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EN BANC

[A.C. No. 5118. September 9, 1999]

MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

For unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of his oath as lawyer, respondent Atty.
Dorotheo Calis faces disbarment.
The facts of this administrative case, as found by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP),[1] in its Report, are as follows:

Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that sometime in November, 1992, she was referred to the respondent who
promised to process all necessary documents required for complainants trip to the USA for a fee of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).

On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the required fee in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00), which was received by Ester Calis, wife of the respondent for which a receipt was issued.

From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several conferences with the respondent regarding the
processing of her travel documents. To facilitate the processing, respondent demanded an additional amount of Sixty Five
Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and prevailed upon complainant to resign from her job as stenographer with the
Commission on Human Rights.

On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents complainant issued Planters Development Bank
Check No. 12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor of Atty. D. Calis who issued a
receipt. After receipt of said amount, respondent furnished the complainant copies of Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant
Visa Application (Of. 156) and a list of questions which would be asked during interviews.

When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that she will be assuming the name
Lizette P. Ferrer married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. the complainant was
furnished documents to support her assumed identity.

Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the complainant demanded the return of her money,
however she was assured by respondent that there was nothing to worry about for he has been engaged in the business for
quite sometime; with the promise that her money will be refunded if something goes wrong.

Weeks before her departure respondent demanded for the payment of the required fee which was paid by complainant, but
the corresponding receipt was not given to her.

When complainant demanded for her passport, respondent assured the complainant that it will be given to her on her
departure which was scheduled on September 6, 1994. On said date complainant was given her passport and visa issued in
the name of Lizette P. Ferrer. Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo and a certain Maribel who were also recruits
of the respondent.

Upon arrival at the Singapore International Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer Belo and Maribel were
apprehended by the Singapore Airport Officials for carrying spurious travel documents; Complainant contacted the
respondent through overseas telephone call and informed him of by her predicament. From September 6 to 9, 1994,
complainant was detained at Changi Prisons in Singapore.

On September 9, 1994 the complainant was deported back to the Philippines and respondent fetched her from the airport
and brought her to his residence at 872-A Tres Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila.Respondent took complainants passport
with a promise that he will secure new travel documents for complainant. Since complainant opted not to pursue with her
travel, she demanded for the return of her money in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).

On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996 respondent made partial refunds of P15,000.00; P6,000.00; and P5,000.00.

On December 19, 1996 the complainant through counsel, sent a demand letter to respondent for the refund of a remaining
balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P114,000.00) which was ignored by the respondent.
Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went to see the respondent, however his wife informed her that the respondent
was in Cebu attending to business matters.

In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see the respondent however she found out that the respondent had transferred
to an unknown residence apparently with intentions to evade responsibility.

Attached to the complaint are the photocopies of receipts for the amount paid by complainant, applications for U.S.A.
Visa, questions and answers asked during interviews; receipts acknowledging partial refunds of fees paid by the
complainant together with demand letter for the remaining balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Pesos
(P114,000.00); which was received by the respondent.[2]

Despite several notices sent to the respondent requiring an answer to or comment on the complaint, there was no
response. Respondent likewise failed to attend the scheduled hearings of the case. No appearance whatsoever was made by
the respondent.[3] As a result of the inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of the respondent to comply with the orders
of the Commission, the investigation against him proceeded ex parte.
On September 24, 1998, the Commission on Bar Discipline issued its Report on the case, finding that:

It appears that the services of the respondent was engaged for the purpose of securing a visa for a U.S.A. travel of
complainant. There was no mention of job placement or employment abroad, hence it is not correct to say that the
respondent engaged in illegal recruitment.

The alleged proposal of the respondent to secure the U.S.A. visa for the complainant under an assumed name was
accepted by the complainant which negates deceit on the part of the respondent. Noted likewise is the partial refunds made
by the respondent of the fees paid by the complainant. However, the transfer of residence without a forwarding address
indicates his attempt to escape responsibility.

In the light of the foregoing, we find that the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS be SUSPENDED as a member of the
bar until he fully refunds the fees paid to him by complainant and comply with the order of the Commission on Bar
Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 6 of the Rules of Court.[4]

Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this administrative case was elevated to the IBP Board of
Governors for review. The Board in a Resolution[5] dated December 4, 1998 resolved to adopt and approve with amendment
the recommendation of the Commission. The Resolution of the Board states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decisions as Annex A;
and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with an
amendment that Respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis be DISBARRED for having been found guilty of Gross Misconduct
for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

We are now called upon to evaluate, for final action, the IBP recommendation contained in its Resolution dated
December 4, 1998, with its supporting report.
After examination and careful consideration of the records in this case, we find the resolution passed by the Board of
Governors of the IBP in order. We agree with the finding of the Commission that the charge of illegal recruitment was not
established because complainant failed to substantiate her allegation on the matter. In fact she did not mention any particular
job or employment promised to her by the respondent. The only service of the respondent mentioned by the complainant
was that of securing a visa for the United States.
We likewise concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution, that herein respondent is guilty of gross
misconduct by engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 101 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent deceived the complainant by assuring her that he could give her visa and travel
documents; that despite spurious documents nothing untoward would happen; that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and
even promised to refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in case something went wrong. All for material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree
of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not mere facile words, drift
and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable.[6] The nature of the office of an attorney requires that
he should be a person of good moral character.[7] This requisite is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice
of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. [8] We have sternly warned that any
gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a
member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.[9]
It is dismaying to note how respondent so cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of complainant when he made her
travel with spurious documents. How often have victims of unscrupulous travel agents and illegal recruiters been imprisoned
in foreign lands because they were provided fake travel documents? Respondent totally disregarded the personal safety of
the complainant when he sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only are respondents acts illegal, they are also detestable
from the moral point of view. His utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a real threat to the Bar and the administration
of justice.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. [10] We must stress that
membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good
behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after giving
him the opportunity to be heard.[11]
Here, it is worth noting that the adamant refusal of respondent to comply with the orders of the IBP and his total
disregard of the summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous acts reflective of unprofessional conduct. Thus, we find no
hesitation in removing respondent Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for his unethical, unscrupulous and
unconscionable conduct toward complainant.
Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for the recovery of the P114,000.00 she paid the respondent is in
order.[12] Respondent not only unjustifiably refused to return the complainants money upon demand, but he stubbornly
persisted in holding on to it, unmindful of the hardship and humiliation suffered by the complainant.
WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be FURNISHED to the IBP and the Bar Confidant to be spread on the personal
records of respondent. Respondent is likewise ordered to pay to the complainant immediately the amount of One Hundred
Fourteen Thousand (P114,000.00) Pesos representing the amount he collected from her.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-
Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Panganiban, J., on official leave.

[1]
Records, pp. 46-49.
[2]
Id. at 46-48.
[3]
Id. at 48-49.

[4]
Id. at 49.

[5]
Id. at 45.
[6]
Masinsin vs. Albano, 232 SCRA 631 (1994).
[7]
Rule 138, Sec. 2 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[8]
People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, Jan. 30, 1990, p. 29.
[9]
Melendez vs. Decena, 176 SCRA 662, 663 (1989)
[10]
Arrieta vs. Llosa, 282 SCRA 248, 249 (1997).
[11]
Marcelo vs. Javier, 214 SCRA 13 (1992).
[12]
See Igual vs. Javier, 254 SCRA 416, 424 (1996).
SEBASTISAN VS. CALIS A.C. NO. 5118/314SCRA1;SEPTEMBER 9, 1999J. _____FACTS:
Sometime in November 1992, one Marilou Sebastian, herein complainant, wasreferred to Atty.
Dorotheo Calis, herein respondent, for the latter to process all thedocuments needed for the former to
travel to the United States of America with the
consideration of P150,000.00. With the respondent’s promise to return the complainant’s
money if there would be trouble with the documents for her travel. In 4 separate payments,complainant
paid the entire consideration receiving, however, only 3 receipts for thepayments. Respondent, Calis,
provided the complainant with spurious documents whichresulted for complainant to be detained in
Changi Prisons upon arrival in Singapore andthereafter, the complainant was deported back to the
Philippines.Upon arrival in the Philippines, the respondent promised to secure new traveldocuments
for the complainant. However, the complainant opted to demand for the returnof her money. Calis
made partial payments of 15,000, 6000, and 5000 to the complainantbut was unreachable when the
complainant demanded for the rest of the payment.Calis also failed to attend the hearings with the
Commission on Bar Discipline ofthe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) despite being issued
summons and beingrequired to answer or comment on the complaint. Therewith, the IBP
recommended thedisbarment of herein respondent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Atty. Dorotheo Calis is guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 101 ofthe Code of
Professional Responsibility which thereby constitutes his disbarment.
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Calis is guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule 101 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege carrying withit the condition of continuous good moral
character. The gross misconduct of a lawyersubjects him unfit to practice law..Canon 1, Rule 101 of
the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility states thatRule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitfulconduct.In the case at bar, Calis guaranteed to secure all the necessary
documents for
Sebastian’s travel to the United States with the promise to return the mon
ey if anything
goes wrong with her travel. Calis’s acts of giving the complainant spurious documentsconstitutes
deception and unlawful conduct on his part. Adding to it is respondent’s
refusal to honor the summons of the IBP which reflects his unprofessional conduct. The
court views Calis’s conduct and continuance in service as a threat to the administration of
justice. Therefore, Calis is deemed disbarred and is ordered to immediately return the rest
of the complainant’s money.

EN BANC

[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his
oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered
pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-
arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of
the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the
Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based
on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution
requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying
with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's
prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was
deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused
took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior
strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went
to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and
begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died
of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a
loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels
the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore
submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is
the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession
of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further
tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or
disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally
irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the
participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."[1]

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of
whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death
of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and
profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless
imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause
of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room
for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be
a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently
of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine
concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.
We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to
be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law.
Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking
the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath
on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

In Re: Argosino, 270 SCRA 26

18JUL

FACTS:

Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls
of Attorneys due to his conviction of “reckless imprudence resulting in homicide” from a hazing incident. Later in his
sentence, he was granted probation by the court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he be allowed to
take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a proof of the required good moral character he now possess,
he presented no less than fifteen (15) certifications among others from: two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and
six (6) members of religious order. In addition, he, together with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship
foundation in honor of their hazing victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath, sign the Rolls of Attorneys, and practice law.

HELD:

YES. Petition granted.

RATIO:

Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the required good moral character as
required before taking the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises
that he is not inherently in bad moral fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally reminded that the
Lawyer’s Oath is not merely a ceremony or formality before the practice of law, and that the community assistance he
had started is expected to continue in serving the more unfortunate members of the society.

https://engrjhez.wordpress.com/2012/07/18/in-re-argosino-270-scra-26/

EN BANC

[BAR MATTER No. 810. January 27, 1998]

IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR.

RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. [1] His oath-taking was held in
abeyance in view of the Courts resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to take the Bar
Examinations subject to the condition that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the
lawyers oath pending approval of the Court x x x due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioners participation in the initiation rites of the LEX
TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991,
where Raul I. Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him. Thereafter,
petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 16, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his
case considered closed and terminated.
In this petition , received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that he be allowed to take his lawyers
oath at the Courts most convenient time[2] attaching thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous,
peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-
in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and
officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph Cathedral,
San Jose, Antique, and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique.
On July 15, 1997, the Court, before acting on petitioners application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D.
Camaligan, father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In compliance with the
Courts directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment which states as follows:

1 He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing him to comment to the pending
petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyers oath, and hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such
gesture.

2 He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its resolution dated March 19, 1997 in Bar
Matter No.712 that the infliction of severe physical injuries which approximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan was deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating
serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the
outset of the proceedings of the criminal case against the petitioner and his co-defendants that they are liable
not only for the crime of homicide but murder, since they took advantage of the neophytes helpless and
defenseless condition when they were beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog, suggesting the
presence of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58
Phil. 524).

3 He, however, has consented to the accused-students plea of guilty to the lesser offense of reckless
imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the petitioner, out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife
of the accused who went together at his house in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for
forgiveness for their sons, on a Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they
reported that the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon learning of his sons involvement in the
case.

4 As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the criminal case for the death of his
son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he has a high hope to become a good lawyer to succeed
him, he still feels the pain of his untimely demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life.
This he cannot forget.

5 He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has become morally fit for admission
to the noble profession of the law. He politely submits this matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the
Hon. Court. [3]

At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and commiserates with the
untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan admits that [h]e is not, right now, in a position
to say whether petitioner since then has become morally fit x x x and submits petitioners plea to be admitted to
the noble profession of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing petitioners admission to
the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which
resulted to the latters untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar.
And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who possess the high standards of intellectual
and moral qualifications the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to
exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless,
is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioners
co-accused below, to take the lawyers oath.[4]
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.s discharge from probation without any infraction of the attendant conditions
therefor and the various certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that
he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate
death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of
the general tendency of the youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. [5] Let it be stressed to herein
petitioner that the lawyers oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing cameras
and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond reproach at all
times and to live strictly according to his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase
Mr. Justice Padillas comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyers Oath, Bar
Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, [t]he Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Cuevas, Jr., will continue with the assistance
he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other
services to the more unfortunate members of society.[6]
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyers
oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment of appropriate
fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioners personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
[1]
Held on September 7, 14, 21, and 28, 1996, at De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila, with Associate
Justice Ricardo J. Francisco as Chairman of the Bar Committee.
[2]
Manifestation With Motion TO Take The Lawyers Oath, p. 2.
[3]
Comment, pp. 1-2.
[4]
Re: Petition of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyers Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Id., at p. 5.

In Re: Arthur Cuevas, Jr.


285 SCRA 59 – Legal Ethics – Lawyer’s Oath
In 1991, a neophyte died during the initiation rites of Lex Talionis Fraternitas in the San Beda College of Law.
Arthur Cuevas Jr was one of the persons charged (with murder) for the death of the neophyte. He pleaded guilty
and was later convicted to the lesser crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. Thereafter, Cuevas
was granted probation and he continued taking up law. In 1995, he was discharged from probation. In 1996, the
Supreme Court allowed Cuevas to take the bar on the condition that in case he will pass, his oath taking will
have to be approved by the Supreme Court first. Cuevas did pass the 1996 bar exams and in 1997, he filed a
petition before the Supreme Court asking the latter to allow him to take the Lawyer’s Oath.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cuevas may be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to
exclude those who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. Cuevas’ participation in
the senseless killing of the neophyte is highly reprehensible however, the Supreme Court is willing to give him a
chance considering that Cuevas has received various certifications regarding his good behavior while on
probation.
The Supreme Court also stressed that the lawyer’s oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the
glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. As a lawyer, Cuevas shall be expected
to abide by the oath strictly and to conduct himself beyond reproach at all times. As a lawyer he will now be in a
better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
http://www.uberdigests.info/2012/08/in-re-arthur-cuevas-jr/

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