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Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato's Sophist

Author(s): Olga Alieva


Source: Hermathena, No. 189 (Winter 2010), pp. 71-91
Published by: Trinity College Dublin
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42950993
Accessed: 16-11-2018 18:08 UTC

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Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato's
Sophist
by Olga Alieva

The well-known sixth definition of the sophist in the


homonymous dialogue contains a discussion of the elenchus
(230b4-e3) which is often referred to as a manifestation of the
late Plato's attitude towards this method of argumentation. It is
generally assumed that the definition of the sophist 'of noble
lineage' given here should be applied to Socrates as represented
in earlier Platonic dialogues.1 Since the elenchus is associated
mainly with Socrates, little, if any, attention is paid to the
elenchus in the Sophist itself. This is only partly due to the fact
that Socrates is not a leading character in the dialogue; more
significantly, ever since Robinson the elenchus has been believed
to be an essential preliminary - but a preliminary only - to the
constructive search for knowledge.2 The Sophist, on the
contrary, pursues a rather positive task of defining the sophist
and, moreover, seems to complete this task successfully - not by
means of the elenchus, but by means of diairesis.
The scope of this paper is to demonstrate that the mention
of the elenchus at 230b4-e3 is not merely retrospective, and to
draw attention to the elenctic dimension of the whole dialogue.
This, in its turn, enables us to reconsider also the method of
diairesis and its methodological potential. This potential has
been repeatedly doubted, and, indeed, scholars are justified in
asking why Plato 'sandwiched' a piece of 'sophisticated

1 Cornford 1935, 177; Vlastos 1991, 23; Nõtomi 1999, 64-5. Duelinger (2005,
17) takes a different stance.
2 Robinson 1953, 12-13. Cf. (Kahn 1996, 99): 'In the Sophist the Socratic
elenchus is described as a noble cathartic art, the first stage of education. [...] Plato
recognizes the negative elenchus as a necessary preliminary, preparing but not
constituting the constructive search for knowledge.' We cannot discuss here Vlatos's
interpretation of the elenchus, according to which this method is not merely cathartic,
but rather is a 'truth-seeking device'. See: Vlastos 1991, 114-15. For criticism of
Vlastos see, e.g: Benson 1995, 45-112 and 2004, 101-13; Penner 2007, 3-19 etc.

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72 Olga Alieva

philosophical reasoning' between kind-l


Linnaeus' 'contribution to botany'.3 T
more intriguing because Plato iden
philosophy (253d: kcctò yévr) 5iaipeT
being and non-being, not while constru
ladders.
In the first section of this essay we wil
of the elenchus is introduced in the d
some parallels with Aristotle's Sophistical
and Aristotle consider the possibility o
which reveal pseudo-contradictions
apparent elenchus is instantiated with t
which the second section of our paper i
aporia created by an apparent refutatio
ambiguity and homonymy by making d
the diairesis. This move, suggested by the
of Aristotle, is discussed in the section 3 o
highlight some of the distinctions made
and Theaetetus in the dialogue in o
opponents and to solve the falsehood p
puzzles about (non-) being.

1. 'God of refutation'

At the beginning of the dialogue Theodorus introduces to


Socrates the Stranger from Elea, recommending him as 'a man
proficient in philosophy'4 (216a4). This characteristic makes
Socrates suppose that the Stranger is 0eòç ÈÀeyKTiKÓç, a god of
refutation (216b5-6). Theodorus associates the adjective
èXeyKTiKÓç with 'those who zealously practice eristic' (216b8:
Třepí TGCÇ epiSas ÈGTTOuSaKÓTcov) . This confusion shouldn't be
attributed only to Theodorus' naivety: what we have here is a
first formulation of the problem which is specified further in
Socrates' question (217a7-8): whether the people in Elea think

3 Ryle 1966, 136-9.


4 Hereinafter the translation is that of Duerlinger (2005), unless specified
otherwise.

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Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato's Sophist 73

that sophists, philosophers and politicians ťare [reducible to]


one or two, or did they, since there are three names (toc
òvóijaTa), distinguish three kinds (*rpia ... xa yevri
8iaipovj|ievoi) and attach a name to each individually according
to its kind.' The relation between ovoļicrra and yévr|, expected
to be clarified by means of division (5iaipoú|iEVOi), is in the
focus of the subsequent discussion, as is obvious from the
Stranger's remark at 218c4-5: '[I]t is always and in every case
necessary to agree about the thing itself (tò irpãyiaa) by giving
accounts (8icc Àóycov) rather than to agree only about a name
without any account (rj Touvoļia [ióvov ... X^P^S Àóyou).'5
The required 'thing', or Trpãyna, is the answer to the 'What
is?' question6 analogous to those we find in earlier dialogues
where definitions of various moral concepts are sought for. It is
assumed on default that this Trpõyiaa is a yévoç7 and that this
yévoç is a branch of Téxvr) - 'despite the well-known denial of
this in the famous Górgias passage (462-3)', as L. Brown justly
observes.8 It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the
validity of the definitions of the sophist given in the dialogue;
what matters here is that ovoļia 'sophist' turns out to refer to
various irpayiacnra, and therefore the task of defining the
sophist overlaps, if not fully coincides, with distinguishing
different meanings of the word 'sophist'. A parallel with the
Phaedrus (237c sqq) seems opportune here, for in the latter
dialogue the search for the definition of love is inseparably
linked with disambiguation. As J. Ackrill puts it, 'neither Plato
nor Aristotle is absolutely clear about the difference between
distinguishing types of X and distinguishing senses of 'X' [...]
[b]ut either activity can be philosophically rewarding; and it is

5 Cf: Soph. 221b: '[N]ot only have you and I now agreed about the name (où
lióvov Touvoļia) of the angling art, but also we have an adequate grasp of the
account of its very function (ìTEpi ai/TÒ Toüpyov).'
6 Plato, Soph. 217b3: 5iopíaao0ai oacpcoç tí ttot' eotiv; 218c7: tí ttot'
EOTIV.

7 Plato, Soph. 21 8d4: tò tou oocpioToü yévoç; 223c4: ETEpov EĪvai ti y


224c7: tò aocpiGTiKÒv yévoç; 226al: tò xpTlUaTiaTlKÒv yévoç.
8 Brown 2010, 164.

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74 Olga Alieva

difficult to deny that Platonic division co


activities.'9
One of the definitions of the sophistic art includes a
description of the elenctic method on which we should linger
here. The sophists of ťnoble lineage' think that all ignorance is
involuntary, so they recur to the following procedure:

Soph . 230b4-8: They ask questions about things about which


someone thinks he is saying something when he is saying nothing
(Aéycov ĻirļBev). Then they easily assess the beliefs of those in error,
gather them in their arguments into the same place, set them beside
one another, and then having done this, they demonstrate that the
beliefs are contrary (èvavTÍaç) to one another at the same time,
concerning the same things, and in the same way (Trepi tcõv
aÙTcov Trpòç xa aùxa Kcnrä TaÙTÒc).

Thus they remove the beliefs that impede learning (230d). Two
characteristics of the elenchus should be emphasized here.
Firstly, it reveals 'contrary', i.e. contradictory, beliefs; secondly,
the contradiction must be genuine and concern 'the same
things, and in the same way'. This reservation is paralleled in the
Sophistical Refutations of Aristotle, where the genuine elenchus is
defined as follows:10

Soph. EL l67a23-27: '[Refutation is a contradiction of one and the


same predicate (àvTÍçaoiç tou aÙToO Kal évóç), not of a name
but of a thing (|afļ òvóiígctoç àXXà irpaynaroç), and not of a
synonymous name but of an identical name, based on the given
premises and following necessarily from them (the original point at
issue not being included) in the same respect, relation, manner and
time' (kcctcx tgcùtò Kai irpòç xaÙTÒ Kal cbaaÚTcoç Kal èv Tep
aÙTcp xpóvcp).

Aristotle's indication that elenchus is a contradiction 'not of a


name but of a thing' means that homonymy should be avoided
in refutations.11 This echoes Plato's reservation that

9 Ackrill 1997 [1970], 105. Cf: Brown 2010, 154.


10 Translation: Forster and Furley 1955.
11 Dorion 1995, 239.

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Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato's Sophist 75

contradictions must concern same things ("rcepi tcov aÙTcbv).


Besides, in compliance with the Sophist Aristotle specifies that
contradictions must be koctcc tcxùtò Kai irpòç TaÙTÒ.
Aristotle's definition of the elenchus thus implies the necessity
to avoid amphiboly and homonymy.12 A refutation that fails to
meet these requirements is, therefore, an apparent one. Such
refutation we find in the Sophist .

2. Apparent refutation
After the interlocutors have agreed that the sophist appears as
'having a kind of reputed knowledge of everything, but not
having the truth' (233cl0-ll), the Stranger attacks this
definition on behalf of the virtual sophist arguing that it is
impossible to utter or to believe falsehood. The falsehood
paradox13 (236d9-237b2) turns out to be the first refutation in
the dialogue - and, as we will see, an apparent one.

Soph. 236d9-237a9: My dear friend, we really are engaging in a very


difficult enquiry. For this appearing to be and seeming to be,
without being, and saying things, but things not true (tò Xéyeiv
[ièv čcttcc, aXīļ0fļ 8è larj), all such things have always been and still
are utterly perplexing (necnra àiTopíaç). For it is very difficult [...]
to see how a person can say or believe that there really are falsehoods
(yeuBrj ÀéyEiv fļ BoÇcjÇeiv) without being caught up in a statement
contrary to itself (ÈvavTioÀoyía). [...] This statement is based on
the daring hypothesis that a non-being is a being (tò ļir) öv EÎvai),
since in no other way would a falsehood become a being (v^euBoç
yäp oùk av áXXcoç ÈyíyvETo öv). When we were children, my
boy, Parmenides the Great began to object to this [hypothesis] and
continued to do so to the end of his life both in prose and in verse:

'Never let it prevail that non-beings are beings.


In pursuit of the truth keep your thought from this path.'

12 Schreiber 2003, 88 and passim.


13 A version of this paradox can be found in the Euthydemus (283e). On different
interpretations of the paradox see: Crivelli 2012, 30.

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76 Olga Alieva

The connection between falsehood and


further: 'Then you say that false belief
are beings (240d9: TÒ |_ir| övtoc SoÇóÇ
the Stranger says. This definition is the
a statement [...] will also be considered
non-beings are beings or that beings ar
te övTa Xéycov ļjr) eTvcu Kai ra ļ
definition of falsehood involves contrad
for, according to Parmenides, only being
A variation on the Eleatic theme is f
paradox unfolds in two steps. First st
being' (237c2: touvoh' . . . touto, tò |jr
(énicpépEiv) to any being (237c7: tcõ
The name 'something' always refers to
touto [pfļua] ètt' övti XéyonEv). (c)
being' is not applicable to any something
ti). Second step, (c) the name 'non-bei
any something 6. (d) He who speaks
speaking of something that is one (23
XéyovTcc Ev yé ti XéyEiv). (f) Ergo,
something is speaking of non- one
impossibility of falsehood is deduced from

Soph. 23 7e4-6: [S]hould we not say that he


non-being (ļarļ öv ç0éyyEO0ai) does n
ÀéyEiv)?

It now becomes clear why any definition of the sophist involving

14 An apparent one, as we'll see later.


15 The Stranger first puts forth the conclusion, thus causing Theaetetus'
confusion (237^12: Ticos Srj;) and only then the second premise.
16 The conclusion of the first step of the argument is used as the first premise of
the second step.
17 Duerlinger (2005, 139) observes: 'The translation of this sentence is painfully
literal, and doesn't represent how it would, in other contexts, be translated, which is
"He who speaks of non-something is speaking of nothing at all." The literal
translation of mēden as "non-one" is made necessary by the previous statement in the
argument that what is something is what is one, so that here, by placing "non" before
"something," the placing of "non" before "one" is justified.'

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Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato's Sophist 77

the notion of falsehood is self-contradictory and utterly


perplexing.18 The interlocutors have faced the aporia which they
are to solve by disambiguating the terms 'being' and 'non-being'.
In doing so, they also secure the sophist of noble lineage, for
according to the description of the elenchus cited above, the
noble sophists refute those who think they are saying something
whereas they are saying nothing (230b5: Xéycov i-irļSev). If
'saying nothing' is impossible, there can be no elenchus at all.

3. Aporia and diairesis


Shrewd arguments, Aristotle says, cause most embarrassment
(ccTTopEÎv TToieī náXuxra).19 'Embarrassment is of two kinds. In
a reasoned discussion (sv toîç auXXeXoyianÉvotç) one is in
doubt which of the questions one should subvert (àvéXrç),
whereas in contentious arguments (èv toîç ÈpiOTiKoîç) it is
about the way in which one is to express the proposition (ttgùç
e'ítit) tiç to -rrpoTaSév)' (182b32-35). It is not always easy to
tell 'whether refutation takes place or not' (182b30-31:
TTOTEpov è'Xsyxoç īļ oůk è'Xeyxoç), i.e. whether an argument is
a reasoned or a contentious one, or whether the elenchus is a
genuine or an apparent one.
Aristotle illustrates this thought with the example of
Parmenides. Though fallacies due to equivocation (èv toîç
"napa Tr)v óncovuníav) are generally regarded as the stupidest
form of fallacy (182b 13- 14), he says, some of the ambiguities
even the most expert fail to discern:

18 Cf. évavTioXoyía and usotò ÓTTopíaç above, Soph. 236d9-237a9.


19 The notion of falsehood in the Sophist is analyzed in terms of propositional
logic, which brings to mind Aristotle's Organon. Although the dating of Plato's and
Aristotle's texts is rather problematical, we can assert with some confidence that at the
time the Sophist was written the discussion concerning the dialectical method(s) was
underway in the Academy. On chronology see Thesleff 1982, 193-8.

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78 Olga Alieva

Soph. El. (185b22-27): A proof of this is th


about the terms used ("TTEpì tcov òvoiicrrcov
"Being" and "Unity" always mean the sam
different ("nÓTEpov tgcùtò OTļļaaivEi kgct
Ev); for some people hold that "Being" and
meaning, while others solve the argument
by saying that "Unity" and "Being" are us
TToÀXaxcos cpa vai tò e v XéyEoSai Kai tò

As is evident from this passage, Aris


argument to be eristic - and, indeed,
explicitly.21
Dealing with eristic arguments, Ar
shrewdest of them are those which mak
the reasoning is conclusive or not
GuXÂEÀóyiOTai rļ oü), and also whethe
a false premiss or a distinction (B
mentions diairesis as a means to solve a
Sophistical Refutations?2 Thus, in chapter

Soph. El. 175a36-175b3: [I]f refutation is un


(àvTÍcpaaiç) based on certain premisses, ther
make distinctions against ambiguity and e
TTpòç c^cpißoXa Kal Tri v òncovuníav); for
the proof. But the only other reason for mak
(irpooSiaipETEOv) is because the conclusion
(èÂEyxoEi5éç). One must, therefore, bewa
(to èXEyx0flvai) but of appearing to be
ambiguities and questions involving equivo
Ta Trapa Trļv òjacovuníav) and all similar fr
even a genuine refutation (tòv àXr|0ivòv e
make it uncertain who is refuted and who i

20 'That this dispute over the ambiguity of "being


impetus from the Parmenides and the Sophist can h
165) believes.
21 Arist. Phys. I, 2 (185a8) and I, 3 (186a6).
22 The diairesis mentioned here must be distinguishe
in chapter 4. The verb 5iaipéco and its derivates are use
to refer to a specific type of fallacy due to enunc
taxonomy of fallacies (168a 17), and to the distin
equivocation (175a37).

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Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato's Sophist 79

Kai un èXeyxóiìevov aSrļAov iroieī).

Likewise, in chapter 18 he says that 'one solves (Xúeiv) the


correctly reasoned arguments (tcov Xóycov roùç nèv
auXXsXoyionsvouç) by demolishing (àveXóvTa) them, the
apparent reasonings (toùç 5è <paivo|_iévouç) by making
distinctions (BieXóvtcx).'
Let us now see how Aristotle himself solves Parmenides'
argument in the first book of his Physics.23 Aristotle's criticism of
Parmenides runs as follows.24 (I) Parmenides erroneously
assumes that 'being' has one meaning. However, 'being' is used
in many senses (185a21: ttoXXccxcõç XéyETCU tò öv), so one
must distinguish between different meanings of 'being' (185a22:
ttcõç Xeyouoiv),25 which may refer to substance (185a23:
oùaiav), quality or quantity (185a23: ii ttoocc īļ iroiá). Ergo,
there will be many beings that differ from one another (185b3-
5).
(II) Another of Aristotle's objections to Parmenides in the
Physics is that even if we take 'being' as having one meaning, the
argument is badly reasoned (186a24: où aunuepaívETai). It
fails both in case we assume being (II. 1), as Ross puts it, 'to be
an attribute belonging to something that has a distinct
substantial nature of its own', or (II. 2) 'to be the substantial
nature of that which is.'26

The first argument fails because (II. 1. 1) ' [t] he fact that
'white' has but one meaning (arinaivovToç ëv toü Xeukoü)
doesn't prevent [the things that are white] being many (ttoXXcc
tò Xeukcc)' (186a26-7). The distinction implied here is that
between a universal and particulars that instantiate it: 'for to be

23 Dorion (1995, 403) points to an important parallel between the Sophistical


Refutations and the Physics. Düring (1968, 213) also notes multiple points of contact
between the two texts. The first book of the Physics is generally agreed to be one of the
earliest of Aristotle's writings (Düring 1968, 232).
24 Translation and commentary: Ross 1936.
25 Cf. above Soph. El. 182b35: ttcõç eitti^. In both cases the expression marks the
necessity to BieXeTv different meanings.
26 Ross 1936, 473.

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80 Olga Alieva

the colour white and to be that which has


same' (186a28-29: áXXo yäp ecrrai tò
SeSeyiaevcp). The confusion is caused
homonymy which is due to the power o
many particulars.27 The second objectio
that (II. 1. 2) if 'being signifies one th
then 'what it is an accident of (cp GUii
that there will be something that is
italics), which is nonsense.
Nor can we consider being in m
substance, because (II. 2.1) all attributes
öv) will be non-being, and characterized
being anymore than not-being' (tí
OTļiiaivEi tò öv fļ Ļirļ öv) (186b3-ll). (II
we suppose that its attributes are being
appear that the name 'being' signifies (o
thing (186bl 1-12).
Hereby, the question of the unity of
closely connected to the semantics of 'b
its peculiar TTpãyiaa(Ta). Considering
options, Aristotle rejects them one aft
contradictions, and refutes Parmenid
semantic diairesis we find also in the So
next we'll endeavor to show that the r
and Trpãyiia is a key motif in the Sophi
is not limited to the outer part of the dia

4. Elenchus and diairesis

We left the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus at the moment


when the virtual sophist caught them up in a contradiction
which can be roughly summarized as follows: falsehood has to

27 Schreiber 2003, 17.


28 Of course, Aristotle's terminology is not applicable to Plato who nowhere
speaks of 'substance' and 'attribute' as two different meanings of 'being'. However,
one distinction is clear throughout the Sophist , namely that of being as a form and
being as whatever participates in this form.

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Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato's Sophist 8 1

do with non-being; non-being is not; hence, falsehood is


impossible. To solve the aporia and to go on with defining the
sophist the interlocutors must proceed to the disambiguation of
'non-being', but first, they have to understand what it is which
is being negated in 'non-being'.
The enquiry into the meaning of 'being opens with the
argument against the pluralists. Addressing those who say that
all things are hot and cold, the Stranger asks:29

Soph. 243d8-e6: What on earth is this thing you are expressing


about both, when you say that both of them and each are
(ÀéyovTEç ànçco Kai ÉKcxTEpov eivai) ? What shall we take this
being of yours to be (tí tò EĪvai touto i/TroXaßcoMEV Ojacov)? Is it
a third thing besides those two, and should we assume that in your
view the totality of things is three and not two?

The implication here is that Eivai predicated both of the hot


and of the cold must refer to some 'thing' (tí). This 'thing'
should not necessarily be understood in terms of Plato's theory
of Forms, but what does it denote, then? This question, though
left unanswered so far, is per se crucial for the following
discussion of being: is there some 'thing' (tí), some Tipãyiaa,
signified by 'being'? Thus formulated, the problem leads the
pluralists to an impasse: they can neither admit a third 'thing'
along with the other two (243e2-4), nor identify 'being' with
either of them (243 e4-6), for in this case the other will be non-
being.30 The third option put forward by the Stranger is also
rejected: being cannot be identical with both (243e8-244al),
for then the two will be identical and, strictly speaking, one. So
when the Stranger asks the pluralists to make it clear what it is
they want to signify (GTļuaiveiv) when they speak of being
(244a5), they have no answer at all: they do not want to signify
any particular 'thing' but just adhere to conventions of ordinary
language.
The search for the Tipãyiaa of 'being' continues in the

29 Translation: Crivelli 2012, 73.


30 For analysis see: Crivelli 2012, 73.

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82 Olga Alieva

argument against the monists. Their th


contradictory:

Soph. 244b9-c2: Let them answer the


somehow say that only one is? ("Eu ttoú
- 'We surely say that' [...]. 'And you cal
(Tí 5É; öv kccÀeîté ti;)? - Yes. - 'Is it the
"one", by using two names for the sam
(ÜÓTEpOV ÖTTEP è'v, ÈTTI TCp aÙTCG T
òvóuaoiv, fļ ttgòç;)'.31

Here, eīvai is predicated of the 'one': 'onl


there are no logical problems with this
hardly consistent with our everyday ex
Stranger makes the second move and f
('being'), it immediately becomes eviden
two things which are the one and the bein
monists would never consent to it. So t
that 'one' and 'being' stand for one and
this taken for granted, can 'being' be p
how, generally speaking, can there be tw
(244c8-9)? What's more, 'even to accep
that there is a name (cbç è'oTiv õvou
because 'by positing the name as diff
(toüvohcí toü TrpáyiaaToç è'TEpov), o
two things' (244c 1 l-d4).32 This play
contradictions inherent in ordinary lan
interlocutors conscious of the discursive
TTpãyna relationship. Good for them, b
from 'being' as at the beginning of the di
For the disambiguation of '(non-)bein
(genuine) elenchus to take place, anot
undertaken. It would be far too daring fo
in the battle of gods and giants, but it'
the Stranger was called a 'god of refuta

31 Translation: Crivelli 2012, 78.


32 Translation: Crivelli 2012, 78.

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Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato's Sophist 83

that his divine power manifests itself. The aim of this argument,
as V. Politis puts it, is 'to put an end to this ceaseless and
bloody battle by arguing first, against the materialists, that
changeless things are real also, and then, against the friends of
the forms, that changing things are real also.'33 The Stranger's
attempt to overcome the underlying discrepancy between the
materialists and the friends of the forms brings him, once again,
to an impasse (249dl0: Tr)v à Tropi a v):

Soph . 249cl0-d3: [T]he philosopher [...] must, as it seems,


absolutely not agree with those who say that the stable totality of
things (tò ttcxv egtt]KÒç) is one or the many kinds, nor listen at all
to those who change being ("rravTaxíi tò ôv kivoúvtcov) in all
ways, but, as with the prayer of children, say that being and the
totality of things (to ov te Kai tò ttcxv) are both together, all
changeless things and all changing things (ooa àKÍvrjTa Kai
KEKIVTļļiEVa).34

Again, Theaetetus doesn't realize the difficulty they faced


(249el): it seems perfectly natural to admit that being and the
totality of things include changeless and changing things. The
aporia only becomes clear when the Stranger draws a parallel
with the argument against the pluralists (250a 1-2): in saying
that both change and stability are we divine 'a third thing'
(250b7, 250cl: TpÍTOV ti) along with the other two which will
be, paradoxically, 'neither at motion nor at rest' (250c 6-7: oute
EOTT1KEV oute kiveTtcu). So, the Stranger summarizes, 'being
and non-being are equally difficult for us' (250e6-7: eÇ 'íoou tó
te ôv Kai tò uri òv crrropíaç ļiETEiAīļcpaTov).
This puzzle, Crivelli justly observes, springs from ťa
fallacious slip from the claim that the kind being is neither
stable nor changing in that neither stability nor change
constitutes its nature to the claim that the kind being is neither
stable nor changing in that it instantiates neither stability nor
change.'35 To guard against this fallacy, the Stanger must attack

33 Politis 2006, 155.


34 Translation: Crivelli 2012, 92.
35 Crivelli 2012, 109.

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84 Olga Alieva

the late-learners who 'enjoy not allowin


but the good good and the man a man' (
defends the possibility of ordinary pred
with identity statements,37 or, to p
possibility to attribute things to each o
or being stable. Thereafter, he proceeds
an ontological justification of this claim
of the communion (251e8: Koivcovia) of
Equipped with this (onto)logical comm
interlocutors return to the puzzle ab
stability - and find out that 'each of th
the other two (toTv ļiev 8uoîv ETEpóv
itself (aÙTÒ 5' éauTcp TaÙTÓv) (25
included the same and the different as tw
enquiry, the Stranger and Theaetetus o
kinds, unlike the other three, cannot b
themselves (kcx0' ai/Ta), but always in r
áÀÀa)' (255cl2-13). This ability of l
different relations between things may so
as is evident from the set of apparent c
change set forth at 255el0-256d9.38
'change is not the same' (256a5) and
(256a7) might seem contradictory thoug
is not the same by virtue of being dif
sameness (257a3); change is the same
(8ia to |i£T6xeiv) in sameness in relatio
the logical level, the statements of the fir
identity, whereas the statements of th

36 Crivelli 2012, 109.


37 Definitional statements according to another in
the late-learners Plato should draw a distinction betw
predicate-expression is taken to provide a full descrip
the item signified by the subject-expression, on t
whereby what is said is simply that the item sign
instantiates the kind signified by the predicate-exp
2012, 108-9).
38 On the whole, I accept L. Brown's interpretatio
2008.

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Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato's Sophist 85

predicate one thing of another (change partakes in sameness).


The Stranger himself speaks of the ambiguity:

Soph. 256al0-b4: [W]e must agree without dissent that indeed


motion39 is both the same and a non-the same (tocùtóv t Eivai Kai
ļiiļ TaÙTÒv). For when we say this, we have not spoken of the same
and non-the same in the same way (où yàp . . . ónoícoç
eipTļKanev). For we say that it is the same because it partakes of the
same in relation to itself (8ià xrjv héSeÇiv xaì/Tou Trpòç ĒauTTļv),
and that it is a non-the same because of its combination with the
other (81 à Tri v Koivcovíav aů Saxépou), because of which, since it
is separate from the same, it does not become that but other, with
the consequence that it is also correct to say that it is a non-the
same.

Plato's distinction of two types of statements (où


eipTļKaļiev) parallels Aristotle's advice to distinguis
ways in which a proposition can be expressed (cf.
Eiirņ Tiç to TrpoTaÖEv; ttcoç Àéyouaiv) in ord
against apparent refutation. This also echoes the d
the elenchus at 230b4-8: the contradictions revealed in the
course of refutation must concern the same things, in the same
way and in respect to the same things (uspi tcov aÙTcov Trpòç
TOC aŮTa KCXTCC TCCÙTCX).

Now, to what extent this distinction is useful for solving the


aporia concerning non-being? Two types of non-being (we'll
label them here as non-being I and non-being II), corresponding
to the two types of relations between kinds (Ka0f airrá / "rrpòç
àÀÀa) or, on the logical level, the two types of statements, are
discovered in the course of the subsequent enquiry (given that
the absolute non-being has been discarded long ago, 258e8).
The non-being I found by the interlocutors is that of the phrase
'change is not being' (256d8-9: KÍvr|aiç övtcos oùk öv boti).
Change is a non-being by virtue of being different from the kind
being and, hence, lacking identity with the kind being.40 This
non-being is, indeed, a partial solution to the falsehood paradox.

39 Or 'change'.
40 O'Brien 2011,211.

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86 Olga Alieva

According to the definition of falsehoo


discourse says that non-beings are beings
beings (24 lai). With the non-being
amounts to false (lack of) identity asse
kind being.
Obviously enough, false discourse is n
identity statements, especially if only the
being is concerned. So the Stranger goe
predication statements and the non-
them.41 The upshot of the previous a
nature of the other renders [each kind]
them other than being' (256el), i.e. oth
However, motion as well as other kind
they partake of being (256e3: öti ueT
Kai övTa). The next step of the argum
these beings-by-virtue-of-participat
ordinary predication statements, corre
those beings, a part of the nature o
(257e3: ccvtite0ev); thus, 'non-beau
contrast of a being to a being (ovtoç 5r
(257e6-7). This part of otherness is then
non-being':

258all-b7: Then it seems that the contrast (àvTÍ08Oiç) in which a


part of the nature of the other (li Tf)ç 0aTÉpou laopíou çúoecoç)
and the nature of being (xfjj tou ôvtoç) are set against one another
(àvTiKEinévcov) is, if we may speak in this way, a being no less than
is being itself [to whose nature the part of the nature of the other is
set in contrast], since the contrast does not signify (otļuaivouoa)
what is contrary to being, but only what is other in relation to it.
[...] It is evident that it is the very non-being (tò un öu) for which
we were searching because of the sophist.

To sum up, non-being turns out to be existent on at least two


interpretations of being: when 'being' stands for the form Being
on its own, non-being (I) is conceivable as part of difference in

41 The new start is marked by the Stranger's remark at 257b 1.

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Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato's Sophist 87

relation to this kind; secondly, when 'being stands for some


kind which participates in the kind being, non-being (II) is
conceivable as part of difference in relation to this particular
kind. If we recall the definition of the false discourse given
above, we'll see that non-being II provides room for falsehood in
ordinary predication statements.42
Of course, this is only a sketchy outline of the argument
concerning non-being in the dialogue, but it suffices for the
purposes of this essay - that is, to show that, in solving the
aporia concerning falsehood and non-being, the Eleatic Stranger
recurs to distinguishing different meanings of non-being. By
means of semantic diairesis he refutes his opponents and proves
their refutation to be only an apparent one (259d5-6: oute tiç
è'Xeyxoç outoç àÀr|0ivòç), for they create apparent
contradictions. He distinguishes between qualified and
unqualified '(non-)being', as well as between different meanings
of the former. As the Stranger puts it, in order to solve the
falsehood paradox they have 'to force non-being in some way to
be a being (tó te 'xř' ôv cbç egti kcxtó ti), and again, to force
being in some way to be a non-being (tò ov au TîàXiv cbç oùk
eoti Tiņ)' (24ld6-7). This ur) is of crucial importance in the
dialogue, and it is hardly an exaggeration to assert that to this
minor qualification the whole multidirectional and
multidimensional argument of the dialogue is dedicated.
If we recur to Aristotle's vocabulary once again, we may say
that the Sophist guards against the secundum quid fallacy.
Aristotle exposes this fallacy in Parmenides' argument43 saying
that it springs from confusion between existential and
predicative modes of being, or between unqualified and qualified
predication. This fallacy is mentioned in chapter 5 of the
Sophistical Refutations',

Soph. El. 166b37-a7: Fallacies connected with the use of some


particular expression absolutely (cxttAcoç) or in a certain respect
(-rrfj) and not in its proper sense (ļir) Kupícos), occur when that

42 For analysis see, e.g. McDowell 1982, 121.


43 Bäck 2000, 56. See also Schreiber 2003, 14 1.

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88 Olga Alieva

which is predicated in part only (tò ev [ié


as though it was predicated absolutely. For
is-not is an object of opinion, then that-whic
the same thing 'to be something' and 'to b
'That-which-is is not, if it is not one of the
it is not a man.' For it is not the same thin
and 'not to be' absolutely; but owing to
language, 'to be something' (tò EĪvai ti) ap
little from 'to be,' (tou EĪvai) and 'not to b
Eivai ti) from 'not to be' (tou 'it' EĪvai).

The upshot of the Sophist is rewarding: th


to demonstrate that non-being is no
TroÀÀaxti (259b5), 'in many respe
discovered through the chain of refuta
turn, provides room for falsehood and
elenchus as such.

OlgaAlieva

National Research University, Higher School of Econo

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Elenchus and Diairesis in Plato's Sophist 89

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