High Speed Rail

London to the West Midlands and Beyond

A Report to Government
by High Speed Two Limited

PART 2 of 11
While High Speed Two (HS2) Limited has made every effort to ensure the information in this document is accurate, HS2 Ltd does
not guarantee the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of the information contained in this document and it cannot accept
liability for any loss or damages of any kind resulting from reliance on the information or guidance this document contains.

© Copyright, High Speed Two (HS2) Limited, 2009.

Copyright in the typographical arrangements rests with HS2 Limited.

This publication, excluding logos, may be reproduced free of charge in any format or medium for non-commercial research,
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For any other use of this material please contact HS2 Limited on 020 7944 4908, or by email at HS2Enquiries@hs2.gsi.gov.uk,
or by writing to HS2, 3rd Floor, 55 Victoria Street, London, SW1H 0EU.

Further copies of this report can be obtained from www.hs2.org.uk.

ISBN: 978-1-84864-072-6

Unless specified, all maps, tables, diagrams and graphs in this report are a product of HS2 and its consultants.

Chapter 1:
ICE 3 high speed train on the Frankfurt-Cologne high-speed rail line, Sebastian Terfloth;
Eurostar, Dave Bushell www.canbush.com/ppbfrontpage.htm;
Gümmenen viaduct over the river Sarine with TGV 9288, Berne, Switzerland, Chriusha;
Tunnelling, HS1 Ltd
AVE Tarragona-Madrid, Fototrenes
St. Pancras Station, HS1 Ltd

Chapter 5:
Matisa www.matisa.com/matisa_ang/matisa_produits.html
Chapter 2 – Our Approach
 Chapter 2: Our Approach

2.1 A basic model for British High Speed Rail

Introduction
2.1.1 As the brief survey of international high speed ‘models’ in the first section has made clear,
‘high speed rail’ is a catch all term which can be used to describe what are in fact quite different
approaches. In developing our proposals, we have aimed to tailor a high speed rail model that would
fit with the particular circumstances in Britain, but importantly allow it to develop and evolve over
time. In this chapter we describe some of the fundamental principles of that model.

A basic model for high speed rail in Britain

2.1.2 There are several fundamental cornerstones in the basic framework for HS2 which are described
below. Where these are not established a priori by our remit, they are the product of our
considerations during the course of the year and we explain here briefly the reasoning that has led
to them. Elsewhere in the report we expand in more detail on several of these arguments.

2.1.3 A model for HS2 cannot be designed in isolation from the potential wider network that may develop
around it. Although we have designed and appraised the railway as it would operate on ‘Day One’8,
we are mindful of the likelihood that HS2 would form the first stage of a widespread programme of
high speed line construction. As we explain in Chapter 6, there appears to be a positive case for the
extension of HS2 beyond the West Midlands and, as a result, we have sought to create a model for
high speed rail – and design of HS2 – that is compatible with future stages on the presumption that
this becomes a stated aspiration.

2.1.4 HS2 itself could be operational in around 16 years. Our

High speed capacity
modelling suggests that, by then, background growth in
should be exploited
demand for travel, coupled with the additional passenger
for maximum benefit.
flows generated by high speed rail, would result in HS2’s
initial capacity being fully employed serving the West Midlands
and other destinations further along the WCML. Furthermore, as we explain later in the report, a
longer term network serving cities east and west of the Pennines is likely to rely on HS2 as its
central trunk into London. Again, we expect a longer term network to make full use of HS2’s
available train paths.

2.1.5 Given also the considerable capital costs of providing a high speed line, there is therefore a premium
on ensuring that the capacity of HS2 is exploited for maximum benefit. Many of the principles which
follow are predicated on this fundamental proposition.

8 We use ‘Day One’ throughout the report to refer to the first day of operations on HS2, when the line will connect back onto the West Coast Main Line, as distinct
from the ‘longer term network’ of which HS2 would be a component part.

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 High Speed Rail for Britain – Report by High Speed 2 Ltd

2.1.6 High speed lines should be principally for long distance

HS2 should be used
trips connecting major cities and in particular city centres,
primarily for long
rather than serving commuter towns or other smaller
distance trips.
intermediate population centres.

2.1.7 City centres offer the densely populated markets to which high capacity, high speed lines are well
suited, with ready access to business destinations. They also provide the hubs for local transport
networks. High speed rail works best when it focuses on serving those markets directly. This has
been the experience in France, where high speed rail has contributed to thriving growth in cities
such as Lille and Lyon, but failed to succeed at smaller regional stations such as Haute Picardie.
By running city to city, the maximum benefit can be offered to the most people. The economics of
high speed rail are also dependent on an ability to offset the high costs of construction against the
revenues and associated benefits from running full trains. This can be only be achieved by non-stop
connections between large markets.

2.1.8 There are other strong reasons for focussing on longer distance trips and avoiding intermediate
stations between cities where possible which we expand upon later in the report. Stopping trains can
cut across the paths of faster non-stop trains behind it, so reducing the line’s capacity. Intermediate
stops also have an impact on the journey times of longer distance passengers. As Figure 2.1a below
illustrates, stopping even the most modern high speed trains can impose a time penalty of at least 5
minutes to through passengers. In this scenario, the train (modelled on a HS2 reference train) takes
91/2 minutes to stop (for two minutes) and regain top speed. In this time, the train travels just over
25.3 km – a distance that would have been covered in 41/2 minutes at a constant 330kph.

Effects of stopping a high speed train at max speed

350

300

250

200
Speed (kph)

150

100

50

0
00

00

00

00

00

00

00
0:

2:

4:

6:

8:

0:

2:
:0

:0

:0

:0

:0

:1

:1
00

00

00

00

00

00

00

Time

Figure 2.1a Effects of stopping a high speed train (Based on HS2 Reference Train)

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 Chapter 2: Our Approach

2.1.9 The penalties for stopping become less severe on the approaches to cities, where train speeds
tend to have already reduced. Where a portion of the city market can also be effectively served
by parkway or interchange stations in the outskirts there may well be a case for such stations,
especially where other transport connections can also be made – for example with airports or urban
transport systems.

2.1.10 To achieve the best journey times, clearly the ideal situation
HS2 should be used
for a high speed line is for the trains to be able to run at as
exclusively by high
high-a-speed as possible for as long as possible, thereby
speed trains.
exploiting the full potential of the technology. A high speed
network in the Britain would supplement the comprehensive
network that already exists, on which slower trains – including freight services – could continue to
run. As a result, a high speed line can instead be used exclusively by high speed trains.

2.1.11 This is important not only because of the greater benefits of faster journeys, but also because of
the impact of slower trains on the line’s overall capacity. Figure 2.1b below gives an example from
the TGV Atlantique route in France, illustrating how mixing different train speeds prevents high
frequency services from following closely behind each other. The slower train (in red) cuts across
six paths of the faster train - in other words, running a single train at 200 kph consumes the same
capacity as running six successive TGVs at 300 kph.

Paris - Montparnasse
Conventional Train at 200kph (80mins)

TGV High Speed Train at 300kph (53mins)

Tours - Montlouis 53 mins Source: UIC

Figure 2.1b Effects of a slower train on high speed line capacity

(Source: UIC)

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 High Speed Rail for Britain – Report by High Speed 2 Ltd

2.1.12 In the example above the full capacity of the line can only be exploited when the high speed trains
are closely “flighted” together, each following the preceding train at the same speed with the
minimum headway. Where possible this is the model we have sought to employ on the HS2 route
between London and the West Midlands, since the effect of a non-high speed train (notionally one
capable of speeds up to 230kph) would be to consume at least four high speed paths. With an even
interval service this would effectively reduce HS2 capacity from 14 trains per hour to just three
high speed and three conventional trains per hour, eliminating many of the benefits of the Day One
service.

2.1.13 Adopting this principle has other implications for the design and specification of HS2, particularly
where differences in service patterns occur and/or trains leave the high speed network. For example
where a train may need to slow down to call at an intermediate station, a deceleration lane would be
needed in order to limit the impact on following services. Even then there is likely to be some impact
on the capacity of the line.

2.1.14 If a future network was to include lightly used stretches of route, there might be value in adopting
the German model of mixed use in order to gain maximum benefit from the line.

2.1.15 Although the stretch of high speed line between London

HS2 should be
and the West Midlands would carry only high speed services, it
connected to the
must be integrated with the wider national
classic rail network...
rail network on Day One if it is to achieve the widespread
benefits that are possible. Running solely a segregated
‘shuttle’ service between London and the West Midlands would not generate sufficient benefits to
justify the costs - there is not the scale of demand for journeys between these two places alone.
Instead trains should be able to continue off the high speed line and on to the classic network to
destinations beyond the West Midlands, following the French and German model. This would allow
the benefits of high speed to be spread further afield and the capacity of the line to be fully exploited.

2.1.16 Under this model, most long-distance

passenger services which have hitherto run To other
destinations
on the WCML to and from destinations North
north of Birmingham would transfer onto
the high speed line, freeing up paths on the Birmingham
existing network for additional shorter
distance passenger services and freight.
WCML
2.1.17 This is a model of high speed rail which may
continue even if, over time, HS2 is expanded HS2
to become part of a much wider national
network. Even under those conditions the
ability to run on to the classic network may
be valuable in connecting some cities to the London

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 Chapter 2: Our Approach

high speed line, especially where the level of demand from those places does not justify the expense
of a wholly new high speed connection. This is similar to the French model, where – for example – a
TGV is able to run off the central high speed line to serve places such as Dijon and St Etienne.

2.1.18 However, integration with the classic network comes at a price.

... but over time,
Reliability is poorer on the classic lines and some of this
become more
performance risk is imported onto the high speed line, with a
segregated.
resultant loss of train paths in the planned timetable. The very high
frequency service and exceptional performance level which
characterise the Japanese Shinkansen network both depend on an ability to exclude risks from
elsewhere. A further cost is the classic-compatible train fleet. The bespoke design makes these
trains more expensive than the off-the-shelf, dedicated train which runs solely on a segregated
network and which is in generic use on high speed lines in Europe.

2.1.19 Therefore as a British high speed network grows, the aim should be to increase the level of
segregation as much as possible, commensurate with the requirement to serve locations which are
not part of the core network.

2.1.20 Inter city journeys do not, of course, exist in isolation –

HSR must be well
people are trying to get to their homes, businesses and
integrated with other
friends. These journeys invariably rely on the local transport
transport networks.
networks to deliver them to a final destination. Building a
brand new network presents an opportunity to tailor its
design to enable efficient links with these networks through effective interchanges, for example with
the use of modern people-mover systems, and to create station spaces which aid the free-flow of
large numbers of people.

Summary and key recommendations

2.1.21 We have identified the basic cornerstones which we recommend as a model for high speed
rail in Britain:
• Exploiting maximum benefit from high speed capacity.
• Long distance, city-to-city journeys.
• High speed trains only.
• Integration with the classic network to spread the benefits more widely.
• Greater segregation over time.
• Integration with other networks.

2.1.22 This is a model for Day One operation between London and the West Midlands, which also has an
eye to the future development of a national network of high speed lines.

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2.2 Establishing the case – our approach

2.2.1 The first sections of the report have described the objectives for HS2; the remit of HS2 Ltd; the
context in which that remit has been set; and the basic model for high speed rail in Britain with
which we have been working during 2009. This section sets out in more detail how we have
approached the task before us: to establish and examine the case for a new line, and to develop
buildable proposals for its design and construction.

Programme of work
2.2.2 Figure 2.2a below sets out the way in which we have structured the year, charting the development
of the project from the initial brief and remit, agreed with DfT at the beginning of March, to the final
report submission at the end of the December. Our approach throughout the year has been to run
option development and appraisal as almost concurrent workstreams, using the emerging appraisal
results to refine and sift our options, with a greater degree of detail applied at each stage of the
process.

2009
End of April End of June End of Sept End of Nov

DEFINE REFINE ASSESS FINALISE DELIVER

Prepare Project Plan Develop, review, Test and assess Finalise Options Report
shortlist, refine options approvals and
Review previous options Environmental production
material Assessment
Deliver by
Confirm requirements Options for released capacity Finalise business 31/12/09
case
Define approach Business case development
Finalise
Resourcing implementation
plans
Initial view on
implications of longer Prepare final report
term options

Identify long list of

options and narrow
down

External Challenge (technical, analytical, strategic)

Figure 2.2a Programme of work during 2009

2.2.3 In developing and testing options throughout the year, we have sought to arrive at a preferred
overall scheme and then to appraise the standalone business case for building a new high speed
line between London and the West Midlands. This has addressed the line’s value for money, delivery
prospects and the appropriate environmental and sustainability considerations.

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 Chapter 2: Our Approach

2.2.4 We have undertaken the work to a demanding timetable. Inevitably this has limited our ability
to conduct wholly new research or, for example, to design bespoke demand modelling tools
from scratch. However we have been able to adapt and build upon work that already exists and
nonetheless conduct a substantial amount of new analysis.

Establishing the case

2.2.5 HS2 Ltd was established to provide Government with advice on which it could base important
decisions about the future of the UK’s national infrastructure. We have accordingly developed our
plans and the assessment of the line’s business case to a sufficient level of detail to enable durable
and confident decision making.

2.2.6 Where it has been necessary to make assumptions and define scenarios, we have adopted a
conservative approach so that options are not presented in an unduly favourable light.

2.2.7 The case for high speed rail rests in part on its relative merits when compared against other options
for achieving similar goals. Therefore, as an alternative, we have examined the case for building a new
line to alleviate congestion, but at conventional speeds. This examination has been conducted on a
more hypothetical basis. There may be other options for increasing capacity and lowering journey times
on the London – West Midlands corridor. The assessment of these alternatives – for example further
upgrades to the existing railway or intervention on the road network – has been taken forward by DfT,
with whom we have shared assumptions and analysis so as to create a consistent basis for comparison.
It will be for DfT to consider the relative merits of the various options open to Government.

2.2.8 The balance of objectives for a wider, national network of high speed lines beyond the West Midlands
may vary from that for HS2. Over the longer term, the focus may come to fall less on the increase of
capacity and correspondingly more on shortening journey times, creating modal shift and boosting
productivity. For this reason – allied to the fact that we have not been asked to produce specific
proposals for a wider network – we have not sought to analyse the possible alternatives to a wider
network of high speed lines. Such consideration may be necessary as part of any more detailed work
on plans for going beyond the West Midlands.

External input and challenge

2.2.9 We have sought to ensure a proper process of quality assurance is in place to validate our approach
and results. This has been particularly important given the UK’s relative inexperience in appraising
and delivering domestic high speed rail projects – although we have been able to draw on the UK’s
growing experience in the delivery of other major projects.

2.2.10 We set up three external challenge groups to provide independent expert scrutiny on different
elements of our work. There is no intention that any of the three groups should be seen as
accountable for the conclusions that, ultimately, we alone have reached. However, their advice has
been invaluable as we formulated our approach and findings. The membership and remit of each
group is set out below.

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 High Speed Rail for Britain – Report by High Speed 2 Ltd

Strategic Challenge Group Technical Challenge Group Analytical Challenge Group

Focused on offering an overall Focused largely on peer review Focused on the appraisal and
view and sense check of the and challenge of the engineering modelling of options, scrutinising
programme as a whole and and environmental specifications the relevant evidence base, as
on providing an independent and assumptions, including costs well as providing technical advice
perspective on our overall and mitigation. on key methodologies.
approach.
Kate Barker CBE Ted Allett Prof. Robert Cochrane
Monetary Policy Committee Formerly Planning Director of Transport planner and visiting
Member, Bank of England Union Railways Professor,
Imperial College London
Prof. David Begg Keith Berryman
Chair of the Northern Way Engineering Advisor, Crossrail Prof. Stephen Glaister CBE
Transport Compact Director,
Clive Burrows FREng
Royal Automobile Club
Richard Brown CBE Director of Engineering,
Foundation and Professor of
Chief Executive, First Group
Transport and Infrastructure,
Eurostar UK Ltd
Prof Andy Collop Imperial College London
Tony Collins Head of Civil Engineering,
Prof. Peter Mackie
Chief Executive, Nottingham University
Research Professor,
Virgin Trains
Alan Dyke Institute for Transport Studies,
Iain Coucher Former Chief Engineer and MD, Leeds University
Chief Executive, Channel Tunnel Rail Link Project
Prof. Henry Overman
Network Rail (HS1), now an Independent
Director, Spatial Economics
Consultant
Stephen Joseph OBE Research Centre, LSE
Executive Director, Prof Robert Mair
Dr. David Simmonds
Campaign for Better Transport CBE FREng FRS
Director, David Simmonds
Cambridge University
David Leeder Consultancy Ltd
Vice Chair, Hugh Norrie OBE FREng
Prof. Roger Vickerman
Commission for Integrated Government’s Agent for Channel
Director,
Transport Tunnel Rail Link
Centre for European, Regional
Sir Michael Lyons Prof Roderick Smith FREng and Transport Economics,
Chairman of the BBC Trust Chair, Future Rail Studies University of Kent
at Imperial College and Vice
Sir Roy McNulty
President of the IMechE
Chairman,
Advantage West Midlands
(from Sept 09)
Anthony Smith
Chief Executive,
Passenger Focus
Tony Travers
Director,
Greater London Group, LSE

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 Chapter 2: Our Approach

2.2.11 We also established an Appraisal of Sustainability Reference Group, comprising relevant

Government Departments and other (eventual) statutory consultees, and throughout the year
convened several ad hoc groups to seek views and validate our approach to specific issues, namely:
Project Funding and Delivery, Climate Change and Noise. We intend also to subject the consultation
strategy to peer review.

2.2.12 On a more regular basis our work – particularly on the consideration of geographic options – has
been informed and guided by location-specific working groups, comprising representatives of
relevant organisations whose regional knowledge and experience has been an important input
to the option sifting and, ultimately, selection process. The specific terms of reference for each
group have varied according to membership and subject, but broadly speaking the working groups’
purpose has been to: collate and review existing data and analysis; identify gaps in that information
and make recommendations as to how they should be filled; identify key issues relating to the
existing proximate transport networks, in particular capability/congestion and the investment
required; identify and oversee resolution of local development issues, where appropriate; consider
environmental implications of proposals; and assist with the initial sifting of options and final
shortlisting. In addition to representatives of HS2 the group membership was as follows:

London Terminals Heathrow West Midlands Line of Route

Interchange
Crossrail BAA Advantage West Midlands Internal to HS2
Network Rail Crossrail Birmingham City Council
TfL Network Rail Centro
TfL Highways Agency
Network Rail

2.2.13 The working group to consider line of route options was limited to HS2 and our advisers, in view of
the particularly sensitive nature of the discussions. However, we held confidential discussions with
individual or small groups of county and local planning authorities about relevant specific options
and these informed the working groups’ deliberations.

2.2.14 In addition to the groups above, we held a series of discussions with rolling stock manufacturers and
operators, as well as relevant local authorities, on the proposed maintenance and stabling strategy,
including depot locations.

2.2.15 We have also held regular discussions with Arup in their capacity as promoters of a scheme to
create a multi modal interchange station, including high speed rail, in the Heathrow area. This
scheme pre-dates HS2 Ltd. In recognition of the potential conflict of interest arising from Arup’s
separate roles as consultant to HS2 Ltd and promoter of their interchange scheme, a number of
assurances were secured from Arup, as a condition of their appointment, on the separation of
their own proposal for Heathrow and HS2 work. These assurances included the establishment of
a completely independent team for the HS2 work.

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 High Speed Rail for Britain – Report by High Speed 2 Ltd

Wider stakeholders
2.2.16 Our approach to consultation with stakeholders has been guided by the need to be as open and
inclusive as possible, in order to maximise the value of others’ input and ensure that our ideas and
findings are well tested. As well as external challenge and location-specific working groups, we had
meetings with a very wide range of stakeholders. These included (on a more formal basis) specific
London, West Midlands, North of England, Scotland and Industry stakeholder groups. In addition
to the established groups, we have also held a number of ad hoc meetings with other interested
parties, for example London (Heathrow) Airlines Consultative Committee (LACC), the Office of Rail
Regulation, the Association of Train Operating Companies, Manchester City Council, the Chilterns
Conservation Board and the National Trust.

2.2.17 Notwithstanding our open approach, throughout the year we have needed to protect certain
information on the development of specific geographic options, so as to avoid causing unnecessary
blight. In some cases it has been prudent to share this information on a confidential basis, but
generally we have avoided disclosing details of specific options to our wider stakeholders. A fuller
report on our interaction with stakeholders throughout the year has been submitted alongside this
report as part of the suite of supporting documents.

Summary and key recommendations

2.2.18 Our work during the course of 2009 has been guided by the need to produce robust and durable
proposals and advice in which Government can have confidence. To this end we have tended towards
conservative assumptions and also investigated the case for HS2 against a classic rail alternative.
We have also adopted an open and inclusive approach to stakeholder involvement and subjected our
approach to rigorous and independent expert challenge.

2.2.19 If HS2 were to progress through further stages of development, we strongly recommend that
this external challenge process be retained, and that consultation and collaboration with key
organisations continue, building on the structures we have established and which are described
above.

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 Chapter 2: Our Approach

2.3 Design and appraisal: specification and assumptions

Introduction
2.3.1 This section explains our more detailed assumptions and specification that we used in the design,
development and appraisal of the options. It covers three key aspects of our approach: the Project
Specification, comprising the main technical, operational and environmental requirements; our
‘demand-led’ approach to ensuring that HS2 serves areas where people travel to and from; and our
approach to achieving value for money.

Project specification
2.3.2 We developed a Project Specification that sets out in more detail the main technical, operational and
environmental requirements that governed our approach to the definition and subsequent initial
design of our options.

2.3.3 The fundamental building blocks in section 2.1 influence the way in which we approached our
design. Beyond these, the main driving factors in the design of HS2 were:
• Providing a safe and secure network for passengers, those who operate and maintain it and third
parties who may otherwise come into contact with it.
• Ensuring compliance with the EU Directive and Specifications for Interoperability to benefit from
standard, proven, competitively sourced high speed rail equipment, systems and trains.
• Providing internationally recognised levels of availability, reliability and speed…
• …with capacity maximised to allow as many as possible to benefit.
• Ensuring that high speed trains can run onto the classic network.
• Harnessing the principles of sustainable development, where possible avoiding or otherwise
minimising, and then mitigating, environmental impacts. We focus in particular on the effects of
effects of tunnelling.

A safe and secure network

2.3.4 Firstly, and most importantly, we have sought to design a secure high speed rail system to protect
passengers, those who operate and maintain it and those who may otherwise come into contact with it.
Measures to protect high speed trains from risk or disruption through interference and trespass have
been based on the experience gained in operation of HS1. By designing generally to internationally
accepted practice and established European specifications, albeit modified where necessary to control
UK-specific risks, HS2 is expected to match the exemplary safety record of other high speed lines.
This is a high standard - the Shinkansen in Japan have not seen a single fatal incident since operation
first commenced in 1964.

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2.3.5 The valuable lessons learnt from these experiences have been incorporated in recent European
regulations for the safety of high speed services (the Technical Specifications for Interoperability
- TSIs). These have taken precedence in our design criteria. The primary aim is to prevent risks
materialising in the first place where reasonably practical and then ensuring that any residual
effects are as limited as possible. Those services that run on to the classic line will also benefit
from new classic-compatible trains. Listed below is a selection of the key safety aspects of both new
infrastructure and new rolling stock:
• No level crossings so as to avoid derailments and improve safety for pedestrians and vehicle
traffic.
• Use of European standard train control systems which incorporate full automatic train protection
(European Rail Traffic Management System - ERTMS).
• Specific structure specifications – such as the use of grade separated junctions to eliminate the
risk of collision through conflicting train movements.
• Appropriate fencing alongside the railway to prevent people and vehicles gaining access to the
infrastructure, including active monitoring systems.
• Separation of maintenance activity from train operations, and the automation of inspection and
mechanisation of maintenance activities as far as possible.

2.3.6 We have also considered the potential impact of a changing climate. We expect that HS2 would be
engineered to withstand extreme weather events and this will be achieved by detailed work in the
subsequent design stages.

Ensuring Interoperability
2.3.7 Our specification complies fully with the EU Technical Specifications for Interoperability. There are a
number of reasons why we have followed this approach:
• The specifications are based on, and in turn have promoted, standard and proven technology,
providing confidence that the components and systems will achieve the levels of security and
reliability required.
• The international high speed rail supply industry provides for competitive sourcing of these
standard components and systems, minimising the need to develop one-off British solutions
wherever possible.
• Through benefitting from such standard components and systems the cost, time and uncertainty
of undertaking UK specific testing evaluation and safety approval will be avoided.
• The TSIs maximise the potential for cross European services by establishing common technical
standards for new railway infrastructure and trains. If an HS1 to HS2 link was constructed it
would allow trains from other countries to run through the Channel Tunnel and onto our network
and vice versa.

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• The specifications are built on the expectation of the future growth in rail demand. Adopting them
allows us to future-proof HS2 by providing an affordable means of further upgrading to benefit
from continuing international advances. This will be particularly important in maximising the
future capacity of HS2 if it becomes the basis of a longer term network.
• The TSIs, brought into legal force through the Interoperability Directive, have been adopted by UK
Government.

2.3.8 Following consultation with industry, the DfT has adopted an approach of progressively upgrading
the classic network over time and building new lines (of which HS2 is one) in accordance with the
TSIs. Full adoption is subject to the cost not being disproportionate to the benefit achieved; the TSIs
allow for use of certain parameters, known as “British Specific Cases”, where full application of
the European norms cannot be achieved without incurring costs disproportionate to the benefits
realised. Such parameters include platform height, platform length, stabling track length, structure
gauge and the distance between track centres. These are all particularly relevant to the migration of
the existing classic rail network. In developing the new HS2 options we have not found that adopting
the TSIs fully would introduce costs disproportionate to the benefits achievable by this project.

2.3.9 The design of HS1 preceded the introduction of many of the EU high speed TSI requirements. It was,
however, designed to established French high speed practice and standards which were a major
source of evidence in drafting the TSIs. So, in respect of principal parameters such as train size and
platforms and route horizontal and vertical geometry, HS1 permits the access of trains from other
European high speed networks.

Available, reliable and fast journeys

2.3.10 High speed trains require certain infrastructure criteria to be met in order to achieve and maintain
their maximum speeds:
• High speeds can only be achieved on relatively straight routes. We have designed to vertical and
horizontal geometry values derived from the requirements in the TSIs appropriate to the ultimate
maximum speed required at any location on the HS2 route.
• We designed the infrastructure to accommodate an ultimate maximum speed of 400kph on
route sections where train performance (through acceleration and braking) or other factors
such as environmental impact could permit. We have been assisted by members of the
train manufacturing industry in modelling the attainable speeds, acceleration and braking
performance and energy consumption of a “Reference Train” for our Day One service. This
Reference Train is based on the performance in tests of trains currently being manufactured for
introduction on the European high speed network with a maximum speed of 360kph. In order to
calculate journey times we have adopted standard European high speed practice of assuming a
service speed of 90% of the maximum for any route section in order to secure on-time reliability
whilst making allowance for minor day to day perturbation.

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 High Speed Rail for Britain – Report by High Speed 2 Ltd

• Achieving an appropriate speed is about striking the right balance between maximising the use
of the line and the environmental effects. For example, where the line approaches city centres we
recognised the need to follow existing transport corridors to minimise disruption and the need to
travel at speeds appropriate to the area. Also there are practical limits for speeds through long
tunnels due to aerodynamic resistance and the additional energy required to overcome it.
• We have designed to a maximum gradient of 2.5% (1 in 40) at which the Reference Train could
still maintain maximum speed. This was also the value adopted during the design of HS1. We
have however used up to the maximum figure of 3.5% (1 in 28.5) allowed by the TSIs in some of
the options for access to Heathrow, and approaching Birmingham, where speeds would be lower
than those on the HS2 main line.
• Infrastructure maintenance would only be carried out on tracks closed to rail traffic. The route
would be configured to permit closure of one track whilst the adjacent track remains open
for traffic at sufficient (reduced) speed to maintain published journey times. Normal planned
inspection maintenance and renewal would be carried out in the closed periods overnight
between midnight and 5am Monday to Saturday (and until 8am on Sunday).

Maximising capacity
2.3.11 In order to assess the initial and potential ultimate capacity of HS2 we have used the modelled
performance of the Reference Train in conjunction with the current reported functionality of
ERTMS. With the assistance of British and European train control experts in the railway and rail
supply sectors, we have also assessed the likely development trajectory of ERTMS over the period
to the possible opening of HS2 and beyond. This work has informed our decision to base the
modelled initial capacity, conservatively, upon existing ERTMS Level 2 capability and make prudent
assumptions about the ultimate capacity at a time a longer term network could be brought into use.
From this activity we have developed an operational availability and capacity specification, the main
elements of which include:
• A seven day availability for full service operation on all sections of HS2 from 5am to midnight
(except on Sundays where an 8am start is assumed).
• Maximum initial utilisation of the line on Day One of up to 14 trains per hour during peak periods,
with a typical utilisation of 10 trains per hour at quieter times. In the longer term, if more cities
were to be served by dedicated new lines and a high degree of segregation from the classic rail
network was achieved, then the capacity of the line could be increased to 18 trains per hour. This
would also depend upon improvements in rolling stock and signalling technology.
• Platforms would be capable of accepting up to two 200m-long trains, either separately or joined
together to run in multiple. For demand modelling purposes, the assumed seating capacity was
550 per 200m set, giving a maximum 400m-long (two-train) capacity of 1,100 seats.

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 Chapter 2: Our Approach

• Standard European TSI compliant GC structure gauge – as illustrated in Figure 2.3a.

This specifies the minimum clearance outline for structures such as tunnels, bridge heights
and the interaction with the platform height. The GC structure gauge would allow European
interoperable double deck trains to run on this network if future demand required them.
The actual structure gauge is greater in tunnels where the cross-sectional area is dictated
by aerodynamic effects on air pressure and resistance.

GC
(HS2 and HS1)

UK1: (Existing
infrastructure in
the UK)

4650mm

3965mm

Typical BR
platform

Figure 2.3a Structure gauge comparison

Ensuring high speed trains can run onto the classic network
2.3.12 To make effective use of capacity from Day One, in advance of any wider network, it would be
necessary to run some services beyond the new high speed line on to the existing WCML. Standard
European gauge high speed trains cannot simply run onto existing classic lines, because they
are taller and wider, and are designed for a lower platform height, as illustrated in Figure 2.3a.
Moreover, stations on the classic network cannot accommodate two 200m trains connected together
and running in multiple.

2.3.13 Through running onto the classic network could be achieved in two ways. First there could be a
mixed fleet of trains. One set would be standard “off-the-shelf” trains dedicated to the new high
speed line and a second set would be specially designed, smaller, “classic-compatible” trains
capable of running at high speed on the new line and then travelling at conventional speeds on the
classic network. This was the approach adopted for the design of Eurostar trains to allow operation
partially on the classic network prior to the opening of HS1.

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 High Speed Rail for Britain – Report by High Speed 2 Ltd

2.3.14 A second approach would be to “gauge clear” classic lines to particular destinations. This
would require alterations to stations, bridges, tunnels and track spacing for sufficient tracks to
accommodate standard high speed trains as well as classic ones. Where station platforms are
altered to accommodate the HS2 trains, they could not also be used by existing UK trains because
of the changed platform height and stepping distances. The degree of work required in the vicinity
of stations would be considerable, with bypass lines being required at some locations. Ideally the
capability to accommodate 400m long trains would also be created to operate such services to
destinations where demand justified them.

2.3.15 Of the two options, we consider that adopting a specially designed classic-compatible train
(although, in itself, relatively expensive) would be the more cost effective. However, further work is
needed to identify whether there are classic routes or route sections where gauge clearance might
be more economic, especially if a longer term network is created.

2.3.16 Curves on the WCML in a number of route sections are sufficiently severe to restrict speeds of
classic trains, so “Pendolino” tilting trains have been introduced to improve journey times. The latest
Japanese Shinkansen train has a system whereby the suspension provides 1 degree of inclination
to improve passenger comfort, allowing the trains to take 250kph curves at 270kph on dedicated
high speed line. There are currently no high speed trains in service which tilt by rotating the actual
vehicle body – in the way conventional speed trains such as Pendolinos do – to allow higher speeds
around sharp curves on existing railway lines. After discussion with train manufacturers and rolling
stock experts, we have assumed that such trains would not be designed especially for our high
speed classic-compatible fleet. We have compared the effect of operating classic-compatible high
speed trains over the WCML in place of Pendolinos. The assessment concluded that, given the
installed power and performance of a high speed classic-compatible train and the extent of WCML
route which would not be limited on speed due to curvature, the time lost north of HS2 on Day One
in comparison to conventional tilting trains would be small. Classic-compatible trains would, of
course, save significant journey time on HS2 itself.

2.3.17 A further approach that has been suggested, pending the construction of a wider network, was to
create an interchange station at the northern end of HS2 and avoid through running by requiring
all passengers to change (cross platform) from high speed trains to classic ones for their onward
journeys and vice versa. This has not been examined in any detail as the time and inconvenience
would negate the benefits of the high speed portion of the journey.

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 Chapter 2: Our Approach

Designing a sustainable service

2.3.18 The four sustainability priorities listed below have underpinned our approach to both designing and
assessing the options and then ultimately deciding which should be recommended as our preferred
choices. We also used these to frame our assessment of the preferred package to demonstrate the
overall sustainability impact of the new line. The four priorities as set out in the 2005 UK sustainable
development strategy Securing the Future are:
• Reducing greenhouse gas emissions and combating climate change.
• Natural resource protection and environmental enhancement (adapted by us to include the
cultural as well as natural environment).
• Creating sustainable communities.
• Sustainable consumption and production.

2.3.19 In following the four priorities in the design of the infrastructure, we have sought where possible to –
• Avoid or, where this is not practicable, to mitigate direct or indirect harm to landscape, water and
ecological resources and to maximise opportunities to enhance such features where possible.
• Avoid or, where this is not practicable, to mitigate direct or indirect harm to historic cultural
resources and to maximise opportunities to enhance such features where possible.
• Avoid or ensure appropriate mitigation of any new noise, vibrations or localised air pollution
caused by HS2.
• Use, where practicable, land with planning designations appropriate to the development for high
speed rail and its infrastructure.
• Minimise land take and avoid demolitions of Measures used to help
properties where possible, particularly residential mitigate the impacts of HS2
properties. To limit noise in surface sections we
• Maintain the health and amenity of residential used the following measures:
communities potentially affected by the scheme, • Lowering vertical alignments to put
including where practicable the maintenance of track in cutting.
access to services and shops. • Noise barriers to limit noise in
• Ensure no net loss of flood storage capacity. surface route sections.

• Minimise waste production. • Bunding (low embankments)

2.3.20 The Appraisal of Sustainability examines in depth the
impact of the preferred scheme on the four sustainability
priorities and how well our design meets the criteria
above. As more detailed design is progressed we
would expect, and have made provision in our cost
estimates for, the development of visual solutions for
running parallel to the track.
To limit ground borne noise in both
surface and tunnel sections we used
the following measures:
• Resilient track support systems.
• Embedded track systems.

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 High Speed Rail for Britain – Report by High Speed 2 Ltd

HS2 infrastructure elements – such as bridges, tunnel portals and overhead power line supporting
structures – to blend them into existing built and natural landscapes. Tunnels are often presented as
the best way to minimise the impact of new routes. We therefore focus on their effects in particular
below. Chapter 4 explains in more detail the scheme’s impact on greenhouse gas emissions and the
implications for design.

2.3.21 We have sought where possible to follow best practice guidance when carrying out our sustainability
assessments. We consulted the relevant statutory bodies, including the Environment Agency,
Natural England and English Heritage on our approach and emerging conclusions. We have sought
to apply the principles of Strategic Environmental Assessment, so that the work we have undertaken
will be transferable to any subsequent stages of appraisal required for scheme approval.

The effects of tunnelling

2.3.22 When approaching the design of the route, we considered the use of tunnels to avoid environmental
impacts, primarily impacts on landscape and major property demolitions. Where necessary, we also
considered tunnels for topographical reasons. There are two types of tunnel that we considered:
• Twin bore, single track tunnels with
cross passages at regular intervals to Door to outside
at Surface Level
allow evacuation from one tunnel to
the other in the event of an incident Intervention
shaft
(as per Figure 2.3b).
Cross-passage
• Single bore, twin track tunnels for linking tunnels
shorter tunnels.
xxxx

2.3.23 Both types of tunnel would accommodate

xxxx x

xx xxxx xx xx xxxxx x

the GC gauge trains. The aim for the

new line would be to allow speeds of
xxxx x

xx xxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxx xx

xx xxx

400kph where practicable. However,

xxxxx

xxx xxxx x xxx xx xxx xx xxxxxx

we acknowledge that the design for

xxxx x xxx xx
x xxxx xxxxx

such speeds in tunnels would be very

expensive as much larger tunnels would
be required. Therefore we designed the
tunnels for HS2 to allow up to 320kph Direction of
and in some cases 400kph. Tunnels Non-Incident Passenger
Incident tunnel
tunnel Evacuation
cost about 5-6 times more per km than
building through open countryside. Figure 2.3b Section view of a twin bore tunnel

2.3.24 Safety regulations, aerodynamics and ventilation are the key drivers in deciding the size and
space requirements within the tunnels. Long tunnels, greater than 2km, require cross-passages
and intervention shafts, providing emergency exits, ventilation or access for emergency services.
From an aerodynamic point of view natural ventilation is required to relieve pressure in the
tunnel and avoid passenger discomfort or excessive noise when a train emerges from the tunnel.

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 Chapter 2: Our Approach

The intervention shafts could be required every 2km in long tunnels and could be up to 20m in
diameter at the surface. Two different tunnelling techniques would be used on HS2 -
• Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM). A standard tunnel construction method, a TBM can be used
through most types of ground conditions. Once launched from a shaft or cutting, they remain
below ground and so avoid many of the environmental issues that affect surface works. Ground
settlement on the surface can also be limited to small amounts. For longer tunnel lengths
intermediate construction shafts may be necessary.
• Sprayed Concrete Lining (SCL). The prevalent ground conditions on the HS2 route would mean
that excavations could be used for this technique. Instead of drills, progress is made through
excavating short sections before putting in support for the roof.

2.3.25 Using the TBM method, precast concrete segments are manufactured outside the tunnel and
installed behind the machine whereas in the SCL method the lining is created in-situ. Both
construction methods require a significant amount of building materials and there is a huge amount
of spoil produced with a sizeable logistics effort required to remove it.

2.3.26 The construction of the tunnels may cause some ground movement and therefore the potential
degree and impact of any settlement must be understood when designing the route and choosing
the tunnelling methodology. Mitigation measures to minimise the impact of tunnelling on surface
buildings and utilities include: reinforcing the ground by injecting grout; moving and then reinstating
the structures post construction of the tunnel; and providing additional support for building
foundations.

2.3.27 During operation of the railway, property on the surface may experience ground-borne noise, a
rumbling sound created by trains passing through the tunnels underneath. The noise levels heard
in a property would depend on their proximity to the tunnel and the geology of the area. Mitigation
measures can be used but add extra cost to the construction and maintenance of the tunnels.

A demand led approach

2.3.28 Our station designs and locations are influenced by where people will start their journey and where
they want to finish. Getting this right determines whether enough people will want to use the service
to make it viable. We built on existing transport models, known as PLANET, to create a forecasting
model to test the impact of what we proposed. The HS2 Demand and Appraisal Report explains in
more detail our modelling approach. It combined three elements:
• An updated Long Distance Model – with rail, car and air demand for journey purposes (leisure,
business and commuting).
• Two regional models – Midland and South – mainly for detailed short distance local rail
movements and high level impacts on car traffic.
• Heathrow spreadsheet model – including both surface and air access to Heathrow.

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 High Speed Rail for Britain – Report by High Speed 2 Ltd

And two stand alone models:

• International spreadsheet model identifying the scope of international travel from key British
cities.
• Station Location modelling station accessibility in London and the West Midlands.

2.3.29 Together these models provide long-range forecasts using data, behavioural assumptions and
traffic and rail modelling parameters. We used the data to determine our preferred options and
understand the impact of our proposals not only on travellers’ choices but also on train crowding,
road congestion and emissions.

2.3.30 In understanding the choices that people would be likely to make there are a variety of reasons why
people would travel by high speed rail rather than road, air or classic rail:
• A faster journey time.
• A more reliable journey.
• Higher quality trains.
• Convenience of overall door-to-door journeys.

2.3.31 The first two are easier to measure and are included in the modelling results, with reliability or
punctuality modelled as an adjusted journey time (one minute improvement in average minutes
lateness is equivalent to an improvement of three minutes journey time). The third assumes some
further inherent attractiveness of high speed services over classic rail. Given the limited evidence to
support an exact measurement of this, we have taken a conservative approach and not treated high
speed rail as a ‘different mode’. It is possible therefore that there would be additional demand and
further benefits associated with high speed rail that we have not captured.

2.3.32 In considering the demand for high speed rail services, we recognised that it would be but one
part of a complete journey. The overall journey will have other sections involving private or public
transport or possibly both. If high speed rail is to deliver the full benefits predicted we recognised
that the specific location and detailed design of our stations would be critical to making the
interchange with complementary transport modes effective, convenient and attractive. We also
recognised the likely future capabilities of local transport networks, particularly the Underground in
central London. We reviewed regional and local strategies that map future plans, and we discussed
our potential proposals with bodies best placed to understand future travel patterns – the Highways
Agency, Local Authorities, TfL and others - in our working groups.

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 Chapter 2: Our Approach

Approach to value for money

2.3.33 Achieving value for money is about getting the right balance between costs and the design aims.
Two areas where decisions have a significant bearing on costs are station locations and the parts
of the route to tunnel.

2.3.34 City centre stations and their allied approach routes are invariably more expensive to build. High
land costs, intensive land use and the potential impact on existing property and services all
contribute. Building at city edges substantially avoids many of these problems. However most people
want to travel to the centre of cities to access other modes of transport, businesses and facilities.

2.3.35 Tunnels are much more expensive than open surface routes and their construction can be
disruptive. Nevertheless, we included them in the design where it was necessary to meet our
sustainability aims – for example where we propose to cross built up areas or particularly sensitive
natural features and where there was a need to reduce major property demolitions or noise.

Appraising value for money for the business case

2.3.36 DfT has a standard approach to appraisal (WebTAG) which ensures consistency and comparability
across transport schemes. We have appraised our proposals as far as possible, using this approach.

Our assumptions
We had to make some assumptions about what would happen between now and possible opening
of the high speed line. We called this our ‘reference case’. We assumed that by the time HS2
opens, the following would also be in place:
• Any highways, rail and local transport schemes that the Government has committed to build
before 2015.
• Continued investment in the roads programme and London transport beyond 2015, consistent
with the National Transport Model, which is unlikely to be affected by the building of a new high
speed line.
• Investment in specific rail schemes beyond 2015 – Thameslink, Crossrail and the Intercity
Express Programmes (now known as Superexpress), which are unlikely to be in competition
with a new high speed line. This is consistent with DfT’s Network Modelling Framework. There
are some specific rail schemes which may directly impact on the degree of detail which we
have not included in our reference case. These include Evergreen III, a proposed new fast
service between London and Oxford, and Airtrack, a proposed new rail line between Heathrow
Airport Terminal 5 and the existing rail network to the south and west, including Reading,
Guildford and Waterloo.
• A third runway at Heathrow Airport. We also reviewed the difference which the absence of a
third runway would make to the business case.

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2.3.37 We have assumed a ‘central case’ which uses assumptions about the methods used in future to
generate electricity and the likely growth in GDP. These forecasts are in line with the National
Transport Model and other Government forecasts. A key assumption is the demand growth forecast.
Growth in road and air traffic was based on the DfT’s most recently published forecasts. For air, this
involves a 178% increase in domestic aviation from 2008 to 2033, and for road this is a 43% increase
in trips from 2008 to 2033.

2.3.38 Growth in rail demand was calculated using the standard industry and Government recommended
approach. This assumes that growth is driven by changes in rail fares, population and employment
and in particular people’s propensity to make more rail trips as they become more affluent. Unlike
for road and air forecasts, the approach for rail produces a demand forecast that grows indefinitely.
Therefore as a proxy for market maturity and given the long term uncertainty in the forecasting
methodology, DfT recommends forecasting no further growth beyond 2026. Because of the longer
term nature of HS2, we have extended this cap to 2033. This therefore amounts to a 150% increase
in long distance rail to and from London between 2008 and 2033.

2.3.39 Our assumption on GDP growth follows the latest Treasury forecasts. Given the uncertainties in
forecasting rail growth, we tested different levels of growth to understand the robustness of the
business case to different scenarios.

Summary and key recommendations

2.3.40 In our approach to the design and specification of HS2 we have sought to achieve a balance
between a number of factors. We have aimed to realise the potential of high speed technology
and maximising its benefits with a demand-led approach. The design has carefully considered
and, where possible, sought to address the impacts on landscape and on those who may live near
the proposed route. At the same time we have striven to achieve value for money and apply the
standards and technology proven in use around the world.

2.3.41 We believe the proposals for HS2 that follow in the next chapter achieve an appropriate balance
between these factors. If HS2 proceeds to further design stages we would expect that its
performance could be further enhanced.

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