, in the international arena, this common sense is no longer acceptable. It has

already been shown that even nuclear reactor class plutonium can make nuclear explosive

devices, and the categories for international nuclear guidelines do not distinguish plutonium by

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its isotope components. As mentioned above, the international guidelines on plutonium aim to

balance the supply and demand of plutonium, sustaining the momentum towards reduced

inventories. Given the fact that the management and disposal of plutonium recovered in the U.S.

and Russia becomes a most important issue for international security with the progress of nuclear

disarmament, it will never be a welcome policy to produce more plutonium.

The above discussion will make it apparent that given the paradoxes of plutonium, the

concept that it will become Japan’s ultimate domestic energy source and will contribute

significantly to Japan’s energy security must be reconsidered.

Stable supply of uranium fuel and its contribution to the best mixes of energy sources

How should the role of nuclear power in Japan be evaluated? Discussion of this question

comprises three main arguments: a) nuclear power generation reduces dependency on oil, b) it

provides stability of supply, and c) it contributes to the diversification of energy resources.

Nuclear power generation here does not necessarily assume the establishment of the nuclear fuel

cycle, but means generation by the existing LWR using uranium of low concentration.

(a) Ability to reduce dependency on oil

Since the 1973 oil crisis, a top priority of the Japanese government’s policies has been

development of alternative energy sources to oil. Nuclear power has contributed significantly as

an alternative to oil. Japan’s dependence on oil for electricity generation declined from over 70%

in 1973 to about 15% in 1998, mainly through the substitution of nuclear power (along with

natural gas) for oil.

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 However, it is not certain that future increases in nuclear power generation will

necessarily lead to oil replacement. According to Japan’s future electricity supply plans, nuclear

power’s share of total power generation is expected to rise to 45% in 2010 from the present 35%,

while that of oil will only fall modestly (see Appendix, Figures 1-1, 1-2). In terms of total energy

supply, nuclear power’s share will increase to 17% in 2010 from 12% now (see Appendix, Figure

2). But nuclear power cannot be counted as an alternative energy for transportation, which is the

largest use for oil, indicating that nuclear power’s ability to reduce dependence on oil in terms of

total energy has become less important than in the 1970s.

(b) Supply stability

In addition to its contribution as an alternative energy source to oil, nuclear fuel can be

evaluated as one of the more stable sources of supply. Main points contributing to supply

stability are relative abundance, resistance to supply disruptions, and price stability.

i) Abundance of Uranium

It is argued that uranium exists abundantly in stable supply in contrast to oil when

considering political factors. Major uranium suppliers include Canada, Australia, France and the

U.K. (which receives uranium shipments from Namibia and South Africa for re-export). Proven

reserves divided by annual production (R/P) are said to be good for more than 70 years, assuring

sufficient quantities to last for the next 50 years. With prices and growth in demand recently

depressed, however, new mines have not been developed. According to forecasts by the OECD

and the NEA, supply capacity may possibly go below demand in the next ten years, making

supplies less secure. Japan has secured its needs until at least 2010 under long-term purchase

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contracts so there is no fear of short supply under normal circumstances.

(ii) Resistance to supply disruption

Historically, uranium has often been put under the control of the government as a strategic

resource, and in some cases, state-owned companies are commissioned to handle sales and

marketing (as is the case with COGEMA). This means that an abrupt individual government

decision by a big uranium supplier can significantly affect the uranium market. As a matter of

fact, in 1974, immediately after the nuclear testing by India, Canada chose temporarily to suspend

exports of uranium due to concern for nuclear non-proliferation. The Canadian move did not

directly affect Japan’s procurement of uranium. Nevertheless, it had a significant psychological

impact on Japan. Nowadays, in a move to address environmental protection and opposition from

the aborigines, the development of Australian mines has been partly curtailed. Therefore,

uranium is not truly an energy source that is free from political influence and potential disruption.

Yet, nuclear power generation is most resistant to the disruption of fuel supply. This

resistance is due to the lead-time for fuel procurement that can be characterized as a feature of

nuclear power generation technology. It takes about two years to mine, concentrate, process, and

charge a nuclear power plant with uranium. Even if procurement contracts should be disturbed,

uranium fuel procured under old contracts will continue to arrive at the nuclear power plant for

the next two years. Moreover, once the fuel is charged into the reactor, normally it does not need

replenishment for up to one year, making it possible to use an average of half a year under normal

operation. This lends credence to the idea that uranium offers strong resistance to the disruption

of supply as compared with oil, which has a short lead-time and needs constant replenishment.

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 Furthermore, uranium has an energy density one million times that of fossil fuel, helping

to making it easy and cheaper to store. According to the OECD, France maintains two to three

years of uranium supplies in storage. Japan is said to hold similar amounts. This also explains

the relatively calm response in coping with the unusual situation of the closure of processing

facilities.

(iii) Fuel Price Stability

Finally, it should be noted that uranium prices are fairly stable. The biggest risk an oil

crisis poses to Japan does not lie in the physical securing of the fuel itself but in abrupt

fluctuations in price. Even LNG prices are directly affected by oil price movements since LNG

contract prices are linked to international oil price levels. In contrast to oil prices, nuclear fuel

costs have been relatively stable. During the oil crises, there were times when uranium prices

soared. Nevertheless, uranium fuel costs account for less than 10% of total nuclear power

generation costs. Thus, if uranium fuel prices were to double, nuclear power prices would only

rise by 20%. A comparison of fuel costs in the past shows that nuclear power generation is

relatively stable.

However, in years ahead with the number of new nuclear power plants decreasing and the

average age of the nuclear power plants going up, the cost components for nuclear power

generation will change, pushing its relative share of total fuel costs higher. Therefore, the

stability of fuel cycle costs will be increasingly important in years to come.

(c) Contribution to Diversity

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 The degree of nuclear power’s contribution to energy security can also be evaluated from

the angle of diversification. To promote energy diversity, it is important for Japan to reduce its

dependence on oil. For diversity of electric power supply sources, Japan’s index is the highest in

the world at 1.56–far exceeding the OECD average of 1.48. Japan enjoys a well-balanced mix of

nuclear power, natural gas, oil, coal, and hydroelectric power. It will be important to maintain the

share of nuclear power as it is now (at 30% to 35%) in years to come. Conversely, the degree of

energy diversity will most likely go down when nuclear power’s share exceeds 40%.

Contribution to a Better Environment

As the so-called 3Es (Energy, Environment, and Economy) are cited as goals of MITI’s

policies, environmental protection as well as energy security has recently been given serious

consideration. As a non-fossil fuel that does not generate carbon dioxide, nuclear power is

considered a trump card in reducing globe-warming gases. The 1998 interim report of a Demand

and Supply Sub-committee Meeting of the Advisory Committee for Energy says that for Japan to

achieve its goals set forth in the December 1997 Kyoto Protocol, it will be necessary to increase

nuclear power generation capacity to nearly 7,000 kWh from the present level of 4,500 kWh.

This recommendation has led to an energy policy to “build new nuclear power plants.” The most

practical alternative to supplying the increase in demand with nuclear power is to supply more

electricity by thermal power generation. This would require increasing LNG-fired thermal power

generation. Without nuclear power, Japan would have to reduce demand for fuel in the

transportation sector as well to achieve the goals of the Kyoto protocol. This could reduce

19
economic growth by 1.2% to 1.7% and result in a loss of 730,000 to 2,250,000 jobs15.

To be sure, increase in nuclear power generation in the past has contributed considerably

to the reduction of carbon dioxide generated by Japan. In the 1960-70s, dependence on fossil

fuels (coal and oil in particular) was high, whereas partial conversion to natural gas and nuclear

fuel helped to reduce Japan’s unit quantity of carbon dioxide gas generated from 0.6 kg CO2/kWh

(in the 1970s) down to 0.38 kg CO2/kWh (in 1998)16.

However, the environmental gains to come from nuclear power will only be significant to

the extent it replaces coal-fired generation capacity. Nuclear power provides most of the base

load for electric power sources already. Another major electric power source for the base load is

coal-fired thermal power. If increased capacity of nuclear power goes as far as to replace coal,

this will help significantly to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. But more recently,

natural-gas-fired power generation is receiving attention as the most economic source, since

combined cycle gas turbine power plants, with their higher efficiencies, are more cost-effective

than coal-fired power plants. It is believed that LNG-fired power generation now used for the

middle load can be used for the base load in future. In this case, carbon dioxide emissions will be

reduced using coal-fired power generation for the middle load. Japan’s electric power sector has

already succeeded in curtailing carbon dioxide emissions to some extent, which indicates that

emissions here will likely grow less than Japan’s average in years to come.

Nuclear power has no use other than that of electric power generation and therefore can

only be of limited effectiveness in contributing to Japan’s total primary energy supply. Given that

expansion of energy use is likely to come mainly in the transportation sector, effective policies

for energy security must focus on primary energy in general and the area of transportation in

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particular.

Nuclear Power Generation Issues: After the Tokai Village Accident

The JCO accident took place at Tokai village on September 30, 1999. It was the worst

nuclear accident in Japan, and it fundamentally shattered the trust of the Japanese people in the

industry’s management capabilities for nuclear power generation. It will doubtlessly affect

Japan’s nuclear power industry for years to come. Even before this accident, there were a huge

number of unresolved issues to be addressed by Japan’s nuclear industry. The industry needs to

improve competitive performance, repair its public image, and develop new ways to dispose of

nuclear wastes and spent fuels17.

In the nuclear industry, where safety must come first, the pressure of deregulation and

cost-reduction is being increasingly felt. This pressure contributed also to the Tokai village

incident. In the years ahead, competition will increase with the deregulation or liberalization of

the electricity market. In Japan, nuclear fuel is said to have an economic advantage over fossil

fuels, but in the future nuclear power generators may have to compete with the marginal cost

competition from Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and even other nuclear facilities.

According to an assessment18 conducted by the Central Research Institute of the Electric

Power Industry on awareness of these issues, costs of existing nuclear power plants are estimated

to drop to 5.10 yen per kWh in 2010, from 7.23 yen per kWh in 1996. However, with new nuclear

power plants alone, costs are estimated to be 9.93 yen per kWh in 2010, and 6.24 yen per kWh in

the same year for existing and new plants combined (see Appendix, Figures 3 and 4). Further, a

review of the cost components of nuclear power generation shows that the capital cost, which

21
accounted for 49% of total costs in 1996, will drop to only 27% of total costs in 2010, and will be

as low as 9% for existing plants alone. On the other hand, the operation and fuel recycling costs

will increase to 38% and 35% of total costs, respectively, by 2010 (see Appendix, Figure 5).

These figures make it clear how important reduction of the operating and the fuel recycling costs

as well the plant construction costs19 is to the competitiveness of nuclear power.

The belief in a high degree of safety and trust in the Japanese nuclear power industry may

have evaporated with the Tokai village accident. Until then, Japan’s nuclear safety

administration was convinced that “(serious) nuclear accidents will not happen.” As this accident

has shown, however, a stance that assumes “zero risk” (that is, just whether accidents will happen

or not) is unrealistic. In other words, it is necessary to establish a “relative safety theory” which

may well include safety discussions based on the theory of probability, comparisons of the

benefits and the risks nuclear power offers, and comparisons between nuclear power and other

energy sources. Some say that the Japanese people do not trust nuclear safety because of a lack of

reasonable explanations. This accident has also shown that there is a lack of trustworthy risk

information. A mechanism is needed that propagates information on the risks posed by modern

science and technology. This will be most important for considering energy security.

To gain people’s confidence, it will be necessary to review the regulation and

administration of safety and also intensify voluntary restrictions by the nuclear power industry. It

will also be necessary to secure risk management capabilities to deal with nuclear terrorism and

sabotage.

Continuous operation of a nuclear power plant requires reliable storage and management

of spent fuel. So far, the only sites to be considered have been within the power generation site

22
and the reprocessing plant. Down the road, it will become essential to build so-called “interim

storage facilities,” since storage capacity is limited. Compared to other nuclear facilities, storage

of spent fuel is very safe. It is not only economical but there are diverse storage choices,

requiring less rigorous requirements than the nuclear reactor. Also, reprocessing and waste

disposal schedules can be made flexible by using interim storage.

As mentioned earlier, the interim storage of spent fuel is considered to be of sufficient

importance to require approval of the Cabinet. But the responsibility of creating such storage

basically falls on the nuclear power industry itself. Given the importance of this issue to the

future of nuclear power in Japan and Japan’s energy security, however, the government should be

more involved in the process.

There are several ways the government could support the construction of interim storage.

Spent fuel, which is called a “recycle fuel resource” as a valuable energy reserve, may well

deserve a national reserve, similar to the national oil reserve. To ensure secure operation of

nuclear power plants and also to facilitate the siting of private-sector interim storage facilities, the

government could make use of state-owned land for the storage of spent fuel. Specifically, a

national reserve to last for about ten years (10,000 tons) would significantly reduce the load on

electric power, making it unnecessary to do the burdensome reprocessing. A national tanker

reserve for an emergency escape may also deserve consideration.

Another possibility would be for the Japanese government to consider participating in an

international reserve. This can be done as part of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament

projects in the arena of international politics. An international reserve must be pursued between

governments and through cooperation with international organizations and must be considered

23
separately from the reserves to be pursued by the private-sector industries. Also, an international

reserve should be meant for specific limited purposes.

It is likely at last that the “High-level Radioactive Waste Disposal Law” will be submitted

to the 2000 Diet session. The law would create “Organization for the Modernization of the

Atomic Power Generating Environment,” which would be financed by an estimated 0.14-yen per

kWh added to electricity bills to cover disposal fees. As discussed earlier, however, the growing

competition in the electricity market can cause larger electricity bills to affect the electric power

company adversely, making it still uncertain whether the whole disposal cost can be added to

electricity bills.

For Japan to establish the nuclear fuel cycle and to maintain its plutonium policies for

years ahead, the international political climate towards non-proliferation must be considered.

The May 1998 nuclear testing in India and Pakistan drives this point home. Increasing

uncertainty about proliferation of nuclear material can adversely affect peaceful use of nuclear

power. After an indefinite postponement in 1995, an international conference will be held to

review the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The conference will discuss many issues including

ratification of the CTBT. Japan should be active in nuclear nonproliferation.

The proper management and adequate disposal procedures for surplus plutonium are

critical to civil nuclear energy programs. In non-proliferation policy, the management and

disposal of plutonium removed in Russia and the U.S. may be top priority, but the reduction of

civilian-use plutonium is no less important. A delay in the Pu-thermal plans in Japan will

increase further surplus plutonium. The timing of the opening and capacity size of the planned

large reprocessing plant at Rokkasho village, which also will likely increase surplus plutonium,

24
needs to be reconsidered. This reprocessing plant also may suffer from cost overruns20. It needs

to be re-evaluated from the point of view of nuclear non-proliferation and economic viability.

In September 1998, the new atomic power round table conference began to discuss

nuclear issues, including long-term nuclear power development and the utilization plan (the

long-term plan) for the year 200021. The government and the electric power industry seem to

expect that this kind of process will help shape a consensus on nuclear power. However, it must

be recognized that an open democratic process to build a consensus will not necessarily end up

favorably for those who favor nuclear power. What is important is how such a forum can help

alleviate the distrust people have in the policy making process. A “predetermined conclusion”

would compromise the process and increase distrust. If a policy decision is to be based not on

government-directed, top-down economic planning but on democracy and the market mechanism,

such a decision making process will involve inherent risks. This point should be recognized as a

social risk.

A major dilemma22 will arise in forging energy strategy consensus in the years ahead.

Energy security should be considered on a national level whereas democratic practice implies

respect for the wishes of the inhabitants at a site to be affected. Cases will also arise where

economic considerations will prevent the development of a specific energy resource from

proceeding as planned. How far should a government go to provide compensation for the

“uncertainties of democracy”? As far as nuclear power policies are concerned, is it not time to

reconsider the meaning and roles of Long-Term Plans in that perspective? Japan’s nuclear power

policies and even Japan’s energy policies are basically characterized by the

“carry-out-government-plans” formula. Isn’t the real question that the consensus building

25
process raises “Where does the government have to intervene?”

The JCO accident has put the consensus building process on a more difficult path.

According to public opinion polls taken at Tokai village, 64% of the inhabitants polled felt “safe”

or “fairly safe” about nuclear power before the accident. This dropped sharply to 15% after the

accident. Only 22% of the village people polled felt “in some danger” or “in danger” before the

accident. This went up abruptly to 78% after the accident. As to the future of nuclear power,

52% before the accident answered, “should be promoted positively” or “should be promoted

cautiously,” which decreased to 32% after the accident. Those who favored “should remain as it

now stands “ dropped to 18% from 30% while those favoring “should be phased out over time” or

“should be abolished immediately” increased sharply to 40% from 12%23. This outcome of the

polls at Tokai village, which once had been most understanding of nuclear power, suggests how

difficult it is likely to be to find future locations for nuclear power facilities.

The government and the electric power industry need to consider the possibility that

nuclear power plans will rarely go ahead as planned. This is one of the factors of the uncertain

energy situation. Consequently, future nuclear power policies should have ample room for

maneuvering and flexibility. To regain trust in nuclear power as an energy source requires

fundamental change24.

CLOSING

Nuclear power has played a great role for energy security. However, it is unrealistic to

think that nuclear power will suddenly create ample indigenous energy resources and freedom

from the exhaustion of resources. It may be advisable for Japan to maintain the present level of

26
dependence on nuclear power. But, for nuclear power to continue to contribute to energy security

and to environmental protection, there are challenges that need to be met. Nations in North East

Asia should cooperate to resolve issues of common interest.

Specific policy proposals on the issue of nuclear power are as follows:

1. Nuclear policy should be developed based on the propagation of scientific information

and thoughtful analysis of nuclear power’s role in promoting energy security.

As promising domestic energy sources, the FBR and the plutonium cycle cannot make

significant contributions as realistic energy source options for some time to come. Yet it must be

emphasized that existing nuclear power generation facilities are making sufficient contribution.

Especially noteworthy among the contributions of nuclear power is supply stability. However, it

must be noted that nuclear power requires a large industrial infrastructure and a long lead-time

and is rather inflexible. Also, the social risks of nuclear power technologies as exemplified by the

“”Monju accident and the critical accident at Tokai village must be taken into account when

evaluating energy security.

2. The target size for nuclear power generation should be based on its share of the total

amount of electric power generated. The present share of about 35% is desirable from the

standpoint of maintaining diversity and economy. It is advisable to maintain a share of

30% to 35% over time.

It is advisable to define the goals for nuclear energy in terms of its role in providing

diversity to the mix of Japan’s energy sources. To maintain diversity, it is not advisable or

27
realistic to increase or reduce the present share. The Government needs to acknowledge that the

present goal to construct 20 power plants by 2010 of 62 million to 70 million kWh will be

impossible to realize given popular opposition.

3. Nuclear power policies should be part of a comprehensive policy for energy and the

environment. It should be consistent with policy for the energy security, deregulation, and

anti-warming measures. Also, to ensure smooth implementation of nuclear energy policies,

it is essential to make the policy-making process more transparent and democratic.

Japanese nuclear policy has been shaped in the past primarily by the Long-Term Plans of

the Atomic Power Committee. It has become clear that since the “”Monju accident, this policy

decision-making process has failed to respond to the needs of Japanese society. Citizens near

nuclear power facilities have developed a distrust of the government’s policy judgment. The fair

assessment of future nuclear power development can be ensured only through a more democratic

and transparent decision-making process. The government’s role in nuclear energy development

should be clearly defined. The dual system of “decided by the state and operated by business”

has distorted the current nuclear power policies. To make the most of the market economy after

deregulation, government intervention should be limited to areas of possible market failure. As

for nuclear power, such areas of government involvement may include safety regulations, nuclear

nonproliferation, and, to some extent, spent fuel storage and waste management and disposal.

4. Concerning the possibilities of nuclear power cooperation in Asia, an international

cooperation could be developed through specific projects that respond to common concerns

28
for security, radioactive waste and spent fuel management, and nuclear nonproliferation.

Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan, and other Asian countries share many common

concerns with nuclear power. Forums where Asian countries can exchange candid opinions

about these common issues are needed. Common issues include nuclear safety, radioactive waste

and spent fuel management, and nuclear non-proliferation. Japan should propose specific

projects to deal with these common issues, drawing on the experience in nuclear power

cooperation it has been offering. Japan’s support for Russia’s nuclear nonproliferation effort

stands as a concrete example of a successful initiative.

29
NOTES

1. The Japan Atomic Energy Commission, “The Long-Term Plans for the Research,

Development and Use of Nuclear Power,” September 6, 1957.

2. The dual system was analyzed in detail by the book “The Social History of Nuclear Power: Its

Japanese-style Development” by Hitoshi Yoshioka (Asahi Sensho, April 1999).

3. For the relationship between the Rokkasho Village Nuclear Fuel Cycle Plant Project and

regional politics and economy, see “The Giant Regional Development Project and Its

Outcome - the Mutsu Ogawara Nuclear Power Development Nuclear Fuel Cycle Plant” by

Harutoshi Funahashi, Kouichi Hasegawa, Nobuko Iijima, the University of Tokyo Press,

February 1998. They did not analyze the nuclear fuel cycle plant project from the standpoint

of nuclear power policies, but focused their analyses on the failure of the project and how

closely it was connected with the regional politics and economy.

4. For analysis of the international concern about Japan’s plutonium polices, see “International

Responses to Japanese Plutonium Programs” by E. Skolnikoff, T. Suzuki and K. Oye,

Working Paper, MIT Center for International Studies, C/95-5, August 1995.

5. The Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (Donen), Reform

Examination Committee report, “Basic Direction of Donen’s Restructuring”, August 1, 1997.

The opposing group published “The Monju Accident and Japan’s Plutonium Policies:

Proposals for Policy Changes” by Monju Accident Comprehensive Appraisal Council,

Nanatsumori Shoten, December 10, 1997.

6. Report by Informal Advisory Council to Discuss FBR, December 1, 1997.

30
7. Decision by the Atomic Energy Commission, “The Way Future FBR Development Should

Be,” December 5, 1997.

8. IAEA INFCIRC/549, “Communication received from certain Member States concerning their

policies regarding the management of plutonium,” April 2000. Besides, 31.3 tons are

estimated by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS). ISIS Plutonium

Watch, May 1999.

9. According to a report by the Nuclear Inspection Institute (NII) of the U.K., it came to light that

BNFL of the U.K. had fabricated the inspection data in the processing of fuels, including the

MOX fuel for No. 3 and No.4 reactors of the Takahama Nuclear Power plant of Kansai

Electric Power of Japan. The Electric power company decided to discontinue using the fuel.

It was found further that the data fabrication had been more extensive, spreading to wider

scopes and longer periods, including the fuel for a German electric power company, and that

nuts had been mixed in the fuel. NII maintains that there is a safety problem, but Kansai

Electric Power has no definite schedule to make use of the fuel in question.

10. Interim report by MITI’s Advisory Council for Energy, Subcommittee on Nuclear Energy,

“Toward the realization of the interim storage of recycle fuel resources,” June 1998.

11. “Global Energy Outlook,” Key Issue Paper No. 1, IAEA Symposium on Nuclear Fuel Cycle

and Reactor Strategy: Adjusting to New Realities”, Vienna, June 1997.

12. “Conversion of the nuclear fuel cycle” by Kazumi Doi, an article of Asahi Shinbun, February

18, 2000. Drawing on his long years of experience with uranium resource development at

PNC (Donen), Mr. Doi maintains that “based on the outlook of the uranium resource, there is

no need for nuclear fuel recycle.”

31
13. The most noted scientific article on the possibility of converting the nuclear reactor class

plutonium for weapons, is J.C. Mark, “Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium”,

Science and Global Security, Vol.4, No. 1, 1993, pp. 111-128.

14. Andrew Stirling, “Diversity and Ignorance in Electricity Supply Investment,” Energy Policy,

March 1994.

15. MITI’s Advisory Council for Energy, Subcommittee on Nuclear Energy, “Basic stance for

the choice of nuclear power,” June 11, 1998.

16. Federation of Electric Power Company, “Electricity Review, Japan,” 1999.

17. “What to do with Japan’s nuclear power: Proposals for the 21st century” edited by Kenji

Yamaji, Study Group for the Future of Nuclear Power, Nikkan Kogyo Sha, 1998. The author

of this paper also participated in this study group, which he finds to be a frank report on

nuclear power policy matters.

18. Report by Central Research Institute of the Electric Power Industry, “The cost structure of

Japan’s nuclear power generation and its future outlook,” Y98019, June, 1999.

19. According to an estimate by the Advisory Council for Energy, Subcommittee on Nuclear

Energy, the power generation cost of a new nuclear power plant as a 40-year lifelong average

is 5.9 yen per kWh, much lower than before but increasing with the cost of operating

management and nuclear fuel cycle.

20. The estimated total cost of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant was up from the initial 840

billion yen to about 2 trillion yen. Its reprocessing cost is estimated to be about 1 yen per

kWh.

21. The second nuclear power roundtable conference closed its activity in February 25, 2000 with

32
 its final proposals, which included: “Offer multiple choices with future nuclear power

plans,” “the group to study the nuclear fuel cycle is to be continued,” and “Set up a similar

forum to discuss the nuclear power policies (temporarily called ‘Nuclear Power Policies

Communications Forum’ from now).”

22. On February 22, 2000, the governor of Mie prefecture urged that the Ashihama Nuclear

power plant project, which had been discussed for over 37 years, be cancelled, and Chubu

Electric Power agreed to cancel it. This is the first cancellation of a planned nuclear power

location in Japan.

23. “Tokai-mura Polls ‘the prevention of disasters and town building’”, the PR Department,

Tokai-mura, “Tokai” No. 659, February 16, 2000.

24. Susan Pickket, “Over the walls of a nuclear power village: A Japan-U.S. comparison of the

consensus building process”, Energy Forum, February 1999, pp. 32-36.

25. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy Bureau, Scientific Affairs and Nuclear Energy

Division, Arms Control and Disarmament Division data; also visit the ministry’s home page.

26. “Liquid radioactive waste treatment facility projects in Asia,” by Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Foreign Policy Bureau, Scientific Affairs and Nuclear Energy Division, December 1999.

27. A. Yamato, K. Aratani, “The Present Status of International Cooperation pertaining to

Russian Surplus Weapons Plutonium Dispositions,” presented at the Second Annual JNC

International Forum on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, February 21-22, 2000, Tokyo,

Japan.

28. M. Bun, N. Numark, T. Suzuki, “A Japanese-Russian Agreement to Establish a Nuclear

Facility for MOX Fabrication and Spent Fuel Storage in the Russian Far East,” Belfer Center

33
for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) Discussion Paper No. 98-25, Harvard

University, November 1998. There is a very similar project, which the U.S. NGO

“Non-Proliferation Trust (NPT)” is negotiating with Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Power.

34
 Appendix

Fig.1-1 Power Plant Facilities Fig.1-2 Electric Power Generation

(Commercial Industry Use) (Commercial Industry Use)

250 1,000

Nuclear Nuclear
Hydroelectric 900 Hydroelectric
Petroleum Petroleum
Coal Coal
200 LNG 800
LNG
Others
Others
700

150 600

bil kWh
mil kW

500

100 400

300

50 200

100

0 0
0 5 0 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
97 97 98 98 98 98 98 98 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
70

75

80

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

95

96

97
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19
FY FY

35
 Fig.2 Total Supply of Primary Energy in Japan
(Transition and Outlook)

100%

80% New Energy etc.

Hydroelectric /Geothermal

60% Nuclear
Natural Gas

Coal
40%
Petroleum (incl.LPG)

20%

0%
)

)
80

40

94

27

38

26

97

16

93
(1

(3

(3

(4

(4

(5

(5

(6

(6
65

70

75

80

85

90

96

-1

-2
10

10
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

20

20
Year (Total Energy Supply Equiv. to Petroleum mil kl)

36
 Fig.3 Fuel Costs based on
Financial Statements

20

18 Petroleum

16 Natural Gas

14 Coal
Nuclear
12
Yen/kWh

10

0
71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95
19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19

37
 Fig.4 Nuclear Power Generation Cost
(up to year 2010)
7.50

Including New Plants

7.00
Existing Plants Only
Yen(1996)/kWh

6.50

6.00

5.50

5.00
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

38
 Fig.5 Cost Structure of Nuclear Power Generation
(Outlook for year 2010)

100%
90% 24
80% 35
43
70%
28 Fuel Cycling Cost
60%
Operating Cost
Share

50%
38 Capital Cost
40%
30%
48
48
20%
27
10%
9
0%
1996 (result) 2010 (incl. new plants) 2010 (existing plants
only)
FY

39