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DIGESTS IN PUB CORP

DANTE V. LIBAN v. RICHARD J. GORDON, GR No. 175352, 2009-07-15

Facts:

During respondent's incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,[1] he was elected
Chairman of the PNRC

Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board... of Governors, respondent has
ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution

Issues:

Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of
the Philippine Constitution

Ruling:

PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions... the Philippine government does not own
the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from the
Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions from private individuals and
private entities obtained through solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors

The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC
members are private individuals, including students.

Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization. The
PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation.

In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.

LIBAN VS GORDON

. THE FACTS Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City
Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme Court what they styled as “Petition to Declare Richard J.
Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate” against respondent Gordon, who was elected
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors during his incumbency as
Senator.

Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent
Gordon ceased to be a member of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides that “[n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.” Petitioners cited the case of Camporedondo
vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049, decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in supporting
their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate when he accepted
and held the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.

Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-5,[1] held that the office of the PNRC
Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is
not appointed by the President or by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a
GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization and
because it is controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of which are private sector
individuals. Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC
Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.

The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is
void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.” The Court thus directed the PNRC to
incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it
wants to be a private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:

WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a),
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No.
95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a
private corporation or grant it corporate powers.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC
likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned
the second part of the Decision with regard to the pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and
the constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC Charter.

II. THE ISSUE Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is the nature of the PNRC?

III. THE RULING [The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the
Decision by deleting the second sentence thereof.]

NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the constitutional issue because it was not the very
lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a private
corporation.

The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the parties, and was not among the issues
defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have reiterated the
rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,
Inc., thus:

This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is the very lis mota. It is a well-
established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be
unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will be
unavoidable.

[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . . the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court
should have exercised judicial restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground
upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely
affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was
being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate under the
Corporation Code, after more than sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several times, particularly on June 11, 1953,
August 16, 1971, December 15, 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D.
No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s corporate
existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private
corporations by law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private corporation
contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.

A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it[,] not just in terms of
structure, but also in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and
the international community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis. It is in
recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective
from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and during the effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not
been questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.

[T]his Court [must] recognize the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect the unique
status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the force and
effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and
harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter to negate the
former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private
corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under international
humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging its obligations
under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither
“be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality” as well as its
independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international humanitarian law
and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC
or a subsidiary thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold
his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion
does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the
provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. [T]he sui
generis character of PNRC requires us to approach controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case
basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in the
humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of
a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC
Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all
national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood
requirements. Its humanitarian work is unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the
core in an untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who
depend on it in times of disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the
Philippines in the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void
must therefore stay.

BSP V. COA (G.R. NO.177131; JUNE 7, 2011)


BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT. G.R. No.177131; June 7, 2011.

FACTS: This case arose when the COA issued Resolution No. 99-011on August 19, 1999 ("the COA
Resolution"), with the subject "Defining the Commissions policy with respect to the audit of the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines." In its whereas clauses, the COA Resolution stated that the BSP was created as
a public corporation under Commonwealth Act No. 111, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460 and
Republic Act No. 7278; that in Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, the
Supreme Court ruled that the BSP, as constituted under its charter, was a "government-controlled
corporation within the meaning of Article IX(B)(2)(1) of the Constitution"; and that "the BSP is
appropriately regarded as a government instrumentality under the 1987 Administrative Code." The COA
Resolution also cited its constitutional mandate under Section 2(1), Article IX (D).Finally, the COA
Resolution reads:

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, the COMMISSION PROPER HAS
RESOLVED, AS IT DOES HEREBY RESOLVE, to conduct an annual financial audit of the Boy Scouts of
the Philippines in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and express an opinion on
whether the financial statements which include the Balance Sheet, the Income Statement and the
Statement of Cash Flows present fairly its financial position and results of operations.

BE IT RESOLVED FURTHERMORE, that for purposes of audit supervision, the Boy Scouts of the
Philippines shall be classified among the government corporations belonging to the Educational, Social,
Scientific, Civic and Research Sector under the Corporate Audit Office I, to be audited, similar to the
subsidiary corporations, by employing the team audit approach

ISSUE: Does COA have jurisdiction over BSP?

HELD: After looking at the legislative history of its amended charter and carefully studying the applicable
laws and the arguments of both parties, [the Supreme Court found] that the BSP is a public corporation
and its funds are subject to the COA's audit jurisdiction.

The BSP Charter (Commonwealth Act No. 111, approved on October 31, 1936), entitled "An Act to Create
a Public Corporation to be Known as the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and to Define its Powers and
Purposes" created the BSP as a "public corporation"

There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently
constituted under Republic Act No. 7278,falls under the second classification.Article 44 reads:

Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:

(1) The State and its political subdivisions;


(2)Other corporations,institutions and entities for public interest or purpose created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations forprivate interest or purposeto which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

The BSP, which is a corporation created for a public interest or purpose, is subject to the law creating it
under Article 45 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 45.Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the laws
creating or recognizing them.

Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.

Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code
concerning partnerships.
The purpose of the BSP as stated in its amended charter shows that it was created in order to implement
a State policy declared in Article II, Section 13 of the Constitution, which reads:
Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and
protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth
patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a
constitutional mandate, comes within the class of "public corporations" defined by paragraph 2, Article 44
of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same
Code. DENIED.

PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS vs. COA. G.R. No. 169752
September 25, 2007

FACTS:

The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by virtue of Act No. 1285,
enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was created,
was composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in
Section 2 of its charter, shall be to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection
of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any
way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.

At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, was not yet in
existence. Act No. 1285 antedated both the Corporation Law and the constitution of the SEC.

For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws for the
protection of animals, the petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend
violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share 1/2 of the fines imposed and
collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto.

Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines
collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of C.A. No. 148. Whereas, the cruel
treatment of animals is now an offense against the State, penalized under our statutes, which the
Government is duty bound to enforce;

When the COA was to perform an audit on them they refuse to do so, by the reason that they are a private
entity and not under the said commission. It argued that COA covers only government entities. On the
other hand the COA decided that it is a government entity.

ISSUE: WON the said petitioner is a private entity.

RULING:

YES. First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the “charter test” cannot be applied. Essentially, the
“charter test” provides that the test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or
controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public
function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are
government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the
CSC, and are compulsory members of the GSIS.

And since the “charter test” had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it follows that
the test cannot apply to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on
January 19, 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in general have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided. All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the purpose
and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective
effect.

Second, a reading of petitioner’s charter shows that it is not subject to control or supervision by any
agency of the State, unlike GOCCs. No government representative sits on the board of trustees of the
petitioner. Like all private corporations, the successors of its members are determined voluntarily and
solely by the petitioner in accordance with its by-laws, and may exercise those powers generally accorded
to private corporations, such as the powers to hold property, to sue and be sued, to use a common seal,
and so forth. It may adopt by-laws for its internal operations: the petitioner shall be managed or operated
by its officers “in accordance with its by-laws in force.”

Third. The employees of the petitioner are registered and covered by the SSS at the latter’s initiative,
and not through the GSIS, which should be the case if the employees are considered government
employees. This is another indication of petitioner’s nature as a private entity.

Fourth. The respondents contend that the petitioner is a “body politic” because its primary purpose
is to secure the protection and welfare of animals which, in turn, redounds to the public good. This
argument, is not tenable. The fact that a certain juridical entity is impressed with public interest does
not, by that circumstance alone, make the entity a public corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be
private although its charter contains provisions of a public character, incorporated solely for the public
good. This class of corporations may be considered quasi-public corporations, which are private
corporations that render public service, supply public wants, or pursue other eleemosynary objectives.
While purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its members, they are required by law to discharge
functions for the public benefit. Examples of these corporations are utility, railroad, warehouse,
telegraph, telephone, water supply corporations and transportation companies. It must be stressed that a
quasi-public corporation is a species of private corporations, but the qualifying factor is the type of service
the former renders to the public: if it performs a public service, then it becomes a quasi-public
corporation.

Authorities are of the view that the purpose alone of the corporation cannot be taken as a safe guide, for
the fact is that almost all corporations are nowadays created to promote the interest, good, or convenience
of the public. A bank, for example, is a private corporation; yet, it is created for a public benefit. Private
schools and universities are likewise private corporations; and yet, they are rendering public service.
Private hospitals and wards are charged with heavy social responsibilities. More so with all common
carriers. On the other hand, there may exist a public corporation even if it is endowed with gifts or
donations from private individuals.

The true criterion, therefore, to determine whether a corporation is public or private is found in the
totality of the relation of the corporation to the State. If the corporation is created by the State as the
latter’s own agency or instrumentality to help it in carrying out its governmental functions, then that
corporation is considered public; otherwise, it is private. Applying the above test, provinces, chartered
cities, and barangays can best exemplify public corporations. They are created by the State as its own
device and agency for the accomplishment of parts of its own public works.

Fifth. The respondents argue that since the charter of the petitioner requires the latter to render
periodic reports to the Civil Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the President, the
petitioner is, therefore, a government instrumentality.

This contention is inconclusive. By virtue of the fiction that all corporations owe their very existence
and powers to the State, the reportorial requirement is applicable to all corporations of whatever nature,
whether they are public, quasi-public, or private corporations—as creatures of the State, there is a
reserved right in the legislature to investigate the activities of a corporation to determine whether it acted
within its powers. In other words, the reportorial requirement is the principal means by which the State
may see to it that its creature acted according to the powers and functions conferred upon it.
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines
FACTS:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents
to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD
be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art
3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec
28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)

3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),particularly
Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,

RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:

1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to consult the local
government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate
under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is
a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental
importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the
requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.

In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:

x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute
is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of
Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public
concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest
(Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec
28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and
effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as
may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the
highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.

E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels
and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

3. a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical,
territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state
in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region recognized in the Constitution. It is
not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets
the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory,
the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter
to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being
itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the
MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The
BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
“autonomous region” in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict
with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal
framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the
necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate
the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and
defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the
Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot
guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be
submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to
Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in
violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly
Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of
Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines “Bangsamoro people” as
the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether mixed or of full blood,
including their spouses.

Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros”
as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent
islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this
freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the
“Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue
of their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does
not form part of the public domain.

Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for
the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of
the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct
consultations beforeany project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including
those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to
the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
CONCLUSION: In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of
discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3,
Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was
designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical,
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive
duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions
but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP
and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.

Basco vs. PAGCOR (G.R. No. 91649) - Digest

Facts:

Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter --
PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it constitutes a
waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila Cit
government’s right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. For the same reason, the
law has intruded into the local government’s right to impose local taxes and license fees. This is in
contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.

Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.

Ruling:

1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Their
charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the municipality cannot
assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been
passed upon by the state itself which has the “inherent power to tax.”

The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that “municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress”, which has the power to “create and abolish municipal
corporations” due to its “general legislative powers”. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over the
Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can
also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

2. The City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked by P.D. No. 771
and vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the
power to issue “license or permits” for the operation of gambling.

3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is
government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of
stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate
gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and
actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to
control by a mere Local Government.

4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. No.
1869.

Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:


“Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes,
fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the
local government.”

SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to “impose taxes and fees” is
always subject to “limitations” which Congress may provide by law. Besides, the principle of local
autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means “decentralization.” It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state. Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED.

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.CALIXTO


CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONYCALVENTO, respondents G.R.
No. 129093

FACTS:

On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto
Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by
Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed
by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on
September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for
declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said
complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the
following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to
refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon.
Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3)
an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the
respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from
implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is
valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of
the national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local
governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this
premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or
ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local government
units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from
Congress. As held in Tatel vs. virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by
Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp

Limbona vs. Mangelin (G.R. No. 80391) - Digest

Facts:

Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or
Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid
Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the
Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house
committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance
of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's
proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly.
Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly
expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before
the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had
become "moot and academic" because of its resolution.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case
moot and academic.

2. Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao subject to the jurisdiction of the
national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two
autonomous governments of Region 9 and 12?

Ruling:

1. The Court does not agree that the case is moot and academic simply by reason of the expulsion
resolution that was issued. If the expulsion was done purposely to make the petition moot and academic,
it will not make it academic. On the ground of due process, the Court hold that the expulsion is without
force and effect. First, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation. It also
does not appear that the petitioner had been made aware that he was charged with graft and corruption
before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their
accusations. As it stands, the charges now are leveled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant
expulsion. Thus, the Court ordered reinstatement of the petitioner.

2. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions 9 and 12 by Presidential Decree
No. 1618. In relation to the central government, the Presidential Decree provides that “the President shall
have the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions...” Now, autonomy is
either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in
order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments “more
responsive and accountable,” “and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.” At the same
time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The president exercises “general supervision” over them, but only to
“ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has not control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government units declared to be
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities.

According to the Supreme Court, an examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous
governments of Mindanao persuades us to believe that they were never meant to exercise autonomy
through decentralization of power. The Presidential Decree, in the first place, mandates that “the
President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.” In the
second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to dischage chiefly administrative
services. Thus, the SC assumes jurisdiction.

Upon the facts presented, the Court finds two sessions held on November to be invalid. Wherefore, the
petition is Granted. The petitioner is reinstated as Member and speaker of the SANGUNIAN.

Disomangcop vs Datumanong
Date: November 25, 2004
Petitioners: Arsadi Disomangcop and Ramir Dimalotong
Respondents: DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong and DBM Secretary Emilia Boncodin
Ponente: Tinga

Facts:

Challenged in the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction are the constitutionality and validity of Republic
Act No. 8999 entitled “An Act Establishing An Engineering District in the First District of the Province of
Lanao del Sur and Appropriating Funds Therefore,” and Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) Department Order No. 119 on the subject, “Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office.”

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Republic Act No. 6734 (R.A. 6734), entitled “An Act Providing for
An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,” was enacted and signed into law on
1 August 1989. The law called for the holding of a plebiscite in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao
del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, SouthCotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and thecities of Cotabato, Dapitan,
Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa and Zamboanga. In the plebiscite,
only four (4) provinces voted for the creation of an autonomous region, namely: Lanao del Sur,
Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. These provinces became the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM). The law contains elaborate provisions on the powers of the Regional Government and
the areas of jurisdiction which are reserved for the National Government. President Aquino issued E.O.
426, entitled “Placing the Control and Supervision of the Offices of the DPWH within the ARMM under the
Autonomous Regional Government, and for other purposes.”

Nearly nine (9) years later, then DPWH Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar issued D.O. 119 (Creation of
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure
projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and the province of Lanao del Sur.)

Almost two years later, President Estrada approved and signed into law R.A. 8999(establishing
engineering district in lanao del sur).Congress later passed R.A. 9054, entitled “An Act to Strengthen and
Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose
Republic Act No. 6734,entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as
Amended.”

On 23 July 2001, petitioners addressed a petition to DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong, seeking the
revocation of D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A. 8999. No action, however, was taken on the
petition.[Petitioners allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of discretion and that it violates the
constitutional autonomy of the ARMM.

They point out that the challenged Department Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering
Office with functions that have already been devolved to the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in
Lanao del Sur. Petitioners also contend that R.A. 8999 is a piece of legislation that was not intelligently
and thoroughly studied, and that the explanatory note to House Bill No. 995 (H.B. 995) from which the
law originated is questionable. Petitioners assert as well that prior to the sponsorship of the law, no
public hearing nor consultation with the DPWH-ARMM was made. The House Committee on Public Works
and Highways (Committee) failed to invite a single official from the affected agency. Finally, petitioners
argue that the law was skillfully timed for signature by former President Joseph E. Estrada during the
pendency of the impeachment proceedings.

Issue: PreliminariesRatio: In seeking to nullify acts of the legislature and the executive department on
the ground that they contravene the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. The challenge to the legal standing of petitioners cannot succeed. Legal standing or locus
standi is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
The term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from a mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. But following
the new trend, this Court is inclined to take cognizance of a suit although it does not satisfy the
requirement of legal standing when paramount interests are involved. In several cases, the Court has
adopted a liberal stance on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue
of transcendental significance to the people. It is not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi Sub-
District Engineering Office under D.O. 119 and the creation of and appropriation of funds to the First
Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed under R.A. 8999 will affect the powers, functions and
responsibilities of the petitioners and the DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have apparently been endowed
with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is
likely that petitioners are in imminent danger of being eased out of their duties and, not remotely, even
their jobs. Their material and substantial interests will definitely be prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O.
119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is direct and immediate. Thus, they can legitimately challengethe validity
of the enactments subject of the instant case.

Issue: WON Republic Act No. 8999 was valid

Held: No

Ratio: The challenged law never became operative and was superseded or repealed by a subsequent
enactment. The ARMM Organic Acts are deemed a part of the regional autonomy scheme. While they are
classified as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they enjoy affirmation
by a plebiscite.

Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case.
The amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite. Although R.A. 9054 was enacted later, it
reaffirmed the imperativeness of the plebiscite requirement. In fact, R.A. 9054 itself, being the second or
later ARMM Organic Act, was subjected to and ratified in a plebiscite. The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A.
6074, as implemented by E.O. 426, devolved the functions of the DPWH in the ARMM which includes
Lanao del Sur (minus Marawi City at the time) to the Regional Government. By creating an office
with previously devolved functions, R.A. 8999, in essence, sought to amend R.A. 6074. The amendatory
law should therefore first obtain the approval of the people of the ARMM before it could validly take effect.
Absent compliance with this requirement, R.A. 8999 has not even become operative.

From another perspective, R.A. 8999 was repealed and superseded by R.A. 9054. Where a statute of later
date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior action the subject, that
intention must be given effect. R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the
constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARG covering,among others, Lanao del
Sur and Marawi City, one of which is its jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning.

R.A. 8999, however, ventures to reestablish the National Government’s jurisdiction over infrastructure
programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent withR.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter
law’s objective.Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic
Acts,R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054. The kernel of the antagonism and disharmony lies in the
regionalautonomy which the ARMM Organic Acts ordain pursuant to the Constitution. On the other
hand,R.A. 8999 contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of regional autonomy. Regional
Autonomy Under R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for autonomous
regions is to allow the separate development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. These
cultures, as amatter of right, must be allowed to flourish.

Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine society in its ethnolinguistic,
cultural, and even religious diversities. It strives to free Philippine society of the strain and wastage
caused by the assimilationist approach. Policies emanating from the legislature are invariably
assimilationist in character despite channels being open for minority representation.As a result,
democracy becomes an irony to the minority group.

The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the case of the Filipino Muslims and theCordillera
people who have been fighting for it. Their political struggle highlights their uniquecultures and the
unresponsiveness of the unitary system to their aspirations. The Moros’ strugglefor self-determination
dates as far back as the Spanish conquest in the Philippines. Even at present,the struggle goes
on.However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the establishment of asovereignty
distinct from that of the Republic, as it can be installed only “within the framework of this Constitution
and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of thePhilippines.” The objective
of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups, with a commontradition and shared social-
cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways of life and heritage,exercise their rights, and be in
charge of their own business. This is achieved through theestablishment of a special governance regime
for certain member communities who choose theirown authorities from within the community and
exercise the jurisdictional authority legallyaccorded to them to decide internal community affairs.In
the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the cultivation of more positive meansfor national
integration. It would remove the wariness among the Muslims, increase their trust inthe government and
pave the way for the unhampered implementation of the developmentprograms in the regionA necessary
prerequisite of autonomy is decentralization. Decentralization is a decision bythe central government
authorizing its subordinates, whether geographically or functionallydefined, to exercise authority in
certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational units. Itis typically a delegated power, wherein a
larger government chooses to delegate certain authorityto more local governments. Federalism implies
some measure of decentralization, but unitarysystems may also decentralize. Decentralization differs
intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-units that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not
possess any claim of right against thecentral government.Decentralization comes in two forms—
deconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration isadministrative in nature; it involves the transfer
of functions or the delegation of authority andresponsibility from the national office to the regional and
local offices. This mode of decentralization is also referred to as administrative
decentralization.Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the transfer of
powers,responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from
the centralgovernment to local government units. This is a more liberal form of decentralization since
there isan actual transfer of powers and responsibilities. It aims to grant greater autonomy to
localgovernment units in cognizance of their right to self-government, to make them self-reliant, and
toimprove their administrative and technical capabilities. The diminution of Congress’ powers over
autonomous regions was confirmed in Ganzon v.CA wherein this Court held that “the omission (of “as
may be provided by law”) signifies nothingmore than to underscore local governments’ autonomy from
Congress and to break Congress’‘control’ over local government affairs.” This is true to subjects over
which autonomous regions have powers, as specified in Sections18 and 20, Article X of the
1987 Constitution. Expressly not included therein are powers overcertain areas. Worthy of note is that
the area of public works is not excluded and neither is it reserved for the National Government. E.O. 426
officially devolved the powers and functions of the DPWH in ARMM to the Autonomous Regional
Government (ARG). More importantly, Congress itself through R.A. 9054transferred and devolved the
administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds for public works to the ARG.I n treading
their chosen path of development, the Muslims in Mindanao are to be given freedom and independence
with minimum interference from the National Government. This necessarily includes the freedom to
decide on, build, supervise and maintain the public works and infrastructure projects within the
autonomous region. The devolution of the powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM and transfer
of the administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds to the ARG are meant to be true,
meaningful and unfettered. This unassailable conclusion is grounded on a clear consensus, reached at
the Constitutional Commission and ratified by the entire Filipino electorate, on the centrality
of decentralization of power as the appropriate vessel of deliverance for Muslim Filipinos and the ultimate
unity of Muslims and Christians in this country. With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away,
and the National Government takes control again. The hands, once more, of the autonomous peoples are
reined in and tied up. The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by virtue of
E.O. 426,have been previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
E.O.426 clearly ordains the transfer of the control and supervision of the offices of the DPWH within
theARMM, including their functions, powers and responsibilities, personnel, equipment, properties,
andbudgets to the ARG. Among its other functions, the DPWH-ARMM, under the control of the
RegionalGovernment shall be responsible for highways, flood control and water resource
developmentsystems, and other public works within the ARMM. Its scope of power includes the planning,
design,construction and supervision of public works. According to RA 9054, the reach of the
RegionalGovernment enables it to appropriate, manage and disburse all public work funds allocated
for theregion by the central government. The use of the word “powers” in EO 426 manifests
anunmistakable case of devolution.It is clear from the foregoing provision of law that except for the areas
of executive powermentioned therein, all other such areas shall be exercised by the Autonomous
RegionalGovernment (“ARG”) of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. It is noted
that programsrelative to infrastructure facilities, health, education, women in development, agricultural
extensionand watershed management do not fall under any of the exempted areas listed in the provision
of law. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that all these spheres of executive responsibility have
beentransferred to the ARG.R.A. 8999 has made the DPWH-ARMM effete and rendered regional
autonomy illusory withrespect to infrastructure projects. The Congressional Record shows, on the other
hand, that the“lack of an implementing and monitoring body within the area” has hindered the
speedyimplementation, of infrastructure projects. Apparently, in the legislature’s estimation, the
existingDPWH-ARMM engineering districts failed to measure up to the task. But if it was indeed the
case,the problem could not be solved through the simple legislative creation of an incongruousengineering
district for the central government in the ARMM. As it was, House Bill No. 995 whichultimately became
R.A. 8999 was passed in record time on second reading (not more than 10minutes), absolutely without
the usual sponsorship speech and debates. The precipitate speedwhich characterized the passage of R.A.
8999 is difficult to comprehend since R.A. 8999 could haveresulted in the amendment of the first ARMM
Organic Act and, therefore, could not take effectwithout first being ratified in a plebiscite. What is more
baffling is that in March 2001, or barely two(2) months after it enacted R.A. 8999 in January 2001,
Congress passed R.A. 9054, the secondARMM Organic Act, where it reaffirmed the devolution of the
DPWH in ARMM, including Lanao delSur and Marawi City, to the Regional Government and effectively
repealed R.A. 8999.Issue:WON DPWH Department Order No. 119 was validRatio: D.O. 119 creating
the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction overinfrastructure projects within
Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions of E.O.426. The Executive Order was issued
pursuant to R.A. 6734—which initiated the creation of theconstitutionally-mandated autonomous region
and which defined the basic structure of theautonomous government. E.O. 426 sought to implement the
transfer of the control and supervisionof the DPWH within the ARMM to the Autonomous Regional
Government. In particular, it identifiedfour (4) District Engineering Offices in each of the four (4)
provinces, namely: Lanao del Sur,Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.[89] Accordingly, the First
Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction over the public works within
the province. The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a duplication
of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The
department order, in effect, takes back powers which have been previously devolved under thesaid
executive order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The DPWH’s order, likespring water,
cannot rise higher than its source of power—the Executive. The fact that the department order was issued
pursuant to E.O. 124—signed and approved by President Aquino in her residual legislative powers—is of
no moment. It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law
prevails over a general one.[90]Lex specialis derogant generali. As this Court expressed in the case of
Leveriza v. IntermediateAppellate Court,[91] “another basic principle of statutory construction mandates
that generallegislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so
interpretedas to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable, that specific
statuteprevails over a general statute and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to
aparticular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail.”E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is
based, is a general law reorganizing the Ministry of Public Works and Highways while E.O. 426 is a
special law transferring the control and supervisionof the DPWH offices within ARMM to the Autonomous
Regional Government. The latter statutespecifically applies to DPWH-ARMM offices. E.O. 124 should
therefore give way to E.O. 426 in theinstant case.In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their
ratification in a plebiscite in effectsuperseded E.O. 124. In case of an irreconcilable conflict between two
laws of different vintages,the later enactment prevails because it is the later legislative will.Further, in its
repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states that “all laws, decrees, orders, rules andregulations, and other
issuances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, arehereby repealed or modified
accordingly.” With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is the basis of D.O.119, it necessarily follows that D.O.
119 was also rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.

BATANGAS CATV, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE BATANGAS CITY SANGGUNIANG
PANLUNGSOD and BATANGAS CITY MAYOR [G.R. No. 138810. September 29, 2004]

FACTS:
On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a
permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution
provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein,
“provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod.

Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month.
As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures
the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210.

Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.

ISSUE :
may a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its
territorial jurisdiction?

HELD: No. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC
exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies.

Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause.
This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses
public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system – the
use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions – allow
an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators.

But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution
No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws
in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s
deregulation policy over the CATV industry.

LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive
regulatory power of the NTC.
DADOLE VS COA G.R. No. 125350 December 3 2002

FACTS: Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in
provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional monthly
allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to reimbursed the amount
they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.

ISSUE: Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the
President.

RULING: Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of
local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the
President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. x x x" The said provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of
control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the President. As such,
they are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it that the local governments or
their officials were performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by statutes, at whose will
and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or
reversed. They are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are
exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the
President's supervisory powers over LGUs

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, GR No. 152774, 2004-05-27

Facts: On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 48 entitled "ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND
EQUALIZATION." The program was established to "facilitate the process of enhancing the
capacities of local government... units (LGUs) in the discharge of the functions and services
devolved to them by the National Government Agencies concerned pursuant to the Local
Government Code."[1] The Oversight Committee (referred to as the Devolution Committee in E.O. No.
48)... constituted under Section 533(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991)
has been tasked to formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its effective
implementation.[2] Further, to address the funding... shortfalls of functions and services devolved to the
LGUs and other funding requirements of the program, the "Devolution Adjustment and Equalization
Fund" was created.[3] For 1998, the DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the
Oversight Committee based on the devolution status appraisal surveys undertaken by the DILG.[4] The
initial fund was to be sourced from the available savings of the national government for CY 1998. [5] For
1999 and the succeeding... years, the corresponding amount required to sustain the program was to be
incorporated in the annual GAA.[6] The Oversight Committee has been authorized to issue the
implementing rules and regulations governing the equitable allocation and distribution of... said fund to
the LGUs.

The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as unconstitutional and void the provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001, relating to the LGSEF. Similarly assailed are the Oversight Committee's
Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029... and OCD-
2002-001 issued pursuant thereto. The petitioner submits that the assailed provisos in the GAAs and
the OCD resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the
LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the... release thereof,
violate the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it mandates that the "just share" of the LGUs shall
be automatically released to them. Sections 18 and 286 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which
enjoin that the "just share" of the LGUs shall be "automatically and... directly" released to them "without
need of further action" are, likewise, cited.

The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release of the five- billion-peso portion of
the IRA, classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by the LGUs with the implementing rules and
regulations, including the mechanisms and guidelines prescribed by the Oversight Committee,
contravenes the explicit directive of the Constitution that the LGUs' share in the national taxes
"shall be automatically released to them." The petitioner maintains that the use of the word "shall"
must be given a compulsory meaning.

To further buttress this argument, the petitioner contends that to vest the Oversight Committee with the
authority to determine the distribution and release of the LGSEF, which is a part of the IRA of the LGUs,
is an anathema to the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991.

Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by the assailed OCD resolutions is the improper
amendment to Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991 on the percentage sharing of the IRA
among the LGUs

Issues: whether the issue had been rendered moot and academic.

(1) whether the petitioner has legal standing or locus standi to file the present suit; (2) whether the
petition involves factual questions that... are properly cognizable by the lower courts; and (3) whether the
issue had been rendered moot and academic.

Ruling: The petitioner has locus standi... to maintain the present suit

Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a party assailing the constitutionality of a statute must
be direct and personal. Such party must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is
invalid, but... also that he has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear
that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or... privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
or act complained of.

The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain the present suit. The
petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and
of the other LGUs.

The petition involves a significant... legal issue

The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the proper legal interpretation
of constitutional and statutory provisions. Moreover, the "transcendental importance" of the case,
as it necessarily involves the application of the constitutional principle on... local autonomy,
cannot be gainsaid. The nature of the present controversy, therefore, warrants the relaxation by
this Court of procedural rules in order to resolve the case forthwith.

The substantive issue needs to be resolved... notwithstanding the supervening events

Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision
if there is a grave violation of the Constitution.
Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve
the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and
public.

Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the substantive issue now before it is the rule
that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading
review."

For the GAAs in the coming... years may contain provisos similar to those now being sought to be
invalidated, and yet, the question may not be decided before another GAA is enacted. It, thus,
behooves this Court to make a categorical ruling on the substantive issue now.

In Article II of the Constitution, the State has expressly... adopted as a policy that:

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.

Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the President's power
over the LGUs to one of general supervision.

Drilon v. Lim:

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor... or superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify
or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform
to the prescribed... rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no judgment on
this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000... and 2001 and the OCD resolutions violate the...
constitutional precept on local autonomy

Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:

Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which
shall be automatically released to them.

When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a "just
share" in the national taxes; (2) the "just share" shall be determined by law; and (3) the "just share" shall
be automatically released to the LGUs.

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic
release of the shares of LGUs in the National internal revenue.

As a rule, the term "SHALL" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
provision is, therefore, IMPERATIVE.

Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without the Oversight Committee's prior
approval. Further, with respect to the portion of the LGSEF allocated for various projects of the LGUs (P1
billion for 1999; P1.5 billion for 2000 and P2 billion for 2001), the

Oversight Committee, through the assailed OCD resolutions, laid down guidelines and mechanisms that
the LGUs had to comply with before they could avail of funds from this portion of the LGSEF. The
guidelines required (a) the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for funding... based on the criteria laid
down by the Oversight Committee; (b) the LGUs to submit their project proposals to the DILG for
appraisal; (c) the project proposals that passed the appraisal of the DILG to be submitted to the Oversight
Committee for review, evaluation and approval.

It was only upon approval thereof that the Oversight Committee would direct the DBM to release the
funds for the projects.

To the Court's mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of the LGSEF is
constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or "just share" of the LGUs in the national
taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of the... implementing rules and regulations,
including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to
time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD
resolutions, makes the release not... automatic, a flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory
mandate that the "just share" of the LGUs "shall be automatically released to them." The LGUs are, thus,
placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.

ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., VS. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 144256

Subject: Public Corporation


Doctrine: Automatic release of IRA

Facts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to Congress a budget of
expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session, submitted the National
Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA
8760, “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It
provides under the heading “ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS” that the IRA for local
government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000”.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading “UNPROGRAMMED FUND,” it is provided that an amount
of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to
fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the
President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain
committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the
Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a
separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount
to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.

On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed with this Court the
petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining
Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the
Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED
FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions)

Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully reducing the IRA
allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same under “Unprogrammed funds”.
Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolve
the issues raised in the present case, it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the
GAA violated the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release
contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the
President, rather than making the release automatic.

ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically releasing the whole
amount of the allotted IRA.

HELD: Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA
contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the
President, rather than making the release automatic. Respondents counter argue that the above
constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not
prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of
the government from “unilaterally” withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the
executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, “This essentially means that the
President or any member of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of
statute, withhold the release of the IRA.”

As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local
governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the
executive from performing this duty.

To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties,
provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute – a
proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of statutes
making the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution
would have been worded differently.

Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified
by the words “as determined by law,” and not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is
not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.

In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic release of the
IRA is, as held in Batangas:
…if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the
collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be
a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made
on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter
of the current fiscal year.

This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the laudable
intent to “lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management.” The pronouncement in
Pimentel, however, must be echoed: “[T]he rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be
carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be
carried out by legal methods.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA
are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10
Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011

DECISION
BRION, J.:
I. THE FACTS: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were
enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and
scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM
Charter and reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of
September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No.
9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the
same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the
next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

II. THE ISSUES:

1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM
elections]?

2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section
26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in
toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of
elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions
of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized
national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections,
including the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days requirement
in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must
pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies
to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a
law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.

3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the
problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the
2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections
assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until
those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent
ARMM officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision
states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
[emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a
holdover.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net
result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like
the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what
it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed,
if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for
the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion
into the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed –
is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover
can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists;
it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the
holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a
policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no
authority to order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on any
other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except
when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may
have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that
power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections
and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential,
congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the
exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call
without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is
not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having
been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to
annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover,
the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice
itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications
must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third
group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of
RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative
officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an
express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than
real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the
elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM
officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May
2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only
for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this
is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial
terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the
adjustments that the synchronization requires.

GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE,et al. v. HON. JESSE M.ROBREDOG.R. No. 195390, 10
December 2014,
EN BANC

, (Reyes, J.)

A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It was
plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directivestated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize
the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects.It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine
themselves if they have been complying with thelaw.

In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination andaudit on the manner the local
government units utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the calendar years 1993-
1994. The examination yielded anofficial report, showing that a substantial portion of the 20%
development fund ofsome LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted
toexpenses properly chargeable against the Maintenance and Other OperatingExpenses (MOOE), in stark
violation of Section 287 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwiseknown as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
In 2010, Jesse Robredo, inhis capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed Memorandum Circular
(MC) No.2010-83, entitled “Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings,”
which aims to promote good governance through enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs. The
MC requires the posting within 30days from the end of each fiscal year in at least three (3) publicly
accessible andconspicuous places in the local government unit a summary of all revenues collected and
funds received including the appropriations and disbursements of such fundsduring the preceding fiscal
year. The foregoing circular also states that non-compliance will be meted sanctions in accordance with
pertinent laws, rules andregulations. On December 2, 2010, the Robredo issued another MC, reiterating
that20% component of the IRA shall be utilized for desirable social, economic andenvironmental outcomes
essential to the attainment of the constitutional objectiveof a quality of life for all. It also enumerated a list
for which the fund must not b e
utilized. Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by the ProvincialGovernment of Camarines
Sur, filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking tonullify the assailed issuances of the respondent for
being unconstitutional for violating the principles of local
and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitutionand the LGC.

ISSUE:Did the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy?

RULING:No, a reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of anexisting provision in
the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfullyobserve the directive stated in Section 287 of
the LGC to utilize the 20% portion ofthe IRA for development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs
to examinethemselves if they have been complying with the law. It must be recalled that theassailed
circular was issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantialportion of the 20%
development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized fordevelopment projects but was diverted to
expenses more properly categorized asMOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the LGC.Contrary to the
Villafuerte,

et al.’s

posturing, however, the enumeration wasnot meant to restrict the discretion of the LGUs in the
utilization of their funds.LGUs remain at liberty to map out their respective development plans solely on
thebasis of their own judgment and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the onlyrestriction that 20%
thereof be expended for development projects. They may evenspend their IRAs for some of the enumerated
items should they partake of indirectcosts of undertaking development projects. Villafuerte, likewise
misread the issuance by claiming that the provision of sanctions therein is a clear indication of the
President’s interference in the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. Significantly, the issuance itself did not provide
for sanctions. Itdid not particularly establish a new set of acts or omissions which are
deemed violations and provide the corresponding penalties therefor. It simply stated areminder to LGUs
that there are existing rules to consider in the disbursement ofthe 20% development fund and that non-
compliance therewith may render themliable to sanctions which are provided in the LGC and other
applicable laws. Villafuerte, et al. claim that the requirement to post other documents in thementioned
issuances went beyond the letter and spirit of Section 352 of the LGCand R.A. No. 9184, otherwise known
as the Government Procurement Reform Act,by requiring that budgets, expenditures, contracts and
loans, and procurement plansof LGUs be publicly posted as well. Pertinently, Section 352 of the LGC
reads that Local treasurers, accountants, budget officers, and other accountable officers
Shall, within thirty (30) days from the end of the fiscal year, post in at least three (3)publicly accessible
and conspicuous places in the local government unit. R.A. No.9184, on the other hand, requires the
posting of the invitation to bid, notice of award, notice to proceed, and approved contract in the procuring
entity’s premises, in newspapers of general circulation, and the website of the procuring entity.
Inparticular, the Constitution commands the strict adherence to full disclosure ofinformation on all
matters relating to official transactions and those involving publicinterest. Pertinently, Section 28, Article
II and Section 7, Article III of the Constitution.

Bai Sandra Sema vs Commission on Elections

June 23, 2011 558 SCRA 700 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – Creation of LGUs by Autonomous
Regions (ARMM) – Population Requirement

The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but
it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989.
Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8
other municipalities.

A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces,
municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff
Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st
district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.

For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of
Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be
retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff
Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to
Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).

Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato
(1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and
that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from
there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a
province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S.
Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the
HOR.

COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being
created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.

HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its
boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must
comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed
in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress
to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However,
under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any
provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.

Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a
province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to
have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not
meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot
validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never
be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what
ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.

League of Cities v. Comelec

Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City
of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and
enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting
plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect
on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The
rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress
ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve
the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through
their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision
exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners
also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing
cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal
revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more
than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in
the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and
just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for
converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of
RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic
aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010


Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor Bernal and Rene Medina
vs Exec. Sec. Eduardo Ermita

Facts: April 3, 2002, the Office of the President advised the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Surigao del
Norte to deficient population in the propsed Province of Dinagat Islands.
Consequently, Prov. Gov't. of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census with the assitanc eof the NSo
District Census Coordinator to determine the population of Dinagat. The census yield 371,576
inhabitants. NSO, however, did not certify the result of the special census.

Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of Dinagat was 82M . The
land area is 802.12 sqkm.

Later, Congress passed the bill for the creation of the Province of Dinagat which was approved by then
President GMA. Then a plebiscite was ratified and approved by the majority. Consequently, new set of
provincial officials took their oath of office following their appointment by PGMA, another set were then
elected in the election later.

Petitioners aver that they are taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, they are Vice-
gov and members of the provincial board. They allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new
province is an illegal act of Congress and unjustly deprives the people of Surigao del Norte a large chunk
of its territory, IRA and rich resources from the area.

They also claim that the creation is not valid because it failed to comply with the population and land
area requirement.

Ruling: Petition is granted. SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or

(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.

The requirements for the creation of a province contained in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code are
clear, plain and unambiguous, and its literal application does not result in absurdity or injustice. Hence,
the provision in Art. 9(2) of the IRR exempting a proposed province composed of one or more islands from
the land-area requirement cannot be considered an executive construction of the criteria prescribed by
the Local Government Code. It is an extraneous provision not intended by the Local Government Code
and, therefore, is null and void.

R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands "contains an approximate land area of
eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km., more or less, including
Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47) islets x x x."33 R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed to
comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.

The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of not less than
250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the
NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in
Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the
NSO as required by the Local Government Code.34 Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the
population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte)
would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation
of the new province.

Petitioners contend that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is an act of gerrymandering on the
ground that House Bill No. 884 excluded Siargao Island, with a population of 118,534 inhabitants, from
the new province for complete political dominance by Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman. This is
unsubstantiated.

"Gerrymandering" is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so


contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, defined "gerrymandering" as the formation of one legislative district out
of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes
gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory.

As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one island and
about 47 islets closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate territories. It is an
unsubstantiated allegation that the province was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-
Villaroman.

MIRANDA VS AGUIRRE

FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent
component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA
No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the City of Santiago from
an independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.
8528 for the lack of provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper
plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the
City of Santiago from an independent component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve
any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing
of petitioners to file the petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over which the
Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING: yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over
said petition because it involves not a political question but a justiciable issue, and of which only the
court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration
of boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of
Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all
residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the conversion of their city
through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives
them proper standing to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.

SAMSON VS AGUIRRE

FACTS: On February 23, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8535, creating
the City of Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City.

Petitioner Moises S. Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon City, is now before the
Court challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535.

Petitioner also seeks to enjoin the Executive Secretary from ordering the implementation of R.A. 8535, the
COMELEC from holding a plebiscite for the creation of the City of Novaliches, and the Department of
Budget and Management from disbursing funds for said plebiscite. Lastly, he prays for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, through a motion we duly noted.

Petitioner asserts that certifications as to income, population, and land area were not presented to
Congress during the deliberations that led to the passage of R.A. No. 8535. This, he argues, is clear from
the minutes of the public hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Local Government on the
proposed charter of the City of Novaliches. Petitioner particularly cites its hearings held on October 3 and
27, 1997. He is silent, however, on the hearings held by the appropriate Committee in the House of
Representatives.

Likewise, petitioner points out that there is no certification attesting to the fact that the mother local
government unit, Quezon City, would not be adversely affected by the creation of the City of Novaliches, in
terms of income, population, and land area.

ISSUE: W/O RA 8535 IS CONSTITUTIONAL

RULING: the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 8535 originated in the House of Representatives. Its
principal sponsor is Cong. Dante Liban of Quezon City. Petitioner did not present any proof, but only
allegations, that no certifications were submitted to the House Committee on Local Government, as is the
usual practice in this regard.

Allegations, without more, cannot substitute for proof. The presumption stands that the law passed by
Congress, based on the bill of Cong. Liban, had complied with all the requisites therefor.

Moreover, present during the public hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local Government were
resource persons from the different government offices like National Statistics Office, Bureau of Local
Government Finance, Land Management Bureau, and Department of Budget, and Management, aside
from officials of Quezon City itself.

The official statements of the representatives could serve the same purpose contemplated by law rwquring
certificates . their affirmation as well as their oath as witnesses in an open session of either senate or
house of representatives give even solemnity than a certification submitted to the chamber.
Clearly, from the foregoing considerations, petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to
defeat the presumption of constitutionality being enjoyed by R.A. No. 8535. Nor did he succeed to
convince the Court with substantial and persuasive legal reasons for us to grant the reliefs he seeks.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED

Heherson Alvarez vs Teofisto Guingona, Jr.

In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent
Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the House of Representatives.

In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in
the Senate.

In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate conducted a
public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its
recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817
became a law (RA 7720).

Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that
the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City of Santiago was not able to
comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of
the reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should not be.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.

2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGU’s income.

HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further, the Senate
held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR.
The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the
Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).

2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGU’s average annual income as was done in
the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of
the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need
of any further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the
local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as
a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the
Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to
when the Code speaks of “funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and
government-owned-or-controlled corporations.

Mariano, Jr. vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995

Facts: Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854, An Act Converting The Municipality
of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.

Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only
by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by
Congress within 3 years following the return of every census. Also, the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional

Held: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter
of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress
from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment law. This is
exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati’s
legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will
be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will
deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec.
5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only
450,000. Said section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of
250,000.

Cawaling vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001

Cawaling vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001

Facts:

Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806which
created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto.On August 16,
2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "ActCreating The City Of
Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon andSorsogon
and submitted the matter for ratification proclaimed

the creation of the City of Sorsogon as havingbeen ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast
in the plebiscite.Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present petition for
certiorariseeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:A. The December 16, 2000
plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation
of Section 54 thereof; andB. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20)
day extensive informationcampaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the
plebiscite.Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional
,contending, inessence, that:1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates
Section 450(a) of the Local GovernmentCode of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution) which requires that only "a municipalityor a cluster of

barangays

may be converted into a component city"; and2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a)
creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolitionof the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby
violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed bySection 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.Petitioner
contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only byconverting "a
municipality or a cluster of

barangays

," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806has done.

Issue:

(1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.(2) WON there exist a
"compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order tocreate the City of
Sorsogon(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article
VI of theConstitution(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional

Held:

Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A
municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted

into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a province
city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteriaestablished by the Code. the creation of an
entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is
recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the Code.

(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In
Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass
uponquestions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are
allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable," and "maynot annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it
is unwise or impractical. 3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the
creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon dueto their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of
Sorsogon City. Suchabolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the
merger. The rule issufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general
object which thestatute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the
nature, scope andconsequences of the proposed law and its operation.(4) No. Every statute has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality. This presumption is rootedin the doctrine of separation of powers
which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of theGovernment a becoming courtesy for each
other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of theLegislature and the Executive, has
passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamentallaw. This Court, however, may
declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner hasshown a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. Inother words the grounds for
nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold thatpetitioner has failed to
present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806
TAN vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986
Governing law: Art XI Sec. 3 of Constitution in relation to Sec. 197 of Local Government Code

Facts:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province
in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of
Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla,
Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986.
Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and
not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because:
• The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the
new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
• The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq.
km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.

Issue:
WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which
states that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit
or units affected”? NO.

Held:
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries,
“the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and
alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the
parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other
affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute
the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent.
Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more
municipalities if there be a merger.”
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of
the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer,
eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.

II. GENERAL POWERS AND ATTRIBUTES OF LGUS

A. SOURCES OF POWERS

B. GOVERNMENTAL POWERS

1. POLICE POWER aka GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE (SEC 16 LGC)

Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras


G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84,
Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the
said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out
their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with
customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing
declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to
promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing
hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly
the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with
the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy
of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end
can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its
face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance,
Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

Binay vs Domingo Case Digest


Equal Protection Clause, General Welfare Clause, Police Power, Powers of Municipal Corporations

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500
burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month. The
funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The Metro
Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement
of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. However, the Commission on Audit disapproved
said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the following reasons:
(1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the
inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and, (3) it
violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.

Issues:

1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with
civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and "Salus
populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience
of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation
may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
repository of the inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are
clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry
out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve
public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and insure the protection of property therein.

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even
to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.

The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but
not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and
convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in
a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a
wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security,
health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal
with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting
public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of
the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition
which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare
legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of the general
welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is
generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of
police power in the promotion of the common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different
groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local
councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to
the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the
continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of
pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more
painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of
the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law." This decision,
however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal governments to
embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise. (Binay vs
Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)

Tano vs Socrates
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine
GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1,
1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a
resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several
species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said
ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of
the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in
violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is
absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right”
of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and
utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles
of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs which
unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances cannot be
doubted.

White Light Corp., vs City of Manila


Police Power – Not Validly Exercised – Infringement of Private Rights

On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance” prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of
Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be
nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of
WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the
Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under
the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes,
restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty.
It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary
regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels
and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest
or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more
or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare.

SJS V Atienza G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007


J. Corona

Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza
passed it the following day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down the property covered by
the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the
MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was extended to 2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. Respondent’s defense
is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was
more of a guideline to 8027.

Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No.
8027

Held: Yes to both, Petition granted

Ratio:
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of
respondent to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or
over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will
not issue. When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public
duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest
and they need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are citizens of manila and thus have a direct
interest in the ordinances.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has
not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional.
Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey
it.
2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No.
8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full
force and effect only until April 30, 2003.

2. TAXING POWER OF LGU (SEC 5-7 ART X CONSTI, SEC 128-196 LGC)

Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 15560 (July 20, 3006)
Public Dominion

Facts:

MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the taxable
years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The City of
Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands
and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands
and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.

MIAA filed a petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying
against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.

The City of Parañaque contended that Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the
tax exemption privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the
Local Government Code. Thus, MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from
real estate tax.

MIAA argued that Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax
itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public
advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.

Issue: Whether or not the City of Parañaque can impose real tax, levy against and auction for
public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.

Held:

MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA
are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. No
one can dispute that properties of public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like “roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,” are owned by the State. The term
“ports” includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port”
constructed by the State.

Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public
dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands and
Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international and domestic
travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public
does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The
charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public
dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one “intended for
public use.”

The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be
the subject of an auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or
auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public
services will stop if properties of public dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction
sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-
hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.

MACTAN CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. FERDINAND J. MARCOS, GR No.


120082, 1996-09-11

Facts: Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) Since the time of its creation,...
enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its
Charter.

Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land
belonging to the petitioner

Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified, claiming in its favor the
aforecited Section 14 of RA 6958 (an act creating the cebu mactan airport) which exempts it from
payment of realty taxes. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing...
governmental functions, citing Section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which puts limitations
on the taxing powers of local government units

Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. -- Unless otherwise
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall
not extend to the levy of the... following:

Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and
local government units. (underscoring supplied)

Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner's realty tax account, insisting that the MCIAA
is a government-controlled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of
Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code... petitioner... was compelled to pay its tax account
"under protest" and thereafter filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu

MCIAA basically contended that the taxing powers of local government units do not extend to the
levy of taxes or fees of any kind on an instrumentality of the national government. Petitioner
insisted that while it is indeed a government-owned corporation, it... nonetheless stands on the same
footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national government by the very nature of its powers and
functions.

trial court dismissed the petition... infer and state that the tax exemption provided for in RA 6958
creating petitioner had been expressly repealed by the provisions of the New Local Government Code of
1991.

So that petitioner in this case has to pay the assessed realty tax of its properties effective after January 1,
1992 until the present.

Issues: respondent City of Cebu has no power nor authority to impose realty taxes upon it...
whether the petitioner is a "taxable person."

Ruling:

Considering its task "not merely to efficiently operate and manage the Mactan-Cebu International Airport,
but more importantly, to carry out the Government... policies of promoting and developing the Central
Visayas and Mindanao regions as centers of international trade and tourism, and accelerating the
development of the means of transportation and communication in the country,"... and that it is an
attached... agency of the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC),... the petitioner
"may stand in [sic] the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national government." Hence,
its tax exemption privilege under Section 14 of its Charter "cannot be considered withdrawn with the
passage of the Local Government Code of 1991 (hereinafter LGC) because Section 133 thereof specifically
states that the `taxing powers of local government units shall not extend to the levy of taxes or fees or
charges of any kind on the... national government, its agencies and instrumentalities.'"

There can be no question that under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the
payment of realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies,
and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and... exemption therefrom the exception,
the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The only exception to this
rule is where the exemption was granted to private parties based on material consideration of a mutual
nature, which then becomes... contractual and is thus covered by the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution.

we conclude that as a general rule, as laid down in Section 133, the taxing powers of local government
units cannot extend to the levy of, inter alia, "taxes, fees and charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units"; however, pursuant to
Section 232, provinces, cities, and municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real
property tax except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the Republic of... the Philippines or any of its
political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person," as provided in item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234.
upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or
juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the said
section,... and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that
its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its Charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been
withdrawn.

In short, the petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section 133 that the taxing powers of the
local government units cannot extend to the levy of:

(o) taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies or instrumentalities,
and local government units.

the petitioner cannot claim that it was never a "taxable person" under its Charter. It was only exempted
from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive
proof of the legislative intent to... make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax.

Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax, in light
of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already become, even if it be conceded to be an "agency" or
"instrumentality" of the Government, a taxable person for such... purpose in view of the withdrawal in the
last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier
adverted to, applies to the petitioner.

Accordingly, the position taken by the petitioner is untenable.

nothing can prevent Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the Government
performing governmental functions may be subject to tax. Where it is done precisely to fulfill a
constitutional mandate and national policy, no one can doubt its wisdom.

Quezon City vs. Bayantel G.R. No. 162015 March 6, 2006 Local Taxation
NOVEMBER 9, 2017

FACTS: BAYANTEL is a legislative franchise holder under RA 3259 to establish and operate radio stations
for domestic telecommunications, radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting. On January 1, 2992, RA
7160 of the “Local Government Code of 1991” took effect. Section 232 of the Code grants local government
units within the Metro Manila area the power to levy tax on real properties. Section 234 of the same Code
withdrew any exemption from realty tax granted to all persons, natural or juridical.

On July 20, 1992, few months after the LGC took effect, Congress enacted RA 7633, amending Bayantel’s
original franchise. In 1993, the Quezon City government enacted the Quezon City Revenue Code imposing
real property tax on all real properties in Quezon City.

ISSUE: What is the extent of the Power of Local Taxation?

RULING:

The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, it may be exercised by local legislative
bodies pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. Under the
latter, the exercise of the power may be subject to such guidelines and limitations as Congress may
provide.

Since RA 7633 amended Bayantel’s original franchise and granted it real property tax exemption from its
real properties that is directly used in its operations, the Quezon City government cannot levy real
property taxes on the real properties of Bayantel that are in Quezon City area.

For sure, in Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. (PLDT) vs. City of Davao, this Court has
upheld the power of Congress to grant exemptions over the power of local government units to impose
taxes. There, the Court wrote:

Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the LGC does not
affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared national
policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local governments simply means that in interpreting
statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal
corporations.

DRILON VS LIM (1994)

Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government
Code3. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared
Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The
RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as
unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy
of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is
constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in
the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due
to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)

Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC

Held: Yes. Ratio:BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the
Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower
courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the
stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every
court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law
unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the
legislative departments and determined By them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it
was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only
by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.

Issue:WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional.

Held: Yes. Ratio: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or
legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he
alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment
for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the
Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.. What
he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the
petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure
for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local
Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify
or replace them. Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act. That
section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the
tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would
involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the
requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than
mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of
Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the
constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is
unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary
Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain
ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds
affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure. The issue of non-compliance
with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter.
(allegations: No written notices of public hearing, no publication of the ordinance, no minutes of public
hearing, no posting, no translation into Tagalog) Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural
requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of
Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only
five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later
submitted to the trial court. We agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed
been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of
the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed
ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively,
and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in
the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this
omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a
newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the
ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local
development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax
ordinances.

Footnote 3 Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory
Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the
purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending
the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein:
Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day
period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate
proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

BATANGAS CITY VS PILIPINAS SHELL

3. EMINENT DOMAIN (SEC 19 LGC; SEC 9 ART III CONSTI ; RULE 97 ROC)

quezon city vs ericta

CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY v. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA AS JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL, GR No. L-34915, 1983-06-24

Facts:

Section 9 of ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION
THEREOF" provides:

"Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City

Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not
later than six months from the date of approval of the application."

For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven
years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the following resolution:

"RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer,
Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where
the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6%... space intended for paupers burial."
Pursuant to this resolution, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in
writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced.

There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both petitioners and respondent
agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings.

The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of ordinance No. 6118, S-64
null and... void

A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the instant
petition

Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police
power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers.

On the other hand, respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking or confiscation of
property is obvious because the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner... of all beneficial use of his
property.

Issues:

"The issue is: Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power?

We now come to the question whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of
police power.

Ruling:

We find the stand of the private respondent as well as the decision of the respondent Judge to be well-
founded.

There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all
private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The... ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private... cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t)
of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the
burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and... to provide for their burial in a proper
place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.

As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the
municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the respondent court is
affirmed.

Principles:

there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights,
namely: (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the
Constitution as necessary attributes of... sovereignty.

"Police power is defined by Freund as 'the powers of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tañada and Carreon, V-II, p. 50). It
is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and... enjoyment of property of the owner.
CITY OF CEBU v. SPS. APOLONIO AND BLASA DEDAMO, GR No. 142971, 2002-05-07

Facts:

petitioner City of Cebu filed... a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and
Blasa Dedamo.

The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the following parcels of land of respondents... for a public
purpose

, i.e., for the construction of a public road

The... total area sought to be expropriated is 1,624 square meters with an assessed value of P1,786,400.
Petitioner deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P51,156 representing 15% of the
fair market value of the property to... enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of the property
pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160.

Respondents, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because the purpose for which their property was to
be expropriated was not for a public purpose but for benefit of a single private entity, the Cebu Holdings,
Inc. Petitioner could simply buy directly from them the... property at its fair market value if it wanted to,
just like what it did with the neighboring lots. Besides, the price offered was very low in light of the
consideration of P20,000 per square meter, more or less, which petitioner paid to the neighboring lots.

petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession

The motion was granted by the trial court... the parties executed and submitted to the trial court an
Agreement... wherein they declared that they have partially settled the case and in consideration thereof
they agreed

Pursuant to said agreement, the trial court appointed three commissioners to determine the just
compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated.

Thereafter, the commissioners submitted their report, which contained their respective assessments of
and recommendation as to the valuation of the property.

Plaintiff is directed to pay Spouses Apolonio S. Dedamo and Blasa Dedamo the sum of pesos:

P24,865.930.00... the commissioners submitted an amended assessment... and fixed it at

P12,824.10 per square meter, or in the amount of P20,826,339.50.

he assessment was approved as the just compensation thereof by the trial court

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals... etitioner alleged that... just compensation should be
based on the prevailing... market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings.

Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

petitioner filed with us the petition for review in the case at bar.

Issues:

whether just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

Ruling:

just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking.

We explicitly stated... that although the general rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain
is the value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception:
where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and not at... the date of the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings."

Also, the trial court followed the then governing procedural law on the matter, which was Section 5 of
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which provided as follows:

SEC. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. -- Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the... property sought to be taken. The order of appointment
shall designate the time and place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and
specify the time within which their report is to be filed with the court.

the parties, by a solemn document freely and voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the
report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract between the
parties. It has the force of law between... them and should be complied with in good faith.

Furthermore, during the hearing , petitioner did not interpose a serious objection.

It is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now without violating the principle of
equitable estoppel.

Records show that petitioner consented to conform with the valuation recommended by the
commissioners. It cannot detract from its agreement now and... assail correctness of the commissioners'
assessment.
REPUBLIC VS CA

4. RECLASSIFICATION OF LANDS

DAR vs Sarangani

G.R. No. 165547, January 24, 2007

Petitioner:

DAR

Respondents

: Sarangani Agricultural Co Inc, ACIL Corporation, Nicasio Alcantara and Tomas Alcantara

Ponente:

Azcuna

Facts:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel, Sarangani passed Resolution No. 97-08 adopting a 10
yearcomprehensive development plan of the municipality and its land use. On January 30, 1998,
pursuant toMunicipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series of 1997, and to accelerate the development and
urbanization of Alabel, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying lots
that were located withinthe built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005 Land Use Plan of the municipality,
from agricultural to non-agricultural uses.Later, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani approved
Resolution No. 98-018 or the ResolutionAdopting the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive Development
Plan (MCDP 1995-2205) and the Land UseDevelopment Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of
Alabel, Sarangani Per Resolution No. 97-08 andMunicipal Ordinance No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel. A portion of the area involving376.5424 hectares, however, was covered
by the CARP commercial farms deferment scheme.The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the
Municipal Planning and Development Council (MPDC)showed that respondents properties located at
Barangay Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified fromagricultural and pasture land to
residential, commercial institutional, light industrial and open space in the1995-2005 land use plan of
Alabel.The respondent then field an application for land use conversion of certain parcels of
land.Meanwhile, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent
a letter-petition to the DAR Secretary oppposing the application for land use conversion filed by SACI.
SARBAI allegedthat its members were merely forced to sign the waiver of rights, considering that the
commercial farmdeferment period ended on June 15, 1998. Later, the PLUTC agreed to recommend the
disapproval of a portionof a property which was still viable for agriculture. The conversion was deferred
subject to the submission of certain requirements.Later, the DAR Secretary denied SACI s application for
land use conversion.On November 9, 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. denied SACI s
application for land useconversion. SACI appealed to the Office of the President. The Office of the
President dismissed the appeal andaffirmed

in toto

the challenged DAR Orders. Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied, so they filedwith the
Court of Appeals a petition for review raising substantially the same issues.The CA granted the petition
and ordred DAR to issue a conversion order. As to the deferred portion, DARwas directed to expedite the
processing and evaluation of petitioner s application.

ssue:

WON a notice of coverage is an indispensable requirement for the acquisition of land

Held:

No, Under the circumstances, a notice of coverage is not an indispensable requirement before DAR
canacquire the subject lots or commercial farms, which are covered by a deferment period under
theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or R.A. No 6657 upon its effectivity on June 15, 1998

ssue:

WON the DAR should use the comprehensive land use plans and ordinance of the local sanggunian
asprimary referenceHeld: Yes, Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991,empowers the local government units to reclassify agricultural lands.
Memorandum Circular No. 54 Prescribingthe Guidelines Governing Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160
Otherwise Known as the Local Government Code of 1991Authorizing Cities and Municipalities to
Reclassify Agricultural Lands Into Non-Agricultural Uses issued byPresident Ramos on June 8, 1993
specified the scope and limitations on the power of the cities and

municipalities to reclassify agricultural lands into other uses. It provided that all ordinances
authorizingreclassification of agricultural lands shall be subject to the review and approval of the province
in the case of component cities or municipalities, or by the HLURB for highly urbanized or independent
component cities inaccordance with Executive Order No. 72, Series of 1993.Hence, with regard to
agricultural lands that have been reclassified for non-agricultural uses by the localgovernment unit
concerned, the CA is correct in declaring that DAR should refer to the comprehensive land useplans and
the ordinances of the Sanggunian in assessing land use conversion applications, thus:
Construing Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code and the subsequent administrative issuances
implementing the same, we are of theopinion that while the DAR retains the responsibility for approving
or disapproving applications for land use conversion filed by individuallandowners on their landholdings,
the exercise of such authority should be confined to compliance with the requirements and
limitationsunder existing laws and regulations, such as the allowable percentage of agricultural [area] to
be reclassified, ensuring sufficient foodproduction, areas non-negotiable for conversion and those falling
under environmentally critical areas or highly restricted for conversionunder the NIPAS law. Definitely,
the DAR s power in such cases may not be exercised in such a manner as to defeat the very purpose of
the LGU concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve social and economic benefits in pursuit of its
mandate towards the generalwelfare. Precisely, therefore, the DAR is required to use the comprehensive
land use plans and accompanying ordinances of the localSanggunian as primary references in evaluating
applications for land use conversion filed by individual landowners. In this case,petitioners have already
complied with the standard requirements laid down under the applicable rules and regulations of the
DAR....

The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses shall be strictly regulated and may
beallowed only when the conditions prescribed under R.A. No. 6657 are present. In this regard, the Court
agreeswith the ratiocination of the CA that DAR s scope of authority in assessing land use conversion
applications islimited to examining whether the requirements prescribed by law and existing rules and
regulations have beencomplied with. This holds true in the present case where, because of the creation of
the Province of Saranganiand in view of its thrust to urbanize, particularly its provincial capital which is
the Municipality of Alabel, thelocal government has reclassified certain portions of its land area from
agricultural to non-agricultural. Thus, toreiterate, in accordance with E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and
subject to the limitations prescribed by law, DARshould utilize the comprehensive land use plans in
evaluating the land use conversion application of respondents whose lands have already been reclassified
by the local government for non-agricultural uses.This is not to say, however, that every property of
respondents which is included in the comprehensiveland use plan of the Municipality of Alabel shall be
automatically granted non-coverage. As mentioned earlier,said application is subject to the limitations
and conditions prescribed by law. One such limitation that is presenthere is that a portion of
respondents property of 376.5424 hectares, a portion totaling 154.622 [or 154.1622]hectares which are
planted to bananas and coconuts, are covered by CARL s ten-year deferment scheme, whichhas expired
on June 15, 1998. By law, these lands are subject to redistribution to CARP beneficiaries upon thelapse
of the ten-year period, counted from the date of the effectivity of the CARL or R.A. No. 6657 on June
15,1988, which was way before the creation of the Province of Sarangani and the eventual reclassification
of theagricultural lands into non-agricultural in the Municipality of Alabel where respondents properties
are located.In short, the creation of the new Province of Sarangani, and the reclassification that was
effected by theMunicipality of Alabel did not operate to supersede the applicable provisions of R.A. No.
6657.Moreover, Section 20 of the LGC of 1991 on the reclassification of lands explicitly states that
[n]othingin this section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the
provisions of R.A. No.6657. Thus, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no
room for interpretation. There is only room for application.

5. CLOSURE AND OPENING OF ROADS (SEC 21 LGC)

SANGALANG VS IAC

Facts: August 12, 1977, the municipal officials of Makati, destroyed and removed the gates
constructed/located at the corner of Reposo Street and Jupiter Street as well as the gates/fences
located/constructed at Jupiter Street and Makati Avenue forcibly, and then opened the entire length of
Jupiter Street to public traffic. Subsequently, Petitioners brought the present action for damages against
the defendant-appellant Ayala Corporation predicated on both breach of contract and on tort or quasi-
delict A supplemental complaint was later filed by said Petitioners seeking to augment the reliefs prayed
for in the original complaint because of alleged supervening events which occurred during the trial of the
case. That the exclusivity of the said village was adversely affected and diminished due to the opening of
the said streets to the public. That the exclusivity of the said village was guaranteed in the restrictions of
TCT.

Issue: Whether the Right to Non-Impairment of Contracts of the complainants was violated by the
Respondents in an resolution promoting the welfare of the general public?

Held: No, while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since
it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., “the power to prescribe regulations
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.’
Invariably described as “the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers” and “in a sense, the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government,” the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired
into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial
of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. Police power is elastic and
must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of
precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. The
court do not see why public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property should not be
made to prevail through the state’s exercise of its police power.

Undoubtedly, the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police
power. The petitioners have not shown why we should hold otherwise other than for the supposed “non-
impairment” guaranty of the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more
compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary
or unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the judgments so appealed. In that connection, we find no
reversible error to have been committed by the Court of Appeals.

MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000]

Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government Agency
tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent
herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use
of the public. The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons
and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No.
7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision
and Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.

The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed a preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do
so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the decision of the lower
courts and claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent
of the State that can practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.

Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its
regulatory and police powers.

Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power. Police power is
primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units.
Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA
cannot exercise police power because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the
government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable
in the said act that grants MMDA police power.

It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various national
government agencies, people’s organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC. 452 SCRA 174 (2005)

Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena with the objective of alleviating
the traffic congestion said to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals
within the city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. to
construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena. City Ordinance 1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary terminals in the City of
Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The
Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared City Ordinance 1631 as a valid excercise of police power while
declaring City Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena Grand Central
Terminal, Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Lucena then elevated it via petition
for review under Rule 45 before the Court. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA)
with which it has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged
orders of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the CA, Lucena now comes
to the Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed
objective were reasonably necessary and not duly oppressive upon individuals.

HELD:

With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the subject
ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already
existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the
franchise for which was granted to Lucena. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City
are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of Lucena. The true role of
Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised
within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. A due deference to
the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.
From the memorandum filed before the Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod
had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers
by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the
proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede
or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals,
apart from that franchised to Lucena, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic
problem, the Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are
compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable
specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those
which are unable to meet the specifications. In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the
proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to
provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. The Court is not
unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a
common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private sector, copies of which were
submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The weight of popular opinion, however,
must be balanced with that of an individual‘s rights.

6. LEGISLATIVE POWER

A. REQUISITES FOR VALID ORDINANCE

City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio (G.R. No. 118127)

Facts: The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged
in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria
Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism
as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain
forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna parlors,
massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns. Owners and
operators of the enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up business operations or
transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds allowable within the
area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the premises of the erring
establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.

June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it
included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it
constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.

Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the Ordinance is constitutional.

Held: SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.

First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power,
not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of the
ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. The closing
down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the ordinance have no
reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments
will not per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the community. It will not itself eradicate
prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The ordinance
forbids running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs owners/operators to
wind up their business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said business into allowed
business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are two
types of taking: A “possessory” taking and a “regulatory” taking. The latter occurs when the government’s
regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property, as in this case.

Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification is
reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be based on substantial
distinction; (2)It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to all members of the class. In the Court’s view, there are no
substantial distinction between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and
other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for
prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside this area. A
noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.

Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in
contravention of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local government
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs
counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area
into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments.

Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.

SJS V Atienza G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007


J. Corona

Facts:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza
passed it the following day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only scaled down the property covered by
the depots and did not stop their operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the
MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was extended to 2003.
Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement Ordinance 8027. Respondent’s defense
is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was
more of a guideline to 8027.

Issues:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No.
8027

Held: Yes to both, Petition granted


Ratio:
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and
certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of
respondent to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or
over which a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will
not issue. When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public
duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest
and they need not show any specific interest. Petitioners are citizens of manila and thus have a direct
interest in the ordinances.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has
not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his
ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and
ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional.
Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey
it.
2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No.
8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full
force and effect only until April 30, 2003.

IV. LOCAL OFFICIALS


A. Provisions applicable to elective and appointive local officials
1. Prohibited Business and pecuniary interest
2. Practice of Profession

1)Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the NPC vs Atty. RambuyongG.R. No. 167810,
October 04, 2010

FACTS: Alfred Chu filed a case for collection of a sum of money and/ or damages against theNational
Power Corporation which was raffled to the RTC of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay Branch 24.Appearing for Chu
is Atty. Richard Rambuyong who was the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Ipil,Zamboanga Sibugay, NPC filed a
Motion for Inhibition of Atty. Rambuyong arguing that under Sec.90(b) RA 7160 (LGC), sanggunian
members are prohibited to appear as counsel before any courtwherein any office, agency or
instrumentality of the government is the adverse party. NPC arguedthat being a GOCC, it is embraced
within the term instrumentality. The RTC favoured Rambuyong. The CA upheld the decision of the lower
court. Hence, this petition

ISSUE: Whether NPC is an instrumentality of government such Atty. Rambuyong, as asanggunian


member, should not appear as counsel against it.

HELD: Yes, NPC is government instrumentality thus, Atty. Rambuyong should not appear ascounsel
against it.

Reason: Based on jurisprudence, Maceda vs Macaraig, Jr., 1997 197 SCRA 771 (1991), theCourt stated
that NPC is a government instrumentality with the enormous task of undertaking development of
hydroelectric generation of power and production of electricity from other sources,as well as transmission
of electric power on a nationwide basis, to improve the quality of lifepursuant to the State policy embodied
in Section 9, Article 2 of 1987 Constitution. With this, theLGC prohibits a sanggunian member (Atty.
Rambuyong) to appear as counsel of a party adverseto the NPC.
CATU VS. RELLOSA (A.C. NO. 5738 02/19/2008)

FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio Pastor who were occupying
one of the units in a building in Malate which was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in
the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where respondent
was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing
to arrive at an amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of the
appropriate action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor
in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the respondent
on the ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood
as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between
the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he
performed his task without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case for free as
she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them,
respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the
prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition,
respondent committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition,
respondent was then recommended suspension from the practice of law for one month with a stern
warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as
the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the respondent were proper.

HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the Code of Professional
Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection to
former government lawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any
matter in which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent was an
incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the said provision.

Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which governs the practice of
profession of elective local government officials. While RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials
and employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while
under RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and
councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or
engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of
the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any
prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. Respondent, therefore,
is not forbidden to practice his profession.

Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior permission or
authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. The failure of
respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation
of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the
required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also
violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal
profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the
dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes
public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics
of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for
violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective
from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

3. PROHIBITION AGAINST APPOINTMENT

ROBERTO A. FLORES v. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, GR No. 104732, 1993-06-22

Facts: Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at Subic, Zambales,...
maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in... italics infringes on the following
constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states
that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position... during his tenure,"... because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official
and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that
"[t]he President shall xxx x... appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint",... since it was
Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject
posts;... for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by
respondent Executive Secretary

In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the
Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
of SBMA).

It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective
official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office.

Issues: whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however, That for
the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be
appointed as the chairman and chief... executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional
proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.

Ruling:

Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his
ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor
remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution.

On the... contrary, since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his
appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility.

As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to
a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained.

He... however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and
void; he may be considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the
law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid... so far as they involve the interest of the public
and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised x x x x under color of a known election or
appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the...
electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility,
want of power or defect being unknown to the public x x x x [or] under color of an election, or
appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before... the same is adjudged to be such.

B. ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS


1. QUALIFICATIONS/DISQUALIFICATIONS

Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012]

FACTS: Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired
Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with
his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.

He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of
Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was
eventually granted by the ERB.

A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC.
Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay
Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A.
9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code.

COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial
candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil.
COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision.

ISSUE: `Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his
domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

RULING:

The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the
requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to
reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.

The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines:
(a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains
until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the
residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he
effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight,
acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by
operation of law and by choice.

When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is
evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued
a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his
domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would
violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.

The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely
been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed,
the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to
establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it
be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house
where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has
proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile.

Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a
fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders,
including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of
Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this
does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or
wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The
Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his
qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will.

Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC.

ROMEO G. JALOSJOS v. COMELEC, GR No. 205033, 2013-06-18

Facts:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari[1] filed under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) En Banc Resolution No. 9613[2] dated January 15,... 2013,
ordering the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner Romeo G. Jalosjos' certificate of
candidacy (CoC) as a mayoralty candidate for Zamboanga City.

The Facts

On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 132875-76, entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Romeo G. Jalosjos,"[3] convicting petitioner by final judgment of two (2) counts of
statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of... lasciviousness.[4] Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer
the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal[5] for each count, respectively, which
carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute... disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).

On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued an order commuting his prison term to
sixteen (16) years, three (3) months and three (3) days (Order ofCommutation).

After serving the same, he was issued a Certificate of Discharge From Prison on March 18, 2009

On April 26, 2012,[8] petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his
previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election
Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters
(Petition for Inclusion) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City, Branch 1 (MTCC).

Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoC[10] on October 5, 2012,... seeking to run as mayor for
Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections scheduled on May 13, 2013 (May 2013 Elections).

n his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered
voter of Barangay Tetuan,... Zamboanga City.

On October 18, 2012,[11] the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute
disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election.

Such denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga

City, Branch 14 (RTC) in its October 31, 2012 Order[12] which, pursuant to Section 138[13] of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code" (OEC), was
immediately final and executory.

Meanwhile, five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC's First and Second Divisions (COMELEC
Divisions), praying for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner's CoC

Pending resolution, the COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution

No. 9613[14] on January 15, 2013, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of
Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and
Local Elections" due to his perpetual... absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the
voter registration requirement.

As basis, the COMELEC En Banc relied on the Court's pronouncement in the consolidated cases of
Dominador Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC and Agapito Cardino v. COMELEC[15] (Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino).

Issues:

Issues Before the Court (a) whether the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it
issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated petitioner's right to due process

(b) whether petitioner's... perpetual absolute disqualification to run for elective office had already
been removed by Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local
Government Code of 1991" (LGC).

Ruling: The Court's Ruling. The petition is bereft of merit.

At the outset, the Court observes that the controversy in this case had already been mooted by the
exclusion of petitioner in the May 2013 Elections.
Nevertheless, in view of the doctrinal value of the issues raised herein, which may serve to guide both the
bench and the bar in... the future, the Court takes this opportunity to discuss on the same.

A. Nature and validity of motu proprio... issuance of Resolution No. 9613.

Petitioner claims that the COMELEC En Banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions' jurisdiction by cancelling
motu proprio petitioner's CoC through Resolution No. 9613, contrary to Section 3, Article IX-C of the
1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution)

The Court is not persuaded. The above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the
COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power.

It finds no application, however, in matters concerning the COMELEC's exercise of administrative


functions.

The distinction between the two is well-defined.

[T]he term 'administrative' connotes, or pertains, to 'administration, especially management, as by


managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or
things. It does not entail an... opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a
decision or resolution thereon.

While a 'quasi-judicial function' is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required... to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.

Crucial therefore to the present disquisition is the determination of the nature of the power exercised by
the COMELEC En Banc when it promulgated Resolution No. 9613.

In Jalosjos, Jr. and Cardino, the Court held that the COMELEC's denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC in view of a candidate's disqualification to run for elective office based on a... final
conviction is subsumed under its mandate to enforce and administer all laws relating to the conduct of
elections.

Accordingly, in such a situation, it is the COMELEC's duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate's CoC,
notwithstanding the absence of any... petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of
the same.

Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory... penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for
public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.

The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from
running for public office.

The law itself... bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final
judgment of conviction.

The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other
government agencies tasked to implement the final... judgment under the law.

Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement the disqualification,
it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on disqualification to run for elective public office is
addressed to the COMELEC because under the Constitution the COMELEC... is duty bound to "[e]nforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election."

The disqualification of a convict to run for public office under the Revised Penal Code, as affirmed by final
judgment of a competent court, is part of the... enforcement and administration of "all laws" relating to
the conduct of elections.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is clear that the COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its
quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any
pending petition or resolve any election case before it or... any of its divisions.

Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner's CoC
on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by
his final conviction

In... this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the
need for a motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
the same being required only in quasi-judicial... proceedings.

while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally necessitates the exercise of
the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based on either Sections 12[20]
or 78[21] of the OEC, or Section 40[22] of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on
account of final and executory judgments as when a candidate's disqualification to run for public office is
based on a final conviction such... exercise falls within the COMELEC's administrative functions, as in
this case.

In this light, there is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELEC En Banc would be
acting in a purely administrative manner.

As petitioner's disqualification to run for public office had already been settled in a previous case and now
stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC En Banc to cancel his CoC as a matter of
course, else it be remiss in... fulfilling its duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative
to the conduct of an election.

Equally compelling is the fact that the denial of petitioner's Petition for Inclusion as a registered voter in
Zamboanga City had already attained finality by virtue of the RTC's Order dated October 31, 2012.

In this accord, petitioner's non-compliance with the voter... registration requirement under Section 39(a)
of the LGC[24] is already beyond question and likewise provides a sufficient ground for the cancellation of
his CoC altogether.

B. Petitioner's right to run... for elective office.

Well-established is the rule that every new statute should be construed in connection with those already
existing in relation to the same subject matter and all should be made to harmonize and stand together, if
they can be done by any fair and reasonable... interpretation.

SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence

ART. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. - The penalties of
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following effects:
The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office.

In particular, while Section 40(a) of the LGC allows a prior convict to run for local elective office after
the... lapse of two (2) years from the time he serves his sentence, the said provision should not be deemed
to cover cases wherein the law[26] imposes a penalty, either as principal or accessory,[27]... which has
the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office.

In this relation, Article 30 of the RPC, as earlier cited, provides that the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification has the effect of depriving the convicted felon of the privilege to run for elective office.

To note, this penalty, as well as other penalties of similar... import, is based on the presumptive rule that
one who is rendered infamous by conviction of a felony, or other base offense indicative of moral
turpitude, is unfit to hold public office,[30] as the same partakes of a privilege which the State... grants
only to such classes of persons which are most likely to exercise it for the common good.

Accordingly, Section 40(a) of the LGC should be considered as a law of general application... and
therefore, must yield to the more definitive RPC provisions in line with the principle of lex specialis
derogat generali general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally
is so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which... the special provisions are not applicable.

In other words, where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
specially designed therefor should prevail.

In the present case, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC, carried with it the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification and in turn, pursuant... to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to
run for elective office.

As discussed, Section 40(a) of the LGC would not apply to cases wherein a penal provision such as Article
41 in this case directly and specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office.

Hence, despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner's service of his commuted prison term, he
remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently,
disqualifies him to run as mayor for Zamboanga City

Notably, Article 41 of the RPC expressly states that one who is previously convicted of a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal continues to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification even though pardoned as to the... principal penalty, unless the said accessory
penalty shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

In this case, the same accessory penalty had not been expressly remitted in the Order of Commutation or
by any subsequent pardon and as... such, petitioner's disqualification to run for elective office is deemed
to subsist.

Likewise, adopting the Lacuna ruling, the Court, in the more recent cases of Aratea,[35] Jalosjos, Jr. and
Cardino, held:

Clearly, Lacuna instructs that the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification "deprives the
convict of the right to vote or to be elected to or hold public office perpetually."

Once the judgment of conviction becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any... public office that the
convict may be holding at the time of his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and
the convict becomes ineligible to run for any elective public office perpetually.
All told, applying the established principles of statutory construction, and more significantly, considering
the higher interests of preserving the sanctity of our elections, the Court holds that Section 40(a) of the
LGC has not removed the penalty of perpetual absolute... disqualification which petitioner continues to
suffer.

Thereby, he remains disqualified to run for any elective office pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Principles: Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution)

The above-cited constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It
finds no application, however, in matters concerning the COMELEC's exercise of administrative functions.

The distinction between the two is well-defined.

[T]he term 'administrative' connotes, or pertains, to 'administration, especially management, as by


managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or
things. It does not entail an... opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a
decision or resolution thereon.

While a 'quasi-judicial function' is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required... to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.

Even without a petition under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under
Section 40 of the Local Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory... penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for
public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.

while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally necessitates the exercise of
the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based on either Sections 12[20]
or 78[21] of the OEC, or Section 40[22] of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on
account of final and executory judgments as when a candidate's disqualification to run for public office is
based on a final conviction such... exercise falls within the COMELEC's administrative functions

EFREN RACEL ARATEA,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO,

G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012

FACTS:

Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in 2010. Rodolfo filed a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to
cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales forfour (4) consecutive terms.The COMELEC Second Division cancelled
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc remained pending during said elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest number of
votesand were proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively. Vice-Mayor elect Aratea took his oath of
office as Acting Mayor.Subsequently, the COMELEC En Banc disqualified Lonzanida from running
forMayor based on two grounds: (1), Lonzanida had served as Mayor for more than threeconsecutive
terms without interruption; and (2) Lonzanida had been convicted by finaljudgment of ten counts of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).Second-placer Antipolo intervened and claimed her right
to be proclaimed as Mayorbecause Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Division
ordered thecancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list
ofofficial candidates.Aratea asserted that Antipolo could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. He
reasoned that since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his
favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent
vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-electedVice-Mayor was mandated to succeed as
Mayor.

ISSUE:

Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the OEC, or made a false material
representation under Section 78 of the OEC that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab
initio.

Whether the second-placer or the Vice-Mayor elect should succeed as Mayor in this case.

RULING: The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec. 78 of the OEC. It alsoheld
that Antipolo, the "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy was void ab initio . In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all.All votes for
Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo actually garnered the highestnumber of votes for the
position.

Qualifications and Disqualifications

The qualifications and disqualifications are laid by Sections 39 and 40 of the LocalGovernment
Code. Section 40 expressly provides, among others: Sec. 40.

Disqualifications

. - The following persons are disqualified from running forany elective local position:(a) Those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moralturpitude or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more ofimprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;x x xSection
12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:Sec. 12.Disqualification. Any person who has been
declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment
for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense forwhich he was sentenced to a penalty of
more than eighteen months orfor a crime involving moral turpitude , shall be disqualified to be
acandidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon orgranted amnesty.

False Material Representation

Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied orcancelled when there
is false material representation of the contents of the certificate ofcandidacy.Section 74 of
the OEC details the contents of the certificate of candidacy. Thisincluded among others a
statement that the person filing it is eligible for said office.The conviction of Lonzanida by final
judgment, with the penalty of prisiónmayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public
office, or from being elected toany public office. This perpetual disqualification took effect
upon the finality of thejudgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of
candidacy.The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,
theaccessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual
specialdisqualification.

Under Article 30 of the RPC, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of deprivation
of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.
The duration of temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty
of prisión mayor. On the other hand, under Article 32 of the RPC, perpetual special disqualification
means that " the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of
hisdisqualification, which is perpetually.

Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute


ineligibilities to hold elective public office.

A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective publicoffice, and
commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate ofcandidacy that he is
eligible to so run.

Lonzanida became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective publicoffice from the
time the judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment ofconviction was
promulgated on 20 July 2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, beforeLonzanida filed his
certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009 .

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 ofthe OEC because
this accessory penalty is an ineligibility

, which means that the convict isnot eligible to run for public office, contrary to the statement
that Section 74 requires himto state under oath in his certificate of candidacy. As this Court held
in Fermin v.Commission on Elections , the false material representation may refer to "
qualifications or eligibility.

” One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for public office. If a
person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy stating
under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expresslyrequired under Section 74
then he clearly makes a false material representation thatis a ground for a petition under Section
78.The dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as adisqualification
under Section 68 as the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance orcondition which bars him
from running for public office despite the possession of all thequalifications under Section 39 of
the LGC." In so holding the dissenting opinions write inthe law what is not found in the law

Legal Duty of COMELEC to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification

Even without a petition, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy
of anyone suffering from perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a
final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC
of the disqualification of the convict from running for public office.

Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much
less to valid votes.

Lonzanida’s disqualification is two -pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the three-
term limit; and second, he is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts
of Falsification. In other words, on election day, respondent Lonzanida’s disqualification is
notoriously known in fact and in law.

Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position, the votes cast for him
should be considered stra
MANUEL B. JAPZON VS COMELEC and JAIME S. TYG.R. NO. 180088 January 19, 2009

FACTS: Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for Mayor of theMunicipality of
Gen. Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the elections of May 14, 2007. Japzon filed apetition to disqualify Ty
on the ground of material misrepresentation. Japzon averred that:1.Ty was a former natural-born
Filipino, born in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani EasternSamar (now Gen. Macarthur, Easter
Samar) to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. 2.Ty migrated to the USA, became a citizen thereof, and
resided therein for the last 25 years. 3.Ty falsely represented in his COC that he was a resident of Gen.
Macarthur for one year priorto elections, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign
country. 4.While Ty may have applied for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never
actuallyresided Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of 1 year immediately preceding the dateof
election as required under the Local Government Code. 5.Ty continued traveling to the USA and
comporting himself as a US citizen even after filing hisCOC and taking his Oath of Allegiance.6.He failed
to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by RA No. 9225 (CitizenshipRetention and Reacquisition
Act of 2003).Ty responded to wit

:1.He was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became anaturalized
American citizen. However, prior to filing his COC, he already filed with thePhilippine Consulate General
in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for thereacquisition of his Philippine citizenship. 2.He
executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Vice Consulof the Philippine
Consulate3.He applied for and was issued a Philippine passport indicating that his residence in
thePhilippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. 4.He
personally secured his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) in Gen. Macarthur, EasternSamar. 5.He was
registered as a voter at Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar.6.He executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. Ty won the elections and was proclaimed Mayor of Gen Macarthur
by the BOC in the interim.The COMELEC found that Ty complied with all the requirements of RA 9225
and dismissed thepetition. Evidence revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance in the USA and a
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 , in compliance with R.A. No. 9225. There was no
material misrepresentation in his COC. Although Ty has lost his domicile when he was naturalized as
U.S.citizen, the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts proved that he has been a
resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least 1 year prior to elections
as stated in his COC. COMELEC went on to explain that the term residence is to be understood not in its
common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence or the
place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of
origin is acquired by every person at birth until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new
domicile(domicile of choice). Japzon’s motion for reconsideration was denied, in the same manner as his
petition with theCOMELEC En Banc failed. The COMELEC En Banc held that a Natural born Filipino who
obtains foreign citizenship, and subsequently renounces the same, constitutes acts of repatriation and
hence becomes qualified to run as a candidate for any local post.

ISSUE : Did the COMELEC err in its ruling by disregarding the parameters for the acquisition of
anew domicile of choice and residence? Did the COMELEC err in refusing to cancel Ty’s COC and
todeclare Japzon as the duly elected Mayor?

HELD : No Japzon’s arguments:1.When Ty became a naturalized American citizen, he lost his domicile of
origin. 2.Ty did not establish his residence in Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar, just because he reacquired
his Philippine citizenship. He failed to prove that he established a new domicile ofchoice. 3.Ty did not
become a resident of Gen. Macarthur by merely executing the Oath of Allegiance under Republic Act No.
9225.4.Ty did not meet the one-year residency requirement for running as mayor.5.Japzon is the only
placer in the elections and should be declared as the duly elected mayor. Ty’s arguments:1.COMELEC
already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar, 1
year prior to the local elections. Findings of fact of theCOMELEC are binding on the Court. 2.Even if Ty is
indeed disqualified from running, Japzon as the second placer cannot take hisplace.
OSG’s position: Ty failed to meet the one-year residency requirement. He was unable to prove that he
intended to remain in the Philippines for good and make it his new domicile. The OSG still prays for the
dismissal of the petition considering that Japzon cannot be declared the duly elected Mayor even if Ty is
found to be disqualified.

RATIO

: Ty was a natural-born Filipino. Even if he left to work in the USA and eventually became anAmerican
citizen, he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to theRepublic before the
Vice Consul in Los Angeles, California in accordance with RA No. 9225. He then, became a dual citizen. It
was only on March 19, 2007 that he renounced his American citizenship before a notary public and
became a pure Philippine citizen again. RA No 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the
reacquisition or retention of Philippinecitizenship; nor does it mention any effect of reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship on thecurrent residence of the natural-born Filipino. Citizenship and
residence are independently treated inRA No 9225. Residency only becomes relevant when the natural-
born Filipino with dual citizenshipruns for public office. He must: (1)meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as requiredby the Constitution and existing laws ; and (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any andall foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Ty complied with the second requirement when he personally executed a Renunciation of foreign
Citizenship on March 19, 2007 before a notary public. By the time he filed his COC on March 28,
2007,he had already effectively renounced his American citizenship.Under Section 39 of the Local
Government Code (RA No 7160), it is required that an elective official be a resident of the independent
component cities, component cities, or municipalites where he intends to be elected for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the day of the election .Ty admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen,
which meant he must have abandoned Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar as his domicile of origin and
transferred to the USA as his domicile of choice. His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship had no impact
on his residence/domicile. He did not necessarily regain his domicile in Gen. Macarthur, but merely had
the option to establish his domicile of choice therein. The length of his residence shall be determined from
the time he made ithis domicile of choice and shall not retroact to the time of his birth.Under
Papandayan Jr., vs COMELEC,it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor. The principle of
animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an intention to return to
theplace where he seeks to be elected. Thus, it is important to determine whether there has been an
abandonment of his former residence. Absence from residence to pursue studies or practice his
profession does not constitute loss of residence.In order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
concur (1) residence or bodily presence inthe new locality , (2) an intention to remain there , and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain inor at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time;
the change of residence must bevoluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.The COMELEC found that Ty had been a resident of Gen Macarthur 1 year prior to the
elections. Factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, are binding and conclusive
on theSC, most especially since the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC on a level higher
thatother administrative organs. Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice became apparent when,
immediately afterreacquiring his Philippine citizenship on October 2, 2005, he applied for a Philippine
passportindicating his address at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
He paidhis community tax, securing CTCs and stating his address in Gen Macarthur. Thereafter, Ty
appliedfor and was registered as a voter on July 17, 2006 in the same town. He has also been bodily
present inthe municipality since his arrival on May 4, 2006. His trips abroad are further manifestations
ofhis animus manendi and animus revertendi. Even with his trips to other countries, Ty was
actuallypresent in Gen Macarthur, for at least 9 of the 12 months preceding the local elections. There is
nothing wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, foras long as he
is able to prove that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes forthe period required
by law. Ty has proven that he had established residence/domicile a little over ayear prior to the local
elections, in which he ran for Mayor and in which he garnered the most numberof votes.
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA,
ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN,Respondents.

Facts:

The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944.
On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain
Kevin Thomas Condon.

On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine
Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003."5 The application was approved and the petitioner
took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.

On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in
turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen.6

The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her
bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-
Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She
took her oath of office on May 13, 2010.

Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan7 and Luis M. Bautista,8
(private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto
questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s
disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed
to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.

The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an
Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she
executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running
for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship.

The trial decision ordered by the trial court declaring Condon disqualified and ineligible to hold office of
vice mayor of Caba La union and nullified her proclamation as the winning candidate.

After that the decision was appealed to the comelec, but the appeal was dismissed y the second division
and affirmed the decision of the trial court.

The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on September 27, 2006, she no
longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as
early as the 2007 elections. Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed
by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her.

Issue: W/N petitioner disqualified from running for elective office due to failure to renounce her
Australian Citizenship in accordance with Sec. 5 (2) of R.A 9225

Ruling:

R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship18 by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign
country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and
political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.

Section 5, paragraph 2 provides:

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation
of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath
contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn
before an officer authorized to administer oath.

The supreme court said that, the renunciation of her Australian citizenship was invalid due to it was not
oath before any public officer authorized to administer it rendering the act of Condon void.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated
September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC (AE).

Cordora vs Comelec

Carpio, J:

FACTS :Cordora filed a complaint affidavit before Comelec law department against Tambunting asserting
that Gustavo Tambunting made false assertion in his certificate of candidacy by claiming that atural
!orn Filipino and resident before the election in "##$and "##%& Cordora alleged that Tambunting was not
eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lac'edthere(uired citi)enship and residency
re(uirements&Cordora presented a certification from the !ureau of *mmigration which statedthat, in two
instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the +hilippines on $ -ecember
"### andupon departure from the +hilippines on $. June "##$& According to Cordora, these travel dates
confirmed that Tambuntingac(uired American citi)enship through naturali)ation in /onolulu, /awaii on " -
ecember "###&Tambunting, on the other hand,maintained that he didnot ma'e any misrepresentation in
his certificates of candidacy& To refute Cordora0s claim thatTambunting is not a natural1born Filipino,
Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born ofa Filipino mother
and an American father& Tambunting further denied that he was naturali)ed as an American citi)en&
Thecertificate of citi)enship conferred by the 2S government after Tambunting0s father petitioned him
through * S Form *1$3#4+etition for 5elative6 merely confirmed Tambunting0s citi)enship which he
ac(uired at birth& Tambunting0s possession of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is
not a Filipino citi)en& Tambunting also too' an oath of allegiance on $7 ovember "##3 pursuant to
5epublic Act o& 8""9 45&A& o& 8""96, or the Citi)enship 5etention and 5eac(uisition Act of "##3&The
Comelec law department recommended the dismissal of complaint because it failed to substantiate the
charges& TheC ;<=<C

En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the C ;<=<C =aw -epartment& The C ;<=<C
En Banc was convinced that Cordora failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by sufficient
andconvincing evidence& Commissioner Sarmiento wrote a separate opinion which concurred with the
findings of the En Banc 5esolution& CommissionerSarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be
considered a dual citi)en& ;oreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his American citi)enship when he
filed his certificates of candidacy in "##$ and "##% and ran for public office& +etitioner filed a ;5but
wasdenied, hence, this petition&*SS2<:>hether or not Tambunting is natural born Filipino&/<=-
:Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father& either does he

deny that he underwentthe process involved in * S Form *1$3# 4+etition for 5elative6 because of his
father0s citi)enship& Tambunting claims thatbecause of his parents0 differing citi)enships, he is both
Filipino and American by birth& Cordora, on the other hand, insists thatTambunting is a naturali)ed
American citi)en&>e agree with Commissioner Sarmiento0s observation that Tambunting possesses dual
citi)enship& !ecause of thecircumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to
undergo the naturali)ation process to ac(uire Americanciti)enship& The process involved in * S Form
*1$3# only served to confirm the American citi)enship which Tambunting ac(uiredat birth& The
certification from the !ureau of *mmigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambuntingclaimed that he is an American& /owever, the same certification showed nine other trips
where Tambunting claimed that he isFilipino& Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual

citi)enship prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the "##$elections& The fact
thatTambunting had dual citi)enship did not dis(ualify him from running for public office&

Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or morestates, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states& Thus, li'e
any other natural1born Filipino, it isenough for a person with dual citi)enship who see's public office to
file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath ofallegiance contained therein&

Dual allegiance

, on the other hand, is brought about by the individual0s active participation in thenaturali)ation
process& AASJS states that, under 5&A& o& 8""9, a Filipino who becomes a naturali)ed citi)en of
another countryis allowed to retain his Filipino citi)enship by swearing to the supreme authority of the
5epublic of the +hilippines& The act of ta'ing an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a
naturali)ed citi)en0s foreign citi)enship

2. MANNER AND DATE OF ELECTION

Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011
DECISION
BRION, J.:
I. THE FACTS

Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by
Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the
first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset
the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No.
9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third time
the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the
next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of the
country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

II. THE ISSUES: 1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections
[including the ARMM elections]?

2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under
Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

III. THE RULING

[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in
toto.]

1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.

While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article
XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately
making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections.
The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national
and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following elections.

In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among the
elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections,
including the ARMM elections.

2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws they must
pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies
to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,
explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:

The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a
law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved.

In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.

3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional

[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve the
problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the
2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over
capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the [2013] synchronized elections
assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until
those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]

3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent
ARMM officials

We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. This provision
states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
[emphases ours]

Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year term limit
prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net
result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like
the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what
it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. Indeed,
if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new
term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the
constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a
constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for it
(namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover
can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists;
it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of suppressing the
holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a
policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation,
except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.

3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no
authority to order special elections.

The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be held on any
other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local officials, except
when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom Congress may
have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that
power.

Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections
and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the presidential,
congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the
exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment measure in
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.

After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering
special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call
without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court is
not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for having
been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to
annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to mandate what
Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.

Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a holdover,
the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the
Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.

The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice
itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.

At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications
must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, which states:

Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. [emphasis ours]

This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:

First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third
group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.

If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under Section 3 of
RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and legislative
officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement indeed is an
express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.

After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent than
real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the
elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way
amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance.
What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform
the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for
the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.

[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact, provides only
for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And
this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its unambiguous
facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure
responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.

3. TERM OF OFFICE

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO v. COMELEC, GR No. 201716, 2013-01-08

Facts: For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and
local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.

In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as
winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor.

Abundo protested Torres' election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the
2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until
the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year... and one
month.

Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other.

When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy... for the mayoralty seat Torres lost no time in seeking the
former's disqualification... to run,... predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.

On June 16, 2010,... COMELEC... issued a Resolution... finding for Abundo,... accordingly proclaimed
2010 mayor-elect of Viga... private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto...
action... to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.
Issues: The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has consecutively served for three terms despite the
fact that he only served the remaining one year and one month of the second... term as a result of
an election protest.

whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected official arising from his
being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full service of
the term for purposes of the... application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local
officials.

Ruling: The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo's three successive, continuous
mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to,
and was veritably... disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was
eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.

To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted
constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:

(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government
post; and

(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

the Court finds Abundo's case meritorious and declares that the two-year period during which his
opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively
removed Abundo's case from the ambit of the three-term... limit rule.

during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor,...
Abundo assumed the mayoralty post... for a period of a little over one year... and one month... it cannot
be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise
entitled.

In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months,... Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even
if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to
the same nor... serve the functions of the said elective office.

The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume
the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner.

Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly
proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve such elective office. For... another,
not having been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one
cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and
purposes,... Abundo was not entitled to the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in
his favor.

Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective interruption of
his service, until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of the remaining term.

Borja vs Comelec Case Digest Three-Term Limit

Facts: Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending on
June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from
1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May
11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s
disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by
June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another term. The Second Division of the
Comelec declared Capco disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco
eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves
the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-
term limit.

Held: No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well
as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run
again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but
simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he
only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayor’s assumption
of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service
in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.

The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, §8) is not only to prevent the establishment of
political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the
historical background of Art. X, §8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional
Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were
with preventing the monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the
Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of election. To
consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for
reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose
whom they wish to govern them. (Borja vs Comelec, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998)

Aldovino VS COMELEC

FACTS: Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms:
1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the
Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal
case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the
performance of the functions of his office.

Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought
by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms,
in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.

ISSUE: WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING: NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term
was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon
B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification.

“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term
and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that
preventive suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the
Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires
an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has
been imposed.

Adormeo vs Comelec
Recall, Term of Office, Three-Term Limit, Voluntary Renunciation

Facts: Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998.
During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term
ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the
ground that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the three term-
limit rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration
which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.

Issue: Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two full
terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections.

Held: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his
defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term and the recall election is sufficient
interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the
LGC.

Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was defeated in the 1998
elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is not a continuation of his two previous terms
which could constitute his third term thereby barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the
2000 recall election is not the “voluntary renunciation” contemplated by the law. (Adormeo vs Comelec,
G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002)

Socrates vs Comelec

FACTS: Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive
terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle,
Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran
and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall proceedings and in the recall
election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s
disqualification under the three-term limit rule.

ISSUE: WON Hagedorn is disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule

HELD: These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an
elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only
consecutive terms count in determining the three--term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents
the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or
consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot immediate re-election for a fourth term, The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to
the next regular election for the same office following the same office following the third consecutive term.
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons: 1)
A subsequent election like a recall election, is no longer an immediate reelection after the three
consecutive terms; and 2) The intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity
of service.

After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election
of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was
Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an
interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation,
but because of a legal prohibition. (Socrates vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002)

Latasa vs. Comelec

Facts: Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections
of 1992, 1995, and 1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the
2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already
served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first
time for the position of city mayor.

Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny
petitioner's candidacy since the latter had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms.
Petitioner countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the 2001
elections since this will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.

The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for
reconsideration was not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and he was proclaimed
winner. Only after the proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that declared him
disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not
be counted.

Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a
different juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for city mayor, it should not be construed as vying for the same local government post.

Issue: Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-
created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos?

Held: As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who
will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the
range of choice of the people.

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post,
unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms
to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality.
This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the
office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the
office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that
of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city.
These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor
for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority
as their chief executive for nine years.

The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those
who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner
Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal
mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be
allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly
holding office as chief executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of
eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not
abhorred by it.(Latasa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003)

Note: ● It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that after an
elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass
upon his qualifications. An opposing party's remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition for quo
warranto within ten days after the proclamation. Time and again, this Court has held that rules of
procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application
of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend
their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.

FRANCIS G. ONG vs. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS


[G.R. No. 163295. January 23, 2006.]

FACTS: Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were
candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10,
2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.

On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due
Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy3 of Francis. The petition to disqualify was predicated on the
three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and
May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for
three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.

the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the office of mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that
contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election Case No. 6850 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected
mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis
had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004
term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.

ISSUE: whether or not petitioner Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor for the mayoralty term
1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.

HELD: YES
POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; TERM OF OFFICE; THREE-TERM LIMIT
RULE; PETITIONER’S PROCLAMATION AS THE DULY ELECTED MAYOR IN THE 1998 MAYORALTY
ELECTION COUPLED BY HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE AND HIS CONTINUOUS EXERCISE OF THE
FUNCTIONS THEREOF FROM START TO FINISH OF THE TERM, SHOULD BE LEGALLY BE TAKEN AS
SERVICE FOR A FULL TERM IN CONTEMPLATION OF THE THREE-TERM RULE. — The three-term limit
rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Section 43 (b) of
the Local Government Code restates the same rule.

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must
concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same
local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring
petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections.

There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality
in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998 and
the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001
mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in
the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation
initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.

The question that begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis’s assumption of office as
Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one
full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.

We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, “service for the full term,” and should be
counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional
and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive term for the same position.

It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis’
opponent (Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of
San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and
value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired.

Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty
election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-
term rule. The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such
contrary view would mean that Alegre would — under the three-term rule — be considered as having
served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served
such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.

Mendoza vs. Comelec

Facts: Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a number of times:

a) 1986 – 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino and served up to 1988

b) 1988 – 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992


c) 1994 – 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed office on 28 June 1994 and
served up to 1995

d) 1995 – 1998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998

e) 1998 – 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.

In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same post in the May
2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Bataan.

Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare respondent Roman’s election as
governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly being contrary to Art. X, §8 of the Constitution.

Issue: Should Roman's incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall elections be included in
determining the three--consecutive term limit fixed by law?

Held: No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely serves
the balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full three--year term.

The law contemplates a continuous full three--year term before the proscription can apply, providing for
only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up the office. If involuntary severance from
the service which results in the incumbent’s being unable to finish his term of office because of his ouster
through valid recall proceedings negates “one term” for purposes of applying the three--term limit, it
stands to reason that the balance of the term assumed by the newly elected local official in a recall
election should not also be held to be one term in reckoning the three--term limit.

In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term nor the elected local
official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted local official following the recall election
could be considered to have served a full three--year term set by the Constitution.

The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than three consecutive
terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit interruptions in the continuity of service, so
long as such interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent.
Hence, the period from June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman
served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on
May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of Bataan for only two consecutive terms
(1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on that day was actually only his third term for the same
position.

A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary interpretation would in effect
cut short the elected official’s service to less than nine years and shortchange his constituents. The
desire to prevent monopoly of political power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters’
obvious preference who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast.
(Mendoza vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002)

Rivera III vs. Comelec

Facts: In the May 2004 elections, respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-2007. Petitioner Dee filed with the COMELEC a petition to
cancel Morales’ Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had served three previous
consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.
Respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term 1995-1998 (first term)
and 2001-2004 (third term), but he served the second term from 1998-2001 only as a "caretaker of the
office" or as a "de facto officer" since his proclamation as mayor was declared void by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). He was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti--graft case from January
to July 1999.

Issue: 1. Has Morales already served his 3 consecutive term?

2. If so, who should then take his position?

Held: 1. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Respondent Morales was elected for the term 1998-2001. He assumed the position. He was mayor for the
entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee
ousting him (Morales) as mayor (because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only after the expiry of
the 1998-2001 term). Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of
Mabalacat continuously without any break since 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will
have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. His assumption of office for the second
term constituted “service for the full term” and should be counted as a full term served in contemplation
of the three--term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions barring local elective
officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.

The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against
the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent
Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a
candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.

2. The question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve for the remaining
portion of the 2004 to 2007 term. In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that a second place candidate
cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred.
This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local Government Code,
to wit:

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and Vice-Mayor. – (a)
If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. (Rivera III vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 167591. May 9, 2007)

Dizon vs. Comelec

Facts: Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the COMELEC
to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was
elected and had fully served three previous consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local
Government Code. Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus,
Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the
same position and same municipality.
Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as mayor of Mabalacat
because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. He averred that the COMELEC en
banc affirmed the decision of the RTC declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in
the 1998 elections. Thus, he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term should
be reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his second term.

COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took judicial notice of SC’s
ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as
mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest
case that the then proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the
three--term limit under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the
2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for
the same position in 2007 elections.

Issues:

1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004--2007 term (although he was ousted from his office as
Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term

2. WON the 2007--2010 term of Morales is his 5th term

Held:

1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his fourth term.
We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales
from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.

Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code state that
the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three years, and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.

There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification: (1) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four consecutive terms:
1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. We disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the
May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales’
proclamation for the 1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales’
service with respect to the 1998-2001 term because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only on 4
July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with respect to the
2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided
by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was
promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice
mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30
June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem
to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1
July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th term)

2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO. Morales occupied the position
of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:
1995-1998

1998-2001

2001-2004

2004-2007.

However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the 2004-2007 term.
Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full term. Morales cannot be deemed
to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration
of the term. Morales’ occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 2004-2007 cannot be counted
as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30
June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30
June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. (Dizon v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009)

Bolos vs. Comelec

Facts: Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol for three
consecutive terms (1994, 1997, 2002). In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran for Municipal
Councilor of Dauis and won. He assumed office on July 1, 2004, leaving his post as Punong Barangay.
After serving his term as a councilor he filed his candidacy for the position of Punong Barangay in the
2007 Barangay Elections.

Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the same office, filed a petition
for disqualification on the ground that Bolos Jr. has already served the maximum limit of three term
hence no longer eligible to run and hold the position in accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991.

Cinconiegue contended that Bolos’ relinquishment of the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was
voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal
councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and Local Elections. He added that petitioner knew that if he won
and assumed the position, there would be a voluntary renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.

In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member, he
left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, it must be considered as an involuntary
interruption in the continuity of his last term of service. Pending the resolution of the case before the
Comelec, Bolos Jr. won in the election.

The Comelec resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue ruling that Bolos Jr. has already served the
maximum three consecutive term for an office and thus disqualified to run for the same office. It further
ordered that the proclamation of Bolos Jr. be annulled and that the office will be succeeded based on Sec.
44 of the Local Government Code.

Issue: Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay by
Bolos when he assumed the post of Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have served for
three consecutive terms.

Held: The three-term limit for elective official is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
The Local Government Code provides for the term of office of Barangay Officials:

Sec. 43. Term of Office. – x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.

(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for five (5) years,
which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1997:

Provided, that the sangguniang kabataan members who were elected in the May 1996 elections shall
serve until the next regular election of barangay officials.

Socrates vs. Comelec held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the Constitution and the
Local Government Code, has two parts: x x x The first part provides that an elective local official cannot
serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance
from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after
the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term.
The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term.

In Lonzanida vs. Comelec, the Court stated that the second part of the rule on the three-term limit shows
the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit
by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their
elected official full service of a term. The Court held that two conditions for the application of the
disqualification must concur: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms
in the same government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms,
satisfying the first condition for disqualification. What is to be determined is whether petitioner is deemed
to have voluntarily renounced his position as Punong Barangay during his third term when he ran for
and won as Sangguniang Bayan member and assumed said office.

The Court agrees with the Comelec that petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of
Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to office as Sangguniang Bayan member of
Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary renunciation.

When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan, he was not deemed
resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to
an intent and readiness to give up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office,
for it was very unlikely that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan
post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then after being
elected and proclaimed, return to his former position. He knew that his election as municipal councilor
would entail abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like
resignation, is voluntary.

Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan member,
he left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did not fully serve his third
term as Punong Barangay.
The term "operation of law" is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term describing the fact
that rights may be acquired or lost by the effect of a legal rule without any act of the person affected."
Black's Law Dictionary also defines it as a term that "expresses the manner in which rights, and
sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person by the mere application to the particular transaction of the
established rules of law, without the act or cooperation of the party himself.

In this case, petitioner did not fill or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead relinquished his
office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he won and assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan
member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay.
(Bolos vs Comelec, G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009)

Comelec vs Conrado Cruz et. al November 20, 2009

Facts: The present petition seeks a review of the RTC’s decision granting the petition of the respon-
dents on declaring Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled An Act Providing for Syn-chronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991) unconstitutional:

Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan offi-cials after the
effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three
(3) consecutive terms in the same position:

Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.

Antecedent: Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a
petition for declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the above-highlighted pro-viso, based on
the following arguments: 1. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not
retroactively. 2. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal
protection of the law. 3. Barangay officials have always been a political.

Issue: 1. WON the term limit should apply prospectively and not retroactively. 2. WON it violates
the equal protection of the law. Ruling: SC affirmed the constitutionality of Section 2, paragraph 2
of Republic Act No. 9164:

1. No retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has been there all along as early as
the second barangay law (RA No. 6679-changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive
term limit). after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued under the LGC and can still be found
in the current law.

2. No. The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III,
which provides: Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality
guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly
situated. It is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one
another on the basis of substantial distinctions related to the objective of the law; when things or persons
are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated differently in law. Appreciation of how the
constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis exists in the
present case for an equal protection challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other
local elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these
elective officials with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the
Constitution itself, is that while the Constitu-tion provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for
local elective officials, it left the length of term and the application of the three-term limit or any form of
term limitation for determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment
recognize substantial dis-tinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform
treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions. From another perspective, we
see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the challenged proviso did not
result in any differential treatment between barangay officials and all other elective officials.

4. RULES ON SUCCESSION

TALAGA VS COMELEC

FACTS: In focus are the disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty
election and the ascertainment of who should assume the office following the substitute’s disqualification.

Ramon Talaga and Philip Castillo filed their certificates of candidacy (COC) for the position of Mayor of
Lucena City for the 2010 elections. Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition to cancel the COC of
Talaga on the ground that he has already served as mayor of Lucena for three consecutive terms (2001,
2004, 2007) without interruption. Talaga countered by saying that the Sandiganbayan had preventively
suspended him from office during his second and third terms, which he claims to have amounted to an
interruption. Thereafter, Talaga withdrew his candidacy. On May 4, 2010, Barbara Ruby filed her own
COC to substitute Talaga. Talaga’s name remained printed on the ballots and votes in his favor were
counted for Barbara Ruby, who won against Castillo. But it was only on May 13, 2010 when the Comelec
gave due course to Ruby’s COC to include her in the official list of candidates. Ruby was proclaimed
newly elected mayor.

ISSUES The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for
the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband. Ancillary to the core issue is
the determination of who among the contending parties should assume the contested elective
position.

RULING 1. Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid
substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that
a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a
valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is
not at all a candidate. All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid
certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and
seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all.

2. A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy should be
filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:

Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.

If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor.

Gamboa vs Aguirre and Araneta (members of SP)

Facts:

In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. and respondents Marcelo
Aguirre, Jr., and Juan Y. Araneta were elected Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and SP
members, respectively. Sometime in August of 1995, the governor designated petitioner as Acting
Governor for the duration of the former’s official trip abroad until his return.

When the Sangguniang Panlalawigan held its regular session, respondents questioned the authority of
petitioner to preside therein in view of his designation as Acting Governor and asked him to vacate the
Chair. The latter, however, refused to do so. In another session, 7 members of the SP voted to allow
petitioner to continue presiding while 4 others voted against with 1 abstention. Respondents filed before
the lower court a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. In the meantime, the Governor re-
assumed his office. Later, the trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner as “temporarily
legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting
Governor.”

Petitioner filed a petition for review raising the issue earlier mentioned. Although this case is dismissible
for having become moot and academic considering the expiration in 1998 of the terms of office of the local
officials involved herein, the Court nonetheless proceeds to resolve this common controversy but novel
issue under the existing laws on local government.

Issue: WON Gamboa, while serving as the Acting Governor, temporarily relinquished the powers,
functions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor, including the power to preside over the
sessions of the SP

Held: YES

Ratio Decidendi: What the LGC provides:

The LGC provides that the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP. In addition to such
function, he becomes the Governor and assumes the higher office for the unexpired term of his
predecessor, in case of “permanent vacancy” therein. When the vacancy, however, is merely temporary,
the Vice- Governor “shall automatically exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations)and perform the
duties and functions” of the Governor. But, no such contingency is provided in case of temporary vacancy
in the office of the Vice-Governor.

Vice-Governor as Acting Governor:

When the Vice-Governor exercises the “powers and duties” of the Governor, he does not assume the
latter office.

He only “acts” as the Governor but does not “become” the Governor. His assumption of the powers, duties
and functions of the provincial Chief Executive does not create a permanent vacuum or vacancy in his
position as the Vice-Governor. Necessarily, he does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as
Vice-Governor by merely becoming an Acting Governor or by merely exercising the powers and duties of
the higher office. A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is actually a quasi-Governor.
This means, that for purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed
as a non-member of the SP for the time being. By tradition, the offices of the provincial Governor and
Vice-Governor are essentially executive in nature, whereas plain members of the provincial board perform
functions partaking of a legislative character. This is because the authority vested by law in the provincial
boards involves primarily a delegation of some legislative powers of Congress.

This is clear from the law, when it provides that “local legislative power shall be vested in the SP,” which
is “the legislative body of the province,” and enumerates therein its membership consisting of the:

1) Vice Governor as presiding officer 2) regular elective SP members3) 3 elective sectoral representatives4)
ex-officio members namely:

a) president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay; b) president of the panlalawigang
pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan; c) president of the provincial federation of sanggunian
members of municipalities and component cities Not being included in the enumeration, the Governor is
deemed excluded and thus, local executive power in the province is vested alone in the Governor.
Consequently, the union of legislative-executive powers in the office of the local chief executive under the
former Code has been disbanded. Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue to
simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since the nature of the duties of the provincial
Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them.

Conclusion:

To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding
temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of
such temporary vacancy.

This event constitutes an “inability” on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to
preside during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b)
of the Local Government Code-concerning the election of a temporary presiding officer. The
continuity of the Acting Governor’s (Vice -Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is
suspended so long as he is in such capacity.

Under Section 49(b), “(i)n the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at the
sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves
a temporary presiding officer.”

Rodolfo Ganzon vs Court of Appeals November 3, 2011


200 SCRA 271 – Political Law – Control Power – Local Government
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed against him on grounds of
misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension
orders against Ganzon based on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing
about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension
order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor
any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports
local autonomy and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere
supervisory power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President’s alter ego, can
suspend and or remove local officials.

HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory
powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly
embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, “supervision” is not
incompatible with disciplinary authority.

The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over
local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our
government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different
things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent. “In administration law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If
the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties.

Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.” But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the
power of supervision of the President over local government officials does not include the power of
investigation when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising
a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.
Joson v. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 131255. May 20, 1998]

FACTS: Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the President for barging
violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men. The case
was endorsed to the DILG. For failure to file an answer after three (3) extensions, petitioner was declared
in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive suspension. Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct
Formal Investigation”. DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of position papers
substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings.
Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of
the DILG Secretary. The former imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6)
months without pay.

ISSUES : Whether or not:

(a) Preventive suspension is proper;

(b) Procedural due process is violated;

(c) The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation; that it is the President
who is the Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG;

RULING

“(a) Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the
issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is
great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose
a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly
barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men
constitutes grave misconduct. The allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two
(2) employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive of the province is
in a position to influence the witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational politics in the
province dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken.

“(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process.
Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall
summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This provision does not give
the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would be
conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. There is nothing in
the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide
that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position papers.
A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their respective
memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing.

“(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated
is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to discipline evidently includes the
power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. A. O. No. 23, however,
delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson’s
claim.

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “…which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the Constitution. Control is
said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the
President, however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required
by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The
members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head of
a department is, and must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority.

SALALIMA v. GUINGONA

FACTS:

In 1993, administrative complaints were filed in the Office of the President against Albay Governor
Salalima and other Sanggunian officials. One of the causes of action against Salalima is the entering into
a retainer contract with Atty Cornago and the Cortes &Reyna Law Firm and the disbursements of public
funds in payment thereof. It was shown that the Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay adopted
Resolution 01-90 authorizing Salalima to engage the services of a Manila-based law firm, and later on,
Atty Cornago and Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. This is despite the availability of the provincial legal officer,
Atty Ricafort, who already submitted the petition. The retainer contract provides that the Atty. Cornago
and the law firm shall receiveP50,000 as acceptance fee and 18% of the value of the NPC property which
is P214Million. P7.3 Million were already paid by the province to the lawyers when the Commission of
Audit discovered the irregularities and disallowed further disbursements.

ISSUE:

WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering into the retainer agreement with Atty.
Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in making paymentspursuant to said agreement

HELD:

YES, guilty. But Salalima & Co. cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term.

RATIONALE:

Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) requires the appointment of a legal officer for the
province whose function is to represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special
proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party.

Exception to this rule is when a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to another component city or municipality.

Since the case does not fall under the exception, the retainer contract is contrary to law. The respondents
also violated Circular 86-25 which requires a prior written approval of the Solicitor General and written
concurrence of the COA before disbursements can be made to lawyers.

However, in this case, the written approval of the Sol Gen was secured only after the disbursement was
made. Another irregularity was the fact that it was only Atty. Cornego who appeared as the corroborating
counsel of the Province of Albay in the Supreme Court case. The law firm never made its appearance
although it was paid P3.6 Million. The attorney’s fee was also unconscionable. The only tasks the lawyers
performed were to appear in court and submit a memorandum, which are not commensurate to the fee of
P38.5 Million. The professional character and social standing of Atty. Cornago are not such as would
merit a P38.5 million fee for the legal services rendered.

It was admitted later that the governor hired Atty. Cornago because they were schoolmates at San Beda
College. By considering the labor and time involved, the skill and experience called for in the performance
of the services and the professional character and social standing of the lawyers, the attorney’s fee of
P38.5 million is unconscionable. Allowing such attorney’s fees, which is patently disadvantageous to the
state, respondents are guilty of grave abuse of authority

ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA,
JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF
TIWI, ALBAY, respondents

FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against respondent
incumbent Mayor and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter. Respondent Mayor appealed to
the Office of the President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution
in accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local Government Code (LGC). The Office of the President thru the
Executive Secretary directed “stay of execution”. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was
dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President
as having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC (1991)
impliedly repealed Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.

HELD: NO. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of execution” applied.

RATIO: The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an “appeal shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final or executory.” As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to
the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom
that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the
intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more
direct language expressive of such intention.

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be
found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be
construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the
terms of the new and old laws.

Malinao vs. Reyes (1996)

Facts: Malinao filed an administrative case against Mayor Red for abuse of authority and denial of due
process with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque. On August 12, 1994, members of the
Sanggunian, by a vote of 5 to 3, found Red guilty, vote signed only by presiding chairman. On September
5, the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2, acquitted Red of the charges against him. This vote was embodied in a
Decision which was signed by all the members. Malinao argued that the First Sanggunian Decision had
already become final and executory for failure of Red to appeal.

The issue is whether or not the second Decision is valid.

Held: Yes, the second decision of acquittal is valid. In any case, this issue is already moot and academic
as a result
of the expiration of Red’s term during which the act complained of was allegedly committed, and further
proceedings

are barred by his reelection. [Sec 66(b) LGC]. Reelection abates any administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the local elective official. [Under Sec. 66 (b) of the LGC, the penalty of suspension
cannot exceed the unexpired term of the official and any administrative disciplinary proceeding against
said official is abated if in the meantime he is re-elected because such re-election is a condonation of
whatever misconduct he might have committed during his previous term. In order to render a decision in
an administrative case involving elected local officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must be in writing,
stating clearly the facts and the reasons for such a decision.

Sangguniang Barangay of Don Marcos vPunong Barangay Martinez (2008,Chico-Nazario)

DOCTRINE: The Sangguniang Bayan (SB)or Sangguniang Panglungsod (SP)cannot order the removal of an
erringelective barangay official from office, asthe courts (RTC) are exclusively vestedwith this under
Section 60 of the LGC.

Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave natureand, if found guilty,
would merit the penaltyof removal from office, the case should befiled with the regional trial court. The
mostextreme penalty that the Sanggunian mayimpose is suspension.

FACTS:

•December 2004 – Severino Martinez,Punong Barangay of Barangay DonMariano Marcos (Bayombong,


NuevaVizacaya) was administratively chargedwith Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office andviolation of the
Anti-Graft and PracticesAct by petitioner (Sanggunian Barangay)through the filing of a verified
complaintbefore the Sangguniang Bayan.

•Pursuant to Section 61 of the LGC, the SBis the disciplining authority over elective barangay officials.

• Charges, among others (6 in all) were for failure to submit and fully remit to the Barangay Treasurer the

income of their solid waste management project particularly the sale of fertilizer and recyclable materials
derived from composting and garbage collection. There was also a charge for failure to liquidate his
travelling expenses for the 2003Lakbay-aral.

•Martinez failed to file an Answer, thus was declared by SB in default,

• July 2005 - the Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed the penalty of removal from
office.

•August 2005 - The Decision was conveyed to the Municipal Mayor (Severino Bagasao) for its
implementation. Mayor issued a Memorandum, stating that SB is not empowered to order Martinez’s
removal from service. However, the Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him.

•Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction
before the trial court against SB and Mayor.

TC - Order of SB null and void. The propercourts, and not the petitioner, areempowered to remove an
elective localofficial from office, in accordance withSection 60 of the Local Government Code.Note:
Although Martinez’s term as PunongBaranggay expired in 2007 and, thus,rendering this petition moot
and academic,the Court will nevertheless settle a legalquestion that is capable of repetition yetevading
review.
ISSUE/HELD:

WON the Sangguniang Bayanmay remove Martinez, an elective localofficial, from office. NO. SC affirmed
RTC.PETITION DENIED.

RATIO:

1.Textual

Section 60 of the Local Government Codeconferred upon the courts the power toremove elective local
officials from office:“Section 60. Grounds for DisciplinaryActions.—An elective local official may
bedisciplined, suspended, or removed fromoffice on any of the following grounds: …

An elective local official may beremoved from office on the groundsenumerated above by order of
theproper court.

2.Legislative Intent – Only RTC

During the deliberations of the Senate onthe LGC, the legislative intent to confineto the courts, i.e., RTCs,
theSandiganbayan and the appellate courts, jurisdiction over cases involving theremoval of elective local
officials wasevident.In

Salalima v. Guingona, Jr

., the Court

enbanc

categorically ruled that the Office of the President is without any power toremove elected officials. Court
invalidatedArticle 125, Rule XIX of the Rules andRegulations Implementing the LocalGovernment Code of
1991 (whichprovides that “An elective local officialmay be removed from office … by order

of the proper court or the discipliningauthority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
other.

3.Ratio for making it anexclusive judicial prerogative

The Sanggunian Brgy contends thatadministrative cases involving electivebarangay officials may be filed
with,heard and decided by the SP or SBconcerned, which can, thereafter, imposea penalty of removal
from office. It furtherclaims that the courts are merely taskedwith issuing the order of removal, afterthe
SP or SB finds that a penalty of removal is warranted. This would counter the rationale formaking the
removal of elective officialsan exclusive judicial prerogative.

Pablico v. Villapando

: It is beyond cavil,therefore, that the power to removeerring elective local officials from serviceis lodged
exclusively with the courts. Thelaw on suspension or removal of electivepublic officials must be strictly
construedand applied, and the authority in whomsuch power of suspension or removal isvested must
exercise it with utmost goodfaith, for what is involved is not just anordinary public official but one chosen
bythe people through the exercise of theirconstitutional right of suffrage.

Their willmust not be put to naught by thecaprice or partisanship of thedisciplining authority.


The rule is intended as a check against any capriciousness orpartisan activity by the
discipliningauthority.

It must not be tainted with partisanpolitics and used to defeat the will of thevoting public. Congress itself
saw it fit tovest that power in a more

impartialtribunal

, the court. Furthermore, LGUsare not deprived of the right to disciplinelocal elective officials; rather, they
areprevented from imposing the extremepenalty of dismissal.

4.Courts not merely animplementing arm of SB

Argument of Sanggunian is anunmistakable breach of the doctrine onseparation of powers, thus placing
thecourts under the orders of the legislativebodies of local governments. The courtswould be stripped of
their power of review, and their discretion in imposingthe extreme penalty of removal fromoffice is thus
left to be exercised bypolitical factions which stand to benefitfrom the removal from office of the
localelective official concerned, the very evilwhich Congress sought to avoid when itenacted Section 60 of
the LocalGovernment Code.Congress clearly meant that the removalof an elective local official be done
onlyafter a trial before the appropriate court,where court rules of procedure andevidence can ensure
impartiality andfairness and protect against politicalmaneuverings. Elevating the removal of an elective
local official from office froman administrative case to a court casemay be justified by the fact that
suchremoval not only punishes the officialconcerned but also, in effect, deprives theelectorate of the
services of the officialfor whom they voted.

5.Power of the Sanggunian

As the law stands, Section 61 of the LocalGovernment Code provides for theprocedure for the filing of
anadministrative case against an erringelective

barangay

official before the SP orSB. However, t

he Sangguniang cannotorder the removal of an erringelective

barangay

official from office,as the courts are exclusively vestedwith this power under Section 60 of the Local
Government Code.Thus, if the acts allegedly committedby the

barangay

official are of agrave nature and, if found guilty,would merit the penalty of removalfrom office, the case
should be filedwith the regional trial court.

Once thecourt assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it wouldbe subsequently
apparent during the trialthat a penalty less than removal fromoffice is appropriate. On the other hand,

the most extreme penalty that theSangguniang Panlungsod orSangguniang Bayan may impose on

the erring elective

barangay
official is suspension; if it deems that theremoval of the official from service iswarranted, then it can
resolve thatthe proper charges be filed in court.

6.Exhaustion of administrative remedies isnot inflexible

As a general rule, no recourse to courts canbe had until all administrative remedies havebeen exhausted.
However, this rule is not applicable where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,amounting
to lack of jurisdiction and where the question or questions involved areessentially judicial.In this case, it
is apparent that the SB acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued theassailed Order removing Martinez
from office.Such act was patently illegal and, therefore,Martinez was no longer required to availhimself of
an administrative appeal in order toannul the said Order of the SangguniangBayan. Thus, his direct
recourse to regularcourts of justice was justified.

LINGATING VS COMELEC 2002

Respondent Sulong had previously won as mayor of Lapuyan on January 18, 1988. In the May 11, 1992,
and again in the May 8, 1995 elections, he was reelected.

Petitioner alleged that in 1991, during his first term as mayor of Lapuyan

, respondent Sulong

, along with a municipal councilor of Lapuyan and several other individuals,

was administratively charged (AC No. 12-91) with various offenses,

and that, on February 4, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office

. Petitioner claimed that this decision had become final and executory, and consequently the then vice-
mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, took his oath as mayor vice respondent Sulong on March 3, 1992

. (REMOVED PRIOR TO HIS TERM)


Respondent Sulong denied that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final and executory. He averred
that after receiving a copy of the decision on February 17, 1992, he filed a motion for reconsideration
and/or notice of appeal thereof on February 18, 1992; that on February 27, 1992,

In the May 1992 elections, respondent Sulong was re-elected mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur
despite the decision of the Sangguniang dismissing him from office. In the 1995 May elections,
respondent Sulong ran and won the mayoralty elections of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur.

Petitioner cites Reyes v. Commission on Elections

14

in which we held that an elective local executive officer,

who is removed before the expiration of the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a
candidate for a local elective position under §40(b) of the Local Government Code. ISSUE: whether or not
the foregoing decision

[in AC No. 12-91],

assuming it has become final and executory, constitutes a ground for the disqualification of herein
respondent-movant as a candidate in the elections [of May 14, 2001]. HELD:

Reyes cannot be applied to this case

because it appears that the 1992 decision of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan, finding respondent Sulong guilty of dishonesty, falsification and malversation of public
funds, has not until now become final.

Sulong filed a "motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal;" that on February 27, 1992, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, required Jim Lingating, the complainant in AC No. 12-91, to comment; and
that the complainant in AC No. 12-91 has not filed a comment nor has the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
resolved

respondent’s motion. The filing of his motion for reconsideration prevented the decision of Sangguniang

Panlalawigan from becoming final.

There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of. As Provincial Secretary of Zamboanga del
Sur Wilfredo Cimafranca attested, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan simply considered the matter as having
become moot and academic because it was "overtaken by the local elections of May [11,]1992."

Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, and the highest ranking
municipal councilor of Lapuyan, Romeo Tan, to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, be
considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because it appears to have been
made pursuant to §68 16 of the Local Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative cases
immediately executory.

Having come to the conclusion that respondent Sulong is not disqualified from holding the position of

mayor of Lapuyan, it is unnecessary to pass upon petitioner’s contention that, as the candidate who
obtained

the second highest number of votes, he is entitled to be installed as mayor because the votes cast in favor
of respondent Sulong were void.

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1995/dec1995/gr_108072_1995.html

Facts:

On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue
City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as
amended,Articles 170 (falsification of legislative documents) and 171 (falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allotted
appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue.
The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide
the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative
sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. On September 1992, a
TRO against Hagad was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing suspension.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local
elective official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160.

Held:

No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not removed by LG Code of 1991.
There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act.
The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other .
Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must
be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all
laws on the subject.
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the
Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24
thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the
modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President.

RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., City Mayor, Lucena City vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, - G.R. No.
169888
G.R. No. 169888 November 11, 2008
RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., City Mayor, Lucena City
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th Division, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Criminal and administrative charges were filed against petitioner Ramon Y. Talaga Jr. before the Office of the Ombudsman. It was alleged, that the petitioner,
in his capacity as mayor, has unlawfully granted favors to a third party with respect to the operation of bingo games in the city, to the damage and prejudice
of the complainants. The administrative complaint was dismissed but the criminal case was retained by the Ombudsman.
Three criminal information charging the petitioner of violation of Republic Act No. 3019 was recommended by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Only one
information was sustained by the Sandiganbayan, the criminal information for giving unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang by approving an ordinance granting
him a local franchise to operate bingo games in the city. However, said information was reverted back to the Ombudsman for the conduct of further
preliminary investigation.
Thereafter, an information charging the petitioner and the City Councilors for the aforementioned offense, alleging that the parties conspired to perpetrate
the crime. The City Councilors moved for the motion to be quashed as the information does not constitute an offense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there exist a valid information under which the petitioner stands charged.

HELD:
Yes, the information is valid.
The test in Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to appraise the accused,
with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.
Based on the foregoing test, the Information sufficiently apprises petitioner of the charges against him. The Information charged the petitioner of evident bad
faith and manifest partiality when as Mayor of Lucena City, petitioner, in conspiracy with the City Council, gave unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang.
Moreover, it states the specific act which constituted the giving of unwarranted benefits, namely, granting unto the said Jose Sy Bang a local franchise to
operate a bingo business in Lucena City in violation of existing laws. These allegations are clear enough for a layman to understand.
Aguinaldo vs. Santos

Aguinaldo vs. Santos

Post under Alter ego doctrine , Doctrine of Condonation , Local Government , Political Law Case Digests ,
Power of Control , Powers of the President

Facts:

Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup d’état
was crushed, DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to Governor Aguinaldo requiring him to
show cause why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. A
sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts
committed during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively
participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel
soldiers.

The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending the outcome of the formal
investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as charged and ordering his
removal from office. Vice-Governor Vargas was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.
Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order with the SC, assailing the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Government.
Petitioner argued that: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government
official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that
since respondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner, the former could not
appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by
petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of
evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.

While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the ground that he had
been removed from office.

The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision of the
Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by a
landslide margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor
of Cagayan.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration
case moot and academic

2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the
President

3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before petitioner could be removed from office.

Held:

1. Yes. Aguinaldo’s re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative
case pending moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the
most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a public
official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off
the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases
pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government officials is anchored on both the
Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by
Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over
all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local
governments. It is a constitutional doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the
acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was
repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to
the legislature the power and authority to enact a local government code, which provides for the manner
of removal of local government officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this court had
the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the present
Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved. The power of
the DILG secretary to remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP 337.

3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the quantum of proof
required is only substantial evidence. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992)

CASE DIGEST: ATTY. VICENTE E. SALUMBIDES, JR., and GLENDA ARA, Petitioners, v. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, RICARDO AGON, RAMON VILLASANTA, ELMER DIZON,SALVADORADUL, and AGNES
FABIAN,Respondents.

FACTS: Salumbides and Glenda were appointed as Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and Municipal
Budget Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon. On May 13, 2002, herein respondentsRicardo Agon,
Ramon Villasanta, Elmer Dizon, Salvador Adul and Agnes Fabian,all members of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Tagkawayan, filed withthe Office of the Ombudsman a complaintagainst Salumbides and Glenda
(hereafter petitioners), the mayor, Coleta, Jason and Aquino. The administrative aspect of the case
charged petitioners et al. with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service, and violation of the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and the Local
Government Code. The Office of the Ombudsman denied the prayer to place petitioners et al. under
preventive suspension pending investigation. By Order dated February 1, 2005, approved onApril 11,
2005, it denied the motion for reconsideration but dropped the mayor and Coleta, both elective officials,
as respondents in the administrative case, the 2004 elections having mooted the case. The Office of the
Ombudsman approved the September 9, 2005 Memorandum absolving Jason and Aquino, and finding
petitioners guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty.

ISSUE:

Is the doctrine of condonation applicable in this case?

NOTE: The doctrine of condonation has been abandoned by the Supreme Court. Please see the case of
Morales v. CA (G.R. Nos. 217126-27) and Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec.
HELD: The reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconductto the extent
of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.The Court should never remove a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office.To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to
elect their officers.When the people elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he
had been guilty of any.It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.Contrary to petitioners asseveration, the non-application of the condonation
doctrine to appointive officials does not violate the right to equal protection of the law.The electorates
condonation of the previous administrative infractions of the reelected official cannot be extended to that
of the reappointed coterminous employees, the underlying basis of the rule being to uphold the will of the
people expressed through the ballot.In other words, there is neither subversion of the sovereign will nor
disenfranchisement of the electorate to speak of, in the case of reappointed coterminous employees.It is
the will of the populace, not the whim of one person who happens to be the appointing authority, that
could extinguish an administrative liability.Since petitioners hold appointive positions, they cannot claim
the mandate of the electorate.The people cannot be charged with the presumption of full knowledge of the
life and character of each and every probable appointee of the elective official ahead of the latters actual
reelection.

Moreover, as correctly observed by respondents, the lack of conspiracy cannot be appreciated in favor of
petitioners who were found guilty of simple neglect of duty, for if they conspired to act negligently, their
infraction becomes intentional. There can hardly be conspiracy to commit negligence. Petitioners fell short
of the reasonable diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due care and prudence in ascertaining
the legal requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their imprimatur and giving
their advice to their superior.

The appellate court correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner Salumbides failed to uphold
the law and provide a sound legal assistance and support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of
basic services and provisions of adequate facilities when he advised the mayor to proceed with the
construction of the subject projects without prior competitive bidding. As pointed out by the Office of the
Solicitor General, to absolve Salumbides is tantamount to allowing with impunity the giving of erroneous
or illegal advice, when by law he is precisely tasked to advise the mayor on matters related to upholding
the rule of law. Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal opinion on a course of action without any legal
basis becomes no different from a lay person who may approve the same because it appears justified.

As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of government funds upon
the direction of the mayor and prior advice by the municipal legal officer did not relieve her of liability for
willingly cooperating rather than registering her written objection as municipal budget officer. Aside from
the lack of competitive bidding, the appellate court, pointing to the improper itemization of the expense,
held that the funding for the projects should have been taken from the capital outlays that refer to the
appropriations for the purchase of goods and services, the benefits of which extend beyond the fiscal year
and which add to the assets of the local government unit.It added that current operating expenditures
like MOOE/RMF refer to appropriations for the purchase of goods and services for the conduct of normal
local government operations within the fiscal year.

DENIED
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES v. CA, GR Nos. 217126-27, 2015-11-10
Facts:

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit[10] was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et... al), accusing them
of Plunder[11] and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,[12] otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection
with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the

Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building).[13]

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators[14] to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an
investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel).[15]
Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint[16] (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et
al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases[17] for Grave Misconduct, Serious

Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases[18] for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).[19]... s to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged
that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the following procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building
project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati

On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative
adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special Panel).[50] Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the

2nd Special Panel issued separate orders[51] for each of the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.

Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued on
March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive... suspension for not more than six (6)
months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.[53] The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive suspension of
a public officer are present,[54] finding that: (a) the... evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing bidders and
members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; (2)
the documents on record negated the... publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official receipts showed the
release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the

Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give them access to public records and allow them to... influence
possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.[55]
Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), through

Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon
receipt of the same.[56]

On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan, a
member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this Court,
assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the March 20, 2015

Resolution directing her to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.[81] The Ombudsman claims that:
(a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770,[82] or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989,"
which states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is prima facie evidence that the
subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction;[83] and
(b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the
Ombudsman is an impeachable officer, and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.[84]

In his comment[85] filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA
judicial power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the

Ombudsman, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this case
when said office issued the preventive suspension order against him.
Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution[90] dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it were held,[91] granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer
for a WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive... suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay, Jr. has an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the condonation doctrine,
citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.[92] Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay, Jr. given
that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities relative to the
Makati Parking
Building project from 2007 to 2013.[93] In this regard, the CA added that, although there were acts which were apparently committed by
Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments on July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,[94] corresponding to the services of
Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,[95] and
Mayor Garcia v.

Mojica[96] wherein the condonation doctrine was still applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's re-election,
reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said... re-election.[97] To this, the CA added that
there was no concrete evidence of Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.[

In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental petition[99]
before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence... of guilt is strong for
purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter
of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that, at... any rate, there is no
condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013

Issues:

Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-
G.R. SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;

Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453;

Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension
order issued by the Ombudsman;

Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine; and

Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA- G.R. SP No. 139504 is
improper and illegal.

Ruling:

The petition is partly meritorious.

I.

A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and 2 thereof... provide:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,... and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying... the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy... in the ordinary
course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived
error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.

n this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition for
certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition.[112] These are: (a)... where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court
a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the... lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances,... a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such
relief by the trial court is... improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or...
where public interest is involved.

In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on the authority of the CA
- and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the

Ombudsman is put to the fore.

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