ALIH vs.

CASTRO

FACTS:

• A contingent of more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces raided the compound occupied by the
petitioners at Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives.
• Sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also
inventoried and confiscated the firearms and several rounds of ammunition found in the premises.

• The petitioners came to the SC in a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order. Their purpose was
to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence against them, and to challenge their finger-printing,
photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right against self-incrimination.

ISSUES:
• Whether or not the search conducted by the respondents was legal.

• Whether or not petitioners’ right against self-incrimination was violated.

RULING:

• The SC held that the search of the petitioners’ premises was illegal and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence
against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases
that have been or may later be filed against the petitioners.

• The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of the
constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures.
• The respondents cannot plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had
every opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid.

• When the respondents could have easily obtained a search warrant from any of the TEN civil courts then open and functioning in Zamboanga
City, they instead simply barged into the beleaguered premises on the verbal order of their superior officers. One cannot just force his way into
any man’s house on the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank.
• It follows that as the search of the petitioners’ premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided
compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are “fruits of the poisonous tree.”

• The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and paraffin-testing of the petitioners does not violate their right against self-incrimination.
The prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial compulsion only.
• “The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.”

MENDOZA vs. ALARMA

Facts
Spouses Fernando and Fausta Alarma are the owners of an 11.7 hectare parcel of land located in Iba, Zambales. The land was posted as a
property bond for the provisional liberty of a certain Joselito Mayo, charged with illegal possession of firearms. When the accused failed to appear in
court as directed on 19 March 1984, the trial court ordered his arrest and the confiscation of his bail bond in favor of the government. It also directed the
bondsmen to produce within a period of 30 days the person of the accused and to show cause why judgment should not be entered against the bail
bond. However, without a judgment being rendered against the bondsmen, the trial court issued a writ of execution against the land in an Order dated
14 April 1986. The land was eventually sold at public auction and petitioners Winston Mendoza and Fe Miclat.
Sometime thereafter, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of property against petitioners with the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales,
Branch 70, grounded on the nullity of the entire proceedings relating to the property bond. On 2 August 1989, the court rendered its decision dismissing
the complaint and declaring that the Order dated 14 April 1986 was a judgment on the bond.
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and nullified the proceedings on the execution, sale, and issuance of the writ of
possession. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court, the Court denied the petition and ruled with finality that the
assailed 14 April 1986 Order was not a judgment on the bond. Meanwhile, petitioners applied for the registration of the land with the Regional Trial
Court of Iba, Zambalesand was granted the registration and issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-7249 in the name of petitioners.
Respondents then filed an action for the annulment of title and reconveyance of ownership of the land covered by OCT No. O-7249 with the
Regional Trial Court of Iba, On 24 September 1997, the trial court dismissed the action contending that it had no jurisdiction to annul the judgment being
an equal court. Respondents filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which reversed the findings of the trial court and annulled OCT No. O-7249.
The appellate court also ordered that a new title over the property be issued in the name of respondents. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which the appellate court denied in a Resolution dated 30 January 2002.
Issue
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding a defect in the proceedings and in ordering the annulment of OCT
No. O-7249.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Section 21, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
SEC. 21. — Forfeiture of bail. When the presence of the accused is required by the court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall
be notified to produce him before the court on a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall be
declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce their principal and to show cause why no judgment
should be rendered against them for the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:
(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do so.
Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen, jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The
provision clearly provides for the procedure to be followed before a bail bond may be forfeited and a judgment on the bond rendered against the surety.
It is only after this 30-day period, during which the bondsmen are afforded the opportunity to be heard by the trial court, that the trial court may render a
judgment on the bond against the bondsmen. Judgment against the bondsmen cannot be entered unless such judgment is preceded by the order of
forfeiture and an opportunity given to the bondsmen to produce the accused or to adduce satisfactory reason for their inability to do so.
In the present case, two years had passed from the time the court ordered the forfeiture and still no judgment had been rendered against the
bondsmen for the amount of the bail. Instead, an order of execution was issued and the property was put up for sale and awarded to petitioners, the
highest bidders.
This distinctly show that there was a failure of due process of law. The execution was issued, not on a judgment, because there was none, but
simply and solely on the declaration of forfeiture.
An order of forfeiture of the bail bond is conditional and interlocutory, there being something more to be done such as the production of the accused
within 30 days. This process is also called confiscation of bond. In this case, no such judgment was ever issued and neither has an amount been fixed
for which the bondsmen may be held liable. The law was not strictly observed and this violated respondents’ right to procedural due process.
The appellate court, therefore, was correct in ordering the annulment of the title to the land as a matter of course. There being no valid title nor any right
to possess the land, reconveyance to the respondents is only proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 9 July 2001 Decision and 30 January 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. SO
ORDERED.

SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS. MANALO

This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19[1] of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to
reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled
“Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
respondents.”
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein responden), accordingly the PRIVILEGE OF
THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
Facts:
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were forcibly taken by several armed men who were later identified as members of the AFP and CAFGU. They were
forcibly taken for being alleged as sympathizers of the CPP/NPA by order of Major Gen. Jovito Palparan and the CAFGU’s who went to the soldiers to
take them were their neighbors, who were accusing them as supporters of the CCP/NPA because there brother Rolando Manalo aka Ka BESTRE was
the NPA leader in the province of Bulacan. They were brought to several places and had suffered too much tortures. Raymond Manalo even saw some
civilians being suspected as members of the NPA’s being killed.
Petitioners dispute respondents’ account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they
filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying any involvement therein,

ISSUE:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-
SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.

RULING:
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule “in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances.” It was an
exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people’s constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address
the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings.” On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are “attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of
the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.”
The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment
of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is
to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, respondents moved to have their petition treated as an amparo petition as it would be
more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers’ enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
Petitioners’ argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of Appeals states:
1. The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated,
contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. – The parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence.
Sec. 18. Judgment. – … If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases
supplied)

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses
in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13,
2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing
manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents’ harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his
different senses and etched in his memory.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both
respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they
are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not “free in every sense of the word” as their “movements continue to be
restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not
been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten
respondents’ rights to life, liberty and security.” (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept
captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.
In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

PEOPLE vs. JALBUENA

Facts:
Accused-appellant Meliton Jalbuena y Tadiosa was charged with rape of a daughter, a minor.
In the morning of August 19, 1996, while her mother BBB was out of the house, her father-accused-appellant approached AAA while she was in bed,
pulled down her underwear, placed himself on top of her, and inserted his penis in her vagina. She was warned not to report the incident to anyone;
otherwise, something bad would occur to her.
The incident was repeated on two other occasions, the last of which was in the morning and witnessed by her uncle CCC while accused-appellant was
on top of her.
CCC reported what he saw to AAA’s grandfather who merely advised her to avoid her father, to an aunt, as well as to her mother BBB who refused to
believe it.
AAA later mustered enough courage to narrate her ordeals to two classmates who reported them to their teacher, who in turn reported and brought her
to the school principal. When AAA was examined, it was found out that her hymen was intact.
Branch 58 of the RTC of Lucena City, however, found the testimony of AAA “clear, consistent, direct and without any hesitation when confronted by the
presence of her own abuser.”It discredited appellant’s defense of alibi, there being no proof that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place,
date and time of the commission of the offense. Accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape and was
sentenced to suffer death penalty. Further, he is required to pay the offended party civil indemnity amounting to of P75,000.00 (P50,000.00 for moral
damages and P25,000.00 for exemplary damages).
The case was forwarded to Supreme Court for automatic review in view of the death penalty imposed. However, the SC referred the case to the Court of
Appeals by a resolution. The appellate court also found the testimony of AAA credible and free from material inconsistencies and contradictions, and so
it affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Upon review by the Supreme Court, the accused-appellant questioned the decision of the lower courts on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, that:
1. The prosecution failed to present CCC (the uncle) as a witness,
2. AAA’s hymen was still intact
Accused-appellant also found the information defective as it bears only the month and year of the incident complained of (“on or about the month of
August 1996”)
Issue: Whether or not the (1) prosecution’s information was defective and (2) failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decision with modification in that in lieu of death penalty (due to the subsequent enactment of RA
9346 or “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines”), accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole, and the award of P50,000 for moral damages, is increased to P75,000.
On the information being defective:
In rape, the gravamen of the offense is the carnal knowledge of a woman, the date is not an essential element, hence, the specification of the
exact date or time of its commission is not important. In statutory rape, like in this case, what matters most is that the information alleges that
the victim is a minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her. If accused-appellant found the information
defective, he should have filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars, as provided for under Rule 116, before he entered a plea. His failure to do
so amounted to a waiver of the defect or detail desired in the information.
On proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt:
The credibility of the testimony of the offended party is put to a stringent test in order that it could be said as credible to sustain a conviction.
The Court finds [AAA’s] testimony clear, consistent, direct and without any hesitation when confronted by the presence of her own abuser.
It is noted that [AAA] had to tell her story several times – to her two classmates, to the teacher, the principal, the police, the doctor, the
Municipal Trial Court Judge who conducted the preliminary investigation, to the prosecutor, to the social worker and to this Court, in the
presence of the public and her father. Her testimony is one and the same.
A daughter would not accuse her own father of a serious offense like rape, had she really not been aggrieved. Her testimony against him is
entitled to greater weight, since reverence and respect for elders is too deeply ingrained in Filipino children and is even recognized by law.
That she would accuse her own father of this heinous crime had she not been aggrieved would be absurd.
Accused-appellant’s claim that AAA charged him with rape because he would scold her very often does not impress.
Parental punishment or disciplinary chastisement is not enough for a daughter in a Filipino family to falsely accuse her father of rape. She
would not subject herself to an examination of her private parts, undergo the trauma and humiliation of public trial, and embarrass herself
with the need to narrate in detail how she was raped if she was not in fact raped. It takes depravity for a young girl to concoct a tale of
defloration, which would put her own father on death row, drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame, and make them the
object of gossip among their classmates and friends.

AAA’s hymen was still intact:

A torn or broken hymen is not an essential element of rape, not even when the victim is an innocent child. Dr. Salumbides, on cross-
examination, testified that there are several classes of hymen; some are elastic and flexible that even in cases of several deliveries, the
hymen remains intact

The prosecution failed to present CCC (the uncle) as a witness:

The prosecutor has the discretion to determine the witnesses he is going to present. Aside from that, CCC was nowhere to be found and
his whereabouts could not be ascertained during the course of the trial.