OUR RULING

We deny the Petition.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in
effect at the time of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both
25

marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in
effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions
under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first
26 27 28

paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.
29 30 31 32

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a
void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable
marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be
ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void
marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4)
in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal
fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the
decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to
establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree. 33

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon, and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code contains no
34 35 36

express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. 37

In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second
marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage
was contracted after the death of the second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was
deemed valid until annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous.
Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its performance, hence,
nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.

This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual
antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial
decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous
marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. A second marriage contracted
38

prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and
void. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this
39

requirement:

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is

the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the
Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life." So
crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of
policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot
be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their
union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to
render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this
inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as
human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official
state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of
society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively
confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable
through records accessible to everyone. (Emphases supplied)
40
1âwphi1

However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of Appeals, the requirement of
41 42

a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of
the Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in
force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and
Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:

x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for
entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was
merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first
marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took
place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity
of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant
to prevailing jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for
judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore,
we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the
present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held
in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of
vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is
patent x x x. (Citations omitted)

As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court
thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her
first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is
immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision
of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen
the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
20 April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 218630

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs.
KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
1

(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision rendered by the Regional
2

Trial Court (RTC) of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of Katrina S.
Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio.

Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence) on the ground of psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual friends. After a brief
courtship, they entered into a relationship. When she got pregnant, the two panicked as both their
parents were very strict and conservative. Lawrence did not receive the news well as he was worried
how it would affect his image and how his parents would take the situation. Nevertheless, they got
3

married on July 22, 2000. 4

Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by bickering and quarrels. As early as
their honeymoon, they were fighting so much that they went their separate ways most of the time
and Katrina found herself wandering the streets of Hong Kong alone. 5

Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until the birth of their child, Lanz
Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30, 2000. Lawrence was distant and did not help in
6

rearing their child, saying he knew nothing about children and how to run a family. Lawrence spent
7

almost every night out for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees. Katrina noticed that Lawrence
8

was alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high degree of
immaturity. Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with him and they lost all intimacy
9

between them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in their bedroom every night to see to the needs
of Lanz.10

Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's decisions-from the manner by
which she took care of Lanz, to the way she treated the household help. Most fights ended up in full
blown arguments, often in front of Lanz. One time, when Katrina remembered and missed her
youngest brother who was then committed in a substance rehabilitation center, Lawrence told her to
stop crying or sleep in the rehabilitation center if she will not stop.
11

In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his parents' home and
never to come back. They have been separated in fact since then. 12
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who confirmed her beliefs on
Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed
Lawrence with Narcissistic Personality Disorder, that is characterized by a heightened sense of self-
importance and grandiose feelings that he is unique in some way. 13

Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent, incurable, and deeply integrated
within his psyche; and that it was present but repressed at the time of the celebration of the
14

marriage and the onset was in early adulthood. His maladaptive and irresponsible behaviors
interfered in his capacity to provide mutual love, fidelity, respect, mutual help, and support to his
wife.
15

The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina and Lawrence as void ab initio. It
disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico

and Lawrence C. Tionglico Ito (sic) as void ab initio. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of her husband having lost the right over
the same and so as to avoid the misconception that she is still the legal wifo of respondent. Custody
over the couple's· minor child is awarded to petitioner, with reasonable visitation rights accorded to
respondent, preferably Saturday and Sunday, or as the parties may agree among themselves.

Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the Solicitor-General, the National Statistics Office and
the Local Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite who, in turn, shall endorse a copy of the same to the Local
Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City, ·Metro Manila, so that the appropriate amendment and/or
cancellation of the parties' marriage can be effected in its registry. Furnish, likewise, the parties and
counsel.

SO ORDERED. 16

The CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus,
Cavite, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. 4903-11dated8 May 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED. 17

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a myriad of cases declaring
that psychological assessment based solely on the information coming from either party in a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case,
the psychiatrist obtained his data, in concluding that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated,
exclusively from Katrina.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a myriad of cases declaring
that psychological assessment based solely on the information coming from either party in a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case,
the psychiatrist obtained his data, in concluding that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated,
exclusively from Katrina.

Katrina counters that the facts, bases and surrounding circumstances of each and every case for the
nullity is different from the other and must be appreciated for its distinctiveness. She points out that
the psychological report of Dr. Arellano clearly outlined well-accepted scientific and reliable tests to
18
come up with his findings. In any case, the decision must be based not solely on the expert opinions
but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings, which the RTC and the CA
have found to have been sufficient in proving Lawrence's psychological incapacity.

The issue before Us is plainly whether the totality of evidence presented by Katrina supports the
findings of both the RTC and the CA that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to perform his
essential marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Katrina.

Contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA, We rule in the negative.

Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be
confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 19

The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals has set out the guidelines that has been
20

the core of discussion of practically all declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological
incapacity cases that We have decided:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. xxx

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. xxx

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. xxx

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent

or incurable. xxx

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. xxx

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. xxx

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. xxx

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
 General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. xxx 21

Using these standards, We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that Lawrence is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of a husband.

Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always
base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings. Here, We find the totality of evidence clearly
22

wanting.

First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated were based solely on
Katrina's statements. It bears to stress that Lawrence, despite notice, did not participate in the
1âwphi1

proceedings below, nor was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being invited to do so.

The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn B. Matudan is instructive
23

on the matter:

Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of the clinical psychologist
cannot [be] relied upon to substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the psychological
incapacity of his wife.

It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below. The clinical
psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-appellee's condition was based mainly on the
information supplied by her husband, the petitioner, and to some extent from their daughter, Maricel.
It is noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age at the time the
respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to know her mother well. Also, Maricel would not
have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because she could not have been there
when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening
between her parents until long after her birth. On the other hand, as the petitioning spouse, Nicolas'
description of Marilyn's nature would certainly be biased, and a psychological evaluation based on
this one-sided description can hardly be considered as credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v.
Angelita Suazo, el al., is illuminating on this score:

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence - the
psychologist's testimony and the psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on
her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in
an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose
bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the
psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with
due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above i.e.,
that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.

xxxx

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager information coming from
a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have
conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition. While the
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is not
true for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as
basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.

In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was similarly declared that
'[t]o make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as
proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.'

At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the psychological condition of
the respondent-appellee to be insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity
existed that prevented Marilyn from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. In said
report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers from. Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
antisocial traits on the basis of what she perceives as manifestations of the same. The report neither
explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor showed that the respondent-appellee
was really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical,
nature. (Emphasis Ours)

The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted by Dr. Arellano can most
certainly be conclusive of the psychological disposition of Katrina, but cannot be said to be indicative
of the psychological condition of Lawrence. There was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to
conclude that Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital
obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving statements. To make conclusions and generalizations on
a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side, as in the case at
bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness
of the content of such evidence. 24

Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly depicts the picture of a
psychologically incapacitated husband. Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and
frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a psychological illness. These acts, in our view, do not
rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and should be distinguished
from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations that characterize some marriages. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
25

his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at
the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of
his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then
about to assume. 26

Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are hardpressed to affirm the RTC and
CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to support the factual and legal conclusion that
Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab initio. No other evidence or witnesses were presented by
Katrina to prove Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity. Basic is the rule that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not
evidence. Here, we reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses
27

to substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her testimony, therefore, is

considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value. 28

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May
27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012
Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the
marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage docketed as
Civil Case No. 4903-11 is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 210766

MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON, Petitioner

vs.
BENJAMIN L. SINGSON, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are the August 29, 2013 Decision of the Court of
1 2

Appeals (CA) and its January 6, 2014 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662, which reversed and set
3

aside the November 12, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch
4

260, in Civil Case No. 07-0070.

Factual Antecedents

On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson (petitioner) filed
a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code of the
5

Philippines (Family Code). This was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0070.
6

It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson (respondent) were
married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said
marriage produced four children, all of whom are now of legal age; that when they started living
together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the
expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually," and a compulsive
7

gambler; that respondent was immature, and was w1ab1e to perform his paternal duties; that
respondent was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's
abnormal behavior made him completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to her;
and that because she could expect no help or assistance at all from respondent she was compelled
to work doubly hard to support her family as the sole breadwinner.

Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was confined at Metro
Psych Facility, a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that respondent's attending psychiatrist,
8

Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio), made the following diagnosis on respondent:

Based on history, mental status examination and observation, he is diagnosed to be suffering from
Pathological Gambling as manifested by:

a. preoccupation with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble as seen
in his stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances[;]

b. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired
effect[;]

c. lies to family members or others to conceal the extent of [his] involvement with gambling[;]
 d. committed illegal acts such as forging the signature of his wife, issuing bouncing checks in
order to finance his gambling[;]

e. has jeopardized his relationship with his wife, lost the respect of his children, lost a good
career in banking because of gambling[;]

f. [relies] on his parents, his wife, and siblings to provide money to relieve a desperate
fmancial situation caused by gambling[;]

While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in] behavioral changes as a young boy, it would
be difficult to say that the psychotic episodes he manifested in 2003 and 2006 [are] etiologically
related to the general medical condition that occurred in his childhood.

Furthermore, [respondent] manifests an enduring pattern of behavior that deviates markedly from
the expectations of our culture as manifested in the following areas:

a. his ways of perceiving and interpreting [his own] self, other people, and events[;]

b. his emotional response[;]

c. his poor impulse control[;]

Such pattern is inflexible and pervasive and has led to significant impairment in social, occupational
and interpersonal relationship. In [respondent's] case, this has persisted for several years, and can
be traced back [to] his adolescence since he started gambling while in high school. He is therefore
diagnosed to be suffering from Personality Disorder.

All these[,] put together, [hinder respondent] from performing his marital obligations. 9

Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a "distraught" family and had a
"dysfunctional" childhood; that respondent had all the love, care, and protection of his parents as the
10

youngest child for some time; but that these parental love, care and protection were, however,
transferred to his youngest brother who was born when respondent was almost five years old; and
that these factors caused respondent emotional devastation from which he never recovered.

Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a high school student, was already betting
on jai alai. She also claimed that she tried to adjust to respondent's personality disorders, but that
she did not attain her goal.

Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any ante-nuptial agreement to
govern their prope1ty relations as husband and wife and that they had no conjugal assets or debts.

On June 19, 2007, respondent filed his Answer. 11

Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that "psychological incapacity" must be

characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are not present in the instant
case because petitioner's allegations are not supported by facts.

Respondent further averred that it was not true that he failed to render any help, support or
assistance to petitioner and their family; that the family home where petitioner and their children are
living was in fact his own capital property; that his shortcomings as mentioned by petitioner do not
pertain to the most grave or serious cases of personality disorders that would satisfy the standards
required to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage; that petitioner's complaint is nothing more than a
complaint of a woman with an unsatisfactory marriage who wants to get out of it; that contrary to
petitioner's claim that he is a good-for-nothing fellow, he has a college degree in business
administration, and is a bank employee, and, that it was money problem, and not his alleged
personality disorder, that is the wall that divided him and petitioner.

Respondent also claimed that petitioner failed to lay the basis for the conclusions of the psychiatrist
to the effect that he is suffering from pathological gambling and personality disorder; that petitioner's
allegation that he came from a distraught family and that he suffered emotional devastation is vague,
and bereft of particular details, and even slanderous; and that assuming that he had not acted the
way petitioner expected him to conduct himself, his actions and behavior are not psychological
illnesses or personality disorders, but simply physical illnesses of the body, akin to hypertension and
allied sicknesses, and that these physical illnesses are not at all incurable psychiatric disorders that
were present at the time of his marriage with petitioner.

Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets and debts; that the land
where their family home is built came from his earnings, hence the family home is their conjugal
property; that he and petitioner also have a house and lot in Tagaytay City, as well as bank accounts
that are in petitioner's name only; and he and petitioner also have investments in shares of stocks,
cars, household appliances, furniture, and jewelry; and that these are conjugal assets because they
came from petitioner's salaries and his (respondent's) own inheritance money.

Respondent moreover alleged that before the filing of the present Petition, petitioner had caused him
to be admitted into the Metro Psych Facility for treatment; that on account of his confinement and
treatment in this psychiatric facility, he has incurred medical expenses and professional medical
fees; and that since it is petitioner who manages all their finances and conjugal assets it stands to
reason that he should be awarded '"spousal support."

On July 25, 2007, the RTC issued its Pre-Trial Order. 12

Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included herself, her son, Jose Angelo Singson
(Jose), and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio.

On February 23, 2010, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which included a photocopy of
the marriage contract; the birth certificates of their four children; her son Jose’s Judicial Affidavit
dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Judicial Affidavit dated June 25, 2008;
Clinical Summary of respondent issued by Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio dated February 11, 2007 (Clinical
Summary); her (petitioner's) own Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 179751 registered in the names of the parties' four children:, and a
notarized document entitled "Summary of Sources and Uses of Funds for tJ1e period November
1999 to March 31, 2008" executed by petitioner and described as a detailed summary of expenses
paid for with the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of the latter's house in Magallanes
Village.
13

Respondent filed his Comment thereon. 14

On March 29, 2010, the RTC admitted petitioner’s exhibits. 15

On May 13, 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss "on the ground that the totality of evidence
16

presented by petitioner did not establish [his] psychological incapacity x x x to comply with the
essential martial obligations x x x". Petitioner filed her Opposition thereto, and respondent
17 18

tendered his Comment thereon. 19

On May 17, 2010, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and stood pat on its March 29,
2010 Order. 20

During the September 30, 2010 hearing, respondent’s counsel manifested that his client was waiving
the right to present countervailing evidence. Respondent’s counsel also moved that the Petition at
bar be submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence already on the record. The RTC thus
declared the case submitted for decision. 21

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The RTC disposed thus-

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is

hereby rendered[:]

1. DECLARING null and void ab initio the marriage between MARIA CONCEPCION v. SINGSON
a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON and BENJAMIN L SINGSON solemnized on JULY 6, 1974 in
Mandaluyong City or any other marriage between them on the ground of psychological' incapacity of
the respondent.

2. ORDERING the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City and the National Statistics Office to
cancel the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent as appearing in the Registry of
Marriage.

There are no other issues in this case.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars ofMandaluyong City and
Parañaque City, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Civil Register General (National
Statistics Office) and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Parañaque City.

SO ORDERED. 22

The RTC ruled that the requisites warranting a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the family Code are present in the instant case because the totality of evidence showed that
respondent is suffering from a psychological condition that is grave, incurable, and has juridical
antecedence.

The RTC also found that the combined testimonies of petitioner and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio convincingly
showed that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations;
that respondent's inability to perform his marital obligations as set out in Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code, was essentially due to a psychological abnormality arising from a pathological and
utterly irresistible urge to gamble.

The RTC cited "[Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's] findings [which] reveal that respondent is suffering
from Personality Disorder known as Pathological Gambling." It ruled that it has been shown that
23

this personality disorder was present at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest
only later; that because of this personality disorder respondent had already jeopardized his
relationship with his family; and that respondent's psychological disorder hinders the performance of
his obligations as a husband and as a father.

Lastly, the RTC found that the only property owned in common by spouses was donated in favor of
the parties' children as evidenced by TCT No.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of this verdict.

But in its older dated January 6, 2011, the RTC denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. It
24

reiterated that the expert witness had adequately established that respondent is suffering from
"Pathological Gambling Personality Disorder'' which is grave, permanent, and has juridical
antecedence. On February 4, 2011, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal which was given due
25

course by the RTC in its order dated February 28, 2011.

26

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC, and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 November 2010 issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 07-0070, declaring the marriage
between Maria Concepcion N. Singson and Benjamin L. Singson null and void ab initio, is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Instead, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 27

The CA held that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations, which in this case, was
not at all proven to be grave or serious, much less incurable, and furthermore was not existing at the
time of the marriage. What is more, the CA declared that any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage, and against its dissolution and nullity, in obedience
to the mandate of the Constitution and statutory laws; and that in this case, petitioner failed to
discharge the burden of proving that respondent is suffering from a serious or grave psychological
disorder that completely disables or incapacitates him from understanding and discharging the
essential obligations of the marital union.

According to the CA, psychological incapacity is the downright or utter incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The CA did not go along with the RTC,
which placed heavy reliance on Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's finding that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations due to a personality disorder known as
pathological gambling. The CA held that, contrary to petitioner's claim that respondent's pathological
gambling was grave or serious, the evidence in fact showed that the latter was truly capable of
carrying out the ordinary duties of a married man because he had a job, had provided money for the
family from the sale of his own property, and he likewise provided the land on which the family home
was built, and he also lives in the family home with petitioner and their children.

On top of these, the CA ruled that it is settled that mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of a spouse, is different from incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; that the evidence at bar showed that
respondent's alleged pathological gambling arose after the marriage; that in fact petitioner admitted
that she was not aware of any gambling by respondent before they got married; that petitioner
moreover acknowledged that respondent was a kind and a caring person when he was courting her;
that petitioner likewise admitted that respondent also brought petitioner to the hospital during all four
instances when she gave birth to their four children.

In other words, the CA found that respondent's purported pathological gambling was not proven to
be incurable or permanent since respondent has been undergoing treatment since 2003 and has
been responding to the treatment.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA's Decision. But her motion was denied by the CA in
28

its Resolution of January 6, 2014. 29

Issue

Hence, the instant recourse with petitioner raising the following question –

[WHETHER] THE [CA] ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE [RTC]. 30

Petitioner's Arguments

In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution, and in asking for the
reinstatement of the RTC Decision, petitioner argues in her Petition, Reply, and
31 32

Memorandum that respondent's psychological incapacity had been duly proved in court, including
33

its juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity.

First, petitioner maintains that respondent failed to perform the marital duties of mutual love, respect,
and support; that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's expert findings are corroborated by the testimonies of
petitioner end her son Jose both of whom demonstrated that respondent’s psychological incapacity
is grave or serious rendering him incapable to perform the essential marital obligations; that for his
pan, respondent had adduced no proof that he (respondent) is capable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage for the reason that everything that the family had saved and built had
been squandered by respondent; and that respondent's confinement at the rehabilitation facility is
itself proof of the gravity or seriousness of his psychological incapacity.

Second, petitioner contends that respondent’s psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, as
shown in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio’s Clinical Summary, which pointed out that such psychological
incapacity, which included pathological gambling, can be traced back when respondents was already
betting on jai alai even in high school, and this was not known to his family; that the Clinical
Summary was based on information provided not only by petitioner, but by respondent’s sister, and
by respondent himself; that such juridical antecedence was neither questioned nor overthrown by
countervailing evidence; and that the root cause could be traced back to respondent’s flawed
relationship with his parents which developed into a psychological disorder that existed before the
marriage.

Third, petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that personality disorders
are generally incurable and permanent, and must continuously be treated medically; that in this case
the Clinical Summary; had pointed out that respondent's understanding of his gambling problem is
only at the surface level; and that in point of fact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had affirmed that personality
disorders are incurable.

Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment and Memorandum, respondent counters that the assailed CA Decision should be
34 35

affirmed. He argues that the grounds cited by petitioner are the self-same grounds raised by
petitioner before the RTC and the CA; that petitioner's evidence indeed failed to prove convincingly
that he (respondent) is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,
hence there is no basis to declare the parties' marriage void ab initio.

Our Ruling

The Petition will not succeed.

It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in our
Constitution and statutory laws, hence any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of
the continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of the same
rests at all times upon the petitioner. "The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the
36

family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. Because of this,
the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties."37

Article 1 of the Family Code describes marriage as "a special contract of permanent union between
a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family
life" and as "the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution."

In the instant case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of this social institution by suing out pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code, which provides that:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order
227)

Petitioner's case will thus be examined in light of the well-entrenched case law rulings interpreting
and construing the quoted Article, to wit:

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). The Court laid down more
definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic
of the Phils. v. CA, x x x [also known as the Molina guidelines]. These guidelines incorporate the
basic requirements that the Court established in Santos. 38
In setting aside the RTC's ruling, the CA in this case held that petitioner failed to prove that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
because she failed to establish that such incapacity was grave and serious, and that it existed at the
time of the marriage, and that it is incurable. We agree.

At the outset, this Court is constrained to peruse the records because of the conflicting findings
between the trial court and the appellate court. We thus did peruse and review the records, and we
39

are satisfied that the CA correctly found that respondent has the capability and ability to perform his
duties as a husband and father as against the RTC' s rather general statement that respondent's
psychological or personality disorder hinders the performance of his basic obligations as a husband
and a father.

We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's
psychological incapacity was grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since
"[respondent] had a job; provided money for the family from the sale of his property; provided the
land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and
their children."
40

Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter "was working
at a certain point." This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary
41

and testimony, which were both included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence, respecting the
parties' relationship history that petitioner and respondent met at the bank where petitioner was
applying for a job and where respondent was employed as a credit investigator prior to their
courtship and their marriage.42

It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence a notarized
summary dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses paid for by the proceeds of
respondent's share in the sale of his parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City which amounted to
around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating that this amount was insufficient to cover the
family expenses from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under oath that the items for their
family budget, such as their children's education, the payments for association dues, and for electric
bills came from this money.

And no less significant is petitioner's admission that respondent provided the land upon which the
family home was built, thus -

[Respondent's counsel to the witness, petitioner]

Q: Does [respondent] [own] any real property?

A: No.

Q: He does not [own] any real property?

A: No.

Q: Showing to you Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413513 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal which
has been transferred with the Register of Deeds of Paranaque and is now re-numbered as S-25470,
which is in the name of [respondent], Filipino, of legal age, single.

xxxx
[COURT to the witness, petitioner]

Q: Who owned this property?

A: Based on the document, it's Benjamin Singson.

Q: Where is this property located?

A: It is located in United Paranaque.

Q: Where in United Paranaque?

A: No. 2822 Daang Hari.

Q: Are you staying in that property?

A: We are staying in that property.

xxxx

[Respondent's counsel to the Witiress, petitioner]

Q: How about the house there, in the United Parañaque [property], who owns it?

A: It was donated to the children.

xxxx

[COURT to the witness, petitioner]

Q: Based on the document, who is the registered owner?

A: It says there, [respondent], Your Honor.

Q: Who owns it now?

A: The children because it was donated [to them]. 43

What's more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as husband and wife since their
marriage on July 6,1974 (and in the company of their four children, too). In fact, shunting aside the
time that respondent was under treatment at the Metro Psych Facility, petitioner did not allege any
instance when respondent failed to live with them.

To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself admitted, that respondent likewise
brought her to the hospital during all four instances that she gave birth to their children.
44

By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that respondent’s mere confinement at the
rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological gambler, is irresponsible, and
is unable to keep a job, necessarily translate into unassailable proof that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It is settled that
"[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will." "[I]t is not enough to
45

prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that
he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical,
illness."
46

Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony in open court and her Clinical Summary be taken for gospel
truth in regard to the charge that respondent is afflicted with utter inability to appreciate his marital
obligations. That much is clear from the following testimony –

[Petitioner's counsel to the witness, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio]

Q: Madam Witness, do you know the respondent in this case, Benjamin Singson?

A: Yes. [S]ir, [respondent] has been my patient since 2003, during his first admission and again [in]
2006, [S]ir.

Q: So, he was confined twice in your facility, [M]adam witness?

A: Yes, [S]ir.

Q: Why was he confined, Madam witness?

A: He was initially confined because of problems with gambling and subsequently because of
[behavioral] problem, [S]ir.

xxxx

Q: What was the cause of his second confinement, Madam [W]itness?

A: Initially, he was able to cope after discharged. However, [in] September of 2006, he knocked on
the doors of the maids in the middle of the night. And in one occasion, he got his car in the garage
and drove out bumping the car parked right across the garage and he [also kept] takfr1g things out
from his cabinet. And if the maids would clean [these], he [would] immediately take them out again.
So, he was brought to the facility in October because of his uncontrolled behavior, [S]ir.

xxxx

Q: So, what [were] your clinical findings on the state of the respondent, Benjamin Singson, Madam
witness?

A: Based on history, mental status examination and observations during his stay, I found that
[respondent] is suffering from pathological gambling. Also, with his history of typhoid fever when he
was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006.
Aside from pathological gambling, [respondent] is suffering from a personality disorder, [S]ir.
Q: What are the results or symptoms of this personality disorder with [regard] to [respondent's
dealings] with other people, with his wife and his family, [M]adam witness?

A: Your Honor, may I read from my report to refresh my memory.

COURT: Go ahead.

A: Because of his maladaptive behavior, [respondent] sees [sic] his problems which [makes] his
personal[,] family[,] and social life[,] and even his vocational pleasure [suffer]. He was pre-occupied
with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble as seen in his stealing and
pawning jewelries and appliances. He needs to amble with increasing amounts of money in
order achieve his desired effects into gambling, [S]ir.

COURT: Your findings, Dr., are incorporated in your report?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

[Cross-examination of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio by respondent’s counsel]

Q: Who were the ones who made the examination, Madam witness?

A: I made the examination, [S]ir, and also the psychologist did the psychological testing, [S]ir.

Q: Now, in your opinion as an expert witness, Madam witness, which we would like to request [from]
this Honorable Court, later on, that you present your credentials as expert witness, you concluded
that the respondent is suffering from personality disorder?

A: Yes,[S]ir.

Q: What does this mean in layman’s language, [M]adam witness?

A: Personality disorder is a maladaptive pattern of behavior that has distracted his ability to perform
his functions as a married man to his wife as a father to his children and as a person who is
supposed to be employed productively, [S]ir. 47

Futhermore, "[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while undoubtedly negative
traits are nowhere nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological incapacity’], in the absence of
[incontrovertible] proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness."
48

We now turn to the second point. Again, in view of the contrasting findings of the trial court and
appellate court, we take recourse to the records to assist us in evaluating the perspective postures
49

taken by the parties.

Here again, well-entrenched is the rule that "there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital
obligations x x x." "A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological
50

incapacity."51
Again we agree with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or correctly lay down the bases or premises
for this particular finding relative to respondent's psychological incapacity, thus:

Second, there is also sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent's inabilities to perform his
marital obligations was a result of not mere intentional refusal on his part but are caused by
psychological abnormality. Such psychological incapacity of the respondent has been shown as
already present at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only after the
solemnization. x x x.52

As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not specifically
identify the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. In fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio
did not point to a definite or a definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid fever when he was
younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and
2006." Besides, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it was not she herself, but another psychologist
53

who conducted the tests. And this psychologist was not presented by petitioner. More than that, Dr.
54

Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony regarding respondent's alleged admission that he was allegedly
betting on jai alai when he was still in high school is essentially hearsay as no witness having
personal knowledge of that fact was called to the witness stand. And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio
claimed to have interviewed respondent's sister in connection therewith, the latter did testify in court.
And we are taught that "[t]he stringency by which the Court assesses the sufficiency of psychological
evaluation reports is necessitated by the pronouncement in our Constitution that marriage is an
inviolable institution protected by the State." 55

Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity could
be attributed to the latter's family or childhood, which are circumstances prior to the parties'
marriage; no evidence has been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for upholding
petitioner's contention that respondent's family was "distraught" and that respondent's conduct was
"dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These are very serious charges which
must be substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner did not at all adduce.
Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific finding that this was the origin of respondent's
alleged inability to appreciate marital obligations.

Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's psychological
incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage. It has been held that the parties' child is not a
1âwphi1

very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have been there when the spouses were
married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until
long after his birth."
56

To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have adduced convincing, competent and
trustworthy evidence to establish the cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity and
that the same antedated their marriage. If anything, petitioner failed to successfully dispute the CA's
57

finding that she was not aware of any gan1b1ing by respondent before they got married and that
respondent was a kind and caring person when he was courting her. 58

Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA's declaration that petitioner failed to prove that
respondents alleged psychological incapacity is serious or grave and that it is incurable or
permanent.

To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that "personality disorders
are generally incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to take judicial notice under
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. 59
"'Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by
reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was
celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have
validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital
tie." This is the situation here.
60

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013 Decision and January 6, 2014
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
G.R. No. 188400

MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner

vs
RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an inability to comply with or comprehend
essential marital obligations.

This resolves the Petition for Review filed by Maria Teresa B. Tani- De La Fuente (Maria Teresa)
1

assailing the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009,
2 3

respectively, in CA- G.R. CV. No. 76243, which reversed the Decision dated August 14, 2002 of
4

Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q- 99-37829.

Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr. (Rodolfo) first met when they
were students at the University of Sto. Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became sweethearts. 5

After graduating from college, Maria Teresa found work at the University of Sto. Tomas Treasurer's
Office. Meanwhile, Rodolfo, who was unable to finish his college degree, found continued
6

employment at his family's printing press business. 7

While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and
was prone to jealousy. She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to have no ambition in life and felt
8

insecure of his siblings, who excelled in their studies and careers.

9

On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married in Mandaluyong City. They had two
children: Maria Katharyn, who was born on May 23, 1985, and Maria Kimberly, who was born on
April 6, 1986. 10

Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. He was jealous of everyone who
talked to Maria Teresa, and would even skip work at his family's printing press to stalk
her. Rodolfo's jealousy was so severe that he once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin who
11

was staying at their house because he suspected his cousin of being Maria Teresa's lover. 12

In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would have sex four (4) or five (5)
times a day. At times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria Teresa from her office during her lunch break, just
13

so they could have sex. During sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie her to the bed or poke
14

her with things. Rodolfo also suggested that they invite a third person with them while having sex,
15

or for Maria Teresa to have sex with another man in Rodolfo's presence. Rodolfo's suggestions
16

made Maria Teresa feel molested and maltreated. Whenever Maria Teresa refused Rodolfo's
17

advances or suggestions, he would get angry and they would quarrel. 18

Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and a priest, as well as any person she thought
could help her and Rodolfo. Maria Teresa also suggested that she and Rodolfo undergo marriage
19

counselling, but Rodolfo refused and deemed it as mere "kalokohan". 20

Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having
an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's head. Maria Teresa,
21

with their two (2) daughters in tow, left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the gunpoking incident.
Maria Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after that, and she supported their children by herself. 22

On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the 23

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was initially archived because Rodolfo failed to file a
responsive pleading. Maria Teresa moved for the revival of the Petition. The trial court granted the
24 25

motion and referred the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for collusion
investigation. Assistant City Prosecutor Jocelyn S. Reyes found no collusion and recommended the
26

trial of the case on the merits. 27

Despite notice, Rodolfo failed to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference. The pre-trial conference
28

was declared closed and terminated, and Maria Teresa was allowed to present her evidence. 29

Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, was presented as
an expert witness. Dr. Lopez testified that he conducted an in-depth interview with Maria Teresa to
30

gather information on her family background and her marital life with Rodolfo, and subjected her to a
battery of psychological tests. Dr. Lopez also interviewed Rodolfo's best friend.
31 32

After subjecting Maria Teresa to interviews and tests, Dr. Lopez concluded that Maria Teresa was not
suffering from any severe mental disorder and had no indication of any organic or functional
impairment. Although Dr. Lopez found that Maria Teresa had an emotionally disturbed personality,
33

he opined that this was not severe enough to constitute psychological incapacity. 34

Dr. Lopez affirmed that he sent Rodolfo a letter of invitation through registered mail. After two (2) 35

months, Rodolfo contacted Dr. Lopez and said, "Doctor, ano ba ang pakialam niyo sa amin, hindi
niyo naman ako kilala." Dr. Lopez explained that he only wanted to hear Rodolfo's side of the story,
but Rodolfo replied with, "[I]nuulit ko doktor, wala kayong pakialam sa akin." 36

Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's]
damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious;
his severe doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his being irresponsible and
lack of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity." 37

Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the severe forms of personality disorder, even
more severe than the other personality disorders like borderline and narcissistic personality
disorders. Dr. Lopez explained that Rodolfo's personality disorder was most probably caused by a
38

pathogenic parental model. Rodolfo's family background showed that his father was a psychiatric
39

patient, and Rodolfo might have developed psychic contamination called double insanity, a symptom
similar to his father's. Dr. Lopez further claimed that Rodolfo's disorder was serious and incurable
40

because of his severe paranoia. 41

Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and Rodolfo's marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo's
incapacity to perform his marital obligations. 42

Summons was served upon Rodolfo but he did not file any responsive leading. He likewise did not
43

appear during the pre-trial conference. He was given a specific date to present evidence but he still
44

failed to appear. he trial court eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his right to
45

present evidence. 46
On June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the Solicitor General to submit its comment on
Maria Teresa's formal offer of evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General was also directed to
47

submit its certification. The Office of the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial
48

court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision without the certification and comment from
the Office of the Solicitor General.49

On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision granting the petition for declaration of
50

nullity of marriage.

While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine Rodolfo, the trial court gave credence to his
findings as they were based on information gathered from credible informants. The trial court held
that the marriage between Maria Teresa and Rodolfo should be declared null and void because
"[Rodolfo's] psychological incapacity [was] grave, serious and incurable." The dispositive portion of
51

the trial court's decision reads:

WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:

(1) Declaring the marriage of petitioner, MARIA TERESA B. TANI DE LA FUENTE to respondent,
RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR. null and void on the ground of respondent's psychological
incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Their conjugal partnership (sic) property
relations is hereby dissolved. There being no mention of properties acquired by the parties, no
pronouncement as to its liquidation and partition is hereby made;

(2) Their children, Maria Katharyn and Maria Kimberly, both surnamed De la Fuente shall remain
legitimate. They shall remain in the custody of the petitioner.

(3) Both parties must support their children. There being no evidence presented as to the capability
of the respondent to give support, no pronouncement is hereby made in the meantime;

(4) Henceforth, the petitioner shall be known by her maiden name, TANI.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars of Quezon City and Mandaluyong
City where the marriage was celebrated upon the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

52

On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration. The Office
53

of the Solicitor General explained that it was unable to submit the required certification because it
had no copies of the transcripts of stenographic notes. It was also unable to inform the trial court of
54

its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it was handling. 55

On September 13, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration, with the dispositive
portion reading:

WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General is hereby deemed moot and academic.

This Court would like to call the attention of the Office of the Solicitor General that this case was filed
on June 3, 1999 and there should be no more delay in the disposition of the case. 56
The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. It argued that the
57

trial court erred a) in deciding the case without the required certification from the Office of the
Solicitor General, and b) in giving credence to Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe
58

personality disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on insufficient data and did not follow
the standards set forth in the Molina case. 59

The Court of Appeals granted the Office of the Solicitor General's appeal.
60

The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of Dr. Lopez was unreliable for being hearsay, thus,
the trial court should not have given it weight. The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Dr. Lopez's
61

finding that Rodolfo's behavior descended from psychological illness contemplated under Article 36
of the Family Code. 62

In addition, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Maria Teresa's admission that she married
Rodolfo with the belief that he would change, and that they were in a relationship for five (5) years
before getting married, showed that they were in good terms during the early part of their marriage. It
also negated her claim that Rodolfo's psychological defect existed at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, and that it deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage. The
63

dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED AUGUST 14, 2002 is REVERSED and the petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

64

Maria Teresa moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
65

Resolution dated May 25, 2009.

66

On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari. 67

Petitioner argued that based on current jurisprudence, trial courts had a wider discretion on whether
expert opinion was needed to prove psychological incapacity. Petitioner further argued that for as
68

long as the trial court had basis in concluding that psychological incapacity existed, such conclusion
should be upheld. 69

Rodolfo filed a Comment stating that he was not opposing Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly
70

believes that there is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as married." 71

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, agreed that a physician was not required to
72

declare a person psychologically incapacitated but emphasized that the evidence presented must be
able to adequately prove the presence of a psychological condition. The Office of the Solicitor
General maintained that Maria Teresa was unable to sufficiently prove Rodolfo's alleged
psychological incapacity. 73

The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that Dr. Lopez's psychological report stated that his
assessment was based on interviews he made with petitioner and two (2) of the parties' common
friends. However, Dr. Lopez did not name the two (2) common friends in the report. Furthermore,
74

during trial Dr. Lopez testified that he only interviewed petitioner and Rodolfo's best friend, not two
(2) friends as indicated in his report. The Office of the Solicitor General insisted that the finding of
75

Rodolfo's psychological incapacity should be dismissed as hearsay as it was based solely on

information given by petitioner to Dr. Lopez. 76
The only issue raised for the resolution of this Court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage because petitioner's evidence was insufficient to
prove that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.

The Petition is granted.

The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals was the first case that attempted to lay down the
77

standards for determining psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family

Code. Santos declared that "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." Furthermore, the incapacity "should refer to no less than
78

a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage[.]" 79

Two (2) years later, Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, provided the guidelines to be followed
80

when interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
"protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law
on evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church - while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other - shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the
inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. (Emphasis in the original)
81

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance
with Molina to warrant the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to
discharge the burden of proof that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity.

The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving undue weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez
since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of respondent's mental
and psychological condition. The Court of Appeals cited Republic v. Dagdag, where this Court held
82

that "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by experts." The Court of Appeals then ruled that "[o]bviously, this requirement is
83

not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testifies on the alleged
psychological incapacity of one party." 84
The Court of Appeals is mistaken.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not
85

automatically render as hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or

psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other." 86

Marcos v. Marcos emphasizes that Molina does not require a physician to examine a person and
87

declare him/her to be psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the totality of evidence
presented establishes the party's psychological condition. 88

Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered
from psychological incapacity. Respondent's paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and
prone to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume
the essential obligations of marriage. As the trial court found:

Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at his conclusion of respondent' [s] personality by taking into
consideration the psychological impression and conclusion he gathered from the analysis of the
different behaviors he manifested during the time that he and petitioner were living together.
According to him, under the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, he found the respondent to be suffering
from a paranoid personality disorder manifested by the respondent's damaging behavior like
reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe doubts and
distrust of friends and relatives of the petitioner; his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his
resistance to treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe immaturity. He also testified that this
kind of disorder is actually one of the severe forms of personality disorder even more severe than
the other personality disorders like the borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.

As to the root cause, [h]e explained that this must have been caused by a pathogenic parental
model. As he investigated the family background of the respondent, Dr. Lopez discovered that his
father was a psychiatric patient such that the respondent developed a similar symptom or psychic
contamination which is called double insanity. This, according to Dr. Lopez is usually developed
among close family members, bestfriends (sic), sweethearts and even couples who are close to one
another; that people close to one another get psychically contaminated; that surprisingly, the
symptom that the father manifested is the same as those of the respondent. The said disorder
started during respondent's late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years.

He further testified that this disorder is very severe, serious and incurable because of the severe
paranoia of the patient; that patients with this kind of personality disorder could never accept that
there is something wrong with them and if ever forced to seek treatment, they would rather engage
in an intellectual battle with the therapist rather than cooperate with them.

Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to

perform his marital obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He recommends
1âwphi1

that the marriage be annulled. (Emphasis supplied)

89

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the ultimate task of decision-making, must
give due regard to expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties. 90

The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder was hereditary in nature as his own
father suffered from a similar disorder. Dr. Lopez stated that respondent's own psychological
disorder probably started during his late childhood years and developed in his early adolescent
years. Dr. Lopez explained that respondent's psychological incapacity to perform his marital
obligations was likely caused by growing up with a pathogenic parental model.

The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological incapacity was also sufficiently proven
during trial. Petitioner attested that she noticed respondent's jealousy even before their marriage,
and that he would often follow her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on
him. She believed that he would change after they got married; however, this did not happen.
91 92

Respondent's jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and severe that these caused him to poke a
gun at petitioner's head.93

The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr.
Lopez. He vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit that there
was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner
when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a
priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counselling to respondent; however, respondent refused
all of her attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined by Dr.
Lopez.

Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent
may have lived together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could
not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.

This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of harassment towards petitioner, which show his
need to intimidate and dominate her, a classic case of coercive control. At first, respondent only
inflicted nonphysical forms of mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her from her family and friends
due to his jealousy, and stalking her due to his paranoia. However, his jealousy soon escalated into
physical violence when, on separate instances, he poked a gun at his teenage cousin, and at
petitioner.

Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which refers to a pattern of behavior meant to
dominate a partner through different tactics such as physical and sexual violence, threats, emotional
insults, and economic deprivation. Although not specifically named, coercive control as a form of
94

psychological abuse or harm has been recognized in Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Children Act of 2004:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of
such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is
not limited to, the following acts:

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of
the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his
wife from her family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his
depravity, and utter lack of comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of
utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she
had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family, respondent simply refused to believe that
there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly could not comprehend
and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that
respondent's mental illness is incurable.

In granting the petition and declaring void the marriage of Maria Teresa and Rodolfo, this Court
reiterates the pronouncement we made in an opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesolamin: 95

Our choices of intimate partners define us - inherent ironically in our individuality. Consequently,
when the law speaks of the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage governed by law, this
refers to responsibility to children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and other matters
limited to ensuring the stability of society. The state's interest should not amount to unwarranted
1âwphi1

intrusions into individual liberties.

Since the State's interest must be toward the stability of society, the notion of psychological
incapacity should not only be based on a medical or psychological disorder, but should consist of the
inability to comply with essential marital obligations such that public interest is imperiled.96

Lastly, this Court takes note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu Te's observation that a straitjacket application
of the Molina guidelines "has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral
insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very
foundation of their families, our basic social institutions." Ironically, the ultimate effect of such
97

stringent application of the Molina guidelines is the perversion of the family unit, the very institution
that our laws are meant to protect.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The marriage of Maria Teresa Tani-
De La Fuente and Rodolfo De La Fuente is declared NULL and VOID. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV. No.
76243 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-37829 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 208790 January 21, 2015

GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner,

vs.
MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

For review is the Decision rendered on January 29, 2013 and Resolution issued on August 7, 2013
1 2

by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set aside the Decision dated3

January 29, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil Case No.
SP-6564(09), which declared the marriage between Glenn Vifias (Glenn) and Mary Grace Parel-
Vifias (Mary Grace) as null and void.

Antecedents

On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married in civil
rites held in Lipa City, Batangas. Mary Grace was already pregnant then. The infant, however, died
4

at birth due to weakness and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the infant’s death was caused by
Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy.

The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender, while Mary Grace was a
production engineer.

Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn
subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was
filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.

On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary
5

Grace.He alleged that Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly
resorting to any pretext to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and
drank and smoked heavily even whenshe was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace refused to perform
even the most essential household chores of cleaning and cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace
had not exhibited the foregoing traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship.6

Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the death of the infant whom she
delivered. She lived as if she were single and was unmindful of her husband’s needs. She was self-
centered, selfish and immature. When Glenn confronted her about her behavior, she showed
indifference. She eventually left their home without informing Glenn. Glenn later found out that she
left for an overseas employment in Dubai. 7

Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace,
he consulted the latter’s friends. They informed him that Mary Grace came from a broken family and
was left to be cared for by her aunts and nannies. The foregoing circumstance must have
contributed to her sense of insecurity and difficulty in adjusting to married life.
8

To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and submitted himself to a
psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as
"amply aware of his marital roles" and "capable of maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual
relationship."
9

On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the data she had gathered
from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back in college.

Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college graduate. She belongs to a middle
class family. Her father is an overseas contract worker, while her mother is a housewife. At the time
Dr. Tayag prepared her report, Mary Grace was employed in Dubai and romantically involved with
another man. 10

According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically harmed Glenn during the couple’s
fights. Mary Grace is also ill-tempered and carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-oriented.11

Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-
social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual
love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the
propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
12

In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained that:

The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe, serious, grave, permanent and chronic
in proportion and is incurable by any form of clinical intervention. It has already been deeply
embedded within her system as it was found to have started as early as her childhood years.
Because of such, it has caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and functionally[-]impaired
especially with regards to heterosexual dealings.

Such disorder of [Mary Grace]is mainly characterized by grandiosity, need for admiration and lack of
empathy[,] along with her pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others[,] which utterly
distorted her perceptions and views especially in terms of a fitting marital relationship. Such disorder
manifested in [Mary Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of entitlement and arrogance.
Throughout her union with [Glenn], she has exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen in her
marked inability to show proper respect for her husband. x x x She is too headstrong that most of the
time[,] she would do things her own way and would not pay close attention to what her husband
needed. She had been a wife who constantly struggled for power and dominance in their relationship
and [Glenn], being too considerate to her, was often subjected to her control.x x x She is into many
vices and loved hanging out with her friends at night[,] and she even got involved in an illicit
relationship[,] which was still going on up to the present time. x x x.

The root cause of [Mary Grace’s]personality aberration can be said to have emanated from the
various forms of unfavorable factors in her milieu way back as early as her childhood years[,] which
is the crucial stage in the life of a person as thisis the time when the individual’s character and
behavior are shaped. [Mary Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with lenient and tolerating
parents[,] who never impose any restrictions [upon] their children. Considering such fact, she
apparently failed to feel the love and affection of the nurturing figures that she had[,] who were
supposed to bethe first to show concern [for] her. x x x She has acquired a domineering character as
she was not taught to have boundaries in her actions because of the laxity she had from her
caregivers and also because she grew up to be the eldest in the brood. She sees to it that she is the
one always followed with regards to making decisions and always mandates people to submit to her
wishes. She has not acquired the very essence of morality [and] has certainly learned set of
unconstructive traits that further made her too futile to assume mature roles. Morals and values were
not instilled in her young mind that as she went on with her life, she never learned to restrain herself
from doing ill-advised things even if she isamply aware of the depravity of her actions.

The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical antecedence as it was already inher
system even prior to the solemnization of her marriage with [Glenn]. x x x. (Underlining ours)
13

On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of his
marriage with Mary Grace. Substituted service of summons was made upon Mary Grace through her
aunt, Susana Rosita. Mary Grace filed no answer and did not attend any of the proceedings before
14

the RTC.

During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were offered as evidence. Glenn
and Rodelito described Mary Grace as outgoing, carefree, and irresponsible. She is the exact
opposite of Glenn, who is conservative and preoccupied with his work. On her part, Dr. Tayag
15

reiterated her findings in the psychological report dated December 29, 2008.

Ruling of the RTC

On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between Glenn and
16

Mary Grace as null and void on account of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC cited the
following as grounds:

The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the] grant of the petition. Reconciliation
between the parties under the circumstances is nil. For the best interest of the parties, it is best that
the legal bond between them be severed.

The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the miserable life [Glenn] had with
[Mary Grace] who is a Narcissistic Personality Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who
does not treat him as her husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are separated in fact since the year
2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned [Glenn] without telling the latter where to go. x x x Had it not for the
insistence of[Glenn] that he would not know the whereabouts of his wife. The law provides that [a]
husband and [a] wife are obliged to live together, [and] observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x x
x For all intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace] was in a quandary on what it really means. x x
x.

From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary Grace] failed to comply with the basic
marital obligations of mutual love, respect, mutual help and support. [Glenn] tried his best to have
their marriage saved but [Mary Grace] did not cooperate with him. [Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of
her marital obligations.

The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a clinical psychologist with sufficient
authority to speak on the subject of psychological incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and was able to
gather sufficient data and information about [Mary Grace]. x x x This [Narcissistic] personality
disorder of[Mary Grace] is ingrained in her personality make-up, so grave and so permanent,
incurable and difficult to treat. It is conclusive that this personal incapacity leading to psychological
incapacity is already pre-existing before the marriage and was only manifested after. It has become
grave, permanent and incurable. (Underlining ours and italics in the original)
17

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC in
its Order dated December 1, 2010.
18
 The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA

On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist proving that Mary
Grace indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her
marital obligations. Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite the root cause of Mary Grace’s
disorder. Further, the RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on Dr. Tayag’s statements
anent the gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. The RTC resorted to mere
generalizations and conclusions sansdetails. Besides, what psychological incapacity contemplates is
downright incapacity to assume marital obligations. In the instant case, irreconcilable differences,
sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility were shown, but these do not warrant the
grant of Glenn’s petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this does
not translate into a psychological illness.
19

Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSG’s appeal.

On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and
declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting. The CA stated the
reasons below:

In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that "psychological incapacity" should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, asso expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity"
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at
the time the marriage is celebrated. The psychological condition must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.

In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace] was carefree, outgoing, immature, and
irresponsible which made her unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. He likewise
alleged that she refused to communicate with him to save the marriage and eventually left him to
work abroad. To Our mind, the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out a case of
psychological incapacity on her part.

While it is true that [Glenn’s] testimony was corroborated by [Dr. Tayag], a psychologist who
conducted a psychological examination on [Glenn], however, said examination was conducted only
on him and no evidence was shown that the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] was
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.

Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive value in determining the

psychological incapacity of a person as she would be in the best position to assess and evaluate the
psychological condition of the couple, she being an expert in this field of study of behavior. Although
the psychologist stated that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, she did
not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she makea conclusion as to its gravity or
permanence. Moreover, she admitted that she was not able to examine the respondent[,] hence, the
information provided to her may be subjective and self-serving. Essential in this petition is the
allegation of the root causeof the spouse’s psychological incapacity which should also be medically
or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriageand shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to
71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations must
similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision.

Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did not establish the root cause of the
psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] nor was such ground alleged in the complaint. We reiterate
the ruling of the Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be: a) medically or clinically identified; b) alleged in the complaint; c) sufficiently proven by
experts; and d) clearly explained in the decision.

Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
and Molina, has this to say:

"Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological– not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis x x x[,] nevertheless[,]
suchroot cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists."

The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that"Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves". It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party evenbefore the celebration
of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." Psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage.

From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage of the parties for the obvious
failure of [Glenn] to show that the alleged psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is characterized
by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for his failure to observe the guidelines outlined
in the afore-cited cases.

Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to [Glenn]. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted from the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis and italics in the
20

original)

The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution dated August 7, 2013, denied the Motion for
21

Reconsideration filed by Glenn.

22

Issue

Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of whether or not sufficient evidence exist
justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace.
In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage should
be judged according to its own set of facts, and not on the basis of assumptions, predilections or
generalizations. The RTC judge should pains takingly examine the factual milieu, while the CA must
refrain from substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. Further, Glenn argues that in
23

Marcos v. Marcos, the Court ruled that it is not a sine qua non requirement for the respondent
24

spouse to be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before a marriage could be

declared as a nullity. However, if the opinion of an expert is sought, his or her testimony should be
25

considered as decisive evidence. Besides, the findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of
26

the witnesses should be respected. 27

In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes that the arguments Glenn raise for
our consideration are mere reiterations of the matters already resolved by the CA. 28

Ruling of the Court

The instant petition lacks merit.

The lack of personal examination orassessment of the respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist

is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." 29

In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito, and the
documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of
Mary Grace’s condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong-willed and
not inclined to perform household chores. Further, she is employed in Dubai and is romantically-
involved with another man. She has not been maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the
time the latter filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is conservative, family-
oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary Grace. While Glenn and Mary Grace possess
incompatible personalities, the latter’s acts and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological
incapacity. Rumbaua v. Rumbaua is emphatic that:
30

In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling toperform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in
the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.

In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly
irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the
respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be
equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that
promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself
admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after
their marriage; their problems only came in later.

x x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:

Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance ofand to assume basic
marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or
"ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological
illness that is contemplated by said rule. (Citations omitted, underlining ours and emphasis in the
31

original)

It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years from
1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses under one roof is
not an impossibility. Mary Grace’s departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or
mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her husband.

Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a
greater burden to present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability of the former’s condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn’s testimony is
wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn’s
statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to Mary Grace’s traits
and acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there isnary a proof on the antecedence
of Mary Grace’s alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before they got married,
they saw each other almost everyday. Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and well[-]educated person" in
32 33

Mary Grace.

Anent Dr. Tayag’s assessment of Mary Grace’s condition, the Court finds the same as
unfounded. Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies
1âwphi1
34

of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz:

We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s psychological
incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in
favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does notdisqualify the
psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a
more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr.
Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually
hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the
doctor’s probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and on this basis
characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who
"believes that the world revolves around him"; and who "used love as a…deceptive tactic for
exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." x x x.

We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying
with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent’s
narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither
did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was
really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature.
Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the
respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder
declared to be grave and incurable" – is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from
her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered
on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition,
this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as
proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.

xxxx

A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time
the parties were married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived
him of the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she
adequately explain howshe came to the conclusion that respondent’s condition was grave and
incurable. x x x

xxxx

First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondent’s exact condition
except in a very general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but
disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can besaid to be suffering
from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable;
how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on
the respondent’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.

Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on
what the petitioner related toher. x x x If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent
means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such
independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly
about the respondent’s early life and associations, and about events on orabout the time of the
marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appearto us to be no more than
a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meagre facts that the petitioner related, and
were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the
marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and
given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his
focus on having a job, his determination to improve himself through studies, his care and attention in
the first six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also what character
and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the respondent’s family
opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of
his mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few
marriages have failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but
because of basic incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological
incapacity. x x x. (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
35

In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary Grace’s status as the eldest among
her siblings, her father’s being an overseas contract worker and her very tolerant mother, a
36

housewife. These, however, are not sufficient to establish and explain the supposed psychological
37

incapacity of Mary Grace warranting the declaration of the nullity of the couple’s marriage.

The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who
can attest to the antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not
exempt a petitioner from complying with what the law requires. While the Court also commiserates
with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides inadequate basis for the
Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
obligations as Glenn’s spouse.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29, 2013 and Resolution
dated August 7, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.