High Speed Rail Revolution

The High Speed Rail Revolution:
History and Prospects

Terry Gourvish
The high Speed Rail RevoluTion: History and ProsPects
1. Introduction: Railways and the High Speed Revolution

High-Speed Railways (HSRs) have been one of the most innovative elements affecting passenger
transport since the Second World War. At the same time, HSRs are expensive to construct,
represent a considerable sunk cost in the transport infrastructure, and produce economic
and social effects which are difficult to predict. It is therefore important to be aware of existing
research on the impact which new lines have had on the economy, on transport and employment
patterns, regional economies and so on. In this report we review the development of the
world’s HSR network, survey the lines which are under construction or in the planning stage,
and summarise the literature which has examined the impact of this technology.1
First of all, we should note that there has been considerable diversity in railway infrastructure,
trains, average and maximum train speeds, and the type of service provided. In particular,
a distinction must be made between the maximum or top speed of a given train technology,
often attained on a special run or on a test track, and the average speed of regular public services.
Service requirements clearly impose a considerable restraint on the possibilities offered by new
railway technologies, since the competitive attraction of faster railways does not lie purely in their
speed, but also in their capacity, frequency, reliability and comfort. These characteristics have a
special attraction in developed economies where good transport provision is required to link cities
located in densely populated, congested, conurbations. The attractions multiply where land is
relatively scarce and expensive, and where environmental benefits may be calculated in comparison
with alternative modes, chiefly air and road transport. In these conditions, journeys of up to
800 kilometres and up to four hours are generally considered to be competitive with road and air.2
‘High speed’ is a relative concept, of course, and has changed radically over time. Since the birth
of the railway age in the 1830s, when 30mph or 50kph was considered ‘fast’, rail speeds have
increased dramatically. As early as 1845 Britain’s Great Western Railway, built to Brunel’s broad
track gauge (7 foot or 2140mm), introduced the fastest rail service in the world with its London to
Exeter expresses, which averaged 70kph. Later in the decade its ‘Flying Dutchman’ train covered
the 53 miles from Paddington to Didcot at an average speed of 90kph. At the turn of the 20th
century both British and American operators claimed top speeds of 160kph on their systems,3
and competitive pressures induced companies to reduce the journey times of passenger services.
In Britain the Great Western introduced the first scheduled service at c.110kph (70mph) in the late
1 For a general introduction to HSRs see, inter alia, Strohl (1993); Givoni (2006); Campos and de Rus (2009); Hall (2009); and Preston (2009).
2 Cf. JORSA (2008); SNCF (2009).
3 These runs were unverified and have been disputed. The Great Western’s City of Truro claimed a top speed of 102.3mph or 165kph in 1904. In Germany
an electric train was run at 203-210kph in 1903 on a special test track. See Hughes (1988), pp.16, 189, Allen (1992), pp.7-12, 37, and also Simmons and
Biddle (1997), p.465ff., and Hall (2009), 59.
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The high Speed Rail RevoluTion: History and ProsPects
1920s: the ‘Cheltenham Spa Express’.4 In the inter-war years there were several runs with steam
locomotives at average speeds in excess of 125kph and top speeds of 160kph, but the future clearly
lay with diesel and electric traction. In the mid 1930s German and American diesel-powered
streamliner trains set new standards of speed and comfort, notably the ‘Flying Hamburger’ of
1933, which ran between Berlin and Hamburg at an average speed of 125kph, and the ‘Burlington
Zephyr’, which in 1934 covered the 1,633 kilometres from Denver to Chicago at the same speed
(top speed: 181kph). In 1936 another Denver-Chicago Zephyr averaged 134kph. Other pre-war
highlights include the apogee of steam traction, Mallard’s high speed run on Britain’s East Coast
Main Line in 1938, when a speed of 203kph (126mph) was attained, and the Italian ETR200 electric
trains of 1936, which served the Bologna-Rome-Naples route. In 1938-39 these trains not only
matched Mallard’s 203kph in a demonstration run but produced average speeds of 165 and 176kph
on the Florence-Bologna-Milan route.5
Pre-war speeds were increased by deploying improved locomotive technologies on the existing
infrastructure. In the post-war period combinations of new trains and new railway lines were
introduced. As Campos and Rus note, four types of HSR may be identified:
i. a complete separation from other rail services (e.g. the Japanese Shinkansen);
ii. a mixed high-speed system, in which trains run on both high-speed and upgraded
conventional infrastructure (e.g. the French TGV: expensive duplication of infrastructure is
avoided, especially at Paris termini, and when trains run onto existing parts of the network
where a TGV may not be justifiable);
iii. a mixed conventional system, used in Spain, in which AVE trains are run at high speeds on
new, standard gauge lines [4ft 81/2in or 1435mm], while others [ALVIA] run on both the new
infrastructure and Spain’s older, non-standard gauge of 1668mm [c.5ft 6in], using the Talgo
gauge-changing technology; and
iv. a fully mixed system (e.g. the German ICE trains, and Italy’s Rome-Florence line), in which
both high-speed and conventional trains, including freight trains in Germany, can utilise the
infrastructure provided.
In addition, there are systems based on the use of tilting trains, for example in Italy, Sweden, and
on Britain’s West Coast Main Line, and the promise offered by the emerging MAGLEV (magnetic
levitation) technology.6
4 In 1929 the ‘Cheltenham Flyer’ was timed to run from Swindon to London at 106kph and in 1932 at 115kph, with one run reaching 131kph: Allen (1992),
p.16.
5 Directory (1965-6), pp.599-600; Hughes (1988), p.18; Allen (1992), pp.41, 47, 53.
6 Campos and de Rus (2009), 21-2; Givoni (2006), 595-7.
4
The High Speed Rail Revolution: History and Prospects
Clearly, there is a considerable degree of diversity. But however we choose to define a HSR,
currently [autumn 2009] higher speed railways, viz. those providing for speeds of 200kph [125mph]
and above, a common definition,7 have been established on at least 12,000 kilometres of route.
Of these, a significant proportion [30 per cent] represents services which have been accelerated
by means of new rolling stock on conventional lines, e.g. tilting trains, and/or by upgrading the
existing infrastructure. If we limit the definition to lines providing for speeds of up to 250kph
[155mph], most of which require a dedicated and largely segregated infrastructure, then the
current HSR network extends to about 8,500 kilometres.8
The first of these new pieces of infrastructure was Japan’s Shinkansen, a new trunk line with
a ‘bullet train’, introduced on a dedicated, standard-gauge infrastructure from Tokyo to Osaka
in 1964. It was followed by an extension westwards to Kyushu and by lines east of Tokyo to
Morioka and Niigata. In Europe the European Union encouraged the creation of a high-speed
network in Europe in policy documents in the early 1990s, which culminated in the identification
of Trans-European Networks (TENs) in 1992, and then in its Directive 96/48 of 1996, part of
a market-harmonising objective. However, practical support in the form of investment was
comparatively modest until the 1990s.9 In fact, network planning on the whole reflected the
national considerations of single countries, the notable exception being the PBKA network linking
Paris, Brussels, Köln and Amsterdam, with London added after the construction of the Channel
Tunnel. In Europe the pioneer was clearly France, which introduced its Train à Grande Vitesse
or TGV on a new Paris-Lyon line in 1981, using the existing infrastructure (formation classique)
for the approaches to main stations. By 1983 it was providing a two-hour service for the 430
kilometre journey. Later, in both Japan and France, attention turned from adding capacity on the
most heavily used transport arteries to the establishment of improved links between more remote
regions of the country and the metropolitan centre.10 In other countries, the initial emphasis
was on optimising the existing infrastructure, especially where networks and conurbations were
denser. Thus, in Britain the first high speed rail services, running at up to 125mph or 200kph, were
provided by diesel-powered High Speed Trains or HSTs, introduced in 1976. A more adventurous
tilting train, the Advanced Passenger Train or APT, made a record-breaking run of 261kph in 1979
but was abandoned in the mid 1980s, only for this technology to be subsequently developed for
service by Sweden, with its X2000, and by Italy, with the Pendolino. France’s lead was followed
by three countries in particular: Italy, Germany and Spain, though their approaches differed.
7 Adopted by the EU in EC Directive 96/48 of 1996, which defined three types of HSR: lines specially built for speeds of 250kph+; specially upgraded
conventional lines for 200kph+; and upgraded conventional lines with special speed constraints. Cf. Givoni (2006), 594, and Nash (2009).
8 UIC database, July 2009, supplemented by the addition of main British 200kph+ lines. The UIC data omit several sections of conventional infrastructure
which have been upgraded for 200kph maximum speeds, e.g. in Portugal, Norway, Sweden and Finland. Cf. Campos and Rus (2009), 19, who suggest
that the total HSR network of 200kph+ is around 20,000kms.
9 In 1993-2001 about h50bn was distributed in loans, subsidies and grants for the transport infrastructure as a whole: Stevens (2004), p.190.
10 Vickerman (1997), 22; Gourvish (2006).
5
In Italy, which had pre-war experience of high-speed running, engineering and other difficulties
hindered development, and it took until 2008 before its primary Milan-Florence-Rome-Naples
route was properly upgraded for modern conditions. In Germany, where the intention was to
improve particularly slow sections of the existing network, and to accommodate freight as well
as passenger traffic, progress was also slow before the 1990s, and the amount of new railway is
still relatively modest. In Spain, which was a relative latecomer to HSRs due to its choice of broad
gauge, the need to accommodate gauge variations was an important element in railway policy.
However, investment in new standard-gauge lines became an imperative after Spain joined the
European Union in 1986, and there has been a considerable investment in such lines since 2003.
Indeed, over the last decade the pace of change has picked up sharply and several countries have
emulated these pioneering developments. In Europe, Belgium and the Netherlands are building
lines which will enhance the PBKAL Thalys services; Switzerland, Portugal, Sweden and Russia
are also either constructing new HSRs or planning new routes. HSR services now account for
around a quarter of passenger rail travel within the European Union.11 In Asia, Turkey, South
Korea, Taiwan and China, and in the Americas the United States have introduced faster services.
China, in particular, has taken the eye. After suffering a steep decline in its rail transport - the
market-share of passenger traffic fell from 77 per cent in 1950 to six per cent in 200712 - it has
opened 1,200 kilometres of HSR in the last two years and is currently constructing over 9,000
kilometres more.13 In established systems passenger capacity has also been increased with the
introduction of duplex [double-deck] trains in Japan, from 1994, and in France from 1996.14
Table 1 indicates that over the period 1964-83 3,300 kilometres of high speed line were
established, activity which was dominated by Japan’s Shinkansen, which made up more than half
of the total. Next came Great Britain, with 28 per cent, but these services were improved with new
trains rather than with new lines. In 1984-2009 there was a much higher rate of development,
with 8,700 kilometres of new high speed services, more than half (4,750kms) being introduced
in the last six years. Activity was divided among several countries, led by Spain with 18 per cent,
France (17 per cent), Germany (15 per cent), and a newcomer, China (14 per cent, all of which was
opened in 2008-09). Table 2 indicates that the high-speed network is set to more than double in
only three years, to nearly 25,000 kilometres. Asia, having led the way with Japan in the 1960s, is
now challenging Europe as the leading contributor of HSR technology. In the autumn of 2009 it
represented 35 per cent of the total network. If the railways under construction are completed
11 Preston (2009), 13.

12 Wang et al. (2009), 766.
13 UIC data, mid-2009.
14 JORSA (2008); www.transport.alsthom.com
6
on schedule, this figure will rise to 57 per cent by 2012, when China’s contribution will be no less
than 41 per cent. This said, we must introduce some caveats into our celebration of the progress
of HSRs. Europe’s HSRs, which amounted to some 7,100 kilometres in the autumn of 2009, are less
than four per cent of the rail network in the European Union.15 In many countries, the proportion of
high speed trains is low in relation to the total provision of rail services. And in Britain, which has
a relatively dense rail network, we should distinguish between the principal long-distance services,
which have become faster, and shorter-distance, commuter services, which have changed little
in terms of speed since the war.16 Furthermore, most HSR lines are currently operating services
at well below the maximum permitted speed (Table 3). While at least nine countries are operating
services at an average speed of 200kph and over, only two – France and Japan, the high speed
pioneers, are offering services at average speeds in excess of 250kph.17
Table 1. High Speed Rail development, 1964-autumn 2009 (kms)

Route Countries:
Period Open
kms Japan Britain France Italy Germany Spain China Other
1964-73 676 676 - - - - - - -
1974-83 2,639 1,128 942 419 150 - - - -
1984-93 1,459 31 - 412 98 447 471 - -
1994-2003 2,522 214 74 709 - 428 598 - 499
2004-09 4,754 127 684 332 496 410 530 1,194 981
1,804 942 419 150
Total 1964-83 3,315 - - - -
54% 28% 13% 5%
372 1,130 1,453 594 1,285 1,599 1,194 1,480
Total 1984-2009 8,735
4% 13% 17% 7% 15% 18% 14% 17%
2,176 1,700 1,872 744 1,285 1,599 1,194 1,480
Total 1964-2009 12,050
18% 14% 16% 6% 11% 13% 10% 12%
See Appendix, Tables 1 and 2. Data to Autumn 2009.
Table 2. HSRs under construction, 2009-12 (kms)

Period China Spain Russia Turkey All
2009-12 9,031 1,634 650 510 12,686
10,025 3,233
Grand total in 2012 650 745 24,736
41% 13%
See Appendix, Table 3.
15 EU27, calculated from UIC and Preston (2009), 15.

16 Leunig (2008/9), 20, and performance data by route, 1946-2008, from the author.
17 Taylor (2009).
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Table 3. Scheduled services running at an average speed of 200kph and above, September 2009
Highest speed:
Country No: of services Speed: range [kph] Speed
No: of services
France 10 251-272 3 272
Japan 9 225-256 2 256
Taiwan 77 207-245 1 245
Belgium-France 55 229-236 1 236
Spain 29 202-236 2 236
China 119 202-236 107 236
Germany 39 200-226 15 226
Britain-France 24 213-219 10 219
Britain-Belgium 1 201 1 201
S. Korea 2 200 2 200
Source: Railway Gazette International (October 2009), 63-4.
2. Development of the high speed network

i. Japan’s Shinkansen
Japan has introduced an impressive, 2,000-kilometre network of high-speed, high-capacity
railways by following a long-established and coherent system of planning. In 1964 the
515-kilometre Tokyo-Osaka line – the Tokaido Shinkansen - was opened to overcome severe
capacity constraints with existing services in Japan’s major transport corridor.18 In many ways
the concept was innovative: a new, segregated railway built to the standard 1435mm gauge
[historically, Japanese railways had been built mainly to the narrow, 3ft 6in or 1067mm gauge].
Route segregation, together with the decision to operate exclusively the line for passenger traffic,
optimised safety – no passengers have been killed in train accidents since the service began
- and made possible the use of lighter, less crashworthy vehicles, which facilitated both high
capacity (first with 12-car, then with 16-car trains) and higher speeds. In fact, the new railway was
operated initially at what now seems a relatively leisurely maximum operating speed of 210kph -
but in 1964 this was far ahead of other rail operators. The journey time from Tokyo to Osaka was
cut from 61/2 hours to 4 hours in 1964 and 3 hours 10 minutes in 1965. By 1992 the journey took
only 21/2 hours, by which time the maximum speed had been increased to 270kph. Construction
costs were high – ¥380 billion, double the estimate.19 Engineered to provide a straight, flat route
with 69 kilometres of tunnel and 173 kilometres of bridges and elevated sections,20 the project
18 Tokyo’s staging of the Olympic Games in 1964 provided a further impetus.

19 Hood (2006), p.94.
20 Hood (2006), p.92.
8
was justified by the high population density of the Tokyo-Kyoto-Osaka corridor (over 45 million
people), and the problems for road transport presented by a narrow, mountainous, earthquake-
prone archipelago. In fact, the Tokaido line was a phenomenal commercial success, and as early
as its third year of operation its revenue exceeded its costs including interest and depreciation.
Further Shinkansen building was undertaken, with government financial support, in accordance
with a policy of geographically-balanced development, pursued via the National Development
Plan of 1969 and the National Shinkansen Network Development Law of 1970.21 The policy, which
envisaged some 7,200 kilometres of Shinkansen, continued despite the adjustments required by
the oil crisis of 1973 and its aftermath; the financial difficulties of Japan National Railways (JNR),
the state-owned railways, which prompted their quasi-privatisation on a regional basis in 1987;
and Japan’s financial difficulties in the 1990s. West of Osaka, the San’yo line to Fukuoka, was
opened in 1975. Operating at first at 210kph, train speeds were increased to 270kph in 1992 and
300kph by 2005. It serves Kobe, Hiroshima, Kokura and Hakata. East of Tokyo the Tohoku and
the Joetsu Shinkansen opened to Morioka and Niigata in 1982. Here the maximum speed was
soon 240kph, and it was increased to 275kph in 1990. In addition, high speed services received an
important stimulus from investment in additional lines and/or upgrades which extended the range
of existing services. Thus, the Tohoku and Joetsu Shinkansen trains, which had started at Omiya,
31 kilometres from central Tokyo, were brought into the capital, first to Ueno in 1985, then to Tokyo
Central in 1991, though the maximum speed on these extensions was pegged at 110kph. And in
the 1990s ‘Mini Shinkansen’ were introduced to extend the range of JR East’s Tohoku line, with
the addition of a third rail to the narrow gauge, a mixed-gauge device echoing the action taken by
Britain’s Great Western Railway in the mid 19th century. Operating at a maximum of 130kph, the
Mini Shinkansen served Fukushima-Yamagata (87kms, 1992), Morioka-Akita (127kms, 1997) and
Yamagata-Shinjo (62kms, 1999).22
Japan’s newer investments in high speed lines cost more per kilometre to construct and were
less profitable than those of the 1960s and 1970. Returns were more elusive since the population
density served was much lower than that of the Tokyo-Osaka corridor. Furthermore, costs
were higher owing to formidable engineering challenges as well as the greater demands of
environmentalists for noise reduction and improved segregation. The San’yo, for example, had
56 per cent of its 400 kilometre Okayama-Hakata section in tunnel, and most of the Tohoku and
Joetsu Shinkansen were either elevated, bridged, or in tunnel.23 Developments in the far east of
the country were inhibited by the escalating cost and severe delays in completing the 54-kilometre
Seikan Tunnel. The Tunnel, which cost ¥1.1 billion and was 14 years late when completed, was
opened to conventional trains in 1988, and proved as much a saga as the Channel Tunnel between
21 Steer Davies Gleave (2004); JORSA (2008).

22 Strohl (1993), pp.55-68; Aoki (2000), pp.138-46; Perl (2002), pp.15-21; Hood (2006), p.18ff.; Smith (2003), 222-37.
23 Allen (1992), pp.70-2; Hood (2006), p.92.
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Britain and France. Although the momentum for new Shinkansen slowed in the 1980s and 1990s
investment in rail was consistent with Japan’s long-term energy policy, which sought to reduce
the country’s dependence on oil, though some lines, especially the Joetsu line to Niigata, were
as much the product of political, as of economic, pressures.24 Following the privatisation of 1987,
four of the regional companies purchased the existing Shinkansen in 1991.
The distinguishing point of the major Shinkansen lines is their ‘classic simplicity of railway
operation’ and high level of automation,25 which permit a high train frequency with flexible
services. The Tokaido line, for example, runs both express [Nozomi and Hikari] and stopping
[Kodama] trains on a simple two-track railway with passing loops. Fully segregated and with
in-cab signalling, it permits minimum ‘headways’, i.e. train intervals, of only three minutes and
provides 323 trains x 1,300 passengers per day between Tokyo and Osaka. A beacon of the modern
high-speed railway, it offers a safe, punctual, ‘365-day railway’, since maintenance work is
conducted between midnight and 6am.26
ii. France: the TGV

France, like Japan, had a clear plan for HSRs, where political and strategic factors were important
policy drivers. Determined to make a mark in rail transport, the French broke the speed record
several times from the 1950s, raising the bar to 243kph in 1954, 331kph in 1955, 408kph in 1988,
and 515kph in 1990. More recently France established a new record on 3 April 2007 with 574.8kph
(357.2mph).27 But with some notable exceptions,28 the existing network and its train services were
scarcely of high quality, and attention naturally turned to the planning of a new network, which
in the autumn of 2009 amounted to 1,872 kilometres, second only to Japan. Much of what has
been constructed was consistent with an SNCF Master Plan, Objectif 2000, formulated in 1976.
The Train à Grande Vitesse (TGV) was introduced on the first, largely dedicated, Ligne à Grande
Vitesse (LGV), the Sud-Est, in 1981, linking Paris with Lyon. For the first two years, trains travelled
at conventional speed over a third of the route, but in 1983 the new line was fully operational and
journey times were cut to two hours. Investment in this major French transport corridor, which
served c. 40 per cent of the French population, was prompted by severe congestion on the existing
24 The extension to Nagano was built for the Winter Olympics in 1998.
25 Allen (1992), p.69.
26 Morimura (2009), and see also JR Central (2008); Mitchell (2008); JORSA (2008). Tokaido punctuality is impressive: train delays averaged 0.1 min. per
train in 2003, 0.3 min. in 2006.
27 Allen (1992), pp.55-60, 166-7.
28 E.g. the Mistral (Paris-Nice, 1958) and Aquitaine (Paris-Bordeaux, 1971) express services: Allen (1992), pp.60-4.
10
rail route.29 An additional consideration was the desire to create a major transport network which
was economical in terms of energy use and independent of oil supplies.30 And the opportunity
was subsequently taken to extend services beyond the confines of the TGV line itself, by taking the
new trains on to towns in the South-east (e.g. St. Etienne, Grenoble, Besançon), to the far south
(Avignon, Marseille and beyond) and to Switzerland (Lausanne, Geneva, Bern). Like the Japanese
Tokaido line, the new line quickly paid for itself, its cost (c.13.8 billion francs, including the trains)
being fully amortised by the end of 1993, after only 12 years’ operation.31 And as in Japan, the
economic case for some of the subsequent investments in HSR lines was weaker, since population
densities and traffic levels were lower. Nevertheless, after the TGV-Nord project was shelved when
the British government abandoned the first Channel Tunnel in 1975, the French pressed ahead
with the LGV Atlantique from Paris to Le Mans and Tours, opened in 1989-90, with the intention
of improving services to Brittany [Nantes, Rennes and Brest] via Le Mans, and the south-west
[Bordeaux, Toulouse, etc.] via Tours. Here the population served amounted to some 25 million,
around 45 per cent of the French population, although the density was comparatively low, and
the investment required a 30 per cent subsidy from central government funds.32 In the following
year approval was given to a revised rail plan, which identified 16 new projects for development by
2015. In 1992/94 the Rhone Alpes TGV provided improved services to Valence, avoiding Lyon, and
thence to Avignon and beyond. There was a greater economic rationale for two investments: the
Nord-Europe line of 1994/96, linking Paris with Lille, Calais, Brussels and beyond, and London
(via the Channel Tunnel); and the Méditerannée in 2001, which extended the Paris-Lyon route from
Valence to Marseille and Nîmes.33 Connections in Paris were improved with the construction of the
‘TGV Paris Interconnections’, a 104-kilometre route from the TGV-Nord line via Roissy (Charles de
Gaulle airport) to the Sud-Est at Moisenay and the Atlantique at Valenton. Finally, the Est project
began in 2003 and was opened to Lorraine and Baudrecourt, 100 kilometres from Strasbourg, in
2007. As with Japan’s investments in Tohoku and Hokuriku, some of France’s later LGVs promised
a much lower rate of return, necessitating a substantial amount of public subsidy. And as in Japan
the planning or project development continued through a major reorganisation of SNCF, in which
the infrastructure management and train operating functions were separated in 1997, though both
remained in the public sector, and the introduction of a broader funding regime for new projects,
including the participation of the private sector.34
29 Strohl (1993), pp.74-5; Perl (2002), p.24.

30 Pol (2002), p.159.
31 Strohl (1993), p.83; Vickerman (1997), p.26.
32 Gerondeau (1997), p.123.
33 Ardui and Ni (2005), 22-8, and see also Strohl (1993), pp.69-107, Streeter (1993); Troin (1995).
34 SNCF (2009). Reseau Ferré de France [RFF], France’s infrastructure operator, has a limited capacity to invest. The organisational separation of
infrastructure and operating, which was introduced elsewhere (e.g by Italy in 2000), was a response to EU directives 91/440 of 1991 and 95/19 of 1995.
11
Unlike the Tokaido Shinkansen, the Paris-Lyon LGV was the product of an integrated infrastructure and
train design. The introduction of high-powered, articulated, lightweight trains enabled the engineers
to build a straight double-track route traversing the contours, thereby minimising earthwork costs.
Noise reduction costs were also low. As a result the construction cost was lower than with most other
countries’ projects. In 2005 Ardui and Ni put the cost at around $4 million per kilometre, and even the
more expensive French projects cost only $10-15 million, a figure which compares very favourably with
the $25 million per kilometre in Italy, and the $74 million in the UK for the first stage of its expensive
Channel Tunnel Rail Link.35 As in Japan a fairly dense service pattern was introduced: on the Sud-Est,
120 trains a day, with a minimum four-minute interval. Today the number of trains is approximately
220.36 Gradients were reduced on the TGV Atlantique, opened in 1990, but the intention was to permit
an increase in speed using new Alsthom-built trains. The maximum operating speed was increased to
300kph, with 320kph on the newer Méditerranée and Est routes. Currently SNCF operates the fastest
regular scheduled service, with one of the TGV Est services averaging 272kph between Lorraine
and Champagne-Ardenne (Table 3).37 At the same time, energy consumption per seat-kilometre is
comparatively low. SNCF claims that energy costs are only four per cent of its total operating costs,
and that it consumes only 0.7 litres of diesel fuel per 100 passenger-kilometres, a figure which
compares favourably with 3.3 litres for private motoring and 7.14 for air travel. On the other hand, there
is a fairly sharp contrast between TGV services and railway services elsewhere in SNCF’s operations
(there are over 4,000 smaller stations in France), though the contrast is mitigated to a significant
extent by the fact that TGV trainsets run over a further 7,000 kilometres of conventional track. All this
may explain why the TGV’s share of rail traffic in France is a high 59 per cent (2008 data).38
iii. Great Britain

High Speed Rail lines have a rather chequered history in Britain. British Rail’s APT project –
designed to maximise speeds without introducing expensive new infrastructure - was innovative,
but teething troubles resulted in its abandonment after short periods in service in 1981-82 and
1984, before the Italians made the technology work. In the event, more conventional, second-best
technology was introduced. The HSTs operated at 125mph [200kph] on the Great Western Main
Line (from October 1976) and the East Coast Main Line (from 1978), and were to prove the mainstay
of British Rail passenger operations for over two decades. Indeed, they produced record runs for
a diesel train – 180kph in 1979, 181.5kph in 1984 and 238kph in 1987 – and are still performing
useful service out of Paddington.39 A new rail link between the Channel Tunnel and London was
35 Ardui and Ni (2005), 22-3.

36 Strohl (1993), p.83; information from Benoît Chevalier.
37 Taylor (2009), 65.
38 SNCF (2009); Preston (2009), 13; information from Benoît Chevalier.
39 Gourvish (2002), pp.85, 218-23; Allen (1992), pp.88-96.
12
part of the Channel Tunnel project progressed in the period 1960-75. Unfortunately, it became
a casualty of the difficult economic conditions which followed the oil crisis of 1973. The British
government’s anxieties about the escalating cost of the British Railways Board’s Channel Tunnel
Rail Link [CTRL], the estimated cost of which trebled from £123 million to £373 million in little
more than a year, contributed substantially to its decision to withdraw from the Tunnel project in
January 1975.40 The second, and ultimately successful, CTRL, now called High Speed 1 [HS1], was
opened in part in 2003, and in full to London St. Pancras in 2007. To date it represents the high
point of passenger rail travel in Britain. However, it also represents a major example of all the
risk-reward challenges inherent in Public-Private-Partnerships and Private Finance Initiatives.
Promised a measure of public sector support when construction was estimated at £2.7 billion in
1994, the extent of the Government’s financial assistance increased sharply, not least in 1998 and
2001, and the total cost of the project was in excess of £5 billion.41
The DETR’s Transport 2010 [10 Year Plan] of 2000 made no reference to new high speed rail lines,
though it anticipated time savings from existing projects, and especially the completion of the
CTRL and the modernisation of existing lines, and especially the West Coast Main Line (WCML).42
Indeed, for some time the emphasis of rail policy was on upgrading the existing infrastructure of
the major routes. As recently as 2006 the Eddington Transport Study argued that because Britain’s
urban centres were comparatively close to one another, in contrast with those in France and Spain,
existing rail services could provide adequate services. Eddington suggested that Britain should
not be ‘seduced by grands projets with speculative returns’, and should only pursue HSR options
where they were demonstrably ‘the highest value for money option to relieve congested corridors’.
This position was supported by the British Government in a white paper.43 Major upgrades have
enabled modestly higher speeds to be introduced on two of the country’s main arteries: the
East Coast Main Line (ECML, implemented by the British Railways Board in the late 1980s);
and the WCML (by the privatised Railtrack and Network Rail, completed in 2008). On the latter,
the deployment of Pendolino tilting trains by Virgin Trains has helped to improve journey times,
even though the maximum operating speed is restricted to 200kph. Indeed, the upgrade cost so
much that with hindsight the money (some £9 billion) might have been better spent on a new line.44
Relieving congestion was a major motive for the upgrade, of course, but there were numerous
disputes about sharing the capacity among the various users while the work was continuing, and
all the indications are that further capacity will be required on the southern part of the route.45
40 Gourvish (2006), 159, 167.

41 Gourvish (2006), pp.379-82.
42 DETR (2000), p.47; Gourvish (2008), pp.47-8.
43 Eddington (2006), vol.2, p.70, vol.3, pp.141, 208-9; DfT (July 2007), p.62.
44 Cf. HC Transport Committee (2008), para.27.
45 Gourvish (2008), pp.202-9; Network Rail, Capacity analysis (2009).
13
iv. Germany, Italy and Spain

In Germany, as in Britain, train speeds were restrained by the limitations of the infrastructure and
by the railways’ traffic characteristics, with a mixed operating system of freight and passengers
on the main network. Germany competed with France in the breaking of speed records, achieving
346kph in 1986 and 407kph in 1988,46 but its scheduled services were generally run at a British
pace on conventional tracks. With rail traffic declining, the government decided in 1969 to upgrade
and extend Germany’s inter-city network. The main thrust of the plan was to build new lines
to reduce bottlenecks on the most heavily patronised route, the long-distance, 950-kilometre
railway from Hamburg to Munich, via Hannover, Frankfurt and Stuttgart. Here new sections, from
Hannover to Würzburg and from Mannheim to Stuttgart, were opened in 1991 with a maximum
speed of 280kph and the first InterCity Expresses (ICEs) were introduced. The network served
by ICE services was then just over 1,000 kilometres.47 More construction followed, after the east
and west German railways were merged as Deutsche Bahn AG in 1994: Hannover-Berlin in 1998;
Köln‑Frankfurt in 2002/04, Germany’s first 300kph line; and Hamburg-Berlin in 2004 (this latter
route was also earmarked for a MAGLEV project, which was abandoned in 2000).48
In policy terms the Germans have steered a mid-course between the French and Japanese
approaches, building both new lines and upgrading others. Progress has been made incrementally
with small enhancements to major routes. Policy was also affected by the need to embrace
reconstruction and unification objectives following the collapse of the East German State in 1989,
which was a critical factor in the Hannover-Berlin and Hamburg-Berlin projects, and by Germany’s
position at the centre of Europe, which encouraged a higher proportion of international train
services. A mountainous terrain, and the requirement to build sections to easier gradients so
that freight could also use the new infrastructure, made construction costs comparatively high.
In addition, expenditure was affected by Germany’s heightened environmental awareness and
concern, and by a more complex, decentralised political milieu.49 All this meant that construction
costs were inevitably higher than with the French TGV – as much as three times higher per
kilometre. At the same time the more limited impact of the ICE, in comparison with that of the TGV
and Shinkansen, means that the pay-off in terms of traffic generation has not been as great as in
Japan and France.50
46 Allen (1992), pp.115-16; Ebeling (2005), 37.

47 Sands (1993), 203-4.
48 Perl (2002), pp.37-40.
49 Sands (1993), 203, 209; Dunn and Perl (1994), 325ff.; Perl (2002), pp.32-4; Ebeling (2005), 37-8.
50 Perl (2002), p.35.
14
Italy had pioneered the approach taken by the Germans, i.e. the upgrading of sections of the basic
infrastructure, but had also led the development of an interim approach to HSRs, the use of tilting
trains. The main network is a T-shape with a West-East route in the north from Turin to Milan and
Venice, and a North-South route connecting Milan, Florence and Bologna with Rome and Naples.
As early as 1913 Italy had taken steps to improve the infrastructure between Bologna and Florence
with a new direttissima, and a second line, shortening the Rome-Naples route, was completed in
1927. By 1939 Italy was one of the railway leaders in Europe, but progress was slow after the war.
For several decades train performance was constrained by the limitations of the infrastructure,51
and achievement trailed behind aspiration. A plan of 1962 envisaged train speeds of 250kph,
and in 1969 work began on a further improvement of the Rome-Florence line. The engineering
challenges were formidable, and progress was slow. Some sections were opened in 1981 and 1984,
but speeds did not increase materially, and it was not until 1992 that the new Rome-Florence line
was completed with the capability to handle speeds of up to 250kph. And it was sometime before
additional lines were opened: in 2006, Rome-Naples and Turin-Novara; and in 2008, a new Milan-
Bologna section (all these at a maximum of 300kph). Much earlier, in 1976, the Pendolino tilting
train had first been put into commercial use on the Rome-Ancona line. Public reception of the
train was little better than the British experience of the APT, however, and the technology was not
perfected until 1988, when the ETR-450 Pendolino was successfully introduced on the Rome-Milan
route. The new trains covered the distance at just under 150kph and cut an hour off the previous
best scheduled time. Then the decision was taken to build HSRs and the non-tilting ETR-500 was
deployed on a new service on the route in late 2008. In 2009 the fastest Milan-Bologna service
averaged 178kph, and the Milan-Rome service 163kph.52
Spain was rather late in developing HSRs, but this was scarcely surprising. A relatively poor
country for much of the post-war period, it gained substantially from joining the European Union
in 1986. Its broad gauge [1668mm] railways contributed to its isolation, and RENFE’s prospects
were hampered by the comparatively large distances between the major population centres.
The development of interchangeable gauge equipment for rolling stock by the Spanish company
Talgo facilitated through traffic to France and beyond,53 but the extent of this was limited.
A comprehensive rail plan was drawn up in 1987 and a series of further plans followed in 1993,
1997 and 2005. The decision was taken to build new lines to the standard gauge, and the first of
these, the 471-kilometre line between Madrid and Seville, was opened in 1992. As in Japan and
France, the easing of capacity constraints was a major stimulus, but the new AVE service produced
51 See Allen (1992), pp.122-4.

52 Taylor (2009), 66.
53 Allen (1992), pp.172-4.
15
a dramatic reduction in journey times and the impact in terms of traffic generation and abstraction
from the airlines was large and instantaneous. Encouraged by this success Spain completed a
new 621-kilometre line serving its main artery, Madrid-Barcelona, which was opened in stages
in 2003, 2006 and 2008, and a Madrid to Valladolid line in 2007. In the same year Malaga was
connected to the new network via Cordoba on the Madrid-Seville line. Some of the changes have
been dramatic. The journey-time between Madrid and Seville was cut from 61/2 hours to 2 hours 32
minutes. Barcelona, which is 150 kilometres further from Madrid than Seville, can now be reached
in 2 hours 38 minutes, which has reduced the airlines’ share of the traffic from 88 to 52 per cent.54
v. Asia
After Japan Asian HSRs have been built in South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey and mainland China. South
Korea’s KTX, based on the TGV model, began operating from Seoul to Dongdaegu at up to 300kph
in 2004. It reduced the journey-time from Seoul to Busan to 2 hours 40 minutes. In the following
year Taiwan began a high-speed Shinkansen-type service from Taipei to Kaohsiung. Turkey
has this year opened the Ankara-Eskisehir section of its main route from Ankara to Istanbul.
China’s headlong industrial revolution has embraced the substantial upgrading of its large rail
network. As one commentator has observed, there is an ‘incredible potential market’ for HSRs
here.55 Pursuing a ‘corridor-building’ approach, China has opened 1,194 kilometres of HSR in
2008-09 (Table 1, and Appendix, Table 2), including the 120-kilometre Beijing-Tianjin line, where
the maximum speed is 350kph. China has also developed MAGLEV technology for commercial
operation over a short route from Shanghai Airport to Shanghai’s financial district, opened in
December 2003. The maximum speed reached is 430kph. With a further 9,000 kilometres of
HSR under construction and due to be completed by 2012 and plans for a final network of 25,000
kilometres [out of a total of c.80,000kms] there is no doubting the ambition of this state-sponsored
railway industry.56
vi. Rest of the world

Elsewhere HSRs are comparatively rare. Australia appears to have abandoned plans for faster
railways after a decision taken in 2002, while in the USA only the north-eastern corridor from
Boston to New York and Washington is remotely fast, using tilting trains on Amtrak’s Acela
Express. Nevertheless, the service has helped to capture more than half of the rail-air market
between Washington and New York, and around 40 per cent of the Boston-New York market.57
54 Givoni (2006), 600; Nadal (2009).

55 Gerondeau (1997), p.134.
56 Wang et al. (2009).
57 Black (2005), 18; Givoni (2006), 599-600.
16
3. Prospects: HSRs under construction and in the

planning stage
In 1996 about 5,000 kilometres of railway were operating at 200kph+, and by the autumn of 2009
the network had increased to some 12,000 kilometres. Both figures are however dwarfed by
the 13,000 under construction and due to be completed by 2012 (Appendix Tables 1-3). Plans
have been produced for a further 17,000 kilometres by 2025. If all of these plans matured the
network would be an impressive 42,000 kilometres. As have seen, China is leading the way.
It has 9,000 kilometres under construction, including the Beijing–Shanghai and Beijing-Wuhan
lines (1,300 and 1,100kms respectively); planning extends to a further 2,900 kilometres. Japan is
currently constructing a further 590 kilometres, including Hachinohe-Shin Aomori, and Hakata-
Shin Yatsushiro, the latter completing the line on Kyushu from Kagoshima to Hakata. It is also
planning a further 583 kilometres, including the completion of the link to Sapporo on Hokkaido
island. Turkey hopes to complete the 533-kilometre Ankara-Istanbul line by 2011, and has plans
for c.1,700 kilometres more railway. The United States has identified a number of rail corridors
for planning purposes, and the Transportation Department has published an ambitious strategic
plan.58 However, the only serious scheme appears to be the 837-kilometre route from Los Angeles
to San Francisco. Recently President Obama lent his support to the rail plan, but the prospects
of any investment seem remote. The US Government Accountability Office has concluded that
the economic viability of rail projects was difficult to ascertain, and that the high construction
costs provided an immense challenge to project development.59 Limited plans are in existence
elsewhere, in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, India, Iran, Argentina, and Brazil. In Europe Spain will be the
most active country over the next decade. Aiming to connect all its provincial capitals with HSRs
by 2020, it is constructing 2,200 kilometres, 75 per cent of which are to be completed by 2012,
and has plans for 1,700 kilometres more.60 France will add only 300 kilometres by 2012, but has
ambitious plans in place for 2,600 more by 2025. Four projects have been declared ‘publicly useful’:
Phase 2 of the LGV Est from Baudrecourt to Strasbourg; the Nîmes-Montpellier by-pass; Le Mans-
Rennes; and Tours-Bordeaux. Germany has 400 kilometres under construction, with an additional
700 kilometres in the planning stage. Other plans involve Poland (700kms), Portugal (1,000kms),
and Sweden (750kms).
58 US Department of Transportation (2009).

59 US GAO (2009), p.12ff.
60 Nadal (2009).
17
In Britain concerns about future capacity following a 40 per cent increase in rail traffic in a decade,
and the operational success of the CTRL or High Speed 1, where reductions in travelling times
led to traffic increases in both 2003 and 2007, have stimulated a consideration of the possibilities
offered by more HSRs. Proponents of a change in policy were able to draw on a study undertaken
by the consultants W.S. Atkins for the Strategic Rail Authority in 2001-03. Asked to examine
the prospects for a North-South line, Atkins concluded that there was both a good transport
case and a good business case for the new line: by freeing up capacity on existing lines, the line
would provide ‘substantial benefits to the national and regional economies’.61 In October 2007 a
Department for Transport white paper entitled Towards a Sustainable Transport System included
a high-speed rail line as one of the possible options for the London-Birmingham-Manchester
corridor, and an updated and still optimistic version of the business case for a North-South line
was produced by Atkins in March 2008.62 In June the Department for Transport asked Network
Rail to examine options for Britain’s main rail corridors. Thus, in the following month the House
of Commons Transport Committee was able to report more favourably on the prospects for
high-speed railways, noting that by this time the government had become more receptive to the
idea.63 Network Rail studied four rail corridors in depth: the ECML; WCML; Midland Main Line
[London-East Midlands/Sheffield]; and the Great Western Main Line. A capacity analysis led it to
conclude that on the WCML there was ‘a significant demand-capability gap in 2020’ and that the
route was ‘now effectively full over key route sections’.64 Consequently a new line from London to
Birmingham, named High Speed Two [HS2], is currently in the planning stage and a company was
established to prepare a case under the chairmanship of Sir David Rowlands. The company has
also been asked to provide advice on a wider network up to Scotland. Early work suggests journey
times from London of 49 minutes to Birmingham, 1 hour 20 minutes to Manchester and 2 hours
40 minutes to Edinburgh and Glasgow. One of the network options identified in a preliminary
study by Network Rail, with a notional cost of some £54 billion, indicated revenue and benefits
of a similar amount over the 60-year life of the project.65
61 Atkins (2003); SRA (2005). The report’s detailed findings were made public in April 2009: www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/researchtech/research/
atkinshighspeed.
62 DfT (October 2007); Atkins (2008).
63 HC Transport Committee (2008), paras.23-5; DfT (2009).
64 Network Rail, Capacity analysis (2009), 1.7-1.8.
65 Network Rail, Case for New Lines (2009). N.b. this study was over-optimistic about achievable journey times.
18
4. The impact of HSRs

Impact studies have been fairly limited in the academic and professional literature, mostly confined
to cost-benefit and costing exercises ex ante, rather than backchecks ex post. Some early efforts
were made to measure the effects of new lines, based on the experience with the early Shinkansen
and TGV services. For example, in 1987 Bonnafous examined the effects of the first TGV on the
regional economy of Lyon and the Rhône-Alpes region in the mid 1980s. Later, Gutiérrez et al.
undertook a forecasting exercise in order to determine the areas which might benefit most from
HSR construction. Vickerman and Nash have contributed several papers on the impact of high-
speed rail services in Europe, Preston and Wall have examined the impact in Britain, and Spanish
scholars have been particularly active, notably De Rus, Inglada and Nombela.66 In this section we
examine the arguments made for and against investment in higher-speed railways.
Transport effects:
i. Time savings
One of the easiest elements to compute, time savings have been generated by all HSRs, although
the precise extent depends on whether the primary aim is to reduce the time between urban
centres, or to increase transport capacity, and on which transport modes one is comparing.
Old and new rail times yield straightforward calculations. Here, some of the more dramatic time
savings are reproduced in Table 4. For example, the Tokaido Shinkansen slashed the time for a
Tokyo-Osaka journey from 7 hours to 4 hours, and it now stands at 2 hours 25 minutes, a third of
the original time. On the Madrid-Seville journey, the time taken fell from 61/2 hours to just over
21/2 hours, a saving of nearly four hours. The building of the Channel Tunnel more than halved
the time taken by the combined rail and sea operators from London to Paris, and achieved much
more than that on the London-Brussels route. Of course, on some routes savings have been more
modest, for example in Germany between Köln and Frankfurt, and on Britain’s West Coast Main
Line, but in overall terms, new HSRs, as opposed to upgrades, have shaved some 30-60 per cent
off the original journey-times. It is a fairly simple matter to compute the value of the time saved,
although some of the assumptions made by transport economists engaged in this process are
contested. Nevertheless, Japan’s time savings were put at h3.7 billion a year in the early 1990s,
and given the investment in HSRs since then, the savings must be higher than this today.67 The
calculations become more complicated when we compare a new railway service with the motor
car and the airline. A recent study based on evidence from seven countries suggested that where
conventional rail services were running at 130kph, the introduction of HSR services would yield a
66 Bonnafous (1987); Nash (1991); Gutiérrez et al. (1996); Vickerman (1995, 1997, 2007, 2009); de Rus and Inglada (1997); de Rus and Nombela (2007); de
Rus (2008); Preston and Wall (2008).
67 Givoni (2006), 600.
19
time saving of 45-50 minutes on journeys of 350-400 kilometres.68 However, when we turn to road
transport, the time savings gained from using the railway may be offset in whole or in part by the
additional time taken to reach the precise destination. This is likely to occur with comparatively
short journeys (of up to 80 kilometres), especially where road congestion levels are lower than
average. With air transport the opposite applies. The longer the journey, the more likely it is that
the convenience of rail in terms of final destination will be offset by the time savings offered by air
services. This is certainly the case with journeys of longer than 800 kilometres.
Table 4. HSR time savings: some examples

Before After After Saving Saving
Route % gain % gain
[min] [1: initial] [min] [2: now] [min] 1 [min] 2 [min]
Tokyo- Osaka 420 240 145 180 43 275 65
Paris-Lyon 227 160 115 67 30 112 49
Madrid-Seville 390 152 140 238 61 250 64
London-Paris 380-420 195 135 185-225 49-54 245-285 64-68
Source: various.
ii. Demand
When Britain’s West Coast Main Line was electrified in the 1960s, patronage increased as a result
of what was called the ‘sparks effect’: a 26 per cent reduction in the London-Manchester journey
time produced a 27 per cent increase in demand.69 This phenomenon has been replicated with
all subsequent HSRs, most of which use electric traction. The increase in frequency/capacity,
speed and city centre-city centre convenience – have all stimulated the demand for passenger rail
services, and in several countries have halted the railways’ secular traffic decline. In Japan, the
Tokaido line’s traffic increased from 11 billion passenger-kilometres in 1965 to 32 billion in 1987,
and 46 billion in 2008. Total Japanese Shinkansen traffic reached 74 billion in 1991 and is now over
80 billion; the Shinkansen’s share of the total Japanese passenger rail market doubled from 15 per
cent in 1970 to 30 per cent in 1990, then remained fairly stable at just below this figure, and is now
about 23 per cent.70 In France, the contrast between pre-TGV and post-TGV operation was marked.
In 1980, 12.2 million passengers had used the old Paris-Lyon line; within five years passenger
numbers had increased to 19.2 million, with 75 per cent of them TGV customers. By 1992, numbers
had increased to 23 million, and the railway’s market-share of Paris-Lyon traffic had increased to
about 90 per cent.71 Total TGV passenger numbers increased from 6.5 million 1982 to 73.1 million
68 Steer Davies Gleave (2004), pp.23-4.

69 Evans (1969), cit. in Nash (1991), 13.
70 UIC data to 1997 cit. in Perl (2002), pp.20-1; more recent data from JR East and Central.
71 Bonnafous (1987), 129; Vickerman (1997), 24; Meunier (2002), p.224.
20
in 1998, and as a percentage of SNCF passengers, rose from under 1 per cent in 1982 to nearly
9 per cent in 1998. Market-widening effects were also evident in France, with the TGV’s impact
extending well beyond the confines of the upgraded lines themselves, either by running on over
conventional tracks or via an interchange with conventional trains. Thus the new Paris-Lyon line
had a stimulating effect on impact on demand much further afield, for example to St. Etienne,
Marseille and Annecy. In 1997 Vickerman noted that the investment in 500 kilometres of new line
had transformed services over a network of some 2,500 kilometres, while the TGV-Atlantique
served a similar network with only 300 kilometres of new construction, producing a 50 per cent
increase in Paris-Bordeaux rail traffic.72 Thus, if passenger-kilometres are used, the TGV’s share
of total rail traffic is of course much higher than for passenger numbers. According to Perl, it rose
from under seven per cent in 1982 to 75 per cent in 1998.73 However, these calculations appear
to be based on long-distance journeys. SNCF’s data for 2008 shows that TGV network traffic
amounted to 50 billion passenger-kilometres in that year: this was 83 per cent of the long-distance
traffic, but only 59 per cent of all railway passenger-kilometres.74
Germany presents a more complex picture. Without the dominance of a single major urban hub
such as Tokyo, Paris or London, the transport effects of its investment in improved inter-city
services are spread across a network of smaller cities and are therefore more difficult to capture.
It appears that the impact of its investment in HSRs has been less dramatic than in Japan or
France, and in 1999 the ICE share of total German rail traffic was only 16 per cent, half that in
Japan and a quarter of the figure for France. Nevertheless, after the initial investments in 1991
the number of ICE passengers increased from six million to 26 million in 1996 and 36 million in
1999, and there were further gains in the first decade of the 21st century. In 2004 its high-speed
passenger traffic amounted to 19.6 billion passenger-kilometres, more than double the level in
1994 (Table 5).75 In Italy and Spain there have been more modest levels of passenger numbers and
passenger-kilometres travelled: in 2004 only 7.9 and 2.8 billion passenger-kilometres respectively.
Here, as elsewhere, some of the demand represents a diversion from existing rail services.76
In Britain, patronage of the Channel Tunnel services has grown as its new high-speed line was
opened in stages. Eurostar passenger traffic increased from under three million in 1995 to about
seven million in the five years before the opening of the first section of High Speed 1 in September
2003. Patronage increased to nearly eight million in 2006, and the completion of HS1 in November
2007 provided a further stimulus. Passenger numbers were 21 per cent up in the first quarter of
2008, but since then have been affected by the world-wide recession.77
72 Vickerman (1997), 26, 31; Streeter (1993), 185-7.

73 Perl (2002), p.27-8.
74 SNCF (2008).
75 Perl (2002), p.35; Campos and de Rus (2009), 27. Vickerman (1997), 28-9 gives ICE passengers as 10 million in 1991 and under 23 million in 1996.
76 Vickerman (1997), p.30.
77 Gourvish (2006), p.370; Preston and Wall (2008), 405; Eurotunnel data.
21
A further demonstration of the potential for HSR trains has been the increased use of the services for
commuting purposes. In Japan, significant growth has been observed in the use of the Shinkansen for
commuting into Tokyo from Takasaki (Joetsu line) and Utsonomiya (Tohoku line). In Spain, commuter
traffic has been attracted to the AVE services, for example between Segovia and Madrid and between
Ciudad Real, Puertollano and Madrid. In Britain the recent introduction of a 37-minute domestic
commuter service from Ashford to St. Pancras on High Speed 1 has quickly exceeded initial expectations.
Although priced at a premium rate the new service, which was opened on a ‘preview’ basis in June 2009,
saw traffic build up quickly, so that some trains lengths had to be doubled.78 The variations in HSR traffic
levels and growth rates in Europe are evident from recent calculations made by Campos and de Rus.
Analysing data for 1994-2004, they showed that the traffic more than doubled over the period. France
had the lowest growth-rate and Italy the highest rate, but both Italy and Spain experienced growth from a
very low base in 1994. In terms of absolute levels in 2004, France, with 41.5 billion passenger-kilometres,
contributed over half of Europe’s traffic; Italy and Spain together provided only 14 per cent (Table 5). A
recent calculation of the share HSRs have in total rail traffic in Europe is given in Table 6 for 2000 and
2006. It is not clear what definition of HSR has been used, but given the results, it appears to be confined
to new high-speed lines, and excludes higher speed services running on conventional tracks. On this
basis, the HSR share of the rail market has risen from 16 to 23 per cent. France has the highest share,
followed by Spain and Germany; Britain has the lowest share. The most spectacular growth has been in
Spain, where the share has increased four-fold from under 10 to over 38 per cent.
Table 5. Growth in HSR traffic in Europe, 1994-2004 (bn. Pass-kms)

Year France Germany Italy Spain Europe
1994 21.9 8.2 0.8 0.9 32.1
1999 32.2 10.2 4.4 1.7 52.7
2004 41.5 19.6 7.9 2.8 75.9
Growth 1994-2004 89% 139% 888% 222% 136%
% share of Europe’s
55% 26% 10% 4%
traffic in 2004
Source: Campos and de Rus (2009), 27.
Table 6. HSRs share of the total European rail market, 2000-2006 [%]
Year Europe (EU27) France Germany Spain Italy UK
2000 16.0 49.7 18.5 9.6 10.8 0.0
2006 23.4 57.2 27.4 38.3 19.2 1.0
Source: Vickerman (2009)
78 Eguchi (2008); Vickerman (1997), 30; Southeastern Railway press releases, 2 July-19 November 2009. The British commuter service is to open in full in
December 2009, when it will be extended to Canterbury and the Kent Coast.
22
iii. Modal shares
Several factors determine the extent to which HSRs not only generate new traffic, but also
capture traffic from airlines, road transport, and existing rail services. These include the density
of the population served, the number and location of stations, the location and quality of airport
and motorway infrastructures, and the design of HSR services. The most quoted changes in
modal shares are those for Paris-Lyon, 1981-84 and Madrid-Seville, 1991-94 (Table 7). Here the
introduction of high-speed services had a swift and significant impact. In these markets, where
the total traffic went up by 37 and 35 per cent respectively, the proportion travelling by air declined
sharply, and in the Paris-Lyon case has all but disappeared. A report by Steer Davies Gleave in
2004 noted that the TGV now enjoyed 91 per cent of the Paris-Lyon rail-air market, 89 per cent of
that between Paris and Nantes, and about 60 per cent of the Paris-Bordeaux and Paris-Marseille
markets. A relatively generous pricing policy for TGV services also contributes to these relatively
high market-shares.79 In northern Europe the Eurostar services between Paris and London,
Paris and Brussels and London and Brussels have also produced a dramatic shift away from
short-haul air services. For example, Eurostar now has around 71 per cent of the London-Paris
rail–air market, and 64 per cent of the London-Brussels market.80 In general, the contemporary
data indicate that high-speed railways customarily take at least 70 per cent of the rail-air market
on journeys below three hours.81 More recently, the emphasis seems to have switched from
competition with short-haul and other air services to modal complementarity. Some of the newer
stations opened on HSRs, for example that at Paris-CDG airport (1994) and Frankfurt (1999),
are designed to facilitate improved interchange between the two modes of transport. London-
Heathrow is another candidate for this kind of approach.82
Table 7. Changes in modal traffic shares for Paris-Lyon and Madrid-Seville [%]
Mode Paris-Lyon Madrid-Seville
Before/1981 After/1984 Before/1991 After/1994
Air 31 7 40 13
Train 40 72 16 51
Car/bus 29 21 44 36
Source: EC COST 318 (1996), cit by Givoni (2006), 601.
79 Steer Davies Gleave (2004), appendix B2.

80 Gourvish (2006), p.371; Preston and Wall (2008), 405.
81 Nash (2009) cit. Steer Davies Gleave (2006).
82 Ulrich et al. (2009), 27.
23
iv. Investment costs and returns
HSRs are expensive to build, and much of the investment represents sunk costs in fixed and
unsubstitutable assets. The returns on these investments vary. They depend on the extent of
engineering and environmental costs, and in turn on the extent and nature of the demand for
passenger transport. Case studies indicate that costs have varied widely over time and over
different projects. Earlier we quoted some figures assembled by Ardui and Ni in 2005, which
indicated a construction cost per kilometre ranging from $4 million for the LGV Sud-Est, to
$74 million for Britain’s High Speed 1.83 Their sources are not revealed, but De Rus and Nombela
have used W.S Atkins data to show that infrastructure costs per kilometre ranged from h12 million
in Spain to h32 in Germany and over h45 in the Netherlands. They have also suggested that
rolling stock cost a further h1.2 million per kilometre.84 Calculations have also been made by
Steer Davies Gleave and, more recently, by Campos and de Rus. The latter gathered data on 45
HSR projects and found the cost range per kilometre to be h6 to h45 million, with an average
of h17.5 million; for the 24 projects which were in operation the range was h9 to h39, with an
average of h18 million (all in 2005 prices). These figures exclude the cost of planning, land, and
rolling stock. The highest costs were found in Italy, the lowest in Spain and France. With the
exception of China, construction costs were generally higher in Asia than in Europe, though the
British and Dutch projects examined by Steer Davies Gleave, viz. HS1 and the HSL Zuid, were found
to be generating exceptionally high costs, their final cost estimated to lie in the range c.h50-70
million per kilometre.85 Campos and de Rus also observed that prior experience of construction
did not lead to economies. In Japan, as we have already noted, the Tokaido line, while thought
expensive at the time, was economical to build in comparison with the lines that followed. Campos
and de Rus put the cost at h5.4 million per kilometre in 2005 prices, a figure which the more
recent Shinkansen projects exceeded by three or four times.86 The same thing has happened in
France, where the LGV Sud-Est cost h4.7 million while the LGV-Méditerranée cost h12.9 million.87
Turning to operating and maintenance costs, the variations by country do not appear to be as great
as for construction. Campos and de Rus examined HSRs in France, Germany, Italy and Spain.
Maintenance costs were found to range between J28,000 (France) and J33,000 (Spain) per track-
kilometre (in 2002 prices). Taking both operating and maintenance costs together, the lowest cost
per seat-kilometre was found to be for the French TGV Duplex and Réseau trains - h0.08 and
h0.10 respectively. The highest was for the Italian ETR-500 and the German ICE-2 trains, where
the cost was 0.18 and 0.19.88
83 Ardui and Ni (2005), 22-3.

84 De Rus and Nombela (2007), 5-6; Atkins (2003), and supporting papers.
85 Campos and de Rus (2009), 22-3; Steer Davies Gleave (2004), 32-3.
86 Campos and de Rus (2009), 23. Hood (2006), 94 draws a sharper distinction, the Tokaido and Sanyo lines costing c.¥3 bn per km, while the extensions
from Omiya and Ueno into Tokyo cost ¥26 and ¥37bn per km.
87 Campos and de Rus (2009), 23; Streeter (1993), 193-4, draws a similar contrast between Sud-Est [7.77 bn FF] and Atlantique [16.34 bn FF, 1986 prices].
88 Campos and de Rus (2009), 25.
24
Returns to investment are more difficult to compute, but it is clear that the Japanese Tokaido
and the French Sud-Est investments, which were not subsidised by the State, were successful in
financial terms. As we have seen, the $550 million Tokaido line was an instant financial success,
though remaining part of a loss-making national state railway system which was privatised (while
still retaining substantial government support) in 1987. After three years’ operating, the Tokaido’s
revenue stream was greater than its costs including interest on debt and depreciation. In France
the investment in Paris-Lyon service was justified by expectations of a 12 per cent financial rate
of return which was exceeded (c.15 per cent); and as we have noted, capital investment in the
line was fully amortised after only 12 years.89 But these are lines with over 10 million passengers
per annum; Madrid-Seville, for all its trumpeting, has only carried five million passengers, and
most of the other lines built have required some degree of government support, and in many
cases have needed full support. More recently, the waters have been muddied in Europe by the
EU requirement that the railways’ infrastructure and operating functions should be separated.
In these conditions, transactions between the two or more railway institutions are critical, and
the financial prospects for HSRs often turn on the level of access charges which operators pay.90
Nevertheless, recent computations of French rates of return indicate a seven per cent return for
TGV-Atlantique, 6.5 per cent for the Paris Interconnexion, but only 2.9 per cent for TGV-Nord.
The social rates of return appear much higher, of course: 30 per cent for Sud-Est, 14 per cent for
Paris Interconnexion, 12% for TGV-Atlantique, and five per cent for Nord.91 In general, it can be
said that HSRs have produced financial returns, but with the exception of the most promising early
investments, have not been particularly profitable. It is safe to assume that future projects are
unlikely to make the kind of profits which would attract unequivocal private sector participation.
5. The impact of HSRs: broader socio-economic effects

HSRs can generate broader benefits. These may accrue to users of the railway in the form of
reduced accident levels, higher comfort levels and other externalities, and for non-users there may
be benefits arising from an increase in economic growth derived from a change in the level and
composition of economic activity. For example, the provision of more comfortable city centre-city
centre access is a clear benefit, even if quantification is not straightforward. Furthermore, there
is little doubt that where a high-speed service attracts private motorists to the railways, the result
will be a reduction in costly transport accidents. Conventional measures of safety, such as the
number of fatalities per billion passenger-kilometres, reveal a clear advantage for rail and air over
89 Vickerman (1997), 26; Pol (2002), p.155.

90 Nash (2009).
91 Vickerman (2009), cit. CGPC (2005).
25
road transport.92 However, the calculation is not entirely straightforward, and it has been
pointed out that the millions saved from the avoidance of road fatalities are offset by the cost
of the infrastructure separation which a railway requires. Savings may also be made in the
form of reduced congestion, not only on the roads, but also in crowded air corridors and at the
main airports.93
6. The impact of HSRs: more contested effects

Several of the imputed socio-economic effects of HSRs are contested, that is to say that some
economists, geographers, planners and other professionals consider them to be exaggerated
or not to exist at all. Here we rehearse the main areas of debate.
i. Economic growth
Do HSRs stimulate economic growth? It is often assumed that the improvements in accessibility
which are created will enlarge markets and increase the competitiveness and productivity of firms
within a newly-connected region. However, most studies indicate that it would be unwise to pin
much faith in new railways as an engine of growth. This is not to say that a growth stimulus is
entirely absent. In 1997 the European Commission estimated that the major TENs would add only
0.25 per cent to EU GDP, and 0.11 per cent to employment over 25 years. The literature review of
Preston and Wall produced the conclusion that the growth impact of HSRs was likely to lie within
the modest range of 1-3 per cent of GDP.94
ii. Regional and local economic effects, including regeneration
High-speed rail services theoretically reduce the locational imbalance between the core cities
and the periphery, notably by bringing provincial centres within easier reach of the capital.
On the other hand, the economic imbalance between the centre and the periphery may well
increase.95 Consequently, much argument surrounds the regional and local impact of high-
speed railway investment. Does a high speed line boost the image and accessibility of regional
centres, with accompanying investment and employment effects? Or does a new line merely
strengthen the competitive advantage of the dominant city, for example by extending the area
of commuting, thereby producing detrimental effects on smaller cities, and in particular on
those which are by-passed by the line? How do new lines affect property prices, office costs,
and land and labour markets? Circumstances vary, and much depends on the positioning of
HSR stations, both terminals and intermediate ones, and the pattern of services – whether the
92 Gourvish (2002), pp.360-2; DfT, TSGB (2009), Table 1.7.

93 Cf. Givoni (2006).
94 Preston and Wall (2008), 419; Karim and Matthewson (2008).
95 Gutiérrez et al. (1996).
26
trains make few or several stops. In our review of the literature we start by considering the
impact of the Paris-Lyon TGV from the early 1980s. One of the earliest contributions was from
Bonnafous, who gathered survey data to examine the impact of the new line on the tourism
and service industries of the Rhône-Alpes region. By the time of his study (1987) the TGV was
serving Grenoble, in addition to St. Etienne, Dijon and Besançon. Bonnafous maintained that
fears about Lyon’s growing dependency on Paris were exaggerated. The situation was once again
complex. While Lyon’s hoteliers lost out when Parisians could comfortably do business there in
a day, hoteliers elsewhere in the region saw a growth in demand as tourism was encouraged.
Professional services such as consulting and market research were given a boost by the new
line, and an analysis of 40 businesses in the Rhône-Alpes and Burgundy regions suggested that
they, rather than enterprises in Paris, were the main beneficiaries. Medium sized enterprises in
particular seized the opportunity offered by the TGV to penetrate the Paris market.96 Mannone’s
subsequent study found that the Sud-Est LGV was only one of a number of factors in locational
decision-making by businesses. The pattern of industrial location in France was shaped by broader
economic forces, and the provision of a high speed line played only a secondary role in determining
the economic development of cities along France’s south-east corridor.97 Further studies of French
TGVs have indicated some growth nodes, for example at Valence, but in general they underline the
limited impact the projects have had on the net redistribution of economic activity between Paris
and the provincial cities.98
Japanese reports are often bullish about the developmental and regenerative impact of the
Shinkansen services and Shinkansen stations. For example, developments at Kakegawa, 230
kilometres from Tokyo on the Tokaido line, have attracted attention. Apparently, the building of
a station there in 1988 stimulated tourism and led to an eight per cent increase in commercial
employment by 1992.99 On the other hand, disinterested observers are often more circumspect
about the effects, noting that while population and employment growth may be higher in areas
served by the Shinkansen, other factors are also at work, and some of the growth may have been
‘imported’ from other areas.100 After twenty years of data-gathering on the impact of the Tokaido
line, the evidence indicated Tokyo’s continued growth but a much slower rate of growth in Osaka
and Nagoya.101 As regards urban regeneration, in particular around the major termini, Lille is often
cited as a success story, and expectations about the St. Pancras/King’s Cross area in London are
high, as they are near Brussels Midi station and at Rotterdam Centraal. It has also been suggested
that Britain’s creative industries would benefit from the agglomeration or ‘clustering’ effects which
96 Bonnafous (1987), 135-6; Meunier (2002), p.224.

97 Bonnafous (1990), 35-8; Mannone (1995).
98 Vickerman, ‘Recent Evolution’ (2007), 14-15.
99 Okada (1994), 14-16, and cf. also Rietveld et al. (2001), 9.
100 Sands (1993), 267-8; Givoni (2006), 603-4.
101 Meunier (2002), p.221.
27
High Speed 2 would encourage.102 And yet caution persists. Mannone found that the revitalisation
of areas around Lyon Part-Dieu and Grenoble stations produced locational shifts from within the
region rather than new activity.103 And in Lille, the critical factors were not only the HSR service,
but its location in northern Europe and the determination of the local authority planners to make
the ‘Eurolille’ district a success. They gave considerable thought to internal transport links,
including a tramway system, which stimulated development in the new commercial district, though
we must be careful not to exaggerate its success.104 Preston and Wall’s work on Ashford, and
other stations on HS1, suggests that wider economic benefits are ‘difficult to detect’, swamped by
external factors and are more likely to result when complemented by supportive planning policies.
The regeneration of Stratford in east London will surely owe as much to the growing importance of
Canary Wharf as a business district and the preparations for the Olympic Games as to High Speed
1 per se.
Regional benefits, then, are not axiomatic, and while new railways and their stations may be a
necessary condition, they are not a sufficient condition for successful development. As Vickerman
and others have pointed out, there is a ‘mythical belief’ that HSRs can solve both transport and
regional development problems, but in many cases the impact is to redistribute rather than
generate economic activity.105 Indeed, as Banister and Berechman have observed, the most
disappointing results are for the two intermediate stations on the Paris-Lyon line, i.e. Le Creusot
and Mâcon-Loché, where growth has been modest. The same phenomenon may be seen at Haute-
Picardie on the LGV-Nord, although traffic has built up there,106 in Limburg and Montabaur on the
Köln-Frankfurt line, and at Ashford and Calais on the London-Brussels/Paris route, and, indeed, in
Kent generally.107 We must not discount the prospect of a regional growth stimulus from HSRs but
it would be wise to remain agnostic, following commentators such as Vickerman, Puga, Nash and
Givoni, and we should emphasise that each project must be analysed carefully on its own merits.108
The choice of office location may indeed be influenced by the accessibility advantages offered by
HSRs, but it remains likely that transport and labour costs are more important in determining
location rather than whether there a high speed line is adjacent.109 The development of a high-
speed rail network in Europe ‘may widen rather than narrow differences in accessibility between
central and peripheral regions’.110
102 Bakker (2009).

103 Mannone (1995).
104 Cf. Van den Berg and Pol (1998), pp.86-93.
105 Vickerman (1997); Vickerman et al. (1999).
106 130m passengers in 1996, 325m in 2002: RFF (2005), p.30.
107 Banister and Berechman (2000); Hay, Meredith and Vickerman (2004); Givoni (2006), 605; Preston and Wall (2008), 406; Kamel and Matthewman (2008);
Hall (2009), 65.
108 Nash (1991), Givoni (2006).
109 Pol (2002), pp.124-6; Rietveld et al. (2001), 13.
110 Vickerman et al. (1999), 12; Puga (2002) 396.
28
iii. The environmental impact
It must be acknowledged that the construction and operation of railways produce a range of
environmental changes. First of all, there are obvious ‘downside effects’ in the form of ‘land take’,
barrier effects, visual intrusion, noise, and local air pollution. The evidence tends to be somewhat
fragmented, but there seems to be a consensus that noise is the most damaging element.111 From
the time of the Paris-Lyon TGV in the 1970s opposition to construction was mounted by a range of
interest groups, from road and air transport operators to landowners, farmers and householders.
All lines have experienced delays, however smooth the planning process, and, as we have seen,
opposition was more powerful in certain countries such as Germany. In France, the consumption
of prime agricultural land for the TGV-Atlantique was a particular bone of contention.112 In Japan,
where there was little or no opposition to the first Shinkansen, the impact of the new railway in
terms of noise and vibration was clearly underestimated, and subsequent construction has had
to conform with Environmental Agency requirements of 1975 on admissible noise.113 A similar
situation was evident with the Paris-Lyon TGV, where insufficient attention had been paid to noise
barriers.114 Current thinking is that the noise from high-speed trains is acceptable at speeds of up
to 300kph, especially where there is a separation from the infrastructure of at least 150 metres,
but that higher speeds produce more intrusive noise levels as a result of aerodynamic effects.115
As environmental concerns have grown, construction costs have risen to mitigate environmental
damage, via noise barriers, cuttings and tunnelling.
The precise impact of HSRs on air pollution and CO2 emissions is difficult to gauge, and there
are many factors which must be taken into consideration, including: the extent to which traffic
is ‘abstracted’, i.e. diverted, from other, more polluting, transport modes; the extent to which
new traffic is generated; the passenger loadings of trains, aircraft and road vehicles; and the
manner in which the energy used (chiefly electricity) is generated, both in the construction and
the operation of railways and competing transport modes. When operating, HSRs pollute the air
with sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx), but in general the problem is not considered
to be serious.116 Many claims have been made in the railways’ favour. These point out that rail is
environmentally friendlier, and has lower energy costs, than either air or motor transport. Campos
and de Rus cite a study undertaken by INFRAS/IWW for the International Union of Railways (UIC)
111 Cf. Givoni (2006), 606, Campos and de Rus (2009), 25

112 Strohl (1993), pp.85-6).
113 I.e. 70 decibels in residential areas, 75 decibels elsewhere. Perl (2002), pp.19-20; Hood (2006), pp.85-90, 174.
114 Strohl (1993), pp.76-7.
115 Givoni (2006), p.26; Campos and de Rus (2009), 25.
116 Cf. Givoni (2006), 606.
29
in 2000, to the effect that the energy consumed by high-speed railways, measured in litres of
petrol per 100 passenger-kilometres, was 2.5, comparing favourably with 6 for the private car and
7 for aeroplanes. Furthermore, CO2 emissions were reported to be 4 tonnes per 100 passenger-
kilometres for HSRs, 14 for cars and 17 for air.117 Greater disparities have been claimed by some
of the rail operators. Thus, as we have seen, SNCF has put its fuel consumption at 0.7 litres of
diesel fuel per 100 passenger-kilometres, compared with 3.3 litres for private road transport,
and 7.14 litres for domestic air lines. Its CO2 emissions are put at 5.7 grammes per passenger-
kilometre, which it notes are much lower than the 111 grammes for road and 180 grammes
for air.118 Load factors and the method of generating electricity (France has substantial nuclear
power plants) may explain these variations. Japanese sources have also reported positively on
the CO2 effects of their trains, quoting, in one calculation, 19 grammes per passenger-kilometre,
compared with 111 grammes for aeroplanes, and 173 grammes for the private car.119 Clearly, while
this evidence points up the potential advantages of rail over road and air, we must recognise that
comparisons can be affected by the occupancy rates of the vehicles being compared, the way in
which energy is produced, and, above all, by the energy and carbon emissions used to construct
a new railway in the first place. Some of the environmental gains may not always be justified by
the scale of the infrastructure investment.120 Nevertheless, an attempt to aggregate the marginal
external costs imposed by the various transport modes, undertaken by INFRAS/IWW in 2000,
produced a positive result for rail. Accidents, noise, air pollution, climate change and urban effects
were among the factors considered, but not congestion or capacity costs. The calculation revealed,
for example, that the rail costs for the Paris-Brussels corridor were h10.4 per 1,000 passenger-
kilometres, but h43.6 for the car, and h47.5 for air.121

118 Loubinoux (2009).
119 Eguchi (2008). More conservative comparisons – 100 rail – 500 air -750 car - are given in JORSA (2008).
120 See Nash (2009).
30
7. Conclusion
Do we need HSRs? In many ways the answer is as much a political as well as an economic one.
The historical evidence indicates that in the development of HSR projects there has always been
a significant political dimension.122 The most active countries – Japan, France, Spain, and, more
recently, China - have all exhibited a long-term political commitment to modernisation, and
included the enhancement of rail services as part of their agenda, although this is not to say that
their pro-rail policies have enjoyed total support.123 HSRs are clearly important where demand for
travel between large cities is high, as much as 12-15 million passengers per annum, and where
a much higher capacity is required to link such centres over distances up to 800 kilometres.
The rail corridor currently being explored by the HS2 project in Britain would seem to satisfy these
criteria. Improved rail services providing journey times of up to four hours and a comparatively
safe and reliable conveyance can offer positive economic and social benefits. The railway’s share
of the market for travel of up to 800 kilometres can be 50 per cent, and for 500 kilometres as high
as 80-90 per cent.124 More recently, the use of HSRs for longer-distance commuting of 100-200
kilometres has been evident. On the other hand, it must be conceded that capital costs are high,
and some commentators are sceptical about the prospects for rail beyond a fairly narrow niche of
journeys from 1-21/2 hours or about 250-600 kilometres, while others argue that the developmental
gains from HSRs are far from certain.125 There is no shortage of enthusiastic support for HSRs.126
But while there is clearly scope for further construction, returns to investment will not normally
be strong enough to attract private sector funding, and most projects will only thrive where
there is a large market, a substantial public sector commitment, and some degree of network
co‑ordination.127
Acknowledgements
I should like to thank the following for their assistance in the preparation of this report: Mike
Anson, Benoît Chevalier, John Dodgson, Tim Leunig, Henry Overman, Rod Smith, Kevin Tennent,
and Roger Vickerman. The views expressed are entirely mine, of course.
122 Cf. Dunn and Perl (1994), 311.

123 Cf. Perl (2002), p.15ff.; de Rus and Nombela (2007), 4.
124 Hall (2009), 63.
125 E.g. Gerondeau (1997), Vickerman (1997), Givoni (2006).
126 E.g. in Britain, Greengauge 21 (2006, 2007), and Future Rail 300 (2009). For a more measured assessment see Segal (2009).
127 Cf. Button (1998), 291; de Rus and Nombela (2007).
31
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37
Appendix
Table 1. High Speed Rail in operation, 1964-96
Date of Length Maximum

Line/Service Route Country
Opening [km] Speed [kph]
210 220 (1986)
1964 JNR Tokaido Shinkansen Tokyo-Osaka Japan 515
270 (1992)
210 220 (1986)
1972 JNR San’yo Shinkansen Osaka-Okayama Japan 161 270 (1992)
300 (2005)
210 220 (1986)
1975 JNR San’yo Shinkansen Okayama-Hakata [Fukuoka] Japan 393 270 (1992)
300 (2005)
1977 BRB InterCity London-Bristol-Swansea Britain 310 200*
1978 BRB InterCity London-Edinburgh Britain 632 200* 225 (1991)
260/70 300
1981/3 SNCF LGV Paris Sud Est Paris-Lyon France 419
(1989)
1981/4/92 FS Rome-Florence Italy 248 250
210 240 (1985)
1982 JNR Tohoku Shinkansen Omiya-Morioka Japan 465
275 (1990)
210 240 (1988)
1982 JNR Joetsu Shinkansen Omiya-Niigata Japan 270
275 (1990)
1985/91 JNR/JR Tohoku extn Omiya-Ueno-Tokyo Japan 31 110
1985/91 DB Mannheim-Stuttgart Germany 109 280
1988 DB Fulda-Würzburg Germany 90 280
1989/90 SNCF LGV Atlantique Paris-Le Mans/Tours France 291 300
1991/4 DB Fulda-Hannover Germany 248 280
SNCF LGV Rhone Alpes
1992/4 (LGV Contournement Lyon-Valence France 121 300
Lyon)
1992 RENFE AVE Madrid-Seville Spain 471 270
Paris-Channel Tunnel/
1994/6 SNCF LGV Nord Europe France 346 300
Belgian Border
1994/6 SNCF LGV IDF Paris inter connections France 104 300
Total in 1996 5,224
Source: UIC data 14 June 2009, with additions/modifications.

Excluded: the Yamagata Mini Shinkansen in Japan [87kms opened in 1992, operating at 130kph].
*HSTs subsequently ran on several other British routes, including London-Penzance and London-Sheffield.
38
Table 2. High Speed Rail in operation, 1997-autumn 2009

Maximum
Date of Length
Line/Service Route Country Speed
Opening [km]
[kph]
1997 SNCB Brussels-French border Belgium 72 300
1997 JR Hokuriku Shinkansen Takasaki-Nagano Japan 117 260
1998 DB Hannover-Berlin Germany 189 250
2000 Amtrak North east corridor Boston-New York-Washington USA 362 240
2001 SNCF LGV Méditerranée Valence-Marseilles/Nimes France 259 320
2002 JR Tohoku Shinkansen Morioka-Hachinohe Japan 97 260
2002 SNCB Leuven-Liège Belgium 65 300
2002/4 DB Köln-Frankfurt Germany 197 300
2003 DB Köln-Düren Germany 42 250
2003/6/8 RENFE Madrid-Lleida-Barcelona Spain 689 300
2003 RENFE Zaragoza-Huesca Spain 79 200
2003/7 High Speed One (CTRL) Channel Tunnel-London Britain 113 300
2004 JR Kyushu Shinkansen Yatsuhiro-Kagoshuima Chuo Japan 127 260
2004 DB Rastatt-Offenburg Germany 44 250
2004 DB Leipzig-Gröbers Germany 24 250
2004 DB Hamburg-Berlin Germany 253 230
2004 KORAIL KTX Seoul-Dongdaegu S Korea 330 300
2005 RENFE Madrid-Toledo Spain 21 250
2006/7 RENFE Cordoba-Antequera-Malaga Spain 155 300
2006 DB Nürnberg-Ingolstadt Germany 89 300
2006 Trenitalia Rome-Naples Italy 220 300
2006 Trenitalia Turin-Novara Italy 94 300
2007 SNCF LGV Est Paris-Baudrecourt France 332 320
2007 RENFE Madrid-Valladolid Spain 179 300
2007 SBB Frutigen-Visp Switzerland 35 250
2007 Taiwan Taipei-Kaohsiung Taiwan 345 300
2008 Trenitalia Milan-Bologna Italy 182 300
2008 NWR/VirginWCML upgrade London-Glasgow Britain 645 225
2008 Chinese railways Jinan-Qingdao China 362 200
2008 Chinese railways Beijing-Tianjin China 120 350
2008 Chinese railways Nanjing-Hefei China 166 250
2008 Chinese railways Hefei-Wuhan China 356 200
2009 Chinese railways Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan China 190 200
39
Table 2. High Speed Rail in operation, 1997-autumn 2009 (continued)

Maximum
Date of Length
Line/Service Route Country Speed
Opening [km]
[kph]
2009 SNCB Liège-German border Belgium 36 260
2009 RENFE Madrid bypass Spain 5 200
2009 Turkish State Railways Ankara-Eskisehir Turkey 235 250
Total in Autumn 2009 6,826
Total 1964-2009 12,050

Excluded: in Japan, the Akita Mini Shinkansen [127kms opened in 1997 and operating at 130kph], and the
Yamagata Mini Shinkansen [62kms opened in 1999, operating at 130kph].
Table 3. High Speed Rail under construction, 2009/10-12

2009/10 NR HSR-Zuid Schipol-R’dam-Belg. border Netherlands 120 300
2009/10 SNCB Antwerp-Dutch border Belgium 36 300
2009/10 SNCF Perpignan-Spanish border France 24 300
2009/10 SNCF Haut-Bugey France 65 300
2009/10 RENFE Figueres-French border Spain 20 300
2009/10 Trenitalia Novara-Milan Italy 55 300
2009/10 Trenitalia Bologna-Florence Italy 77 300
2009/10 Russian railways Moscow-St. Petersburg Russia 650 300
2009/10 Chinese railways Zhengzhou-Xi’an China 458 350
2009/10 Chinese railways Wuhan-Guangzhou China 968 350
2009/10 Chinese railways Ningbo-Fuzhou China 562 250
2009/10 Chinese railways Fuzhou-Xiamen China 275 200
2010 DB München-Augsburg Germany 62 230
2010 Chinese railways Guangzhou-ShenZhen China 104 350
2010 Chinese railways Nanchang-Jiujiang China 92 200
2010 Chinese railways Changchun-Jilin China 96 200
2010 Chinese railways Guangzhou-Zhuhai China 142 200
2010 Chinese railways Hainan circle China 308 200
2010 Chinese railways Chengdu-Dujiangyan China 72 200
2010 Chinese railways Shanghai-Nanjing China 300 300
40
Table 3. High Speed Rail under construction, 2009/10-12 (continued)

2011 Turkish State Railways Eskisehir-Istanbul Turkey 298 250
2011 Turkish State Railways Ankara-Konya Turkey 212 250
2011 JR Tohoku Shinkansen Hachinohe-Shin Aomori Japan 82 /
2011 JR Kyushu Shinkansen Hakata-Shin Yatsuhiro Japan 130 /
2011 Chinese railways Wuhan-Yichang China 293 300
2011 Chinese railways Beijing-Shanghai China 1318 350
2011 Chinese railways Tianjin-Qinhuangdao China 261 350
2011 Chinese railways Nanjing-Hangzhou China 249 350
2011 Chinese railways Shanghai-Ningbo China 300 300
2011 Chinese railways Hefei-Bengbu China 131 300
2012 SNCF Nimes-Montpellier France 70 300
2012 SNCF Dijon-Mulhouse France 140 320
2012 RENFE Barcelona-Figueres Spain 132 300
2012 RENFE Madrid-Valencia-Alicante Spain 902 300
2012 RENFE Vitoria-Bilbao-S. Sebastian Spain 175 250
2012 RENFE Variante de Pajares Spain 50 250
2012 RENFE Santiago-Ourense Spain 88 300
2012 RENFE Bobadilla-Granada Spain 109 250
2012 RENFE La Coruña-Vigo Spain 158 250
2012 Chinese railways Mianyang-Leshan China 316 250
2012 Chinese railways Xiamen-Shenzhen China 502 200
2012 Chinese railways Beijing-Wuhan China 1122 350
2012 Chinese railways Haerbin-Dalian China 904 350
2012 Chinese railways Nanjing-An’qinq China 258 200
Total 2009/10-2012 12,686
41

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The High Speed Rail Revolution:

History and Prospects

1. Introduction: Railways and the High Speed Revolution

11 Preston (2009), 13.

Table 1. High Speed Rail development, 1964-autumn 2009 (kms)

Table 2. HSRs under construction, 2009-12 (kms)

15 EU27, calculated from UIC and Preston (2009), 15.

2. Development of the high speed network

18 Tokyo’s staging of the Olympic Games in 1964 provided a further impetus.

21 Steer Davies Gleave (2004); JORSA (2008).

ii. France: the TGV

29 Strohl (1993), pp.74-5; Perl (2002), p.24.

iii. Great Britain

35 Ardui and Ni (2005), 22-3.

40 Gourvish (2006), 159, 167.

iv. Germany, Italy and Spain

46 Allen (1992), pp.115-16; Ebeling (2005), 37.

51 See Allen (1992), pp.122-4.

vi. Rest of the world

54 Givoni (2006), 600; Nadal (2009).

3. Prospects: HSRs under construction and in the

58 US Department of Transportation (2009).

4. The impact of HSRs

Table 4. HSR time savings: some examples

68 Steer Davies Gleave (2004), pp.23-4.

72 Vickerman (1997), 26, 31; Streeter (1993), 185-7.

Table 5. Growth in HSR traffic in Europe, 1994-2004 (bn. Pass-kms)

iii. Modal shares

79 Steer Davies Gleave (2004), appendix B2.

iv. Investment costs and returns

83 Ardui and Ni (2005), 22-3.

5. The impact of HSRs: broader socio-economic effects

89 Vickerman (1997), 26; Pol (2002), p.155.

6. The impact of HSRs: more contested effects

i. Economic growth

ii. Regional and local economic effects, including regeneration

92 Gourvish (2002), pp.360-2; DfT, TSGB (2009), Table 1.7.

96 Bonnafous (1987), 135-6; Meunier (2002), p.224.

102 Bakker (2009).

iii. The environmental impact

111 Cf. Givoni (2006), 606, Campos and de Rus (2009), 25

117 Campos and de Rus (2009), 25.

122 Cf. Dunn and Perl (1994), 311.

Aoki, Eiichi et al., A History of Japanese Railways, 1872-1999 (Tokyo, 2000).

Bonnafous, Alain, ‘TGV et aménagement du territoire: le Cas de la region Rhône-Alpes’, Réalités

Department for Transport, Transport Statistics Great Britain 2009 (2009).

Directory of Railway Officials and Year Book 1965-1966 (London, 1965).

Eddington, Sir Rod, The Eddington Transport Study (2006).

Eguchi, Shugi, ‘High-Speed Railway Policy in Japan’ (2008).

Fujita, Hiroshi, ‘Long-term vision for Japan railways’ (June 2008).

Gerondeau, Christian, Transport in Europe (Norwood, MA, 1997).

Greengauge 21, High Speed Two: A Greengauge 21 Proposition (June 2007).

JR Central, Data Book 2008.

Leunig, Timothy, ‘Train times’, CentrePiece (Winter 2008/9), 20-1.

Loubinoux, Jean-Pierre, ‘The French High Speed Business’ (February 2009).

Mitchell, Mike, Notes on a visit to Japan, November 2008 (DfT).

Morimura, Tsutomu, ‘Technological Insight of the Tokaido Shinkansen’ (4 September 2009).

Network Rail, Capacity analysis (August 2009).

SNCF, Annual Report 2008 (2008).

SNCF, ‘The French High-Speed Business’, 4 February 2009.

Stevens, H., Transport Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke, 2004).

Troin, Jean-François, Rail et Aménagement du Territoire (Paris, 1995).

US Department of Transportation, Vision for High-Speed Rail in America (April 2009).

1. Introduction: Railways and the High Speed Revolution

3. Prospects: HSRs under construction and in the