Railways: high speed rail (HS2)

Standard Note: SN/BT/316

Last updated: 26 July 2010
Author: Louise Butcher
Section Business and Transport

This note sets out the policies of the present and previous government regarding the
construction of a high speed rail line (HS2) from London to the Midlands, the North of
England and, ultimately, Scotland.

In September 2009 local council leaders from across the UK joined together to form an
organisation to lobby for the construction of a high speed line. Details are available on the
High Speed Rail UK website. In addition, the Congressional Research Service published a
report on HSR in the United States in December 2009.

Information on HS1 (the Channel Tunnel Rail Link) can be found in HC Library standard note
SN/BT/267; and information on other rail-related matters can be found on the Railways
Topical Page of the Parliament website.

Contents

1  Policy of the Coalition Government, 2010- 2 

2  Policy of the Labour Government, 2005-2010 3 

3  Policy of the SNP in Scotland, 2007- 7 

4  Independent work on high speed rail 8 

4.1  Reports published, 2004-05 8 
4.2  Reports published, 2006-08 10 
4.3  Reports published, 2009- 12 

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1 Policy of the Coalition Government, 2010-
Both the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats committed to building a second high
speed line in the UK in 2008. The Conservatives made HS2 the centrepiece of their transport
policy at the 2008 Party Conference; 1 this was confirmed in the Party’s 2009 rail policy
document. 2 In their manifesto for the 2010 election, the Conservatives stated that if elected
they would:

... begin work immediately to create a high speed rail line connecting London and
Heathrow with Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds. This is the first step towards
achieving our vision of creating a national high speed rail network to join up major
cities across England, Scotland and Wales. Stage two will deliver two new lines
bringing the North East, Scotland and Wales into the high speed rail network. 3

In June 2008 the Liberal Democrats published a transport policy document in which it
committed to building a high speed rail line from Heathrow, via St Pancras, to Birmingham
and Manchester. 4 In their 2010 manifesto, the Liberal Democrats said that they would “set up
a UK Infrastructure Bank to invest in public transport like high speed rail”. 5

The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government that took power in May 2010
stated in its Coalition Agreement that it will:

... establish a high speed rail network as part of our programme of measures to fulfil
our joint ambitions for creating a low carbon economy. Our vision is of a truly national
high speed rail network for the whole of Britain. Given financial constraints, we will
have to achieve this in phases. 6

The Conservatives had criticised Labour’s March 2010 White Paper on HS2, particularly for
not going to Heathrow, while the Liberal Democrats sought guarantees that money would not
be ‘raided’ from existing rail projects to pay for HSR and asked for a long-term commitment
to extend the scheme to Scotland. 7 On 9 June, in response to a Westminster Hall debate on
HSR, the Transport Minister, Theresa Villiers, set out how the Coalition intends to proceed
on HS2 as follows:

I can assure hon. Members that high-speed rail plays a core role in the new
Government's vision for the future of travel in the United Kingdom [...] Let me take this
opportunity to emphasise that the Government's ambitions for high-speed rail do not
stop at Birmingham. Although the previous Administration had a change of heart on
high-speed rail, their focus was still just on detailed plans for a route to Birmingham. It
is manifestly clear that we will not reap the full benefits of high-speed rail unless we go
much further than the west midlands, important though a link to the west midlands
obviously is. We want to make progress as rapidly as possible towards the creation of
a national network that connects to the rest of Europe via the channel tunnel.

1
Theresa Villiers MP: speech to the Conservative Party Conference, 29 September 2008; see also: “We need
faster trains, now a third Heathrow runway”, Financial Times, 30 October 2008; and “Why we are leading the
way on high speed rail”, Transport Times (no. 57), November 2008
2
Conservative Party, Conservative rail review: getting the best for passengers, February 2009
3
Conservative Party, Invitation to join the Government of Britain: the Conservative manifesto 2010, April 2010,
p23
4
Fast track Britain: Building a transport system for the 21st century (policy paper 85), June 2008, para 2.1.5;
see also: “Liberal Democrat transport spokesman Norman Baker makes the case for investment in new high
speed rail”, The House Magazine (no. 162), 9 September 2008
5
Liberal Democrats, Liberal Democrat Manifesto 2010, April 2010, p79
6
HMG, The Coalition: Our Programme for Government, May 2010
7
HC Deb 11 March 2010, cc450-54

2
 [...]

The Secretary of State is considering the timetable set out by HS2 Ltd. He is also
considering questions relating to the integration of Heathrow into the high-speed rail
network, which I will come to in due course. He will report to Parliament in due course
on the timetable and on how things will be taken forward. However, the intention is to
go forward with the consultation as promptly as possible, after that statement to
Parliament.

[...] it is important that the high-speed rail line should be affordable for ordinary
families. The analysis done by the Conservative party in opposition and by HS2 Ltd
under the previous Government makes it clear that the line will be affordable and
deliverable with a contribution from future fares revenue, even with fares that are
reasonable and broadly in line with existing levels on existing services. We can deliver
the line without necessarily assuming that the fares will be unreasonable and out of the
reach of ordinary families. 8

On 5 July the Secretary of State, Philip Hammond, confirmed the government’s intention to
consult on the London-West Midlands portion of the route early in 2011 alongside a further
consultation on the overall strategy for HSR. 9

On 21 July Lord Mawhinney published his report on HSR access to Heathrow. Amongst
other things, the report recommended that serious consideration should be given to making
Old Oak Common (west of Paddington) the initial London terminal for the high speed line.
The reason for this is that in the early stages of a high speed rail network, the report found no
compelling case for a direct high speed rail link to Heathrow, and that a London-Old Oak
Common interchange could provide “an appropriate, good quality terminus and connection
point to the airport”. Therefore, changing the route of the main high speed line to run via
Heathrow, at an additional cost of £2 billion to £4 billion, would connect Heathrow to HS2 at a
point in time when “this connection is not likely to represent value for money to the taxpayer
or the train operator. In any event, such a route is not supported by the evidence of benefits”.
Lord Mawhinney recommended that such a route should not be pursued. However, he did
state that as the high speed network is extended beyond Birmingham, the case for a more
direct high speed rail link to Heathrow becomes more persuasive and that in light of that fact,
when the high speed line from London-Old Oak Common to Birmingham is built, appropriate
junction engineering works should be included to make it possible for a high speed loop
through Heathrow to be built at a later date. 10

On 26 July Mr Hammond announced that the exceptional hardship scheme for HS2 would
begin on 20 August. 11

2 Policy of the Labour Government, 2005-2010

Before late 2008 the Labour Government took a broadly negative view of the potential to
build a second high speed line in the UK, despite the fact that the 2005 Labour Party
Manifesto contained a commitment that the party would “look at the feasibility and

8
HC Deb 9 June 2010, cc17-19WH
9
HC Deb 5 July 2010, c10W
10
DfT, High Speed Rail Access to Heathrow: A Report to the Secretary of State for Transport by Rt Hon the Lord
Mawhinney Kt, July 2010, summary of recommendations, pp2-3
11
HC Deb 26 July 2010; see also: FAQs on the Exceptional Hardship Scheme

3
affordability of a new North-South high-speed [rail] link”. 12 It was intended that this would be
conducted in the context of the Eddington Transport Study, published in December 2006. 13

In his report, Sir Rod argued that economic returns from high speed rail in the UK are
unlikely to be as large as for investment in some alternative projects. He identified a numbers
of factors that contribute to this, including the compact geography of the UK, an extensive
national air network, potentially high and unpredictable costs of new high speed technology
and significant environmental costs. 14 He concluded that decisions on specific schemes or
policies would need to be informed by detailed appraisals of specific high-speed rail
proposals, and of appraisals of other policy options for achieving the same objectives. 15 Even
before the Report was published, there were concerns expressed in the press, based on
what appeared to be leaked information, that the Treasury and the Department for Transport
had ‘interfered’ with the direction of the report and any recommendation Sir Rod may have
been thinking of making about high speed rail. 16 Sir Rod rejected the accusation when he
gave evidence to the Transport Select Committee in April 2007. 17

In July 2007 the then Secretary of State for Transport, Ruth Kelly, announced the publication
of what became Labour’s final rail White Paper. On high speed rail, this said:

…it would not be prudent to commit now to ‘all-or-nothing’ projects, such as network-
wide electrification or a high-speed line, for which the longer-term benefits are currently
uncertain and which could delay tackling the current strategic priorities such as
capacity. 18

It went on to make a broader case against high speed rail. 19

The government’s official response to both the Eddington and Stern reviews, published as a
single document in October 2007, proposed that it would look at the potential for a high
speed link between London and Birmingham, as one of a range of options. 20 However, when
the then Railways Minister, Tom Harris, gave evidence to the Transport Committee in March
2008, he reflected the government’s earlier, more sceptical attitude:

... in yesterday's speech by the Secretary of State she alluded to the fact that a lot of
the debate on high speed lines is basically saying, "Well, here's a solution. Now let's
look for a problem to answer it," and actually what I think we should be doing and what
the DfT actually will be doing for the rest of this year is that we are going to say, "Let's
identify what the challenges actually are in transport within the country, then let's look
at the different options." There will be more than one option for meeting that challenge.
"Then let's look at a solution." But at the moment people are saying, "Well, we've got
high speed rail as a solution, now let's find the problem."

[...]

12
Labour Party Manifesto 2005, p24; information on the government’s views between 2003 and 2006 was given
in a Freedom of Information release in July 2006, available on the DfT website
13
DfT/HMT, Eddington Transport Study, December 2006
14
ibid., Vol. 3, para 4.173
15
ibid., para 4.196
16
e.g. “Has the dead hand of civil service nobbled Eddington?”, Transport Times, 20 October 2006
17
Transport Committee, Minutes of Evidence: Sir Rod Eddington (session 2006-07), HC 458-ii, 16 April 2007,
Qq19-24
18
DfT, Delivering a Sustainable Railway, Cm 7176, 24 July 2007, p9
19
ibid., paras 6.11-6.15
20
DfT, Towards a sustainable transport system, Cm 7226, 30 October 2007, p66-67

4
 I think a number of assumptions are made about high speed and one of them is that it
is environmentally friendly. Another is that it contributes to the economy. Another is
that it will result in a certain amount of modal shift from planes to trains. A lot of these
assumptions I am not convinced we have the empirical data to support [...] Another
argument which is often put to me is that France, Germany and the Continent have
these high speed lines, why can we not have them? There may be a case at some
point in the future for a high speed line, but it is not going to be justified by saying, "Our
neighbours have got it, therefore we should get it." 21

This general approach changed in late October 2008 when the new Secretary of State for
Transport, Geoff Hoon, announced the establishment of a ‘National Networks Strategy
Group’, chaired by the then Minister of State, Lord Andrew Adonis. Lord Adonis was asked to
report by early 2009 on two main issues; one roads-focused and the other “longer term
solutions for the strategic corridors”. 22 The Financial Times reported this as Mr Hoon
‘throwing his weight’ behind high speed rail “barely 15 months after his predecessor largely
ruled out both options in a white paper on the railway industry”. 23

In January 2009 the government published its decision in principle to invite BAA to bring
forward a planning application for a third runway and a sixth terminal at Heathrow. 24 One of
the conditions for approving such a plan was that of better surface access to the airport. The
high speed rail document accompanying the announcement indicated the government’s
intention to establish a new company charged with advising Ministers on the potential for a
high speed line connecting London and the West Midlands. This also stated that the purpose
of this ‘first stage’ would be to assist the government with any future consideration of high
speed services from London to Scotland. 25 The government published details of the
objectives, remit and funding for the ‘High Speed Two (HS2) Ltd’ company in January 2009,
setting out HS2’s principal aim to advise the Secretary of State for Transport on the
development and proposals for a new railway from London to the West Midlands and
potentially beyond. 26

HS2 presented its report to the then Secretary of State, Lord Adonis, at the end of December
2009. In March 2010 the Labour Government published its conclusions, based on the work of
HS2, in a White Paper. While the first part of the paper made a case for a high speed
network beyond Birmingham, the second part of the paper began with an explanation of why
at that point, the government was only looking in detail at a route between London and
Birmingham:

... it is one thing to make a strategic argument for high speed rail, and another to
demonstrate that a British high speed line would be a credible and buildable project,
especially given the challenges posed in identifying and constructing a London
terminus and a route out of the city. For this reason, HS2 Ltd was commissioned to
develop a detailed proposal for a high speed line from London to Birmingham including
potential route options, train service patterns, and costs for the development,

21
Transport Committee, Delivering a sustainable railway: a 30-year strategy for the railways? (tenth report of
session 2007-08), HC 219, 21 July 2008, Qq810-814
22
HC Deb 29 October 2008, c34WS
23
“Minister backs electric rail routes”, Financial Times, 30 October 2008
24
DfT, Britain’s Transport Infrastructure - Adding Capacity at Heathrow: Decisions Following Consultation,
January 2009; for more details on Heathrow expansion, see HC Library Research Paper RP 09/11
25
DfT, Britain’s transport infrastructure: High Speed Two, January 2009, para 9
26
DfT, The role and funding of High Speed Two Ltd, 14 January 2009

5
 construction and operation of the line. London to Birmingham would be the essential
first stage of any British high speed rail network. 27

Lord Adonis, outlined the government’s proposed route, London and Birmingham stations
and interchanges with other rail schemes such as Crossrail in his statement to the House:

Subject to ... consultation, the London terminus for the high speed line would be
Euston; the Birmingham City Centre station would be at Curzon Street; and there
would be interchange stations with Crossrail west of Paddington and near Birmingham
Airport. HS2 Ltd’s recommended line of route between London and Birmingham is
also published today; the Government endorses this route, subject to further work
which I have commissioned on mitigation, and to subsequent public consultation. HS2
Ltd’s recommended route would pass in tunnel from Euston to the Crossrail
Interchange west of Paddington. It would leave London via the Ruislip area, making
use of an existing rail corridor. It would then pass by Amersham in tunnel towards
Aylesbury, before following the route of the A413 past Wendover.

North of the Chilterns, the recommended route would follow in part the disused Great
Central rail alignment before passing Brackley and entering Warwickshire. It would
then skirt to the east of Birmingham, to enter the city via a short link, alongside an
existing rail line, beginning in the Water Orton area, with the main line extending north
to the West Coast Main Line near Lichfield. 28

He also explained the decision not to take HS2 to Heathrow and announced that the
Conservative peer and former Secretary of State for Transport, Lord Mawhinney, would take
forward further work on this area:

It is important that Heathrow is connected to any high speed line. A prime purpose of
the proposed Crossrail Interchange is to provide such a connection, via an 11 minute
direct service to Heathrow. However, the overwhelming majority of passengers on a
high speed line south of Birmingham would be going to or from London. This is the
other reason why the Crossrail Interchange station is so important. Crossrail, a very
high capacity line, will provide fast services direct to the West End, the City and
Docklands, catering for an estimated one third of all the passengers travelling on the
high speed line. Without this Interchange to Crossrail, congestion on the tube from
Euston would be exacerbated, and passengers would be severely disadvantaged in
getting in and through central London.

The question is whether there is a case for an additional station at the site of Heathrow
itself. HS2 Ltd, after thorough analysis, advise that the business case for such an
additional station appears weak, given the estimated cost of at least £2 billion for the
additional tunnelling required to serve the site. Furthermore, Heathrow is not a single
place; it is an airport with three widely dispersed terminal centres.

However, I am conscious that, as foreshadowed in the Government’s January 2009

decision on adding capacity at Heathrow, there may be a strategic case for a high
speed station at Heathrow, particularly in the light of that planned expansion. I have
therefore appointed Lord Mawhinney, a former Transport Secretary, to advise on the
best way forward, having fully engaged with all interested parties. A complex decision

27
DfT, High Speed Rail, Cm 7827, March 2010, paras 5.1-5.4; the White Paper was accompanied by a
consultation paper on a proposed Exceptional Hardship Scheme for householders most affected by the
recommendations, see: DfT, High Speed Two - Exceptional Hardship Scheme Consultation, 11 March 2010
28
HL Deb 11 March 2010, cc448-9

6
 of this nature should not be taken in a knee-jerk fashion, but after a full analysis of the
facts and options. 29

The White Paper put the cost of designing and building a line from London to Birmingham at
between £15.8 billion and £17.4 billion, at 2009 prices; extending the ‘core’ network to
Manchester and Leeds would increase the total cost to £30 billion. 30 As to where the money
would come from, the Paper indicated that it would be “a largely public sector funding
approach”. 31 Had Labour won the election it intended to hold a formal public on the proposed
HS2 route between London and Birmingham in autumn 2010 and a further consultation on
extending the route beyond Birmingham sometime after early 2012. 32

The Labour Party Manifesto for the 2010 General Election included a “commitment to a new
high-speed rail line, linking North and South. Built in stages, the initial line will link London to
Birmingham, Manchester, the East Midlands, Sheffield and Leeds, and then to the North and
Scotland”. 33

3 Policy of the SNP in Scotland, 2007-

Following the 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections, The Scottish National Party (SNP)
secured a single seat majority over Labour, the next largest party. This total fell well short of
the 65 seats needed for a “working majority”. The SNP subsequently signed a co-operation
agreement with the Scottish Greens. The leader of the SNP, Alex Salmond, was elected First
Minister on 16 May. 34

The SNP’s manifesto for the 2007 Scottish Parliament elections indicated support for high
speed rail both within Scotland and between Scotland and England:

We must be prepared to match the best on offer elsewhere in Europe with high-speed
or bullet trains connecting our major cities. In government we will conduct an early
study into options for inter-city high-speed links in Scotland.

There is a strong case for a fast rail link to London to reduce demand for the current
domestic shuttle flights to London. We recognise the contribution air travel makes to
carbon emissions and in this light will aim to promote and encourage an extension of
international connections alongside practical steps to reduce reliance on internal UK
flights. 35

The SNP reiterated its support for a London-Scotland high speed rail link in January 2009:

Following the announcement of plans by the UK Government to build a third runway at

Heathrow, SNP Westminster Environment spokesperson Mike Weir MP has called for
clarity over references by the Transport Secretary to the development of new high-
speed rail services between London and Scotland.

Mr Weir said:

" … the vague references by Geoff Hoon to new high-speed rail links between
Scotland and London are simply not clear enough. Scotland needs a high-speed rail

29
ibid., c449
30
op cit., High Speed Rail, paras 11.1-11.2
31
ibid., paras 11.16-11.18
32
ibid., section 9
33
Labour Party, A Future fair for All: the Labour Party Manifesto 2010, April 2010, p1.8
34
for more information, see HC Library standard note SN/PC/4372
35
SNP, SNP Election Manifesto 2007, p26

7
 link to London, and we need to be certain that Geoff Hoon’s warm references to public
transport and rail improvements are a serious commitment rather than merely a cynical
attempt to make the third runway proposals sound more palatable". 36

It was previously reported in December 2008 that the SNP supported Maglev technology to
construct a high speed line; the same article in The Sunday Times looked at how a future
Conservative Government and the SNP Government in Scotland might work together on
such a project. 37

The Scottish Parliament’s Transport, Infrastructure and Climate Change Committee

published a report on high speed rail in February 2009. It concluded that:

The recent [January 2009] initiative by the UK Government is an important positive

commitment to high-speed rail. However Committee believes that these proposals
must go further and include Scotland as an integral part of any scheme from the
outset. It is vital that Scotland does not miss the chance to shape the debate on high-
speed rail in the UK. The Scottish Government must develop a clear policy on high-
speed rail as a matter of urgency, and must be willing to lobby hard in discussions with
the UK Government to ensure that Scottish interests are fully taken into account if and
when a high-speed line is developed. The Committee believes that high-speed rail
could lead to significant social and economic advantages for Scotland, and has
potential to deliver wider benefits elsewhere in the UK by providing the opportunity to
reduce flights from London airports.

Importantly, also, the Committee believes that if the Scottish and UK Governments are
serious about meeting the challenging targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions,
radical and bold new policy ideas need to be developed in the field of transport. The
Committee believes that high-speed rail could play an important role in reducing
domestic aviation which will help meet these climate change targets. 38

4 Independent work on high speed rail

4.1 Reports published, 2004-05
In February 2004 the Centre for Integrated Transport (CfIT) put the case to government for
high speed rail, following that publication of its report on how such systems work in other
countries. In his forward to the report Prof. David Begg said:

I believe that a persuasive case exists for a fresh look now at the future role for high-
speed rail. This study demonstrates clearly that high speed lines are not only desirable
in shrinking journey times between main cities but are essential if we are to deal with
capacity constraints that are building up on our intercity network. 2015 is a key juncture
for us in terms of our capacity limit. But, given the long lead times, the planning needs
to start now (…)

Our research suggests that HSR [high speed rail] is very much an idea whose time has
come in the UK. Market differences help explain why some countries have constructed
more high speed rail lines than Britain and also why France has constructed more
routes than Germany and Italy. Unlike the continent or in Japan, the UK already has
direct, frequent inter-city links with good journey times. Such a network, if it has spare

36
SNP press notice, “Heathrow debate proves need for high speed rail”, 15 January 2009
37
“SNP on board for high-speed bullet train to London”, The Sunday Times, 21 December 2008
38
Scottish Transport Infrastructure and Climate Change Committee, Report on the Inquiry into the potential
benefits of high-speed rail services (first report of 2009), SP Paper 219, 27 February 2009, paras 155-156

8
 capacity, reduces the incremental economic case for HSR, particularly over shorter
distances.

The case for construction of HSR in the UK was, therefore, much weaker in the 1970s
and 1980s, when other European countries were planning their first high speed lines
and building high speed lines in the UK then did not stack up. At that time there was
ample spare capacity on the British national rail network, but that has now disappeared
which has had an adverse effect on performance. The upgrade of the WCML has
demonstrated that resolving capacity constraints on the live network can be very
disruptive, time consuming and expensive. 39

Prof. Begg went on to prophesise what would happen in the UK rail sector if high speed rail
were not taken forward; three and a half years later it seems somewhat prescient:

If HSR were not seen as the way forward, how else could excess demand on our
railways be addressed? One way, and a very unpopular one, would be by imposing
ever higher fares, pricing people off the network. However, that would not offer a long-
term solution as it would force people into their cars onto an already congested road
network. 40

Also in 2004 the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) 41 commissioned a report from Atkins into the
possibility of high speed rail. The report concluded that high speed rail was an attractive and
viable project but that in order to go forward it would need strong support from Government:

Is there a Transport Case for HSL?

Our forecasts of north-south travel movements in the UK show that the strategic rail
network is likely to experience considerable overcrowding in the long-term unless
action is taken. This holds true under a range of scenarios and suggests that the West
Coast Main Line will be overcrowded by 2016 and the East Coast and Midland Main
Lines by 2031.

This is taking place against a forecast increase in congestion on the highway network,
leading to a reduction in average travel speeds for car journeys.

Depending on route option, an HSL is capable of relieving much of the crowding on

competing rail routes. Similar improvements could also be secured by upgrading the
existing strategic rail network, but HSL has the advantage of also being able to free
capacity on the existing rail network that can be used to open up new local, regional or
freight markets.

We therefore conclude that there is a good transport case for HSL.

Is there a Business Case for HSL?

In economic terms, HSL has a positive case, generating a benefit: cost ratio of at least
1.4 to 11 – and it is possible to improve this significantly by optimising the use of freed
classic rail capacity and by fine-tuning the fare strategy.

Other alternative investments do not deliver the journey time or capacity benefits of
HSL and so do not perform as well economically as HSL. HSL also has the potential to

39
CfIT, High Speed Rail, February 2004, forward
40
ibid.
41
the SRA was wound-up in 2005 following the Railways Act of that year; for more information see HC Library
standard note SN/BT/1344

9
 provide substantial safety and accessibility benefits which other schemes cannot
match.

HSL’s key weakness is in its environmental impact – the construction of a new railway
will inevitably lead to significant impacts upon the environment. However, our appraisal
has shown that it is possible to develop a scheme that avoids the most critical
environmental designations and mitigates the worst impacts.

On balance, therefore, there is a good business case for HSL, and it is capable of
delivering greater net benefits than other rail or highway schemes.

How can HSL be Delivered?

If the SRA wishes to progress the HSL project and wishes to achieve an opening date
of 2016, project development would need to commence without delay. Securing the
legal powers through a Hybrid Bill is the recommended route, as it has considerable
advantages in terms of practicality and timing. However, this route is only likely to be
practicable for the first and most important phase of HSL, so it will be important to
secure a strong statement of government support for the HSL concept as a whole. 42

The Institution of Civil Engineers published a further report in 2005 putting the case for high
speed rail, 43 as did the Campaign for Better Transport (formerly Transport 2000). 44

4.2 Reports published, 2006-08

Greengauge 21, a not-for-profit organisation dedicated to campaigning for a high speed line,
has been operating since 2006. Their manifesto states:

There is general agreement that a joined-up strategy is needed, one that recognises
the important linkage between decisions on the location of development on the one
hand, and the provision of transport infrastructure/services, on the other. But there
seems to be little chance of success on the back of our current efforts. The consensus
on the need for road user charging is important and no doubt welcome, but it’s not
enough to solve the problems associated with a growing economy.

High Speed Rail is the missing ingredient. With it, we can extend the range of the
London effect, so that a much larger part of the country can exploit the opportunities of
the world city economy. This means that businesses in the midlands and the north can
participate in the economic advantages enjoyed by the south. At the same time, the
pressure for development in the southern regions will be eased. We would create for
ourselves an alternative to continuing near-total dependence on the least sustainable
forms of long distance transport. 45

In August 2007 the Northern Way, a group of regional development agencies in the North of
England, 46 published a report on the potential for high speed rail. It concluded, generally that:

• North-south links, particularly to London will become more, not less, important over
time in economic terms;

42
SRA, High speed line study: summary report, 2004, paras 9.1-9.9
43
ICE, The missing link – a report on high speed rail links in the UK, 2005
44
Transport 2000, Fog on the runway - how calls for a third runway at Heathrow have overlooked the potential of
High Speed Rail to meet travel demand, 2005
45
Greengauge 21, Manifesto: the high speed rail initiative, 2006
46
David Begg gave evidence to the Transport Committee on their behalf in March 2008

10
 • The future state of the transport links from the North to Heathrow is a fundamental
concern, including the potential loss of domestic air services from the North;

• The Government should be urged to note the importance of additional capacity for
north-south links and the additional productivity benefits that quicker journeys will
bring to the North. We have important new evidence that supports this point. There is
significant wider economic benefit, additional to that identified by Atkins for the
Eddington Transport Study, in the form of agglomeration benefit. It adds up to a lot in
terms of NPV (as much as £10bn over 60 years) and has a significant contribution to
the economic growth of the North (a 0.05% annual difference in output). This includes
similar levels of impact on London’s economy, so the case for highspeed rail is not
just about connecting the North to London – it is about integrating the North’s and
South’s economies. High-speed rail may, therefore, have a stronger overall economic
case than other candidate major rail investments; and

• Northern Way should argue not for one corridor rather than the other but the
development of a strategy for north-south high-speed rail serving both east and west
sides of the Pennines and London. To this should be added a trans-Pennine high-
speed connector in the light of the substantial uplift in agglomeration benefits that it
would deliver. A trans-Pennine high-speed connector as an integral part of a national
network of conventional high-speed rail lines will facilitate not only a new economic
geography of faster city to city links across the North but also nationally through faster
linkages between the North East and Yorkshire and the West Midlands, and between
the North West and East of England growth areas. 47

In March 2008 Atkins produced a further report on high speed rail. The press notice
accompanying the report stated:

A new high speed rail network could deliver over £60 billion worth of benefit to the UK,
according to multinational design and engineering consultancy Atkins.

The effects would be felt across the UK, from London to the Midlands, the North and
Scotland through connecting the major business centres and increasing productivity.

The addition of new high speed lines would not only provide capacity themselves, but
also help free up space on existing lines, and encourage more local investment in
transport improvements to reduce road congestion in urban areas.

Andy Southern, managing director of Atkins’ transport planning division, said, “It is
clear that a high speed rail network should not only be viewed in terms of its benefit to
relieving congestion on the rail network. The economic gain could also be extremely
significant.

“Our modelling shows the impact would be felt by local communities as well as the
business traveller choosing to go by rail rather than air. There is also potential to
reduce overall carbon emissions from transport in the UK.”

Building on previous work carried out between 2001 and 2003 for the now-defunct
Strategic Rail Authority, the new Atkins report shows high speed routes on the east
and west coasts could cost £31 billion to build, but deliver more than twice that in
economic benefit in the first 60 years.

47
Steer Davies Gleave for the Northern Way, North South Connections, August 2007, pp29-30

11
 The gain would be from staff productivity with significant journey time savings – an
hour to Birmingham, three hours to Glasgow. A new High Speed network would also
mean companies further converging around major cities served by the new lines. This
would lead to greater business to business activity, and a deeper pool of potential
employees.

The report has also looked at future capacity needs, assessing the impact of the
expected upgrades to the network set out in the government’s High Level Output
Specification and recent passenger growth trends. It appears if recent trends continue,
with higher numbers of travellers switching to an improving rail network, then capacity
could be exhausted quicker than expected – perhaps within a decade.

Atkins thinks a new network could be operational before 2026, but for that to happen
the planning process would have to start in the very near future. 48

4.3 Reports published, 2009-

In April 2009 the Department for Transport published a series of reports about its HSR
strategy under FOI. The reports were commissioned from Booz Allen Hamilton and were
used when the Government was drawing up the 2007 rail White Paper. They are collected on
the DfT archive website and are described there as follows:

This suite of documents consists of seven reports produced in the development of the
Government’s policy on new lines for the 2007 rail white paper. To enable cost
comparisons of rail infrastructure options (conventional, high speed and maglev), an
indicative ‘hybrid’ line was developed in preparation for the white paper. This line,
providing conventional-speed services but high-speed-capable, was not included in the
final white paper. However, drawing on this work, the white paper noted that “the
balance of advantage would appear to favour services running at conventional speeds
on re-opened alignments between London and Birmingham”.

Many of the seven reports contain details of this indicative new rail alignment for the
hybrid line and associated land take that would be required. This information has been
redacted from the reports under section 35 of the Freedom of Information Act. The
release of this information has the potential for disproportionate and unwarranted
adverse impact on property values which may result from publication (generalised
blight). 49

In June 2008 Network Rail (NR) announced its intention to commission a feasibility study as
to new rail lines, including a high speed line, from an independent consultant – Steer Davies
Gleave. 50 This was billed as a 'strategic review', looking at the feasibility of creating high
speed routes on five existing sections of the railway. NR published the report in August 2009,
which concluded that the case for a route via the North West, rather than the North East,
stacked up best. The report concluded:

The best value for money option was a new high-speed route from the centre of
London to Scotland with new high-speed lines delivering passengers to the centre of
Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Edinburgh with calling points at
Warrington and Preston ... The new high-speed line could offer up to 16 trains per
hour from and to London, the Midlands, North West and Scotland and four trains per

48
Atkins press notice, “A high speed route to regeneration?”, 10 March 2008; the report, Because transport
matters: high speed rail, is available on the website
49
DfT, New Line Capacity Study, April 2009
50
NR press notice, “Meeting the capacity challenge: Network Rail looks at the case for new rail lines”, 23 June
2008

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 hour between regional cities. The new city centre terminal stations in London,
Birmingham, Manchester, Glasgow and Edinburgh would be located close to the
principal existing city centre stations allowing good access to where people want to be.
At this stage of the study no lines have been drawn on a map, it is just too early in the
development of the scheme. 51

A press notice accompanying the report set out the anticipated costs and benefits:

Network Rail today revealed the results of a detailed investigation into the need for
new capacity on Britain's railway network. It concluded that a new 200mph high-speed
line to the Midlands, the North West and Scotland, halving travel time to Scotland to
just over two hours, was the best option generating almost £55bn of value with a
capital construction cost of £34bn.

(...)

Network Rail’s study, running to over 1,500 pages of research, modelling and analysis,
concluded that in order to meet demand a new high-speed line from central London to
central Manchester (in just 1hr 06mins) with a diverging high speed line to the centre of
Birmingham (just 46mins) offered the best benefits.

Continuing the high-speed line to Preston (1hr 13mins), with a diverging high-speed
line to Warrington (1hr 06mins) and Liverpool (1hr 23mins), and then northwards
splitting to go directly to Glasgow (2hrs 16mins) and Edinburgh (2hrs 9mins) offered
the best value for money, generating revenue and benefits worth almost £55bn, paying
for itself 1.8 times over. 52

In September 2009 Greengauge 21 (see section 4.2, above) published its high speed rail
strategy for Britain. The press notice accompanying the report stated:

Greengauge 21 recommends a comprehensive network of routes linking all Britain’s

major cities, which it believes to be vital for a competitive and sustainable Britain (...)
This is the first time a national network has been identified. Greengauge 21 says that it
should provide a helpful context for the work of the Government's company HS2, which
is looking in the first instance at high-speed rail for the London – West Midlands
corridor, and which is due to report to Ministers at the end of the year.

Jim Steer, Director of Greengauge 21, explains that other countries such as Japan,
France and Spain, having seen the success of their first high-speed line, each
developed a long term national strategy to capitalise on the benefits available. Britain,
which has its HS1 (the link from London to the Channel Tunnel), he says, must do the
same. The cost of 53 the full network is estimated to be £69bn and will be developed
through a phased construction programme. Jim Steer summarises the business case
simply: “for every £1 spent on the high-speed rail network in Britain, our economy gets
£3.50 back”.

Also in September 2009 SERA, the Labour Environment Campaign, published ‘Labour’s
case for high speed rail’, including an introduction to the pamphlet by the Prime Minister,
Gordon Brown. 54

51
Steer Davies Gleave for NR, Meeting the capacity challenge: The case for new lines – summary report,
August 2009, p4; the full report and supporting documents are available on the NR website
52
NR press notice, “London to Scotland by train in just two hours”, 26 August 2009
53
Greengauge 21, “A high speed rail strategy for Britain”, 16 September 2009; the full report is available on the
organisation’s website
54
SERA, Fast Forwards: Labour’s case for High Speed Rail, September 2009

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In November 2009 the British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) published a report setting out
the business case for high speed rail. The report, which was supported by Network Rail and
Greengauge 21, argued that the business and environmental case for an HSR network has
clearly been made – offering revenues and benefits to the economy worth almost £55 billion.
It also called for funding solutions to be found “as soon as possible, so that construction can
begin during the life of the next Parliament” and for all political parties to sign a binding
agreement that would commit the next Government – from whatever party – to go ahead the
work already conducted by HS2. 55

In June 2010 the media reported on a study by a group of experts including the former head
of the Audit Commission, Sir Andrew Foster and David Ross, former chairman of National
Express that envisaged cutting the costs of HS2 down to around £6 billion – by avoiding city
centres. The Financial Times had the most extensive coverage:

A new high-speed railway network that would begin to transform travel in the UK within
a decade could be delivered at a cost to the public purse of just £6bn, according to an
authoritative study being considered by ministers.

The report puts the cost of the 225mph London to Birmingham service – the first stage
of a national high-speed network – at less than half the £15.8bn-£17.4bn price tag
placed on the same route by High Speed Two, the company established by the
government to bring forward proposals for new rail lines.

While the new coalition government has said a domestic high-speed rail network is a
priority, progress could be hampered by the dismal public finances and opposition from
homeowners along the new routes.

But the study – co-authored by a group that includes the former head of the Audit
Commission, Sir Andrew Foster and David Ross, former chairman of National Express
– suggests the first stage could be built for a much smaller sum by avoiding city
centres, limiting the number of stations and creating a special purpose vehicle to fund
the project.

More than half the cost of the £5.8bn Channel Tunnel rail link – the world’s most
expensive high-speed project – came from the final approach to central London
because of the extensive tunnelling and other engineering works involved.

The new report proposes bypassing Heathrow and linking Birmingham and
Manchester airports with Old Oak Common in west London, without venturing into the
cities themselves.

Old Oak Common will connect with Heathrow through Crossrail – the £16bn route due
to open in 2017 – and will be only two stops from the West End and seven from the
City. Connecting Birmingham International to a high-speed rail line fits with the
Conservative party’s commitment to allowing regional airports such as Birmingham to
soak up any airport growth.

The government has recently blocked the development of a third runway at Heathrow,
as well as expansion at Stansted and Gatwick.

Funding for the basic infrastructure would be financed largely by government-

guaranteed debt, sourced from infrastructure funds, bond investors, banks and
multilaterals, the report suggests.

55
BCC press notice, “BCC warns parties: Action not talk is needed on high-speed rail”, 16 November 2009; the
full report is available on the BCC website

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 This would cost around £6bn according to projections from major construction
companies. Train operators would be privately financed. 56

Also in June 2010 the HS2 Action Alliance, a non-profit organisation working with local
community groups to challenge the case for HS2, published a report questioning some of the
key assumptions of the HS2 business case. The key conclusions are:

• Projected increases in rail demand are not realistic, based on the recent historical
record;

• HS2 will not deliver the environmental or wider economic benefits that many claim;

• Additional capacity could be gained more cost-effectively from other schemes such as
new rolling stock; and

• High speed rail is possible without the ‘super fast’ speeds proposed in HS2 and the
attendant requirement to build a new line. 57

56
“Report says high-speed rail could cost just £6bn”, Financial Times, 2 June 2010
57
HS2 Action Alliance, A case for alternatives to HS2, June 2010 [revised July 2010]

15