MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

THE GREEK
AND PERSIAN WARS
 EDITOR: MARTIN WINDROW

THE GREEK
AND PERSIAN WARS

Text and colour plates by

JACKCASSIN-SCOT
ISRN o 83045 27 I f6

Thc preparation of 111istrxt wnulrl havr bccn

impnnsihlr wi tho11t thr nssiatancc o F Charlcs Wonrill,
who gavr of' h i s time rnml cr~lrrouslv,ancl savrtl ~ h c
Iwmk ham manv rsron of'I;i(.~. IlI~~~rr;~tions
2:3 to 30
art. taken firm Cn.~l~/rn~o f t l ~ r&rek.r and Kornnni hy
'l'hrnnas Hopr (1)rlvr.r P~~hlicationsl.

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Hamphir~

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If? t ~ 1 1W{I~II(I!ikr 11) l A r c ~ i vIrItnre

v i i ~ U o r ~ n a ~<IiIo W~ N Ili
Chpl-rv Militar? Imnks, 'l'hr T)s1>rthvMt.<st-ngri i\ :r
rr~(11:1r ~ ~ c * ~ d vivl~irll
t l r r c t ~ ~ ~ a t; ltf lii st . k s , II(W 1itTr
inl<~rti~:ttiti~l:IIIC\ *pt~i:tl4)Wh-s. Tt),ioi11pIv;lsr \wilt. I<):
O.sptcy Military Ur~wnger,
PO Box 443,
Petmbotvttgh PE2 6 U
 :\ristaqor;w. :\?I urgc.rlr ;~pprnlTor:lid was at~swvrcil
h!. 11o111 ;\thcns and the snlall city stiltc o f 1:rrlria on
thr i s l a t ~ lol' F,t~lmra; :Irhcns sul>l,lirrt twcn~y-li\+c*
Tlir yci81.s Stro 323 1 3 . ~ : . \vrw ;I ~wrirxlctF intcnsr sIlips. Spartx, thr grvatcst mili tar! ~ ) o w c ~ within
-
military activity it1 rht- c.;~scr-rn51c.tEitcr.r;l~~c.;~r~ ;mrl Ihr tiellmic \rfc)r-ltl, h i d no qrrat likiriq for rtiskant
his hlinor. 7 ' 1 ~ ron~l)atu~lts. 1%-11rrI1c.t rlwy \tbrrc-
involvcrl in prtty inter-st i ~ t t . sr~~iflic.ts or t h ( .
opprmsivr- \rn;~~.monqc-tit~c a~lrli ~ ~ i l ~ r l - i ; ~ of
lism1111-
Prmians i ~ n d1lac.c.r Donians. T r ~ ~ ntdt3(- &)1'1111lr-s of'
rvar rrrarir ; ~ n t l\.icrtq, olitb~lrphc*~~lr-r:~l.
In thr r.ilrly filih rmtury n.c. ;~ftcsttlr. li~llnf IIIC which tiicy ~ a p t u r t ~;tnd l rlrst royt.rl. For some
Lydian Empirr-, t l ~ r . I'rrsian \vilfi t~r.g;m as arl rcason Ih r :\lthcnian cont i n g ~ t l t\\.its thcn crrdrrrcl
idcoloqic;~lronflic!. tinlgh t 1wtwct.n ;I t!.rannirat
mi~11tyvrnpil-t. ; ~ t l t l;I ~)r'outltIrm~ri~tic- frcctlcnn- I. Relief ahowing the archer-bodypard of Dnriuu, the
lovin? prtq~lc.'!'heimmc*cli;trt.~.;IIISI- t\*as tllc. rc\.olt 'Immortals'. T h e e spltadid f i p p r r r r were made in coloadml
glazd bricks and d t c o r a t d thr wall* of the Patmct OF Suka.
orthr C;rrrk citics in lania, alt~nqt h r crnlral coast (7hc Pcrscpolir)
 made a strategic withdrawal rrom Li , ard'.rs, rctrcat-
in^ to Ephcsus whrre. after a shor~firrcr I~attlc,
they wrrt. drfratrd and forced ro capiiulatc, A
Pl~oerlician naval sqnarlron uncler Isrrsian corn -
tnand was ordcrcd to Cyprus. Thr lactical in-
tclttions wcrc thc dcstmction ofthe Greek f l ~ c and t
the landing of an occupation Torcc. 'I'hr (;rt*rk Ilwt
gave a gtmd account or ilsrli, inllictin~ F r a t
clarnnq*o n thc Persian slrips, I,ul things wwt-nt I)arlPy
Ibr thc insitrgvnt Hellrnic land forcm and Cyprus
I'cll nnrc. a ~ a i nunder Persia11 rt~le.Altvr this tht*
t of i t s impetus.
revolt l ~ mtlst
,"I yvar Eatcr, the Penian atmirs, caking Full
advantaqc. 06 thc drclininx rrvolutionary spirit,
rrrapturrd thr- towns and citirs on the Hrllrsjx)nf
and in Aeolia. C~arEa. however, offrrrrl grr-at
rrsistanrc, and a k r two bloody and costly I~a~zlrs
t hr Prrsians w r r r rc-j)~~lsr-rl. loriian I:l<*rt
nltt t l ~ e
was drfcatrd off the island oE'Lade, anrl, with thc
ELII of thr Ionian city of Milct114in 494 n.c., the
rcvol t was ovcr.

e Detrif rmm an Attic marble relid, s h d g au Arhcni.a

hsplitr aarnplrtr with mmnd shitkd (aapiaj,hrir style htlmtt,
M y and I r e a m o u r and rhc Ionr-chnftnl spear. [Natiooal
Muscum, A ~ h m s ) Aficr t hc Ionian revolt, ~ b cinvasicln or rhc Greek
mainland became inevi~ablc.In rhe sprinq of 492
B.C. narius sent a p s o t ~ i ncxprditisnary
~ force
hotnc-, hut this initial success opcnecl the way for tl~mught h r Hellespont; this consisted o f a larqe
Zl~rcher thrusts all along the coast, spreading the fleet supported by a well provided arrnv, under thc
revolt to the cities ol' ~ h rHcltrxpnt, Calia and, command of Mardonius, his son-in-law. On the
finally to the Greek tnwns o f Cvprus. hordrrs of Macedonia the troops had to sustain a
Thc Pcwians reviewed [his rcl-rcllinn with some v i o l ~ n tassault by a Thracian trihc and Masdonius
alarm. 'l'be court oTSusa saw imrnt.cli;rtcly that, iT was woundcrl. At the same timc this flct-t ran into a
succmsful, i t would h a w a drastic cft'ect on the scijprc storm whilst rounding the dangrrt~uspenin-
authority of the empirc. 'I'hc 'Grcat King' Darius sula of Mount Athos, and hair 01' tllc ships wcrc
realized thc skill and strrngt h oft hc rebels only tw eilhcr drivcn ashore or wrecked. '1"hough some
wrll, as thcy wrrr part oT his empire's military authority had heen re-cstahlish td, Mardonius
forces, and hc considered that his most usc6ul course wilhdrcw and rcturned to Persia wherr: hc was
of action was to adopt a naval expcdition as the temporarily rclieved or his command.
pivot of his campaiqn; a strikc by his ships Spring 491 R.C. saw a flurry of envoys from
cornbinid with the landins or troops would prove Darius, t ~ s t i n gthe morale orthe Greek states. His
the crucial factor in turning hack thc flood or rquest 'demanding carth and water I'nr vnssalsgc*
revolt. was acccptrcl by many slates from the norlh
Hastily zqzss~mblcd royal contingents from the Aegcan to the UardanclFcs, but Athens and Sparta
sa'trapiesof Asia Minor were rushed, first to rontain rrfilsed. With so many states in his powcr Darius
the Ionian inrantry, anct then to mnvc forward fell rcartv lo attack.
t a k i n ~the ofknsivr. Thc Ionians gave way and Otlr year later, in (he spring 01'4130 R.c., a l a q e
newly-hi11 nect and a l a r ~ carmy asscrnbled near
Tarsus on the Cilician coast oppositr Cyprus. This
forcc was under the.jnint command oiilrtaphernt-s
~Darius'ncphcw) and Dati~(aMcdian nobleman),
who took with them thr c-xilcd Athenian quisling
Hippias as t h c i r guide. Thcir orclcm were to destroy
thr cncrny forces on thr mainlanrl ol'Grercc and to
pillage and destroy thc ports and then the cilirs or
Athms and Eretria, Sor t tlrir part In the revolt. Thc
opcraltion procerrled along the soutl-tcrn shores of
Asia Minor, thrn westwards horn Ionia. "I'hr Rcct
movcd through thr Cyclades reaching Naxos,
which had sunrivcrl carlicr attacks llut was now
xscauttrcl and sackrd. Having: secured thc first
objective, command of the Cvcladm and the
Acqean Sea, the I'crsianspushcd forward with their
invasion. 'T'hr fIrrt advancwl rrom island to island,
commandeer in^ troops ancl hostagrs. Rrsistance
was cnco~~ntrrrd at Carys'trls, the rnosl wuthrrly
town of Kuhora, h u t , with n force nt.snrnc ~j,ooo
l i ~ h t i n amrn against thrm ancl their crop clrs-
troye~i,t tlc' C;~rystianssoon capitulated. Pcrsian
troops disemhnrkd on Euhora and laid s i c ~ cte
Eretria which rcsistnrl for a wrrk. I ' a k i n ~fill1
advantage of a 'bctraval from insirltb fhc city, the
Persians eapturrd and pillaged wifhout mcrcy. \r
quick thrust across the short crossing brou~hrthe
Persian army onto the shores or Artira.
Hippiaa, as thc Persian military adviscr, recorn-
mended 111eBay of Marathon as thc bcst place Tar
disembarkation. It was an idral h:~rhour;lqe,a lony
firm, Hat plain between the mountains and the sea,
pmtrctrd fn>m the north and cast winds, and
within rasy rrach or Ath~ns, which lay somr
38 kilomcrrcs ro the norlh-cast, rhrozqh thr
Hymcttus-l'rntrle Pass. 'l'he si~nrly I>r.;\~hcould
accornmrxlatc t hr 6r~os h i p , which rcr~t~ircd
somc
livr killomctrcs, I:urthrrrnorr., rhr nprn plait1 of'
kilonlctres -
attic sladcs
0 4 6 1 2
l i a r i ~ t h r )n1li.rc.d
~~ thr riqht r.ontli~ion.i ti)r thr c;~lltd i t p ~ l ~ ~ r t t t r t -itr~rl lt nrw tnilititry It-a<lc.rs
Pcrsian ra\.;llr.y. ;~q;iinst tc-l~irh t l ~ t *:'ct hc-nian I r/rfltr,pib of tllr Kv1,11l>Firwlln wrrt. rlrtcrnrinrd to
~~~~~~~~y \rnt~ldhc inc.lli.c.tivc. mainr;~iti thr intlrprr~clr-nrc ol' :\thc.ns; rhr
'171~invasion flrcr 11r;lc-hc.tlon ill(. s;tnrly short-, cr,t~~m;inder-in-r:hirf' was (.:i~llim;lchus nl' :lpliiclna
ha~rlrclu p 111(. ships xtlrl <liscml)arktrl ~ h 1lorsr.s. c anrl thc c~vt-riil!pli~rrt~rr ant1 stratr,qisr was X~lil-
'l'l~csitv cl~cl\;rnwas trl the t~orth-c.;~sr 01' t tiv t i i i c l r . ~I althclugli hc :~lsr)st.nlccl :is ontmof' thc ten
t>ct\\-.rt.~~ tllr. rn;~rsht.snntl i r k r l ~ t .protvrrion 01' t h t tli\.isional ct)rnmanrlt.rs,.
prnmontory, .r.;~llcvl (I~I-tosura,on t h r latltlw;~rtl E l a r i n ~1w;nc-ons \r;lrtlc-ct t hc :\thr=tli;inx that thr
sidr. 'l'llr c ; ~ n ~ pw : ~rit~~;l!c.daicar ~ h rX1;~karia 13c.rsi;~ninv:ision t r m p s 1l;td landtul. ' 1 1 ~icrvs ~ was
spring tc~l~ich pmvi(ltul ~ C K K I graxinr: Tor IIIV hrmcs tirkrmn a h s t runllt-r 10 Sp:trt;\ ; rhc Spa~.tat~r;,
aucl a plrntihrl s~rpplyol'z*~atrr. i ~ l t t ~ ~St ~ ~ c hI ~ ~t i ~c .;~nnouncrd
T !I ~ ~ t l ~ a ttheir rc-
111 :\tlit*ns the sittl;ilinn r u m vcrv di tlimr.etltrrom li~fouscotlsr-ic-nrrlosl,;ldr rhcir [ m o p firm cmtrr-
111;11wl.tic.11had prt.zliiilv<P irk the d;tys 01.1-lil~pins.In inq inlo r l ~ t .fivltl oI'I)atrl~until alirr t11v tilt1 1 1 1 o o n .
pmvtAr t ~ o \ v was :III ~ l v c ~ ~r- oc n l ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ t ~ i I t ~ r - i:I$
~ ~i -t c - I ~.ji c:lugrist.
f this mr;lnt n wait ol'sis to srvrn
cl;~yshrlhrc. I hc. ;~rri\.;~l r l l ' rt.it~forct.mt~t~ts. Another
3. &tad frum an ampham *hawing a mouatd warriar in full rr*qurl;t lo Pl;ltat.a, a small Rocoi i a t ~~ ( I M ' T \vhi~61 I lay
a n n w r , a r c a m p m i d hy his servant. ( N o t i o n a l Mu-,
Yaplei) to rhr nnl-rll of :\itir;i. \tr:as answr.rt.tl wirh ;I
volunteer forcr oI'qrv~ralhunclrcd m m . Miltiadex t h c cngaqrrnmt must hr f i s u ~ h tanrl won in r11n.c.
gave thc first instruction Tor battlc, 'contain rile hours. ' I ' i r n ~was short and thc order tn a t t a r k was
invadinq rorccs nn thr \)c*achr's ancl resist an ~ivrn.
advance on .4thms'. It'itliin a few hut~rsor thr Tkr A~heniantmopswrrt:drawn up in thr hattlr
alarm, some ro,ooo hcavily armccl infitntryrnet~. ordcr Miltiadcs had plannrcl. 'l91r:commanrlrr-in-
mainly hoplitcs, wrro on the march to thc plain or' chicf, C:alIimacllus csmmaorlnl tlic r i ~ h tflank,
Marathon thrrlugh the H yncttus-t'cw t c.lr gal>. and thc lcfi flank was Iicld 1 ~ ) - the Platacans. ' 1 ' 1 1 ~
'I'hr Athenians took up thcir position at thr centre, which was to takc thr l ~ r u t ~otf thc first
sonthern end of thc plain with Mount A~riclikicJn anstaught, was under t l ~ r+joint cornrnenci ol'
thcir l e l i flank and the sea to the right ; the Rrvxisa Themistoclm and Rristrides. 'l'ht. Athenian tartic.
marsh lay slightlv to thc war. 'I'hr ccjastal road to was to wcakcn the ccntrc hy widen in^ thc space
Athrns was tiow efictivclv scalrd. J'rrm rverc cut 'bctwcen cacli man ancl to rcrlucr rhe ranks t o tibur
down and man-hauled into drfrnsivc p s i tions with instcad of thr usual r i ~ h a .'Tltc chance r ~ l
thc branrlles licing the Pcrsian linrs, a prccal~tion 131.eakthrough was a caltula~cd risk. Thc rnairt
atpinst thr Prrsiat~cavalry!..From 7 to I r .August strcngth wi~gmassed on thc flanks which i l was
thc front lincs rrrnained static, five kilomctrcs
apart, ncithrr side willing to rnakr thr first mnvc.
Thc .4thvni;trus wcrv loath to commit thrir tmops
to hat tlc, as thc advantap lay wi tk thc Pcrsians in
an open -plain con flirt. A q i n s t thr superior Pcrsian
force of cavalry and arrhcrs, thr Athrnians had
only inrantrymen.
The Pcrsians remained irnmobilc hccause r hrv
had II(F wish to engage tthcir own weak and i n h i o r
infantry agains~thc Grcck hoplitrs in thcir prc-
p a r d position ; thcy wcrc also hoping for ;t s i ~ n a l
from Hippias' ii-iends within Athens itscll: Rut thr
stalemate could not last indefinitely and Datis
finally put Iiis own battlc plans into action. Under
mver of darkncss on thr nigIlt of I I 112 August h r
reem barked most oft hc cavalry as well as his task
force and, slipping out, sai1r.d Tor Phalrran nay
leaving behind Artaphernm with a holdinq force
facing thc Athenians. Thc departure of' D a ~ i sdid
not ga z~nnoticecl and Milliadcs' scouts wrsc
quick to iniirrn him of thc h r t . ?he r l ~ h c n i a n
commanders were surnnlonccl and Miltiadcs out-
Iind the only posible chancc of a Greek victory :
the Persians could not passi1)ly react1 Phalcron by
sea in less than tw hours; 1,eashing and d iscmhark-
ing would take a frw more hours, by which timr it
would be late aFtrrnoon or early eveninq; in thc
immediate vicinity, on the plain of Marathon,
Artaphernm had lost a large part of the cavaliy and
tmp, but would still have his archrrs. Thr
quesrion waq whcther thc Aihenians shnulcl risk an
engagemcnt with the Pcrsian forces; if they did,
ant1 clefeated thcm, there was still timr to doubIt
back Tor the defence of Athens. It was 5.30 a.m., so
11q~d U'C)IIICI complctc at1 rnrirrlinfi movement.
"I'hr Pcrsian li>rrcs were drploycd as Miltiadcs
anticipatrd : thc crntrr was stalIi.cl with the rriitk
troops ar~tl thc flanks wrrr helcl 11y interior
hartalions drawn fmnl thc conscripts oft hc clnpirr.
'IBc risks Ihr thc Athenians wcre great, howcvrr;
5. D c d I from a p i mof d f i g t u t Attic bowl (fithcmtury kc),
showing m~ Athenian boplite w n m o r mttncking n Fersipp
stmdard-befrrr. (LOIMP, P u r i ~ J
rhrir strcngth was a littlr orrcr half' that of thv
Persian cen trc, and tIlr opcn qround to hc covcrrd
put thr Greeks at the mprcy of thc rlitr Pcrsinrr
arrhcrs.
At almut 6 a.m. otl 12 August the distance
l>ctweetlt11etwo armics was apprclxirnately nnr anrl
a halr kilornetres; t11r lrtrrnpet wunded thr con-
mand and thr Alhcnian ranks movcrl forward. T h e
acivance start cd briskly, drveloperl into a trot, thcn
hrokc into thr. clnublc as thcy rushrtl thc last 140
rnctrcs to avnirl thc hail arrows. T h e Persian
royal coneinqc'ents put up a stronq resistance, the
centre standinq its ground, forcing t h r Athcnian
hoplitrs t ~ ~ c kMranwhilc,
. on cither flank the
Athenians wit11 thrir slronE concentration uf troops
carried all ihcforc ~ h c mant1 ptlt the P&rsi;~n flanks tn
i n ~thc Great M;irsh whew
fliqht, man?) ~ ~ r t r r a t to
they drtmned. Ot hcrs retrratcd along ~ h sllorr c tr,
thcwaiting ships in thc I~eof'tbcpronlontow. Zlr'ilh
thc Pcrsian flanks in cornplcte disarray, tl~r
rlthcnian ancl l'latacan flar~ krrs dimgaged thc
pursuit accol-ding to plan. Regroupi nx, thry
rclturnrd to thr sccnc of thc batrlc whcrc thc
remain in^ Prrsiarls wcrc out flanked in r douhir
pincer rnovcmcnt. Thc rctn8at in^ Persians rouxht
their way back in the dirrction ol'thcir s h i p along
the narrow gap Ir~twcon thc marsl~csand thr
beach. Thrv werr closrly pursrlcd l)y t l ~ Athrn- r lrmthrr sling w a n r r l r n u t d , b u r l k ~the 1cmd shot
ians, who were drtr*rrninc.clto dcs~rovt hc enemy
forces and fleet. 'I'hc I'ailurc at' t h e Persians to
envisaqc surh a contingcncv was qui tc astonish in^,
especially 21s t h r d>vious Athenian preparations
can hartlly h a w mrapcd rhcit notice.
Ry a.m. on r l r \ ~ p ; r l ~ t~ h surviving
c Pcrsian
roval trmps ancl the ships of khr Mararhon task
forcc wrrr out at sra and heading for PhaErron. In
the final count ol'c;~-ualtiwthr Pcrsians had lost
6400 nlrn and an unrt.c.orclcd num hcr 01' prisoners
and ~vounrl~*d ;*long with scvrn ships. "I'hc ?t~Fic-
nians suni~mrtsurprisin~lyfew castmities with on iy
192 dead, inclucl ing: t hcir commander-in-chief
Callirnachus.
In orcler to cornplvtc his ovcrall stl-aregic plan,
l\liltiadcs had to clernand fmm his mcn ionr more
H e ~ u l c a ncndravour, tht- march l ~ a c kto Athens,
'as bst as thrir feet could carry them'. Commander
Aristeidrs and one division wcrc left lwhind to
guard thr prisoners of war and raptured cquip-
mrnt. 7'hr rcttrrn ol'the Athenian army, quick in
comparison with thc slower naval squadrnns of
D;itis, had to take fill1 advantage of surprise iT
h'liltiades' plan was to take elrecl, GIfhen thc Persian
invasion task iorce arrived, the Athenians were
alrcacly in thrir delinaivc posirions at C y n o s a r g ~ ,
muth or thr. citv ancl fiicin~tlw st:;t. And, whcn
Dalis arrived in Phalcron Bay, hc founcl the citv
wrll drfended. Attcrnpis t o I;~ndwoultl have h e n
tlscl~ssso hc allcharmi and awairtd Arrapllcrnrs'
L Pi-orl-d sbot which w e r t t t n d am rnimdtun
with the d d or n leather s l i a ~ .T h e sling m n
a w u q ~mund, d niter aomc turn8 n wider
nwep m ar ucctrrnplirhd and one cad of the
vwuy with qrtat momrrrtum. 'IXe *hot warn o f t e n
i n s c r i h r l with mrk.iaEts. (Rritinh Museum,
Lnndon)
drtachmcnt. Thcir arrival: i l l a dvplrtrtl and
1)atrrrecI condition Idi only orw rollrsc Ibr thc
Prrsiati inval;icln rot-cv, il stra~eqicwirhdrawal. l,;lck
to Asia.
Marathon had provcul that the hpavy troops of
the hoplirr inrantry cottld cornprrc succrssli~lly
ag;Jnst supcrioritv of numbem, particularly whcn
tlicir opponrnts wcrr only liqhtly arrnccl, hut [hc
Circck victory should not bc o\~rrcstirnattd.Thc
Pet-siitn losse~;wrrc c;lsiIv I W ~ ~ R Cl ~ SO
y l i ~ ;1r~ W~C T ~
and scnrct only to emphasize thr nccd Ibr a
prnprrly pwparcd rxywdition il'Gwrcr was za br
suhjigarrcl. 'I'h;~trite Pt-rsians woriltl rrtllrn was
incvitahIt*, ancl it was clcartv t-ssrntial h r thr
Grcrks to rralizc thar, dmpitr t h e glov of Ma-
rathon. they had done Iittlr- morc than I~uvlimr in
wliich to prcparr t Iicmsrlvcs for t h r rrsurnption or
the con flick.
In 4W.9 w:. Miltiad-, rotnmanrling tthv A1hr.n-
iarl flvrr, attrmptcd to regain cnt~~rt)l of rhost-
Aegean islands which had capitz~latcd to thc.
Persians, hut his naval forcc insufTicirnt to
accomplih this task and his hlockadc of Parm
bitcrl ;I dcl'cat which let1 tn his imprisonment ar
Athcns, whew h c d i d smn after ol' a wound
rcceivcd ar Paros. Thc Ath~niansncxt tried LO
obtain mastpry of thc Saronic CuIi'by ovcrpoww-
7-. C r o m r u t p f d r q a h o w k ~ a nA l h t n i a n horseman,
475 m.c. The h m m i s without *ndrElc or stirrups hut with full
head hmeuzrs. 'Fht horwman wrar.c a lonq, hiahly-patlrrnrtl,
rtiArlnak and r a m r n the -hart j ~ v e i i n s (Villa
. Ciiulira, Hornr)

in^ rhc pro-l'rrsian island oT:\r.@qina whusc raiders By this tirne Gr~rccbhad rcrcivrd alarming relxlns
mntinually ravagrd rhc shorm ot'tittica. This too ol' cxtrnsivc I'rrsian inv;~sirln pl.c.parnlit)ns, rum-
w;rs n f;lilurt, ant1 i t llccamc ob\pious that rhc o t ~ r spr<~pagali~l l>y D ~ I - ~ Ison.
I s ' S v t * x v s ~[hr new
Arl~rnianflrr~raulrl o&r little pmtrction ;qainst a I'crsian kin^, who apprrriatrd t hc psychalqical
11mlil~S V ; ~powrr. v[Ti.cl o f w~chstorirs, prrhaps haping thcrrhy to
'l'llevacancy crrnlcd 1)y thc fall of h4iltiadr.swas Entlucc selmc areas o ~ G r r ~ 10r t c. i l l ~ iul;itc
l without a
frllrd '1'hc.rnislr~:lr-s,who rully apprrciatrd nht fish t .
nclvl fir a stronq naval ti~rcc; thc discovr~yof nrw To facilitarr thr rnclvrrncnt ~f his army into
s chc Lauricln mining district placed Grcecc. Serscs had orrlerrd thr I)rid~ingof the
silvrr d r p ~ i t it)
surplus capital (hr dispjsal of' thr A~semblyand Hellcspcmt, a maqnificcnt achivvvrnrnt on thr part
enal>lr(l thc Athtbt~ians, ~rcrsuaclcd by 'I'hrrnis- a l his rnqinccrr; who t~seclavtSrsix hunclrcrl ships to
toclrs, ~ r stommcncr a shiphuildinq programrnt. construct two huge pontoon brirlqcs. I n order to
inrrnrlrcl t o prodrice [wnhuntlrrcl new triremes filr avnLI risking his fleet arountl thc d;ingcrous cape of
thc Athrniat~fleet. Moutrt rlthrrs hc tlihrl acannl (lug r:at.rtnsthc isthmus.
and rracm ol'this canal can stillt 3 idrntificd.
~
Set-xcsdrrnantluu!rcln t ir~grt~ls
lkom vvrysatrapy
of the Persian Empire ant1 the rmponse enabled
him to amam an imposing lbrrc. Ry 48 I KC. he had
set up his I~eacEquancrs,
at Sardcs in 1,ydia ancl sent
out toall t11eGrrpk stat(%rxccpl Athens ancI Sparta
for thc carth and wa'tcr of submission. Tlrc sizt. (IT
the Persian arm?;has htcn a clurstion ofrlispn~rand
conjccturr cvcr since Horoclot us' c~rifinal figusc.
gros4y exaggrratccl, of ovrr two millicin com-
txttants. More realistic latter-day commrntators
estimatr Xrrxm' forcr at some r jo.ooocomhatants,
approximately half OF which arc thought to havc
h e n Prrsian troops, and i t i n c l u d ~ d thc hcst
cavalry available li-orn t h r Mditrrranean arca.
His fleet, said by Hrrodot~rsto nurnl~crabout I ,200
vessels, many of which werc snlall t ranslxlrts.
hasted a contingent o f skilled Phoenician svilrnrn
and forces from E4ypt,Carin and Ionia. Sinrr :in
army of such a size coulcl nor hope to live off so arid
a land as Gmrcr it nepdpd to be provisionrd rrrlrn
the sca as i t prncccclcd around thc shows of thr
Thracian scil ancl into ccntral Gwccr. T h r Hvvt
would also ~>mvidra mili rer? bar-k-1111w1icnt.w.r
necessan.
Serxrs clrarly intrndecl the subju~atinnn f tlic
whalcofGrrcce ifpossible Tor he harl to~nmittrrfan
rnnrrnous numbrr of troops and had mad(. rxtcmn-
sire ~~rcl)arations,inr:ludinq an aLwr.rntLntwith 11rc
C;~rlhaginianswho wrrc tn pin clown thc wt=qtcmrn
Grrrks ol' Sirily whilst S c r x r s attack(.cl from the.
vast.
Hy tlie spring of 480 R.C. [he huge itmy I ~ a d
crossvd ~ h Mrllrsl~lr~t
r w h ~ r ri t was-joinecl by the
flcrt, and was making its way. in 111rce separate
columns, rc~warclsThrssaly, prt-c*r.rl(*dby alarrning
rumnurs that i t was drinking [hv ri\.ecs dry.
Mranwhilc, thr I;rtr.h, in the autumn of 481
R.c., rrummnntd to thr Isthmus of' Crlrirlth 1rpt.r-
srnta1ivt-s c~l'allthtsc statrs which hacl nnt at ready
subniittcd t o Pcrsia. and an alliancr, lrrl hv Alllens
ancl Spart;i, was Srwrnt-c!. I-lowtvrr. a s~~clclcr~ blow
was rlc-alt to Crrvk rrcolution 11y ~ h voicr r of thr
Tlrlphic. orarlt., which prr~lictc.rl rlisast~rfor ~thc
Grccks and arlviscd thr Athrnilins in particular ta
flcr For thrir livtx. 'Thv oraclr rlairn~tlthat the only
hopr lay in a wtrdr-n wall, and although (his
prtw~rnahll;indica~c.rithc wrmclen rlcfcnces oi' t hc
:Ir.rt~polis, ir wiu i n ~ ~ r p r e t ~hy
r l 'I'hernistoclm to
mran tllr Grt-ck f1t.t-t.
On the qucstion nf strate,:, opinion ar thc
Isthmi;tii cc~nfi*rc.nc-c-was dividrtl. 'I'he Spartans
and rhrir l'(-lr~~~r~ri~ic.siiirinrighhours hclcl tcn-
;~ciouslyt o ~hr:view [hat tlie main d~renccsbould
GEPIERAL S U R V E Y
-
-
Road
Trsci
----- Goat r r x k
4.*k h:am contours

8 . DcmU f a a 8 mid on m G m k p v e s h m e , A* late gtb
century acj this depicts a s t q l c between Athenian and
S p r t n n wnrriom durhp: thr Pclopwncskn war. (Mtnpo-
litan Mu- of Arc, U.S.A-)
be at the Isthmus of C~rinth-the gateway to thc
Peloponnese. This plan howrvcr had drawbacks,
principallv that it woufrl leave the Persians Trre lo
cstahlish thernsclvcs i n northern and central
Greece, also Itiat the Isthmus could he outflankccd
;by spa and i t s drfrndcrs causht between ~ w forces.
o hoplifes derending 'rht.mr~py!ae.O n hearing this
I f the plan was adopted Athens wor~ldhe left ao [lie
r a v a p or the Persians, and, understandahty, this
was an unpopular idea with the Athenians.
Consequently it was a ~ r c c dthat an attempt should
be made to hold the Pcrsians in Thessaly; hecausc
of the inferioritv CI t' Chck numbers, however, this
would enlv he possihlc if the narrow passe were
dricndecl. At t h nTurst~ of the 'l'hmmlians, an
initial t'orce nf I o,ooa hoptites in two divisions-onc
Spartan under Evacnetus and the or her Athenian
under Themistoclcs -wcrc transported by ship to
Hillus whrncr ~ h m ra r c~h 4 to the Vale ol"1Pmp
in northern 'l'hessaly. Hut, on arrival, F,vaenetus
found that there werc morc pasqes than he could
rcaaonably hope to hold, and, much to the
discouragrment or the Grccks. the army retscatecl
to thc Isthmus.
The Council at Corinth now docidcd to attempt
a defcnce in the arca afcentral Grrrcc to the west of
thu Eutxlean Channel, a posirion favourable to the
Grcrks bccause i t compris~d narrow, easily de-
tensilrle passm for thr armv ancl hccausc any
outflankinq rnovrrncnt hy the Persian flcst would
t a k ~i~ into the Euhoean Channcl whrw its sizc
would hc a disadvantage. It' tha land hrcc could
hold out against Xerxcs' army lonq cnough to
indue<:srrrh a move by t hr Persian fleet, the Crccks
mighr inflict upon the l a t w a drrrat sufficient to
prevent its attacking the Isthmus by sca. Givcn a
little extra time by Xcrxrs, who had moved his
armv on a tcn-dav detour ol'Mount OEyrnpus, the
Crccks thrreforr resolved to stand at Thrrmopylae,
supprtrd by thrir fleet in h e Malian Gulf. The
Crrrk army, Icrl Iy Lconidas, king OF Spana,
consist r d of 7,000 ro 8,mo hopli tes and light trtxlps,
some o r whom were Roeotians al' dul)ious loyalty,
ancl includctl thr 300-strong Spartan roval b c l y -
guard. Undrr ~ h clTcctivl-
r control oi'the Athenian
Thernistoclrs, the Grcek fleet, comprising 300
triremes, 147 of which werr from Athens, was
mooted in the hay of Artemision, north of Euboea.
It has been suxgcstcd that the Persian plan was to
arrive sirnulrancnusly at Thcmopylae and the
northern end nl' thc E u b e a n Channel whilst a
Phoenician naval squadron was to enter tht
channel frnm thc ~ 1 1 t andh trap the Greek fleer,
but the Pemian flcct was still ar its l~aseat l'hcma
when Xerncs' advance forces met rhe Greek
news thc Persian bingnrdrrrd his flrrt toprocced ta
Eulmea, but i t was caught in a storm off the east
coast of Magnesia and lost, according to Her.
d o t u s , 4oa warships. Thc Phornician squadron
was also routrd hy thc ralr,enabling; 53 Greeksliips
guarding tllc channel at Chalcis to head hack
towards the main Ilrrt at Artrmision.
Detcrmincd 10 takc advantage of the Persian
disorder l'hemistocl~ prnuadrd the Greeks to
at tack. Thc cngagvmcnt which followed war
incondusive, hut it bccame clcar that the superior
mobility oI' thv Check rrircmcs was causing prob-
Icms Tor the l a r ~ c rPrrsian forces. Thc fnllowinq
dav, the Pcmians rnountrcl an olf'cnsivc but again
the oulc-omr was indrcisiv~, and drspitr bray
I w m on bothsides, the Greeks m a n a g 4 to hold the
enemy back, prrventing it Tram supporting tht
army at Thrrmopvlae,
I.19hilst thr Ilrru wcrr- thus cngaged at Artc.
mision, the Persians had Ixrn attcrnptin~to break
through the pass ar Thcrmopylae. 'The pass
mmistcd, at t h i s rirnr, ot'thrce narrow rlefilrs nr
'g;ttrs*of which rhr crnrral one was 'I'llel-mnpylar
pto1,r.r. Thr two o111t.rg;lics, ~II(, IVrst. Iyinc a little
ewt or t h ~mouth
" oft hc rtsopl~srivcr, ancl t hr East,
ncar the tow11 nT :\Ipc.ni, wmt. siruant-d vc111idis-
tanfly otl cithrmr side ol'~ h Midrllr
r Catt.. South of
thc pass 1;iy t hc vscarpmcnt of Mo~tnrOeta, and
throug11 11tis [c~.rairrl a 1 1 a [rack which c.xrt.ndcd
from the- I:ik?;t xatc- t o thc Aajptrs I:cqr. Ry rnrnns
of this tr;ir.k tllc. pass a1 Thcrmopylac could he
nut flxnkrrl Srtvrn (41hc*rdirccrinn. I.ci>nidaschow 10
occupy the. Midrllr <;air. wlicrc thc pass was
prnbxbly only fnttr metres witlc. A fPw mtbn\vould
he ahle ta hold such a ~msition. a l i h n u ~ htllr Crvrks
intender1 to spnd rc.i11 lkrrrmrnls tr) aid Lconidas*
small hand. 'I'o Ilrotr-rt himsrlr from bring out-
flanked to thr south, Lconidas post~tl r,ooo
Phncian troop. all t h c - r n m 11e coztld liparc., to
guard thr trark through the. cmscarpmc.nt. ~rndthrn
srttlcd down to a w i ~ Xrmca'
i~ arrival.
On reaching the Malian plain, Xcmes waited for
bur days, hoping*according to H e d o t u s , that his
vast army would Frighten the Greeks into flight, b't~t
some rccrnt historians think it mow prohablc that
he was awaitin!: a Pcmian naval victory at
Artemision before e n g a ~ i n gthc Grcrk hoplit-. O n
thc filih clay, hnwt.vt.r, hr attackccl the Middle
Gatc and was rrpulsrd hv thr hcavilv amourcd
C:reeh, who wtmrt.suprriclr in respect of training
and ctquipmsnt m d against whom his light troops
had litrPc cffcct. This tactic was repentetl thc next
day with E t ~ csamc rmul L,ancl Serxcs realized that
some other way or braking the Grepk position
would have to hc found, Sir, with his navy trapped
at slrzcmision, he was without supp1it.s.
l'hr prnl>l~mwas suddenIy rrsolvcd I>y oncw
EphiaItcs whn infornled Xemes of the cxistense of
the path which t hc Phociana werc guarding. Acrina
as a g u i d ~ , Ephialrrs l ~ c l a conringrnt or thc
" 1I mmc~rt;tls'(royal hodvguard) alnng rllv track in
an attempt to attack 1,conidas' posi~ionkern th.r
rear. ' l ' h ~Phocian guard was routed and news soon
rrached Lronidas of zhc imrnincnt danger. Opin-
ions dilfer as to what occurrcd next, but i t is fairly
clear that thr forces from central Greece rnovrd
hack kowards thc East Gate [caving Lmnidas and
9.A d d C r a m r bqp m 4-a the st-le htwcta
DrtIus in a chariot m d A l t n n d e r *nd his a m . T h e d d o f
t h e P c m h koldiefln d m shown
~ ihC high Icmnt head c o v e r i q
which also conce~lcdthe lower part OF thc face. (National
M U - ~ n mNmplv~)
.
thcir headquarrrrs at TheEm, 'Thv Athmiat~s, 'Thcmis~oclcswas strnrlgly in fitvour of an carly
string their city ~>clwcrlrssagainst Sencs' I~ITCCF., rngaEctnetl1, prrfrrahly on Grt:rk terms. E~ut. as
c v a c u a ~ ~ dthr non-combatant popula~ion to IISLI~I,Greek learlrwhip was dividr~l,sqtrnc sfill
r l e ~ i n a , T'rt~czcn and Salamis whilst t h r ablr- prcfi-rring a consolidated dcfcnce oS t h e Isthmus.
lwciird mcn wcnt ahoard ~ h ships c tcr await thc ncxz Howcvcr. the size of'tilr Athrnian rnntribt~tionIn
conflict. A few p u tl~rir~ faith in a drfmcr or Athcns the Llert cnablecl cl'hcmistocles to Tclrcc ;I drcision
and rcrnained in tht- stockaded. Acrr~polis. Thc hv ~hrc':ut~ning a withdrawal of thr .Athenians il'
Spartans, rn~anwhilr. harl built a Ihstiliuation hattlr was not olli:rrrl in thc. Stl-aitsorsalarnis. 'I'ltis
acmss thc Istl~musof C~rinthand thc Grrck army position was favc~urahlrto the Grrrks hcc:~uscor
now concrntrarvd an thr drfmct. which had, all t hr ~ a r t i r a disadvanragr
l which thr l'rmian nutn-
alonq, most appcalcd to the Pelopo~~nt.sians. I~crsw o ~ ~ l~xprrirrlrt.
d tl~rrr,At rlrtm~isionthe
Persian flcet had I~rrnablc ro drploy itscjf' with
rclativr vasc. hut thew would I,r c<)nsidc.r;iblc
rrstrictions o n mannvrtvrrs in the narrow straits
?[cm.lueshad no rouble in annihilatitlg thcdcr~nrIc-ss north nlSa!atiiis. 'I'hc-mistoclcs had, oTrc~uwc,still
ofthe ACI-opolisand pillaqing ilthcns, ancl Ilmught lo inrlticc Scrsrr; tr~ofi-rl>attlc,and, bc-r-dwith the
his flret into thc Saronic Gulf t o a ~nooringat wavering mnralr of his mrn. hr i s said to I-~avc
Phalcron. jyhilst thc Grcrk llcrt rrmainecl tin.tlr- rntirrrl rhc Pprsjan corn~t~andvrwith a rnEsr
frat&, ~ h c r rwas no possil,ility of Pmian maslr? message. suggestinq i h a ~tl~cGre~ks,dyicrtcd ancl
dGrrcce; wonrr or later a navaI engaiyrnpnt was irrrsolulc, woulcl oKir l i t t l r or no rcsistnnct~.
inrvitablr. C3n thv r v r ofthr hat~lc,22 Scptcrn1,rr 480 KC.,

MT AEGALEUS

SALAMIS CHANNEL

~LIPSOKOUTALII
t TAlANTONESIk
11.. h n i l from Crrtk vase p i n t b g q50 ns, shmving an
lrrbtr n t z i n f i n ~M u bow.

the Greck flcct lay krtwern rhr nt~rthcoast of the

island or Salamis and thr coast nf Altica north-west
of Piraeus. The Pcrsians had drawn up facing north
in a line, thrikc d-cp, from thr Cynosura pro-
montory on Salamis to Pirarus. The channel
bctwcrn Salamis and Megara, t h r o u ~ hwhich the
Grerk pmi tion could be reached r r t m the west, was
Irft un~t~artlc-dby Thrmistocles, pssihl l; to tempt
Xerxes to rmptov thc same tac~icas had initially
been adnprcd at Artemision-la divide his force
and trap thr. Crcck fleet in 111rhapr orcapturing it
intact. 'I'his Xrrxcs did, senditig his Kpptian
ct~ntingmtarouncl t h e south coast ofsalamis to seal
t hrw western channcl. The Greeks were apparently
still arguing whcn r hcv received ncws of t hc Pcrsian
movrs, and thry rra1ir.d that ~ h c r rwas no other
course opvn to thcm but to fight. Accordingly, the
Grcck fleer rlrrw up in batlie formation facing
Hcracleion on the show ofnttica. T h e y had at thcir
disposal about y o vessels, the Athenians caking the
Icft wing and the Aeginetans the right. Ry the
mornin# nf F ~ ha(tl(*
C t hr Prrsi ans hail dc-plt)ycd,
with thcir right wing held by rhe skilrul Phoenicians
and thc Ioniaii ships (once more under. Persian
rutc) on the left. Whilst still rnanwuvring into
position, the Persians wcrc rowed upon 11). the
Gr~ekswho began to rorcc the Icatling Persian ships
rs. Milthdes, the G m k com-drr who m s r c ~ i b ~ t
hack upon rhcir FcIlows, causing disorder in zhc the C;mk victery at Mmrnchon.
overcmowdcd Persian forma tion, This was ~ollowed
hy an Athenian flank attack on the Phoenician
ships, which wfrc pushcd hack into their own
rcntrr anrl rmlo thc [.(last of :\tticn. :\ti rr*lrr*atiny.Prrsiatl f1cc.t !jut cvenruallv h l l o w d it as
rvt.rltu;il
h r a s t h r islnntl ol':inrlrt~swherr tlrt=!' llc.ltl ;I council
. ,
01' wral-. I hrrnistnclcs ~ a ~ w u r r sail
t l in^ ;kt nncc for
t h c Hdlrspnnt ant1 rlrstso~ing;Xrrsrs' Mvny hack
suilirt-tl hc.;~vyIrsscs - ;iccorrlirlg tr r 1-irrtdotus. .roo ;~uross thr l~~-itfgr.s, thus trappi~lg liiiri without
ship ;irid 1w;rrlvrl hack r o l'halrron wlit.ilc-4. it supplirs: hut ot hcrs k i t 1hal lliis tvottld rnch;in r h r
rrturnrtl c.vrnrualty to l l ~ rMrllcxlwn~t.Facccl now pil1;tgin.q nf C:~.cccr1,y a lxrqr and star\-ing army,
will1 ilrt. iinpowi I ~ l rtask rh' ~,ro\.ixioningil huge and rllr pl;in w;u dropp~rl.
army from st1c1-1a rleplr~trtlflrrl, Srrsr.; had nn h grt-;it tic-ill of prrstiqr harl hc-rt~Inst Ily Xtmcs
option h u ~10 withcll-alw the' I,ulk or h i s forces. at Salarnis ancl hc hacl ro consirl~.~. carrfi~llythc
'Fhr Prrsians had hrrtl rleti-ated 1)y ;I cnm- i n ~ p l i r i ~ t i t xrd' ~ s witl~clraw;~l.I,oss or Tact= 1ni~l11
lin;riion or supcrior Grerk tactics ant1 their own ins~irr+ rrvolt on ~ h wtbstt.rn
r ln~rdrrorltis ernpire as
inrptittwlr in fail in^ lo npprcriatt- that shrc-rwrbight i t had ;~Irr;trlydotle in 'lhracr anrl M;~c.rclonia,and
ol'numtlrm 7it-as insuficirnt to c-arn tltt- clay arainst hr rlt.cidt-rf maintain the till-rat t o C:rt*ccc by
forces which. although stmallc-r. wrrc: or h i ~ h r - s lravinq \)art o f his army in ' ~ ' l ~ r s ~ a'I'hrarr ly, and
qualit?.. I'hr fight for inclepct~.rlcncc was a powerSul !tl;acc-c!r~ni;~.~ ~ n d c lhf - arclnniiis x ~ ~ r; l\ ~ ~ i ~ l f i ~ z ~
~nolivation for thc Greeks, ;trlcE t 11c. u ~ ~ c l i strd ~ > u whilr taking thr rmt hack wit11 him over thc
victor!: at Salamis hoostet.1 the-it. moritlr ;~nrE Hrllrspor~~10 rtBasscrt cont 1-01 thr c.;istc-rn
rrpmation at thr rsprnst. ol' Xrrsrs' n ~ i q h\i W i i r Argean coasl. wlrirhcr he srnt his flwt Tctr thi. samv
rnachint.. purposr. Mardonius was lcii in 'I'hrssal y with
Unawart. (1 "t Xrrxcs' i n t ~ nions,t tlu* Grrrks 13.Dttnil S- a -lid the hcrd aCa G& -0s ha
drlayecl hcfilrc sctltin~ out in pursuit or thr a Bwotian-qpehelmet. (TheAl-dcr SPrcopham, Pstnnbul
Museum)

q. Pi- -f a relid sbowhg a amggk ktwtcn Marc-
dapinn d Persian warrior* Thtrrc f i p r r r wtr. mmd an
the rarnaus AJcxudcr Smrropbnpn by o d e o f &c k i u ~ or
Sidon, AWlonymus, who w c c u d hin t h r o w rhrou~hthe
innu- of M-drt. (TheAlr-ader Srrcopbp~h, Israubul
Museum)
suficicnt rorccs to rcnrw tlic olrrnsivc at his
cliscrrtir,n. His armv uonsistrtl of 12,non cavalry
sncl ahnut .~O,OOO infanlr)l or whom mmt: wrrr
run tingen ts from central and northern Grrcr~.
Included in this torce, which was a continual threat
to Grevk indcprnclencc, wcrc thc Immortals and
the Guard C:avalry.
A n attcmpl to won the Athenians and t h ~ i r
valuable H i r t into a trenly wirh thc P ~ n i a n smrt
with failure, and Mardonius, hoping lo thn:atcn
thcm inko sul)mission, rnarchrcl on Athsns, 'l'his
provokcd t h r Athenians into an aqrcernrnt with
Spasta to mount a n imnldiatc offcnsivr upnn thc
irrv;lrlcr. M~si(lt's,Srrxm t l i iq1rl ;12 anv limp srnrl a
rrfirrhishcd flrrt to asqist Mardonius; the Grrcks
cnuld not affhrd to hrsi tatr Ihr loo long.
As thc Spartans rnovccl up through the Corin-
rhii~n isrhlnus in 479 P.C.. ldardotii~~sfirrd
Athens ant1 rctircd to Bocoliir whrrc the ~vrrainw;rs
admiral)ly w~itcd to his cavalry, assrml~linghis
filrcca n p p i t r Mount Cir hrrac nn the :%wpua
plain hrt w r r n Thcl~csand I'1atar.a. Ry f'rlIin2 a
nurnbcr oE' trrrs in thcr area 11rcrtbatccl stitl lilrthrr
ad\antage ror his cavalry, and w;u waitinq at tllr
rc;rdy when thr 3.5,ooo-strnng Clrcrk huplirc hrcr,
mrnrnal~dedFy rhc Spartan Pausimius, nlo\-cld ovrr
Mount Cithrrat. and camprd nciw l'lataca na tlic
slnprs ovrrlookiny the plain.
Matrlonius cornmcncccE hatilit iw IIV scndinq his
cavillry nqainsl 111vGrccks. who wrrt. pmqirianed on
ground zrnsuitahJr for a cavalry action. Pre-
dictably, t h Prtrsians
~ wrre forcrtl to rctrrat, hut ia
has hcrn proposed that the loss nnf is rav;tly was a
pricc Mardnnius was prcparccl to pay in orcler to
lurr tlw Creeks into il more oprn position on the
plain. 'l'liis is indrcd what happrntd, f i r Pausanius
Icd his men onlo the plain and statinned them
l>ctwrcn Plataea and rhc ~Isopus,a littlr ~ 1 1 t or h
~ h zrivrr.
. T h e Spartan hoplites took ~lrrright flank,
tlw rlthcnians the Irfi, with the rernaintlcr of the
;~llicsoccup~ingthr tcntrr. On srring this, M a r -
donills drew u p his f i ) r ~ c lacing
s them, can thc other
sirlc of the river, and in this position thc two armia
wait(-d, sn Herodottrs says, Tor c i ~ h tclays. Earh
commander may h a w bcrn wailillx lfbr Ihr othvr to
makr t h t first mow, Imth appreciatin~thr slrrngrh
nTa mawd hoplizr drrcncc. Howrvrr, Pvtxian raids
ilz thr mnllntainc behind thc Grrck lines seriously
threa~rnrdPausanius' supplirs, a situation which
the skarionary Grrek rorcr:s on t hc plain could in 110
wa?.allcwintr, Aftrr il pvriotl o r s ~ x ~ r ; ~ skirrnishn
rlic
betwren rhc two rorces, Maxdonius dccidrrl to
commit hirnscl f and at ~ackvdwit 11 his cavaly,
whosc missilrs pinned dowtl t hr lucklcs Grceks.
Cbntinurd prcssure Tmm thc Prmian cavalr!
succcrtled in prcvcnring nhc Grrrk lcfi and crntrr
from using thc watrrs aT the Asnpr~s,mmpcllig
thrm to rclv on thc Gargaphia spring which lay
hchind ~ h Spartans
r and Irotn wtrirh thrse latter
had heen drawing thcir supplies. PJn fortunate1y I i r
Pausanizrs the I'rrsians managrd sonichnw tn
ctut flank or push hack the Spartans ;uld rcndcr the
spring untlsahlr, thus leavine ~ h Grrcksr withoa
wiltcr. Furt trcmorc, t h ~CirrcL supply mum
thnmgh hillorrnt Cit hrrac had been l>~sirgr:rd. I t war
now ~ l p a rha^ Marclonius was control to pursue a
policy of attrition whirh might wrll sw:~.rcdf
Pausanitla did not rnanagr tn rr-r.;t;~l~lish
his linrsnf and rhr rnanncuvrc was nrll ~ s c c u t c ~until
l cl;l>-
mmrnuniratiim and hrnrr t h r provisionin~01' h i s break.
army. Mardnnias' c.avalry wrrr srnt to harass thr
'2'hc Spartan cornmantler was I'aced wit11 a Spartans until tht. infantry ct,ultf l,e I~rougllt lo
ha;rarrlo~~r rctreat into hlounl Ci ther;~r20 hold the tmgage ~ l i c m antl,
, tlircrting tht. 1k)lwtians on lllr
main passes. a manoeuvrr hindered 11). 11ie poor Pt-rsim right to attack 1 hc cxp)sctl i2t hc-nians. htb
9pir.it in rvhirh snmr nl' the allirti Greeks rrrc-ivtul mohilizml ihc hulk of his ann!- a~ainrtthe Greck
nrrlvrs from a crimmanrlrr who war, not ~l'thrirown riqht. Rcalizinc that h i s Spartans wo~~lrl h a w to
citv-state. It srprns thal Pausatlius plnpsrcl lo Iwar thr I3runz nf thr Persian attack, Paulrnniusst.nt
withdrr~wthc Spartans, \vho lav on rhr G~.t*ekright ct, thr vrnhattlrd ilthmians Tor assistanrt., h111rht.
winq, to M o r l n ~Ci~hrraein o~*drr to re-oprn tllc Grrck ccntrc was by now pinned down and con!d
supply lines, whilst the a1lir.d li,rces in thr. Grr.r.k not rtspnncl.
centre were to rplrcat south towarrl Ylataea. Last to IVhrti the Prrsiatl inihnwy was upon the Spar-
move woulcl be I he I\ thmians, who wpre tn l>rncei=d tans, Pausat~iusdecided to take aclvantagr of rhr
wut h-eaxtwards across thr path recently takrn hy cnnges(ecl Prrsian rii~mhrrsand launch a coun tcr-
ihc allies and positinn ~hrmsclvrsas 111rnew Gr~t-k attack with his hopliirs. 'l'hrrr S'ollnwrd a ficrctr
ccntrr. hattlr whirh rrmainccl undcridcd until Mardonius
Severhal Lqctors cmnplicatrtl this manrlc.uvrtm.'l'hr himsc.Ef li-ll ant1 his mcn flccl. 'l'he Athtnians
atrcmpc was scvrrelv l~andicapprd t ~ ydarknt.ss. rncrtnwhilt. hat! rnanagrd to mut thr Zheolians and
and i t i s hclicvcd by some that the Athenians the Grprk I'Orcrs w m t nn to capture and clestroy t hc
tcfi~wcl to obey Pmsanius' order to withdraw, Persian camp.
leaving themselves cut OK tinrn the rest of r b army
~ I~ollnwinqrip their victnrl;, thc Grrcks hrsirqvrl
which prcrc~ecl~das plannrd towarrls Mor~nt 'l'hehrs, whirh capitulated a f ~ c r[went? clays and
Cithesar. Although the allied Grrrks srrm tn lmvr hnnrlrrl ovrr to I'ausanius, and thcrt-by to thcir
rno\~ocl back suuccss~isllyto Plataca, cli~cnsionin
15. D m d from anearly bmm-retitrmhowlng A m b m m w
~ ~
the Spartan ranks dclayccl the Grcck riqht flank n carnet hcial:atcacked by A~syrinan,p h cmtury n , (Palnnof
~
AssurbanipE, Ninwch)

16. D r d l from the ' G ~ t n m a c h i a Stirzr,
boplit* ubitld So-tion.
' sbowhg the Creek
(Siphniur Trmnnry. Delphi)
dr:lths, thtnc lcadrss who wcrr svmllathctic to the
Ptmrsi;in C ; ~ I F C . Ry this tirnr rhe Pt~rsians,wrrc
tnaking ttirir way hack to thr Hcllmpont, having
witt~tlt.;lwua strI,stanrial pitrt of rhrir ;~rml;, uncler
t\rt;~I,asus, lkom t h r tirlrl at Platac-a.
1311rinq the- si1rnmt.r of 479 R.C. a mrssagc was
rrrcivrd kmn ~ h lonian r I;rvrks which st~gqwtrd
that il' they I ~ ~ P T$\*~n
P rhr arllqmrt 01' a IPirt thcl;
wotiltl rrvot t ngilinst t hr I'rwf;~ns. Con~nanrlrctb y
rhr S1~r1a11kinq. 1,cotychidas. thc Get-k I1t.c.t lrli
Delns Tor Sarnor;, off the eastcmrnAegean coast, anrl
rnovtd fkorn tlic.rr. to X4ycaIr in Ionia whew Xrrxcs
h i d amaswcl a l;~rg(* army to maintain a sun.ril-
lihnc~nl' thc Ionian Greeks. Lror ychidas' fhrcm
landed n l c a r h,Iyci~li-and succt-s~firl ly ?~ssaultt~lthc
; Pcrsian sllipq, wlli~llhacl I)CCII
Pcrsiarn p s i ~ i n r l thr
1,citclic.rl f i ~ sality,
r wcrc dt.stn)yrd.
Hiivinq I lins immol~ilizcdPersian wa p w e r thr
G r r r k s rK<.crivrly prntcctcct th~rnsclvc=sarainst
rtlrthcr. invi~sintn liom Asia and wrre now snlc
marrtrn o f thc ~Zr*qrati.'1'h.c v i c r q at ?ulvralr,
ratilitatc.d by the Ioniitn Crr~kswho drsenwl thc
Prrsians as snrm as tlie 1);lttlc commrntcd, led to
uprisinys throuq11out the Ionian coastal arca anrl
t h r rxpulsion nt' Prnian ty.ants and prrisons.
The Cirrrks tno\rrtl l i r x t against Srstosin otrler to
wn-st rhr H r l l r s p n t kom thc I'rrsians ancl to
drstrol~the gatrway into Grrrk tcrri m y . Lccl 13:
NantI~ippus,tIlr- Athenians l,t.~;ic,rpclS~stusand the
city fdl at Iils~ in thr sprinr: or 478 R.c,, r h o u ~ h
Eitnrilitics rtid nt12 cease imrnc*rliatrly.and !i>rman!:
yrars altrmtards Persian trnops i.cnlai nrd in
Thracr.. Thr rnnflict c*ntErrE finally, i t is hc.licrvccl.
.t+q 48 R.c.. t l ~ rI'cxu-t. of
t h ;I !rt.al! rl;ttin~f j n n ~
C:alli;ts.
A f e r the. virtorim at I'lalara and h4?.cale an
atlierl C;rt.ok flret 1111dt.r Pausanitrs s r r ahout
drivinq thr F'c.1-siann out ol' thc Carian islands.
( :yy>rus a11tI tllr Hcllesptn~~. Pnrlsanius, how~vcr,
provrd 10 1w ;I ~yrannical,comrnandcl-, w l i o a ~ways
w c r r unpop~r lar with tht. non-Prlnponntbsi;~ncon-
tinct-t~ts111" thr flcct; evetltu;~ll!., aTt~ran lomian
mrttiny l'nllnwing the rakina nf'Ityxantiiirii. hr was
r r r n l l ~ lI,\ rhr Spartans. rvl10 pulletl out or thr
irvnturc al~ogvc.rhcr.
flkpT~~~~o////cv
%%-I*
I h r Alhenians now scttlrrl down to consider thr
li~trtrt* oi'thr hvgcan states and thcir own rclatinns
with thc I'rIolxlr~nrsiana. The Pw.si;~nsmighr onc
clay rrturu to Ci1-rrt-c to rcnrw rhr rnn flirt, arlrl thr
Grrrk?;wisb~ci,mrn-vovcr, to rctain rc~ntrolol'thr
eastrrtl Acgctan roast ti-om which the rrcent
invasinn harl come.. Thc Spartans, who had alwa?q
l ~ c r nrtbltic~rtntto ,ioitl o ~ f i ~ i v w~ s~ .r cblcirly
r not
intrrrs~rtlin li~rthrcrxp~ditinnsaqalnst t l l r Pcr-
sians and wvre II t~rcasponsivrto At hcnian init iat it.6
in this dirrbctian; nr) clr)~rhf tht)? watrhrd with
rnncrsn as thc Arhrnians hiistcned to FortiT?~[heir
city, which h;icl twice bcrn ra\.aqrd dusinq the war
with Persia. ll'ork was also szartccl lo makr Pirarus
into a wrll-protcctrrl n i l ~ a lhaw.
12thms. ricrcrnlinrd lo maintain t hr ~)rcssttw
againsr th(. Pcmians, stluqh t alliances wii 11 sym-
p;r~lit.tirsralcs, and in thr w i n t ~of478.
r j j KC. thr
Ilrlian-Attir Maritime Icaguc was iormrd. Ovcr
100 stalt-s joit~ccl with Athct~s in an i i l l i i t ~ ~ c ~
apparcnily intended to I)(. a p.rm;lnrnt ~ ~ n i oThr n.
hradq uartcrs wcre sit uatc.d on Dclos, where* rrprc-
s~nt;rlivcs met ant1 the tscasury was founded.
t i t r ~ v rstatrs suppliccl ships to augment thc
Atlir.tni;lt> flrrt wllilst l h r smallcr nnts r.ontril>utrd
financial support assessrd hy ilrist idcs, thr twa-
surrr, Apan ii.om hindi1 1 tlnr ~ Lt-afir~c. taqr~hcrhcron a
xutr rconnmic h t i n g , this practice p l ; t c ~ llave
sums or rnonry undrr Athenian control. The
I,crag~rt. opcra~t.rl rlTvutivrly in harassing the
I G m k Ught Idan1ry (gymnet)
s C m h b-vy infratr). rhaplire)
3 Greek di-r
 Petsiaru. l l t l t it slowly hrtame clear that thr
,Athenians rtirl not ronsirlrr i t to hr a clctnocratic
alliancr o1'ti.r.r stiur-s. Sclmt. tirnc. during tthr pcriml
'1 70 69 D.c., Yaxos trrrnin;~tcd its atlianuc with thp
I,~aguc,1t was i tnmctliatcly l~csieqecland li~r-rrd to
capitularr ; rlthrns, i t srrrned, wor~lclnot tol~t-a;?te
insubordin:ltion From her 'allies'. :\I i~bnut thrsmnv
timc (:aryst~anntl thr surrounding land in sor~tl~rrn
l c n fort-iMy ;innrxml hy r h h~ a g u c k~l-
I : ~ ~ l ~ was thc
sakr of consnlirlarinq i t s ~crritnrirs. 'I'hr impli -
calt inns wc~?cthlvious- ;\ t hcns was transforming;
thc Lcaque into an crnpire. 'l'lle brcrs avai lahlc to
[hc 1,ra~urwrrr mnsidcrable. 111 4fi8 rc.r:. it rlralt a
rlrci<ivc blow t o the Pt-rsians who wcrt. launching a
ncw fleet, cvmprisin~200 ships, from rhrir Phw-
l)ctwrm Sparla ancl itthcns
niriiln shipyarrls. tt?i~r
qradu:~lIybeca~nvirlcvitahlc, fin+thr rIthc.nii~nshad

17. Creek warrior d lDo- helm@dthe arpis muad

shield. The lonq-nhnftcd qmmr (Aphaia Trmple,
;a missing.
At+) I& A. P e h helmet, pmbbly w o r n at Mnrathon 490 m . c E.
t crntury nr:. C. Boaotian helmet, p ~ s i b l y
Thmcian h e h ~ 5th
worn by Al-dcr'n soldier^ 3rd century R.(L n.
Grrc'k hdmet
p 3ML.0.c:.

mad(*allint~cpsw i ~'Illrss;ily
l~ ;~ntlh~Irg;waant1 with
Rrqcls, a ~ m ~ . ~ r 1'~Fnponnt~ii~n
fi~l rival of r hu
Spartans. rls rrlations worst-nr-rl with .~Leginaancl
Corinth. who wrrrb+j(maln~rs c ~ t z' h r rr:ldinq potenrial
01' Piracus. hy now tltc c-llirf'6 r c r k Iwrt. tcnsion in
thr I't.lopnnt~cserapidly l~rramt-ac-utc..
'lhc pmmincnr figure in r\tIlcnian politirs at this
t i n ~ ewas Prrirlrs, who \vasdrtrrminrrl to unitr thr
w l l a l ~of Grcccc under rlthrnian rvli~iousIradrl--
ship. I n 457 n.c., Ilc completrrl tllr lbrlifira~icmof'
ITraeus and linkrcl i t tr, :\rIicns \vith il wiillcil
c.orridor almu t seven kilomrt rtms w i r l ~ . , ;tnrl hir
command was 10 scr* thc city reach thc hcigl~lofits
imperialist aspirat ions.
Athenian expansionist polirv had hecnrnr sn
obvious [ha! S p r r a scnt an I I ,mu-s~rongarmy lo
Rocotia to prrsztarlc. its inhahitants to join E ~ P
Pcloponnesian L v a ~ l i c -and rtmsist Arhrns. and this
fclrcr drl'eatsd an Akhrnian army at 'I'anagra, ens1
or Thehes; hut i t thcsn withc!rcw IO the IstEirnrts
I r n v i n ~the hroriitns ;it thr mt-rry 01' t h r 111hrn-
inns. who took c o l ~ ~ r oofl t l i r wholv arm, rxct-pr
Thrhcs i twff, two months later. Evcnt~rallya five-
year pvac*c treaty w a s n c g o t i a t ~ d I j t - t w ~ ~tlw
n
rZItl~cniansancl thc Prlopnnnrsian I,c:lgvr in ,ls'z
R.c., I)ut i t was t101 until ++5 n.c. that a c l r f i n i ~ i ~ r
trtt~c'. intrrldrrl tcl last liu- (lrirty yrnrs. rr'as aqrt.c*d Prl-ic-1w dircl in .y2g Bar:. and thc. rlrw Iradlr-,

howevr-r. find tlcr rnt~cuallyacct.pt;clhc*t r r n t s whit-11 h i s attituclr, t11r11rcI h i s attrnt inn c I HP

wnuld hr likcl y to form ii Eal;~in,q pPnrc, and t11r Iic>perl to scm\-c.r
tllr links I)ctt\*t.~-t~ ;inti t hc
Syr;~c-~~sc.
tnmat!:l i b 1 1 prthy to 1 hc* ct)rr f tict ol' irlrrrcsts wl~icll I ' ~ I n ~ ~ ~ n n ~Ihr
~ s irhr
; ~ ~Syrarusnns
~s, h;nl a sub-
rharitctesisrd rrlittions bctwrc.t~ :\thcnr a11c1 stantial flrc-r which roulrl 1,~- n thl-[.a[ to the
Sparla. Xtl~rnians.Thr war provrd inrntlclusivc. Ihr lmth
:\tht.ns atlrl Sp;irta, l)ur in 425 R.c:- an t.s11cditiw1ro
19. &tail F- r $rb-tury LC painted v a y rhowing rn
and clothing. (Louvre, Pariu)
varicty o r w r ~ p o a n
 Sicily t11rnt.d thc sralrs in favour nr thr -4thrnians.
Forty ships undcr Eurymctlion ;tnd Stq)h(-)clrswrgrt8
e r r i t t o rcinbrctr tmops all-cady in Sicily. T't;vcclling
with thrm was Dcmosthrnt.~who, i ~ l i h c ~ ~hold- ~gh
I ing no cotnmanri, was t-mpowt.rt.d to rlst. t ht. iIc.r't as
I h e saw GL. Wlwn I<uryrnr:don and Srlphoc-.lrs
t~ceivcdncws that sixtv Pvloponnrsian ships 11ad
i~rri\pedat C:cn.rvra off thc wcst coast of Kpirlrs thry
drcided lo hasten strniglltaway tn r ~ ~ r tltr r t rtirmv,
drspitr thcir inlbriority ofnumbrss. O p p n s i n ~this,
Dernosthenr~maclr thr :ipparcntly cstranrrlin;~~
prc~lmsitionthat thr flrrt slrt~l~lrl instc:trl put in at
thr headlnncl nfPyltw on thr wrst coast oTXIIr.csc.nia,
along which they w w c at that timr: s ; ~ i I i n ~ .
Drmostllenes' plan was tc) hrriSy and htdd Pylrjs,
Ijul the two aclrnirals wcrr unimprrsscrl artd wt.rrb
only persuaded t n along with t h r - ir1c.a whcn ir
, storm co~npcllccl111{-mto shcltc~.in N;tvarins I3ay,
, protcctrd IIV lhc. Pylos prninsula and thc island nt'
Sphactcria. Walls wcrthconnrurzrd IO thr south-
east and south-tvt-s~ol' PvEos, and alw to ~ h tlc>rtlj r
where i~ was cnnnccred by a sand bar In the.
m. A r6tbcmtury r n g t a v i n ~o f
phd- cm-ryit~gIhe long 'saris-'
iMadoniaa
!-cayi, (Bib .
mainland Dernosthcnes, with livv shi1.n :lrltl I .ooo
(Ii~iolh+~ Nmtimnsle, ~ q . i l / hoplirrs nnrl l i ~ 1 1 tt r n p s , was lrfi tn g a r r i s n ~tIir
~
1 hci~dland.

1
 .\lt~;tntvi.liilc.thr 1niUn l)nd!' 111 2 1 ~ flvrt
. maclr lor
C;nlr?1.a otirc Inrarr. Ilc*nirfitl~er~~\'
I ~ ; I I I w:~q to
insiiyatc atlrl nljlltr)l-t I+L'VOIT i n .\!csEvII~;~.i l t ~ ~t IICl
S l ~ ~ t i trrspnnst.
~b \\-as ~ \ v i ! i - 'TIlc* I,ulk ol' IIIV
I'rlo~nwt~csiattal+ln!*withdrrw frc~rn:\ttica. \r*l~ic.h
liad oncc aq;tirl I x ~ r t i nrr.~~l~ir.rl, ancl ~ ~ ~ ~ t . t * l i r c l
t l i r r c ~ lt ~( ~I'! 10s. Tt~rS C ~ ~ I ~ I I I I . ;I[ ~ ) ~C:~II.(.~IX
~ W;IS
iristnrctetl to sail i~tlr~lrtli;tfr.ly klr tllr samt. spot.
n r n ~ o s t h c ~ l t - sLEP.C'EC
. \\.it11 lhr ~i-Q.09131'Ct ol' a t !;irk
frrlln land ant1 %-;I. reel i~c.stc.tlinimrrlinlv wicl frcim rrf tllr ;irtnihticr h a d hrrn violatrd, rcfil.;ccl to hand
t hr rlthcniat~H(-c.1, tlow at %;rt.~;nthirs. Iliic k thra Sj3i1rln11 s l ~ i l illl~!
~ . 1>1~1~kit(l~'~I Sphac~rriii
T h r Spartans prcl>at*rult o track tllr garrison at clrlct- nrorr. 'l'hr c*?rpc=c-rirt inn was r l i i l t the garristrn
13!mlus, prrli.r.it11ly hclkrr 11ic. rcttll-ll ol'111c.:tlhrnian o n Spl~;ic-trrinwoultl I)c s t a r ~ r r into l surrender. Ijut
llt-ct, l ~ i tliit~n{I 1 h a ~thi. i1111y l~rat-~i(+itl~li- ap- S ~ ; I I ' Lp lAt r~i f Ii t ~ n l a n ; l ~ ~loE run rtn;dl S I I ~ P s~ h) i j ~
prcr;~chrsw r r r ;I! rliose ~ x l i n i sirlrriltl) limi fit-rl by ;islirrre rln ~ l i cseawartl sicle ol' Spl~uc.tc-ria.w11r.n
Dr*n~osthrt~es. Hrqlinq to prriprnt:2tl1r1iiail ~ t s rr d stt-onewincl.; k v p ~ttlr A ~ I i ~ n i a t ~ ~the i t ilmy.
~ i ~and
I~~
~ h rirlancl
. nl'Sph;wrrria, ~llr.Sparlans Ia~~rlrtl t h ~ r ;~~ f t c srvrs;~l
r wccks ic W;IS rvIc1~11tll~attlw zarrisnn
;\ garrison (11' 420 11r;lviiv ar~nc-rlnlrn, of'\ \ , I w m ;I U.~AIICI l i o t st;In.e.
litili. 11ndr.r a 11ii3r wcre rl-uc6 'Spartialvq', t'l'i~vk D~rnosthc.11c.r was tuakillq plans filr arr assault nn
Sp;u-tan trrwps. 'I'ltr attack rlri l'!,lte was pnrti- Spliac t r r i ; ~whvn C:Ert)~iirjipc.i~rcd.h a v i r ~I~oi~stcd ~
czilal.ly rlilljcul~ 1 w . c . a ~ti!' ~ ~ 11s strctiqth as ;r Ir, tl~rh ~ ~ ~ - r ninl ~:\lllrns ly thal Ile coultl 1;1kc the
fior~ific-i~tion. ;\a(! ~ h Spart;~"'
r \wrc coi~iitrti;~ll\ i.;l;rnd in twc-nt y clays. :In initial a s ~ ~ u Ewiis r niatl~
;Iwanhof T he possil iiit y o I ' a ~ t a c krrtlni t h r :ltl~t.rii;in with 8on Iurplizcs a1 rhc. sclr~~hcrn eml ol*thc idand
I1rt.t t hrnugh thr. sot~tht-rrl t.litr;tncc to 111t. I)ay, i ~ n r la S p a r l ; ~ n o u t p s r ht.lrl I>? tllit.2~ 1 ~ 1 c . n rsaq
which it was i ~ i ~ ~ ~ c hto~ I~loc-k;itlc iblr succ*qf'irlly. r)\*r-rlmwt-i=vrI; rt>,t)uo rl~ol-rmrn ii~llowrd.tntnrly
1:or thc clcl'rl~rt-ol' hi5 posilicln D r r n n s ~ l ~ r r i t r P i ~ h rtroops itlrlrwling; ahnlil 80n a r c h r ~ WIIO s h i ~ dil
~ m ~ Icl . 1d~qrratcr ~>;irt "This Eirst-r. a t tE?r Iandwalr3 c.onridrr:iI)l~.ittlvan t R ~ tP1 ~ ~ 111'a~ily 1 ' a1-mvC1 hop-
f o r ~!it-a~ions
i wliilq~111m l i i ~ ~ ~ s ~ l l a' l5tmall ~ ~ ~11r)cIv
~ ~ ~ l litc.;
r c ~in tht. nrr.kl; tcrrai~l.Ut.rncathcnrs' tacticbwas
ot'hoplitrs to fight tJr:~ssnu!~ 1)). sim;l. Thc lat~<lu.:~rrl t o {ill-m L I ~ S111t. hoplit(-s Ihritlq t h r Spartans hut tn
tl~Srnrt.s wvrr. as 1111- Spa rt a l a di\;c.c)vrqr~d. im - rt-trvnt tr-l~rtt l);lltlr ivas IIILLTCCI, It.a\.ing thr
p o s i i ~ l tt t~) hl-racl~.and t h r y had nrl n-tnrc szlcct-ss Sp;mr:ins 13 rry tn t hc largcs t1~1rnht.1-s r l f ligh1 trrlr)ps
w h r n thry trircl lo sitrl ihcbir ships r~vl-rthc rock) p ~ ~ r ncr ol ~ u ~ tlicir il flatrks ancl war whn assaiftd
i~pprnachr t , t l ~ cIlearEl at ~ h ~r o ~ t t t l - ~ r~~~~~~I. + r s ~ CII thrm wit 11 rni~silt.rS r n t ~a~clistat~c-c*. \ t ' < ~ r tclown
~ hy
thc hratllancl. :\tirr a day of' f ~ ~ r i o ufigl1tin.q s thc this lactic and u n a h l r to ~ltnkt.n succcsqf~ilcountrr-
Prlopnrrt-sians wit!>rlrt-w to await tltt- i~rl.ivnlol at lilt-k. tl~nsc.Sliartans who ha(I not fillell I-rtrr;rtrd
m i t i c r i ~ lilrl ~ ~llc.buildin!: ofsieqe rt~ginvs. ill lhcir tratlititmally t l i ~ c i p l j t ~ iil'iliiol~
r~l to thr rot-!
Soon alirr rhr lull irt t l ~ vliqh tir~g,chr. i\theninri at thc norllrt-1.n cnd nPtElr islanil. t v h c r ~t h r y r;tngrd
ship$, no\\- n ~ ~ n t l ~ rfirfry, i n ~nr.ri\-r.d itnd ir~sprc.rt.d t hcrn.wli-t-s in ;I semi-cil+clr to f i t ~ cthe ent-my. :It
t31iasituation. Scrillq no nl)pi~rtut~it> ritht*rto ctltrt' t11c. s~rmntit01' a hill, rh~irflitnks prot~ctril.the
thi* bay, \vllic.li W ~ oS~ c i ~ ~ ) i r c ltlic S ~ ) ; ~ r f illrtat, ln tlrli-nrlcrs 11c.ltl ~ h c i rown urliil :t group of' liqhtlr
or to ~tlakc,a I;inrlitiq at Pylrls i t h ~ wo111~1 ~v 11;tt-1' armc.rl tnc.11, rommat~clrtlhy n h~lc-ssrniancaptain.
ht.rtl rln room l'nr sr, w;my \.c.sst.Ixl t!~c.yI . P ~ ~ F C * ~ !cntnt. 111) o1.t-r thc hill and 1i.H u p o t~h~r ~ nT~nm~ h r
rlrwtl~tcl ~ h isl;~tlrlr nl' Protv. rear. Yo.rr.I ha1 virton- tvas assu~=rd, t hc !tt henianr
Early ncxt morriin~the Sl>art;inswcrr pu(ting to l~rid off. p l ' ~ t \ ~ ) ~ i ftol g rhe Spartans that tbcy
sra, i t t i c a r h a v i n ; ~I,c-auhcd iht-ir ships Tor lhr. ~iight. sut.rr.rrdcr. Rlivr m u c h cliscussicm rhc remaining
W I I P I ~ t111- r\tllrtliilrls ~IISIIPCI in I I ~ H I I I 111r111: 111~' 2 9 2 mrn. I st) al' t E i r ~ rSpnrtiat~s. ~ g;~\~c* t hrmst*l\.n
S p a r t a n ships urr~+r p u s h ~ dhark 10i h r shnrc am!. 1" iitw'I wcrr takrw to ;lthet~s.
rx,r~~tuall?+, t hr ;!rheni;~n~ mrccrerlc+riin c;~ptusit~,q U r p i t c tilr I>rilliancco6l3emnsrl~c:ncs'tactics in
fivr \,ca~t-Is ancl cornplt-tc. mnlmaricl; I)T tlir Ila?., t r l i ~ s i n qtt, clllploy liis h o p l i t ~ rin ii s i t ~ ~ a t i owllrw n
liqht troops coi~ldbe u m I so much morc cKec lively,
it was C:l~onwho. o n returninq to Athens, took [lie
praiu- fi~rso prrsrigious a victory. ancl it seclmcd
that the roriuncs or (he warmongers in Athcnian
politics werP irr thc. ascrnciant. RUL,two years laicr,
Cleon tlird in thc rout of thc Athcnian army at
:\mphiupolis. and a fi rty-yeat peace treaty was
t~ccntiatcdwhich called for Athcns to hand hack
thosc cities shc had annexed durinq the war, along:
with t h c prisoners from Sphacteria. In return, she
rtqaincd nearly all the territories she had possessed
a t the commrncrment ofhcrstilities. And so the war,
which had heen so acutely cxp-nsivc in h t h
human and ctonomic tcrms, led only to a rc-
sumption of thc sratus quo, as far as Athens and
Sparta wcrc cancerned. Rut Carinth, Boeotia and
Mcgara were so djssatisfiecl that the reopening of
hnstflitirx was incvitablrr.
Scvcr;tI firmrr Spartan allics, Argra, Cot-inth,
Mantinca ant1 Elis, formrd an alliancc Indc-
pt'wlrnlly orthc Laccclacrnonians and nrgotiatd a
trr-atv with thc Athenians in 420 B.C. under the
acgis of a ncw ancl influential ilthcnian st rate go^,
Altil,iadrs. This state of afiii',lirswas shortlivecl for,
aftrr a Spartan victory at hIantinca in 418 n.c,, the
I'rloponnmian statcs rcjoinrvl thc Spartan camp
and I,acdacmonian supremacy ovcr t hc Pclopon-
ncse was once morc cstahlishcd.
Under hlcibiadr~thc Athcnian qumt for mas-
tery of the Grwk worlrl found ncw inspiration ancl
the :\ssernhly, despite the opposition oi'Rlcihiadrsl
fellow slrnt~gosNicinq, r a t i f ~d an amhitious scheme
toconquer Sicilv, in particular t h port ~ orSyracuse.
An impressive rorcr was rnustcrcd comprising 5 , m
hopIitcs, 1,300 lighrly a m e d troop and a fleet of
t34 triremes with a complement of a b u t 20,000
men. In addition (0 this ~hcrttwere large numbers
o f supply ships and attendant vessels. Although the
land force was rclativcly small, the supremacy of
her fleet ovcr any Syracusan opposition gave
Athens hope For victory in SiciIv. 'l'he expedition
was led by Nicias, AIcihiadcs and Lamachus; but
not lone: i t f i c r i~rrival in Sicily, Alcihiadcs was
recallod ro face political charges, and chose instead
to cr;c.apeto the Peloponnesc. 1,arnachus ~avoureda
swift attack on Syracuse, hut Nicias wasted time in
ft~tilc cxcrcises and the Svracusans took the
opp~rtunityto orgianizc thcir drfcnccs and srnd for
help to Corinth and Sparta.
TR t h r s p r i n ~nf 414 B.C. an Athenian assault
gained po~qrssinno f t hr plntcau nrl.:pipoiat., which
commanded the city from the wmt, ancl thcv hcgan
huilclinq ;L wall running nnrth lo south ovpr the
pla~rauin an attcrnpt t o cut Syracuse o r rmm the
rPst or Sicily. Tlie Sywcusan op1msiltion was unallle
to prcvent this ancl the siruarion was hecornins
despcraw, when [he Corinthian fleet arrived,
hackrd u p hv a hastily raiscd army of n,ono hop1itc.s
and light troops Icd bv Cylippus. This iirmv
manaarcl toseizr the nor1hern part orEpipolac and
to construct a counter wall wetwarcls across the
plateau, frustrating the Arhrnians and cutting;their
land communications. This forced t hr: Athcnians to
scnd for reinforcerncn ts, which wrrr dispalchtrl
unrtrr thr mmmand nf Drrnasthcnrs and Eury-
rncdon. Upon his arrival, Desrnosthcnes dccidcd
that an irnmecliatc. attack offvrcd thc best chancc of
surrws. Hc midc a night attack o n Epipolac hut
was t~ns~rcccssii~l and ~hvt-rfi,rc.dutidcd that with-
d r a w i ~ lwas t hc wisest c o r ~ w Drlayrcl
. by Nicias'
intlrcisinn, tht. hthrnian flrrt was aucldrnl y block-
aclrd bv thc Syracl~sansin rhc Grrat Harbnur and,
despit~a valiant attrmpr to smash thhr way
through tn rrrrdorn, the armv was hrcetl t o makr a
lanclwarcl retreat towtlrrls C a ~ a n i a nnrth
, ot'Syra-
cuse. 'I'hey mart-hetF in it hallow wltlarth, prnrrctrd
around the outside by heavy infantry. Falrltv
communications Ird to thr separation ofthr lrading
division, undrr Nicias, Tram thc r w r , I d bv
Demoslhenrs, and thr. fi~rcvw m sonn overtaken
and massacred hy [he Syracusan army. Nicias and
Demmthrnm werr cxrcutcul and rhc 7,000 sur-
vivom were imprisonrd in ~ h cstone cluarries of
Svracusr, where thry sulI'errd rrrril>lleprivations in
thc merciless dimate.
'Thc Symrt~sandis:1stc.s was an irnmcnsr srthack
to Athenian imperinlism and her enemies were
quick to lake aclvantag~of the situation. Several
stales revdled, ancl Sparta kegan refurbishing her
fleet with too ncw ships. Besides these develop-
ments within Greece itsell; thc Persians, on the
othcr side of the Aeqean, renewed their interest in
thc Ionian Grcek states.
Alcibiarlm, who had tcft just bcfbrc thc fateful
events at Syrarusc, was at thk timc busying himself
with political machinations involving Athcns,
Sparta and the satrap nS Lydia, Tissapht.rncs.
Puttinq hirnselrat thc tlisposal of the Athcnians,
Alcil~iaclrsIlvlprrl thr.rn ro rrqain tt~rHrlles~~orlr
:~nrl I hc Ikq)l~orus1)ul. aftrr the clrii'at cr3' an
:ltIirnian flc.c.t i l t Intiurn i r ~ ,l.oI; R.c., hr. was
repl;~cvd1); Chlnot~.Hritsinq 1hn1lhc. Sl);~~-t;in llr-ct
unclpr L ~ ~ i l t l (W:IP
I t ' ~; ~ t r ~ n ~ p l i10l l disrupt
g .\11tct1-
inn Ponlic. tr;itlr nnrl hat1 l~c~<it.qrrl 1,arnpsncits ill
t h r Hclleslm~it,I.>~nonrclok I Ho ships anrl nIlit+ed
hat r lc a[ :~cgosptharni.
'Thr t l ; y :ilirr he arsivvd C;c>r~c)rrlwvd n up
rowal-rls thc. Sp;trt;in flret at t,ntnpsacus only to find
~ h a lLys;mndt.r rt.fuscd t n engage. ;lncF so 111c
;\I lirnians r c t u r n ~ r lro .2r.%osy,or;1mi,~)rtrsuculby
Sp;lrt;m rccounai~ssnccships. For ;I Khrthcr tour
clays this escrcisr was rrpr-a1rrl ; r hr nrst dav. I lie
t i t hvnians, relturnit~~ anotlrrr u n n ~ c c c ~ ~ f ~
li-om ?;(.I
challengr, put ashnrr in the hay oi'Aegcspotarni to
rallcc~supplies. Apprisrrt or this ;)1 his srnurs,
Lysander launchrcl a wrprise attack and captured
all but nine of thr: Athcnian ships, massacring ovcr
3.000 men. Connn escaped with cighl s h i p to
Cyprus, and a solitary dispatch tmar m a d r its way
hack to Athrns with news of thr rlisastcr.
'I'he Spartans followcd up this virtual annihi-
lation of the Athenian Ilect by hc*sir,qin~: Athens
with thc Pcloponnesian army, and, blockaded from
thr sea hy the victorious Lysandrr, Athpns was
obliged to negotiate a wttlerncnt. The Spartans, in
a position to demand almost any terms, i n s i s t ~ l
that the Long Walls and brtifications be pulled
down, a11 foreign possrssions ,@vcn up, ancl Athen-
ian control confincd to Atrira ancl Salamis.
Sparta. hitherto thr champion ofindividual state
autonomy in Greece ancl thc vnrrny o f Athenian
imperialism, now revealed thr vrry attitudes
against which she had nstensibly f c n ~ ~ h The t.
oligarchic governments SIIP at~crnptcdlo impose
upon sul!jcct states proved unpopular, and Sparta
had considcrahle trouble maintaining her leader-
ship in Grrrk politic?,
11r the rnd at' thc Peloponnesian war thc city
militias which, during the years of mnff ict, had
been almost permanently mohilizrd, wcrc disban-
ded. Largt* numhcrs of experjencccl wlclicrs were
thus seeking employmenr of some kind, and,
capitalizing on their capacity as fightinx mmcn, thcy
hired thcmselvcs out to anyone who would pay we11
for their services. In 401 s.c. an opportunity arose
for many mercenaries to take up arms a ~ a i nin the
pay of Cyrus, yorrngcr brother of the Pcrsinn king
Artaxerxes. Intending to overthrow his hruthcr,
Cyrus induced the cities of lonia to revolt against
the satrap Tjsaaphcmes, and rnustcrccl an infantry
force aT 40,000 ( 1 o,ooo of whom wcm rnrrrcenary
hoplites) together with about 3,000 cavalry.
Included in this force were joo hoplitrs sent hv
Sparta, well aware that she was in debt to Cvrus for
aid he had supplied during the Peloponnvsian war.
After marching 2,400 kiIomctrrs, Cvrus con-
rronted Artaxcrxta' armv at Cunaxa, north of
Babylon. Artaxerxes' a m y was prnhably half ns
stmng again as Cyrus' army and was rquippecl with
the scytlird chariots upon which the Persians relied
to break up the cncm y's formation. Cyrus' trnops
allowed thr I'rrsian chariots and cavalry to p:us
t h m u ~ hthrir ~=anks
rrlativcl y harn~lrsslyand thvn
i~rf\vinced on the. Prrsians, many nl- whom Ilrd
immcdiatcl y. Cvrus' ~ i ~ v a l rthen
y charged. but in
an attrmpt to rcach h i s hruthvr in ordrr to kill him
~wrsnna11yCyrtis was separa ted lkom t ht*suppnrt r ~ f
his army and lost his lifi-.
T h e conclusion nl'thc hattlr left both Greeks and
Persians unsure oiwhat to rln next. Despite ~ h r i r
victory, thc Grccks wrrc faccd with attemptins a
withdrawal with many hmtile Bmians still in thv
arm. The Persians, for thrir part, wcre Inath ro
rngagc the Greeks but krcn to be rid or them. 'l'l~cy
offrrrd tn escort them out of the country and hack
m Grcccc, hut soon after the march srartrd thc
Grcck gcncrals were l u r ~ daway fmm the army ancl
put t o dcath and the rctrcatine soldiers were thrn
atkackrd. Quick to dercnd thrrnsrlvcs, tl~cygmup-
erl in *2 hox fnrmatinn with hop1irt.s munr1 t l ~ r
outside and, keeping the Persian cavalry and liqhr
tronps at hay with slingers, ~ h rGrccks. who had
maintained good order and quickly clcctrd new
strate~oi,managed to reach Trapezos on thc Rlack
Sra. This extraordinary rrlrtmatwrll illustratecl thr
in~cnuityof Grrrk soldirrs in maximizing thcir
strrn~thin the race or Tar suprrior nurnl)rss.
With Cyrus dead, Tissaphcrncs attcmprrd to re-
mtahlixh his rule in Iania, and thr Grrck cities there
appraIcd to Sparta Sir pro~rction.A flcct com-
manded by Pisander was sent to thrir aid hut at thr
battle of Cnidus in 394 R.C-it clashrd with a P<.rsian
forcr undcr Conon, the Athmian cornmandcr who
had rscaprd at Argospotami and had had a change
oS l~eari.T11c Spartans lost ii fty trircmcs, and al t
hope or naval suprcrnacv in the A c ~ c a n .Takinq
advanza~e01' this dcfcat, the Greek ciry starcs
handed ~ogrther in revol L. Suppnrbcd by the
Persians, Thches, Athens, Corinth and Arxos
rrbclld, and although thcy wcrc dcfcated hy the
Spartans ncar Corinth in July 394 R.C, they
entered upon thc Corinthian war, c l u r i n ~which
some notable succcsscr; were scored against thr
Spartans hy tht alliecl generals. Even~ualsialcrnatt
led to Persian-inspired peace propnsds which
dernandrd thcl Forfrit o f Asiatic Greek citios to thc
Persians, and sc-cstahlishccl Spartan lradership in
Greece. I t was nor long hcfore the inevirat>le
rebellion came. This timt. thc centre was "I'hrhrs,
fortunate in her military commander Epam-
inonclas, who is said to have introduced into Grrek

warfare the successf~rlusc of a tactic arainst thc
renowncd Spartan hoplitex.
In a valley near Leuctra in Bwutia, a Spartan
force thought to num her approximately I 0,000, of
whom 1,aoo wcrc cavalry, met Epaminondas
whose army was of a simiIar siw and constitution.
'The Spartans took up their traditional formation,
with thc best tronps on the right wing, and thc rest
of their infantry spreacl o m , twelve deep, in a
relatively straight line. Eparninandas posted his
Theban infantrv, fifty deep, on the left of his force
oppmi~cthe track Spartan troops, and had the
remainder of his men set obliquely back towards his
right wing. The cavalry of both sides, stationed
ahead ol' the infantry, cngagcd first, and the
Spartans were decisively dcrcatcd; whilst still in
disarray, thr Spartans werc hit by the massed
strength of the hopli tes on rbe Theban left and were
unahlr to resist. The Spartans lost over I ,000 men,
qoo of whom werc Spartiates, a trrrible blow to a
state whose rorces had never heforc: hren drfeated
in pitched, battle. Et was now t h c turn of Thches to
dominate, just as Sparla and Athcns had once
done, but this served only to unitc thc city states of
the old PeEopnnacsian IA-~RUCa ~ a i n s hcr,
t Icadinq
to a r o n ~ r o ~ ~ i a tor n Theban and allied armirs
l o the
at Manrinca. Roth lbrces were over 20,000 strong
and Eparninondas' tactics were the same as they
had been at Leuctra. The massed 'I'hehans broke
chuir oppencnts*right wing, hut Epaminondas was
killed, and without his grnius r h Thchan~ army
failed to push home for a cfccisivtt rrsult, AIicr that,
Thcban p w c r failecl, ancl the city states, squab-
blinx over poIitical control, Ijrtle st~sp~cteclthl:
radical changes which la): in the near liiture.
the 9~/7t
~A/XUIIAY-
On the death of his brother Perdiccas in 359 KC.
Philip I1 of Macedonia, then aged ~wcnty-thwe,
srizcd the throne. During his reign he created a
unificd national army such as had n w e r been seen
by thv volatilc alliances of Greek states. In the first
twu p a t s ofhis rule he succeeded in redefining the
boundaries of the rragrnented kingdom hc had
inherited, and spreading his intrrrastsfarthrr afield
towards Pangaeus, Thrace ancl Chalcidicc.
Although reluctant at first to interlire in the
afhirs o f other Greek states, Philip was forced in
354 R.C. to take action against Phocian inaetf'erence
in Thmsaly, which lay immerliatrly to thc south of
his own lands. Dcfcating the Phocian army near
Phcrac in 351 R.c., he movt*d on against Phocis
itself, but a m v i n ~at Thermopylae he found the
Phocian army supported by 5,000 Athenian hop-
litcs and decided that i t would hc prudent to
withdraw. Philip was anxious to avoid conflict with
Athens, thc forcmost naval power in Greece, but
Maceclonian policy was by now amusing concern in
the Grcck statcs. Athens however, keenly aware of
her current weaknesses, was happy 20 accept peace
proposals concluded in 346 B.C. which receivd
Philip into thc Dclphic Arnphictyony; this was a
federation or Grwk statcs, and i t is at about this
time that Philip dcvdoprd iclras not only of
extcnrling Maccrlanian hrgcmonv nvcr thr whnleof
Greece hut of uniting the Greek states and carryinq
the war against thcl Pcnians. Despite setbacks at
Pcrinthus and Byzantiurn in an attempt to take
contml of the traclr routes of the HclIcspont, Philip
moved muth once morr and in 339 LC., bvpassed
Thermopylae anrl occupied Elathia. Athcns and
Thehrs f i ) r n ~ dan alliance against him and. raising whn were never rvcltlrtl into n sinql~,wtll t ) c v ~ n -
a forre of owcr 40,cx)n mrn, they nwt Philip at izcd fightinc bodv. 'E'hc 1mt trt>r~ps, C;~-t=c-k
Chaemnea in 3138R.C. Philip, with 3n,m infantry mcrct.nnrirs nncl Persian c;iviilsy, oficn round
and 3,000 cavalry, cntrustcrF to t l w cavalry on his themst-lvr..uundcr the higher camrnancI of'rclativciy
lrft wing, who werr lcrl hv his son Alexander, thc incnmprtmt satraps who l a c k 4 tllc ability to make
task of hreaking the Thc'uan phalanx. 'I'his t h y the hrqt use of them.
duly did, whilst Philip's rie;ht wing madr a ractical Alrxander's force of approximat~l y 3o,noo
retreat lo draw thr Athenians on and hrcak the incintry and 5,000 cavalry had a core or r 2,noo
Greek linr. Thc plan was succcs~ft~l, and tlsc Maccdonian root ancl I ,800 first-ratr hlacrclonian
Athenians, trappcd bclwprn Philip and cavalry, I ~ u tinclrirfcd, along with :i,ooo merccn -
Alexander's victorious cavalry, wrrc severcly irrica, j,oao i n k t r y ant1 Goo hnrsr from t llr Grrck
defeated. Apprcciatinq the scnsrlrsmcs5 of anni- stales. Qnrstions of stratc-gy lay cntirrly w i ~ l l~ h c
hilating rhosc soldiers he Ilopcd mon lo command M ;tccclonian high rnm nlsnrl , and a sys1c.m was
himsell; Philip allowrul t l ~ ealljm rt, r ~ x p c . rlrvisc.rl wherclp+ rcinforcrmrnts were 1)rotlght
Tltis victory rffcctiv~ly estahlishvrl Philip's prrinrEically rrom Grrr*rt. lo kccp the arm?. up to
It-adenhip of rhr Hellenes, ant1 having sccurcvl st rmgt h. Thc Itlact.tlonisns' chier wc-i~knrss\ r u s
hrinrh, hr summoned to thp city rlr.lcptcs from their f1t.t-I, which mmpriscd only rfio trin.rnt.s, Thc
thc Greek states and pmpmed ctlr Ibm;ltion of a i~dvancrhrrr ~rnclcrI'armvnitr harl Iwrn s~~llil.inq
drfcnsivea!~~-nsivo lca~utrunder Macrdonian mil- sr\,rrely at the. h a n d ~ ~ 1 ' M e m n o n 0 ~ R h ~ ~ l ~~1 .h1 t~ ~
itary command. 'l'bc C;rucks wrrc hrccd to accrpz. satraps ol'thc nci,qhbourina rrgiot~a.on Ilc;~rinqor
Philip's aim was to Icad an c x p ~ l i t i o ninto Asia hlexandcr's arrival, joincd 14cmnon in t hc 'I'roarl.
a ~ a i n s trhc Pvrsians whose perpetual intrrfrrrnce
in Grrrk alhirs wprcsrnltrcl a ~hrrar t o hllarrcl-
onian hrgrmony. In 376 n.c. he scht11 ~ o , m mrn
under ParmcaL)l o rsti~hlishn fmtholcl llryor~rlthr
Hellespont in nithynia and t h ~ 'I'roarl wliilat hc
himsell' assernblrcl t hc main invxqiotl I'orrr. Philip
was, IIOWPVCT, dcrrtincd ncvcr to rralixc his am-
hition personally, for in thc atltumn ol' 336 n x . . at
ltis daughtcr"~wpdctinq in Prlla, he was assassi-
nated, and i t was lrrt ro h i s son,Alexander, tn rnakr
sure t h a ~~ h kdcration
c did not drgcnoralc rmcc
more into a rltrstrr or bickering rivals.
I'hilip's death was followcd Isy revolt amonq thc
ritv-stares, ancl only after Alcxandcr had swifily
supprcsrd rrflrllion in Thchw and destroyed thc
rity did the Grrekx rvalizc. that thr rlrw rufrr conld
rctain as strnng a holcl as his fathrr had over
insurgent rncml~rr-starcsof the contcrlcracy. Thrrr
had l ~ e e nimplications of Prrsian I,~-iberyin thr
rcvolt, ancl i t was olwioris to Alexander t h a ~his
Fat hrr's plan must hr implcmcntcd if Grerk unity
was to IK maintainrd. Lcavinq a small force of
9,- men and a fi-w horse to ktrp ortlrr in Grrcce,
hlcxandcr leli Pella Ibr Scstos, and in spring 334
sac.brought his army into 'I'roas,
+P h m helmets, hw,W p a r r ~ quiver,
, tunic,
' h e Pclsian forccs untlcr thc recently enthront.4 rxe mdjavclfn. Mnny arthcrrc were aftrn worn and
c a m r d by Ptmian troops.
Darius I11 wcrc cornpowd, as usual, ol' a vast
conglomeration of trmps of ditT~rrntnat innalitics
U 11dc1-thc cotntrlar~do f Aristz~.satrap o f Hr~llrs-
~mntinc Fhryin, t h ~ ydiscusserl thcir stratc-gy:
Mrrnnon's nt,und arlvicr was t o rrtrc.:it. dcstroyinq
the land as 11ley went, arid t l ~ r . t i to v a r y thr war
into Grevct-, leaving 1hr. i)c.lr.agut.~*rd Alrxandrr in
a hostile wasteland ; l ~ i tlijs
t plan was r ~ j r t t r dhy
111~ satraps. who fitv~~urrcl an irnmcdiatr conflict.
app;~rcnrly placing thcir uonfidcnce in thc advan-
t i i p thcy h;ld avcr Alcxandcr in their choicr nf'
rcl-rain. F'osi tioncd on the eastern !lank of thc rivcr
Granivus (which was in thc area ol' the Darclati-
c.lIt.s), thrv cnt~ldforw .'\lr?cancler to alcernpt a
prrcario~~s crossing whic tl wou ltl 111-rak h i s liw-
marion and hindrr thr rlf'rctivr use nf rava1t-y.
?\lthouqb thr Pvrsinn infantry was nr) rnatcbh for
that ol'thr Macvtfonians, Aristrs war; rrlyingon hi9
supcrior 11t1rnl)rrs or ~ ; - I v ; I ~ I ovvr
-v I 5,000- to
countcs any Mart.tFonian attack.
O n reaching IIIC /,a~tLc-groundAlcxandcr's staff
saw clcarly thr dangers o f a dirccc advance across
the river, and so, ovcrnight, they rno\~cddown-
sttram. forcling; the river at dawn. Ry the time the
Persian ravalrv, summonrd by scouts, had arrived
at hlrxander's crznsing point, tlzr Maccrlaniarl
phalanx llaci Sr)r-mt.d u p and hlc*xandcrk cavalry
charged, forcing a I'crsian rrtrcat.
'131eg~.oundon the castrrn s i c k of rhr Granicus
/
!
2% (imk -(.
dabort sword.
hehim& o f t h e b r r i c sty1c,shittd

gave the Maccdonian c.aval~-ythe chance to

cxercise its skill t o tFlc full. and as soon as the
Memnon who had cscaprd at Granicus, proved
Pcrsians advanced on his position Alrxancler intransi~ent; Alexander leTr. a dctachmrnt of 3,000
moved his right wing cavalry against r hcm. Moving font anrl noo horse ro besiege the port, and hradcd
first towards the Persian Irft, hc suddenlv bore on round the Lycian coast, aiming cvcntually to
round and forcrd his wrdgc Formation inro the occupy all the ports or the uastcrn Meclitrrrancan,
Persian centre. 'I'hc cnrmy rvplirul with a similarthus renclrrritlg the Persian flcel inoperative. By
chargr a p i t l s t the .Macrdonian ccnzrc, but Irft
Octobcr 333 R.C. h e had arrived at 'Tarsus in Cilicia
thcir infijntry an easv target lbr thp Maccdcmian whence he mevcd arnuncl thc coasz of Syria to
phalanx. A further cavalry c h a r ~ c ,this timc by
Myriandsus, only la hear t h a ~Daritls' forces had
Parmrnio on the Macedonian riqht wing, pur the nlanoeuvr~dinrn position hehint1 him, at Issus, on
the northern bank of 111erivcr Pinarus. Hia lincs of
Persians to fligfr t, leaving only a pocket ol'rcsistance
kern Memnon's Greek mvrccnarics, snon ovcrcome supply artcl communication cut, Alcxandcr was
by the triumphatit Alcxandor. 'Thc clrfcat cost forced to turn a h u t and light. His exhausted
..\ristes 2.500 cav*2lty, and disprlltxl anv illusions
troops marched back towards ~ h Pinarus
c where
Darius miqht have had about thc gmvity of the the Persians, having once again choscn thcir
Macerlonian threat. position with care, awaitprl rhrrn. Darius was
Many cities in Asia Minor submittrd without protecting his weak Asiatic infantry with Greek
troublc to Alcxancler, b u ~h v mt.t with sornr. mercenaries, who, along with the 2.000 first class
rcsistancc, particularly at Mllrtua anrl Halicar- Pcnian tmops of the Royal Rodyguard, and rhc
nassus, After a short siego ,Milvtus was t~rupicd, lightly-armed Cardaces, made up the Persian front
but Halicasnassus, d e h d c d by thc c-xpcrienccd line. As Alexander approacl-lcd, Darius moved his
main cnvalq fi)rt.c.onto his I - ~ s F I ~ wing w a r rhr scil wtlirh, suitahlv Ect.rllctE. wr>ultl br atlmirmaI>lr
shorc.. Partnrt~ioand i2lcxanctrr- Ictl 111cleli and t l his r-;l\.;~lry
t r ~ ~ n iLi~r : ~ t l t l chariots.
r i ~ h winq
r c . a v : ~ rrppc-r-tivcly.
l~ t hc. pl~il!;tnstakinq A lirs a110~,in.q11 is ;irIny srvrral rlilvs' rcsl,
up the relitrr. A l r s a ~ ~ r l rwllo
r . harl hcb;tiul l i l ~ r nc-;~ptnrrdscottts of
As soor1 its thr first vclltry of arrrlws h;ld hrerl E);11-i us' finill plan, rract~rcl~ b Ir~ t 1 tlrfic.Irl i171dsaw
loosect hy thr Pet+sian;irrhers, 11lvx;iridrr led t h c = to his hol-rc~rrhar I1;lri ~ r l ; ' tbrcc.s WVTF considc*rably
Cotllpariir~nC:av;~lrl;in a hrilliilztt c-harce ivllich st rnr1qc.r t l ~ n rhc- ~ hilrl hrlirvrcl. Thc Great King was
shattr~.rclTkrius* riqt~twinq. Wnwt.vt.r, [his crcatrtl rrlyinq ntl a srrt)nqEy arrnrrl cav;~lr! ol' :+~,O(IO to
a gap to t h r rig111 01' thr ntrugglinq hInccdorliitn fntm~hi^ fkont linc: the- hIarr.ilr~nianc a v a l l ~wotllrl
p I ~ ; ~ l ; ~aticl
n u intn ~ l ~grrp i s Daril~s'sI :i.rrk ~ n c r c r r l - lw ot~tnumllcrctf i111nt')st livv ro orrtm.O n *r!j
;tri(-s p n ~ ~ r e cIMIl , tling i*m-iotlsly wi I 11 . \ I ~ ~ S : I T ~ ( ~ ~ ~ I - ' S Sep~c.rnl)cr:\lrx;lntlr.l- r*c.c.onnclitrcrl t l ~ plain r ;I t ~ r l
centre. 121t.xandrr's mitit1cot1cr.r-tintlw wils citlirr t i 1
capturp Dari tis or tcl kill him. hc~pirtqt o rcmoIbe,
nltlnq with tl~r.C;rc*iri Kiriq, any 1Lrtl1cr unirrrt
oplmsiirinn wit hit1 rhr Pvrsian F,';lttpirt., n;~rius,
s r r i n ~rllr rlanqcr, flrtl ~ h l~atrlrfielrl.
r : ~ l t h o u h~ ~l~
apparently woundcrl :\lcx;lndrs wf H ) illmost rook
him i r i a dirt.rht chargr.
I t i n r e h t - rhould ~ n i r s ~ r t .Alrx;~zlrlt~r
, hat l first In
mxkc sure of his victory: hr twnerl 11Ix right wirlg
nqaiust llle 13c-rsE;incvntrc.. Thc nivrrcrlarirs wrrr
shatt~rrc!and thrir prrrlicanrcnt taustrl thc caralr.!
on thrir r i ~ h t ro li~Ilow P)arius in Clisht. 't'hr.
hf;lcedonian~ fbl lowctl and t IIP I'c.t.si;~~isw r r c
rnutccl. "rIrsanr1c.rwas now [irt. t o pursllr the. Grri~t
Kin3 himwlf, I ~ uI);~ri~ls l Ilai1 T T I ~ I C ~gow1
C his rVscnpr,
0vr.r 1 o,ooo I;I.(*I'~ ~ ~ i ( - r ~ t ' ~ i ~; ~~~~. ci (c*ts~ ~ srp-fi~lly
trcbst~rl, to nfkt. 111c.ir srrvic.f*sin thr= nrsl c.onflict.
whir11 wras i n ~ v i ( i ~ l ~ils I c Ic)tiq
- its n:ll-iitx n.rnaincrl The E>atilt-orclrr nl':\lrxi~nclvr's army was clr;lwn
oveslorcl ur t hz. Prrniiu~F,mp>in.. ~ ~ in
1113 1 1 ~ clay 1 rnuc.11 t h r snttw way ;ts it l ~ n d11ct.11 at
r\lrxandrr prtsl~rclon clowr~ rhr Syriars romt. C;r;uiicns ant1 Issus, IJLII with i h t w i n p strt-ng-
taking all tllc E'rrsian naval hmra arlrl rlicrt*l>y tilt-nrcl ant1 ; ~ ~ g l rllnrk d li-om the mait1 litrt-c.
ollti~iningcomj)Irtr rtll~lroli r rhv ~ r*nstchr-tlhlrtli rcr- 13~*Iiind;I c.;~v;tlry srrckc-11 ( ~ nthr r i ~ l l twine, hc
rantLan,rldvtour was made i r l l r ~T,.qpl, hi11 I,? the ~>l:lrrda ~ ) i ~ w c r f imrrrrnar): ~l force, whils~ the
sumrncr or 331 R.C. Alcaantlrr hat1 Icrl l ~ i satmy rvrnaind~r01' rl~crl~c.l.r-t.n;lrics and t t ~ c1,raglrc
back notthw;trrls 11trt>ughSyria 10 Thapsactw t)n it~lkr~ry ~srr~tcctrtl t h r . rr*nrh.'1'11~1c.t-t winq WRF. its
thr Kttphratcs, r n rrltltc' for Ral~ylon,thr rconomic
crntrc r)rt hr Empirt.. Mcanwhilt.. Ihrius, 2 hinkinq
that hlrxandt=r wt~uldhead clown t l ~ l r f3upl1r;ltcs.
preparvtl f i r 1 rrprat of Rrta~c~~~xcms' dvl'ral ; i t tn makc ,a dvcisivt* r l ~ a r g cinto t11r )?c*rsi;tncetllse
Cutlaxa which tay a little rrorth or H;lhylori. Thr whc-rr Dsrius Itimscl I' w;w positionccl. i\s t h r two
astlltr Mact.rloninn Ir-itdekr was not, l~owtlvrr.I r k I,r ;irmius apprnachrrl rach athvr, r\lrxanrl~t~'srrlrn
rlrawt~intr) t h i ~trap. ;rnrl having <T~IWCCI t l l r * Ri\.r.r drilicrl n\-c-l-tr~w;trdslIlr mngh q r n ~ l n dou Daritts'
F,uphratr.s struck o r t t nordl tnr\rards Czarrhac. Ivft and this manocuvrr Forr-t.d rhc Pcrsians t u take
narius was fi)rccd to rllangr his plan< and ht- look rhr inilia~ive.UI'SSI~S,J ~ a c l i 1l 1~1~Pc.rsinn ~ Irrt-wins
his hrctrs to h r l ~ r l a hollinfi
, to met-[ illcxander at c a i ~ i l l rcnyagrcl ~, 111t. h1l;tc-cdonians. 1 3 ~ fin~nrl
1~ that
tI1r Tigris. Hy Srpt cmhc-r hc for~nd[ h i l t Alcsandr.1- h r nrlcdrcl con~inualrrinforcc~~icnns lo ct~trnlcrtlc t
was heading still i'urihcr 11ortIi arlcl rlrcitlt-d no rhc. l a r ~ enum1)rrs oI'rnr11 :21chxantlc.r was pushing
rngage him ar Gua,q;imel;t, wllc.rt* thcrr w:u a plaitt (utt 10 re-sist him. O n rhr Maucdonian Lrli fl;ink

q.G m k m r r t o r dm- from a k r e in m
Florentine @my.
Parmenis was just rnanaginq to hold o l f Mazcus
and the Persian right wing cavalry. As sonn as thc
Persians were fullv occupicd on both his Ranks
Alcxandcr led a rurious charge, in thr prnvecl
weclgc formation, riir~ctlyinto the Persian ccntre,
and succeeded in putting Ifilrim to nigh[. Bcssus,
now cut off from Darius and I'earing that
Alexander's wedge might turn upon his cavalry,
began to rctreat. Once i i lwcarne cleat that narius
had fled, Mazeus iao withdrew from thc stru~gle
and the Persian front line rapidlv disintega~rd.
Reports of the losses at Guag-arncla wcrr incnn-
s which to
sistent, and t herc are no reliablc f i g ~ s e on
base an estimate. Alcxandcr imrnedia~clysct off
after Darius, only to find that he had onrc more
disappearecl. However, Alexander hacl 1-s cause t o
worry now that the defeat at GuagameIa had
desrroyed thc Great King's crcdihility.
Alexander marched on to Babylon, and looh i t
easily hccause the walls had been allowcd to
crumble awav; from thcre hr moved eascwarcls
through Susa, Yrncpolis and Pasgarda, thcn north -
west to Ecbatana. Darius still eluclrd him, and
whcn, a Tew clays latcr, Alexander finally caught up
with him, he hacl twcn rnnrdered by UPSFUR, who no
doubt felt that Darius'failure at Guagamcla was
too murh to hear.
h~surnincthe titlc of King aF kin,^, Alexander
marched to thv <:asternsatrapirs trt cnnsolidatr his
npw empire, csrablishing !I'orts for thc dcfcnce of his
north-eastern firmtier be tbre turning south inlo
India, Hc cmswd the Indus and arrivcd in 326 B.C.
at H ydaspes (Jhclum). Alexandrr had hoped to
ford the rivcr,Jhclum at Haranplir but arriving. at
the crossing Sound Porus, an lndian king, waiting
on the apposite bank with a ~n'orrnidahlerorce
including archrm, c hariats and, mtlst t crri fyinp: of
all, elephants. Crossing the rain-swtdlrn river at
this point was, ofcourse, out ol'thc question, and so
Alexander plannccl to deceive Porus in to holding
his position whilst the main Macrdonian farce was
transported upstrram to cross the river further east
atJalapur. Leaving a forcc under thc command of
Cratenis at Haranpur to trick Pcwua into hlicving
that the army was dctaying there, Alcxandcr
moved a rorce o f 5,000 horse and 10,000 foot
upstream ancl hrgan to transporl i t across to the
south bank. Nrws of this manoeuvre rrachd Porus
whilc there was still time for him to counter it, and
he r r a l i x d that his wisest move was to cngaye
Alcxander as soon as pmible, preferahIy before the
Maccdanians re-formed on thc southcrn hank.
Leaving a small force to hold Crarsn~soff, he went
upstream to mcet Alexander with an a r m v esti-
rnatcd at about 22,000, including ~,ooocavalry and
I 30 elephants.
Porus drew u p his hattlc Line, ahout six kilo-
mrtresIong,on ii flat sandy plain.castofthccros~;in~
at Haranpur. T h e hulk ol'his m o p wcre infantry
bur on each wing hc postcd his cavalry, scrrcncd by
war chariots. Whcn thc two armies met, Alrxandm
sent two divisions of cavalry, o u t OF sight, around
thc Indian right wing. His hope was that upon
srring the depfetcd main Macrdnnian cavalryl
Porus would launch against i t both win,gsofhisown
cavalrv, in an attempt to wipe it our and gain a
swirt victory. Alexandef s assumption was correct;
as the right wing of the Indian carralrv charqed,
Alexander's rrsrwr force took them Tmrn the mar.
N'i th t h c Indian horsr trapprcl, Alexandrs odered
the phalanx and Guards Brigadr to advancc, and
the battle was soon won.
The march into lndia continued, Alexandrr
planning tn rrach the Ganges and then thc coast.
However, his men, veterans of an arrluons and
lcn~thycampaign, found thcir morale hmkcn hy
the unkaral>lc monsoon climate and they rcfuscd
to 30 flurt her. Alcxancl~rhad no option l ~ tut o make
the journcy homeward. He consrruc~~d a f l c r t on
thc Jhrlum and fbllowcd thc river to rhe mouth of
the Indus, where, having established a naval
station a t Pattala (Hydc.rahad), hr dividcrl his
army intcr two sections and made his way hack to
Susa, which h c rcached in thc sprinp, of 324 B.C. A
yrar later hc moved to Babylon, his chosen capital,
and began tn plan various explorations or his
empire. Alexander himself ncvcr implemen tcd
thrsr projects, Sir be fell ill with malaria, and on lo
Junc 323 B-c., he died leaving his empire to bc
fought ovcr by the strongest of his gcnrrals.
In the years after his death rhe memory or
Alexander merger! with romantic talcs of
sup~rhumanvalorir giving rise to the myth which
represents him as a demi-gd, parsuing a vision of
world unity. A closer look at Alcxandet's hiatoty
may suggc-qt a rather d i K ~ r t~story,
n blr t even today e8, G d w a d q drawn f
- t Sicilkan v a ~ .
his military prowess and indirrputablv brilliant - - - -

generalship rcmain his most endllring rnonumrnt.

was a bow and quiver darrows. Traditionally the

Persians and the Meclrs scrved mainly as archers.

A 2 Pmsinn Imrnortol s p ~ n m a n
12rotn information shown in colourrtil glazed -hick
rrliers in the ruins or PcncpoIis the Immortal
A I Pminn stundard-h ~ m ~ r spearman is depicted hcrr in the dress ol*thr kinx's
This s(anda1-d-hearer, taken rrom a paintitl~:or] a bodycuard; thry wcrr thc clite corps of the kinq's
Grcck vase, wcars [he traditional woli'-skin tic-ad- bodyguard and army, and they wcrv callcd
d r m 0ovr.r thr head and shoulrlrrs as a clistinction or *TmmartaIs' hcc.a~isc thcir numhrrx were never
rank. Thc colnurfi~I, pat t~rncd,tir nic and trousers allowed to fall helow ro,ono, with the possjhlc
madr thc standarcl-bearcr easy to recognize in addition of somc infantry and cavalry. 'l'hey ware
battle. The 'uniTom* followed thc Mrdian style the Pessian style 0~1ong-skirtcd,loose-fitting tunic
with close-fitting tunic and narrow slcrvcs, tight at with thc wide flowing slccvcs. The skirt was hitchcd
thc wrist; under the plain short skirt, thc close- up in front with a f r i n g ~ waist l sash. I t is possihlc
fitting truscm also fitt~l-tightly at the ankk. No that a claw-fit tin^ under-tunic was worn with
shield was carried as both hands were required to narrow slrcves fitting rightly at the wrist (these can
raise the standard, hut slung from the leu shoulder be seen crmcr~ngfrom the wide slcrve). The tunic,
 lg. G m k a
-r, showing pn early shield from *be
inside, helm&, g m v c q swoxd, bow, quiver m d
herald stpffs.

was colourrt~llyd r c o r a ~ dwith floral or grornet ric B Arnh cnmd cfit~nlry

drsigns. '111~hair and hvard were plaited in thc 'I'hr has-relief work in thr ruins ol' thc Palacr or
Persian fashion, and rncircling thc head was a Assl~rbanipalat Ninrveh shows details t~ftht.ratncl-
broad twisted cord lillrt. He carried the main riding Arabs. The Assyrians had almost des~rnyed
Persian weapons, a spear and how with quivcr. thc clesert nomads to which thest. camel riders
h r h the bowand thcvrnatcquivrrwere hung !+om belonged and had thrrehy oprned thc way Lbr rhc
r shoulrlrr and the long, 24-mrtrc spear wizh
~ h Irfi Persian attack and invasion r)T thcir countrv.
thr pomegranate hrrt t spike was carrird in thc right 'The Prrsians further clrvrlopcd thc camel
hand. Far rhc officers, the hurt spikr was gil E and for cavalry corps far lhoir own r~scand thc firsk-known
the m m i t was in silver. On active svrvfce rhr successful operation was ;t~ainst thc RalrvIonian,
Median stytc clrms wolild probably havc been C:tocs~;us,in 547 K C . anrl Iatrr sqainst khc clrsert
worn. nomads or Syria and Arabia. The carncI carps was
oftcn a two-man unit ol' cavalry, kuing us(:<! as
Ag Per~innarc/rrr lightly-armed mounted b w m e n . Mobility and
The Median-styk dress Tor an archer was a Iring manoeuvrability srcrn to have bccn the stronE
tunic coming ta rhc knct.. with the tight-fitting points of this arm of thc Persian cavalry and ~ h c y
sleevrs to thr wrist. Under the tunic trousrm were wrrc probably used for skirmishing and for
worn. A coloured sash was wound round tht. waist, pursuing thr retreating enemy.
knotted in thp centre and thc ends allowed to hang
clown in front; the rcct wvre ccovrred with Iighr CI G r ~ klifltt infnnlv {gymn~!)
slipprrs. TIlc hair and beard werc: dccoratrd with TIlcsc soldiers were uacd as p.ciloi, which was a ti tte
plai IS and rlr~ssrditr I Ilr Pcssian style, ancl a hrim l e s ~ given to the light iniantrv skirmishers. Thcir main
high 'howlrrr tvpc' hat was worn. A shaped quiver, taqk wnq to oprn the ronnict hy harassing the
which also carritul t hc how, was carried over the left rnrrny in short swiii attacks with ~ h cavalry r on
shouldrr, and in thr riqh~hand was a typical spear. their flanks. The hoplite phalanxes, holding the
central position, wou Id chargc the cnrmy after
several attacks by thr fisiloi.
This p n ~ soldier
f (~ht. name means nakrcl) was
armed with thr simplest wcapons, a sword (ntfirll-
nira) and a,javrlin or club. Thc hrielks! ofclothing,
usually a chiton turned clown and Ihstcnrcl at the-
waist, wllich lcft his arms cornplctclv f r ~ e ,and
movernerlt unimpairt*d. W e made iin excellent
skirmisher Tor the typc ofwarrare which was carried
out in this prriod.

Cz Creek henry infonlrv (Irofilite)

The massed formation of hoplites was a most
formidable tactic, thcir harsh clisciplinr: and
fanatical llcrusal to yield gmund making them idcal
soldiets, ' 1 % ~heavy brll-shapcrl cuirass so pnpular
in the clm~icalpcriocl was now giving way to a
composite flc*xihlr leather-I~ackcclcorselet which
was covered with small over-lappirt~metal ptatcs.
Over this t~ody-piecewere two s houldrr-picrrs,
which were sccuscd at the back, and then pulIr.cE 9 G m k trumpeter with shir1d (aspis), from which
over the shoulders and lacccl at the ii-ant. This hlmg n paiattd t r protector,
~ f- a vase p h t i n p .
corselet was worn over the simple chiton which camc
down to the miridlc o r thr thigh. Thc hody, kom
the waist down, was prfitrctcd, as wrre sornrtimr's
the shoulclers, by strips of lrathcr known as ~ / P ~ I I , ~ P . Twhich roll Id Be a rlisadvantaqe in closc-rluarte~.
(feathers) usttally weighted with a small mcl;a! fightinq.
plate.
Thr large round shiclcl, which was called arr Cj: C h p k s l i n ~ ~ r
aspis, was peculiar ro the hoplitrs ;it was designed so Similar to t Ile , g m n ~ t \ . ,thc slingcrs were also light
that the support arm lsat~cl and the hand grip infanir!. skirmishers (f2~ilni).They worr a simple
positioned thr shicld to prott:ct half of the holdrr chiinn with na arrnnur other than the small: round
and half oi' the hoplite on his lcft. This rnacle thv shield (pelfe). Apart from the sling thcir only
solid Formation firwhich they werc rcnowned. Thr weapons wou1d l)r pcrhaps a small knifc or dagger
shield-boss was d t c n shapecl likc thc hcad of'an carricd from a shouldcr sling on rhr Irft sirlc. '['he
animal and paintrd. The shins and lower Ergs wt.w sling made tiom lrather could he a most cfTectivr
protccred by hronm greaves, with the reel oftm and dangvr<suswcapan in t hc right I~anrls;rnissilcs
hare. As all hoplires had tn find thcir own werr tit her sloncs or small [earl pircrs, sornctimes
equipment there wrre various stylcs, and thr rnrssagrs were carvtd on rhr rnissilrs, f i r ltse in
hclmct was no cxccption. The hopli tc illust r a t d siege warfare. It was said that thc finest sling~rsin
wean a Doric-slylc hclmet, which was compIeteIy thr Grcrk army came h~rn thc island ol' Khorlcs.
dosed except for two smalI openings for thr eyrs,
and ornamented with a large horsehair crest fixed D P~rsjuncnrlnlrymnn
to the top of the l~elrnct,with a Leatl~rron each siclr. \Vhm drscribing rhr: Pcmian army of this prriod
The sho1.1, thrust in^, straight sworcl was Lor with i t s hrtc.rr>,qrneousapprarance it must he bornc
fighting at close quartcrs ; for the fbrmation chargr in mind that, despi re arehacolo~icaldiscovesics
~thclong-shafted spcar was usccl. Until the timc o f and Grvrk writcls such as Mrrtnlotus and Xen-
Alcxandrr, the hoplitcs often wore their hair I r m ~ , ophon, thr dress is rnostly rrr.onstruction ant1 oprn
to dispute, especially as the Persians went un-
chronicled by thcir own pccrplc. This cavalryman is
rirrpinq a shielcl; opinion is ciividr~lallout whrther
or not shirldrr were carried. 'l'ht- 1lorse is withrlut
armour Tor, although thcrr wrrc cavalry units
which were partially armourucl, this was not a
widespread practice.
Durinc mrnhat the Prssian arm); worc Mcdian
drcss, which was mnrr practical f i r horse-hack
rid in^ and campaigninq, ancl which was usually
brightly rolourtgcl. A vcsy ornate and elahorate
bronze helrnrt was worn which had a home-hair
crest an [he lop and a trailing tail at the basr of thc
helmet. His quil tcd lincn cuirasl;, po~qihly with
metal shoulder pit-ccs, had thc advantage of bring
3'. F-ian smIdicre m a v - m i q dm- from ruins st
Pc~snpolis.
liqht in weight and very functional. The weapons
were javelins or spears or bows ancl arrows. The
mounts used I>y both Grceks and Pcrsisns wrrt:
wrll-brcd horses of about fiurtccn to fiftccn hands
and were typical o f the countries surrounding the
Mediterranean at this period. The Persian cavalry
used bridles that were very much the same as
m d e r n onm. 'Sherc was no saddle and no stirrups;
the cavalryman's only cumfbrt was a s a d d l ~dorh
which was secured l,y a girth to the horse.
E r G r d ho/dir~
Thc appearanrr of' thesr hcavil y-armourcd hop-
lites varied from city state to city statc only by the
various emblems and blazons painted on thc shicld
racesand armour. Althou~hconstantly at war with
each other, theyjoined forc.esto combat thc Pcmian
invasions in qge and 480 E.C. 'I'hc basic dress was
the corsclet with the two shoulder piecm. the lower
part ofthc body bring covcrcrl by I he Irathcr strips
$ t ~ m x ~ ~Thr r ) . shield was rotind and measurtd
a hour one mctre or rnclre in diametcr ; rrlirkn this had
largc I ~ ~ S S P Son t l ~ vlitl)n~
in the ti~rmrjrnnirnal hrads
ancl werc usvcl i11 close-quarter fiqhting 10 push
against the cncrmy and crush him. Thc Clorinthian-
typc helmet was made in onc picrr with ;t larae
colourcd horsehair crest. Painted hron7x grcavcs
wen= warn as Icx protcrctors. Thc short thrusting:
sword was carried hanj$nq from a leather strap
over the right shoulder. A long spear was often used
which had a hcad at ei thcr cnrl ; whrn thc shaft w a s
't>rokenthc w c a p n could br rr.vcrscd and the fight
continued.

E2 Gr~tkard~rn
Thc Greeks werr: not renowned Tot thrir prowcss as
archers, compared with thr Persians, although
same sourccs stair that thr Athenians did maintain
a rqirncnt ofarchers during thc Pcmian wars. This
rcconstruction is from a statue datcd r . 480 R.C. and
shows an archcr in action. Hc wosc a Iion-skin
head-covering-. anrl a lrathcr c o m ~ l c twith shnuldrr
picc~sovcr the t radi t ianal chilnn tunic. From I hc
waist hung the leather p t e r t ~ t e , ~Over
. his shoulder
hung the quiver which was usually very ornarcly
decorated. He squatted so as to be in the best firing
position. They were used in the phalanx among the
hoplites and, in the p ~ i i o i ,as tight infantry.

These archen were mercenaries and, apart from
rhc Scythian archers, were the only troops to be
hired by the Athenians as regular light infantry.
They were employed in the same capacity as
slinqers and othrr l i ~ h ttmclps, c-ithcr a%p.G/ni or
positioned among the hoplite heavy infantry. Their
di~ltinctivc:characteristic was thc rcd chiton tunic.
They worc no body arrnour and rhcir only
protection was the small round bronze shicld
(Jeltn), As wrll as IHIW i ~ n dquivrr of arrows i t i~
possihlc that r hey i ~ carried
l ~ javelins.
F I PJ~?yginnh~ary-in
fnn@ mPrcPnary
Thew tough mercenaries came from the north of
Asia Minnr and scrvrd h t h Grcrk and Persian FP I'ursintr s / ~ c ~ r n n n
maskrs. Their tunics wcrc colourful and thcir body This i s in a11 probability a Pcrsian spearman, hut as
m.Greek noldiet.9 returnlnp; from battle. cmfY;n~:
from the
mmrnrmnratiun mnrl~lrof Salnmim. (Pirnww M u s e u m )
atrnour was made from leather with metal rein-
rorcemenw. Under the leather arrnour the arms
and lrp wrrt: cnvcrcd with a highly-coloured thick,
woven material. which was close-fitting and wa%
tight at thr wrisrs and ankles. 'I'he: head wascovrrrd
hv a metal helmet which came in various forms; thc
one hcrr has movable chrrk-pircrs, which arc
shown turned up. Weapns consisted or spear,
sword or axe (bipennes). A specia! feature was the
crescent-sl~apedshirld which cna bled thc soldirt t o
g c t v r r y rlosc to thr cavalryman.
53. Crown Prince Xcnes, detail From the Treasury Frieze at 34. A Creek hoplite without 8 #Meld, dttpfl from a *lief.
Pcrsepolis. ( N a d m l M u ~ r u r n Achcns)
, ( N a t i o p a l Muacum, Athens)

all troop or the Persian army wore the Median- aficn concealing thr lowcr jaw. The, high crown
style dathes on campaign it may be a littlr di ficuit was usuaIly a sign of'rank. Equipment was the
to distinguish thc regular troops from the d i t c standard shicld, quiver and h w and thc long spcar.
'Immorralq'. T h e ca1ourfi1l tunic came to mid-
thiqh or slightly lower; trousers were worn unclcr F3 PPI.rinn oJictr
the tunic and fitted very closely to thc leg and Persian officers ware a quilted type amormr over (he
ankle. Various snurms stale that armour was worn rlathing, as the Persians and ,Metlrs wcre used as
Irut, as thcre is no evidence of this, i t must IH: lightly-armed mounted archers. OfTicerx wore the
assumed rhar it was worn tlndct the runic, a Mcdian-type campaign dress with the knee-length
common p r a c t i c ~in warmer climates. Thr head tunic, and trousers. 'l'hr quiltcd armnur camc to
was covcrrd by a lnosc cloth which framed the face, waist and a sash encircled the waist. A short broad-

38
sword, similar to the Creek one w m used, mainly
lror thrusting, this was supported in a scallbard
which hung froni a leathcr sling from ttlc left
shoulcler. A turban covered the head and a cloak,
which was v c y usrful an c a m p a i p , was olien
worn.
G I Gwrk cnvalrynim
With all the trappings or thc hoplite, the heavy
cavalryman was ablr to fulfil the roles of in-
fan tryman and horseman. Often these elite caval-
rymcn cum hoplitcs woulrl ride to the site of thc
battic then dismount and fight on Smt. The
rtluipmrnt and arms wrrr thr samc as those oi"a
11oplitc with the exception of thc shicld; a caval-
ryman never carried onc. Thc typc of ht=[m~t worn
IJV this cavalryman was known as 'Attic', alier the
Coddcss Athene. As a11 thc q u i p m m r was pur-
chased hy thc solcli~rs~hernsrlvcs,therc was very
little uniformity.
C2 ir-/t~s.~a/innra7vlyntan
Onc of the most p o p l a r fi~urpsznkrn from Grerk
vast: painting is the unualal figure o1'1hi.ThessaIiatl
horseman. Thme cavalrymen carnr from thc plains
of Thmsaly in the north o f Greecr, and wcre
rnercenarics. This tyllical Thesalian wrars the
chiton tumcd dawn to he waisl and, over his
shouldrrs, a s t i f f brightly-coloured cloak. His
clistincrivr Thcssalian hat was aften called a sun-
hat Sccause of its w r y wide brim and small crown.
As all h o w m c n of that period did, h e rndc without
saddle or stirrups, only a small rphippion or
saddlecloth was sometimes placed on thr home's
hack. 'l'he h o w was tbr usual small Mditrrranran
type, extensively lrsed by thc cavalry at this time.
Spears nr javelins were carricd.
Rofilif~
G3 Amnured i v f i n ! ~
TIIOU~IF
the appearance of the hoplites varied with
the pcrsonal taste or the individual the basic
equipmmt prevailed, the metal or lrathrr Irasrrl
torselel over the clrr'ton, shown here, with thr
addition o f a cloak. T h c large round shicld jaspir)
had a blazon painted on, with a small canopy
attached to guard thc Icgs from sword or spear
thrusts. Bronze grcavcs werc worn. On the h a d
was the Ionic helrnrt which had a fixed nose-piece
and two hinged check-picces: the fixed crest was a
tnlourcrl horsvtail.
H I . Hz, H-7 Cret-k I I Y ~ O U T Pinfi~n!~_l
~
'I'hese qoldiers camr rrom t h e Grcek city states 01'
Athens, Sparta, Tl~ehcsor Corinr h. A1though 111err
was deep enmity between them they sallied
to2e:erhprwhrn th(-Prrsians invadrd. At t h e battle ol'
Marathon in 490 B.c.,with thc phalanx ol' thr
A1lleniar1 l~c~pliws, they dcfcawd thc. Prrsian
arc11rr-s who w t w ac-claimed as the Iwst in tIlr.
world. At thr l~attlrof Thcrnmopylar 300 Spartan
(HP)hoplites hrlcl nul for thrrr days against a fierce
t ou times greatpr in numhcr, until all werc k i 3 l d .
T h e hoplitr's main squipmcnt rrrnained the cuirass
or corseler which covcrrd thr rrppr pa~tof thc
M y , made of metal or some flrxi1,lc maai.rial onftr
which metal strips werr altachrd. The shield had a
rnctal arm-loop inside, at thr ucntrc, thmuqh
which the left arm was pushcd up to thc rlhow, ancl
a m r h l handle near the rim. Hrlrnrts wcrc ust~alty
onc of three types : Doric, cornplctrly closecl with
slats For thc ryes, Corinthian, madr in cjnc pirce
with Iixccl nose alicl cherk-pirctms, r,r lonir, witl-t
movahlc cheek pieces. These helrncts nearly always
had crmts, though later ones were worn without
crcxts. Metal greaves, sandals and hoots were worn.
Thc lung spcars wrrc not thrown, hut were uscd as
thrusting weapons, either from almve to the neck,
or from 1x10~ to the point under the cuira~q.'I'hc
short .word or dagger was used as a ttlsus~ingrat h ~ r
than a cutting wcapon.
:I Iln arthrr.cni~rhanruln xrc. rl'llr~ v:ur Crrrqur. .?yr I1.r:. *-a blilriarlrr. lc
cornrnnndani Grrcquc r m p n n u h l c dc la vicroirc tlt Muwll~on.c3 'Ti.tr d'un
wcrrirr C r m q u c pnrraeil un caquc l h t r . 14 RrlirTrl';'ll~x;lnrl45 ~ r r p h a r m
d l . l w ~ r > ~ nla a ~h~r t r c n r r r Ira p r r r i r n M a r h l a u ~ i c ~c~i t I ' m r s . 15 Bar-rrlirf r l u
yrntr qiirlr. nio#ilran\ I- : b ~ ~ r m q t*~all;iquenq
i I- Arahr%~ I ~ I I T +-3 <c l ~ ~ ~ i t i c ; i u .
r 6 l&i.r:til t l ' u ~ l rIriu-dr 'Gi~.tnt~,m;trhi~', lllrmtnrbl u l l r It~rrn;mltr~rb r l r Irt>uj-lirr
l ~ i v 17<;lherric*~I ;1rt,i#11r
t ~ ~ ~ pt.rrr1111r. ; ~ wit- ; ~ q u[Iur1<111r
r rt l n h ~ ~ r l iri~nr!.
rr ~8
n;\ I (~;tsrli~i*
In*-m. + ~ I III.<:., ll; C :AUIIIY 'l'tlr~i.ir11a i r 1 ~ E > I I I ~ > ?~n-rlt*
rt.~:. C :.nsqk~~
lL,,.l,. dl, .3+,,>? <i~Il.. n.c, (1) 8 C::L<~I,P 1 ;,,vr ,,v *,,Kh ,$t"> n.<: tg ll"iil,l t l ' l , , , ,-.nr
<l;tt;~rrtrl~t~i.r~~rr,r-rl~.montr;h~~t III~I'\ ;lril.~l,il!.ll~;rlr.*CI ~ l ' l 1 ~ 1 6 Ih: .I 1~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ Y U ~ Y ~ I
14ri+nlrrib( Ir IIWIII~I ,lrll 11111. ~ > t ~ i ~ l ihl.tc~111~1i111~n
i~txr r r p ~IYlrtr i 111. FI>IKIPT I,~III
c%
'S.kriw',
nt Uravurr N u n phalanx datant d u tfinr Jklr. p.A r r h r r p n a n t u n b n CI rn F i n Ikrqrnwhulzc spam! r i n r Wnffr; n a r h dnrr firiwhihrn V m , 4yi
l'hrv.~lr.n, u;uc r,~y, n.r:.T*a x r t h r n i t ~ i r n uuliria
t par Alcxx~lrlrrrn q : ~R.<:.
, sg v.Chr r%M ~ l ~ i a t ! r rq,r i w l l i r h r lhfrhlrllalwr w.ihrrnd (lr111 'ivg 'K h l a r ~ h o n .
FCmclirm I'lrrv~irm.ranlutllr r r hipnlrra. y <:.L~II<Y P h v p ~ ~arc. ~ r Irtpnnv.
. l ~ i v ~ l ~Krin,gvrh~l>I
vr I~III -FZew~$;m'1 lrml,n..14 U v h r l \,~btb.\tcx:\rulvm
1.3 t
t i , t t i t j : i v l i r ~ r ti^ L r n r v ~ i i r ~I . I biirkoph.1~ rilit,nl Kimirlld ~ w i w h r nn ~ i ~ ~ w l o r ~ lint1 i w h p-miu-l\rr~
~n Kriqrm
t t o l ~ l mP r r r . *5 C;uvrricr (:n.r-rlur pnt:u11 un r;tulur l)r,~iqui., ,kcrt UII dsm!rlla-ntl. t 5 lb.m-~u-!ir~ di*t~r7. Jiif>rb~u~icie.rt, Aswrirr ~ r r i l r:1mIx1 t~ ;ill(
tn~uc,t~rr r t IIIW vp+r rorlrrr. & 1L~acItr.t 'l'l~cb~rts iat-et- arr et rarq!ium. q vi11v11 K.*tnrl II~~II~PI?: arb. r 6 D ~ I . ~ I dI r r 'C:~~.~t~roin.wcl~i.a'-Frirqe%' rut
i r ur I I u a I u I r r i i ~ id i jirqrl~llial~l~vr It ~ q ~ I ~ t ~ * - S u ~ t ~ i l r i - F n ti tf ~tr;ar t~i r~cmt i i ~ - h Krlrqc1
rr nlrl ~II~M
C h r r r i r r (;rrcq~trdrsini,d'tln v;lrc Sicilirll. n g A r m ~ r r r h 4 . r ~ q upc L:t\Pr4,rnn14. I1dn1 ti11d r u ~ r t a l ~ , r 5r ~~ I i i t l i .m8 ,,.I! l'rwwrhrr t l?ltu. i!w%*,(,:l~r. I s 1 '~III
I;m-rlur rlui JOLJP (It. 1.1 tumprtlr. 31 klrEatn I'cru., rit..mir~h clur n ~ ~ r i r , % alc ;,.
Hrtn~. i z t ~ r t i ~ ~ ~ u r'.(:hr.
b r r i ~,rrICmliiwhcr 1Irlm; .(, jahrl~utmla+rbv.I Ilr. .rl;
I'cra11r~lk.31 Slldiuts I;CCC(]LIPI rrvrt~.unl rlr lr birrilillr. cI.tworr d r SilJdmuir r n . l ~ r ~ IN^ jrn r.t:hr. sg 1k-tail r-irwr V i ~ wi l l 1 5 rlrm 5. j.r ttrlr~~trrlr
I . r ~ , ~ - l r i ~ l1rl111.
r I t t ~ ~ t ~ r ~ n t rS i i i . i fI I I I dc I e r r :r..( :hr.I tnil v r t v l l i ~ . t l r n r nIV;~lla-rr1111rl. I l l ~ k l l . i r l a l m i + < ~ t ~ ( ~1:inSlir.h
k ~ * . ~ ;trlrtlrrri
q l r I'r~wplis, 1 {cq~litrGrct.rlr~r. ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ , t i ~: v111rtr l r ~I~> ~I ~ :r <I r r~
~~ ~ ! ~nmt
I'LI.II,WIIX >dIr In ~ ~ ~\~C n~I rn I '~S :*t t~
i ~I~ t - l

or Stirh rinrr Phalmx rros d r m t7. j r h r h u d ~ r t .pn F.in hynuhuzre mil

r i n r r Vnwrr, 535 \,.Chr. Alrxandrr srlerr dim- Krirqrr
p h v y i r h r r Mu47.r: r l a c l ~
Notes sur Ies pfpnch- en c e d e a t qr+ut - ( :hr. cir~.Q Phrirvgiwlw ?ic.hilrlrr, Ktlrhrr unfl R ~ ~ n r liq r .l'l~~~bu-
IIrlnrv. &rqm, I l i l r n n r . K ( r h r r , t Irnlrl, .k~tunrl WnrRpr.rr. I ' m i w h r rrispprn
I~rnlbtztrnviek a L 1 a - w ~ < ~ ~ ~ c ~ ~ ~ a5 t d rl l~t lr ri . ~ l ~ i Ku,1cgthr
w ~ ~ ~1 ~r ~i 1~iort*c-l~r
1
ha IRPclrtcut r l r rlra-11 hrac p a r c lrnr roifftbrc cn p u dr lotly,rlr .1 l h c H r l ~ n ,Srhillt rrrltl kurza.rlr 3%-hwrr~. 16 l'hrl~:in~-a-ht+r4e,llilrl mlr I h q r l ~t l u l l l
l l l q u ' > ~ I xrll,ullr- Iwwr ~lr*lirlgurlrrn n n c ; il rrl. tmrlr IKIX (14' ~YJII{ LIT ~.mr11 li~rhrr7 . I;ril.chiwk,~r F;rirprr: n ~ r eillrlll ! ~ ]'lartik rn clnrr Kunrtllsllr ln
h w i n dc w?i 11rux nlirinr prr E1iv1.r tr rIr.lprau. k z tan4 irr rrrr ' I m n l r w \ ~ t ' Flqnrrn~.-zR ;"~LII~\L bwr L r ~ r ~ vnitt-11r : riwr Vxw . t r ~Si>.ilirtb. q (;riecl~~whrr
11:llbili r n m ~ ; ~ * du d c n g r p r i l l nli: ilr 6hictu :qllrli.u ximi car ilr ~~'avuifritIM Ic Ilarrrrsrtt. 30 I:rzccl~iuchrr ~I'n,mprrrr. ,nit r i r r r r n Srlvilrl alavem hinE rillt
rlrrrlr rldhr l ~ t i ~ i r r t ~ r r r n ~ i r 1rr<lillr11r
~ ~ r ~ h r rIU~.IM)II.
, A3 ArrIlrr l3rw~O~.III! IIII\IR[II~ R 1 ~ ~ Thj m
l r 15~411% llutr I~rrrlh.
5I11li~tl.
3F Prniu-hr Solalatrn mrh r i n r r r>n~*lrllum~r: in den Ruincn zu Pcrsrlk ~s
B (:i~wEmi.~ifd':\riih C I Udm~ rhameattx,, prir tl'un bar-rrlirr dxns Ir I':~laia li;rirrhivE~r % ~ l ( l . t t rit11f ~ ~ ctrtn Kiirkkctn n:trl~rrincr % hlarht. Nar I clnmm
I - h ~i ln .1 1 n 1I I r iI m i l r l m i n . 33 Krr,llljrlnr Yrrxcx; n a r l ~
h l a r m ~ a r - I k n l ~ ~i rni S rlrlir Scllstzkanlmr-
rlmrrr d qtu .kppur la-nuirr~tInrnrtntrl~rrdr~~,AIIK:IU, 41. avail Xlmw u ~ ~ v lri ti v<~!f
i I . r ~ r - r ; I'rrwtx~lis C;rlec:hi* tb.t I~O~LILIT.
y~uvq!rcIcs I'rmr p u i w n r rnvnlllr I r i ~ pays.
r
CI (;ymnrI, Ii~i-rrrtibnrvri<- I;rr.rulttr. elr,nl Ir hthl 1winr.i ~1 Ct,bil I ~ P
r.t,mn>mccr lr rrurvfli~rn h a r r r l m t I'mrmi. Cn Iloplilr, i n h b r r i r itrvm
u r ii n nI I i nac I I i I m ip ir n Farbtpfeln
ruurliir t r n i l ~
11111' I'kwnllnr (lr m n rhlr p r ~ r f l r I.r s Iloplitnr rl:linll rrntrnlrnk
p u r rmr sol~tlr l<~rnallnn.Q Asiioi. fn~rulwrr(irra-tlur; WI lbztdw +tall
t i l r I I I t in t i tI 5 I t m iI Am Di-rr ~ m i n r h rS l a n d a n m l r k c r lraw D t m t R r j r l s h x ~ i r h mrjnrn
II~IIII~II
rluc 1'011 1.1ilbr .wrwrnl aver- drs innut<m. $V<~!rtwIrb11~e.rK r ~ p i ~ S ~ rnhd~ ~ l ~ r 1,1
- n ha1
l . kv111rrr.?wl~ilrl4I.k r r tiir \ I . I I I C ~ A ~ ~ n1i1
b w i t l r ~1fi111(Irn
~ 4r.1grn n111w. kt I'~rww11cr' L ~ n % ~ r r l ~ I i c !-in7fn1r;t~rr
hcr' in dtr
Cn I'mr I r l r r m t tine cuira*rr (l(~~llll~ dc roilc- W'JrG1rr skyr drr a ~ r t ria s i r nn d r r %;thl
'1 r,rt,l~rulrr krmqliclren Iritbrr.lrrlr. DIP h i m n ' ~ ~ c ~llluu,llrn'
p i r m d r m r r : ~ Ip ~ u11-rp3ul~k
~r r t un r q u r r i l l r n ~ n z c a v rlrl n r ( r h r cfr t r i l s r l r nir tmrrr ~~,.,~,r, t~rr.ilrzusi.c~kr~~ rrl.lulJr wudm.As lFvrriwllrr l % ~ v ~~n
I-hrv.11 el u l l r qurur rrllinlnrc. II pnr un inrwr,tinhr,lrleliqur l'rm 1111 clllr #,a ric w mrrtlst-~lrr ~ I ~ ~ . ~ , ~ I ~ ~ ,
pnrlrait : ;
P i rf mnnlrnr 1.1 Qwlqll- T~ICI-.YUX p , r i ; ~ i r n t d- .~rnrurmli,~"-
,,, , ,Ir.lnol, , r l r l , , j l ; la , Fl A r ~ l > i w hKr a ~ l t e t r r i t t ~ rntlch
Ninrvrll. l h i i ~ l w r r i rhartrn
i;
r
rincnr Hw-wlici iln l?rl;cr~7-11 Aur~rbanipuP.
tlir Sl.tlnrrlr d i m r kzrnrtrr~rcndci~ \lrusrmkrlrgrr
t%t ~rmlslrih!ri crlui qu'on t ~ q i t i ~ 1i1:11111rn,ant.
t*
hrlnallr aurqrmtlrt brnrt so <I.-II~ V Wliar ~ I U -p m v h r n Einmarnch in ihn-rn
EICk1 H ~ l p l i tCr j r q u t ponc u n c . q l l r tlu l v Co ~ r i n l h ~ qili
, i.lnir h i t cn un l,+llli~r rn,~ll,ft,
nrimrrau atlw cnttllulr rlr c h ~ v zl la r ~ r?e rr,lr~rc. Llnr l n n ~ r lanrr ~ r avail rlrtrx
Ixrlnn rlc, . I r;~ llr rlr~ ~ ~rllli ~ s1 la~fl;ct,r t i r . rI r l.r r ;* t ~ ~ ;~ ltr Ct (:).rnnr~, ~ r i c c h i i h Lrirhlm-lnbnterjc-minklrr.
c Ihrr A u l m h r r n r n,dir
rmrrrrri.c Krvir .,t, 1h34trr ,-htt, FA ~ i ~ ,,u ,lr,
F(;mrlufl rr'i.,nir,,l pw %irhlar111 dun-h h . u l i n ~ h i g c n(14 I.'rilirlr?l r u rrrrfinm. Ca Ha~plllr:~ r c h i w h c
rrt~ullllll~ p,Ilr brlm m~hrrI, il I,ilntll l,l.~~~ il\YjCn~ milin~rllllr rrRlmrnt *t-!lw-rr1~1 Ilit:b~~'.rttr trill sririctir 51,h11<1, t l a s s r qn~alli-I war. ( I s rr urwt~lil~ l r n
. p , , ., (r.t 1 i n , , '1 rx@nrrrl)jq~ slr 311thr k t i l ~ r ~ k ~ u t r h ~hlan~l n d f n hnllidrrmkrn Lrmntr. So h~ldrrc
C3 Astllll:
,.i i.lalnL tn .I.tllr~tr nu~mq,li ~,brc.IIt 1<11+, ~ ~ ,,11 hI , . ~ F ~ ~~miirt d i r ,l r s l t F<~niri~ti<>n
~ t i~~ rwrlrhc~111r H ( ~ ~ p l i tu, ~ lt w ~ n l h t ~ i thnrrrl.
~
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~r Scitir Strinsrllrlrtlrr war atrq Intrr. rlit Sliuu~irm
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119 ; ; I ~ll~l,., 807 t:,t-~,.,. , I ,!.~lr>,f <,-II~.:>,I \
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91 .I~I..~I. '..l.ir$:yH r < rrr.rtr 157 t 1, 1 1 ~r.kcts
233 . r ~ r , . ? h r m v IP7371 1 1 . 123 A*.rrt*al:,.r Arm, 5"' l r 7 !
237 -rc.rcl: AI~IIV Ifii:) 'I : I ; 8 64 L,I+I~./* :lr, AI ,!:y , L - '~'41r
277 ~ ~ , ~ . ~ . I I ~ . . , ~ ~ lR7- T~I~-I~~IW~: I 6 l C..\.:.. .!, IO.-IP~. I PVIT
57 Th- ,'I.L War 197 PC,, I ' '. a r a l . M.~.::!rcl Pcl!r r
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 An unriv~lledwurcc o f informstion on the uniforms, insipria and nppmrancc orthe world's fighting
mcn of past and present. 'l'hc M~rt-nr-Amtstitles cover suhjccts as clivcrsc as the Impcrial Roman a m y ,
the Napn~cnnicwars and Ciermnn airhomc troops in n popularpR-page format including snrnc
40 phatagraphs and diagrams, and cipht frrll<nlnur plntcs.

COMPANION SERIES FROM OSPREY

EF,TTE
Detnilcd infomation on the uniforms and i n n f p i a o f thc world's most fi~rnnusmilitary forms.
Fach Wpngc hook contains same 50 photovaphs and diag-rarns,and 12 pages of full-cnlaur arwnrk.
W.rlRRIOR
Rcfinitirc analysis of the armour, weapons, tactics and motivation of thc fighting mcn ofhistory.
F ~ c M-page
h hmk contnins cutaway9 and cxpfnded artwork o f thc warrior's wcnpons and amour.
NEW VANGUARD
Cnmprchcnsivr: histories of the dcsip, develnprnent and opcration~Iusc of the world's armuurcd
vchiclcsnnd artillcry, I*:ach48-pa~eIumk ctlntains eight paEcs nof full-colnur artwork including s dctaiIed
cutaway orthe vchiulc's inrcriar.

C.4MP.IIIGN
C ~ n c i s c authoritative
, accounts of decisive encounters in military history. F ~ c h
9Gpagc hook contains
mare than 90 illustrations includingmaps, nrders o f battle and colour platen, plus a series o f
thrcdimcnsional hsttlc maps that mark the critical staws of thc campaign.

THE ANOENT WORLD 1 5 1 Fed eval C h ~ w w

Arnm 279 T-c Ro&r qc ven
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161 lPth * - r t ~ -l t , z?lard#-7
260 Pr:~r ,e+.i!'-, f v v v : I; !d3rtry
69 r,r#rL S, P,-.,.~I '&.n., X P . 3 7 3 Rf 2b4 F'r:~r-l..*G,r.b:'c ASP, : ; C..,u.bl?
148 A r w v n' P .-u.inerr : ~ ' : T . I : 1 18 J I S - C ~ IHrks:
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Ill L3+13v,r ir, War5 236 1 - - : f r ~ t-rd:,rrx: I )
46 F?on..q~.hrrrv
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271 A~~s.,r~an
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158 ( 1 I G;. 11:A Hr~rr*.t+C . r l r i 4 8 Wol!r'rA-rrv
175 i 3 I P,I~?I.!V. P. %~\%1l'cs 228 hr?c.n:ai WimxIlaid Indnns
$80 I-ISplrrr ,'IA.<t. I r 4 i t 3 1 : . 39 I'r t rh h r w y In h A r c r
243 !> t- -7r L2-rr-t 1 ron-l-r
16TH A N D 17TH ZENTURiES 244 1 rcnrb ~nA n c * W.\I hncl
THE MEDIEVAL WORLD 146 Thp lr 1 1 W3rr IaRY- IJ 1 37 3 C.rrcr?.!W;151..rror's A m y II I 1775.
147 110tr 1, ir,:3T? ? a r t s h 7 r A'.!--%hc I P I b c r 7 L Ill's Ar-nr
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154 A d h ~ . ,R ;~ryn-57.w.roiW,i-,
NAPOLEONIC PERIOD
3B Thc L a w i s k r t u ~ t s 257 I.J..l* r r~,r,',. .tnr>,u~~y 11~1:nly
252 Arm ct of :I.,. Y L I ~T Lcrlcvcn 101 Thclopq~~radorm 7 9 h . : l * > ~ , r ';*r y. p - al r , :..>mpa'Rn
125 A ~ Tr . n'~ I< ,ir->. 7 9 - 1 lh; 263 Muaht I r d a I :W- 761 87 h,,lu>rmur', :-!:-.? ;
150 T h r A?,Po!C tlarlrm.11:r~ 234 GLC:AVU~ A d d ~ I > u \ lr! I n f ~ n - ~ y 6 1 h J q > - c . :vlr,:\.,~r.rrA C a r a ~ i b r n
89 R y ~ a n . . r e A r n ~ eRRh
: 1 1 18 262 C~zauus/~drdd;ll'l~1i7~.CAVII~ 55 h.q'',,I?-.I~~I..; R larCtr<
84 Lwr. V k v ~ R Nur.nar I4 knp, shC~vrlW?. h r v ~ s 6B h,q,'$I.,?.- rl~arsmrs
331 f rrirl. Ycd~rvaArmrcr I W -1330 IIP kkw Modpl A. rr y 1645 6C
76 E*.~p'r H~.;=..trs
7s A , r c r a ' P + ~ C - L I ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ 2D3 Cosqs XIV ;Army
171 LiI,~llad~i R :b*5irrrnc, 267 'Itw Hr ( $hArrny 1660 17W 83 N . ~ l ~ ' c , Z ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r d I : a v a l r y
I 4 I N,lp-rL u r ,ilartr)r
152 K~lybtrolChr17 97 M.ir b w o ~ g b5 A m y
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