AJP 3.3 Joint Air and Space Operations Doctrine PDF

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED
AJP-3.3
JOINT AIR & SPACE

OPERATIONS DOCTRINE
The information contained in this document shall not be released to a nation

outside NATO without prior approval of the NATO nations as laid down in C-
M(55)15(Final) or MC-167/2.
MAY 2002
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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION (MAS)
NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION
July 2000
1. AJP-3.3, JOINT AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE, is a

NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED Publication. The agreement of nations to use this
publication is recorded in STANAG 3700.
2. AJP-3.3 is effective on receipt and supersedes ATP-33(B) which should be

destroyed in accordance with the local procedure for destruction of documents.
A. GRØNHEIM
Major-General, NOAF
Chairman, MAS
I
ORIGINAL
AJP-3.3
(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)
II
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CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION

BY NATIONS
1
3 TU
4 GE
III
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CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATIONS BY NATIONS
1 NONE
2 NONE
3 The use of the terms quote ‘senior subordinate commanders’

unquote in AJP-3.3, Page 3-3, Para 4, Lines 2 and 6 are not
acceptable for TU. Because the term of quote ‘senior’ unquote is
not exist in NATO C2 system.
4 GE disapproves of the fact that the evolving concept of Extended Air
Defence which was developed by the NADC, supported by the MC
and explicitly approved by the NAC, is not reflected in AJP-3.3. GE
initiated specific activities within the NATO HQ, which might lead to a
revision of the view regarding this issue.
5 NONE
6 NONE
7 NONE
Glossary NONE
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(ATP-33(C))
JOINT AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE
Allied Joint Publication-3.3 (AJP-3.3) Joint Air & Space Operations Doctrine, which is
effective upon receipt, is promulgated:
As directed
by the Chiefs of Staff
A A Milton
Major General
Director General Joint Doctrine and Concepts
Ministry of Defence
V
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RECORD OF CHANGES
CHANGE DATE EFFECTIVE BY WHOM

DATE ENTERED DATE ENTERED
1 - May 2002 --- --- ---
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
CHAPTER 1 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF AIR AND SPACE DOCTRINE
101 Introduction 1-1
102 Principles 1-2
103 Nature of Air and Space Doctrine 1-3
CHAPTER 2 EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER

201 Fundamental Considerations 2-1
202 Levels of Joint Operations. 2-3
203 Principles of War 2-3
204 Application of Air Power 2-4
205 Factors Affecting Allied Force Integration 2-5
206 Rules of Engagement 2-6
207 Law of Armed Conflict 2-7
208 Organisation of an Operational Theatre 2-8
209 Control Means, Co-ordination and Identification Measures 2-9
CHAPTER 3 COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS
301 Overview of Air Command and Control 3-1

302 Principles of Air Command and Control 3-1
303 Joint Force Structure in Theatre 3-2
304 Air Component Commander 3-4
305 Airspace Control Authority and Air Defence Commander
Designation 3-7
CHAPTER 4 JOINT AIR OPERATIONS
401 The Employment and Purpose of Air Power 4-1

402 Categories of Air Operations 4-1
403 Counter-Air Operations 4-3
404 Air Operations for Strategic Effect 4-9
405 Anti-Surface Force Air Operations 4-11
406 Anti-Surface Force Air Operations in the Land Environment 4-13
407 Anti-Surface Force Air Operations in the Maritime Environment 4-14
408 Anti-Surface Force Air Operations in Amphibious Operations 4-16
409 Supporting Air Operations 4-17
410 Force Packaging Concept 4-25
411 Contributing Forces 4-26
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CHAPTER 5 PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AIR OPERATIONS
501 Priorities and Phasing 5-1

502 Air Battle Management Tasks 5-2
503 Decision Cycle 5-2
504 Air Operations Planning Process 5-3
505 Force Management Process 5-9
506 Targeting 5-10
507 Joint Air Tasking Cycle 5-13
508 Conflict Termination 5-16
CHAPTER 6 SPACE OPERATIONS
601 The Utility of Space 6-1

602 Space Treaties 6-3
603 Space Control 6-3
604 Force Enhancement 6-6
CHAPTER 7 NON-ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS
701 Overview of Crisis Response Operations 7-1

702 Air and Space Power in Support of CRO 7-2
703 Rules of Engagement 7-5
704 Deterrence and Enforcement 7-6
705 Air and Space Roles 7-6
706 Force Extraction 7-9
Glossary of Abbreviations Abbreviations-1
Reference Publications Reference-1
List of Effective Pages LEP-1
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CHAPTER 1
Fundamental Principles of Air and Space

Doctrine
101. Introduction
1. Aim. The aim of this publication is to provide guidance to ensure the effective
employment of NATO resources in air operations and the associated exploitation of
capabilities provided by space facilities.
2. Guidance. The joint air and space operations doctrine described in this publication
is intended to influence thinking and provide guidance to commanders and their staffs on the
planning and execution of air and space operations. AJP-3.3 is intended primarily for NATO
forces within the static command structure and for operations within a Combined Joint Task
Force (CJTF). CJTF operations may be within or outside the NATO AOR, or cross-boundary.
However, the doctrine could be applied, where necessary, for operations under the umbrella of
the Western European Union (WEU)/European Union (EU), or a coalition of NATO and non-
NATO nations within the framework of a CJTF. It should not be seen as a set of rules to be
followed blindly, but as a guide for professional judgement and a stimulus for the thought
processes and planning activities needed to exploit fully the potential of the air and space
forces available.
3. Scope. This publication will address the fundamental factors that influence the
employment of air and space power and the key aspects of the associated Command and
Control (C2) mechanisms. It will explain the stages in the development of air and space
operations and their subsequent execution from the command perspective. It will address the
doctrine associated with each of the roles of air and space power in Article 5 and non-Article
51 situations, and the role of air and space power in Crisis Response Operations (CRO). Its
primary concern is with the employment of those air forces assigned to the Air Component
Commander (ACC) 2. However, the principles espoused concerning the employment of air
power are equally applicable to the air assets assigned to any force component commander
(CC) 3.
4. Focus. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) 4 has a prime responsibility to accomplish
his assigned mission by exploiting the military capabilities of his assigned force. The most
effective proven way of employing air and space power is by unity of C2 over the air effort
1
North Atlantic Treaty, signed 4 April 1949. The Treaty came into force on 2 August 1949.
2
.Within this AJP, the term ACC is a generic term. In the NATO static command structure the ACC is the Regional
Air Commander (RAC) whilst for the CJTF the ACC is the Combined Joint Force Air Component Commander
(CJFACC).
3.
Within this AJP, the term ‘force component’ refers to the major force elements of the NATO static command
structure and to the components of a CJTF.
4.
For the purposes of this AJP, the generic term JFC is used to indicate the responsible operational commander. This
may be a Regional Commander (RC), a Commander CJTF (COMCJTF) or a Joint Sub-Regional Commander
(COMJC).
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through centralized planning and decentralized execution of air and space operations. For
major operations a JFC is particularly reliant on the ACC to:
a. Coordinate the air power capabilities of the allied forces in order to meet
assigned objectives.
b. Devise ways to exploit the different capabilities of air assets and space
facilities made available to him, whilst minimizing the effects of their limitations.
c. Plan operations that maximize the total combat power and synergy of the
aggregated air and space effort.
d. Conduct an effective air operation as part of the overall joint campaign.
DOCTRINE
Strategic
Operational
Tactical
INPUTS
Nations’ & Alliance
interests OUTPUTS
NATO’s military Organisation
objectives MILITARY Equipment
Perceived threat STRATEGY Force structure
Politics/policies Plans
Theory Requirements
History Training
Capabilities
FEEDBACK
Experience
Current combat
Training results
Evaluation results
Figure 1-1. The Doctrinal Process.

102. Principles
1. Doctrine is defined as the fundamental principles by which the military forces guide
their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application’
(AAP-6). It provides the philosophical basis for the particular action taken by military forces
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and the reasons behind that action. Enduring principles, innovation in technical and
conceptual terms, and experience constitute doctrine, and in some rare cases where experience
is lacking, doctrine is developed through analysis and postulated actions. Doctrinal
development is a continuous and cyclic process that, at its various levels, provides the
guidance for the employment of military capability. This military capability is tested through
combat experience and the feedback is used to adjust the doctrinal inputs and then the doctrine
itself. National strategies and the multinational objectives of the Alliance drive the NATO
doctrinal process, which is shown at Figure 1-1.
2. Air and Space Power. The purpose of Allied air systems, supported by national
space systems, is to project military power and to counter the threat. These systems generally
include military employment of Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) weapon systems, manned
and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and their weapon systems, satellites and space platforms
utilized in support of the application of military force.
3. Air Operations. Air power is used to attain objectives or achieve goals through
combined, joint or independent air operations (See Chapter 4).
4. Space Operations. National space capabilities, in the form of space products,

support Allied joint force operations in the attainment of Allied objectives and goals (See
Chapter 6).
5. Air and Space Operations Doctrine. Air and space operations doctrine
represents the fundamental guiding principles for the employment of air and space power.
The fundamental doctrine of space operations is the same as that for air operations, other than
those specific considerations peculiar to space detailed at Chapter 6.
6. Component Organic Air Assets. Component organic air assets are those assets
recognized as being integral to the component warfighting capabilities.
103. Nature of Air and Space Doctrine
1. Air Concepts. Control of the Air and Power Projection in the form of operational
goals, can be achieved through the operational functions which comprise command and
control, combat air operations, supporting air operations, and other contributing forces.
2. Air Doctrine. The air operations doctrine expressed in this volume is based on the
collective wisdom distilled from the experiences of air forces, air arms and air operations since
the inception of military air power, and offers the current vision of the best method of
employment of air power. The fundamental concepts described here are not new, they have
evolved from experience and several applications of air power on a massive scale. The two
key concepts of Control of the Air and Power Projection have not changed for many years.
However, derivatives of them often evolve rapidly as the advance of technology makes new
capabilities available to the operational air commanders that were unimaginable a decade
earlier and therefore imposing new Techniques, Tactics and Procedures (TTP).
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3. Space Concepts. Space concepts do not have extensive past combat experience
but nonetheless are rooted in the same tenets that guide air power. While air power is
primarily affected by aerodynamics, space power is guided by the principles of orbital
mechanics and is not limited by the vertical extent of the atmosphere. Like air operations,
operations in space require three-dimensional consideration and both share the inherent
advantages of being able to manoeuvre in the third dimension.
4. Space Doctrine. Space doctrine contains beliefs and warfighting principles that
describe and guide the use of space forces in military operations. For the Alliance, these space
capabilities are provided by those NATO members with national space forces. There are
tenets that guide the application of air power doctrine that are equally true for the application
of space doctrine. Space power, like air power, possesses inherent characteristics of speed
and range that may be used to great advantage in military operations. Space power because of
its nature can be applied in a way to produce an almost permanent presence effect, greatly
increasing the commander’s situational awareness in and over the area of operations. Like the
manoeuvre aspect of air power, space power allows for potential global strategic perspective -
that ultimate high ground aspect. Space power can be the great enabler that allows all air,
land, maritime and special operations forces to harmonize their contributions to a campaign
requiring a combined arms approach.
5. Application of Air Doctrine. The application of air operations doctrine at the

operational level of warfare is achieved through the development and subsequent execution of
operations plans. The objectives of air operations plans will depend upon the objectives and
the desired end-state of the joint campaign. Decisions during air operations will be driven by
the achievement of key objectives or decisive points. The tempo of operations will be highly
dependent upon the assets available.
6. Application of Space Doctrine. National space capabilities are evolving rapidly

into sophisticated architectures covering the spectrum of intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, navigation and communications. These assets contribute greatly to
information operations, which are now crucial to Allied military operations. The need to
dominate the medium of space is therefore of increasing importance. Space superiority, which
can be defined as the freedom of access to space for the conduct of friendly operations, while
denying the same to a potential adversary, is thus an essential military condition for an Allied
campaign. The global perspective of space power dictates that it should be applied in a
coherent fashion to maximize its effect on operations. The JFC may elect to delegate the
detailed responsibility for coordinating and requesting space support to a suitably experienced
force component commander. It will often be that the ACC undertakes this responsibility.
7. Doctrine and Training. The human factor is the most decisive in conflict. To
prevail in military operations, a force must comprise a wide-ranging group of skilled
professional personnel whose full development requires a balance of training, military
education, experience and motivation. Training is the basis of operational preparedness. The
practical aspects of the relevant level of doctrine provide the framework for the training
required to develop the professional capabilities needed for success. Therefore, air forces
must practise as they plan to operate, and their combat ready status must reflect, as far as it is
achievable, exposure in training to the chaos, stress, intensity, tempo, unpredictability and
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violence of conflict. To this end training and evaluation must be conducted at all levels of the
force, including the most senior command level. Exercises must be rigorously analysed and
evaluated by specialist staff in order to validate or amend the doctrine and to feed back
improvements in organization, training and equipment.
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CHAPTER 2
Employment of Air Power

201. Fundamental Considerations
1. Fundamental considerations guide the application of military forces and in particular

guide the application of air power. They should not be viewed as a set of fixed principles that
guarantee success. Commanders should be familiar with the fundamental aspects of air
power.
2. Air Power. Air power is an essential element in virtually all military operations. It
can be employed over the full spectrum of military operations, at any level, in support of
national, joint, or multinational operations and objectives. It can be brought to bear on an
adversary’s political, military, economic, information or social system structures
simultaneously or separately, and it can be coordinated with land and maritime surface and
sub-surface, and space operations or employed independently.
a. The use of air power may be rapidly escalated or de-escalated in any kind of
conflict and, if used correctly, can be an effective means of achieving objectives.
However, the effective use of air power is conditioned by many factors, not the least
of which are the capabilities and attributes of the air assets themselves. By virtue of
their speed and range, air assets are capable of rapidly delivering precision combat
power and presence throughout the world. Furthermore, the flexibility, mobility and
responsiveness of air power allow for the element of surprise across the spectrum of
conflict.
b. Those planning for the use of air power must take into account the capabilities
of individual types of air assets. When correctly coordinated and packaged air power
assets can provide a concentration of fire power which, given the lethality and
precision of modern airborne munitions, can have a disproportionate effect on the
conflict. As high value resources, air assets must be afforded an appropriate degree of
protection against any kind of threat. Air power has the unique ability to concentrate
forces originating from diverse locations, perform a coordinated attack in time and
space, then disperse quickly.
c. The use of air and space power may avoid the military and political liabilities
that can arise from an extended presence in, or over, a foreign country. As air power
can operate without having to put troops on the ground throughout the area of
operations, it may be able to influence a conflict with reduced risk to friendly forces
and to minimize potentially unfavourable international reaction. Moreover, should an
extended presence in the country be deemed essential, air power can support this
presence efficiently.
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d. The presence and readiness of air power can provide a strong deterrent
element in pre/post conflict periods and may contribute to stabilisation of the overall
situation.
3. Multinationality. Few nations individually possess the size, capabilities, diversity

and quantity of air power to conduct simultaneously long lasting and large scale multiple air
operations. The multinational air assets available to NATO, however, offer greater potential
for more effective and efficient integration of their respective capabilities through adoption of
common doctrine and procedures. Moreover, multi-national forces will help to retain a full
range of capabilities, even if fewer national force elements are available, while sharing the
resource burden among participating nations. The multinational employment of air power
provides the opportunity for greater flexibility and sustainability in the conduct of military
operations. However, these advantages can only be achieved through interoperability and the
successful integration of efficient C2.
4. Planning and Execution. In order to realise the full potential and effectiveness of
air power, available air resources must be employed under a command arrangement that
avoids dissipation and fragmentation of effort. Centralised control is best established by
designating an ACC. The ACC can prioritise the conduct of air operations and discriminate
between those objectives that are strategic, operational or tactical by nature. Effective liaison
at the ACC level will result in a high level of flexibility being achieved. Since the application
of air power requires sound knowledge of its capabilities and potential, it is vital that
centralised planning be conducted by someone who has a profound understanding of air
operations; this will normally be an airman. In contrast, execution should be decentralized to
allow for the greatest freedom and flexibility in the conduct of operations, and to cultivate the
highest standards of initiative, airmanship and professionalism according to the prevailing
situation. An important prerequisite for a successful decentralized execution is the provision
of appropriate information in time and quality.
5. Responsiveness. In order to respond to the ACC’s requirements in a timely,

effective and efficient manner, a responsive C2 structure is essential. The C2 system provides
the necessary information at every level to plan, organise, orchestrate and ultimately apply air
power to its fullest.
6. Communications and Information Systems (CIS). Timely and efficient

communications are essential to coordinate and execute air operations effectively across the
entire theatre. CIS must be reliable, secure, survivable and capable of operating in adverse
climatic, geographic and operational environments. Joint operations call for a high degree of
standard operational procedures across and beyond NATO command boundaries, and these
should be supported by interoperable information systems.
7. Lines of Communication and Basing. Air power can be applied over large
distances, thereby crossing the sovereign airspace of many countries. Air-to-Air Refuelling
(AAR) can reduce dependence upon staging and forward basing requirements. Nevertheless,
in order to apply air power in a responsive and visible manner, the availability of secure
staging facilities sufficiently close to the theatre of operations, overflight rights, flexible use of
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airspace and the necessary support must be considered. Aircraft carriers may also provide
secure basing in theatre.
8. Force Balance. Air power can be applied across the full range of military
operations. However, it is essential to have a balanced force with the right weapon systems to
enable timely reactions in an appropriate, proportional and flexible manner. Having an
appropriate 'force mix' in itself forms a credible air power posture and, even without being
actively employed, will act as a means of signalling and/or deterrence.
9. Defence and Protection. Air assets are of ‘high value’ in both monetary and
operational terms and are likely to be scarce and vulnerable, particularly when on the ground.
Survivability and sustainability are therefore important considerations in order to preserve
their warfighting potential against the prevailing threat through peace, crisis and conflict in
both conventional and Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) warfare environments.
Protection is achieved through airspace management, accurate and timely threat analysis and,
derived from this, an adequate force planning and employment of air and space assets. The
assets needed to defend and protect air assets on the ground, termed collectively Survive-To-
Operate (STO), are essential to the successful exploitation of air power. It must not be
considered in isolation, divorced from sound operational employment or logistic support.
Adequate capabilities must also be maintained to provide effective protection during pre- and
post-conflict periods and when in support of Crisis Response Operations (CRO).
202. Levels of Joint Operations
1. Joint operations are conducted at three levels - Strategic, Operational and Tactical.
The Military Strategic level defines the military aims to achieve political goals and embraces
the articulation and application of the associated military strategy. The operational level
employs operational art to plan, sustain and conduct Allied campaigns with assigned forces to
achieve military objectives as tasked by the strategic level. At the operational level, military
forces are structured to achieve strategic aims through the design and execution of campaigns.
At the tactical level combat units are employed to achieve the campaign objectives determined
at the operational level.
203. Principles of War
1. The Principles of War are the most fundamental form of military doctrine,
representing the basic guiding elements of warfare. Although the Principles may vary between
nations the underlying doctrine is consistent. It is essential for operational commanders and
their staffs not only to understand the Principles, but also to be completely familiar with their
meaning. The Principles are not separate and distinctive items from which a commander
selects a few when employing his forces, nor are they a checklist. They are inter-related and
interacting elements designed to provide a better understanding of warfare. The Principles are
explained more fully in AJP-01 and AJP-3 and other operational AJPs.
2. The application of the Principles of War to joint and combined operations must be
continually examined in the light of new technical and scientific developments, this being
particularly true in the case of air power. Evolution of new weapon systems can tend to
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emphasise the importance of some Principles, while obscuring that of others. Although the
relative importance of these Principles may vary with scientific progress, it must be
remembered that the art of war is the contemporary application of the Principles considered in
combination, and with due regard to the circumstances. The conflicting claims of the various
Principles can often be balanced by applying the Principle of economy of effort.
3. Ideally in peacetime, the observation of the Principles will promote the development
of a force structure capable of providing the maximum deterrent to aggression. Once involved
in conflict, the application of the Principles will be an aid to the most effective employment of
Allied military power.
4. When applying the Principles to CRO careful examination of their relative importance
is needed. Phrases such as 'concentration of force' must be interpreted in the light of the
political and humanitarian imperatives under which CRO are conducted. Nevertheless, the
underlying truths of the Principles remain valid.
204. Application of Air Power
1. Control of the Air. The first consideration in a campaign plan is to create the
environment wherein friendly operations on land, at sea, and in the air can proceed
unhindered, while friendly areas and military forces remain safe from attack. Therefore,
achieving some measure of control of the air is of vital importance to military operations and
is one of air power's most important contributions to the successful execution of a joint
campaign. It is invariably one of the key steps towards the achievement of the political and
military end-state.
2. Power Projection. If the desired level of control of the air is reached air power
provides the possibility to project military power where and when needed, unhindered by
natural barriers. This ability to react quickly and avoid obstacles enables air power to achieve
effects denied to terrestrial forces.
3. Operations Exploiting Flexibility. Air power’s reach and concentration of force

allow it to be employed at all levels of operations including the strategic level to achieve both
lethal and non-lethal effects; examples of the latter are the gathering of strategic information
and strategic airlift for humanitarian support. Air power, or the threat of its use, therefore
offers a variety of ways of attacking an opponent’s cohesion and will to fight while
maintaining significant economy of effort. It is the flexibility of air power, along with its
speed, mobility, precision and the possibility of independent application that gives it its unique
position as a politico-military instrument. In any crisis air power can be made available
around the world rapidly with either a small or a significant force. The force can provide a
show of determination, or can destroy targets with great precision while minimising the risk to
Allied forces.
4. Operations Exploiting Initiative. The design of a campaign plan entails being

proactive as opposed to reactive, and could range from establishing an embargo, to bringing
forces to readiness, to deploying to a forward posture or to undertaking offensive operations
aimed at tactical, operational or strategic objectives. Even within a strict defensive strategy the
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adage 'the best defence is a good offence’ may be true; and success in any military operation is
generally attained by taking the initiative. The speed, reach, ubiquity and flexibility of air
power offer opportunities for wresting the initiative through surprise, shock and simultaneous
actions within multiple lines of operation.
5. Parallel Operations. The flexibility, reach and ability to concentrate force enable
air power to conduct or support different lines of operation against different targets, and at
different levels of war concurrently. Furthermore, air power can be switched from one role or
objective to another within or between theatres, without change of base. Thus, air power can
be rapidly adapted with comparative ease to meet evolving operational requirements. This
provides the JFC with the ability to refocus effort at will, or permit operational pauses in other
lines of operation without relaxing pressure on the enemy. The net effect is to achieve a
tempo of operations that will defeat the adversary's cohesion and his desire to continue the
fight.
6. Symmetric and Asymmetric Operations. Air power provides the JFC with the
means to take advantage of both friendly strengths and opponent weaknesses whilst
preserving his own freedom of action. In so doing he may direct symmetrical actions where
the opposing forces and friendly forces are similar (e.g. air defence v air attack), or pit its
strengths against the opponent’s vulnerabilities (e.g. attack Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence (C3I) architecture, mobile targets in the open and vulnerable
infrastructure). Most importantly, air power enables the JFC to complement the strengths and
compensate for weaknesses in other components to achieve the synergy that is essential for
success in the joint campaign.
205. Factors Affecting Allied Force Integration
1. Liaison. Liaison is critical to the integration of forces assembled from various

countries and Services.
2. Standardization. Standardization is an all embracing concept that underlies the

successful conduct of joint and/or combined operations. It concerns the development and
implementation of concepts, doctrine, procedures and design to achieve and maintain the
required levels of compatibility, interchangeability or commonality in the operational,
procedural, materiel, technical and administrative fields to attain interoperability.
Interoperability describes the ability of Alliance forces, and when appropriate, forces of
Partner or other nations, to train, exercise and operate effectively together in the execution of
assigned missions and tasks. The 3 levels of standardization are as follows:
a. Compatibility. The suitability of products, processes or services for use

together under specific conditions to fulfil relevant requirements without causing
unacceptable interactions. (ISO-IEC)
b. Interchangeability. The ability of one product, process or service to be used in

place of another to fulfil the same requirements. (ISO-IEC)
c. Commonality. The utilisation of the same doctrine, procedures or equipment.
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In air operations, the speed of events and the requirement for mutual support across
contributing nations make standardization of operational procedures and C3I systems vital.
3. Language and Culture. The scope and magnitude of the potential language and
cultural difficulties in multi-national operations cannot be overstated. Time is required for
translation; differences in terminology need to be resolved. Interpreters for the less widely
spoken languages are not always available in the numbers desired. Language and cultural
difficulties can dictate the overall level of integration that can be achieved and may have an
adverse impact on the commander’s decision cycle. Significant effort should be invested in
overcoming potential language and cultural problems in a coalition or Allied force in order to
maximise the synergistic effect of combined forces, and such investment will be of immense
value in maintaining political cohesion. Where language is foreseen to be a difficulty in
combined operations, the commander should ensure that all directions and decisions are
recorded in writing for clarity and subsequent audit. Importantly, a common language does
not infer a common culture. However, for air operations, speed of events and international
convention dictates that English be the common language of the air.
4. Political Cohesion. It is usual in an alliance for operations to be conducted in

support of political objectives that are agreed by consensus of the nations. In an ad-hoc
coalition, the political cohesion during operations can vary significantly depending upon the
strategic circumstances and the composition of the coalition. There needs to be an awareness
by operational commanders that these political objectives may be further changed as
operations progress in order to maintain the cohesion of the coalition.
206. Rules of Engagement (ROE)
1. ROE define the degree and manner in which force may be applied, or other military
action taken, and are designed to ensure that the use of force complies with international law
and political constraints. However, the ROE cannot anticipate all possible circumstances that
may arise, and there can be no absolute guarantee of the legality of all action which may
comply with the ROE. It is always the commander’s responsibility at all levels to authorise
and use only that degree of force that is necessary, reasonable and lawful in the circumstances.
2. ROE inform commanders of the limits or constraints imposed, or of freedom

permitted, to carry out their assigned tasks. If a commander at any level requires a change to
the extant ROE profile in order to carry out his assigned task he must request a change, with
justification, through his command chain. This request should be made as soon as the need is
identified; the decision will be made at the strategic level. However, the inherent right of self-
defence is not affected by the ROE.
3. Air operations generally have a high political profile and the potential for strategic
impact which tend to attract restrictive ROE. Furthermore, commanders should understand
that delays in the ROE approval process could have a negative impact on timely and effective
air operations.
207. Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
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1. The LOAC is a part of international law governing the relations between states. It
regulates the rights and duties of the belligerents in time of armed conflict. The main purpose
of LOAC is to protect combatants and non-combatants from unnecessary suffering and to
safeguard the fundamental human rights of persons who fall into the hands of an adversary
(such as prisoners of war, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked) and of civilians. There is a
distinction between the law relating to armed conflict between states, that is international
armed conflicts, and the internal armed conflicts within the territory of a state. Although the
fundamental legal rules are the same, the rules relating to international armed conflicts are
much more detailed. As part of international law, LOAC binds states. Violations by
individuals may be war crimes.
2. The LOAC is to be found in customary law, rules developed from the practice of
states which are binding on all states, and in treaty law. Treaty rules are expressly agreed to by
states in international treaties that are binding on states which have ratified or acceded to the
relevant treaty. When treaty law is declaratory of existing customary law, it is binding on all
states even if they are not parties to the treaty concerned. There are four principles of
customary law from which the LOAC has developed. These are, briefly, as follows:
a. The Principle of Military Necessity. This principle permits a state engaged in

an armed conflict to use only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited
by the LOAC, that is required to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely
the partial or complete submission of the adversary at the earliest possible moment
with the minimum expenditure of life and resources.
b. The Principle of Humanity. This principle forbids the infliction of suffering,

injury or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate
military purpose
c. The Principle of Distinction. This principle separates combatants from non-

combatants, and legitimate military targets from civilian objects.
d. The Principle of Proportionality. This principle requires that the losses

resulting from a military action should not be excessive in relation to the expected
military advantage.
3. The nature of air operations is such that airmen rarely meet the enemy face-to-face and
are separated from the consequences of their actions by the environment in which they fight.
However, these factors do not absolve the airman from his obligations under LOAC to
minimise incidental loss of life and collateral damage. The general provisions of LOAC are
incorporated in the ROE; however, there will be situations that cannot be defined or predicted
in advance, when aircraft commanders under extreme pressure have to exercise their
judgement and discretion. The customary LOAC principles outlined above will have to be
adhered to, and those involved will have to comply with the treaty rules to which their nation
is a party.
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4. LOAC issues should ideally be resolved in the planning stages of an air operation,
particularly in relation to target selection and weapon employment, to avoid aircrew being sent
into action in such a way as to contravene the LOAC. Legal advisors should be made
available to assist the ACC on the legal aspects of air component activities.
5. In order that air commanders at all levels can plan and execute their missions
effectively within the constraints of international and national law, they must understand the
legal regime within which they operate. They must also understand the constraints and
freedoms conferred by the ROE within the context of the law.
6. Allied forces when deployed to a friendly nation are subject to the law of that
particular country, unless otherwise specified in a Memorandum of Understanding or Status of
Forces Agreement.
208. Organisation of an Operational Theatre
1. The geographical area, defined by an Allied Command Authority within which a crisis
and the associated response occurs, is an operational theatre which is designated the JFC's
Joint Operations Area (JOA). To assist in the coordination and deconfliction of action within
the JOA, the JFC may assign Areas Of Operations (AOO) to subordinate commanders. The
size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and
nature of the crisis, the projected duration of operations and the desired end-state. The area
designations are defined as follows:
a. JOA. A JOA is a temporary area defined by a NATO Strategic Commander

(SC) or Regional Commander (RC), in which a designated joint commander plans and
executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. (AAP-6) It is defined in
coordination with nations and approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or the
Military Committee (MC), as appropriate, in accordance with NATO’s Operational
Planning Architecture. A JOA and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the
mission and geographic area, are contingency- or mission-specific and may overlap
Areas of Responsibility (AOR) 1.
b. AOO. An AOO is that portion of an area of war necessary for military

operations and for the administration of such operations. (AAP-6) In practice, it is a
geographical area defined by a JFC within the JOA in which a commander designated
by him (usually a force component commander) is delegated authority to conduct
operations. A JFC may use lateral, rear and forward boundaries to define an AOO.
Theatre air sorties are not constrained by land boundaries per se, but the use of
airspace above an AOO is often regulated through the use of Fire Support
Coordinating Measures (FSCM) and Airspace Control Means (ACM).
209. Control Means, Coordination and Identification Measures
1
An AOR is the geographical area associated with each NATO SC (and RC in Allied Command Europe) as defined
within their terms of reference, within which the NATO commander has authority to plan, conduct and coordinate
operations, and develop and maintain infrastructure, as delegated.
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1. Airspace Control Means. Procedural measures that when established, reserve

airspace for specific airspace users, restrict the action of airspace users, control actions of
specific airspace users, and/or require airspace users to accomplish specific actions. ACMs
can also be used to identify friendly users, provide separation from other friendly airspace
users and avoid the risk of being engaged by friendly air defence weapons.
2. Fire Support Coordinating Measures. The measures employed by land or

amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously to
provide safeguards for friendly forces. Commanders position FSCMs consistent with the
operational situation and in coordination with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected
commanders. FSCMs include: No-Fire Areas (NFA) to protect friendly forces; Free-Fire
Areas (FFA) to facilitate rapid engagement of targets of opportunity; Restrictive Fire Areas
(RFA) to facilitate future operations; and Fire Support Coordination Lines (FSCL) established
by a land or amphibious force commander in coordination with other CCs to facilitate rapid
and effective firepower delivery.
3. Fire Support Coordination Line. Within an assigned area of operations, a line

established by a land or amphibious force commander to denote coordination requirements for
fires by other force elements which may affect the commander’s current and planned
operations. The FSCL applies to fires of air, ground or sea weapons using any type of
ammunition against surface or ground targets. The establishment of the FSCL must be
coordinated with the appropriate commanders and supporting elements. Attacks against
surface or ground targets short of the FSCL must be conducted under the positive control or
procedural clearance of the associated land or amphibious force commander. Unless in
exceptional circumstances, commanders of forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must
coordinate with all affected commanders in order to avoid fratricide and to harmonise joint
objectives. Note: In the context of this definition the term ‘surface targets’ applies to those in
littoral or inland waters within the designated area of operations.
4. Identification (ID). The appropriate electronic and procedural means of

identification to provide safe passage of own aircraft (including rotary wing air traffic) without
disproportionately restricting the use of airspace. A whole spectrum of passive and active
technologies is applied to minimize fratricide and deny abuse of friendly identification codes.
In the near future, means of identification such as air-to-surface and battlefield combat ID, as
well as future ID data-combining processes within the NATO Air Command and Control
System (ACCS), will surpass the traditional sphere of air operations and will encompass all
aspects of joint combined warfare. Therefore, standardization (particularly interoperability) of
joint identification systems and procedures is vital.
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CHAPTER 3
Command and Control of Air Operations

301. Overview of Air C2
1. This chapter addresses the fundamental principles and doctrine for the C2 of air
operations. It is concerned with the operational relationships, policies, procedures and options
for C2 of air operations through an ACC. In general, it is always preferable to identify an
ACC with a dedicated staff to run coherent air operations. Nevertheless, the JFC retains the
option of controlling air operations directly using his JFHQ staff.
2. Normally, the air assets allotted for air operations will be organised as a devolved
functional component. Within the NATO static command structure, this function may be
provided by the Regional Air Commander (RAC) for the RC, or by the RAC acting as a
supporting commander to the Commander, Joint Sub-Regional Command (COMJC). Within
a CJTF organisation, the air component is headed by a Joint Force Air Component
Commander (JFACC) under the COMCJTF.
3. An air component can be employed in 3 types of NATO operation:
a. Article 5 Operations. C2 of air operations will normally be exercised through

the NATO static command structure.
b. Non-Article 5 CRO within the NATO AOR or across the NATO Boundary.
C2 of air operations could be exercised either through the NATO static command
structure or through a JFACC as part of a CJTF.
c. Non-Article 5 CRO beyond the NATO AOR. C2 of air operations will

normally be exercised through a JFACC as part of a CJTF.
While the primary mission of a CJTF will be to conduct non-Article 5 contingency operations,
a COMCJTF supported by a CJFACC may provide additional flexibility for all three cases.
Therefore, a possible employment of a CJTF for Alliance Article 5 missions, within its size
and parameters, is not excluded.
302. Principles of Air C2
1. Unified action is essential for the effective use of air power; to achieve its greatest
effects it must be concentrated at a decisive point in time and space. However, the inherent
speed, reach and flexibility of air power allow it to be exploited on diverse and multiple tasks
simultaneously, but that can lead to its fragmentation and consequent dissipation of effort. To
achieve the strength of unified air action, and to ensure that the capabilities of air power are
used as the overall situation demands, the following key principles must be recognized:
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a. Unity of Command. The unity of air effort is most likely to be achieved when
command of the joint force air assets is exercised from the highest practicable level
where the relative priorities of combined/joint demands on those assets can best be
assessed. Only the JFC is in a position to balance the changing and often conflicting
requirements of a joint campaign. Thus the JFC should be the single focus for
command of all the air assets, within their terms of assignment.
b. Centralised Planning. Flowing from this, centralised planning of the joint air
effort is essential to ensure integrated air operations to meet the JFC’s overall intent. It
will preclude air assets being exploited randomly by uncoordinated users, tasked
against impractical objectives or divided into small and ineffective packages that
would inhibit flexibility and hinder rapid concentration of force. Thus the
employment of limited air assets can be concentrated at the critical time and place to
achieve decisive results, maximising joint synergy.
c. Decentralised Execution. A single commander cannot personally direct the

detailed execution of a complex air operation. Thus decentralised execution is
essential, and is accomplished by delegating authority to execute tasks to supported
and supporting commanders. It is essential that the commanders with delegated
authority are fully aware of their superior commander’s operational objectives, thereby
allowing them to act on their own initiative without weakening the cohesion of the
campaign by taking divergent action. It is also necessary, that commanders with
delegated authority have full access to relevant information to avoid any frictions
within the execution of operations.
d. Strategy-to-Task. In order that scarce air assets are not wasted, the objective
of every air task should be traceable upwards through the command chain and be
shown to be related to the high level strategy, the objective of every air task must
contribute directly to achieving previously defined military-strategic objectives.
303. Joint Force Structure in Theatre
1. JFC. The JFC will normally be granted Operational Control (OPCON) over all forces
allotted for the operation. These forces may be existing force elements in the NATO static
command structure or components within a CJTF. The JFC will exercise OPCON through the
force component commanders (CC) to whom he will delegate the appropriate level of
authority. Coalition forces operating alongside NATO forces may limit Transfer of Authority
(TOA) to the granting of Tactical Control (TACON) to the appropriate Allied functional
commander over forces made available for tasking.
2. CJTF Component Organisation. When the scale of operations demands, the

COMCJTF may elect to exercise his authority through component commands that are most
likely to be organised as functional components, but may be organised as Service components,
national contingents, or any combination thereof. The components will reflect the scope of
operations envisaged but will normally comprise functional maritime, land, air components
and special operations, with other components added as required.
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3. Location of the CJFACC. During CJTF operations the maritime and land CCs
may be deployed with their forces, but the location of the CJFACC is less obvious. He
functions at the operational level in his role as senior air adviser to the COMCJTF and in
respect of daily air operations, supporting and being supported by other CCs across the whole
span of the campaign. The CJFACC’s central involvement in the air apportionment process
and his ability to provide highly responsive forces in a crisis dictate that normally his optimum
site is collocated with the COMCJTF, which reflects the extant NATO static command
structure for Article 5 operations.
4. Relationship between the JFC and Subordinate Commanders. The JFC

will designate his senior subordinate commanders and define their authorities and
responsibilities based on his Concept of Operations (CONOPS). He normally assigns
missions and issues mission-type orders to all force components. With receipt of the mission
goes the authority to conduct operations in accordance with his direction and guidance.
Senior subordinate commanders will normally be responsible for the detailed planning of their
force operations and their subsequent execution. They make capabilities/assets available to the
JFC for tasking to support the joint force as a whole based on assigned component missions
and the JFC's guidance or orders. Air capabilities/assets are tasked directly by the ACC based
on the JFC's apportionment decision. Only the JFC has the authority to order or apportion a
component's organic air capabilities/assets to support another component. For coordination
and deconfliction purposes it is essential that force component organic air assets appear on the
ATO in as much detail as possible and that their airspace requirements are included in the
Airspace Control Order (ACO).
5. Authority and Responsibility of Supported and Supporting Commanders.

In joint and multi-national operations, capabilities are optimised by mixing and matching
forces from different Services and nations. In order to simplify the potentially complex C2
arrangements, NATO uses the terms ‘supporting’ and ‘supported’ commanders, which will
find utility in all joint and multi-national operations. They are defined as follows:
a. Supported Commander. A commander having primary responsibility for all

aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and who receives
forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. (AAP-6)
b. Supporting Commander. A commander who provides a supported

commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan.
(AAP-6)
Support is the action given by a component or force commander to assist another force as
directed by the JFC. The commander of the supported force will indicate in detail to the
supporting commander the support mission objectives he wishes to have fulfilled, taking
account of the normal operational procedures of the supporting force. He will provide the
information needed for complete coordination of the supporting action with the action of his
own force. However, supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as
much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations. The commander
of the supporting force will ascertain the requirements of the supported force and take action
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to fulfil those that are within his capabilities. Unless directed otherwise, the supporting
commander will direct the operational tactics and associated activities of the supporting force.
6. JFC Staff Option for Joint Air Operations. There may be situations where the
designation of an ACC is not required. Typically, this would occur when a conflict or
situation requires only a very limited scale air operation that is of limited duration, scope,
and/or complexity. Unity of effort, centralised planning and decentralised execution of air
capabilities/forces would still be of primary importance to the JFC. In cases where a JFC does
not designate an ACC, the JFC may elect to directly task joint force air capabilities/assets. If
this option is exercised by the JFC, the JFC's staff will plan and coordinate air operations for
JFC approval. The JFC may elect to centralise selected functions (planning, coordinating, and
tasking) to provide direction, control, and coordination of the capabilities and/or forces
assigned to the joint force.
304. ACC
1. For air operations based upon the NATO ACE static command structure, the ACC will
be the appropriate appointed RAC. For CJTF operations, COMCJTF will generally designate
an ACC as the JFACC who will advise him on the exploitation of the capabilities of the
allotted air assets. Normally, this ACC is the commander with the preponderance of air assets
and the capacity to plan, task and control joint air operations. The ACC directs this
exploitation through a cohesive joint air operations plan (centralised planning) and a
responsive and integrated control system (decentralised execution).
2. ACC Authority. The ACC should plan and conduct coordinated joint air operations
using available air and other force contributions in accordance with the JFC's guidance to
accomplish the JFC's overall campaign objectives. The ACC exercises whatever level of
control authority that he has been granted by the JFC.
3. ACC Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the ACC are determined by the JFC.
These include, but are not limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking of joint
air operations based on the JFC's CONOPS and air apportionment decision (See Chapter 5).
Specifically, the ACC plans and executes air operations of assets apportioned or made
available to him for tasking, and coordinates the organic air operations of other components
through the ATO. The responsibilities of the ACC normally include:
a. Developing a joint air operations plan to best support joint force objectives as
assigned by the JFC or higher authority.
b. Recommending to the JFC apportionment of the joint air effort, after

consulting with other force CCs.
c. Request through his command chain any required changes to the extant ROE
profile.
d. Providing centralised direction for the allocation and tasking of air and other
force contributions made available according to the JFC’s air apportionment.
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e. Controlling execution of joint air operations as specified by the JFC, to

include making timely adjustments to targeting and tasking of the contributions made
available.
f. Coordinating joint air operations with operations of other CCs and assets
assigned to or supporting the JFC.
g. Evaluating the results of joint air operations.
h. Performing the duties of the Airspace Control Authority (ACA), when

assigned that authority by the JFC.
i. Performing the duties of the Air Defence Commander (ADC), when assigned
that authority by the JFC.
j. Functioning as the supported commander for:
(1) Counter-air operations.
(2) Strategic air operations.
(3) Airborne reconnaissance and surveillance.
(4) The JFC's overall Air Interdiction (AI) effort.
k. Functioning as a supporting commander, as directed by the JFC, for

operations such as Close Air Support (CAS), AI within AOOs, or Tactical Air Support
for Maritime Operations (TASMO).
4. The ACC HQ is structured to operate as a fully integrated C2 entity and staffed to fulfil
all of the ACC's responsibilities. For a CJTF, it may be land-based or afloat, depending upon
the operational circumstances. Typically, the organisation would comprise a body of special
advisors and principal staff elements A-1 through A-9 as required. The ACC Air Operations
Centre (AOC) 1 organisation may vary based on specific operational requirements. Each of the
ACC HQ's elements relies on expertise from other force components to coordinate requests
and activities and to maintain visibility of current operations in the joint campaign.
a. ACC Staff. The staff of the ACC should reflect the composition of the forces
contributing to the air effort. Functional area experts (such as intelligence, electronic
warfare (EW), logistics, airspace, plans and CIS) should provide appropriate expertise
in the planning, execution and support functions. Mission experts (such as counter air,
AI, CAS, reconnaissance and surveillance, air-to-air refuelling and air transport)
should provide the operational expertise required to plan and to employ the
1
Within a static Regional Air Command, an AOC is called a Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) or a
Deployable Combined Air Operations Centre ((D)CAOC).
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contributions made available by the nations and force components. The ACC, in
consultation with the other force CCs, will determine the specific manning
requirements.
b. Air Operations Centre. The Air Operations Centre (AOC) 2 plans, tasks,
coordinates, supervises, assesses and reports on air operations of all apportioned
assets as directed by the ACC. It facilitates the centralised planning and the
decentralised execution of air operations, optimising the employment of air power, and
exploiting its inherent potential by managing the air effort in accordance with the Air
Operations Directive (AOD). The AOC provides the ACC with the tools to perform
near real time air power management. The Air Task Order (ATO) is the output of the
AOC.
c. Liaison Staffs. Senior liaison officers from the force components serve as
conduits for direct and essential coordination between the ACC and their respective
force CCs. They should represent their commander authoritatively on critical issues
and offer individual force component perspectives and considerations on the planning
and execution of joint air operations. Senior national liaison officers would undertake
a comparable role in respect of their national forces. Liaison staffs at the lower levels
within a HQ should be selected in consideration of their particular expertise in relation
to the host HQ staffs with whom they are intended to work. The role of the liaison
staffs is the key to an efficient command structure and the necessary operational
transparency between major force components.
d. Component Liaison and Coordination. The AOC would normally host, as a

minimum, elements provided by the maritime, land and special operations CCs to
effect inter-component coordination and liaison. The AOC relies on the expertise of
these non-organic elements to coordinate requests or requirements, to maintain a
current picture of their parent component operations and, when appropriate, to
facilitate coordination and synchronization between component operations. The ACC
assigns Air Operations Coordination Centres (AOCC), as extensions of the AOC, to
the maritime and land component or Corps level HQs. The AOCCs advise their host
commanders on the exploitation of air power, and assist with the integration of air
operations into their schemes of manoeuvre and vice versa. Each AOCC is
subordinate to its AOC but is responsive to the HQ with which it is collocated.
e. National Liaison. All nations providing air assets and space support should
provide expert liaison staff. National liaison elements should consist of experienced
air and space warfare specialists as appropriate, who assist in the integration of
national air and space assets with joint air operations. They should also coordinate
and deconflict national direct support air operations with Allied joint air operations.
f. Air Transport and Aeromedical Elements. Air transport flights into and within
a theatre of operations are coordinated by the Airlift Coordination Centre (ALCC).
The ALCC is usually located within the AOC and works in concert with the Director
2
Detailed information on the organisation of an AOC is contained in AJP-3.3.7.
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AOC. There may be instances, however, where an ALCC exists to coordinate airlift
operations without an AOC. In this case, the ALCC reports directly to the JFC or the
ACC. The Aeromedical Evacuation Coordination Centre (AECC), which is normally
co-located with the ALCC, is responsible for defining aeromedical requirements.
305. Airspace Control Authority and Air Defence Commander Designations
1. ACA and ADC Functions. The operational level functions of the ACC, ACA and
ADC must be integrated to unify joint combat and combat support air operations, joint
airspace control and joint air defence operations in support of the JFC's campaign. Because of
the close relationship between these functions, the responsibility for them should normally be
assigned to one individual. Designating one force component commander as the ACC, ACA
and ADC should simplify the coordination required to develop and execute fully integrated
joint air operations. If conditions do not permit this designation, then close coordination
between all three commanders is essential. For air operations based upon the NATO ACE
static command structure, the ACC will be the appropriate RAC who is also pre-designated as
the Regional ACA and ADC3.
2. ACA. The ACA is responsible to the JFC for the provision of Airspace Control
(ASC) throughout the JOA. The ACA, in consultation with the force CCs, designs the
Airspace Control System (ACS) and the Airspace Control Plan (ACP) to complement the joint
campaign plan. The ACA takes into consideration the air coordination as required and
organised around maritime and land units. He is responsible for directing the execution of the
ACP through the implementation of ACMs and the development and promulgation of the
relevant ACOs and Special Instructions (SPINS) by the Joint Airspace Coordination Centre
(JACC). All force CCs are required to comply with the ACP, however, centralised direction
by the ACA does not imply that the ACA assumes OPCON or TACON over any joint force air
assets. The ACA is required to:
a. Coordinate and integrate the use of the airspace control area.
b. Develop broad policies and procedures for airspace control and for the
coordination required among units within the JOA.
c. Establish an ACS within the ASC area which is responsive to the needs of the
JFC, provides for harmonisation of the ACS with the host nation or regional airspace
control plan, coordinates and deconflicts user requirements.
d. Develop the ACP (coherent with the Air Defence Plan (ADP)) and, when
endorsed by the JFC, promulgate it throughout the joint force.
e. Provide sufficient flexibility within the ACS to meet contingency situations

that require the rapid employment of forces.
3
Bi-SC Directive 80-80 (2nd Edition).
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3. ADC. The ADC is responsible to the JFC, in consultation with other force CCs, for
the protection of the joint force from hostile air activity. The ADC must apply the principle of
centralised control, with decentralised execution, to ensure the maximum degree of freedom
for diverse weapons systems, especially in a hostile, reactive environment when balanced
against the need to minimise fratricide and weapons expenditure4. Control responsibilities
must be carefully defined for each level to support a smooth and controlled flow of orders,
directives and information, and to allow all to benefit from the activities of other elements of
the joint AD structure. The ADC’s broad responsibilities include:
a. Integrating and coordinating the AD assets of each force component into a

coherent joint ADP. This includes coordination with regional/host nation AD systems
and the exchange of information necessary to support civil defence activities.
b. Applying the principles of AD to counter hostile air activity. This includes

operations to counter adversary Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), anti-surface-ship,
anti-air ship and cruise missiles as well as Tactical Ballistic Missiles (TBM).
c. Promulgating and employing common procedures for AD battle management

and the reduction of mutual interference. These procedures will take account of the
AD required and organised around maritime and land units.
4
The application of this principle requires a comprehensive and reliable C4I system with adequate redundancy.
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CHAPTER 4
Joint Air Operations

401. The Employment and Purpose of Air Power
1. Air Strategy. Air strategy is the overall employment plan for air power, and it must
conform to and further the overall aim. To be successful, an air strategy should be directed at
the required objective, be applicable to the situation and be achievable. Each conflict will
generate its own air strategic priorities. However, when facing an adversary who is capable of
exercising air power, priority in air strategy should be given to achieving the required level of
control of the air.
2. Control of the Air. Control of the air is one of the most important factors in
deciding the outcome of military operations. The first consideration of the JFC is to shape the
battlespace wherein friendly operations can proceed at any given place or time without
prohibitive interference, whilst ensuring that friendly centres of gravity and military forces are
safe from attack. Therefore achieving a measure of control of the air is of vital importance to
all military operations and is one of air power’s most important contributions to the successful
execution of a joint campaign.
3. Power Projection. Gaining control of the air is not an end in itself, but is only
useful if it is then exploited as a means to a greater end. However, because control of the air is
so critical to the total military effort, the air commander should avoid, as far as possible, any
distractions before it is achieved. On the other hand, if surplus air power is available, it can be
apportioned concurrently to other lines of operation within the joint campaign, but only after
very careful deliberation. Potential for such simultaneous operations is one of the greatest
strengths of air power. Once sufficient control of the air has been achieved, the full range of
air power capabilities should be exploited to project combat power in support of the joint
campaign objectives.
402. Categories of Air Operations
1. All air operations may be grouped into four general categories:
a. Counter-Air Operations. Counter-air operations are divided into Defensive

Counter-Air (DCA) and Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) and are carried out to achieve
and maintain the desired degree of Control of the Air.
(1) Control of the Air. The degrees of control of the air are:
(a) Favourable Air Situation. A favourable air situation is one in

which the extent of the air effort applied by the opponent’s air assets
is insufficient to prejudice the success of friendly maritime, land or air
operations.
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(b) Air Superiority. Air superiority is that degree of dominance in

the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of
operations by the former and its related land, sea and air forces at a
given place and time without prohibitive interference by the opposing
force. (AAP-6)
(c) Air Supremacy. Air supremacy is that degree of air

superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective
interference. (AAP-6)
(2) DCA. DCA involves destruction or neutralisation of enemy forces

conducted near to, or over, friendly territory and is generally reactive to the
initiative of enemy air assets. DCA includes the employment of active air
defence weapon systems such as fighters, Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD)
weapon systems, complemented by passive defence measures. DCA in the
maritime environment is known as Anti-Air-Warfare (AAW).
(3) OCA. OCA involves destruction or neutralisation of enemy forces

ranging mostly throughout enemy territory and conducted generally at the
initiative of the friendly force. OCA may include fighter sweep, fighter escort,
airfield attack, attacks against missiles and associated systems on the ground,
and Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) and associated C2. SEAD
may have a utility role in support of the full spectrum of joint operations.
However, in achieving its objective and irrespective of the nature of the
supported operation, it contributes to the overall OCA mission to gain control
of the air.
b. Strategic Air Operations. Air operations for strategic effect can be planned at
either the strategic or operational level but are likely to be shaped by political aims and
constraints. Strategic offensive air operations are carried out to defeat an adversary’s
strategic Centre of Gravity (CoG) or attack other vital target sets including command
elements, energy sources, vital war production assets and key supporting
infrastructure associated with that strategic CoG. Strategic defensive air operations are
based on the strategic objective of deterring and defeating aggression against NATO
territory or Allied Forces.
c. Anti-Surface Force Air Operations (ASFAO). ASFAO are conducted to

deprive the enemy of the military power he needs to occupy territory or exploit
seaspace by neutralising, delaying or destroying his surface forces. In the maritime
environment ASFAO are carried out by land-based aircraft using TASMO procedures
in support of the naval warfare areas (Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) and Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW)). In the land environment ASFAO are carried out by land
and sea based aircraft in support of land or amphibious forces using procedures for AI
and CAS. ASFAO must be closely coordinated with the supported commander. They
must be integrated with the supporting commander’s organic air operations to achieve
unity of effort and avoid fratricide. ASFAO contributes to the shaping of the
battlespace for the joint force. They also enable a commander to take advantage of
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both friendly strengths and enemy weaknesses whilst preserving his own freedom of
action through the exploitation of air power’s utility for asymmetric warfare.
d. Supporting Air Operations. Combat support aircraft may be employed to

support other aircraft or forces undertaking combat roles, or to assist operations of all
types and in all environments. Supporting air operations are addressed at para 409.
403. Counter-Air Operations
1. Counter-air operations may embrace all aspects of joint operations and depend on the
full range of supporting air operations and surface combat-support activities. OCA and DCA
operations must often rely on the same resources and are often conducted simultaneously in
the same airspace, hence they cannot be considered in isolation from each other. Indeed, at
the outset the ACC (in consultation with the ADC when appropriate) must decide on the
offensive/defensive balance in the commitment of forces to the counter-air operation.
Counter-air forces must be prepared to operate for extended periods and be capable of all-
weather and night operations.
2. Counter-Air Options. To achieve control of the air through counter-air operations

the ACC essentially has three options in recommending apportionment of counter-air assets:
a. Control airspace over friendly territory or protect specific operations of own

forces by DCA. (The short term solution when the opponent has a significant air
defence capability.)
b. Wrest control of the air through destruction of the opponent’s ability to

control or exploit it by OCA.
c. A mixture of OCA and DCA based on an assessment of the situation.
3. DCA. DCA operations comprise all measures designed to nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of hostile air action. Establishing the correct aim is fundamental to the success of
these operations. Essentially there are two objectives, to minimise the damage sustained by
friendly forces and facilities and to inflict the maximum attrition on the adversary. To a
certain extent these objectives are interdependent, the more adversary aircraft that are shot
down, the fewer that are available to inflict damage in future raids. The less damage the joint
force sustains, the more capable they will be of defending themselves if the enemy continues
with his attacks. Deciding where the priority lies between these two aims has major
implications for structuring and operational deployment of the joint force, and thus for AD
resource allocation. All DCA air missions should be published in the ATO.
4. As the nature of DCA is generally defensive, it may prevent conflicts from escalating
due to the fact that air defence forces are usually operating in/over friendly territory.
Furthermore, fighter aircraft are usually operating over friendly territory at lesser risk and are
not normally faced with range problems. However, DCA is reactive and leaves the initiative to
the opponent, offering him the benefits of the most fundamental principles of war (surprise,
speed, concentration, economy of forces, etc). Since the adversary can choose time, place of
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action, numbers of attackers, tactics, employ deception, etc, with very little warning time,
effective DCA demands a relatively large force at a high readiness state. Moreover, the
attacking force can only be countered at the moment that it is expecting it and when it is fully
prepared to nullify attempts to stop it. Failure to neutralise all air attackers may result in
considerable and immediate damage to the Alliance.
5. DCA comprises two AD methods that rely on control and coordination for their
effectiveness with complementary weapon systems.
a. Passive AD. Passive AD includes all measures, other than active air defence,
taken to minimise the effectiveness of hostile air action. These measures include
electronic protective measures, C2-protection, deception, dispersion, stealth
technology and the use of protective construction. Passive AD measures are required
on the part of all military forces to provide the maximum protection for friendly assets
and to complicate a potential adversary's targeting process.
b. Active AD. Active AD is direct defensive action taken to nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of hostile air action. It includes such measures as the use of aircraft, AD
weapons and missile systems, and electronic warfare. Active AD operations are
conducted using airborne and/or surface-based surveillance and weapons systems,
supported by dedicated secure and highly responsive communications, in order to
detect, identify, intercept and engage, or shadow hostile or potentially hostile airborne
vehicles. The following roles comprise Active AD:
(1) Ground or Deck Alert. The use of aircraft on ground or deck alert,
fully serviced and armed, and with combat crews at readiness to respond
within a specific period of time. Ground alert will enable economy of force
but the ADC has to consider the nature of the threat and the warning time
required.
(2) Combat Air Patrol (CAP). CAPs are mounted over an objective area,
over the force protected, over the critical area of a combat zone, or over an air
defence area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft
before they reach their targets. They enable rapid reaction to enemy intrusion
and may be positioned well forward of the areas to be defended. CAPs may
be highly demanding on resources such as aircrew, fighter aircraft, AAR
tanker, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Electronic
Warfare (EW) support.
(3) Interception. An intercept mission involves the use of an aircraft to

intercept adversary, unknown aircraft or tactical missiles. Upon completion of
the intercept other actions may be ordered e.g. visual identification
(interrogation), shadowing, diversion of the target from its intended flight path
or mission (intervention) or engagement.
(4) Ground Based Air Defences (GBAD). GBAD consists of surface-to-

air missiles (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and associated C4I. These
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systems are generally capable of countering the full spectrum of the air threat,
allow a high-readiness status to be maintained over long periods of time,
provide quick response and may provide greater utility than manned aircraft
for fields such as area and point defence.
(5) Maritime Air Defence System. Maritime AD systems consisting of

SAMs, anti-aircraft naval guns and associated C4I based on board surface
ships could be deployed outside of the territorial waters of friendly or hostile
nations.
c. Control and Coordination. Control and coordination systems should integrate

all of the various elements of the weapon and detection systems into a coordinated
entity, thus ensuring the optimum use of available resources against the threat. The
JFC normally designates one individual responsible for integrating the joint force DCA
effort - the ADC. Where applicable, coordination with the NATO Integrated Air
Defence System (NATINADS) and the Regional Air Defence Commander (RADC) is
required. A maritime Task Group/Task Force within the JOA may require the
establishment of a Coordinated Air Defence Area (CADA) within which the AAW
Commander is responsible for the coordination of AD operations.
d. Weapon Systems. An air defence weapon system will normally consist of two
complementary components, the platform, e.g. an aircraft, a ship or a GBAD-System,
and its weaponry.
(1) Fighter Aircraft. Aircraft may have limited endurance since they
cannot be rearmed, re-crewed or serviced in the air, other than by AAR. They
are flexible and reusable and can therefore be switched between AD tasks or
other tasks, should the operational situation demand it. Fighter aircraft are
mobile and hence can be used to protect very large areas or be concentrated
rapidly to counter enemy saturation raids. Additionally, they have the facility
of identifying targets visually. Also during a crisis, they can be used to show
presence, shadow other aircraft or force them to change their flight path.
(2) Ground Based Air Defences. GBAD systems complement fighter

aircraft in a layered AD structure. To achieve maximum effect from GBAD
systems a Recognised Air Picture (RAP) should be available. In comparison
with fighter aircraft, GBAD systems have less range and mobility but a higher
rate of fire and an ability to sustain operations. Modern GBAD systems
incorporate advanced technology to achieve a high probability of kill on the
threat.
(3) Fighter/GBAD Force Mix. The preferred force mix between fighters
and GBAD within an AD system - and the nature of the operational
deployment - will depend on a variety of factors. Perhaps the most important
of these are the likely warning time, the target categories, the importance of the
targets or areas to be defended, the size of the area to be defended and the
distribution of friendly assets within it.
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6. Joint Air Defence. Joint air defence should aim to integrate the AD capabilities of
all components in order to protect and influence the battlespace in line with the campaign plan.
The principles of joint air defence are:
a. Denial of intelligence to the opponent to mount an attack or to complicate his

targeting and control process to the extent that his attacks are ineffective.
b. Obtain warning of hostile action by putting in place the means to compile and
disseminate a RAP that will facilitate options for the ADC to provide an appropriate
response to hostile activity.
c. Defence in depth can be achieved through the integration of all air defence
systems. The ADC will need to establish coordination measures related to the
defensive assets by which hostile attack systems will need to be countered. The
number of defensive layers will depend upon the assets available, the C2
infrastructure, the warning time achievable, the threat orientation and the disposition
of the joint forces.
d. Coordinated AD activity whereby subordinate regional commanders

established by the ADC can procedurally exchange the RAP, air battle management
information, effect weapons coordination and reduce mutual interference during
operations.
e. Concentration of effort by means of a coordinated AD design to gain

maximum synergy out of joint AD assets and effectively counter the whole spectrum
of air threat.
7. Air Defence in the Maritime Environment. Anti-Air Warfare is the maritime

term for DCA and is part of the joint AD system. AAW consists of those measures taken to
defend a maritime force against attack by airborne weapons, launched from aircraft, ships,
submarines and land-based sites. The air component can contribute to AAW using land-based
aircraft utilising defensive TASMO procedures. It can involve AD fighters, shore-based SAM,
organic aircraft and surface vessels to intercept and destroy adversary aircraft and/or missiles
before they reach their targets. The main principle of maritime AAW is layered defence,
where aircraft will be employed in the outer layer on CAP.
a. Area Air Defence. The use of AD assets to counter threats in a geographical

area not necessarily specific to a maritime force or naval operations.
b. Barrier Air Defence. The use of AD assets employed between the threat and
the maritime force or operation.
c. Air Defence of a Specific Naval Force. The use of AD assets in direct support
of naval forces, to destroy enemy aircraft/missiles, which threaten the force.
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Anti-Ship Missile Defence (ASMD) integrates active and passive measures and quick response
reactions to defend naval forces against anti-surface ship missiles. AD fighters,
reconnaissance platforms, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) as well as other
supporting aircraft, organic and/or shore based, are normally the first line of defence against
this threat. They can provide early warning of missile launching platforms or threat
indications as well as hard and soft kill weapons at extended range and far beyond the
maritime forces' sensor horizon. Thus they can provide a maritime commander vital extra time
to successfully initiate his own ASMD countermeasures.
8. OCA. OCA operations are mounted to destroy, disrupt or limit the adversary’s air
power as close to its source as possible. The major part of OCA operations will invariably fall
to air forces, but surface and even sub-surface forces can also make an important contribution.
Thus, to ensure maximum effectiveness in OCA operations, the relevant capabilities of the
other major force elements should always be integrated as closely as possible with those of the
air forces. The balance of advantages versus drawbacks for OCA is exactly opposite to those
of DCA. It is an offensive action and it may trigger escalation. Furthermore, tactical aircraft
must penetrate the adversary’s territory. They are at higher risk and may be faced with range
problems. However, the principles of war are in favour of the attacker and when the
operation is orchestrated carefully, risks can be minimised while maximising the outcome.
The ACC chooses operational outline, time, place, force concentration, use of SEAD and
deception. This should diminish the ability of the adversary to counter the attack effectively.
A careful selection of critical targets to be neutralized will enhance the effect of the attack.
Therefore, when left with a choice, the ACC should assign air assets to OCA to gain control of
the air.
a. Command and Control System. OCA will often be performed beyond range
of friendly ground-based control systems. Nevertheless, such systems should
contribute to the maximum extent possible to the effective conduct of the mission by
providing information and advice during those portions of the operation within their
range. Attacks against surface targets short of the FSCL must be conducted under the
positive control or procedural clearance of the associated land or amphibious force
commander. Those OCA surface attacks beyond the FSCL will be coordinated with
all affected commanders.
b. OCA Assets. Any force or system attacking OCA targets could be considered
an OCA asset. The majority of OCA is carried out by manned or unmanned aircraft,
rocket systems, and surface-to-surface and sub-surface-to-surface missile systems.
The total combination of aircraft type, role and weapons stores available offer a wide
choice of options. The capabilities and limitations of different aircraft are governed
by such factors as range/payload, weapons carriage, night/weather capability, self-
defence capability, AAR capabilities, precision capability, special equipment and
training standards. Types of aircraft systems conducting OCA include fighter, fighter-
bomber, SEAD, bomber, EW, special operations aircraft, attack helicopters (AH) and
UAVs. Surface-to-surface and sub-surface-to-surface missiles and long-range rockets
may be used for OCA operations. Factors such as weapons effects, asset cost,
possibility of collateral damage, the importance of the target and its relative
vulnerability to other forms of attack, must be weighed against the benefits of using
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missiles or rockets against targets other than counter-air. Land forces (particularly
Special Operations Forces), naval and land-based weapon systems can also make a
significant contribution.
c. OCA Missions. The following details OCA missions for fighter/attack

aircraft:
(1) Airfield Attack. Counter air attack is carried out against airfield
operating surfaces, associated C2 installations, weapon and fuel storage,
aircraft and personnel. Harassing attacks can disrupt an opponent’s air
operations whereas sustained major attacks may bring his operations to a halt.
(2) Fighter Sweep. Fighter sweeps involve offensive action by fighter

aircraft to seek out and destroy an opponent’s aircraft or targets of opportunity
in an allocated area of operations or along the flight route of other air
missions. They are most effective when flown in conjunction with offensive
air action.
(3) SEAD. In the context of OCA, SEAD is carried out by aircraft

disabling an opponent’s area or local GBAD via hard and soft kill measures
using EW and/or a variety of weapons to create favourable conditions for
friendly operations. Although an essential part of any OCA operation, SEAD
is also conducted in support of other air operations, such as DCA and Anti-
Surface Force Air Operations (ASFAO).
(4) Escort. Escort missions by air defence aircraft may be needed to

support other aircraft carrying out offensive, defensive or combat support
tasks.
d. OCA Targets. The following are likely OCA targets:
(1) Air Weapons Systems. This category includes an opponent’s fixed

wing aircraft and helicopters, UAVs, rocket and missile systems, etc. The
targets pose a threat to friendly air and surface forces. In most cases air
weapons systems on the ground are lucrative targets for OCA. Some enemy
aircraft and missile systems may be heavily sheltered and protected and may
not present a suitable target without the use of highly specialised and scarce
weapons. In most circumstances it is preferable and more efficient to attack
aerial systems on the ground rather than in the air. Air weapons systems in the
air that are not posing an imminent threat to friendly forces are also
considered OCA targets.
(2) Airfields, Operating Bases and Aircraft Carriers. Adversary airfields,

operating bases and carriers are also OCA targets. Due to hardening and other
such measures on airfields, the runways and support facilities may be more
vulnerable than the aircraft themselves. Destruction of hangars, maintenance
facilities, POL and other storage areas will affect the opponent’s ability to
generate aircraft sorties. Runway or taxiway closures may prevent use of the
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airfield for an extended period. This may depend on subsequent attacks and
the opponent's repair capability.
(3) Electronic Warfare Systems. This category includes adversary systems

capable of performing Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM) and Electronic
Support Measures (ESM) that may be airborne or surface-based. Once
detected and located such systems are usually vulnerable and worthwhile
targets.
(4) Adversary Air Defences. Adversary air defences include C2, radars
and surface-to-air defence systems in a specific area and can be neutralized,
destroyed or temporarily degraded by physical attack and/or electronic warfare
to enable friendly air operations to be conducted successfully.
(5) C2 Installations. Attacks against C2 installations of opposing air

forces e.g. Air Operations HQ or communications nodes, may seriously
disrupt enemy air operations thus enhancing own control of the air.
404. Air Operations for Strategic Effect
1. Air operations for strategic effect can be either offensive or defensive in nature. It is
the effect on the strategic objective that determines the strategic nature of such operations and
not the range, type of platform or weapon used.
2. Strategic Air Operations. Strategic offensive air operations exploit the speed,
reach and concentration of air power to strike directly and with precision at the opponent’s
CoG and related Decisive Points (DP). These may include his leadership, command structure,
organic essentials (such as main electrical power, gas and oil facilities), infrastructure and key
nodes, or vital research and production facilities, and essential military capabilities. Strategic
air operations are designed to affect the political will of the adversary directly, and/or
neutralize his war waging capability, in other words to achieve strategic paralysis. They can be
used for political signalling purposes, to coerce an adversary, or as an integrated element of a
theatre campaign. Unfocused attacks are unlikely to yield decisive results; the targets must be
carefully chosen to ensure that they lead towards the political or strategic centre of gravity and
hence achievement of the political objectives of the campaign. Strategic air operations - far
more than counter-air or anti-surface-force air operations - are likely to be shaped by political
constraints and considerations. Consequently, selection of targets is critical to the success of a
strategic air offensive.
3. Considerations. Strategic offensive air operations can be carried out largely

independently of other air and surface operations, but they tend to be much more effective
when all operations are mutually supporting within the theatre campaign. Control of the air is
needed if strategic offensive air operations are to be sustained, unless sufficient long-range
stand-off weapons are available. However, it may be possible in certain circumstances to
achieve a sufficiently favourable air situation, through use of ‘stealth’ technology or deception,
though these may achieve only limited duration effects.
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a. Control and Coordination. Normally, the ACC is designated the supported

commander for strategic offensive air operations. Attacks conducted short of the
FSCL will be controlled (i.e. positive control/procedural clearance) by the land or
amphibious force commander. Attacks beyond the FSCL are coordinated with all
affected commanders. All strategic offensive air operations will be coordinated by the
ACC and executed in accordance with the ATO; this includes missile attacks.
b. Weapon Systems. Strategic air attacks can be carried out by manned aircraft,
by surface-to-surface or subsurface-to-surface missiles (cruise or ballistic) or by
unmanned aircraft. Essentially, these are complementary systems. Much of the
following discussion on air assets used for AI applies also to strategic offensive air
operations.
c. Targeting. The targets for strategic offensive air operations will be selected in
direct support of the political objectives. Typically, they will be related to Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD), C3 or military-industrial infrastructure. A detailed analysis
of potential targets to identify the critical target sets and effects required is always
needed. Identification of these sets and the employment of appropriate weapon
systems against them can allow the objectives of the campaign to be met with
economy of effort, minimal attrition and least risk of collateral damage. The aim of
strategic offensive air operations in a major conflict will usually be to attack sufficient
targets simultaneously to achieve strategic paralysis overall. In a small-scale conflict
the aim will usually be to select discrete targets for their political significance or
coercive effect, though proportionality will be a particularly important consideration in
such conflicts.
4. Strategic Defensive Air Operations. Strategic defensive air operations are based
on the strategic objective of deterring and defeating aggression against NATO territory or
Allied Forces.
405. Anti-Surface Force Air Operations
1. The ability to prosecute ASFAO effectively will depend heavily on the success of
counter-air operations. At the same time, progress with ASFAO can have important
implications for maintaining control of the air; thus, counter-air and ASFAO may be closely
integrated. Moreover, like all types of air operations, ASFAO may depend on the full range of
supporting air and combat-support surface operations.
2. AI.1 AI is conducted to destroy, neutralise or delay the opponent’s military potential

before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from
friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of
friendly forces is not required (AAP-6). Interdiction is normally carried out through joint
operations. AI operations can have strategic, operational and tactical effects. However, the
time delay between AI and the discernible results at the location of intended effect means that
1
Detailed information on AI and CAS is in AJP-3.3.2.
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most AI is planned to achieve operational rather than tactical level objectives. AI and
manoeuvre are complementary operations that should normally be synchronised. Responding
to the combination of AI and manoeuvre produces agonising dilemmas for the enemy: if he
attempts to counter the manoeuvre, his forces may be exposed to unacceptable losses from AI;
if he employs measures to reduce losses from AI, his forces may be unable to counter the
manoeuvre. The synergy thus achieved produces significant advantages, especially at the
operational level. Although AI operations may be flown in support of surface force
objectives, it must be viewed from a theatre-wide perspective. AI assets are used to attack
targets throughout the theatre in support of JFC objectives as well as those targets designated
in the land or amphibious force commanders' AOO.
a. Control and Coordination. The ACC is normally the supported commander

for the JFC’s AI effort. However, a land or amphibious commander is normally the
supported commander for AI within his AOO. AI missions flown short of the FSCL
are controlled (i.e. positive control/procedural clearance) by the land or amphibious
force commander. Forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must coordinate with all
affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide
and to harmonise joint objectives.
b. Weapon Systems. There are numerous types of air assets used for AI. These
include aircraft (fixed-wing, UAV or AH) and surface-to-surface and subsurface-to-
surface missile systems. Aircraft usually carry out the majority of AI missions.
Aircraft systems are flexible; they may be more suitable than missiles for AI because
they may be recalled or redirected and can carry a variety of weapons and payloads.
Stealth technology and precision weaponry enhance the effectiveness of aircraft
systems. Missile systems may be the delivery system preferred when attacking heavily
defended targets, during adverse weather conditions, or when necessary supporting air
assets, e.g. SEAD or AAR are unavailable or too vulnerable.
c. Targeting Procedures. The ultimate responsibility for targeting rests with the
JFC. CCs nominating targets inside their AOOs will designate target priority, effects,
and timing. They may also nominate targets outside their AOOs, indicating target
priority, effects, and timing. All these priorities are considered along with JFC’s
theatre-wide interdiction priorities and are reflected in his apportionment decision.
The ACC will use these priorities to plan and execute the theatre-wide AI effort.
3. CAS. CAS is defined as air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity
to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and
movement of those forces (AAP-6). The firepower and mobility of aircraft can make an
immediate and direct contribution to the land battle, especially against targets that are either
inaccessible or invulnerable to available surface weapons. CAS has the ability to concentrate
firepower in time and space when and where required. It can have a decisive effect on a
battle. However, as there are inherent problems with target acquisition and inevitable
complications and limitations coordinating air attacks with the fire and movement of surface
forces, CAS can be difficult to execute effectively. Moreover, CAS can also be costly if the
opposing troops are protected by an effective, layered air defence system.
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a. Control and Coordination. The supported commander states the requirements

for CAS. Allocated CAS missions are normally requested for pre-planned or
immediate execution via the Air Liaison Officers (ALO) and the AOCC attached to the
supported component's C2 architecture. Although it may be executed anywhere
throughout a JOA, CAS is normally conducted short of the FSCL. Regardless of the
location, CAS is flown under positive control. Requirements identified early enough
are forwarded as pre-planned air requests. Immediate requests arise from situations
that develop once the battle is joined and are those that cannot be identified early
enough to allow detailed coordination and planning. Satisfying these immediate
requests may impact the availability of air assets for other planned operations.
b. CAS Assets. A wide variety of aircraft and weapon types can be employed on
CAS, but not all are optimised for this role. The director of the AOC will consider the
organisational structure, missions and characteristics of CAS-capable aircraft (such as
24 hour and marked target seeker capabilities) to determine how CAS is best
employed. A critical resource will often be the timely availability of Forward Air
Controller (FAC) teams or Airborne FACs (ABFAC) to direct CAS missions.
406. ASFAO in the Land Environment
1. Air-Land Integration. Fundamental to the LCC’s scheme of manoeuvre within his

AOO will be his exploitation of the capabilities of air power. Its reach, speed, flexibility and
concentration of force give him opportunities to achieve surprise, shock, simultaneous actions
and tempo. He may use air-delivered combat power, integrating his organic air capabilities
with those of the ACC, to shape his battlespace in depth, by marginalizing or destroying
adversary forces, or by seizing targets of opportunity or by providing intimate support to
ground manoeuvre with aerial fire power. The type of mission employed and degree of
aircraft control used will be based on the proximity of hostile targets to friendly forces. Within
a land AOO, the land component commander (LCC) will normally be the supported
commander and will designate the target priorities, required effects and timing. The ACC, or
other CCs, may need to conduct air operations within the LCC’s AOO (e.g. to support
counter-air or strategic objectives), but these must be coordinated with the LCC to ensure that
the proposed attacks do not adversely affect his planned operations or scheme of manoeuvre.
Joint planning and coordination utilising the liaison elements, such as the (AOCC(L)) and the
BCD, is therefore essential.
2. Army Aviation/Airmobile. Land forces view helicopters, not only AH but also
those operating in support from another Service, as an integral part of the LCC’s scheme of
manoeuvre and an irreplaceable element of the LCC’s design for battle. Helicopters, when
operating in the same battlespace as ground units, must be responsive to changing tactical
environments and ground formation battle plans. Unlike fast-jet aircraft, AH stalk their targets,
remaining on station for long periods while manoeuvring for advantage throughout the
engagement. They can be given manoeuvre missions, and will execute these by moving
tactically within the ground environment, employing fire and manoeuvre. Their operations
appear on the ATO in as much detail as possible for deconfliction purposes. Nevertheless,
they form a significant part of the air power spectrum and can make a major contribution to
other CC’s operations. Airmobile operations are conducted using forces deployed by
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helicopter under control of an appropriate land or amphibious force commander. They are
similar to airborne operations and may include significant levels of fixed-wing support.
3. Joint Air Attack Teams (JAAT). The capabilities of fixed-wing aircraft and
armed or AH are often complementary. AH can mark targets or suppress air defences, while
fixed-wing aircraft can compound surprise and provide weight of firepower with a wide range
of weaponry. Tremendous synergy can be achieved by combining both capabilities, if
practicable with EW and artillery support, in JAAT operations. JAAT operations are normally
planned by the land component and supported by the air component. Conversely, COMAOs
planned by the air component may benefit from the addition of AH support from the land
component.
4. AOCC(Land). The AOCC(L) integrates the liaison and coordination functions

related to air operations. To avoid fratricide, all land organic air assets should appear on the
ATO and their airspace requirements should be included in the ACO. Helicopter operations
are listed in the ATO in as much detail as possible for deconfliction purposes. The
responsibility for coordinating these aspects of army aviation and facilitating support requests
to the AOC lies with the AOCC(L). The AOCC(L) is functionally subordinate to its AOC but
is responsive to the LCC with which it is collocated.
407. ASFAO in the Maritime Environment
1. In maritime air operations, land and sea based aircraft work in close coordination with
naval surface and sub-surface forces to ensure the most effective use of available assets. Their
aim is to detect, monitor and neutralise or destroy the opponent, achieve defence in depth, and
to seize and retain the initiative. The ACC supports maritime air operations by employing
apportioned land-based air assets using TASMO procedures on request of the maritime
component commander (MCC). A primary aim of maritime air operations is to assist the MCC
with the compilation of the Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP). Combined operations help to
exploit the natural synergy between air and naval forces but, because of their far greater speed
and reach, air assets may also have to carry out independent operations. ASFAO in the
maritime environment are executed to attain naval objectives concerning:
a. Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW).
b. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW).
2. Employment of Ship-Based and Shore-Based Aircraft. Depending upon the

area of operations a choice may exist between employing ship-borne or land-based aircraft.
The advantages and limitations of each should be evaluated before selecting the optimum
force mix. The nature and location of the threat to maritime forces is likely to be the major
influence in this decision. The threat may be beyond the range of the surface force organic
sensors requiring the MCC to initiate coordinated land-based air operations far away from the
naval forces being threatened. Ship-borne aircraft can react more quickly to threats emanating
close to the force. TASMO procedures are employed for the use of allocated land-based
aircraft initiated by the MCC, MPA excepted.
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3. Air Employment in the Maritime Environment. Maritime and TASMO air

assets may be tasked to provide support for forces at sea in three categories of operations:
a. Area Operations. Area Operations are conducted in a geographic area and are
not directly related to the protection of a specific force. They are conducted in areas
where opposing forces are known to be, through which opposing forces are likely to
transit, in which friendly forces are planned to operate, or within which it is desirable
to deny the opponent freedom of action.
b. Direct Support (DS). TASMO or MPA operations in DS are related to the

support and protection of a specific force at sea during which TACON of the aircraft
is delegated, by the component commander retaining OPCON (usually the MCC), to
the naval force's Officer in Tactical Command (OTC). Whilst on DS, aircraft may
need to communicate with a variety of assets but will mainly work under control of a
delegated Aircraft Control Unit (ACU) to which the OTC will have further delegated
TACON.
c. Associated Support. Associated Support concerns aircraft operating in

indirect support of forces at sea. The authority retaining OPCON (usually the MCC)
will retain TACON unless taken under command of the OTC.
4. ASUW. The aim of ASUW is to prevent an adversary from effectively employing his
surface forces. Aircraft, helicopters, submarines and surface vessels can carry out this task
independently, but preferably, as part of a coordinated attack. However, MPA and naval
helicopters may be equipped/armed and able to provide an independent or combined attack
capability. ASUW covers a wide range of operations involving reconnaissance and
surveillance missions that may culminate in the targeting and attack of an opponent’s vessels.
ASUW operations can be carried out as offensive or defensive action:
a. Offensive Surface Action. To destroy, neutralise or deter the adversary in

order to maintain control of the sea area involved.
b. Defensive Surface Action. To protect own forces against adversary surface

forces and to prevent such forces from locating, pursuing and engaging own main
bodies, convoys or high value units.
5. There are four distinct phases to an ASUW mission:
a. Surveillance. Surveillance of a particular area to locate a naval force and

thereby contribute to the RMP upon which the MCC will coordinate further action.
b. Identification and Recognition. Identification and recognition is part of the

process of establishing the RMP, and determines the identity of detected contacts.
c. Shadowing. Shadowing is the continual observation of a ship or force for the

purpose of reporting its location, movement, composition and other relevant
information.
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d. Attack. Attack can be carried out either autonomously by aircraft (or

helicopters) or aircraft can be used as a targeting platform for other attack aircraft,
ships or submarines.
Surveillance, identification, recognition and shadowing require specialist sensors that can
provide accurate target discrimination, position and identification, together with secure and
robust communications to the MCC and to other forces. MPA, AWACS and/or maritime
helicopters can provide attack support for strike/attack aircraft.
6. ASW. The aim of ASW is to deny the adversary effective use of submarines.
Countering the submarine threat demands an extensive range of capabilities and may involve
the use of MPA, helicopters, submarines, ships or other aircraft. A skilfully conducted anti-
submarine offensive can be switched rapidly from one area to another, and anti-submarine
forces may be concentrated or dispersed within relatively short periods of time. There are two
overall strategies that are available to the MCC when conducting ASW operations:
a. Offensive ASW. The purpose of offensive ASW is to deny the submarine

access to the environment where it can operate with tactical freedom. It could involve
the blockade of ports or an attack before the submarines can manoeuvre into open
ocean.
b. Defensive ASW. Defensive ASW is conducted in areas where the submarine

can operate with tactical freedom. The reactive speed and endurance of MPA often
means that they are the primary assets available to counter the ASW threat. However,
knowledge of oceanography, likely submarine transit routes and patrol areas, and
sensor performance are critical to the success of the Defensive ASW search. Good
coordination between naval and air assets, as well as sound water and air space
management are essential to enhance the probability of detection.
7. AOCC(Maritime). All aircraft based afloat, MPA and land-based aircraft should
appear on the ATO and their airspace requirements must be included in the ACO. Helicopter
operations are listed on the ATO in as much detail as possible for deconfliction purposes. The
responsibility for coordinating these aspects of maritime air tasks and facilitating TASMO
requests lies with the AOCC(M). The AOCC(M) is functionally subordinate to its ACC but is
responsive to the MCC with which it is collocated, most likely alongside the Maritime Air
Operations Centre (MAOC). The tasking of organic maritime air is conducted by the
commander afloat who coordinates with the MAOC. The MAOC also tasks MPA and other
long term apportioned air assets and provides maritime air information to the AOC for
incorporation into the ATO.
408. ASFAO in Amphibious Operations
1. Air Support for Amphibious Operations. Air support for amphibious

operations can be provided by both land and sea based air assets depending upon the location
of the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA). Air support will normally include the AI and CAS
roles of air-land operations, but may also require counter-air, littoral ASW and ASUW, and
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supporting air operations. As for land-air operations, responsibility for coordination of air
support will rest with the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) or Commander
Landing Force (CLF) (depending upon the phase of the landing operation) as supported
commander within the AOA. The limited shore-based fire support assets and lightly armed
nature of amphibious forces makes them particularly dependent on air delivered support. The
joint use of air assets must therefore be carefully coordinated to ensure that the maximum use
is made of the firepower available, and to permit adequate airspace control in the area of
operations.2
409. Supporting Air Operations
1. Air and Space Reconnaissance and Surveillance3. The primary objective of

air and space reconnaissance and surveillance operations is to provide timely collection from
airborne and space based sensors and other collectors. This information is used to derive
intelligence and targeting data on the activities and resources of an adversary or potential
opponent. Air reconnaissance and surveillance operations can be categorised as strategic,
operational and tactical depending on the purpose and level of operations for which the
information is being gathered. In addition, air reconnaissance and air surveillance operations
are used to gather information about adversaries’ or potential adversaries’ capabilities, which
is essential for the conduct of Allied operations.
a. Definitions:
(1). Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain by visual

observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and
resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the
meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area.
(AAP-6)
(2) Air Reconnaissance. The collection of information of intelligence

interest either by visual observation from the air or through the use of
airborne sensors. (AAP-6)
(3) Surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or

sub-surface areas, places, persons or things, by visual, aural, electronic,
photographic, or other means. (AAP-6)
(4) Air Surveillance. The systematic observation of airspace by

electronic, visual or other means, primarily for the purpose of identifying and
determining the movements of aircraft and missiles, friendly and enemy, in the
airspace under observation. (AAP-6)
2
Further details can be obtained from ATP 8(A) (Doctrine for Amphibious Operations).
3
For further detail on reconnaissance and surveillance support see AJP-3.3.4.5.
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b. Principles. The most important function of strategic reconnaissance and

general surveillance operations is to detect changes and anomalies in the activities of
actual or potential adversaries. Strategic, and to a lesser extent tactical, reconnaissance
and surveillance assets have an important role to play in gathering information relating
to the capabilities of possible adversaries as well as relating to their intentions. For air
reconnaissance and surveillance operations, as with many other air operations, the key
to success is likely to be found in sustaining those operations until a positive result is
achieved.
c. Intelligence Tasks. The main output of reconnaissance and surveillance

operations is to support intelligence requirements. The principal intelligence tasks that
are supported include: provision of indicators and warnings, intelligence preparation
of the battlefield, identification of adversary orders of battle, contribution to situation
development, monitoring of adversary activity, supporting force protection, support of
targeting objectives and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
d. Systems. A wide variety of systems are employed to fulfil these roles and
functions including, but not confined to, manned and unmanned, airborne and space-
based vehicles carrying a variety of sensors both imaging and non-imaging. Each
offers peculiar complementary attributes for the reconnaissance and surveillance tasks.
Due to their elevation, space-based systems offer the widest coverage, but not always
an optimum image resolution or sensor type. Modern platforms permit off-nadir
viewing, day/night and all-weather operation. The overall mix of systems deployed
will depend on the extent of the total surveillance task and the perceived strategic,
operational and tactical requirements.
e. Control and Coordination. Not all reconnaissance and surveillance systems

will be assigned to the JFC. Data from some national or strategic intelligence sources
may be exploited without any form of JFC control over the collection platform. Most
air breathing systems will fall under the JFC’s control, and the ACC will be
responsible for planning most reconnaissance and surveillance missions in
coordination with the JFC’s Collection, Coordination and Intelligence Requirements
Management (CCIRM) organisation. The reconnaissance and surveillance cycle is
closely related to the intelligence cycle, responding to collection requests and
providing intelligence and combat information for subsequent processing and
exploitation. The two cycles must positively interact to ensure that the required
information is available in a timely manner.
2. Airborne Command and Control. Airborne surveillance systems provide

opportunities for conducting air battle management but to be effective the surveillance must be
continuous. Some systems are equipped with search radar for airspace surveillance and
communications which can provide on-board positive control and direction of friendly air
defence weapon systems and transfer data to the air defence control system. Other systems are
equipped with moving target indicator (MTI) radar for ground surveillance and
communications that can provide sensor to platform information to attack aircraft and transfer
data to the AOC and other nodes. In order to fully exploit the real-time engagement capability
of an AWACS asset and ground surveillance aircraft to handle time-critical situations in the
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most effective manner, it is essential that a measure of TACON be delegated by the ADC or
LCC to the airborne tactical director. That will enable him to make timely decisions regarding
weapons system employment and, when appropriate, the engagement of an adversary’s forces
by designated forces. AWACS and ground surveillance systems can also contribute to the
intelligence cycle by providing timely information about an adversary’s air and ground
activities and his potential to attack friendly territory or to interfere with friendly air, land and
sea operations. Often, air operations are dependent upon the direction provided by AWACS
aircraft. Most DCA and OCA missions are monitored and often directed by AWACS aircraft,
similarly, AWACS and ground surveillance aircraft may support CAS and AI missions, and
strategic air operations.
a. Control and Coordination. OPCON of AWACS assets is normally delegated

to the JFC. AWACS operations are monitored by the AOC and all missions will be
executed according to the ATO.
b. Assets. AWACS aircraft are specially equipped and manned by trained

control and coordination personnel. These aircraft are considered high value and are
usually protected. They will inevitably be in great demand, and efforts must be made
to avoid over-tasking to the point where their long-term availability for the campaign
is jeopardised.
3. Electronic Warfare4. In modern warfare, any adversary is likely to make use of a

full range of modern communications, surveillance and weapon systems operating across the
electro-magnetic (EM) spectrum, and both sides will attempt to dominate that spectrum by all
means at their disposal. Each echelon of command will attempt to make effective use of the
EM spectrum for its own purpose, while trying to deny its use to the adversary. These
activities are generally referred to as EW, which can be summarised as the battle for the
exploitation and control of the EM spectrum. Air assets provide valuable support to EW
operations whether it is through Electronic (warfare) Support Measures (ESM) or Electronic
Counter Measures (ECM). The overall objective of EW in air operations is to enhance mission
effectiveness and increase the survivability of friendly aircraft and other assets.
a. EW Objectives. In any conflict the ACC will need to achieve the following
EW objectives:
(1) Assess the opponent's EW capabilities.
(2) Deny the opponent the effective use of his EM equipment.
(3) Retain effective use of friendly EM equipment in an environment of

hostile and friendly EM radiation.
(4) Retain effective use of friendly EM equipment despite opponent

attempts to search for, intercept, identify, and/or target friendly sources of
friendly radiated EM energy.
4
For more detailed information on EW in Air Operations see ATP-44(C).
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(5) Ensure maximum operational exploitation of hostile EM radiation.
(6) Ensure the effective use of offensive EM capabilities.
b. Control and Coordination. Specific resources of the other components can

significantly influence the success of air component missions and every attempt
should be made to coordinate them into the air operations plan. Similarly, air EW
assets can play a significant role in land and amphibious force operations. The
uncoordinated use of EW systems can be extremely disruptive to friendly forces and
presents a challenging command, control and coordination problem for the JFC,
particularly in a multi-national operation. It is particularly important that all
components fully understand each other’s capabilities, priorities and operational
doctrine, and it is essential that commanders at all levels have the support of an
experienced EW staff. Normally, the JFC will establish an Electronic Warfare
Coordination Cell (EWCC) in the JFHQ to coordinate all EW activities of the joint
force. The EWCC may exercise control of EW assets as directed by the JFC.
Generally, the EWCC is established within the JFC J-3 (Operations) staff and includes
representatives from each nation and Service providing EW resources. Most EW air
missions are planned by the AOC staff and coordinated through the EWCC. Air EW
operations will be executed in accordance with the ATO.
c. Assets. Many Allied nations possess an air EW capability. Some aircraft

systems are dedicated to an EW role. They may be specialist aircraft or configured
fighter aircraft used for SEAD, chaff laying or jamming roles. Non-fighter aircraft
weapon systems are also used in EW operations for communications jamming,
electronic deception, and ESM roles.
d. Relationship between EW and other Operations. Most EW efforts are in

support of other missions and can be employed using offensive EW as part of a SEAD
mission or jamming an adversary’s communications capability in support of the JFC’s
information operations.
4. Air Transport. Air transport provides a military commander with the capability to
deploy, employ and re-deploy forces and equipment quickly and over considerable distances,
sustain those forces and support effective application of their military effort. The inherent
speed, range and flexibility of air transport make it ideally suitable for operations beyond
NATO’s area of responsibility including those of a humanitarian nature.
a. Air Transport Categories:
(1) Strategic Air Transport. Strategic air transport involves the inter-
theatre movement of personnel and equipment. It may be augmented by the
use of civil charter aircraft. This is particularly important for the carriage of
passengers and outsized cargo.
(2) Tactical Air Transport. Tactical air transport provides the intra-theatre
movement and delivery of personnel and equipment.
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b. Types of Air Transport Operations. Within these categories, air transport

aircraft can perform the following types of operations:
(1) Airborne Operations. (See para 409.5)
(2) Air Logistic Operations. Air Logistic Operations include those tasks,
other than airborne missions, conducted to deploy, distribute and recover
personnel, equipment, supplies and the extraction of non-combatants.
(3) Special Air Operations. (See para 409.7)
(4) Aeromedical Evacuation. Aeromedical Evacuation is the movement

of patients to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation
under medical supervision.
c. Control and Coordination.
(1) Strategic Air Transport. Air transport is a national responsibility. For

strategic air transport, nations retain operational command and control.
Strategic air transport deployment/redeployment airflow planning will be
coordinated and deconflicted by the Allied Command Europe (ACE) or Allied
Command Atlantic (ACLANT) Allied Movement Coordination Centre
(AMCC). The AMCC also assists nations or NATO organisations that require
AT to find a nation to meet the requirement. The AMCC can also assist with
identifying available civil air transport through close liaison with civil advisors
provided by the NATO Civil Emergency Coordination Centre. The strategic
air transport flow into a theatre of operations will be coordinated by the Airlift
Coordination Centre (ALCC).
(2) Tactical Air Transport. Control of specified air transport aircraft may
be transferred to a NATO commander. If required, an intra-theatre air
transport pool will be established to support the JFC's requirements. Control
of those assigned air transport aircraft is exercised on behalf of the JFC by the
ALCC in accordance with the priorities recommended by the Air Transport
Allocations Board (ATAB) and approved by the JFC. The ATAB is normally
chaired by either J-3 or J-4 and includes representation of joint staff agencies
in need of air transport and the Joint Theatre Movements Staff (JTMS)
(3) ALCC. The ALCC coordinates both strategic and theatre air transport
operations for inclusion into the ATO and ACO, develops Special Instructions
(SPINS) for aircrews as necessary, and requests airspace and air transport slot
times.
5. Airborne Operations. Air delivered combat power can be used to seize ground or
installations that are vital to the opponent by delivering land forces directly onto the objective.
This may be achieved by airdrop or air-landing delivery. Ports of entry, airfields, and key
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installations or structures, all offer potential objectives. Airborne operations should not be
confused with air logistic operations, which are described under Air Transport operations.
The significance of airborne operations may be operational or strategic within the joint
campaign plan. They pose high risks, but the potential gains make them a valuable element of
the air power inventory.
a. Assets for Airborne Operations. Air transport aircraft that conduct airborne
operations are intrinsically vulnerable. Surprise, COMAO protection and objective
preparation by fixed or rotary wing aircraft may well be needed to protect the delivery
force. Air delivered forces are lightly equipped and, once on the ground, will usually
continue to depend on air delivered fire support and logistic resupply until linked up
with ground formations or extracted. The bill for such support can be heavy and a
rapid link up or air extraction is usually essential.
b. Planning. Joint planning of an airborne operation at all levels is essential to

ensure that both the land and air elements fully complement each other’s capabilities.
It is necessary for the ACC and the LCC (or their senior representatives) to have full
consultation once the intention to mount an airborne assault is proposed. This will
allow the apportionment of air assets to be planned and the impact on joint operations
to be assessed in order that the JFC can be fully briefed and critical joint decision
points defined.
c. Command and Control. The JFC may appoint a Commander Airborne Task
Force to oversee all aspects of the mounting, insertion and conduct of an airborne
operation. He will usually charge the ACC with command of the insertion phase of
the operation until a viable ground force has built up. The ACC may elect to exercise
aspects of his responsibility through an airborne commander.
6. AAR. The objective of AAR operations is to enhance combat effectiveness by

extending the range, payload or endurance of receiver aircraft. It allows air power to be
projected over greater distances or concentrated where and when it is needed the most. To
achieve operational effectiveness there must be compatibility in terms of equipment (e.g.
boom vs. drogue), airborne procedures and aircraft performance between AAR aircraft and
receivers. Strategic AAR supports the deployment of forces to theatre whilst theatre AAR
provides support to units operating in theatre.
a. Control and Coordination. Generally, strategic AAR assets, like strategic air
transport assets are nationally owned and controlled. Strategic AAR is coordinated by
the theatre air mobility element. Theatre AAR operations will be planned by the ACC
and issued as an integral part of the ATO. An AAR team consisting of staff officers
with specific AAR expertise will plan, coordinate, manage and monitor all aspects of
AAR operations.
b. Allocation. Allocation of theatre AAR assets will be determined by the ACC

in light of the JFC’s apportionment decision and the overall campaign objectives.
AAR assets may be fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft that may be equipped with a
probe/drogue, a boom or both.
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While AAR offers greatly enhanced flexibility and capability to air forces, there are important
limitations concerning tanker availability, interoperability, the time taken to refuel, the volume
of airspace required for AAR and the need for control and protection of that airspace to ensure
mission success and to prevent losses due to accident or action by an adversary.
7. Special Air Operations (SAO). SAO support special operations and may be
conducted during peace, crisis and conflict. SAO activities may include both combat and non-
combat tasks involving the deployment, infiltration, support, exfiltration and withdrawal of
Special Forces. SAO may be conducted in conjunction with other joint operations or may be
autonomous. Often, SAO must be carried out regardless of the overall combat conditions, and
under air situations not normally considered suitable for other air operations. The specialised
nature of SAO, and the abrasive and challenging environment in which operations are usually
conducted, require employment concepts, organisations, training methods, aircraft and
equipment tailored to each situation.
a. Control and Coordination. In joint operations, a Special Operations Force

Component Commander (SOCC) will normally have OPCON over Special Forces. In
the JFHQ, special force operations, including SAO, are coordinated through the J-
3(SF) Special Forces Operations Cell. SAO are coordinated further through the
Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) in the AOC. SAO missions will normally
be reflected in the ATO, though detail may be withheld to conserve mission security.
b. Assets. Fixed-wing and rotary-wing assets may be used for SAO. Most
aircraft conducting SAO are of a specific design or modification to meet the demands
of a special force operation.
8. Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)5. CSAR is a coordinated operation using

pre-established procedures for the detection, location, identification and rescue of downed
aircrew in hostile territory in crisis or conflict and, when appropriate, of isolated personnel in
distress, who are trained and equipped to be rescued 6. CSAR provides a JFC with the means
to preserve his force, improve the morale of air units and deny the use of captured personnel
as sources of intelligence and propaganda. The scope and scale of CSAR operations will vary
widely. The successful commitment of CSAR forces in a threat environment requires detailed
intelligence, careful planning and coordination, force packaging, risk analysis and rapid,
reliable means of secure communication. Well-trained units operating according to
standardised procedures are essential for success.
a. Control and Coordination. In an operational theatre the JFC assumes

responsibility for the coordination of CSAR which he may delegate to the ACC. The
ACC will establish a Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) within the AOC to
undertake the planning of joint CSAR operations and monitor their execution. Each
force component may also form a RCC to support its own forces but must inform the
JRCC of its activities. The JFC will coordinate with respective nations and provide
5
For further details on CSAR operations see ATP-62.
6
This CSAR definition is based on STANAG 7030 (2nd Edition - draft).
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guidance to the JRCC on the priority and mounting of CSAR missions and the
availability of assets from other force CCs.
b. Operations. Rescue or recovery of personnel at risk will normally involve a

rapid response pick-up from the threat area, and will normally rely on helicopters but
may involve other means of transport, such as ships or Special Forces vehicles. These
rescue assets are unlikely to be armoured, and have limited defensive weapons.
Where the threat is limited, or recovery can be effected before a threat develops, they
may operate unsupported. However, in more demanding situations, a CSAR mission
may have to be a carefully planned covert operation, or part of a full rescue and
protection package. The rescue helicopter (or ship/vehicle) route may need to be
sanitised by attack aircraft with SEAD support.
9. Search and Rescue (SAR). SAR is defined as the use of aircraft, surface craft,
submarines, specialised rescue teams and equipment to search for and rescue personnel in
distress on land or at sea (AAP-6). According to the provisions of the International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), SAR is a
national responsibility that is often delegated to its Armed Forces for peacetime operations.
The boundaries for SAR responsibility are normally defined by the appropriate Search and
Rescue Regions (SRR). However, during operations outside the NATO area by a joint force in
a benign environment, the JFC may need to organise a SAR capability in his JOA. In this
case, the JFC must ensure that international agreements, host nation laws, regulations and
policies, as well as host nation SAR capabilities are taken into account when establishing
procedures within his JOA. Control and coordination of SAR operations in peacetime is
normally the responsibility of the national Rescue Coordination Centres (RCC). Military SAR
assets may be made available to assist host nation civil authorities when the task does not
interfere with military requirements.
410. Force Packaging Concept
1. Force packaging is a concept that endeavours to enhance the effectiveness of all types
of air operations by tasking aircraft in complementary or supporting roles as an integrated
mission. Operational effectiveness should be enhanced through surprise, attack compression
and the associated swamping of an opponent’s defences.
2. Composite Air Operations (COMAO). Since air operations require the

penetration of an adversary’s territory, optimum results and safety can be obtained by
operating in COMAO packages. COMAO are designed to maximise the impact of a given
force by concentrating its effect, whilst at the same time minimising attrition through mutual
support within the attacking force and by saturating defences en-route and in the target area.
To achieve its aim, COMAO may need AAR, fighter sweep/escort, reconnaissance,
surveillance, targeting designation, jamming and defence suppression aircraft in support.
Tasking agencies should regard COMAO as an efficient method of employing air assets.
Normally, COMAO will be initiated, constructed and coordinated by the AOC; specialised
combat support resources will be allocated by a higher formation if required. There are 2
principal types of COMAO, each of which operates to a single mission commander:
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a. Force Package. Force packaging is used if the requirement is to concentrate a

large composite force against a single objective, and particularly if there is a need for
combat support forces. The optimum combination of impact and survivability may
only be achieved if the force operates as an integrated unit. The component parts of a
Force Package COMAO are mutually supporting and create a synergistic effect. This
type of COMAO is more effective because support assets are dedicated to the package.
However, it is complex and it must be tasked and briefed as a complete entity.
b. Force Flow. Force Flow consists of missions and/or packages which,

although separately tasked against an array of targets aimed at a common mission
objective, are coordinated in time to make optimum use of combat support resources
during ingress, egress, and/or in the target area. A tactical director on-board the
AWACS/Airborne Command and Control Centre (ABCCC) may be designated as the
single commander for this type of COMAO.
411. Contributing Forces
1. Air Traffic Control (ATC). ATC guides, controls and supports civil and military
air traffic within the framework of the ACO. As a means of control and in its supporting
function, ATC provides prerequisites for the safe, orderly and expeditious flow of air traffic
by day and night and in all weather conditions as well as for efficient and economic mission-
accomplishment. Based on primary and secondary radar, ATC controls air traffic under
tactical aspects, supports air operations and provides information to aircrews. ATC augments
the NATINADS or theatre recognized air picture and acts as a part of the surveillance system.
a. Regional ATC. Regional ATC guides combat air traffic, controls air transport
and supports other air operations (e.g. air refueling, reinforcements) within their area
of responsibility.
b. Local ATC. Local ATC controls air traffic and supports, if required, air
operations (e.g. Base-CAP) in the vicinity of military airfields as well as aircraft
deployments. It renders approaches possible up to CAT 1 weather conditions.
2. Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) Forces. The term METOC

refers to terrestrial weather, space weather, oceanographic conditions, and climatology inputs.
It encompasses observing, forecasting, and tailoring of products to enhance decision-making
at all levels of operations. METOC forces consist of a mixture of NATO assigned weather
personnel, national military forces, and national civilian personnel at forecast centres and air
bases. It also includes infrastructure such as fixed airfield and tactical weather sensors and
communications circuits.
a. Control and Coordination. In Allied joint operations, the JFC assumes

responsibility for METOC forces at the operational level. Generally, nations maintain
control of tactical level METOC units and personnel supporting their individual air,
land, and maritime forces. In a CJTF situation, METOC units and personnel
supporting the component commanders will often be combined into a single METOC
cell. They will usually be delegated to the air or maritime component commander.
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This allows limited METOC forces to pool resources and best support the myriad of
commanders and agencies that require METOC information.
b. Operations. Generally, METOC forces are tasked to deliver high-quality

oceanographic, terrestrial weather, and space environmental information, products,
and services anytime, any place to Allied Joint Forces. Accurate, timely, relevant, and
tailored METOC support is essential, depicting the state and operational impacts of the
air, sea, and space environments, which can enhance or impede the effectiveness of air
and space systems and operations.
3. Geographic Support. The geographic services in NATO are established to ensure

that joint forces are provided with the geographic support essential to the planning and
execution of operations.
a. Control and Coordination. In joint operations the JFC assumes responsibility

for geographic support for joint forces. When directed by the JFC, J-2 will undertake
the planning of, and monitor the execution of all geographic operations including, but
not restricted to, the production and supply of geographic material and digital
geographic data.
b. Operations. Geographic forces are tasked to produce and supply high quality
geographic material (maps, charts and terrain analysis products) and digital geographic
data to joint forces. Accurate, standardised, timely, and focussed geographic support
is indispensable in providing mission-relevant information describing the operational
impact of geography and topography, and the availability of the geographic material
and data, either of which can enhance or impede the effectiveness of tactical and
strategic systems and operations.
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CHAPTER 5
Planning and Execution of Air Operations

501. Priorities and Phasing
1. The JFC may employ combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in
various dimensions in order to accomplish the strategic objectives in the shortest possible time.
The ACC develops an air operations plan to employ the available air assets to meet the theatre
campaign objectives of the JFC. In meeting the JFC's directives, the ACC should seek to
avoid an opponent’s strengths while pitting his own force strengths against an opponent’s
weaknesses through symmetric or asymmetric actions. Air power offers many opportunities
for achieving this. However, campaign objectives will argue for varying combinations and
levels of participation by air, land and maritime forces, which will be reflected in each
component’s scheme of manoeuvre. It will normally be necessary for objectives to be
prioritised and operations phased, in order to ensure the required mix of symmetrical and
asymmetrical actions.
2. Priorities. Just as the JFC will prioritise theatre objectives, an ACC will do the same
for his objectives. The setting of priorities by the JFC may drive the phasing of the
component operations; for the air operation it may dictate a specific mission flow based on
both strategic and operational considerations. This should translate into a priority listing for
target sets and individual targets, or a summary of desired effects. Attacks may be carried out
in series or parallel. Attacks in series generally indicate attacking target sets sequentially in
priority order, or may involve attacking target sets based upon geographical considerations.
Attacks in parallel refer to attacking targets across geographically dispersed target sets
concurrently as well as near simultaneous attacks on target sets of different levels (i.e.
strategic, operational or tactical) or type. The potential of air power to carry out both series
and parallel attacks provides the JFC with the freedom to change the emphasis of the theatre
campaign according to changes in priority.
3. Phasing. The phasing of a campaign or an operation provides an orderly schedule

of military activities and can indicate step changes in priorities and intent. The phasing of the
theatre campaign will determine the basic phasing of component operations to achieve the
desired coordination. Phasing may be dictated by region, objectives, or limitations imposed by
the composition of the force. Phases must always have clearly identifiable start and end
points, but will often overlap to some extent.
502. Air Battle Management Tasks
1. The ACC has four essential air battle management tasks to meet the air objectives
designated by the JFC in his mission statement:
a. To determine where and when (priorities, effects and timings) to apply air
power in concert with other force CCs.
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b. To create the conditions to give the air assets the best chance of success.
c. To adjust the air operation according to mission results and the revised
intentions of the JFC.
d. To exploit opportunities arising from combat.
2. The successful accomplishment of these tasks requires the ACC to adopt a disciplined
decision cycle and a rigorous application of the air operations planning process. The planning
process is dependent upon the positive interaction with both the joint air tasking cycle that
requires the ACC to recommend the air apportionment to the JFC, and with the joint targeting
cycle that actively involves the ACC, and for which he may be delegated part responsibility.
503. Decision Cycle
1. The decision/action cycle is sometimes called the observation - orientation - decision -

action loop that is also referred to as the OODA loop or Boyd Cycle. The importance of this
cycle in battle management cannot be over-emphasised. To obtain the initiative, the
commander must complete his decision making cycle more quickly than his adversary.
Otherwise his plans will be overtaken and he will be restricted to reactive decisions. However,
speed must never compromise accuracy. An improper action resulting from an erratic
command cycle procedure will waste valuable assets and may result in losing the advantage.
He needs to continually review the cycle to see where activity can be speeded-up and he has to
guard for accuracy of information and actions throughout the cycle. This way he can stay
ahead of his adversary's cycle and exploit that advantage to achieve surprise. The tempo of air
operations is not only regulated by the speed and accuracy of the decision cycle, but is also
dependent upon the speed and accuracy of execution of the plan and the rate at which the type
of activity within the plan is changed.
2. In practical terms the decision/action cycle is made up of a number of parts. The first
part of the cycle is concerned with the Air Strategy (Planning) and starts with the ACC’s
Guidance, followed by the Air Estimate and Planning, whilst the second part focuses on Air
Operations and comprises Tasking, Execution and Combat Assessment.
a. The Air Strategy. The ACC’s guidance is fundamental to the planning and
management of the air C2 process. Effective analysis of the situation, in the form of a
procedure known as the Air Estimate (See para 504.1), is central to the air operations
plan. The planning phase is based on the Air Estimate. It examines the scope for co-
operation and coordinated action with other force components, seeks to exploit fully
the forces available, develops and assesses alternative options and, as a result, sets out
the best course of action. The net result is an outline plan that provides guidance, in
terms of space and time, for organising and coordinating the forces to be employed.
This allows a detailed operation plan to be drawn up, which selects required
resources, missions, personnel and equipment, assigns responsibilities (usually on a
functional or area basis) and associated authority within the organisational structure.
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b. Air Operations. The Tasking process is driven by the air operations plan but
is iterative in that it has its own short term air tasking cycle (See para 507) that assigns
responsibilities to specific resources through the production and promulgation of the
Air Tasking Order (ATO). Execution is the implementation of the ATO that entails
the detailed management of the air battle ensuring that air assets are best employed as
the situation changes to make sure the JFC's intentions are achieved. The final
element of Combat Assessment (CA) assesses and compares the results achieved
against the scheduled air operations plan and the residual capacity of the air assets, and
informs the ACC for the start of the next decision/action cycle.
504. Air Operations Planning Process
1. Normally, there are four stages in the joint air operations planning process - initiation,
orientation, development and review - and each stage produces a specific product. Although
presented in a sequential order, the stages do not need to be completed in that order, and work
on the various stages may be concurrent. However, at some point these stages must be
integrated, and the products of each stage must be checked and verified for coherence. The
estimate process, which has evolved over many years as a tool of analysis for military
operations, helps to achieve this. A form of it should be used to determine the strategy and
objectives at each level of warfare, including for air operations. A diagrammatic form of the
estimate in AJP-01, adapted to meet the characteristics of scale and tempo unique to air
planning at the operational level, is at Figure 5-1. The four stages of the planning process are
detailed below.
2. Initiation. The ACC will receive the JFC’s planning guidance based on an analysis
of the strategic and operational situation and the enemy’s capabilities. This planning guidance
should contain an assessment of the situation and the conditions for crisis/conflict termination.
The product of this stage is the initial guidance from the JFHQ in the form of an approved
Mission Statement.
3. Orientation. The products of this stage are an intimate knowledge of the adversary,
identified CoGs/DPs and the identified air objectives.
a. Research. In any conflict it is essential to ‘know your enemy’ and the theatre
in which you may be required to support a campaign plan. Basic intelligence is
produced by national and Alliance joint intelligence communities as a continuous
peacetime process. Its products give a detailed insight into the military capabilities and
political intentions of potential adversaries. Basic intelligence forms the foundation
for air operations planning, and is supplemented by current intelligence when the
actual theatre of operations and circumstances of the crisis become known. To be of
value, this research must be widely based to give a deep insight into the country under
study and go well beyond the normal scope of military intelligence. Ultimately the
focus is one of identification and prioritisation of potential adversary CoGs and DPs,
with an appreciation of their vulnerabilities. When a specific situation develops which
may result in the deployment of forces, the responsible regional commander and the
JFC, together with his CCs, focus their detailed research on the known theatre of
operations drawing on the basic intelligence research for that region. This is
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intelligence preparation of the theatre in light of the current situation. The principal
effort will be directed towards gaining information about enemy and friendly
capabilities and the specific environment in which any conflict might take place. The
goal of this stage is to gain a complete understanding of the JOA and the adversary’s
capabilities, intentions, strengths and weaknesses compared with those of the joint
forces in the light of the JFC's mission.
b. CoG/DP Identification. Those CoGs and/or DPs that must be defeated to

satisfy the JFC's strategic and operational objectives must be identified, together with
the tactical objectives and those Allied CoGs and DPs that must be defended. The
JFC’s mission and intent must be clearly understood, to help identify the appropriate
CoGs and DPs. The greatest risk in selection of a CoG or DP lies in not considering
all aspects of the adversary's and friendly forces’ relative capabilities.
c. Air Objectives. Quantifiable objectives must be clearly defined that will contribute to
the accomplishment of the JFC's campaign objectives. Planning objectives are usually
documented in the JFC's initial planning guidance, and his intent stated in the campaign plan.
Joint air objectives and supporting objectives must be identified and then categorised for each
level (strategic, operational, and tactical). The objectives at each level must support the
objectives at the higher levels to ensure unity of effort. The initial mission analysis carried out
by the JFC’s air staff will identify the air objectives and show how they are linked to the JFC’s
theatre campaign plan. Subsequently, they are developed in much greater detail by the ACC’s
planning staff. Whereas objectives at the Allied strategic level may be of an abstract nature,
the air objectives in the air operations plan must be clear and concise, applicable, attainable
and should be measurable in terms of the effects required.
4. Development. There are 2 elements to the development stage:
a. Concept (Air Strategy). The outputs of this aspect are the ACC’s decision on
the air Courses of Action (COA) and his associated guidance on the development of
the air operations plan. They are based on the air objectives and the JFC’s strategy
articulated as his statement of intent in the theatre campaign plan. The ACC's planning
staff, in conjunction with JFC's staff and force component liaison officers, assess
possible COA to derive the most appropriate air strategy. This, in the form of an air
Concept of Operations (CONOPS), states how the ACC plans to exploit joint air assets
to support the JFC's objectives. After approving the CONOPS, the JFC will issue a
Mission Statement to the ACC endorsing the air strategy.
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JFC
Background Explicit tasks

AIR
ACC OPERATIONS OWN EFFECT OF
Implicit tasks
Pol/Mil Strategy MISSION OBJECTIVES COURSES ADVERSARY
Higher intentions Apportionment/ COURSES
ANALYSIS Strategic
Time Options* ON OWN COURSES
Operational
JFC's Directives
Tactical
Constraints
DECISION
Selection of
Best Course
SITUATION ANALYSIS CONOPS
GEOSTRATEGIC ADVERSARY (NEUTRAL) FRIENDLY RESTRICTIONS/ASSUMPTIONS

Weather Military Capabilities Time for Analysis & Tasking
Environment Bases, ROA, AAR, Host Nation Sp Time & Space
Topography Deployment, Overflight, Turnaround ROE Reasoned, Logical, Relevant,
Centres of Gravity# C4I Media Clear & Accurate
- Decisive Points Morale, Training, Doctrine Airspace WILL IT WORK?
--Target Sets Ground & Security Can more be done?
When to Re-assess?
Factor Deduction Task/Constraint
ORDERS
Enemy Courses: Apportionment/Time Options* = most likely or worst case.
Apportionment,
ATO
* Consider apportionment between and within Air Operations.
# Strategic/operational Centres of Gravity leading to Decisive Points for air Operations.
ROA = Radius of action.
Figure 5-1. The ACC Air Estimate
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b. Plan. The product of this stage is the joint air operations plan. The ACC’s planning staff, in
conjunction with the air operations staff and force component liaison elements, draw on the air
CONOPS and JFC’s Mission Statement to create this plan. It is the means by which the ACC
articulates and communicates his strategy to his force. In the cyclical force management process the
plan will be developed periodically into the AOD and Master Air Attack Plan (MAAP) which form
the basis for the development of the ATO. The joint air operations plan should therefore:
(1) Account for current and potential adversary offensive and defensive threats.
(2) Identify and prioritise friendly areas, objects and forces to be defended.
(3) Integrate the efforts of joint air capabilities/assets in achieving the JFC’s objectives
using procedures for allocating, tasking and exercising C2 of joint air capabilities/assets
made available.
(4) Identify objectives and targets by priority order, describe in what order they should be
attacked or dealt with, the desired results, and the weight of effort required to achieve the
desired results in support of the JFC's objectives. (Targets prioritised by significance do
not necessarily indicate the order of attack.)
(5) Indicate the phasing of joint air operations in relation to the JFC's campaign plan
phasing and in relation to each other.
(6) Include Combat Assessment (CA) means to measure progress towards achievement of
joint campaign objectives.
(7) Include a comprehensive sustainability assessment for the joint air operations plan.
This plan must clearly delineate any changes to logistic support practices effected by such
agreements or directives.
5. Plan Review. Throughout the theatre campaign the air operations plan should be under constant
review. The plan should be revisited as a regular and routine procedure, and whenever there is a change in
the operational circumstances or unforeseen events occur. This review process is best accomplished by
reworking the Air Estimate.
505. Force Management Process
1. Levels of Force Management. Force management of air assets is carried out at four levels:
a. Allotment. Allotment is the temporary change of assignment of tactical air forces between
subordinate commands. The authority to allot is vested in the commander having operational
command. (AAP-6) The process of allotment is used to provide a balance of forces needed to
achieve the objectives stipulated by that commander normally being the SC or RC.
b. Apportionment. Apportionment is the quantification and distribution by percentage of the

total expected effort, in relation to the priorities which are to be given to the various air operations
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in geographic areas for a given period of time. (AAP-6) Apportionment is the responsibility of the
JFC. The ACC is responsible to the JFC for the apportionment recommendation; the ACC will
make his recommendation following the prioritisation, phasing and assignment. In order to take
full account of JFC’s campaign objectives, the ACC staff must continuously consult and advise the
joint force’s other force CCs, and the ADC if applicable, through their respective liaison officers
before submitting the apportionment recommendation.
c. Allocation. Allocation is the translation of the apportionment into total numbers of sorties
by aircraft type available for each operation or mission. (AAP-6) The ACC's allocation should
explicitly take into account the practicalities of geography and aircraft capabilities. The JFC's
apportionment should have taken these factors into account; if it has not, then feedback and further
consultation will be required.
d. Tasking. Tasking is the process of translating the allocation into orders, and passing these
orders to the units involved. Each order normally contains sufficient detailed instructions to enable
the executing agency to accomplish the mission successfully. (AAP-6)
2. Apportionment Responsibilities. The JFC will normally delegate to the ACC the following
aspects of management of air resources:
a. In consultation with other force CCs, and in consideration of various options available
(including lethal and non-lethal), recommend to the JFC the apportionment of the joint air effort
that should be devoted to various mission categories and/or to geographic areas to meet the JFC’s
campaign objectives.
b. Translate the JFC’s decision on the ACC’s apportionment recommendation on division of

air effort between force components and his guidance on targeting into an ATO.
506. Targeting
1. Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them taking
account of operational requirements and capabilities (AAP-6). It is informed by the JFC’s direction and
guidance, own capabilities and the threat to friendly forces posed by the adversary. Targeting occurs at all
levels of command within a joint force and is performed at all levels by forces capable of attacking targets
with both lethal and non-lethal disruptive and destructive means. An effective and efficient target
development process and air tasking cycle are essential for the JFC and ACC staffs to plan and execute joint
air operations. This joint targeting process should integrate the capabilities and efforts of national,
multinational, joint forces, and force component commands, all of which possess varying capabilities and
different requirements. The process is the same for all operations, from conflict to CRO, though the degree
of political control may vary.
2. Levels of Targeting. Targeting is conducted at the three levels of operations: strategic,

operational and tactical. Air power's reach and flexibility enable it to be employed at any or all levels, thus
it is most effectively utilised by a top-down approach to campaign planning and target selection.
a. Strategic Targeting. When exploiting air power to achieve strategic effect, air operations
are primarily aimed at coercing an adversary into compliance by direct or indirect attack on his
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CoGs. Strategic targets may include non-military targets, such as communications nodes, energy
sources, production facilities and infrastructure, which risk open-ended escalation of the conflict.
Attack of strategic targets therefore demands high level political clearance.
b. Operational Targeting. Operational target sets are likely to be primarily those affecting
military capability, and normally comprise both fixed and mobile elements. The JFC may use air
forces, or air and surface forces (such as AH or Special Forces (SF)) acting in concert. However,
those target sets not solely consisting of fielded military forces, or those that could involve
collateral damage (such as C2 nodes collocated with civilian facilities), may be circumscribed by
political or legal considerations. Additionally, intelligence on parts of a target set may not be
available (e.g. because of collection or source sensitivities) to in-theatre forces.
c. Tactical Targeting. Tactical target sets may include adversary offensive counter-air
capabilities. However, they mainly comprise the adversary’s forces on, or with the potential to
influence, the battlefield, or areas of surface conflict, often where the adversary possesses capable
air defences or there is a significant risk of fratricide. Integration with other component schemes of
manoeuvre and fire plans (land and naval artillery and rocket systems, AH, etc.) is therefore
essential.
In particular, commanders at all levels will seek to identify High Value Targets (HVT) and High Payoff
Targets (HPT). A HVT is a target that is important to an adversary for the achievement of his objectives. A
HPT is a HVT whose defeat would have a disproportionately severe effect on an adversary’s capabilities in
relation to the resources needed to attack it.
3. Targeting Cycle. Figure 5-2 shows targeting as a cyclical process that begins with guidance and
priorities issued by the JFC. It continues with identification of requirements by CCs, the prioritisation of
these requirements, the acquisition of targets or target sets, the attack of targets by components, component
and JFHQ assessment of the attacks, and continuing guidance from the JFC on future attacks.
a. Targeting matches objectives and guidance with inputs from intelligence and operations
personnel to select specific targets and identify the forces necessary to achieve the desired effects
against those targets.
b. Targeting mechanisms should exist at multiple levels. National authorities or HQs senior to
the JFHQ may provide guidance on political restraints, priorities, and targeting support to JFC.
Joint force components identify requirements and nominate targets that are outside their AOOs or
exceed the capabilities of organic assets. After the JFC makes the targeting and air apportionment
decisions, components plan and execute assigned missions.
c. The JFC may create a Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). If the JFC so
designates, the JTCB would be an integrating centre providing a macro-level target review
mechanism. This should be a joint activity, comprised of representatives from the JFHQ staff, all
components of the joint force and, if required, national liaison representatives. Typically, the JTCB
would review target information, develop targeting guidance and priorities, and will prepare or
refine a Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List (JIPTL). The JTCB normally endorses the JIPTL for
the JFC's approval. Since the majority of its targets will be attacked from the air, the ACC will be a
key member of the JTCB. The ultimate responsibility for the JIPTL rests with the JFC.
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d. The JFC will normally delegate the authority to conduct execution planning, coordination,
and deconfliction associated with joint air targeting, to the ACC and will ensure that this process is a
joint effort. The ACC must possess a sufficient C4I infrastructure, adequate facilities, and readily
available joint planning expertise. A targeting mechanism, tasked with detailed planning,
weaponeering, and execution, is also required at the component level to facilitate the process.
4. Operational Transparency. All joint force CCs must have a clear understanding of each force
component's mission and general concept of operations/scheme of manoeuvre within the JFC's theatre
campaign. The force components provide this information and the extent of any support to the ACC
through their liaison elements within the ACC HQ. It is essential that objective assessments are made of the
factors bearing on targeting, apportionment, and priority decisions, and that the JFC and his CCs
understand and agree the basis on which those decisions are taken.
JFC Guidance/Priorities
Identification of
Assessment Component
Requirements
Prioritisation of
Attack Component
Requirements
Acquisition of
Targets/Target
Sets
Figure 5-2. The Targeting Cycle
507. Joint Air Tasking Cycle
1. The short-term joint air tasking cycle begins with the JFC's overall review of the total situation and
culminates with the combat assessment of previous missions/sorties. The joint air tasking cycle is used to
provide for the efficient and effective employment of the joint air capabilities/assets made available (the air
apportionment process). The cycle provides a repetitive process for the assessment, planning, coordination,
allocation, and tasking of joint air missions/sorties, within the guidance of the JFC, as shown at Figure 5-3.
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The cycle accommodates changes in the operational situation or to JFC’s guidance, as well as late notice
requests for support from other CCs. The joint air tasking cycle is an analytical, systematic approach that
focuses targeting efforts on supporting operational requirements. A timely ATO is critical. Other joint
force components conduct their planning and operations based on the content and scheduling in the ATO
and are dependent on its accuracy.
2. Phases. The joint air tasking cycle consists of six phases:
a. Phase 1: JFC/Force Component Coordination. The JFC consults often with his force CCs
to assess the results of the warfighting effort and to discuss the strategic direction and future
operations plans. This provides force CCs with an opportunity to introduce recommendations and
support requirements, and state their ability to support other components. The JFC provides broad
guidance and objectives and his vision of what constitutes military success. JFC thereby refines his
intent and adjusts his priorities. The JFC's guidance and objectives will include his apportionment
decision and identify target priorities. From these will flow the Joint Target List (JTL), planning
guidance, procedures, appropriate manoeuvre and movement control, joint fire support
coordinating measures, ROE, and the extent of inter-component support.
JFC/Component Coordination
(JTL, Apportionment, ROE)
Combat Assessment Target Development

(BDA, WEA, RR) (JIPTL, AOD,)
Force Execution Weaponeering/Allocation

(MAAP)
ATO Development
(ATO, ACO, SPINS)
Figure 5-3. The Air Tasking Cycle
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b. Phase 2: Target Development. The JFC’s guidance and apportionment during Phase 1 are
used to focus target development. Targets are nominated to support the targeting objectives and
priorities provided by the JFC. All potential air targets are processed through the ACC (Guidance,
Apportionment and Targeting (GAT) cell in Combat Plans) to the JTCB, which will identify,
prioritise and select specific targets that meet the JFC's objectives and guidance. Targets are
selected from the JTL, component requests, intelligence recommendations, Signals Intelligence
(SIGINT)/ESM/IMINT/HUMINT inputs, and current intelligence assessments, as the situation
dictates. The end product of the target development stage is a prioritised list of targets i.e. the
JIPTL, which supports the objectives and conforms to the guidance. Thus, in accordance with the
JFC's objectives and component targeting requirements, the JFC and ACC staffs will develop the
AOD to best employ available capabilities/assets.
c. Phase 3: Weaponeering/Allocation. During the weaponeering and allocation stage, targeting

personnel quantify the expected results of lethal and non-lethal tactics/weapons employment against
the required effects on targets nominated in priority order on the JIPTL. The JIPTL provides the
basis for weaponeering assessment activities. All approved targets have weapons calculations
completed on target worksheets, which detail target identification and description, target attack
objectives, target area threats, Desired Mean Point of Impact (DMPI), recommended number/type of
aircraft and weapons, fusing, and probability of meeting effect criteria. The processed targets are
then included in the MAAP. The resulting MAAP is the plan of employment that forms the
foundation of the joint ATO. It is the key element of the concept of joint air operations. Thus, the
development of the MAAP includes a review of JFC and ACC guidance, requests for support from
other components, updates to target requests, availability of capabilities/assets including
contributions from components, target selection and development from the JIPTL, and aircraft
allocation.
d. Phase 4: ATO Development. After the MAAP is approved by the ACC, Combat Plans
continue detailed preparations on the ATO, SPINS and the ACO bids (assuming the ACC is also the
ACA). The JFC and ACC guidance, target worksheets, the MAAP, and force component
requirements are used to finalise the ATO/SPINS/ACO. Force components may submit critical
changes to target requests and asset availability during this final stage of ATO development. The
ACA and ADC instructions must be provided in sufficient detail to allow components to plan and
execute all missions tasked in the ATO. The ATO, ACO, and SPINS provide operational and
tactical direction at appropriate levels of detail. The level of detail should be very explicit when
forces operate from different bases and multi-component and/or COMAO missions are tasked.
e. Phase 5: Force Execution. The ACC directs the execution of, and deconflicts all
capabilities/forces made available for, a given ATO. The JFC may give the ACC the authority to
redirect joint air operations. However, approval of the affected force CC is essential for all requests
(other than those made by the JFC) for redirection of organic air assets. Affected force CCs will be
notified by the ACC of redirection of sorties previously allocated in the ATO for support of their
operations. It is important that aircraft or other capabilities/assets available or apportioned, but not
allocated for tasking, are included in the ATO for coordination purposes. They may be redirected
as necessary by the JFC or, with the approval of the respective force CC or his designated senior
liaison officer, by the ACC. Force components execute the ATO as tasked and recommend changes
to the AOC as appropriate, given emerging JFC and component requirements. During the
execution stage the following battle management actions may be required:
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(1) The AOC is the central agency for revising the tasking of joint air
capabilities/assets. Consequently, it is also responsible for coordinating and deconflicting
those changes with the appropriate control agencies or components.
(2) Due to the need to respond to moving targets or to changing priorities, changes may
be required to planned air operations during their execution. The JFC will normally
delegate authority for this to the ACC, who is responsible for notifying the affected force
CCs, as appropriate.
(3) Ground or airborne command and control platform mission commanders may be
delegated authority by the ACC (under the same conditions outlined above) to redirect
sorties/missions made available to higher priority targets as necessary. However, it is
essential that the AOC/Combat Operations be notified of all redirected missions.
f. Phase 6: Combat Assessment (CA). CA evaluates the progress and effectiveness of combat
operations in achieving command objectives, and is executed at all levels of the joint force. The
JFC should establish a dynamic system to support CA by all force components. The ACC must
continuously evaluate the results of joint air operations and provide these to JFC so that he can
determine progress towards the campaign end-state, and recommend changes in courses of action.
The CA CONOPS should include timely BDA and Weapons Effects Analysis (WEA), so that Re-
attack Recommendations (RR) can be made promptly; the collection of this data should be
referenced in the MAAP.
508. Conflict Termination
1. JFC will need to consider at the outset how he will recognise that the theatre campaign is reaching,
or has achieved, its end-state. Recognising the inevitability of defeat may be relatively straight-forward, but
the adversary may not be able to rationalise his defeated state in the same manner and sue for peace. In
these circumstances the JFC may have to revise his overall aims and continue with operations to force the
adversary to recognise his defeat. In so doing JFC, in consultation with the ACC, should consider
exploiting his air forces to achieve that ultimate strategic effect.
2. There is also the possibility of the opposite situation occurring whereby the adversary seeks
negotiation and the conflict terminates positively but prematurely, or it just fades out before reaching the
previously declared campaign end-state. Such a situation could create a vacuum where the population may
need to be protected from dissident forces, humanitarian aid may be required or monitoring operations may
need to be implemented. However, the termination of the conflict and the setting up of the conditions for
termination is primarily a political matter and decision.
3. In either event the JFC’s campaign plan and the associated component plans must recognise the
need for Allied forces to be reconstituted and redeployed, possibly on peacekeeping operations for an
indeterminate period after the cessation of hostilities. It is probable that all component forces will need to
undertake operations in support of CRO with consequent changes to the ROE. Follow-on air component
operations for this range of circumstances are described in Chapter 7.
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AJP-3.3
CHAPTER 6
Space Operations
601. The Utility of Space
1. Attributes of Space. The systems that operate collectively in space offer several
useful attributes to a joint force:
a. Global Coverage. Space-based systems in appropriate orbital deployments

provide world-wide coverage and frequent access to specific Earth locations, including
those denied to terrestrial-based forces, on a recurring basis. Satellites deployed in
specific orbits and in sufficient numbers can maintain a continuous presence over the
territory of potential adversaries. Twenty-four navigation satellites placed in semi-
synchronous orbit enable terrestrial-based forces anywhere on the Earth to be within
line of sight of the necessary three satellites to obtain three-dimensional precision
navigation.
b. Perspective. Space offers the highest possible observation position (the

ultimate ‘high ground’) above the Earth’s surface. Some space systems can be focused
to provide information on specific areas of interest, which can improve situational
awareness and planning tempo and can enable information dominance for all friendly
military forces. By exploiting comprehensive space capabilities, space forces can focus
on and provide detailed services for a specific geographic area and support regional
planning requirements.
c. Flexibility. Space systems provide flexibility in meeting requirements for

timely, accurate, and reliable data products, and services. For example, today’s
satellite systems perform continuous tasks such as navigation, communications, and
surveillance, to either complement or transcend terrestrial capabilities. Operationally,
space systems can adapt to new situations through on-orbit, real-time reprogramming.
Modifying terrestrial processing operations and modifying replacement satellites being
readied for sustainment launches provide further flexibility options. Suitably equipped
satellites can change their orbit (e.g. to deliver payloads or overfly other locations) and
their orientation (e.g. to aim sensors or communications antennae). However, orbital
manoeuvre is expensive in terms of fuel consumed and is normally reserved for high
priority missions.
d. Synergistic Effects. Space operations have evolved from a force enhancer to a

critical force enabler. The precise, coordinated application of the various elements of
aerospace and surface forces can produce effects that exceed the individual
contributions possible from forces employed separately. Also, functions accomplished
by space-based and terrestrial-based systems, using aerospace assets, provide mutual
backup and complicate hostile attempts to neutralize a friendly commander’s overall
military capability.
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2. Role of Military Space. As an integral element of military capabilities, space

influences operations throughout the conflict spectrum, from peacetime engagement to general
war.
a. Peacetime Operations and Deterrence. Space forces provide arms control

verification data, indications and warning, warning of air or ballistic missile attack,
surveillance and reconnaissance of space systems controlled by adversaries, and
critical command and control communications. Space forces play a significant part in
the ability to characterize threats and identify an adversary’s strengths, weaknesses,
and vulnerabilities. Data and information derived from space forces are often critical
decision making elements that can provide global situational awareness and diplomatic
advantage. Employment of space forces must be responsive to meet the needs of
users performing both combat and non-combat operations.
b. Escalation Control. As crises escalate, space systems provide data and

objective information that can help NATO leaders accurately appraise the situation and
implement appropriate diplomatic, economic, and military measures to defuse or
respond to the crisis. The use of military forces and capabilities permits effective
actions prior to conflict that reflect NATO’s resolve to support Allied objectives and
interests. Timely intelligence data could be provided to one or both sides in a potential
conflict area to reduce tensions. If these efforts fail, space forces directly support the
deployment, employment, and redeployment of military forces and the conduct of
combat operations.
c. Space Operations Support During Conflict. In the future, NATO nations may
not have the opportunity for extended mobilization of military forces in preparation
for conflict; therefore, space support for military forces will initially be accomplished
using currently deployed space forces. Additional space forces will be integrated
commensurate with the requirements of the JFC and available assets. The ability of
space forces to collect, process, and disseminate timely strategic, operational, and
tactical information on the adversary’s forces is essential. Conversely, allowing an
adversary access to information on Allied force deployments, order of battle,
movements, and logistics may jeopardize the ability to stage and deploy forces and to
successfully execute military strategy.
d. Information Dominance. The ability to control the adversary’s information

derived from space forces may become decisive in future terrestrial military
operations. This means space control for information dominance becomes a
prerequisite strategic objective for future combat. Information dominance focuses on
asymmetric warfare where Allied forces possess a greater understanding of the
strengths, weaknesses, interdependencies and CoGs of an adversary’s military,
political, social and economic infrastructure than the adversary has of Allied sources
of nations power. Failure to attain information dominance early in the crisis or
conflict could mean the difference between success or failure of diplomatic initiatives,
crisis resolution or conflict, and the ability to maintain the element of surprise during
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military operations. Therefore, the ability to attain information dominance widens the
gap between friendly actions and adversary reactions and allows friendly commanders
to manage the adversary’s decision cycle by controlling and manipulating the
information available to them.
e. Post-hostilities. Post conflict actions include the period in which nations

return to a peaceful state and re-establish legitimate governance over their people.
During military operations, critical civil infrastructure such as communications
systems and navigation aids may be destroyed. Space systems can provide these
critical services while indigenous communications systems, navigation aids, and other
systems are rebuilt. Space systems may provide the only means to conduct theses
activities in the post-hostilities phase.
602. Space Treaties
1. The military use of space is constrained by international treaties. The main treaties are
the Outer Space Treaty (1967) and the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty 1 (SALT 1).
SALT 1 is a USA-Russia bilateral agreement which precludes the testing and deployment of
space based anti-ballistic missiles systems by the signatories. The Outer Space Treaty has 4
major provisions:
a. All nations have free access to space with liability for damage caused.
b. Space will be used for peaceful purposes.
c. No Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) will be placed in orbit around the

Earth or on the Moon.
d. All space objects will be registered with the UN.
Neither of these treaties specifically forbids the deployment of weapons in space, other than
WMD. Most nations regard reconnaissance as a defensive activity designed to prevent
aggressive conduct and this separation of defence from offence legitimises peaceful military
activity in space.
603. Space Control
1. General. Space Control enables space operations. It is the means by which space
superiority is gained and maintained to assure friendly forces can use the space environment
while denying its use to an adversary (if necessary). Space control operations must not focus
exclusively on the protection and negation of space systems, but rather on space capabilities.
Since space operations are currently focused on the production of data and information, the
aim of space control will typically be the protection or denial of space derived information.
2. Counterspace. Counterspace is the mission carried out to achieve space control

objectives by gaining and maintaining control of activities conducted in or through the space
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environment. Counterspace involves activities conducted by land, sea, air, space and/or
special operations forces. Counterspace includes both offensive and defensive operations.
a. Offensive Counterspace. Offensive counterspace operations destroy or

neutralize an adversary’s space systems or the information they provide at a time and
place of our choosing through attacks on the various elements of space systems.
Although attacks could be carried out by space or terrestrial-based forces, the principal
means of conducting offensive counterspace operations is through the use of
terrestrial-based forces such as air attacks against space system ground nodes or
supporting infrastructure. Offensive counterspace operations can involve the use of
lethal or non-lethal means and are conducted to achieve four major purposes:
deception, disruption, denial, and degradation/destruction of space assets or
capabilities as required.
(1) Deception consists of those measures designed to mislead the

adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the
adversary to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests.
(2) Disruption is the temporary impairment of the utility of space systems,

usually without physical damage to the space segments. These operations
include delaying critical mission data support to an adversary. Given the
perishable nature of information required for the effective C2 of military
operations, this disruption impedes the effective application or exploitation of
that data.
(3) Denial is the temporary elimination of the utility of the space systems,
usually without physical damage. This objective is accomplished by such
measures as denying electrical power to the space ground nodes or computer
centres where data and information are processed and stored. Denial of
commercial space support will be a critical facet of offensive counterspace and
may involve extensive action at the diplomatic level.
(4) Degradation/Destruction is the permanent impairment or elimination

of the utility of space systems, usually with physical damage to the terrestrial
element of a space system. This last option includes special operations forces
missions and/or air strikes targeted against launch infrastructure, satellite
command and control systems, and satellite communications nodes.
b. Defensive Counterspace. Defensive counterspace operations reduce and

preclude the effectiveness of an adversary’s counterspace operations and preserve our
ability to use friendly space systems. There are a number of hostile actions an
adversary might take to deny critical Allied space support. These include attacks on
the ground segment of a space system with conventional military actions, attacks on
the space segment with an anti-satellite (ASAT) device, or attacks on the connecting
communications segment by jamming the link segment of Allied space systems.
Defensive counterspace operations consist of active and passive defence.
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(1) Active Defence. The objective of active defence is to detect, track,

identify, intercept, and destroy or neutralize enemy space and missile forces.
Active defence operations include manoeuvring the spacecraft, deploying
mobile ground links and terrestrial elements, and deploying decoys. It may
also include the employment of lethal protection methods.
(2) Passive Defence. The objectives of passive defence are to reduce the
vulnerabilities and to protect and increase the survivability of friendly space
forces and the information they provide. Passive defence includes measures
such as encryption, frequency hopping, hardening, and redundancy. Space
assets can also be defended by camouflage, concealment, deception,
redundancy, mobility, and dispersion.
3. Contributing Capabilities. The following capabilities are critical to the successful

conduct of space control operations:
a. Surveillance and Reconnaissance of Space. Surveillance and reconnaissance

of space detect and identify space systems and help characterize the space threat
environment. Space surveillance (broad area coverage) provides information vital to
the reconnaissance (close scrutiny) of an area or objects of specific interest. Space
surveillance identifies alterations in the space environment, such as changes in the
order of battle and deployment or retirement of space systems and other data to assist
in targeting and situational awareness. Information derived from both surveillance
and reconnaissance data will contribute to effective intelligence preparation of the
battlespace (IPB) by identifying an adversary’s space capabilities and vulnerabilities.
The IPB process includes defining the battlespace environment, describing the
battlespace's effects, evaluating the adversary, and determining the adversary's
potential COA. Intelligence should include not only the location (orbits) of supporting
satellites, but also which transponders and frequencies are in use, the type and number
of Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers possessed by adversary forces, details
on contractual obligations, and the source of third party support.
b. Space Environment Operations. Fluctuating conditions in space impact on

systems operating through or in the space environment. Knowledge of this
environment helps warfighters avoid operations during times when space environment
disturbances (e.g., solar flares) degrade space-based information; helps communicators
choose the best frequencies, antenna angles, and transmission schedules; and allows
spacecraft operators advanced notice of effects which may impact on satellite and
surveillance operations. Observations and forecasts of the natural space environment
contribute directly to space control.
c. Satellite Operations. Satellite control capabilities provide the means to

manoeuvre, support, and sustain on-orbit forces. Single-system and multiple-system
facilities and sensors provide telemetry, tracking, and commanding (TT&C) support
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and distribute mission data for a variety of military, commercial, and multinational
space programs. Satellite support generally falls into four categories:
(1) Low-orbit vehicles which require high levels of support.
(2) Medium-altitude vehicles which may require support only once every
other revolution.
(3) High-altitude vehicles which, depending on satellite requirements, need

minutes to hours of support every day.
(4) Defence of Allied satellite control facilities may be critical to the ability of
space systems to effectively support the prosecution of operations by
terrestrial forces.
d. Spacelift Operations. Spacelift provides the ability to project power by

delivering satellites, payloads, and material into or through space. NATO allies with a
space capability use a combination of military, civilian, and civilian contractor
personnel to process, integrate, assemble, check out, and launch space vehicles. Civil
and commercial contributions further expand the number of launch sites available to
spacelift. During periods of increased tension or conflict, it may be possible to launch
and deploy new or replacement space assets and capabilities as necessary to achieve
NATO objectives. Spacelift operations are conducted to deploy, sustain, or augment
satellite constellations.
604. Force Enhancement
1. General. Operations conducted from space enable or support terrestrial-based

forces. Surveillance and reconnaissance, environmental sensing, ballistic missile warning,
navigation and positioning, and communications may increase a force’s ability to detect, plan,
and react faster than an adversary. These enhancements consist of data, data relay, analysis, or
other enabling capabilities. Force enhancement must include consideration of civil and
commercial space support that can augment military space systems.
2. Surveillance and Reconnaissance of Terrestrial Environment. Monitoring

terrestrial (air, land, and sea) areas of interest from space can help reveal the location and
disposition of adversary forces. Such information contributes to the IPB. It provides warning
of attack, evidence of an adversary’s understanding of the battlespace and contributes to BDA.
Expeditious and timely dissemination down to the user level is critical.
a. Application. Space systems normally have unrestricted overflight capability of

otherwise restricted areas. Consequently, they can gather information about the
activities and resources of an adversary or potential adversary, and acquire data
concerning the meteorological, hydrographic and geographic characteristics of a
particular area.
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b. Advantages. The prime advantage of reconnaissance and surveillance space

systems is their ability to provide world-wide, quick reaction coverage of areas of
interest. They also enhance planning capabilities, providing updated information
regarding terrain, weather, and adversary force dispositions. Often, the product of a
space or terrestrial system can cue a space system to survey a particular area of interest,
thus enhancing accuracy and reaction times to the user. It may also be possible to use
non-military space surveillance systems and products (including civil and commercial
capabilities) when requirements outstrip available military resources.
c. Limitations. In addition to the access limitations dictated by a particular

satellite’s orbit, satellite surveillance and reconnaissance systems may be affected by a
variety of atmospheric disturbances such as fog, smoke, clouds, and electrical storms,
which affects the ability of optical and IR imaging systems to detect terrestrial
activities. Radar satellites can provide imagery day or night and in any weather
conditions but at a much lower level of resolution than that provided by optical and IR
imaging systems.
d. Support Mechanisms. There are a number of military and non-military space

assets that can, either individually or in combination, provide information required by
Allied commanders. The support procedures for products/information are dependent
on the individual system.
3. Environmental Sensing. Space forces provide data on meteorological and

oceanographic factors that might affect operations. Knowledge of these factors allows forces
to prepare for or avoid adverse environmental conditions (such as poor surface conditions or
severe weather) while taking advantage of suitable conditions to enhance operations. Such
monitoring also provides information to aid the commander in assessing an adversary’s
capabilities and intent. Technologies such as Multi-Spectral Imagery (MSI) provide joint force
planners with current information on surface conditions (such as surface conditions for
vehicular traffic as well as beach conditions, vegetation, and land use).
a. Application. Weather affects mission timing, route selection, target and

weapons selection, mode of weapon delivery, communications and surveillance.
Space-based environmental monitoring systems can provide weather data over route
and target, wind and cloud temperature and atmospheric moisture data for weapon
selection, and monitor ionospheric disturbances and weather conditions which affect
command, control, and communications. Knowledge of the location and
characteristics of oceanographic features such as sea heights, sea surface ice, currents,
fronts and eddies can be used by commanders to concentrate forces in areas where an
adversary is, or is not, most likely to be operating. This knowledge can also be used
by Allied naval forces to optimize tactics and search and rescue plans.
b. Advantages. Environmental satellites provide monitoring access to remote or

hostile areas. Weather satellites typically gather data in visual, infrared, and
microwave spectral bands. Infrared sensors provide images that are based on the
thermal characteristics of atmospheric features such as clouds, and earth features such
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as land masses and water bodies. This data can be used to calculate the altitude of
cloud tops, and ground or water surface temperatures. Thermal and visible images
provide the coverage and extent of clouds at various levels, as well as other physical
phenomena such as ice fields and snow. Microwave sensors are used to measure or
infer sea surface winds, ground moisture, rainfall rates, ice characteristics, atmospheric
temperatures, and water vapour profiles.
c. Limitations. Some meteorological parameters needed by forecasters for

operational support cannot currently be accurately determined from satellites,
including: heights of cloud bases, visibility restrictions, and lower level winds. Quality
and utility of data is also a function of the type of orbit of a given monitoring satellite.
Polar-orbiting satellites (i.e., those with 90 degree inclinations) have limited data-
refresh rates while geostationary satellites provide low resolution images (because of
distance from the Earth). Moreover, the image quality of geosynchronous satellites
(i.e. those that complete one orbit in exactly 24 sidereal hours) degrades as distance
and angle from the point directly under the satellite increases. As a result of the
increased angle, coverage at the polar latitudes is poor or non-existent.
d. Support Mechanisms. Weather and oceanographic support to Allied

operations are normally provided by meteorological and oceanographic (METOC)
units assigned to one or more of the participating force components. Central facilities
provide users with real time and stored weather satellite cloud imagery, processed
products, and satellite information incorporated in other environmental products. Data
is distributed over secure and insecure data and facsimile links. Real time weather data
can be directly downlinked to transportable tactical terminals.
4. Ballistic Missile Warning. Both space-based and ground-based warning and

surveillance sensors can provide unambiguous, accurate, and timely warning of potentially
hostile and actual ballistic missile attack events. This warning will be vital to commanders
regardless of the level of operations at which they might be functioning (strategic, operational,
tactical).
a. Application. Theatre missile warning involves a C2 network capable of

functioning within the limited time afforded by the missile event. Other space assets,
in addition to sensor satellites, are involved in this process. These supporting assets
provide communication links that carry raw data, process data (information), and
verbal command directions to warn the affected air, ground, amphibious, and naval
forces to coordinate theatre missile defence activities.
b. Advantages. Detection and warning of adversary ballistic missile launches

allow commanders to take appropriate measures to safeguard forces as well as to alert
defended areas and populations as needed, and to direct the appropriate reciprocal
attack operations.
c. Limitations. Close coordination is essential to the progress of a responsive

warning system. To maximize operational utility of missile warning data, during
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development of operational requirements, specific reporting criteria must be

established. These criteria include: false report tolerance, sequence of information,
warning timeliness, location of threats and forces (latitude/longitude versus general
area), launch direction to area at risk, reporting for high confidence data, and
broadcast versus point-to-point reporting.
d. Support Mechanisms. A JFC requesting missile warning support that is not

provided for in existing operations or contingency plans, or to modify support thereto,
should forward requests for support to the appropriate coordinating authority.
5. Navigation and Positioning. Space-based navigation and positioning

(NAV/POS) systems provide precise, reliable three-dimensional location and timing
information which permit commanders to more effectively plan, train, coordinate and execute
operations.
a. Application. Space-based NAV/POS plays a key role in almost every military

mission from precisely fixing friendly force locations in a night, adverse weather
environment to employing precision munitions against enemy targets. For operations
on land, space-based NAV/POS allows accurate site surveys, precise gun
emplacement, exact target acquisition and location, and ‘common’ time and distance
for synchronized operations. For naval forces, locating, targeting and engaging units,
harbour entry and rendezvous operations are facilitated, coastlines can be accurately
surveyed, and mine locations can be accurately plotted. For air operations,
information on position, velocity, and time enhance or enable airdrop operations, air
refuelling, search and rescue missions, airspace deconfliction, and weapons delivery.
b. Advantages. Space-based NAV/POS data allows the establishment of a

‘common navigation grid’ within the JOA and is easily accessible. User equipment is
generally passive, providing continuous real-time information. Commercial user
equipment, however, may not be able to receive the most accurate military positioning,
velocity and timing service available to authorized users. For example, the GPS has
two levels of service: a standard positioning service (SPS) and a precise positioning
service (PPS).
c. Limitations. Limitations generally fall into two categories. First, an

adversary’s exploitation of easily accessible NAV/POS data, even if less accurate, can
cause the Allied military advantage to be diminished. Secondly, the civil and
commercial application of NAV/POS data may impose constraints on the ability to
manipulate the signals for military use. For example, a JFC can request a change in
GPS SA implementation thereby changing the degree of accuracy of the signal.
However, due to the global nature of SA, and the tremendous civil dependence on the
system, any change in the configuration would affect GPS users world-wide with
significant ramifications. Finally, intentional or unintentional jamming of NAV/POS
signals can affect joint operations across an area of operations. Commanders will have
to factor interference into their EW plans, and may need to take measures to eliminate
the sources of signal jamming.
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d. Support Mechanisms. A commander’s operational influence on space-based

NAV/POS systems is limited.
6. Communications. Using military satellite communications, as well as civil,

commercial and international systems, commanders can disseminate plans, orders, and force
status over long distances, increasing C2 effectiveness, especially in areas with limited or no
communications infrastructure.
a. Application. Modern communications satellites carry multiple-beam steerable

antennas to provide flexible coverage and resist jamming. They support a variety of
media including television, interactive computer and digitized voice. The frequency
bands over which satellite communications operate are ultra-high frequency (UHF),
super high frequency (SHF), and extremely high frequency (EHF).
(I) UHF satellite communications support secure voice and data

transmission at relatively low data rates over a single channel for both mobile
and fixed users. Compact terminal equipment and omni-directional antennas
allow deployed forces to exchange quickly and efficiently both voice and data
communications.
(2) SHF satellite communications support multi-channel, secure voice and

high data-rate communications for C2 and intelligence data transfer. Normally,
users of SHF generally employ fixed, large ground terminals for point-to-point
communications. However, smaller, less efficient mobile terminals can be
used to provide high-capacity, multi-channel communications in austere areas.
(3) EHF satellite communications support survivable voice and data

communications in a hostile environment but at a reduced data rate. EHF
characteristics, such as its narrow beamwidth and use of spread spectrum and
frequency hopping, give it capabilities such as low probability of intercept
(LPI) and low probability of detection (LPD). EHF also permits the use of
smaller antennas that enhance mobility, enabling wider use of manpack,
submarine, airborne, and other mobile terminals.
b. Advantages. Communications satellite capabilities are such that operators can

tailor the communications beams to suit the needs of different sized user terminals
almost anywhere in the world depending upon the satellite constellation, location,
coverage, and number. Most satellite communications systems provide real-time
connectivity for both voice and data and preclude the need for long terrestrial
communications links, particularly in and across hostile territory. Security can be
provided through double and triple encryption. The flexibility of satellite
communications can be especially useful for forces that require dynamic C2 while on
the move.
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c. Limitations. Communications capacity may be limited by bandwidth and

access port availability. Antenna size, frequency, bandwidth and data rate capacity are
interrelated and commanders often must compromise between information flow rate
or mobility. All radio receivers, including satellite systems, are susceptible to
jamming. Moreover, heavy solar flare activity can disrupt satellite communications for
short periods of time.
d. Support Mechanisms. A commander’s operational influence on space-based

communications systems is limited. Also, there are a number of non-military space
assets that can, either individually or in combination, provide information required by
Allied commanders. The support procedures in these cases are dependent on the
individual system. Management of the electro-magnetic spectrum capacity will be an
important function for the authority tasked to coordinate space support capabilities.
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CHAPTER 7
Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations

701. Overview of Crisis Response Operations (CRO)
1. CRO focus on deterring war and promoting peace. CRO embrace Peace Support
Operations (PSO) which specifically are concerned with the promotion of national
reconciliation and the re-establishment of effective government following the collapse of state
institutions. It is the impartial nature of PSO that makes them different from other military
operations. CRO are more sensitive to political considerations because the operational level
military activities often will be directly in support of political objectives. It is essential that
NATO personnel involved in CRO should understand the political objectives and the potential
impact of inappropriate military actions.
2. Legal Aspects. The first Article of the UN Charter states that the UN’s main
purpose is to maintain international peace and security. The Charter provides for the
fulfilment of this responsibility including the settlement of disputes by a variety of peaceful
measures. It is also designed to deal through coercive means with threats to peace and acts of
aggression perpetrated by nation states. The UN Security Council is empowered to investigate
alleged violations and take appropriate measures, including the use of force. There are 2
classes of UN operation:
a. Authorised. Operations for which the UN sanctions military intervention with

the lead role assigned to a nation or an organisation e.g. NATO or WEU/EU.
b. Directed. Operations conducted under UN auspices with a military force

under UN control.
NATO has indicated its willingness to undertake PSO with, or on behalf of, the UN or the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This could include
deployments of NATO forces designed to prevent conflict, restore peace by resolving or
terminating conflict before it escalates to war, or assist with the rebuilding of peace after
conflict.
3. CRO Tasks1. CRO activities encompass a broad range of military operations and
support a variety of purposes including supporting national objectives, deterring war,
supporting PSO, maintaining national influence and supporting the civil power. These
objectives are achieved by providing military forces to accomplish a wide range of missions
other than warfighting. CRO tasks can take place in peace through conflict to post-conflict.
Air operations will sometimes play a key role. NATO forces may undertake the following
tasks:
1
See MC 327/2.
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a PSO, which includes Peacekeeping (PK), Peace Enforcement (PE), as well as

conflict prevention, peace making, peace building and humanitarian relief.
b Humanitarian Operations (as an independent task).
c Disaster Relief.
d. Search and Rescue Operations (SAR).
e. Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) – permissive and non-

permissive.
f. Military Aid/Support to Civil Authorities.
g. Enforcement of Sanctions.
702. Air and Space Power in Support of CRO
1. Applications. The contributions of air and space power to CRO can vary with each
operation; nevertheless, exploitation of both air and space remain significant factors. Air and
space power is now as important an instrument for managing crises as it is for waging war. Its
flexibility offers significant advantages when a political commitment may be unreliable in
scale, duration and even popularity. At times, aircraft operating from outside territory
threatened by disputing factions may avoid the need to insert and protect a ground force.
From the earliest stages of a crisis air and space power can provide a deterrent, with implicit or
explicit threat of escalation. Alternatively, it may prepare the environment for secure insertion
of a ground force, and then complement other forces by its ability to be activated or
suppressed rapidly - from surveillance, through show of force to application of force - in
concert with progress on other military, humanitarian or diplomatic fronts. Finally, air power
projection operations can be ended quickly, and without the problems of extraction in the face
of intense media interest.
2. Harmonization of Strategy. As with surface forces, the ACC must have a clear,
achievable mission and an exit strategy. Moreover, as air assets and their C2I structures will
often be located outside the zone of conflict, there is potential for operational goals to diverge
from those of joint forces and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) enmeshed in the
surface situation. For instance, a strategy of PE from the air would be incompatible with a
strategy of PK on the ground. Joint planning of air and space operations is therefore essential
to ensure that they are fully integrated into and supportive of the overall campaign plan.
3. Operational Risk. Whilst the specifics of the operation will dictate the requirement
for particular CRO air roles and tasks, provision may be largely dependent on the level of
conflict with regard to the degree of risk posed to the aircraft, supporting agencies and
individuals, as well as the degree of risk acceptable to individual nations. However, risks are
unlikely to be uniform throughout an operation. The intensity of conflict will vary with area
and time, and this must be borne in mind both in establishing ROE, and in selecting and
controlling air tasks.
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4. CRO Air Environment.
a. In the CRO environment the belligerents may each dominate a number of

areas scattered throughout the territory. Pre-emptive offensive action to achieve
control of the air is most likely to be precluded by restrictive ROE. There is a need for
an Allied force to be seen to be operating strictly according to the mandate and within
international law from the outset. Successful air operations in CRO tend to rely upon
the passive consent of the belligerent parties, although this may only be achieved
through a ‘carrot and stick’ approach. However, the degree of freedom of the Allied
ROE must be commensurate with the perceived intent by the belligerents to challenge
Allied air operations.
b. A most important operational assessment to be made by the COMCJTF

concerns the risk to which forces are exposed at any time and place. He is required to
achieve his given objectives in the knowledge that the political restraints have been
framed against a lower threshold of risk acceptance for CRO. Further, he must
balance the use of force to achieve the political objectives against his assessment of the
belligerents’ inclination to challenge that force, which may at best be uncertain. An
extended period of acquiescence does not mean that a stable situation will not radically
change to a high-risk state with little or no warning. Intelligence will provide
information on the belligerents’ military capabilities. However, intelligence must also
inform the JFACC’s situational awareness, which is of critical importance in CRO, by
providing detailed theatre level indicators and warnings in a timely manner to allow
him to assess the belligerents’ intentions against his force. The JFACC’s confidence in
his assessment will be influenced by the political situation and the coherence of
military and political actions at all levels. He will need to continually determine the
operational risk to his force and apply risk management techniques in balancing his
force protection measures against the need to fulfil his given objectives.
5. CRO Airspace Control. The Allied air component imposes its rules and conditions
in support of the mandate on the airspace previously the domain of the belligerents. The
legality of its boundaries may be mandated internationally and civilian air traffic right of
passage may need to be protected. The conditions imposed on the use of the airspace by the
belligerents will be determined as categories of freedom or denial, the legal authority for which
may be derived from the mandate. The formulation of those rules and conditions must take
account of the potential challenge to Allied air operations. If the mandate is overly restrictive
such that adequate airspace control means cannot be put in place, then an amplification of the
mandate must be requested. The JFACC must also be aware that, with the proliferation of
highly capable and mobile SAM systems, the threat envelope to Allied air assets may extend
beyond the mandated boundaries of the theatre airspace.
6. Control of the Air in CRO. In the CRO environment, control of the air represents
a ‘means to an end’ to enforce the authorised mandate and, most likely, not a state of freedom
to carry out offensive actions as part of a total air operation. Control of the air is principally
achieved through presence, restraint and force credibility and not through offensive action. In
order for the Allied force to meet its mandate it is reliant on the compliance of the belligerent
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parties. The choice of deterrent or enforcement profiles will directly contribute to the key
factor of mutual restraint from the outset. To reduce the risk of challenge to the Allied force it
is necessary to demonstrate an adequate degree of control of the air with prudent application
of the deployed air power to deter implicitly, or explicitly when necessary, the belligerents
from interfering with Allied air operations. An integral objective in achieving control of the
air is to provide for adequate protection of the Allied force as a whole. At the higher levels of
command the belligerents may not actively co-operate with the Allied force but may be
acquiescent in their acceptance of the imposed air situation; however, that acquiescence may
not be reflected at lower levels of command where a considerable degree of regional
autonomy may exist. The belligerents will probably not regard the Allied air force as their
primary enemy and will only challenge the Allied force when it obstructs their aspirations to
forcibly extend their influence. Conversely, they may attempt a challenge as a political
statement in the wider context of the dispute.
7. Air Operations.
a. Despite the unpredictable circumstances of CRO, a JFACC may have

sufficient confidence to believe that a degree of control of the air exists at times and
places within the threat envelope. It is likely that the repetitive nature of routine air
activity could lead in time to flights being effectively ignored by the belligerents’ i.e.
effectively a state of pseudo or apparent air superiority. When the JFACC is required
to mount specific coercive air attacks or demonstrations of dominance which are
clearly beyond routine operations, he will need to create a favourable air situation for
the specific time and place of the attack by providing a sufficiently high level of
protection for the attacking force to achieve success. During such times of heightened
tension, but when political sensitivity to offensive action remains a major influence,
the use of low collateral damage and soft-kill weapons, including offensive EW for
jamming and defence suppression, may be essential.
b. In CRO air assets operating under restrictive ROE may be tasked to carry out
missions in support of the mandate under circumstances where it is not feasible or
politic to routinely seek a favourable air situation for their protection. As a
consequence, all aircraft operating within the threat area need an effective defensive
aids suite to enable them to ‘survive the first shot’ and avoid the problems associated
with aircrew becoming either hostages or the object of a high-risk CSAR effort. The
right of self-defence will always apply but the ROE may preclude immediate
retaliatory action against the attacker. Avoidance or evasion as self-defence tactics
may not always be practicable on some missions e.g. reconnaissance against sensitive
targets located within known missile engagement zones, in which case electronic
protection measures may be the only possible option. If an Allied aircraft is shot
down, damaged or forced to defend itself, then it is highly likely that some form of
political sanction or demonstrative military action by the Allied force will be ordered
once the circumstances have been fully considered by the political and military
authorities. The scale of response should be proportional to the outcome of the
challenge and hence an effective self-defence by the target aircraft may require a lesser
response and less damage to the established level of mutual restraint. The use of
UAVs for surveillance and reconnaissance support for the Allied force can both
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demonstrate restraint and at the same time reduce political vulnerability in the event of
being shot down.
c. A JFACC is faced with a number of considerations when establishing an air

presence in a CRO situation, not least the nature of a strategic, and possibly
asymmetric, response must always be borne in mind. However, within the limitations
of the ROE and the relevant authorisation, the JFACC should always be prepared to
mount an immediate and appropriate tactical response to any challenge to Allied air
dominance. He should actively seek sufficiently permissive ROE in this respect in
order to pre-empt further confrontation before it is allowed to develop. The loss to
belligerent action of any Allied air asset in CRO can result in a disproportionate loss of
credibility. Hence, the introduction of HVAA into theatre must be approached with
extra caution, as this action will introduce a further degree of complexity into the
JFACC’s risk assessment. Loss of a HVAA in the early days of the mandate would
provide the belligerents with great political advantage causing maximum Allied
political embarrassment. The deployment, operational profiles and protection of
HVAA need to be addressed with a degree of circumspection, particularly prior to the
time when the JFACC is confident that an adequate level of control of the air has been
established.
703. Rules of Engagement
1. ROE are approved by the NAC, and may place significant restrictions on the use of air
power in CRO. It is implicit in the majority of such activities that the minimum force
commensurate with achieving the objective must be used. It can create particular difficulties
for air assets with their capability of immediate action. In some cases it will be impossible to
attack targets because of the risk of collateral damage.
2. The authorised ROE are liable to be extremely stringent and will be subject to scrutiny
by the media in relation to any action by a unit or individual aircraft, particularly if operations
go wrong. The local commander may also need to put further restrictions on the use of
particular assets. One particularly important aspect is that CRO activities are not war and
therefore it is likely that peacetime regulations will apply. In most circumstances the ROE
should be designed to avoid being provocative and, in response to any challenge, should be
primarily concerned with self-protection.
3. A coalition operation is likely to be made up from the types of air and ground forces
which the contributing nations decide to deploy rather than those which are best suited to the
roles which need to be exercised. This will leave gaps in capability that can generate
difficulties in developing appropriate ROE if the process is not carefully coordinated from the
outset.
704. Deterrence and Enforcement
1. Deterrence. A major contribution of air and space power in this environment is

likely to be in discouraging a belligerent from relying on his own military force to achieve his
objectives. For air and space power to discourage effectively, it must be accompanied both by
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a convincing and overtly stated political will to intervene, and a military capability strong
enough to neutralise any opposition. The availability, imminence or actual presence of
superior force in the form of air and space power can deny a belligerent any advantage from
military escalation, and persuade him to comply with the operational mandate.
2. Enforcement. If deterrence fails, air power’s primary offensive task is to reduce the
military capability of intransigent belligerents. Offensive air operations should have the
overriding aim of making a belligerent aware that he cannot achieve his will by force. This
calls for fine judgement by commanders and may result in some military principles having to
be compromised. Giving warning prior to military action reduces surprise, and may reduce
the success of the subsequent attack and increase the danger for friendly participants.
However, surprise may be regained by action against a single target from a previously declared
category. All attacks must be followed up by post-attack reconnaissance, both to confirm that
the required level of effect has been achieved and to refute any belligerent claim of collateral
damage. Throughout, one basic principle must remain uppermost. If air attacks have to be
made, they should be made against significant targets, where the effects will support the
politico-military strategy of the campaign. Although such attacks must be proportionate and in
accordance with the Alliance’s mandate, they must leave no doubt in the belligerent's mind as
to the futility of continued military opposition.
705. Air and Space Roles
1. Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Surveillance and reconnaissance conducted

using air and space visual, photographic, radar, electro-optical, and air sampling means offer a
wide range of capabilities, including cross-border monitoring. Moreover, sovereignty issues
do not affect space systems, and their data is usually considered to be authoritative and
impartial. Natural resources, pollution, borders and boundaries, are all traditional reasons for
dispute; air and space platforms are capable of measuring, monitoring, and reporting these
potential reasons for conflict precisely, promptly, and repeatedly. Appropriate levels of
monitoring are vital to confidence building but there will be a need to balance overt and covert
surveillance; air and space assets are particularly well suited for the latter. They can also be
used to detect abnormalities in the behaviour of actual or potential parties to conflict and
assess the threat to Allied forces. UAVs have considerable potential as, apart from their low
political profile and reduced risk of embarrassment through loss of manned systems, they have
the ability to complement other sensors by providing close-in confirmatory detail.
Reconnaissance can reinforce the credibility of Allied forces (established by accurate
information) and, in a deteriorating situation, can enable commanders to select coercive targets
that are suitably vulnerable, give the necessary political leverage, but will involve the
minimum probability of collateral damage. In a PE situation where co-operation is lost, it is
likely that there will be attempts to deceive reconnaissance and to mask activities. Airborne
surveillance will be key in ensuring the coherence of crisis management options between
deterrence and the use of force.
2. Control of the Air. Even a poorly equipped belligerent may be able to launch
limited air attacks that achieve disproportionate political results. In contrast, any offensive air
action by CRO forces beyond strict self-defence will be heavily constrained, and counter-air
operations are likely to have to be reactive. Nevertheless, air superiority over disputed areas
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will normally be the level of control of the air necessary for the safe and efficient execution of
other air and ground operations, including aid distribution. Measures to achieve this can
include air exclusion zones, air policing, and combat air patrols. However, the tight ROE and
time needed to obtain authority to engage that are normal in CRO can hamper aircraft with
their limited endurance and capacity for immediate response. Objectives for achieving the
required level of control of the air may include:
a. Protect Allied (and possibly local or neutral) assets from attack by air or
surface weapons.
b. Monitor airspace in order to classify aerial activity and, if necessary, confront

unauthorised activities.
c. Impose partial or complete airspace denial, including such measures as forcing

down or destroying unauthorised aircraft.
d. Prepare to attack all or part of a belligerent’s air inventory where there is

irrefutable evidence of non-compliance.
Whenever air forces are deployed in support of CRO irrespective of the scale of the operation,
there is a need to establish appropriate airspace control means. These may need to supplement
or replace existing airspace control structures.
3. Air Transport Operations. AT operations will always be a fundamental part of

CRO. They offer a high profile demonstration of political commitment that attracts significant
media attention. Strategic AT can quickly move large numbers of Allied troops and quantities
of equipment into a crisis area. AT can also act as a tool for building trust and confidence. It
has an important role to play in the movement of the key players in crisis, whether they are
belligerents or their representatives, mediators, observers, members of aid agencies or other
NGOs, security or inter-positional forces, or the media. It can also be used to bring medical,
engineering or other expertise and 'enabling elements' to a particular area in need of relief or
support. AT operations may include:
a. Scheduled air transport services involving the programmed movement of aid,

support personnel and supplies.
b. Air logistic support operations conducted to outload, distribute, and recover

personnel, materiel, and equipment.
c. Airborne operations involving the movement of combat forces and their

logistic support to an objective.
d. Aeromedical and NEO.
AT assets are particularly vulnerable. Threats may include sabotage, small arms, mortars and
artillery to aircraft on the ground, and automatic weapons, MANPADS and SAMs to aircraft in
flight. The necessity for self-defence aids will be dependent upon the theatre environment.
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Minimum time on the ground through the use of integral freight handling systems, short field
performance to increase available landing sites and reduce vulnerability during approach and
departure, and ability to operate at night and in poor weather, will all help to reduce
vulnerability.
4. Surface Attack. The application of lethal offensive force, in conjunction with other
measures, may be necessary to demonstrate intent, to respond to infringement of an
agreement, or to support friendly troops on the ground in the event of an attack by
belligerents. However, it poses the most difficult operational, legal and presentational
problems. Detailed consideration must be given both to the desired physical effects,
particularly possible collateral damage, and to the likely reaction of opposing, friendly, and
neutral forces and observers. In all cases the principle of proportionality is of paramount
importance; the amount of applied force must be in proportion to the initial infringement.
When SEAD is necessary, the use of ECM as an alternative non-lethal attack may be the only
method of attack allowed by the ROE. It is imperative that targets are unambiguously
identified, and, where necessary, positively designated or marked; they may also require
political approval.
a. Weapons stocks, armour and heavy artillery are less controversial examples of
CRO targets. Attacks on infrastructure targets, such as bridges, power production and
water resources, must have obvious military relevance. This is essential, not only to
meet legal requirements, but also to ensure acceptability to the international
community.
b. Air power alone cannot enforce a surface exclusion zone. However, it can
provide support by attacking targets within it, and engage targets that strike across the
zonal boundary from outside the range of surface forces.
5. Helicopters. Helicopters, whether belonging to maritime, land or air forces, can

perform a wide range of essential functions and can be forward based for timely support of
Allied forces. Helicopters will always be a scarce resource, and their tasking must be carefully
directed to ensure equitable distribution of their effort. This may be complicated by differing
national procedures for sharing of effort, and differing capabilities despite similarity of
helicopter type. Helicopter roles include:
a. Reconnaissance. Helicopters can provide first class information. Their low

operating altitude gives excellent perspective, while their rapid response and forward
deployment can yield timely data. The electro-optical systems fitted to armed, attack
and observation helicopters can provide excellent imagery, at times from stand-off
distances that make them inconspicuous to those being observed.
b. Troop Movement and Logistic Support. Helicopters can resupply almost any
area, and carry out a wide range of logistic tasks, including liaison, troop movement
and medical evacuation.
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c. Armed Action. Combat aviation, in particular AH, can provide a flexible and
responsive deterrent force to the land commander. Their utility in a wide range of
roles can place heavy demands on their availability to other components.
d. Maritime Operations. Maritime helicopters perform similar functions to their

land-based counterparts, but in addition can assist in surveillance and anti-surface
force action in maritime PE or blockade operations.
706. Force Extraction
1. Emergency or opposed extraction of an in-theatre force will usually require a separate

force and command structure from that of the force being extracted. Air power can facilitate
the extraction of such forces. However, this is a high-risk option that could require defensive
and offensive air cover in addition to air transport assets. Force extraction is a contingency
that must be considered before the committal of ground forces. It is possible that while one
side is using force to compel withdrawal; others may be using force to dissuade exit from
theatre. The possible need for extraction of troops by air transport assets, with offensive and
defensive air coverage to dissuade attacks against friendly elements, cannot be ignored.
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
AAA Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AAR Air-to-Air Refuelling
AAW Anti-Air Warfare
ABCCC Airborne Command and Control Centre
ABFAC Airborne Forward Air Controller
ACA Airspace Control Authority
ACC Air Component Commander
ACCS Air Command and Control System
ACE Allied Command Europe
ACLANT Allied Command Atlantic
ACM Airspace Control Means
ACO Airspace Control Order
ACP Airspace Control Plan
ACS Airspace Control System
ACU Aircraft Control Unit
AD Air Defence
ADC Air Defence Commander
ADP Air Defence Plan
AECC Aeromedical Evacuation Coordination Centre
AEW Airborne Early Warning
AEW&C Airborne Early Warning & Control
AH Attack Helicopter
AI Air Interdiction
AJP Allied Joint Publication
ALCC Airlift Coordination Centre
AMCC Allied Movement Coordination Centre
AOA Amphibious Objective Area
AOC Air Operations Centre
AOCC Air Operations Coordination Centre
AOCC(L) Air Operations Coordination Centre (Land)
AOCC(M) Air Operations Coordination Centre (Maritime)
AOD Air Operations Directive
AOO Area Of Operations
AOR Area Of Responsibility
ASC Airspace Control
ASFAO Anti-Surface Force Air Operation
ASMD Anti-Ship Missile Defence
ASUW Anti-Surface Warfare
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare
AT Air Transport
ATAB Air Transport Allocations Board
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATO Air Tasking Order
AWACS Airborne Warning And Control System
Abbreviations-1
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BCD Battlefield Coordination Detachment

BDA Battle Damage Assessment
BMC4I Battle Management/Command, Control, Communication, Computers and
Intelligence
C2 Command and Control

C3I Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
C4I Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Intelligence
CA Combat Assessment
CAOC Combined Air Operations Centre
CAP Combat Air Patrol
CAS Close Air Support
CATF Commander Amphibious Task Force
CC Component Commander
CCF Conventional Counter Force
CCIRM Collection, Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management
CIS Communications and Information Systems
CJFACC Combined Joint Force Air Component Commander
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
CLF Commander Landing Force
COA Course Of Action
CoG Centre of Gravity
COIN Counter-Insurgency
COMAO Composite Air Operation
COMJC Commander Joint [Sub-Regional] Command
CONOPS Concept of Operations
CRO Crisis Response Operations
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue
DCA Defensive Counter-Air

DMPI Desired Mean Point of Impact
DP Decisive Point
DPC Defence Planning Committee
DS Direct Support
EAD Extended Air Defence

ECM Electronic Counter-Measures
EM Electro-Magnetic
ESM Electronic (warfare) Support Measures
EW Electronic Warfare
EWCC Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell
FAC Forward Air Controller

FAOR Fighter Area of Responsibility
FFA Free-Fire Area
FSCL Fire Support Coordination Line
FSCM Fire Support Coordination Measures
Abbreviations-2
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GAT Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting

GBAD Ground Base Air Defence
GPS Global Positioning System
HPT High Payoff Target

HUMINT Human Intelligence
HVAA High Value Airborne Asset
HVT High Value Target
I&W Indicators and Warnings

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation
ID Identification
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
IMO International Maritime Organisation
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
JAAT Joint Air Attack Team

JACC Joint Airspace Coordination Centre
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC Joint Force Commander
JFHQ Joint Force Headquarters
JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Commander
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JFSOCC Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JIPTL Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List
JOA Joint Operations Area
JTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTL Joint Target List
JTMS Joint Theatre Movements Staff
LCC Land Component Commander

LOAC Law Of Armed Conflict
LPI Low Probability of Intercept
MAAP Master Air Attack Plan

MANPADS Man Portable Air Defence System
MAOC Maritime Air Operations Centre
MARLO Marine Liaison Officer
MCC Maritime Component Commander
METOC Meteorological and Oceanographic
MPA Maritime Patrol Aircraft
MSI Multi-Spectral Imagery
NAC North Atlantic Council

NALE Naval and Amphibious Liaison Element
NATINADS NATO Integrated Air Defence System
NAV/POS Navigation and Positioning
Abbreviations-3
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NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical

NEO Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NFA No-Fire Area
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OCA Offensive Counter-Air

OODA Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action
OPCOM Operational Command
OPCON Operational Control
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OTC Officer in Tactical Command
PE Peace Enforcement
PGM Precision Guided Munitions
PK Peacekeeping
POL Petrol, Oil and Lubricants
PPS Precise Positioning System (GPS)
PSO Peace Support Operations
RAC Regional Air Commander

RAP Recognised Air Picture
RC Regional Commander
RCC Rescue Coordination Centre
RFA Restricted-Fire Area
RMP Recognised Maritime Picture
ROA Radius Of Action
ROE Rules Of Engagement
SA Selective Availability (GPS)

SAG Surface Action Group
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile
SAO Special Air Operation
SAR Search and Rescue
SC Strategic Commander
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defences
SF Special Forces
SHF Super High Frequency
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SLO Space Liaison Officer
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement
SOLE Special Operations Liaison Element
SPINS Special Instructions
SPS Standard Positioning System (GPS)
SRR Search and Rescue Region
STO Survive To Operate
Abbreviations-4
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TACOM Tactical Command

TACON Tactical Control
TALO Tactical Air Landed Operation
TAM Tactical Aerodynamic Missile
TASMO Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations
TBM Tactical Ballistic Missile
TM Tactical Missile
TOA Transfer of Authority
TT&C Telemetry Tracking and Commanding
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UHF Ultra Hugh Frequency
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WEA Weapons Effects Analysis

WEU Western European Union
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Abbreviations-5
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Abbreviations-6
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REFERENCE PUBLICATIONS
1. The following bibliography shows the Allied Publications (APs) and
other principal documents relating to the relevant Chapter, and is provided to
guide the reader to a source of detail concerning the Chapter’s contents.
2. The list includes, as appropriate, only ratified and promulgated

publications. It should be noted that APs are identified by the number in the
short title of the original edition (e.g. ATP-8); editions which have a suffix letter
(e.g. ATP-8(A)) are not identified as such except where the publication’s title
has been changed.
Chapter 1
AJP-01 - Allied Joint Doctrine
Chapter 2
AJP-3.00 - Operations (under development)
APP-8 - Allied Tactical Air Messages
Chapter 3
Bi-SC Directive 80-80 (2nd edition)
Chapter 4
AJP-3.1 - Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures
(ATP-1)
AJP-3.2 - Land Force Tactical Doctrine (ATP-35)
AJP-3.3.1 - Counter Air Operations (ATP-42)
AJP-3.3.2 - Air Interdiction and Close Air Support (ATP-27)
AJP-3.3.2.1 - TTP for Close Air Support Operations
AJP-3.3.3 - Tactical Air Support for Maritime Operations (ATP-34)
AJP-3.3.4.2 - Air-to-Air Refuelling (ATP-56)
AJP-3.3.4.3 - NATO Air Transport Policies and Procedures (ATP-53)
AJP-3.3.4.3.1 - Airdrop Systems for Personnel and Supply (ATP-46)
AJP-3.3.4.4 - Search and Rescue (ATP-10)
AJP-3.3.4.5 - Reconnaissance and Surveillance (ATP-61)
AJP-3.3.4.6 - Combat Search and Rescue (ATP-62)
AJP-3.3.5 - Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War
(ATP-40)
Reference-1
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ATP-8 - Doctrine for Amphibious Operations
ATP-18 - Allied Manual of Submarine Operations
ATP-26 - Air Reconnaissance Intelligence and Reporting
Nomenclature
ATP-28 - Allied Anti-Submarine Warfare Manual
ATP-31 - NATO Above Water Warfare Manual
ATP-44 - Electronic Warfare in Air Operations
ATP-47 - Handbook for Air Reconnaissance Tasking and
Reporting
ATP-49 - Helicopters in Land Operations
ATP-55 - Secret Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and
Procedures
ATP-62 - Combat Search and Rescue
AXP-5 - NATO Experimental Tactics and Amplifying Tactical
Instructions
NATO Geographic Policy (SHAPE 3601/SHOCE/116/96 dated 12 Aug 96)
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
No NATO references
Chapter 7
AJP-3.3.7 - CJFACC
MC327/2 - NATO Military Policy for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response
Operations (1st working draft)
Bi-SC Directive for NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations
General References
AAP-6 - NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions
Reference-2
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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
Effective Pages Page Numbers

Change 1 i (Reverse blank)
Change 1 iii, iv
Change 1 v (Reverse blank)
Change 1 vii (Reverse blank)
Change 1 ix, x
Change 1 1-1 to 1-5 (Reverse blank)
Change 1 3-1 to 3-8
Change 1 5-1 to 5-12
Change 1 Abbreviations 1 to 5 (Reverse blank)
Change 1 Reference 1 to 2
Change 1 LEP 1 (Reverse blank)
LEP-1
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LEP-2
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NATO/PfP UNCLASSIFIED

JOINT AIR & SPACE

The information contained in this document shall not be released to a nation

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION (MAS)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

1. AJP-3.3, JOINT AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE, is a

2. AJP-3.3 is effective on receipt and supersedes ATP-33(B) which should be

CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION

CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATIONS BY NATIONS

3 The use of the terms quote ‘senior subordinate commanders’

JOINT AIR & SPACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

CHANGE DATE EFFECTIVE BY WHOM

1 - May 2002 --- --- ---

CHAPTER 2 EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER

CHAPTER 3 COMMAND AND CONTROL OF AIR OPERATIONS

301 Overview of Air Command and Control 3-1

CHAPTER 4 JOINT AIR OPERATIONS

401 The Employment and Purpose of Air Power 4-1

CHAPTER 5 PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AIR OPERATIONS

501 Priorities and Phasing 5-1

CHAPTER 6 SPACE OPERATIONS

601 The Utility of Space 6-1

CHAPTER 7 NON-ARTICLE 5 CRISIS RESPONSE OPERATIONS

701 Overview of Crisis Response Operations 7-1

Glossary of Abbreviations Abbreviations-1

Reference Publications Reference-1

List of Effective Pages LEP-1

Fundamental Principles of Air and Space

d. Conduct an effective air operation as part of the overall joint campaign.

Figure 1-1. The Doctrinal Process.

4. Space Operations. National space capabilities, in the form of space products,

103. Nature of Air and Space Doctrine

5. Application of Air Doctrine. The application of air operations doctrine at the

6. Application of Space Doctrine. National space capabilities are evolving rapidly

Employment of Air Power

1. Fundamental considerations guide the application of military forces and in particular

3. Multinationality. Few nations individually possess the size, capabilities, diversity

5. Responsiveness. In order to respond to the ACC’s requirements in a timely,

6. Communications and Information Systems (CIS). Timely and efficient

202. Levels of Joint Operations

203. Principles of War

204. Application of Air Power

3. Operations Exploiting Flexibility. Air power’s reach and concentration of force

4. Operations Exploiting Initiative. The design of a campaign plan entails being

205. Factors Affecting Allied Force Integration

1. Liaison. Liaison is critical to the integration of forces assembled from various

2. Standardization. Standardization is an all embracing concept that underlies the

a. Compatibility. The suitability of products, processes or services for use

b. Interchangeability. The ability of one product, process or service to be used in

c. Commonality. The utilisation of the same doctrine, procedures or equipment.

4. Political Cohesion. It is usual in an alliance for operations to be conducted in

206. Rules of Engagement (ROE)

2. ROE inform commanders of the limits or constraints imposed, or of freedom

207. Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)

a. The Principle of Military Necessity. This principle permits a state engaged in

b. The Principle of Humanity. This principle forbids the infliction of suffering,

c. The Principle of Distinction. This principle separates combatants from non-

d. The Principle of Proportionality. This principle requires that the losses

208. Organisation of an Operational Theatre

a. JOA. A JOA is a temporary area defined by a NATO Strategic Commander

b. AOO. An AOO is that portion of an area of war necessary for military

209. Control Means, Coordination and Identification Measures