G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
After the church wedding, he
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416
dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-
1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla
before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through
machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by
Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel
Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and
Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were
introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a
supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the father
of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage
contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to
Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his
supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any
marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no
marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and
claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May
1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969 5 at
the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages
were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the
National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the
lack of marriage license after having been married to her for
25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified
that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita]
appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a
Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila
where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in
civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff
alleged, was an aide of defendant's father
accompanied them, and who, together with another
person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That
although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly
issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was
indicated in the marriage contract, the same was
fictitious for he never applied for any marriage
license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him
through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil
Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11,
1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr.,
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage
license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office."
On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed,
this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan
Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church in
Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed
another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same
marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated.
Preparations and expenses for the church wedding
and reception were jointly shared by his and
1
defendant's parents.
and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills
until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March
1970. As his parents continued to support him
financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some
time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their
marital relationship turned bad because it became
difficult for him to be married he being a medical
student at that time. They started living apart in
1976, but they underwent family counseling before
they eventually separated in 1978. It was during this
time when defendant's second son was born whose
paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a
divorce decree against defendant in the United States
in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation of
their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff,
himself manifested that when his service was engaged
by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the
circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with
the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the
supposed marriage license was obtained and with the
Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the
religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His
request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March
7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March
11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by
the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto,
issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"),
and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994
(Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was
ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy
Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy
of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant
(Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11,
1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely
religious ceremony, having been civilly married on
May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage
License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May
19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local
Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates dated
March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20,
1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil
Registrar, and testified that their office failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792
may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and
plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship after they
met and were introduced to each other in October
1968. A model, she was compelled by her family to
join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when
plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run
away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff,
she turned back on her family and decided to follow
plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila,
she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in
Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Sevilla,
told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when
they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla
convinced them that she will take care of everything,
and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As
plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked
her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge
of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4)
on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was
made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they
had lunch and later each went home separately. On
May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which
the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since
defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her
family did not participate in the wedding
preparations. Defendant further stated that there was
no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and
that it was after two months when they finally had
sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's
physician and one of their wedding sponsors that
plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age
12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem
compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff
has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her
knees of which he would take endless pictures of.
Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in
between the knees which she called "intrafemural
sex," while real sex between them was far and
between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their
marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual behavior
which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug
addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar,
plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he
had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines,
benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him
from sleep and then would take barbiturates or
downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard
to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has
become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since
they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about
four and a half years, and during all those times, her
mother-in-law would send some financial support on
and off, while defendant worked as an English
teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying,
did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as
plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this
led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned
that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the
United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he
was not aware of the civil wedding of his daughter
with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson
came to stay with him after they returned home from
Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since.
His grandsons practically grew up under his care and
guidance, and he has supported his daughter's
expenses for medicines and hospital confinements
(Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister,
testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's
family that attended to all the preparations and
arrangements for the church wedding of her sister
with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the
couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the
church wedding. She also stated that she and her
parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the
marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff
testified that because of irreconcilable differences
with defendant and in order for them to live their
own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that
when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in
the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was
with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in
fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to
represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his
adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent
certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the
marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage
2
license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"),
is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of
the marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following
justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the
validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a
license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was
shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E",
and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the
more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE")
that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued
by that office, hence, the marriage license no.
2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts
executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31,
1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification
enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence,
particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil
marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N.
Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the
Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their
contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites
by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish
on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the
requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract
of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the
registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be
cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the
proper civil and property registries in accordance with
Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy
hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor
General for its record and information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals
disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9,
1994), the Supreme Court explained that: "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus,
unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes
conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader
of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that
they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage
license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason
that "the employee handling is already retired."
With said testimony We cannot therefore just
presume that the marriage license specified in the
parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the
end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar
of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license
was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage
license was issued but rather, because it "failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792
 is registered." Simply put, if the pertinent book were
available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that
it would have contained an entry on marriage license
no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the
parties' marriage on the basis of a mere perception of
plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective
with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage
contract, a perception that ultimately was not
substantiated with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005
which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6
April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued
in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to
the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly
applied and relied on the presumption of regularity of
officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage
license, arising solely from the contents of the
marriage contracts in question which show on their
face that a marriage license was purportedly issued
by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila,
and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly
invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a
marriage arising from the admitted "fact of
marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether
or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as
appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued,
are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab
initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in
force at the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles
53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an
essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage
between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as
one involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground of
absence of a marriage license based on the certifications
issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this
Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the
Court held that such a certification is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent
3
any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case,
the certification issued by the local civil registrar
enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all date relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the
marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and
that they secured the required marriage license.
Although she was declared in default before the trial
court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue
and explained the absence of a marriage license in
her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this
Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue
and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that
will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed
validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage
between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the
certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read
in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v.
Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of
documents to certify that despite diligent search, a
particular document does not exist in his office or
that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not
to be found in a register. As custodians of public
documents, civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register
book where they are required to enter all applications
for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued
and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar
must categorically state that the document does not exist in
his office or the particular entry could not be found in the
register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be
sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written
statement signed by an officer having the custody of
an official record or by his deputy that after diligent
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is
found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications
by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with
Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing
requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
 No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever
issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage
License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we
cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you
our full force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and
provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number
2770792 were ever issued by this Office with regards
to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all
effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you
our full force locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this
office, no Marriage License Application was filed and
no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May
19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O.
SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and
license do not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index
and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of
the interested party for whatever legal intent it may
serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
4
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that
"hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full
force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied
from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due
to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to
state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was
issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the
representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot
locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of
the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of
the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not
appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was
deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be
secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the
logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been
exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were
required to bring to this Court among other things the
register of application of/or (sic) for marriage
licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January
19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you those
records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the
request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of
marriage of marriage applications that your office
maintains as required by the manual of the office of
the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked
by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
 Why don't you ask her direct question
whether marriage license 2880792 is the
number issued by their office while with
respect to license no. 2770792 the office of
the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very
definite about it it was never issued. Then
ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same
was ever issued by their office. Did you ask
this 2887092, but you could not find the
record? But for the moment you cannot
locate the books? Which is which now, was
this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect
that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook
where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered,
the presumption of regularity of performance of official
function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the
certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m), 20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a
species of evidence that may be accepted and acted
on where there is no other evidence to uphold the
contention for which it stands, or one which may be
overcome by other evidence. One such
disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official
act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty
is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the
case at bar where the presumption has been effectively
defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof
of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also
mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook
just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent
efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept
that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity
of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or
fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds. 23 The courts look upon
this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great
weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife
and lived together for several years producing two offsprings, 26
now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he
5
filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he
married another individual sometime in 1991. 27 We are not
ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his
marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow
him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening
the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based
on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State
can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break-up of families weakens our social and
moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of
the family members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x
x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of
society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by
our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30
This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the
prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage.31
By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not
trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have
said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are
situations like this one, where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20
December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking a review of the December 10, 2008
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action for
certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon.
Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-
G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC),
declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage
between petitioner and respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family
Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for
annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the
following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and
respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980
as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under
Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences
provided by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the
National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this decision.
SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25,
2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11,
2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due
course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required
motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section
20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of
Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its
August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and granting the
Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC
as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the
September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilo’s
appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the
motion to reconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3)
the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006
decision as final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be
declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential
marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty
of abandoning him, the family home and their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and
set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court
stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as
a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not
apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo
was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code
took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v.
Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to the effect that the "coverage [of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC] extends only to those marriages entered
into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her
Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion
for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of
the Honorable Court’s Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The
CA, however, in its February 11, 2009 Resolution, 4 denied the
6
motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day
reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is
non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The
motion for partial reconsideration was likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court raising the following
ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008
CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING
THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT
SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IS
APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN
ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY
ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE
FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS
TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE
WORD "MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC
ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE
NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO
MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY
OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR AN
APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT
REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A PRECONDITION FOR
APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL
IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND
IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A
LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER.
MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND
NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal
question to be resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable
to the case at bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable
to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family
Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its
decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case,
which did not even involve a marriage solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the
pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision on its
merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the
substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case
from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to
be declared null were solemnized, and the action for
declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of both
the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003.
In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while
the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is
not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was
solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.
He further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from
the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null and
void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing
the mere "failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss,"
but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as
required under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case.
Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section
1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the
Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no
room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which
took effect on August 3, 1988. 7 The rule sets a demarcation
line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s
interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to
the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is
clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room
for construction or interpretation. There is only room for
application.9 As the statute is clear, plain, and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the
plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of
intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non
est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should
be no departure."10
7
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the
tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and importance of
the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a
relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court
has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully
complied with and should not be discarded with the mere
expediency of claiming substantial merit.11 As a corollary, rules
prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking
certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to
prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge
judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory.12
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration
considering that the reglementary period for filing the said
motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced in
Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court has made this
clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon.
Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered
thereto.1avvphil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate
court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is
justified, precisely because petitioner’s earlier motion for
extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-
day reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has
already attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already
beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside
the RTC decision which denied due course to respondent’s
appeal and denying petitioner’s motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is
to bring up for review a final judgment of the lower court. The
courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive
a party of his right to appeal. 14 In the recent case of Almelor
v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While
the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right,
nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and
courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party
of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-
litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the
fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal
considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution
of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an
inviolable social institution. This constitutional policy is
echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its
permanence and inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.16
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is
vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The break up of families
weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their
preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010
ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of
the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother
solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal
issue to be determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner
whose action for that purpose has been dismissed by the lower
courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed
marriage, had no right to bring the action.
Antecedents
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted
on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato.1 The case was docketed as Special
Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of
Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license,
due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950,
thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his
being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died
without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real
properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby
making him a real party in interest; and that any person,
himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage
between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the
death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab
initio.2
Ruling of the RTC
8
On October 18, 2000, 3 the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the
Court hereby resolved to DISMISS the petition for the following
reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long
prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage
(contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato
on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B.
Calolot).
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on
November 14, 2000.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),
assigning the lone error that:
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed
out of time and that the petitioner is not a party to the
marriage.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003, 4 however, the CA
affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered
void from the beginning does not prescribe, the law
nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the
proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the
parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition was
filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who
is not a party to the marriage contracted by Cresenciano
Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-
appellant that he is considered a real party in interest under
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage will not
prosper if persons other than those specified in the law file the
case.
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the
proper party to file the subject petition. More so that the
surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even
impleaded as a party to said case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders
now on appeal are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684
AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN,
MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 69684
(SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 209 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a
real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of
husband and wife and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties,
and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes
the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a
marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time
the marriage is contracted.6 As a general rule, the nature of
the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a
subsequent amendment of the governing law. 7 To illustrate, a
marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void
under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the
Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family
Code does not affect the void nature of a marriage between a
stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of
the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void,
considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the
law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony. 8
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to
the issue posed herein of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-
11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took
effect on March 15, 2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to
distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. 9
Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages
covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3,
1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after
March 15, 2003.10
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted
from the limitation, to wit:
1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the
effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during
the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated
under the regime of the Family Code prior to March
15, 2003.
9
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and
Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable
law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity
of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate
the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the
petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when.
Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog,12 the children were allowed
to file after the death of their father a petition for the
declaration of the nullity of their father’s marriage to their
stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a
marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a
void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and
when each might be impugned, thuswise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial
decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree
to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is
expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be
ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of
legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal
purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the
husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated
as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable
marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties
so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be
impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that
effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action
or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage
imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then
the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so
long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code
connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only
for purpose of remarriage.13
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the
old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a
license to just any person to bring an action to declare the
absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v.
Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to
be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party in interest.15 Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a
"proper interest" can file the action. 16 Interest within the
meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved
or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest
to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party
in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of
cause of action.17
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late
Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the
petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a
material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be
adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a
brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under
the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate
of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article
1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled
to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or
their children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral
relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants,
ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes
collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the
deceased’s estate.18 Necessarily, therefore, the right of the
petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of
whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving
heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial
court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved
the issue presented in this case. We reverse their error, in
order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may
not be prejudiced.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead
Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s surviving wife, 19 stood
to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own
marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all
marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required
a marriage license for their validity; 20 hence, her participation
in this action is made all the more necessary in order to shed
light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a
marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a
marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be
joined herein:
xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine
qua non for the exercise of judicial power.1avvphi1 It is
precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court
[that] the action should be dismissed." The absence of an
10
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.21
We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were
parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 entitled Heirs of
Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila
Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to
determine who between the parties were the legal owners of
the property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No.
91025 was decided on November 26, 2009, and the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a
defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably
presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs,
Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of
the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable
party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will
definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.
The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not
immediately fatal to the present action, however, considering
that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the
dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his
initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the same
rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may
be made "on motion of any party or on (the trial court’s) own
initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are
just."
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003
rendered by the Court of Appeals.
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification
of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records
are returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in
Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with instructions
to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading
in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila
Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine whether
the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants,
or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his death
as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and
surviving heir of the late Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to
succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to
proceed accordingly.
No costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 April 11, 2002
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Arañes charges respondent judge
with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-Complaint
dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. Petitioner
alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge
solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B.
Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua,
Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of
this marriage until her husband passed away. However, since
the marriage was a nullity, petitioner's right to inherit the
"vast properties" left by Orobia was not recognized. She was
likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired
Commodore of the Philippine Navy.1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent
judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations
which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment
and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the
Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N.
Elepaño for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of
the Court Administrator required respondent judge to
comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred
that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15 February
2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February
2000. Having been assured that all the documents to the
marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage
in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that
Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors
of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers
from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if
respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to
which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the
ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted to
him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not
possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to solemnize
the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date.
However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of
visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he
proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it
might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just
suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated
the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the
parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage
void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they
would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same
day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it
up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to
his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the
contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the
absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own
fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of
Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court
Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially
refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly
issued marriage license and that it was because of her
11
prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the
same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out
of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by
respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is
now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner
and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License on 5
January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the
marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However,
neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General
issued a Certification that it has no record of such marriage
that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur
issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot
issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since
it has no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent
judge so the latter could communicate with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance
of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the Local
Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9
May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage
license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death
Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and
Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the
respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a
duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his
territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended
to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129,
the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of
inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme
Court.1âwphi1.nêt
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs.
Domagtoy,1 respondent judge held office and had jurisdiction
in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding at his
residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which
did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the municipalities
of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
"A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his
local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to
do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed
by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice
of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the
venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed
to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while
it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative
liability."2 (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months
on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage outside
his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We
further held that:
"The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if
not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they
are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary laymen.
They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative
that they be conversant with basic legal principles
like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment,
for which they are not penalized, the respondent
judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of
law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the
status of married persons."3
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent
judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in
Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects
him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage
out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid
liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People vs.
Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance
of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an
iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by
law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent
judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the
marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted
in gross ignorance of the law.1âwphi1.nêt
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit
of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently
held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint
does not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating
respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt
and fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of
court personnel, would be undermined.5 Disciplinary actions
of this nature do not involve purely private or personal
matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of
every complainant who may, for one reason or another,
condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the
unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the
Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise,
that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust
character of a public office and impair the integrity and
dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.6
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur,
is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense in the future will be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169766 March 30, 2011
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A.
TAMANO and ADIB AHMAD A. TAMANO, Respondents.
12
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A new law ought to affect the future, not what is past. Hence,
in the case of subsequent marriage laws, no vested rights shall
be impaired that pertain to the protection of the legitimate
union of a married couple.
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision 1
dated August 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution 2 dated September
13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner
Estrellita Juliano-Llave’s (Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal
A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
Factual Antecedents
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married
Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and tradition
on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City 3 and, subsequently, under a
civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao
del Sur on June 2, 1993. 4 In their marriage contracts, Sen.
Tamano’s civil status was indicated as ‘divorced.’
Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the
whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his death, his
widow.
On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda
A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano
(Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.
Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda,5 filed a complaint
with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being
bigamous. The complaint6 alleged, inter alia, that Sen.
Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and
that this marriage remained subsisting when he married
Estrellita in 1993. The complaint likewise averred that:
11. The marriage of the deceased and Complainant
Zorayda, having been celebrated under the New Civil
Code, is therefore governed by this law. Based on
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, the subsequent
marriage entered into by deceased Mamintal with
Defendant Llave is void ab initio because he
contracted the same while his prior marriage to
Complainant Zorayda was still subsisting, and his
status being declared as "divorced" has no factual or
legal basis, because the deceased never divorced
Complainant Zorayda in his lifetime, and he could not
have validly done so because divorce is not allowed
under the New Civil Code;
11.1 Moreover, the deceased did not and could not
have divorced Complainant Zorayda by invoking the
provision of P.D. 1083, otherwise known as the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws, for the simple reason that
the marriage of the deceased with Complainant
Zorayda was never deemed, legally and factually, to
have been one contracted under Muslim law as
provided under Art. 186 (2) of P.D. 1083, since they
(deceased and Complainant Zorayda) did not register
their mutual desire to be thus covered by this law;7
Summons was then served on Estrellita on December 19, 1994.
She then asked from the court for an extension of 30 days to
file her answer to be counted from January 4, 1995, 8 and
again, another 15 days9 or until February 18, 1995, both of
which the court granted.10
Instead of submitting her answer, however, Estrellita filed a
Motion to Dismiss11 on February 20, 1995 where she declared
that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were
married under the Muslim rites, as had been averred in the
latter’s disbarment complaint against Sen. Tamano. 12 Estrellita
argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the case because under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines (Muslim
Code), questions and issues involving Muslim marriages and
divorce fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of shari’a courts.
The trial court denied Estrellita’s motion and asserted its
jurisdiction over the case for declaration of nullity. 13 Thus,
Estrellita filed in November 1995 a certiorari petition with this
Court questioning the denial of her Motion to Dismiss. On
December 15, 1995, we referred the petition to the CA 14 which
was docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 39656, the RTC
continued to try the case since there can be no default in
cases of declaration of nullity of marriage even if the
respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita was allowed to
participate in the trial while her opposing parties presented
their evidence. When it was Estrellita’s turn to adduce
evidence, the hearings set for such purpose15 were postponed
mostly at her instance until the trial court, on March 22, 1996,
suspended the proceedings16 in view of the CA’s temporary
restraining order issued on February 29, 1996, enjoining it
from hearing the case.17
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the petition adverse to
Estrellita in its Decision dated September 30, 1996. 18 Estrellita
then elevated the appellate court’s judgment to this Court by
way of a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
126603.19
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Decision, the RTC
ordered Estrellita to present her evidence on June 26, 1997. 20
As Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the hearing was reset
to July 9, 1997.21 The day before this scheduled hearing,
Estrellita again asked for a postponement.22
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of their case,
Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the case for decision, 23
reasoning that Estrellita had long been delaying the case.
Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has not yet filed her
answer as she still awaits the outcome of G.R. No. 126603.24
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Quezon City,25 stating as one of the reasons that as shari’a
courts are not vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction in
cases of marriages celebrated under both the Civil Code and
PD 1083, the RTC, as a court of general jurisdiction, is not
precluded from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In our
Resolution dated August 24, 1998,26 we denied Estrellita’s
motion for reconsideration27 with finality.
A few days before this resolution, or on August 18, 1998, the
RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring
Estrellita’s marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.28
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen. Tamano and
Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamano’s
subsequent marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being
bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code of the
13
Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.29 The court said:
A comparison between Exhibits A and B (supra) immediately
shows that the second marriage of the late Senator with
[Estrellita] was entered into during the subsistence of his first
marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the subsequent marriage
void from the very beginning. The fact that the late Senator
declared his civil status as "divorced" will not in any way affect
the void character of the second marriage because, in this
jurisdiction, divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not an
acceptable method of terminating the effects of a previous
marriage, especially, where the subsequent marriage was
solemnized under the Civil Code or Family Code.30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her appeal,31 Estrellita argued that she was denied her right
to be heard as
the RTC rendered its judgment even without waiting for the
finality of the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
126603. She claimed that the RTC should have required her to
file her answer after the denial of her motion to dismiss. She
maintained that Sen. Tamano is capacitated to marry her as
his marriage and subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed
by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted Zorayda’s lack of
legal standing to question the validity of her marriage to the
deceased.
In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated August 17,
2004,32 the CA held that Estrellita can no longer be allowed to
file her answer as she was given ample opportunity to be
heard but simply ignored it by asking for numerous
postponements. She never filed her answer despite the lapse
of around 60 days, a period longer than what was prescribed
by the rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely on her
pending petition for certiorari with the higher courts since, as
an independent and original action, it does not interrupt the
proceedings in the trial court.
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA adjudged that
Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano is void ab initio for being
bigamous, reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and Sen.
Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, which does not provide
for an absolute divorce. It noted that their first nuptial
celebration was under civil rites, while the subsequent Muslim
celebration was only ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to
the CA, had the legal standing to file the action as she is Sen.
Tamano’s wife and, hence, the injured party in the senator’s
subsequent bigamous marriage with Estrellita.
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution, 33 the CA denied
Estrellita’s Motion for Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration where it debunked the additional errors
she raised. The CA noted that the allegation of lack of the
public prosecutor’s report on the existence of collusion in
violation of both Rule 9, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court 34
and Article 48 of the Family Code 35 will not invalidate the trial
court’s judgment as the proceedings between the parties had
been adversarial, negating the existence of collusion.
Assuming that the issues have not been joined before the RTC,
the same is attributable to Estrellita’s refusal to file an
answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Estrellita’s allegation that
the trial court erroneously rendered its judgment way prior to
our remand to the RTC of the records of the case ratiocinating
that G.R. No. 126603 pertains to the issue on the denial of the
Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the validity of
Estrellita’s marriage to Sen. Tamano.
The Parties’ Respective Arguments
Reiterating her arguments before the court a quo, Estrellita
now argues that the CA erred in upholding the RTC judgment
as the latter was prematurely issued, depriving her of the
opportunity to file an answer and to present her evidence to
dispute the allegations against the validity of her marriage.
She claims that Judge Macias v. Macias 36 laid down the rule
that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of an answer
suspends the period to file an answer and, consequently, the
trial court is obliged to suspend proceedings while her motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction has not yet
been resolved with finality. She maintains that she merely
participated in the RTC hearings because of the trial court’s
assurance that the proceedings will be without prejudice to
whatever action the High Court will take on her petition
questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction and yet, the RTC violated
this commitment as it rendered an adverse judgment on
August 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R. No. 126603
were remanded to the CA on November 11, 1998.37 She also
questions the lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent a
finding of whether there was collusion, this being a
prerequisite before further proceeding could be held when a
party has failed to file an answer in a suit for declaration of
nullity of marriage.
Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that her marriage with
the late senator is valid as the latter was already divorced
under the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She asserts
that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda
and the deceased without need of registering their consent to
be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage
was solemnized under Muslim law. She pointed out that Sen.
Tamano married all his wives under Muslim rites, as attested
to by the affidavits of the siblings of the deceased.38
Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and Adib have no legal
standing to file suit because only the husband or the wife can
file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Supreme Court Resolution A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.39
Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General (Sol Gen)
defends the CA’s reasoning and stresses that Estrellita was
never deprived of her right to be heard; and, that filing an
original action for certiorari does not stay the proceedings of
the main action before the RTC.
As regards the alleged lack of report of the public prosecutor if
there is collusion, the Sol Gen says that this is no longer
essential considering the vigorous opposition of Estrellita in
the suit that obviously shows the lack of collusion. The Sol Gen
also supports private respondents’ legal standing to challenge
the validity of Estrellita’s purported marriage with Sen.
Tamano, reasoning that any proper interested party may
attack directly or collaterally a void marriage, and Zorayda
and Adib have such right to file the action as they are the ones
prejudiced by the marital union.
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not file any
comment.
Issues
The issues that must be resolved are the following:
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s
judgment, even though the latter was rendered
prematurely because: a) the judgment was rendered
without waiting for the Supreme Court’s final
resolution of her certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No.
14
126603; b) she has not yet filed her answer and thus
was denied due process; and c) the public prosecutor
did not even conduct an investigation whether there
was collusion;
2. Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the
late Sen. Tamano was bigamous; and
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing
to have Estrellita’s marriage declared void ab initio.
Our Ruling
Estrellita’s refusal to file an answer eventually led to the loss
of her right to answer; and her pending petition for
certiorari/review on certiorari questioning the denial of the
motion to dismiss before the higher courts does not at all
suspend the trial proceedings of the principal suit before the
RTC of Quezon City.
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita was deprived of
her right to due process. She was never declared in default,
and she even actively participated in the trial to defend her
interest.
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias 40 to justify the
suspension of the period to file an answer and of the
proceedings in the trial court until her petition for certiorari
questioning the validity of the denial of her Motion to Dismiss
has been decided by this Court. In said case, we affirmed the
following reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is Estrellita’s
basis for her argument, to wit:
However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001, a ‘Motion to
Dismiss,’ instead of filing an Answer to the complaint. The
filing of said motion suspended the period for her to file her
Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is resolved by the
Respondent Court with finality, it behooved the Respondent
Court to suspend the hearings of the case on the merits. The
Respondent Court, on April 19, 2001, issued its Order denying
the ‘Motion to Dismiss’ of the Petitioner. Under Section 6, Rule
16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [now Section 4], the
Petitioner had the balance of the period provided for in Rule
11 of the said Rules but in no case less than five (5) days
computed from service on her of the aforesaid Order of the
Respondent Court within which to file her Answer to the
complaint: x x x41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All we pronounced
therein is that the trial court is mandated to suspend trial until
it finally resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed before it.
Nothing in the above excerpt states that the trial court should
suspend its proceedings should the issue of the propriety or
impropriety of the motion to dismiss be raised before the
appellate courts. In Macias, the trial court failed to observe
due process in the course of the proceeding of the case
because after it denied the wife’s motion to dismiss, it
immediately proceeded to allow the husband to present
evidence ex parte and resolved the case with undue haste
even when, under the rules of procedure, the wife still had
time to file an answer. In the instant case, Estrellita had no
time left for filing an answer, as she filed the motion to
dismiss beyond the extended period earlier granted by the
trial court after she filed motions for extension of time to file
an answer.
Estrellita argues that the trial court prematurely issued its
judgment, as it should have waited first for the resolution of
her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before
this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly
ruled that the pendency of a petition for certiorari does not
suspend the proceedings before the trial court. "An application
for certiorari is an independent action which is not part or a
continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the
judgment complained of."42 Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
explicit in stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt the
course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the public respondent from further proceeding in the
case."43 In fact, the trial court respected the CA’s temporary
restraining order and only after the CA rendered judgment did
the RTC again require Estrellita to present her evidence.
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated to us by way of
Rule 45, we never issued any order precluding the trial court
from proceeding with the principal action. With her numerous
requests for postponements, Estrellita remained obstinate in
refusing to file an answer or to present her evidence when it
was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial court should wait
first for our decision in G.R. No. 126603. Her failure to file an
answer and her refusal to present her evidence were
attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to
benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the
other party. Sans her answer, the trial court correctly
proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it
deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side
of the story. Neither should the lower court wait for the
decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become final and executory,
nor should it wait for its records to be remanded back to it
because G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety of the
Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of validity of marriage.
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
to the non-existence of collusion.
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 9, Section
3(e) of the Rules of Court, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)44 also requries the participation of the
public prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. It
specifically mandates the prosecutor to submit his
investigation report to determine whether there is collusion
between the parties:
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.–(1) Within
one month after receipt of the court order mentioned in
paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall
submit a report to the court stating whether the parties are in
collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their
respective counsels, if any.
(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists,
he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The
parties shall file their respective comments on the
finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a
copy of the report. The court shall set the report for
hearing and if convinced that the parties are in
collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.
(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion
exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It
shall be the duty of the public prosecutor to appear
for the State at the pre-trial.
Records show that the trial court immediately directed the
public prosecutor to submit the required report, 45 which we
find to have been sufficiently complied with by Assistant City
Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his Manifestation dated
March 30, 1995,46 wherein he attested that there could be no
15
collusion between the parties and no fabrication of evidence
because Estrellita is not the spouse of any of the private
respondents.
Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident in the case at
bar. Even assuming that there is a lack of report of collusion or
a lack of participation by the public prosecutor, just as we
held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 47 the lack of participation
of a fiscal does not invalidate the proceedings in the trial
court:
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of
marriage and legal separation proceedings is to determine
whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care
that the evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's
vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates
the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties.
There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence was
suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these
circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of
a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the
contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the
proceedings in the trial court.48
The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late
Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD
1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void
ab initio.
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was
celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. 49
The only law in force governing marriage relationships
between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of
1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can
exist at any given time. 50 Under the marriage provisions of the
Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 39451 which was not availed of
during its effectivity.
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage
to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under PD
1083,52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However,
PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof
provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein
both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with
Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we
already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083
does not provide for a situation where the parties were
married both in civil and Muslim rites."53
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4,
1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code
which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen.
Tamano and Zorayda. The former explicitly provided for the
prospective application of its provisions unless otherwise
provided:
Art. 186 (1). Effect of code on past acts. —Acts executed prior
to the effectivity of this Code shall be governed by the laws in
force at the time of their execution, and nothing herein
except as otherwise specifically provided, shall affect their
validity or legality or operate to extinguish any right acquired
or liability incurred thereby.
It has been held that:
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the principle that
all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary appears or
is clearly, plainly and unequivocably expressed or necessarily
implied; accordingly, every case of doubt will be resolved
against the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186
aforecited enunciates the general rule of the Muslim Code to
have its provisions applied prospectively, and implicitly
upholds the force and effect of a pre-existing body of law,
specifically, the Civil Code – in respect of civil acts that took
place before the Muslim Code’s enactment.54
An instance of retroactive application of the Muslim Code is
Article 186(2) which states:
A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior to the
effectivity of this Code in accordance with non-Muslim law
shall be considered as one contracted under Muslim law
provided the spouses register their mutual desire to this
effect.
Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for
the marriage to be considered as one contracted under the
Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent between
Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are
Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and
Muslim laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil
Code governs their personal status since this was in effect at
the time of the celebration of their marriage. In view of Sen.
Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita
married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged
by the CA as void ab initio.
Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal
personalities to file the declaration of nullity of marriage.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the husband or the
wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in
application and does not shut out the prior spouse from filing
suit if the ground is a bigamous subsequent marriage.
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of the Philippines, 55
Estrellita relies on A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on
March 15, 2003 claiming that under Section 2(a) 56 thereof, only
the husband or the wife, to the exclusion of others, may file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only she
and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the validity of their own
marriage.
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void
marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. However, this interpretation does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy.
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC only the spouses
may file the petition to the exclusion of compulsory or
intestate heirs, we said:
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages
and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in
the following manner, viz:
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for
annulment of voidable marriages and declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be filed by the
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
[Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for
annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State.
The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have
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only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and hence can only question the validity of the marriage of the
spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the
regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is
to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.57
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the "aggrieved or injured
spouse." If Estrellita’s interpretation is employed, the prior
spouse is unjustly precluded from filing an action. Surely, this
is not what the Rule contemplated.
The subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if
he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that
the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss
had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage
benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected
that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and
thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be
given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous
marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of
all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The
subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the
infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage
which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Indeed, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son
from impugning the subsequent marriage.1âwphi1 But in the
case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib have legal personalities to
file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution
governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is
prospective in application and does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003.58
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of
Estrellita’s marriage in November 1994. While the Family Code
is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which
no marriage has taken place and cannot be the source of
rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly
or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 59 Since
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the
children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is
likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit
he and his mother had filed since both of them stand to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.60
Since our Philippine laws protect the marital union of a
couple, they should be interpreted in a way that would
preserve their respective rights which include striking down
bigamous marriages. We thus find the CA Decision correctly
rendered.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 17,
2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762,
as well as its subsequent Resolution issued on September 13,
2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
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