Lowell M.

Mower

POLT 560

November 28, 2009

U.S. and North Korea: Past Policy and Future Foundation

Acronym list:

 DPRK – Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea)

 NPT – Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
 ROK – Republic of Korea (South Korea)
 IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency
 WMDs – Weapons of Mass Destruction
 START-I – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
 UNSCR – United Nations Security Council Resolution
 DMZ – De-Militarized Zone
 LWRs – Light Water Reactors
 TWEA – Trading With the Enemy Act

U.S. and North Korea: Past Policy and Future Foundation

After the Second World War, the development of a Cold War between the United States

and the Soviet Union began to form. Cold War ideology quickly spread, fears of Soviet

communism began to transform into fears of all forms of communism. George F. Kennan’s

popular theory of containment over shadowed all other forms of foreign policy in regard to

dealing with communist nations. This containment theory sought to isolate and control the

boarders of communist regimes, allowing for the inner dissolution to be the overall demise of

the communist actor. The policy of containment was widely implemented toward the Soviet

occupied states, as well as, the states in which communism was “spreading”; the Middle East

(Afghanistan), South East Asia (Vietnam), and North East Asia (North Korea). As the Cold War

slowly crumbled with the demise of the Soviet Union in the latter half of the twentieth century,

the policy of containment became less and less applicable to the now “free” global actors.

As the late 80s and early 90s approached, the US policy of containment persisted

toward the communist, totalitarian regime of North Korea until President George H. W. Bush
began to warm relations in 1991 and ’92. However, it was not until President Bill Clinton and

the policies of his cabinet did significant reform in foreign policy take shape with regard to

North Korea. The Clinton administration’s near decade long approach toward multiparty

negotiations and normalization of bilateral relations seemed lost with the onslaught of the Bush

era. After two terms of George W. Bush in office, we the United States now face, under the

Obama administration, a difficult foreign policy issue; creating and establishing multiparty

negotiations with the totalitarian DPRK to procure the abandonment of their nuclear weapons

program, deter the economic motives for creating, selling, and testing WMDs, and normalize

bilateral relations between Pyongyang and Washington. To convey how our current foreign

policy has come to be, I will present a timeline beginning at the end of the Cold War, on

through the Clinton administration, and further on into the radical change felt during the Bush

era. I will then seek to theorize where and how we can improve our foreign policy with this

isolated, autocratic, totalitarian state that is the DPRK.

The United States foreign policy with regards to North Korea can be seen in three

distinct stages sense the end of World War Two. The first of these three foreign policy stages

can be seen in the years immediately following the Second World War. The theory of

containment was the prevailing policy towards communist regimes and the DPRK was no

exception. The second of the three stages came in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union;

while during the first Bush administration and on through the following Clinton years, the

United States saw a warming in relations with the DPRK and liberalism in foreign policy relating

with the totalitarian regime. The third stage of the U.S. foreign policy came as George W. Bush

took office in 2000. The warming of relations with North Korea was reverted to its infancy as
President Bush publicly labeled North Korea as part of the “axis of evil.” i during a six day trip to

China. The fluctuation in foreign policy displays that the United States has not had consistent,

productive, and cogent policy towards the DPRK, which I firmly believe is the largest

shortcoming in procuring a secure and profitable bilateral relationship. It is of the essence for

the United States to develop a lasting policy that transcends not only the current administration

but reaches further into the future and provides stability and longevity in negotiations, security,

non-proliferation, and political as well as economic relations.

As the Cold War drew to a close and communism began to lose the long standing stigma

that had been attached to it, President George H. W. Bush began to construct the first steps

towards creating a relationship with North Korea. It was the hope that a sound relationship

with the DPRK could develop foreign policy that would achieve U.S. goals in the region. The

United States publically supported the admission of both North Korea and South Korea as

members of the United Nations which benchmarked the first steps of the DPRK towards

becoming an interactive and cooperative global actor. Following this radical step toward

international communication, that seemed to contradict Cold War attitudes, President Bush

also called for the disarmament of strategic nuclear weapons throughout the world and signed

the START-I treaty with Russia that would significantly decrease both nuclear arsenals. ii This

trend in nuclear non-proliferation continued as North Korea signed the NPT and a safeguards

agreement with the IAEA that would subject itself to regular inspection of its nuclear facilities. iii

The Bush administration furthered the reward to North Korea by pulling its “tactical nuclear

arsenal” out of South Korea.iv Though the Bush administration helped to facilitate dialogue

between the DPRK and ROK, it maintained an avoidance of direct negotiations with Pyongyang.
 The IAEA began inspecting the declared nuclear sites of North Korea in 1992 and quickly

discovered that there was more nuclear production occurring in the DPRK then was being

declaredv. The contradiction in production, along with a DPRK spy ring being discovered in the

ROK, compounded peninsular tensions between the North and South vi. These tensions then

resonated throughout the foreign policy of the United States, whom of which the ROK looked

towards to enforce the NPT and the security of the South Korean boarders. The Bush

administration took an obtuse approach to the issue; no direct action toward the DPRK was

taken, nor was a strong support for the IAEA given to further interject on the matter. The

presidency was turned over to William Clinton in a time of awkwardness and tension with

North Korea. It is widely believed that the reinitiating of “Team Spirit” (a joint ROK\U.S. military

exercise) by the Clinton administration, after being canceled the year prior, was a move to

intimidate the DPRK into compliance with the IAEA guidelinesvii

The Clinton administration inherited a foreign policy that had, in its first years, gained

momentum towards resolving the key issues with North Korea. However, this foreign policy

was now being challenged by escalating tensions over the nuclear ambitions of the DPRK and

the IAEA-ROK responseviii. These tensions were furthered when North Korea announced it

would withdraw from the NPT, this in turn sparked the United States, through a UNSCR, to

conduct multiparty negotiations.ix Though the negotiations were successful in continuing the

participation of the DPRK in the NPT and seemed to open up new channels of dialogue; these

progressive steps were undermined by the unpredictable, seemingly unmediated, erratic

posture of North Korea. Once again, North Korea halted the U.S. policy objectives by not

allowing the IAEA access to its Yongbyon reactor which was in violation of the safeguards
agreement.x It is at this point, the previous administration differs so largely from the Clinton

administration; Clinton understood that foreign policy could not be shaped around the IAEA nor

the ROK and initiated a more direct dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. This

bilateral negotiating strategy was widely debated, many of whom wanted to see reform in

North Korea come about through strong sanctions while supporters of bilateral negotiating

rooted success though direct diplomatic engagement.xi

The Clinton administration did not completely rule out the use of sanctions, however,

sanctions did not offer much political influence over a country where the economy was already

in shambles. Due to the strict government control within the DPRK, North Korea’s failing,

industrial based, command economy would be little effected by economic sanctions as they

would also do little to sway political opinion and likely only hurt the citizens (who have little say

in political agenda).xii Two opposing avenues of thought developed during the Clinton

administration, hawks and doves. Doves favored soft power and diplomacy, the hawks wanted

to use military influence to topple the North Korean regime. It was thought that by destroying

key nuclear sites by means of preemptive engagement, that the DPRK would fall, this was a

notion rejected by the Chinese (who had no intentions of absorbing North Korean refugees) and

the ROK (with Soule located less than 50 miles South of the DMZ).xiii The administration could

not be constantly restrained at the negotiating table by Chinese and ROK interests and thus the

shift towards more direct, bilateral engagement between Washington and Pyongyang

developed.xiv
 This direct engagement on the part of the Clinton administration was producing positive

results. North Korea agreed to allow IAEA access to all of its declared nuclear sites as well as

resume talks with the ROK.xv These concessions on behalf of the North Koreans did not go

unrewarded by the United States, again, the Team Spirit military exercises were canceled for

that year and motions toward providing “less proliferation-prone” reactors were made. xvi As a

New York Times article insists, “Diplomacy will cost less the confrontation…” xvii This diplomatic

stance of direct engagement and policy through communication seemed to be a more

successful alternative to IAEA aggressiveness and ROK military posturing. However, as before,

the unpredictable DPRK denied the IAEA access to one of its seven reactors sparking a trip by

former president Jimmy Carter to North Korea, which in turn, brought the DPRK back to

bargaining table and allowed the IAEA to maintain its presence in the North. xviii

The Clinton administration successfully brought the DPRK to the negotiating table; North

Korea gave commitment to an agreed framework, settled upon in Geneva, which mapped out

the responsibilities of the DPRK and the rewards from the U.S. xix In return for the North’s

cooperation in closing most parts of it nuclear program and its continued participating in the

NPT the United States would offer economic assistance in the form of crude oil and the building

of two LWRs to compensate for the closing of the other facilities. xx Bipartisan debates on how

the Clinton administration was spending U.S. dollars to bribe North Korea into coherence with

its foreign policy objectives raged on through the mid 90s. By the late 90s the administration

was being accused of propping up a regime that should be allowed to collapse and reveal the

chance for peninsular unification. Politicians on both sides of the aisle cited the use of the food

aid by the United States as a significant bargaining tool and called for the immediate end to
economic support; as James Przystup and Robert Manning of the Washington Post pointed out

“Pyongyang should be offered the choice of keeping its gun or its tin cup. But to allow it to have

both is sheer folly.”xxi

By 1998 the Clinton administration faced not only the nuclear threat of this

authoritarian regime but also its despicable human rights record, its money counterfeiting, drug

smuggling, and its assembling and selling of ballistic missiles. The foreign policy framework was

now being challenged by politicians, allies, and the despicable behavior of the DPRK. The final

straw in the DPRK’s ‘bad behavior’ was a short range ballistic missile test that caused the

Japanese to withdraw its one billion dollar investment toward the building of LWRs as part of

the agreed non-proliferation framework.xxii This missile test in conjunction with the discovery of

a large underground facility that could house a nuclear reactor, verified the doubt surrounding

the Clinton administrations’ agreed framework with North Korea. William Perry (former

Secretary of Defense) was appointed as North Korea’s policy coordinator and was asked to

dissect the administration’s policy with the DPRK and offer a comprehensive strategy towards

future policy and relations.xxiii Perry’s report offered new solutions including a reinitiating of

high-level negotiations with Pyongyang and “improved intra-governmental coordination [in the

U.S.]” as “The tug of war between the legislative and the executive branch over North Korea

policy had crippled implementation of the Agreed Framework.” xxiv Though the Clinton

administration never achieved a fully functional relationship with an entirely cooperative DPRK

it did manage to make large steps in both bilateral and four party negotiations, bipartisan

political agenda, and in theory created a foreign policy that offered the framework to achieve a

non-proliferating North Korea.

 Foreign policy took a hard turn with the inauguration of President George W. Bush. The

Bush administration inherited two presidential terms that were littered with attempts at

creating a functional relationship with the DPRK. Bush’s foreign policy stance, in regard to North

Korea, almost immediately postured itself against the progressive steps taken by his

predecessors. The Bush administration stopped the shipping of fuel to North Korea and isolated

the DPRK in all ways except for a small humanitarian relief effort.xxv President Bush had a

conservative ‘hawk’ approach to foreign policy with North Korea that was lacking in direct

engagement and in extreme discord with the ROK. The U.S. policy did not compliment Kim Dae

Jung’s (ROK president) “sunshine policy” which sought to increase North-South relations and, in

2000, won him the Nobel Peace Prize for his steps towards peninsular unification. xxvi With U.S.

foreign policy unaligned with its allies, it is no wonder that North Korea continuously challenged

the agreed framework and the IAEA, as it had done so in the past.

Throughout the Bush era, the DPRK continued “bad behavior” by having a terrible

human rights recordxxvii, testing ballistic missiles that posed a threat to the U.S. and its allies xxviii,

removing itself from the NPTxxix, restarting its nuclear reactorsxxx, and proving itself unclear and

opaque in its motives and demandsxxxi. However, the biggest problem with U.S. policy during

the Bush era, was not the unpredictable and complicated DPRK; it was the inconstancies in

negotiating as a part of a six party system. As the United States would have liked to see regime

collapse and had foreign policy that reflected that desired outcome; China and the ROK were

intensely opposed to this as it would mean a serious refugee problem and a costly war xxxii. The

inability to have all of the regional partners onboard left the idea of imposing sanctions little

more than an empty threat. China continues to this day to trade with the boarding North Korea
even after an executive order from the Bsh administration which declared restrictions of trade

under the TWEA.xxxiii Bush’s foreign policy was unable to achieve success through multilateral

negotiations because the administration was not sympathetic to the needs of our North East

Asian associates in regard to the North Korean regime.

It is my belief that our foreign policy objectives with North Korea could not be reached

because our approach was misguided. The ultimate goal is for a North Korea that is non-

threatening, non-proliferating, and over all cooperative with a Western political agenda in

North East Asia. To create this idealistic North Korea, the DPRK must begin traveling one of two

directions; a regime collapse or regime reform which creates a state more interdependent with

the U.S. and its regional allies. The first direction seems to be the quick answer, with a regime

collapse the ROK, as an extension of U.S. political agenda, could step in and create a new

regime (under the pretenses of peninsular unification) that would no doubt be cooperative with

Western objectives. The first major problem with a regime collapse however is the prospect of

hundreds of thousands of refugees spilling over into China. The Chinese have no desire to see

this happen, nor, I doubt, are they willing to entertain the idea of this prospect for the purpose

of extending American influence in the region. The second major issue with a sudden regime

collapse would be the power vacuum created in the absence of the totalitarian state. With the

Kim dictatorship gone, China, Japan, Russia and the ROK (essentially the U.S.) would all be in

competition for control of the state. If amalgamation of the peninsula were to manifest itself,

this “unification” could actually be detrimental to U.S. foreign relations. The joining of North

and South Korea could easily be interpreted by other countries in the region as the extension of
U.S. influence in North East Asia. Although the ROK is an independent entity outside of the U.S.,

it is also heavily influenced and intertwined with the United States and its foreign policy.

As it would seem, the alternative to regime collapse is the optimal route for the United

States and our North East Asian allies. Regime reform appears to be the ultimate goal and the

only means by which we may procure our own foreign policy objectives. Reform may only come

about by means of strict, multiparty negotiations in which we, the United States, do not engage

the DPRK with the “go it alone” mentality we have had in the previous administration. The U.S.

must first understand not only the North Korean objective but the objective of the surrounding

nations in regards to the DPRK. A well educated and understood assessment of the surrounding

nations’ desires will allow for better cooperation in the implementation of rewards and

punishments in regard to North Korea. Previous sanctions and punishments put upon the DPRK

have failed because there has not been harmony in the implementation of these penalties. For

sanctions, tariffs, embargos, etc. to be successful, the United States must have the participation

of all regional allies in order for the policy to be achieved. If Russia, Japan, the ROK, and the

United States all agree to isolate the DPRK economically, China must also be willing to do this.

However, extinguishing the trade routes between the Chinese and the North Koreans may not

necessarily be in the interests of China. Therefore, we, as a bloc of North East Asian allied

countries, must make participation of all countries wishing to see a non-proliferating DPRK, a

fiscally, politically, and militarily desirable option. This can be achieved by developing policy

that offers rewards not only to the DPRK for practicing good behavior, but also to the

participants of the enforcement of policy. If the DPRK is to be isolated economically, alternative

trade routes or incentives must be developed for the countries who participate in exchange

with North Korea.

If the United States and its allies can successfully isolate North Korea economically, it is

my belief that the already weakened command economy will collapse in a relatively expedited

manner. If North Korea can be brought to its’ knees through economic isolation, the United

States and its allies can then help rebuild a North Korean economy that is entirely dependent

upon the support from these countries. By making the relationships between North Korea and

the surrounding nations indispensible, we as a united North East Asian bloc, could then

necessitate the regime reform that is so desperately needed. Before this may happen however,

the United States must thoroughly understand the desires of its allies, clearly define the future

goals for North Korea, and ultimately have the participation of all associated countries in the

rewards and punishments with regard to the DPRK. It is my hope that this allied effort becomes

reality before any military option is explored. I do not believe that preemptive or preventative

strikes on the DPRK’s nuclear programs could do much other than cause thousands of lives to

be lost and further empower the current regime. Through strict and structured multiparty

negotiating that builds a reliance upon the North East Asian bloc and rewards good behavior

while at the same time being beneficial for all participants, the world may eventually see a non-

proliferating, internationally cooperative North Korea.

i
BBC News America, “Bush’s ‘evil axis’ comment stirs critics,” Kevin Kim,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1796034.stm, accessed Nov. 13th 2009
ii
Miller Center for Public Affairs University of Virginia, “American President On-line Reference Source,” Gerald L Baliles,
Director, http://millercenter.org/academic/americanpresident/keyevents/bush, accessed Nov. 14th 2009
iii
Library of Congress, “Country Studies: North Korea,” Library of Congress Researchers,
https://blackboard.unh.edu/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp?tab_id=_132_1, accessed Nov. 14th 2009
iv
Foreign Policy in Focus: A Think Tank Without Walls, “A More Expensive Bill for North Korea,” Brent Choi and Joowoon
Jung, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/6136, accessed Nov. 15th 2009
v
Keith A. Simmers, “U.S. Foreign Policy for North Korea: Flexibility is the Best Policy” (Masters thesis, Naval Post Grad.
June 2006) p. 7
vi
iBid, p. 8
vii
iBid, p. 9
viii
Lindsey Ford, Zachary Hosford, and Michael Zubrow, “U.S.-DPRK Negotiations: A Survey of the Policy Literature,” Center for a New
American Security (2009) p. 9
ix
iBid, p. 10
x
iBid, p. 10
xi
iBid, p. 10
xii
Andrew Mack, “The Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula,” Asian Survey Vol. 33 No. 4 (1993) p. 356
xiii
Lindsey Ford, Zachary Hosford, and Michael Zubrow, “U.S.-DPRK Negotiations: A Survey of the Policy Literature,” Center for a New
American Security (2009) p. 13
xiv
iBid, p. 14
xv
New York Times Editorial Board, “Back to the Brink Again,” New York Times, Feb. 14th 1994, pg. A22 (accessed through
‘New York Times’ digital archive)
xvi
iBid, p. A22
xvii
iBid, p. A22
xviii
David E. Sanger, “Carter Optimistic After North Korea Talks,” New York Times, June 17th 1994, p. A10 (accessed through
‘New York Times’ digital archive)
xix
Lindsey Ford, Zachary Hosford, and Michael Zubrow, “U.S.-DPRK Negotiations: A Survey of the Policy Literature,” Center for a New
American Security (2009) p. 14
xx
iBid, p. 14
xxi
James Przystup and Robert Manning, “Feed Me or I’ll Kill You,” The Washington Post. February 20, 1997. as cited in Lindsey Ford,
Zachary Hosford, and Michael Zubrow, “U.S.-DPRK Negotiations: A Survey of the Policy Literature,” Center for a New American Security
(2009)
xxii
Steven Lee Myers, “North Koreans May Be Preparing Another Missile Test,” The New York Times, September 4th, 1998,
p. A3 (accessed through ‘New York Times’ digital archive)
xxiii
Lindsey Ford, Zachary Hosford, and Michael Zubrow, “U.S.-DPRK Negotiations: A Survey of the Policy Literature,” Center
for a New American Security (2009) p. 19
xxiv
iBid, p. 19
xxv
Jihwan Hwang, “Realism and U.S. Foreign Policy: Will the United States Engage North Korea?” (Paper presented at the
2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 28-August 31,
2003)

xxvi
Tony Karon, “Peace Prize Recognizes Truly Epic Achievement,” Time, Oct. 13th 2000 (accessed through TIME Magazines
digital archive, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,57592,00.html)
xxvii
Amnesty International Board of Trustees, “Starved of Rights: Human Rights and the Food Crisis in the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (North Korea),” Amnesty International USA, http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?
id=3A85FB1357C97BA080256E1B00478D0B&lang=e accessed on Nov. 20th 2009
xxviii
CNN's David Ensor, Barbara Starr, Kyra Phillips, Elise Labott, Justine Redman, Atika Shubert, Sohn Jie-Ae, Stan Wilson
and Ed Henry contributed to this report, “U.S. Officials: North Korea Test Long Range Missiles,” CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/07/04/korea.missile/
xxix
Lindsey Ford, Zachary Hosford, and Michael Zubrow, “U.S.-DPRK Negotiations: A Survey of the Policy Literature,” Center for a New
American Security (2009) p. 26
xxx
iBid, p. 26
xxxi
U.S. Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, North Korea: U.S. Policy Options. 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 2006 p.
10
xxxii
Lindsey Ford, Zachary Hosford, and Michael Zubrow, “U.S.-DPRK Negotiations: A Survey of the Policy Literature,” Center for a New
American Security (2009) p. 24
xxxiii
George W. Bush, “Executive Order: Continuing Certain Restrictions With Respect to North Korea and North Korean
Nationals,” June 27th 2008 p. 3-5