SEPTEMBER 1966

PAKISTAN’S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

MOHAMMED AHSEN CHAUDHRI

For more than a decade and a half after independence, relations between Pakistan and the USSR were not
good. This was not because of their basically different value systems and ideologies, but rather to their different
concepts of their own self-interest. The Soviet Union was not impressed with the reasons which had led to the
creation of Pakistan. Nevertheless, when Pakistan was formed, the Soviet Union evidenced no hostility and promptly
established diplomatic relations with the new State.
The Soviet Union was deeply involved in Europe in 1947. The Cold War had started and the world lay
divided between two power blocs, one led by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States. Pakistan wanted to
steer clear of both power blocs, and therefore pursued a policy of peace and friendship with all countries, whether
Communist or non-Communist. At any rate, neither antipathy nor political intimacy between Pakistan and the
Soviet Union was expected or achieved during the early years, and there was hardly any contact between the people
of the two countries.
Although the ancestors of the people of Pakistan (particularly West Pakistan) came from Soviet Central Asia,
this area was completely cut off from Soviet Central Asia during British rule of India. London rather than Tashkent
and Bokhara became the focus of peoples’ attention. The elite received their education in English universities, and
were more impressed by the Western philosophy of liberalism than by the philosophy of Ali Sher Nawai or by the
thoughts underlying the Russian revolution. Even today there is hardly a university in Pakistan which offers a course
on Soviet history or culture, while courses on America and Europe are offered at almost all universities. It is a
paradox indeed that educated people in Pakistan know a great deal about distant countries having cultures and
traditions very different from their own, but know so little about a country with whom they have close geographical,
historical and cultural proximity.
It may be that the lack of understanding between Pakistan and the Soviet Union was due to lack of
knowledge. In 1947-48, the Soviet Union was looked upon by the intellectuals in Pakistan as a country far behind
the West in the field of economics, science and technology. Under the circumstances, the Soviet Union could not be
of much help to Pakistan, and relations between the two countries were confined to diplomatic levels. In 1949 Prime
Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was invited to visit Moscow, but instead went to the United States. Why this change of
plans occurred has never been satisfactorily answered by the Government of Pakistan. Perhaps the only explanation
is that Pakistan was in need of economic and military aid for development and defense purposes, and the United
States was in a better position to supply Pakistan the aid required. However, Pakistan had no intention of having
exclusive relations with the United States. While in the United States, Liaquat Ali Khan repeatedly stated that
Pakistan had much to gain in the agricultural field through better relations with the Soviet Union.
It is indeed significant that relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union remained satisfactory as long as
Pakistan remained uncommitted in the cold war. But following the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951,
Pakistan’s policy of non-alignment underwent a change. There were, of course, many reasons for it. Pakistan was
 SEPTEMBER 1966

militarily weak, and felt impelled to strengthen its defenses against the danger of war with India, only narrowly
avoided on several occasions. This led Pakistan to enter into a military defense pact with the United States.
While U.S.-Pakistan negotiations for military aid were underway, the Soviet Union protested to Karachi that
she could not regard with indifference the reports “concerning the establishment of American air bases in Pakistan
nor reports that Pakistan and U.S. Government were negotiating on the question of Pakistan joining in plan to set up
a military aggressive bloc in the Middle East.” The Soviet note betrayed ignorance of the nature of negotiations
between Pakistan and the United States. Pakistan denied that any negotiations for air bases on its soil were being
conducted with the United States and assured Moscow that “it would not take any step in hostility or unfriendliness
to U.S.S.R.,” but would adopt only such measures as might be necessary and appropriate to safeguard her interests.
The Soviet Union was not convinced and relations between the two countries deteriorated.
Why did the Soviet Union make no attempt to prevent Pakistan from concluding a military pact with the
United States? There is no positive answer to this question. Probably, as one writer has speculated, Pakistan’s
actions suited the Soviet Union. Moscow was able to bring India closer to her line of thinking in world affairs,
because of New Delhi’s concern with American military aid to Pakistan. The two countries signed a num- ber of
barter deals, cultural and trade agreements, and the Soviet Union began to supply military equipment, heavy
machinery and technical aid to India. The growing amity and friendship with India was definitely to Moscow’s
advantages, for it enhanced Russian prestige in Asia.
Later, when SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) came into being, the Soviet Union strongly
protested Pakistan’s participation. The USSR alleged that these pacts were directed against her and other
communist countries, particularly China. SEATO, as the Soviet Prime Minister saw it, aimed at the “preservation
and consolidation of colonialism, suppression of national liberation movements and interference in the affairs of the
Chinese People’s Republic and other Asian countries”? The Baghdad Pact was also looked upon as a part of the
Western system of military pacts hostile to the Soviet Union. “One might have believed in the defensive nature of the
pact,” said a Russian writer, “had it come into being as a result of the efforts of the Middle Eastern countries
themselves without the participation and interference of the Great Powers located thousands of miles from this
region.”
In reaction to Pakistan’s membership in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet Union lent its support to
India and Afghanistan against Pakistan. During their tour of Asia in December, 1955, Khrushchev and Bulganin
made statements which were unfriendly to Pakistan. In one of his speeches in India, Bulganin declared that he
regarded Kashmir as the northern part of India and the people of Kashmir as part of the Indian people. While in
Kabul he lent support to Afghanistan’s demand that 5,000,000 Pathan tribesmen living in West Pakistan be allowed
to exercise their right of self-determination. In reply, the Prime Minister of Pakistan stated that “it is extraordinary
that while Bulganin is prepared to give the right of self-determination to the frontier tribesmen who are part and
parcel of the sovereign state of Pakistan and who never wanted it, he denies the same right to the people of Kashmir
who are struggling for it.”
It was ironic that the Soviet Union, which had always supported the right of self-determination, should lend
its support to India on Kashmir. Prior to 1954 the Soviet Union had adopted a neutral attitude on this issue, and had
abstained when the Security Council decided in 1949 that the Kashmir question should be decided by a free and
impartial plebiscite. The change in the Soviet attitude indicated an interest in punishing Pakistan for joining military
 SEPTEMBER 1966

defense pacts sponsored by the United States. Also it appears that the Russians wanted both to win India to her side
and to draw Pakistan out of the Western camp by pressure tactics. But despite their pro-India statements on
Kashmir, the Soviet leaders tried to mend relations with Pakistan. In March, 1965, the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr.
Mikoyan, visited Karachi to participate in the Republic Day celebration, and was asked to express his views on
Kashmir. He replied that “the future of Kashmir was not for us to decide. This is for the people of Kashmir to
decide.” In Delhi, however, he interpreted Mr. Khrushchev’s statement on Kashmir to signify that Kashmir had
already become a part of India. Despite these differing statements, it was clear that Mikoyan was trying to repair the
damage done by Bulganin and Khrushchev to Pakistan-Soviet relations. During his visit to Karachi, Mikoyan
renewed the offer of economic aid to Pakistan. At the Republic Day reception at the Pakistan Embassy in Moscow,
the Soviet Minister, Mr. Molotov, hinted that the Soviet Government would be willing to construct a steel mill in
Pakistan, as it had in India.
The change in the Soviet attitude was probably part of an overall transformation in Soviet foreign policy.
Pakistan, however, failed to take note of the Soviet gestures and retained the policy of alignment with the West. A
reappraisal of foreign policy in the light of the changing world situation might have saved Pakistan headaches at a
later date. It was extraordinary, however, that Pakistan made no serious effort to remove Russian suspicions
concerning the construction of launching sites for guided missiles or rockets. In April, 1958, the USSR charged
Pakistan with having such sites and military bases in proximity to the Soviet Union. The Government of Pakistan
replied to these charges, but the Soviet Union remained suspicious. In an Aide-Memorie dated February 18, 1959,
the Soviet Union repeated its charges and warned “that the entire responsibility for the consequences of the steps
taken by Pakistan towards turning her territory into a foreign military base will rest with the Government of
Pakistan.”Pakistan in its reply expressed regret at the threatening tone of the Aide-Memorie, and noted that
“Pakistan has categorically and authoritatively stated several times that it entertains no aggressive designs against
any country nor will it allow its territory to be used for aggressive purposes by any other power.”
Following the exchange of notes, the “U-2 incident” took place in May, 1960, and added fuel to the fire. A
U.S. reconnaissance plane took off from Peshawar, crossed into Soviet territory, and was shot down by a Soviet
rocket. The pilot, who parachuted to safety, was convicted of espionage by the military division of the Soviet
Supreme Court. Pakistan was not responsible for the incident, but the USSR was incensed not only against the
United States but also against Pakistan. According to one report, Premier Khrushchev even drew a red ring about
Peshawar as a bombing target on his strategic map of the world. The Soviet leaders became even more stubborn in
their support of India on the Kashmir question. Twice the Soviet Union vetoed Security Council resolutions on
Kashmir which merely demanded that India and Pakistan should settle the dispute amicably.
At this stage Pakistan’s policy of alignment with the West faced an acid test. By its total dependency upon the
West, Pakistan had weakened her bargaining position. In 1962 the world situation had rapidly changed to the
detriment of Pakistan’s policy of alignment. Ideological disagreement had widened the gulf between China and the
Soviet Union, and the dispute between China and India over their Himalayan border had exploded into an armed
conflagration. The United States, as part of its “containment” of China policy, rushed military aid to India. The
Soviet Union, which had been competing with the United States for India’s affection and had followed pro-India
policy, joined the United States in the race to strengthen India’s defense. By 1964, the Soviet Union had supplied or
committed military aid to India valued at some $131 million against $110 million by the United States. In the
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process, the balance of power in the sub-continent was changed, and moreover, Pakistan’s fear that India might use
the newly acquired weapons to maintain its control over Kashmir were enhanced. Pakistan protested to the United
States, but Washington ignored Pakistan’s protests. This shook Pakistan from the illusions on which her foreign
policy had been based. Rawalpindi hurriedly took steps to normalize relations with both China and the USSR which
set into motion a chain reaction.
Pakistan’s policy of normalizing relations with China, in particular, was disliked by the U.S. In April, 1965,
President Johnson abruptly cancelled President Ayub’s visit to Washington and the consortium meeting which was
to allocate funds for Pakistan’s Third Five Year Plan. Pakistan was not cowed down, but rather changed her foreign
policy from alignment to complete independence, and membership in the non-aligned bloc of Afro-Asian States.
Pakistan also established relations on a new footing with states south of Russia—Turkey and Iran.
These developments prompted Moscow to take a new look at her policy towards Pakistan. In April, 1965,
President Ayub was invited to visit Moscow, and he was the first Pakistani President actually to make the trip. The
talks between the Russian leaders and President Ayub contributed to removing the misunderstandings which had
plagued relations between the two countries since 1947. The joint communique issued at the end of their talks
condemned colonialism and imperialism and supported the people who were fighting for their right of self-
determination.
Thus, the Soviet Union seemed to move away from Khrushchev’s support of India on Kashmir and to accept
the view that the people of Kashmir should decide their own future. Commenting on the outcome of President
Ayub’s visit to Moscow, a leading Pakistani daily observed that it has broken “the barrier which Indian diplomacy has
succeeded in erecting between Pakistan and the Soviet Union over the past decade.”
Another outcome of President Ayub’s visit to Moscow was the signing of an agreement on trade, economic
cooperation and cultural exchange. The Soviet Union agreed to assist Pakistan in implementing 30 major
development projects during the Third Five-Year Plan period, including steel plants, power plants, radio
communications, sea ports and air fields. Recently the Soviet Union increased its credit for the Third Plan from $30
million to $50 million for oil exploitation and the purchases of industrial machinery.
Thus, by 1965 Pakistan’s foreign policy has undergone a definite change. As a result Pakistan’s relations
with the Soviet Union improved and she received more Soviet economic aid. Indeed, many Pakistanis feel that
contacts between Pakistan and the Soviet Union should have been established earlier. Expressing regret at this delay
while in Moscow, Foreign Minister Bhutto stressed his government’s desire to redouble efforts to make up for the
lost time.
Ironically, the tide of events took a new turn at the time of the Indo-Pakistan war in September, 1965. The
Security Council of the United Nations acted promptly, but neither the Soviet Union nor the United States were
prepared to accepted Pakistan’s allegation of Indian aggression, nor did they encourage other countries to support
Pakistan’s struggle. This was probably due to the desire on both their parts not to intervene in opposition to one
another. As a result the Security Council quietly shelved its own plebiscite resolutions for Kashmir. This led the
Prime Minister of India to declare that the Soviet Union has been most helpful to India and “in the Security Council
Russia simply refused to agree to any resolution or motion which was not acceptable to India.”
 SEPTEMBER 1966

The Soviet-American understanding was probably the result of fear that China might become involved in the
war between India and Pakistan. Since both the big powers wanted to prevent such a development, the U.N. Security
Council acted promptly and passed a resolution on September 20, 1965, which demanded cease-fire.
However, the war between India and Pakistan demonstrated to the Soviet Union, as to the rest of the world,
that to leave the Kashmir dispute unresolved was dangerous. In a letter to President Ayub, the Soviet Prime Minister
expressed concern over the military conflict in Kashmir, which, as he put it, “has broken out in an area directly
adjacent to the frontiers of the Soviet Union.” In an effort to solve the Kashmir dispute, he offered his help to India
and Pakistan. Pakistan interpreted this as a change in the Soviet attitude on Kashmir, and on Indo-Pakistan relations
in particular.
In the past the Soviet Union had not shown much interest in resolving the Kashmir dispute, either inside or
outside the United Nations. Although the Soviet Union did not now give up her support to India completely, it did
realize that a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute is desirable. The Russian weekly, New Times appeared to
be voicing the official view when it wrote:

“The Kashmir dispute is one of the disputes that colonialism has handed down
to the newly emerging independent countries. A number of reasons make it
especially dangerous. The geographical position of Kashmir, laying as it does where
the frontiers of India, Pakistan, China and Afghanistan meet only 20 kilometers
from the southern frontiers of the Soviet Union, attracts the imperialists.”

In an attempt to bring peace to the sub-continent, Prime Minister Kosygin invited the leaders of India and
Pakistan to meet and discuss their differences. It was for the first time that the Soviet Union had come forward as an
intermediary between the two Asian states, who also happened to be the members of the Commonwealth. Pakistan
interpreted the Soviet invitation as an offer of good office to help solve the Kashmir dispute. President Ayub
therefore announced readiness to talk peace; the late Prime Minister Shastri appeared to be more reluctant to accept
the invitation and maintained that Kashmir was an integral part of India. However, India considered the Soviet
Union on her side in the Kashmir dispute. While the war was going on, the Soviet Union had continued to supply
arms to India. Thus India found it difficult to decline the Soviet invitation.
President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri met at Tashkent in January, 1966. Prime Minister Kosygin as
intermediary worked hard to find a common ground between India and Pakistan. Finally, his tireless effort was
crowned with success, and President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri signed the Tashkent Declaration. To discuss
the pros and cons of the Tashkent Declaration is not the purpose of this article. It would suffice to say that the
declaration was a triumph of Soviet diplomacy. Most of the clauses of the declaration were aimed at restoring normal
relations between India and Pakistan, but it provided no mechanism for resolving the Kashmir dispute which was the
basic problem between the two neighbors.
However, Pakistan made one positive gain at Tashkent; an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union.
The official explanation of the Tashkent Declaration issued by the Pakistani Foreign Office gives the impression that
the Soviet Union now understands Pakistan’s point of view on Kashmir. It is hoped in Rawalpindi that the Soviet
Union, in the future, will act objectively on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council and may also try to resolve it
from outside.
 SEPTEMBER 1966

If the official Pakistani explanation is correct, the Tashkent Declaration marks the beginning of a new role
for the Soviet Union in South Asia which in turn implies a greater degree of cooperation with the United States in
bringing peace, stability and economic progress to the sub-continent. The fear of China has enhanced the prospect
of their cooperation in settling differences between the two Asian neighbors. It is not certain, however, in what
manner the differences will be resolved. If the big powers followed the advice of Machiavelli that might is right, there
will be no lasting peace in Asia.
Only mutual respect for the principles of self-determination and peaceful co-existence would further
strengthen relations between Pakistan and the Soviet Union and provide a solid framework for peace in Asia.
Foreign Minister Bhutto, while in Moscow in April, 1965, had stated that “Pakistan believes and subscribes to
peaceful co-existence and to the Bandung principles, complete and general disarmament, liquidation of colonialism
of whatever form or texture—white or brown—that may take place.” To this he added: “We are an ideological state.
So is the Soviet Union—as an Eastern thinker has said, let one hundred flowers bloom and let one hundred schools of
thought contend.”
All told, it appears that Pakistan and the Soviet Union have come a long way in improving their mutual
relations. Apart from efforts by the leaders of Pakistan and the Soviet Union, the contingencies of international
politics have played a decisive role in shaping the course of relations between the two countries.