RELIGION IN NATION BUILDING

AT every important juncture in our country’s history, the question of national unity and cohesion
rears its head. The nation is once again at a critical juncture of political transition, with the
establishment trying to further consolidate its grip on power. The ongoing transition has re-
triggered the debate about the nature of the Pakistani state and its relationship with society. On
Quaid-i-Azam’s birth anniversary earlier this week, many highlighted the widening gulf between
his and our visions of Pakistan, which entail two contrasting approaches to nation building.

Defying the Quaid’s dream, those who have been at the helm of state affairs have used religion
as the principal tool of nation building. Since 1956, in particular, Pakistani power elites have
been trying to forge national cohesion through the use of religion and religious groups, albeit
facing much reservation from religious minorities and major political parties — including from
erstwhile East Pakistan. Even after debating four drafts of the constitution, the Constituent
Assembly had set aside the apprehensions of dissidents and included the Objectives Resolution
in the first constitution of the country, though as a preamble. The 1956 Constitution determined
the future course of the country; what followed is history.

After taking many twists and turns, the establishment’s romance with religion has reached a
point where a new religious sensitivity is being blended in the nation-building process. This new
phenomenon is indeed being nurtured around national identity under the state’s authority. It
appears that the establishment has resolved the dichotomy of the sovereignty rooted in the
Objectives Resolution.

Pakistan is once again at a critical juncture of political transition.

Religious groups had exploited the notion to gain authority and legitimacy, and the state very
comfortably accommodated them for two major reasons: first, these groups helped power elites
in consolidating power; and second, they served the state by protecting its strategic interests.

Another important factor was the inability of state institutions to directly handle matters
connected to religion. The state had created several religious institutions, but shared few judicial
and legislative powers through establishing the Council of Islamic Ideology, the Federal Shariat
Court, etc. Apart from the stated purposes of these bodies, which were to please the clergy, the
establishment used them to seek endorsement for its actions.

Pakistan’s war against terrorism was tough not only on the physical front, but also in weakening
terrorism’s ideological and political appeal. However, it was also difficult for the establishment to
reconsider its approach towards its religious allies in the institutional ascendancies. The
establishment gained moral legitimacy from the religious clergy and, in return, gave it favours on
the basis of which religious institutions have thrived and gained further influence. At several
occasions, the clergy registered its dissenting note on government policies (mainly related to
Sharia compliance), but the state tolerated the opposition and tried to pacify the clergy with
more favours.

However, the rebellion of so-called ‘militant proxies’ against the state after 9/11, and the
reluctance of a larger proportion of the clergy to oppose them, forced the establishment to
readjust its approach towards the clergy and its organisations. The religious-political parties,
mainly the JI and JUI-F, which were the trusted allies of the establishment, took the path of
dissent.

Two factors had played a key role in their dissent. First, the successful experiment of the
Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal — an alliance of six major religious parties that secured reasonable
electoral success in the 2002 general election — had given the parties confidence for solo flights;
these two parties then tried to develop their own independent political strategies.

The second factor was linked with the growing annoyance among religiously inspired militants —
mainly those having any sort of association with these parties — regarding the alliance between
their religious-ideological leaders and the establishment. In an effort to defuse this displeasure,
both parties started using anti-establishment rhetoric, which eventually proved
counterproductive. In the last election, the MMA failed to impress the electorate.

On the other hand, the establishment started to bet on new horses. The formation of an alliance
of militant groups and small religious parties, the Difa-i-Pakistan Council, proved effective for
mobilising street protests against drone attacks and exploiting anti-US sentiments. But this
alliance, too, was not capable of securing electoral success. The establishment’s romance with
the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan proved to be short, and the idea that a ‘Barelvi awakening’ could
help build a counter-narrative to that of the Deobandi militant groups proved false.

During this time, however, the establishment succeeded in launching Paigham-i-Pakistan, a joint
declaration by hundreds of religious scholars against terrorism and sectarian violence. Most
serious religious scholars had reluctantly signed the document, but the heads of banned
sectarian and militant groups who did were jubilant, for they found in it an opportunity to
survive by becoming its custodians. The security institutions are also running sensitisation
campaigns on educational campuses based on Paigham-i-Pakistan.

Some in the establishment still favour the idea of mainstreaming those banned organisations
that once served as state proxies. However, they are not willing to give them the power to
control narratives. The establishment only needs these instruments to approve its ideological
framework, and has become the sole proprietor of the country’s nationalist project. Its doors will
remain open for all religious actors if they wish to accept the state’s supremacy on religious
narratives.

The establishment will construct new religious commitments around its new notion of religious
sensitivity — but, apparently, it is confident that the religious legal and constitutional process
has been completed and it has no further obligations in this regard. Religion is connecting the
people as religiosity in society is on the rise. It may also believe that, to counter radical
tendencies, the patronage of a political-religious movement like the Tableeghi Jamaat and the
promotion of a certain brand of spiritualism and Sufism would be enough.

From here, the establishment can move forward to other spheres with confidence. As its powers
grow, achieving the objective of ‘national cohesion’ will become easier.

The writer is a security analyst.